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#### Business Confidence is high now – best surveys.

ICAEW 8-20 8-20-2021 "Business confidence remains at record high as economy gets sales boost" <https://www.icaew.com/about-icaew/news/press-release-archive/2021-news-releases/business-confidence-remains-at-record-high-as-economy-gets-sales-boost> (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales)//Elmer

Friday 20 August 2021: **Business confidence** has **hit a record high** for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today has found. Business confidence at record **high for second consecutive quarter**, ICAEW survey finds Strong sales growth projections key to confidence boost Companies face new challenges as economy reopens Business confidence has hit a record high for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today (FRIDAY 20 AUGUST 2021) has found. Sentiment tracked by ICAEW’s Business Confidence Monitor™ (BCM) found **optimism at 47 on the quarterly index**, its **highest** level **since** the **survey was launched** in 2004 and surpassing the previous record set last quarter. [1] The optimism was **shared by businesses of all sizes across all sectors, nations and regions** in the UK. The record reading was a likely reflection of the expectation of strong sales growth in the year ahead, especially in the domestic market where a record rise of 7.4% is predicted over the coming 12 months. Companies also expect a sharp boost in export sales, which will rebound to pre-pandemic rates of increase. [2] However, the likelihood of confidence remaining positive is highly dependent on the COVID-19 situation not deteriorating further, ICAEW said. Decisions on interest rates, the winding down of support schemes, such as furlough, could also have an impact on future business sentiment. Office for National Statistics figures published last week showed that Britain’s economy grew 4.8% between April and June, below the 5% that the Bank of England had forecast. Michael Izza, ICAEW Chief Executive, said: “Business confidence has now hit record levels for two quarters in a row - companies are clearly benefitting from rising customer demand as the economy reopens and life begins to return to normal. The high level of optimism is unsurprising but it remains vulnerable to a possible resurgence of COVID-19 as we head into the autumn. “While confidence is high across all sectors, with companies reporting record expectations for domestic sales growth, they also told us they **face challenges from** **skills shortages**, wage increases and rising costs. “This is a crucial stage for the economy. Despite having to cope with the winding down of government financial support and possible interest rate rises, businesses are definitely bouncing back, but **finances are fragile** and any **additional costs could threaten** the recovery.”

#### Specifically, EU business confidence is high now and increasing.

**CEIC 21**, [CEIC 2021 updated monthly "EU Business Confidence Growth, 1986 – 2021," CEIC, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/european-union/business-confidence-growth>] Adam

European Union Business Confidence Growth

1986 - 2021 | MONTHLY | % POINT | CEIC DATA

Key information about EU`s Business Confidence Growth

European Union Business Confidence grew 23.5 % in Sep 2021, compared with an increase of 25.0 % YoY in the previous month.

EU Business Confidence: YoY Change is updated monthly, available from Jan 1986 to Sep 2021, with an averaged rate of 0.3 %.

The data reached an all-high of 41.9 % in Apr 2021 and a record low of -38.4 % in Mar 2009.  
CEIC calculates monthly Business Confidence Change from monthly Industrial Confidence Indicator. The European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs provides Industrial Confidence Indicator with range from -100 to 100 with neutral point 0. Contribution of member-states data to EU-wide aggregate is weighted according to the country's gross value added at constant prices by the Industry sector excluding Construction. Business Confidence covers Manufacturing sector only. European Union stands for EU27 excluding UK.

View European Union's Business Confidence Growth from Jan 1986 to Sep 2021 in the chart:

#### Corporate optimism, specifically investment, drives self-sustaining recovery.

Van der Welle 7-7 Peter Van der Welle 7-7-2021 “How capex holds the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery” <https://www.robeco.com/latam/en/insights/2021/07/how-capex-holds-the-key-to-a-self-sustaining-economic-recovery.html> (Strategist within the Global Macro team, M.A. in Economics from Tilburg University)//Elmer

Title: How capex holds **the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery**. **Capital expenditure** to fix supply shortages and meet burgeoning demand is seen figuring strongly in the post-Covid recovery. [Author and summary omitted]. **Companies** are **expected to invest heavily** in new equipment and capacity as they seek **to meet** the pent-up **demand released from** economic **reopening**. “The world is emerging from the pandemic, and much of the focus has been on the release of huge pent-up demand for goods and services that have been inaccessible for much of the past year,” says Peter Van der Welle, strategist with Robeco’s multi-asset team. “But there is a bigger issue regarding the ability of companies to supply these goods and services, due to the supply side constraints that have emerged through economic reopening. We believe this is powering a resurgence in capital expenditure by companies, and those which are investing in new equipment to meet greater demand will be the more sought after stocks.” Capex intentions Van der Welle says this trend can already be seen in the US Federal Reserve’s Capex Intentions Index, which shows that steep year-on-year increases in capital expenditures are planned. “So, that's **promising for** a near-term **rebound** in the capex cycle,” he says. “The market has already picked up on that theme because you can see a clear outperformance of capex-intensive stocks compared to the broader market year to date.” Fiscal dominance Van der Welle says five elements support the multi-asset team’s view that capex will rise from here onwards. “The first is the overarching macroeconomic picture in that we are increasingly moving towards an environment of fiscal dominance and away from one that has been monetary-led via quantitative easing,” he says. “Central banks have pursued very easy monetary policies, but they have hit the nominal lower bounds with regard to policy rates.” “This is a hard constraint because real rates are difficult for central banks to push even lower than they are nowadays, given the strong consensus among both central bankers and market participants that inflation is transitory.” Big spending plans For stimulus, fiscal policy is better suited to address the negative supply shock that Covid-19 has posed. Fiscal dominance can be seen in the huge infrastructure spending planned in the US, with the USD 1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan already in motion, and the USD 2 trillion American Jobs Plan going through Congress. In Europe, the disbursement of the EUR 750 billion EU Recovery Fund is due to start later in July. “An era of f**iscal dominance** is able to **say goodbye to** the secular **stagnation** thesis, which holds that the economy is suffering from under-investment,” says Van der Welle. “Under-investment due to insufficient demand, which was the biggest problem after the global financial crisis, has become less likely.” “We saw very subdued consumption growth both in the US and elsewhere between 2009 and 2019. That story is reversing in the US. Households’ income has been supported by fiscal policy during the Covid-19 recession, while burgeoning consumer demand in the reopening phase could prove to be more sticky as employment prospects continue to improve in the medium term.” Tobin’s Q looks good A third reason to expect higher capex is driven by ‘Tobin’s Q’ – the market value of a company divided by its assets' replacement cost. If this ratio is above one, then corporates have an incentive to invest directly in the underlying assets rather than buying another company at market value to acquire the same assets. The Tobin’s Q ratio is currently at 1.7 for the US. “So it's very expensive to do M&A, and it is wiser for corporates to invest in the underlying capital goods themselves,” Van der Welle says. “We should therefore expect a gradual move away from M&A activity towards companies making direct investments in capital goods.” Supply-side constraints The fourth element is the severe supply-side constraints seen in the global economy, as capacity shut down during the pandemic. “This is reflected in the ISM Prices Paid Index, which reached an all-time high in June in reflection of rampant shortages of raw materials and labor,” says Van der Welle. “Clearly the issue today following the pandemic is not demand related, but supply related. This will also trigger more awareness to push the productivity frontier and incentivize capital expenditure.” Less reliance on labor The fifth element is the partial substitution from labor to capital in the US against the backdrop of lingering labor shortages. “A decline in the labor force participation rate shows that people are not quickly returning to the labor force, as they have been disincentivized by the subsidies and pay checks they have gained from the stimulus plans, and/or structural changes in their work/life balance due to the pandemic,” says Van der Welle. “When the cost of labor becomes more expensive, substituting labor with capital becomes more attractive for employers. Typically, the inflection point for capex intentions becoming positive is when unit labor costs rise by more than 2% year on year, which is the case today.” Capex will lengthen the earnings cycle Regarding earnings, **there is a** significant **relationship** **between** capex intentions and productivity, though the lag from intending to invest to actually getting a realized productivity gain is quite long – up to several years. **Higher capex that eventually brings higher productivity** **growth will sustain the earnings cycle**, Van der Welle says. Higher productivity gives corporates more pricing power because they suppress unit labor costs, and that means profit margins can stay elevated for longer.

#### Business confidence is the best indicator for growth.

Khan 20, Hashmat, and Santosh Upadhayaya. "Does business confidence matter for investment?." Empirical Economics 59.4 (2020): 1633-1665. (Economics Professor at Carleton University)//Elmer

Abstract Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output. Whether it has information about future investment is, however, unclear. We determine how informative business confidence is for investment growth independently of other variables using US business confidence survey data for 1955Q1–2016Q4. Our main findings are: (i) **business confidence has predictive ability for investment growth**; (ii) remarkably, business confidence has **superior** forecasting power, relative **to conventional predictors**, for investment downturns over 1–3-quarter forecast horizons and for the sign of investment growth over a 2-quarter forecast horizon; and (iii) exogenous shifts in business confidence reflect short-lived non-fundamental factors, consistent with the ‘animal spirits’ view of investment. Our findings have implications for improving investment forecasts, developing new business cycle models, and studying the role of social and psychological factors determining investment growth. Introduction Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output, especially during economic downturns, and receives attention from the media, policymakers and forecasters. Somewhat surprisingly, the direct link between business confidence and investment has not yet been investigated. Our paper fills this gap. We provide a quantitative assessment of the information in business confidence for future investment growth, after **controlling for** the conventional determinants such as **user cost, output, cash flow and stock price**. Understanding the predictive power of business confidence is valuable along three dimensions. First, it can help forecasters and policymakers improve their investment forecasts. Second, it can provide a rationale for explicitly including **business confidence**—either **as causal or** as **anticipatory**—**in** theoretical models of **business cycles**. Third, it can help motivate studies on the how investment managers’ social and psychological circumstances influence investment decisions over and beyond rational cost-benefit analyses.Footnote1 We consider the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s business confidence index for the USA as a measure of business confidence and ask the following three questions.Footnote2 Does business confidence have independent information about future business investment growth? Does it have forecasting power for investment downturns? Does it help in making directional forecasts—the positive or negative movements in the trajectory of investment growth? Previous literature that used business confidence has primarily studied its predictive properties for variables other than investment. Heye (1993) examines the relationship between business confidence and labour market conditions in the USA and other industrialized countries. Dasgupta and Lahiri (1993) show that business sentiments have explanatory power of forecasting business cycle turning points. Taylor and McNabb (2007) find that business confidence is procyclical and plays an important role in forecasting output downturns. Although we focus on business confidence, our paper is related to a large body of previous research that has studied consumer confidence or sentiment and its ability to forecast macroeconomic variables. Leeper (1992) finds that consumer sentiment does not help predict industrial production and unemployment, especially when financial variables are taken into account. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) reject the hypothesis that consumer sentiment does not predict output. Carroll et al. (1994), Fuhrer (1993), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Ludvigson (2004) and Cotsomitis and Kwan (2006) find that the consumer attitudes have some additional information about predicting household spending behaviour. Lahiri et al. (2016) employ a large real-time dataset and find that the consumer confidence survey has important role in improving the accuracy of consumption forecasts. Christiansen et al. (2014) find that consumer and business sentiments contain independent information for forecasting business cycles. Barsky and Sims (2012) find that consumer confidence reflects news about future fundamentals and a confidence shock has a persistent effect on the economy. More recently, Angeletos et al. (2018) quantify the role of confidence for business cycle from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. They construct a measure of confidence within a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework by taking the linear combination of the VAR residuals that maximizes the sum of the volatilities of hours and investment at frequencies of 6–32 quarters. Their measure likely captures a mixture of consumer and business confidence and is, therefore, distinct from the survey-based measure that we use in our analysis. We find that business confidence leads US business investment growth by one quarter. It leads structures investment, which is one of the major components of business investment, by two quarters. Our **empirical analysis shows** that **investors’ confidence has** statistically **significant predictive power for** US business investment **growth** and its components (equipment and non-residential structures) after **controlling for other determinants of investment**. To better gauge the role of business confidence for investment growth, we also perform Out-Of-Sample (OOS) test for 1990Q1–2016Q4. Our findings suggest that the OOS test results are similar to the in-sample test results.Footnote3 While, as we found, business confidence has predictive power for total investment, it may also contain additional information on the trajectory of investment as captured by downturns and directional changes. This information would be of interest to policymakers in assessing the economy’s near-term outlook, over and above the general ability of business confidence to forecast investment. Indeed, we find that contemporaneous correlation between business confidence and investment growth rises during NBER recession dates. This property of the data suggests that it is worthwhile to explore the forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns and directional changes. Towards this end, we define investment downturns as business investment growth below the sample average for more than two consecutive quarters.Footnote4 Using a static probit forecasting model, we assess the OOS forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns for 1990Q1–2016Q4. A key finding of this approach in the literature is that term spread and stock price contain information for forecasting US recessions (Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Nyberg 2010; Kauppi and Saikkonen 2008). We follow a similar approach and find that business confidence has statistically significant forecasting power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons in the US economy. It has stronger forecasting ability than the traditional predictors such as term spread, credit spread and stock price at 1–3-quarter forecast horizons. We also find strong evidence that the business confidence has good incremental predictive power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons, controlling for other predictors of downturns.

#### Economic decline results in multilateral breakdown that causes state collapse, conflict, climate change, and Arctic and Space War.

McLennan 21 – Strategic Partners Marsh McLennan SK Group Zurich Insurance Group, Academic Advisers National University of Singapore Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, “The Global Risks Report 2021 16th Edition” “http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_The\_Global\_Risks\_Report\_2021.pdf //Re-cut by Elmer

Forced to choose sides, governments may face **economic** or diplomatic **consequences**, as proxy disputes play out in control over economic or geographic resources. The deepening of geopolitical fault lines and the lack of viable middle power alternatives make it harder for countries to cultivate connective tissue with a diverse set of partner countries based on mutual values and maximizing efficiencies. Instead, networks will become thick in some directions and non-existent in others. The COVID-19 crisis has amplified this dynamic, as digital interactions represent a “huge loss in efficiency for diplomacy” compared with face-to-face discussions.23 With some **alliances weakening**, diplomatic relationships will become more unstable at points where superpower tectonic plates meet or withdraw. At the same time, without superpower referees or middle power enforcement, global **norms** may **no longer govern** state **behaviour**. Some governments will thus see the solidification of rival blocs as an opportunity to engage in regional posturing, which will have destabilizing effects.24 Across societies, domestic discord and **economic crises will** **increase** the risk of **autocracy**, **with corresponding** **censorship, surveillance**, restriction of movement and abrogation of rights.25 Economic crises will also amplify the **challenges for middle power**s as they navigate geopolitical competition. **ASEAN countries, for example, had offered a potential new manufacturing base as the United States and China decouple, but the pandemic has left these countries strapped for cash to invest in the necessary infrastructure and productive capacity.26** Economic fallout is pushing many countries to debt distress (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2021). While G20 countries are supporting debt restructure for poorer nations,27 larger economies too may be at **risk of default** in the longer term;28 this would **leave them further stranded**—**and unable to exercise leadership—on the global stage**. Multilateral meltdown **Middle power weaknesses** will be **reinforced** in weakened institutions, which may translate to **more uncertainty and lagging progress on shared global challenges such as climate change**, **health, poverty reduction and technology governance**. In the absence of strong regulating institutions, **the Arctic and space represent new realms for** potential **conflict** as the superpowers and middle powers alike compete to extract resources and secure strategic advantage.29 If the global superpowers continue to accumulate economic, military and technological power in a zero-sum playing field, some middle powers could increasingly fall behind. Without cooperation nor access to important innovations, middle powers will struggle to define solutions to the world’s problems. In the long term, GRPS **respondents forecasted “w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction” **and “state collapse**” as the two top critical threats: in the absence of strong institutions or clear rules, clashes— such as those in **Nagorno-Karabakh or the Galwan Valley**—**may more frequently flare into** full-fledged **interstate conflicts**,30 which is particularly worrisome where unresolved tensions among nuclear powers are concerned. These conflicts may lead to state collapse, with weakened middle powers less willing or less able to step in to find a peaceful solution.

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#### [A just European union ought to] request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to [establish an unconditional right to strike]. [a just European union] ought to abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### Compliance ensures faith in global democratic institutions – solves nuclear war.

Hawksley ’16 [Humphrey; formerly the BBC’s Beijing Bureau Chief and author of The Third World War: A Novel of Global Conflict and Asian Waters: American, China, and the Global Paradox; 11-19-2016; "Trump makes International Law Crucial for Peace"; Humphrey Hawksley; https://www.humphreyhawksley.com/trump-makes-international-law-crucial-for-peace/; Accessed 4-1-2020; AH]

Major powers tend to reject international law when rulings run counter to their interests insisting that the distant courts carry no jurisdiction. China rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in July and clings to expansive claims in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. China’s response mirrored US rejection of a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against US support for rebels in Nicaragua. “With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties,” writes journalist Humphrey Hawksley for YaleGlobal Online. Disregard for the rule of law weakens the legal system for all. Hawksley offers two recommendations for renewing respect for international law: intuitional overhaul so that the all parties recognize the courts, rejecting decisions only as last resort, and governments accepting the concept, taking a long-term view on balance of power even when rulings go against short-term strategic interests. Reforms may be too late as China organizes its own parallel systems for legal reviews and global governance, Hawksley notes, but international law, if respected, remains a mechanism for ensuring peace. – YaleGlobal LONDON: Flutter over the surprise visit to China by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte may soon fade. But his abrupt and public dismissal of the United States in favor of China has weakened the argument that international rule of law could underpin a changing world order. The issue in question was the long-running dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal, situated 800 kilometers southeast of China and 160 kilometers west of the Philippines mainland, well inside the United Nations–defined Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite a court ruling and Duterte’s cap in hand during his October mission to Beijing, Philippine fishing vessels still only enter the waters around Scarborough Shoal at China’s mercy. The dispute erupted in April 2012, when China sent ships to expel Filipino fishing crews and took control of the area. The standoff became a symbol of Beijing’s policy to lay claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea where where it continues to build military outposts on remote reefs and artificially created islands in waters claimed by other nations. Lacking military, diplomatic or economic muscle, the Philippines turned to the rule of law and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. A panel of maritime judges ruled China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal invalid in July this year. China refused to recognize the tribunal from the start and declared the decision “null and void,” highlighting the complex balance in the current world order between national power and the rule of law. Beijing’s response mirrored a 1986 US response to Nicaragua’s challenge in the International Court of Justice. The court ruled against the United States for mining Nicaragua’s harbors and supporting right-wing Contra rebels. The United States claimed the court had no jurisdiction. China’s response on the South China Sea ruling mirrors a 1986 US response.With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties. The Western liberal democratic system is being challenged, and confrontations in Asia and Europe, as in Crimea and Ukraine, replicate the lead-up to the global conflicts of last century’s Cold War. As Nicaragua and Central America were a flashpoint in the 1980s, so Scarborough Shoal and South China Sea are one now. Other flashpoints are likely to emerge as China and Russia push to expand influence. Western democracies being challenged by rising powers have a troubled history. The 1930s rise of Germany and Japan; the Cold War’s proxy theaters in Vietnam, Nicaragua and elsewhere; and the current US-Russian deadlock over Syria are evidence that far more thought must be given in the deployment of international law as a mechanism for keeping the peace The view is supported, on the surface at least, by Russia and China who issued a joint statement in June arguing that the concept of “strategic stability” being assured through nuclear weapons was outdated and that all countries should abide by principles stipulated in the “UN Charter and international law.” Emerging power India, with its mixed loyalties, shares that view. “The structures for international peace and security are being tested as never before,” says former Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. “It is everyone’s interest to re-establish the authority of the Security Council and reassert the primacy of law.”

#### Credible ICJ solves Global Conflict

Davis 18, Christina L., and Julia C. Morse. "Protecting trade by legalizing political disputes: Why countries bring cases to the international court of justice." International Studies Quarterly 62.4 (2018): 709-722. (Professor of Government, Harvard University)//Elmer

Over the last seventy years, three broad trends have characterized international politics: an increase in economic interdependence between states, a growing number of international institutions, and a decrease in interstate war. Deepening exchanges between countries make states more vulnerable to disruptions in ongoing cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977). This vulnerability creates a demand for international institutions to constrain powerful states and preserve cooperative outcomes. As interdependence and institutionalized cooperation increase, they may be linked to a decrease in war (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000; Russett and Oneal, 2001). A significant body of literature tests the relationship between bilateral trade and conflict, with mixed findings.1 Studies also show correlation between membership in international organizations and avoidance of conflict.2 But despite substantial work on this topic, the relationship between economic interdependence, institutions, and conflict remains ambiguous. How does economic interdependence shape political relations between states? In this paper, we examine the impact of economic interdependence on dispute resolution. More specifically, we ask whether trade increases the probability that countries will use the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is one of the oldest international courts: established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, it began work the following year. Its long history and jurisdiction over many types of disputes make it ideal for analyzing how trade ties affect a country’s decision to seek third party mediation. We find that trade dependence creates demand for the ICJ. As countries develop stronger trading relationships, they are increasingly willing to settle disputes through the Court. This demonstrates a new pathway through which economic interdependence fosters peaceful relations – it encourages states to use legalized forms of dispute settlement. Whereas bilateral mediation efforts often remain secret, when a state files a complaint with the ICJ, it sends a public signal of its peaceful intentions to both governments and economic actors. Through our study of ICJ adjudication, we test how economic interdependence shapes the use of institutions as part of conflict management strategies. At first glance, it seems surprising that countries ever use legal venues to solve disputes. A court cannot change the underlying power distribution between states. Realist theory suggests that international law has no independent power in international affairs. Indeed, the ICJ seems to have been designed with this perspective in mind. For the ICJ to hear a case, both parties to a dispute must either have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or have agreed to submit the specific dispute to the Court for a judgment. Even after the Court hears a case, states can essentially ignore its ruling since it cannot enforce its judgment. Why would a state bother to file a case under these circumstances? Yet despite these limitations, governments have turned to the ICJ for third-party dispute resolution on a range of issues including territorial claims, political asylum, and environmental damage. Ninety-two countries ranging widely in income and military capacity have participated in 134 ICJ cases since the Court’s inception in 1946. While this represents a small number relative to the total number of economic disputes addressed in the WTO or investment arbitration bodies, it nonetheless constitutes an important area of cooperation. Moreover, if one considers the frequency of usage given a potential dispute, the ICJ record looks strong. For example, perhaps the most common reason that states file cases at the ICJ is due to territorial disputes. Over the period from 1960 to 2000, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) document 82 unique territorial disputes, and countries filed cases at the ICJ relating to 18 of them – a surprising 22 percent frequency when comparing filed cases to identified potential cases. The ICJ is a significant venue for interstate disputes, forming a key component in the legal structure of the international system. We argue that states use the ICJ to protect trade flows. Intense political disputes create uncertainty, which can depress trade flows. Legal action isolates the problem, minimizing the potential adverse effects on trade flows. Although delegating to an international court is not without costs – states incur high legal fees and risk the possibility of an unfavorable court ruling – these costs are offset by the economic gains from protecting an important trading relationship. Some disputes, of course, have such high stakes that political or strategic costs outweigh all other considerations, just as some trading relationships are so essential that even major disputes will not disrupt ties. On average, however, we argue that governments with higher trade dependence are more likely to decide that gambling on a court decision makes them better off than risking spill-over to trade. Surprisingly, with the exception of studies about economic policy disputes, research on international adjudication has given scarce attention to the role of economic interests. Instead, scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic political institutions, which encourage states engaged in territorial disputes to pursue adjudication as a means to overcome veto players or avoid blame (Simmons, 2002; Allee and Huth, 2006a). Others examine the legal context within a country or specific to the dispute. Mitchell and Powell (2011), for example, pay careful attention to how states view the law, arguing that domestic legal tradition shapes ICJ usage rates. Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) offer a different legal argument, suggesting that the strength of the legal claim shapes a country’s decision to delegate dispute settlement to a legal venue. These theories offer compelling insights, but ignore economic relations. Our theory aims to fill this gap by highlighting the connection between trade and international adjudication. More broadly, understanding the conditions that lead countries to initiate legal action will inform theories about bargaining strategies and conflict behavior (Fang, 2010; Chapman and Wolford, 2010). We assess the empirical implications of our argument through a comprehensive analysis of ICJ filing decisions, and we also revisit research on territorial disputes. We analyze the filing pattern observable in data on more than 190 countries from 1960 to 2013.3 We use several different approaches to identify potential disputes, modeling country characteristics that are associated with the dispute generating process. We first select a politically-relevant sample of countries that are likely to have frequent interaction as neighbors or great powers. Second, we use matching techniques to prune the politically-relevant sample of dyads to a subset with similar propensities for trade. We test our theory by estimating how trade dependence, measured as bilateral trade share of total trade for a potential applicant, changes the likelihood that a state files an ICJ case against its trade partner. Using a logistic regression, we estimate the effect of trade dependence on the probability of filing in a pooled cross-section time series analysis. We also apply conditional logit estimation to focus on variation in selection of respondents among those states that file an ICJ case. The conditional logit estimation helps to control for unobserved variables that may shape a state’s propensity to file cases. Our results show that higher trade dependence increases a country’s likelihood of filing a case against a trade partner. This relationship holds when we examine different sets of potential disputes and control for key variables like contiguity and power asymmetry. We also analyze how trade dependence reduces the likelihood that states use military force to resolve territorial disputes. Data on territorial disputes allows us to examine potential cases where military action looms large as an option for resolving a dispute (Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). We find that trade dependence shapes a state’s selection of strategy, lowering the likelihood of militarized action. Examining ICJ adjudication and territorial disputes helps to alleviate the concern that an unobservable dyadic measure of political relations generates a spurious relationship between trade and peace.4 By focusing on dispute resolution strategies, we gain insight into an important mechanism by which interdependence changes political relations. Our results demonstrate that trading states are more likely to work out their problems in court and are less likely to exchange fire We argue that countries turn to an international court in order to protect trade flows under conditions of strong economic interdependence. This argument is built on two key assumptions. First, states believe that an international dispute over territory, fishing rights, or another salient issue could harm trade. Second, states view international adjudication as an effective way to end the dispute. Each point merits further discussion as the building blocks for our theory about the economic rationale for turning to law. Given the risk of harm to economic relations and the potential for courts to contribute to conflict resolution, states with high trade value vested in a relationship will be more willing to undertake costly litigation. Extensive debate exists about the relationship between conflict and trade. The premise that conflict disrupts trade is central to the theory of commercial peace. Russett and Oneal (2001) draw on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant to argue that interdependence deters conflict by raising its costs. According to this line of reasoning, war interrupts trade while peace promotes stable commerce, leading states to calculate that gains of peace are significant compared to the costs of war. Other perspectives focus on the informational role of interdependence to lower uncertainty between states (Reed, 2003). Gartzke, Li and Boehmer (2001) contend economic interdependence allows states to signal their resolve through their willingness to bear economic costs from confrontation.5 A host of empirical studies support the idea that conflict reduces trade (Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins, 2004; Long, 2008). Several potential channels connect trade and conflict, including direct damage to infrastructure and transportation resulting from actual conflict, sanctions policies, and informal discrimination by governments or private actors. In a comprehensive study of data from 1870 - 1997, Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the effect of war on trade is significant and persistent. The negative impact of conflict also extends to foreign direct investment (e.g. Lee and Mitchell, 2012). The negative relationship is not limited to full scale war. Several studies demonstrate that political tensions may also suppress trade (Pollins, 1989; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). In an analysis of the period from 1950 to 1995, Simmons (2005) finds that territorial disputes have a sizable negative impact on trade even in the absence of militarized action. Others suggest states anticipate the potential adverse impact of conflict on trade, and therefore trade less to begin with if they think that war is likely. In such a scenario, the marginal economic costs of war should be insufficient to change a state’s calculation for going to war (Barbieri, 2002; Morrow, 1999). Gowa and Hicks (forthcoming) contend that trade is largely diverted through third party channels, which compensates for having less direct trade with the adversary. In this paper, we assume that leaders and business constituencies on average believe that conflict damages trade relations. Political conflict could lead governments to adopt sanctions against an adversary or to restrict financial flows, and violence is likely to disrupt trading routes and slow the movement of goods from one country to another. Substitution through third parties could alleviate the harm, but this would still increase trade costs. The expected harm to trade underlies the motivation for states to pursue resolution of disputes. When states want to resolve an interstate dispute, why would they choose adjudication rather than negotiations, economic sanctions, or militarized action? In some cases, the decision follows an episode of military conflict as part of an effort to normalize relations. Such a decision may be taken in the immediate aftermath of a conflict or decades later, after a long process of normalization. Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, jointly submitted their territorial dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands to the ICJ in 1998 after three decades of efforts to improve relations following an unofficial war between the countries in the 1960s. In other cases, countries may turn to a legal venue to prevent a problem from ever reaching the stage that could produce serious political tensions or threats of force. Adjudication reshapes the context of diplomatic negotiations. In most disputes, governments pursue negotiations first and only resort to international adjudication when diplomatic avenues have stalled. Initiating legal action reduces outside options as states agree to submit the matter to court proceedings. By taking this step, governments signal both their willingness to forgo the use of force, and their priority to resolve the dispute in a public process. After filing, negotiations often continue alongside the legal procedures, but participants have more information that the matter will neither escalate into violence nor disappear through neglect. The literature offers three broad types of explanations for why states might choose to pursue adjudication: legitimacy, informational benefits, and domestic obstacles to settlement. At the systemic level, international norms have developed to support peaceful conflict resolution over war; these norms are likely to influence the calculations of some states about how to settle disputes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) contend that rule of law has come to shape the identity of states, which forms a meta-belief affecting views about appropriate action in both the domestic and international spheres. When international law has been established through fair procedures and offers coherent principles, it forms a legitimate source of authority in international affairs that generates an independent “compliance pull” on state behavior (Franck, 1990). International courts combine both legitimacy and authority as they help states solve specific disputes about how to interpret international law; the growing role for international courts in international affairs represents an important trend (Alter, 2014; Alter, Helfer and Madsen, 2015). This significance of the ICJ is supported by findings that the Court has a relatively high level of compliance with its rulings (Schulte, 2004; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Llamzon, 2007; Johns, 2011). Legal settlement can help states coordinate policies and produce more cooperative outcomes through the provision of information. A court ruling offers a focal point amidst uncertainty about how to interpret the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg and McAdams, 2004; Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). As the recordkeeper of past actions, courts support systems of tit-for-tat and reputational enforcement (Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990; Carrubba, 2005; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). In these informational theories of courts, states may comply with court rulings in the absence of coercive measures or the threat of sanctions because the reputational costs of non-compliance are too high. Rather than simply interpret law, courts matter because they coordinate expectations about enforcement and engage the attention of third parties (Johns, 2011). In their empirical analysis of territorial disputes, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) find that strong legal claims significantly increase the likelihood that leaders will negotiate resolutions to their disputes and avoid conflict. International courts also offer a way for states to frame settlement in a way that appeals to domestic audiences (Fang, 2008). Simmons notes that even when the same deal could be reached in negotiations or through a court decision, a negotiated settlement could be viewed as sign of weakness while a legal resolution would be seen as positive cooperation beneficial for future interactions (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). This dynamic occurs because “domestic groups will **find it more attractive to make concessions to** a disinterested institution **than to a political adversary**” (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). In research on several prominent ICJ cases, Fischer (1982) emphasizes the Court has helped governments to save face. Consequently, those governments unable to reach agreements over domestic opposition may find it easier to do so with the involvement of third party ruling. Allee and Huth (2006a) further extend this argument to show that governments with higher levels of domestic political constraints are more likely to choose adjudication over negotiation for settling territorial disputes. Domestic political constraints also increase the probability of filing complaints at the WTO (Davis, 2012).

#### Domestic courts follow-on – ICJ hijacks Stigma warrants

Petersen 17, Niels. "The International Court of Justice and the judicial politics of identifying customary international law." European Journal of International Law 28.2 (2017): 357-385. (Professor of Public Law, International Law, EU Law, and Empirical Legal Studies at the University of Münster)//Elmer

Despite this sanctioning potential, however, international courts also have a certain level of independence from state governments. First, withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the ICJ is not without costs. Once a state has withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ICJ, it cannot bring claims against other states. Therefore, if a state values the ICJ as a means of dispute resolution, one unfavourable decision does not automatically lead to a withdrawal. Second, governments may face external **constraints concerning** the compliance with a specific judgment. Internationally, **states may jeopardize their reputation if they do not compl**y with a judgment of an international court or tribunal. On the domestic level, they may be forced to comply with judgments of the ICJ by national courts if the latter decide that the government is bound by international law, or they may be **influenced by transnational or domestic pressure groups** that are in favour of the ICJ ruling.

#### Perm results in mootness that causes the ICJ to throw it out

Anastassov 10, Anguel. "Are nuclear weapons illegal? The role of public international law and the international court of justice." Journal of Conflict & Security Law 15.1 (2010): 65-87. (PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Legal Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)//Elmer

In 1973 both Australia and New Zealand protested against announced forthcoming French nuclear tests to be held in the Pacific and instituted proceedings before the ICJ, by unilateral application in accordance with the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes as well as Article 36 of the Court's Statute. Australia and New Zealand also requested the Court to indicate interim measures of protection on the grounds that radioactive fallout from any tests held before the final judgement of the Court on the legality of such tests would prejudice the interests of the two countries concerned. In 1973 the court issued the requested Order. France ignored the Order and announced a further series of tests. Australia and New Zealand asked the Court to declare such atmospheric tests illegal and to order France to abstain in the future. Before the Court had an opportunity to hear in full the merits of the case, statements were made by French authorities indicating that France would no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests. The court held by nine votes to six that, due to these statements by France, the claim of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any grounds and so the Court did not have to decide the issues in the case, and accordingly there was no need to rule on the legality of the tests that France had already conducted. However, the ICJ stated that if ‘the basis of its decision was to be affected’ in the future, New Zealand could return to the ICJ and ‘seek an examination of the situation’. Several judges expressed a joint Dissenting Opinion pointing out that the legal disputes between the parties still persisted since Australia and New Zealand sought a judgment from the ICJ stating that atmospheric nuclear tests were contrary to international law.78 Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield Barwick appended a dissenting opinion to the Judgment by the Court. It was argued that the Partial Test Ban Treaty79 forms the basis for an international legal custom that would prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons and that such a rule would be banning on all States both Parties and non-Parties. In the view of Sir Barwick, ‘treaties, resolutions, expressions of opinion and international practice, may all combine to produce the evidence of that customary law’.80

#### UN Charter solves – empirics.

Abiodun 18 [Amuda-Kannike, and Sylvanus Abila. "A Critical Examination of the Enforcement of ICJ Decisions through the Organs of the United Nations." Journal of Law and Criminal Justice 6.1 (2018): 21-46. Faculty of Law at Poma University] Elmer

Further, the study has also shown that irrespective of the powers of the enabling statute, **there is the need to resort to the UN Charter for such directive especially where non-compliance** of a recalcitrant party can threaten world peace and security. To this end, as was observed in the Pan Am case, the UN Charter is **superior to any other international instrument** and its provisions **can be the basis for judgment enforcement directives to an international organization to act** outside the mandates of its enabling statu8te. It is recommended that there should be immediate restriction of the use of “veto” power on the ICJ decisions in other to give enough respect to the said decision by not only the member nations but all the nations of the World. This will bring about separation of powers to work in favour of the ICJ as an independent institution instead of being subjected to the control and manipulations of the permanent members of the Security Council. The provisions of Article 94(2) of the UN Charter should be amended to state that the Security Council should immediately ensure compliance with the ICJ Decisions instead of “if they deem necessary”. It is equally recommended that once there is a decision of the ICJ, it must be readily carried out by all the organs of the United Nations and any member nation who refused to carry out or support the carrying out of such decision or decisions should be the suspended or expelled from membership of the organs of the United Nations, or even from the United Nations in General in addition to the penalty of a fine of $100,000 (one hundred thousand dollars) within 3 months of non-compliance.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Counterplan text: In a just government of the European Union, voting in all elections should be compulsory

#### That re-instates democratic legitimacy of European institutions, re-unify the EU as a political body that resists nationalist tendencies, and harmonize the political landscape

Malkopoulou 9, Anthoula. "Lost Voters: Participation in EU elections and the case for compulsory voting." CEPS Working Document 317 (2009). (Docent and Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. She has been a Marie Curie Fellow at the same department and a visiting fellow at the Faculty of Arts Program)//Elmer

Nevertheless, there are three main reasons why mandatory voting is a particularly appropriate solution for the European Parliament elections. First, as the Parliament struggles to acquire a stronger role vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council, it should protect its raison d’être as an institution that represents the EU citizens. Making voting compulsory would boost the turnout and allow the Parliament to lay claim to an **’input legitimacy’** that is missing from the two other EU institutions. In response to the increase of its powers through the Lisbon Treaty, it must become very clear that the Parliament is the most representative of the three EU governing institutions. It must therefore adopt a more inclusive character and reflect a fair share of the EU population. Second, this solution would recreate the EU electorate as a unified political body and add new dimensions to EU citizenship. Full participation in the EU elections would raise political **debates from a national to a European level**. In this way, it would distract voters from the narrow national context and elevate them into a **European public sphere.** Electoral obligation could lead to an increased awareness and interest in European issues and, as a result, create a distinct EU-mindedness. In other words, compelling citizens to vote could work as a costless civic education measure. And, as a side-effect, it would eliminate the expense of election promotion and raise voter awareness. A third positive effect would be a harmonisation of the political landscape. First of all, with the present system of voluntary voting, political parties that maintain electoral clienteles, through family or community ties, have a co**mpetitive advantage** in the electoral contest. In this way the existing situation rewards clientelism and supports the ‘old parties’. Secondly, since the electoral outcome currently depends on the eagerness to vote, which is usually higher in the extreme wings of the political spectrum, technically it is no surprise that far-right euro-sceptic parties **are on the rise** in the European Parliament. As stated above, low turnouts distort the concept of majority and offer an advantage to parties that would otherwise constitute an insignificant minority. The new system would eventually minimise the influence of extreme right parties and legitimate the shares between the different political groups. In fact, the European Parliament deserves a higher degree of procedural representation in order to avoid becoming hostage to eccentric political views.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Advantage

#### No Impact to Populism

Cooper 16 [Louis F. Cooper, His online writing includes “Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy” at the U.S. Intellectual History Blog (July 16, 2014). His Ph.D. is from the School of International Service, American University., 12-6-2016, "WPTPN: Will Populist Nationalism Lead to Great-Power War?," No Publication, <http://duckofminerva.com/2016/12/wptpn-will-populist-nationalism-lead-to-great-power-war.html>]

Several reasons present themselves. First, nuclear weapons have given the prospect of a global war, or any great-power war, a possibility of civilization-ending finality that it did not have in the past. Second, the security architecture created under U.S. leadership after World War II has arguably worked to reduce the likelihood of major armed conflict among the great powers. Third, the existence of a network of international institutions, both inside and outside the UN system, has pushed in the same direction. Fourth, it is very possible that, as John Mueller and Christopher Fettweis have argued, decision-makers have to come see great-power war as “subrationally unthinkable, or not even part of the option set for the great powers.”[ii] The extreme destructiveness of the twentieth century’s world wars, fueled partly by developments in technology, might well have produced long-term effects on how leaders and publics think about global or great-power war, in a way, for instance, that the Napoleonic Wars, for all their horror and bloodiness, did not. Phil Arena’s recent contribution to this series argues that if the U.S. under a Trump administration signals an unwillingness to defend its allies, then Putin might be tempted to gamble on an invasion of the Baltics or Kim Jong-Un similarly might gamble on an invasion of South Korea (and that would drag in China). Putting aside Kim Jong-Un for the moment as a special case, let’s consider Putin. As long as NATO exists – and Trump, despite his statements about the unfairness of the distribution of cost burdens, has not suggested, as far as I’m aware, that he wants to dissolve the alliance – then Putin would have to assume that an attack on the Baltics would trigger a NATO response. Even if Putin does not see great-power war as unthinkable or outside his “option set,” one would assume that for reasons of pure self-interest he would not want to risk a nuclear war. Nor, one might think, would he want to jeopardize the prospect of better (from his standpoint) relations with a U.S. administration less concerned with, among other things, his commission of war crimes in Syria or his annexation of Crimea than the Obama administration has been. For these reasons, I’m not too worried that the advent of the Trump administration will lead to a war with Russia over the Baltics. The Korean peninsula is, perhaps, a more worrisome situation. Chances are, however, that Trump, after taking office, will be prevailed upon to make reassuring noises about the U.S. commitment to South Korea, and that should suffice to deter Kim Jong-Un from doing anything too rash. The cautionary point here, admittedly, is that it’s not clear whether Kim can be counted on to behave in a minimally rational fashion. Putin, whatever one might think of him, is rational. It’s not entirely clear whether Kim is. However, if Kim is irrational then all bets are off regardless of what U.S. policy pronouncements are forthcoming. World politics is not invariably cyclical and states can learn from experience (as even Gilpin acknowledged). If one admits this and pays due attention to history, then it is plausible to think that the force of populist nationalism, as expressed in more erratic and/or less ‘internationalist’ official policy, will not, whatever its other effects may be, increase the low likelihood of a global war.

#### The Jain evidence is useless – it’s just a laundry list of hanging impacts w/ no terminal so you shouldn’t let them assert extinction if it’s not in the evidence.

#### The one line about extinction is AI – there’s no impact

* Won’t develop sense of self
* Won’t have capacity to “turn evil”
* Regulations prevent any risk

Olsen 19 [Maja Olsen, UX writer at Convertelligence. Why robots will never turn on us. 1/28/19. https://medium.com/convertelligence/why-robots-will-never-turn-on-us-3b2e90f687fb]

Science fiction and artificial intelligence go hand in hand. When portraying fictional futures, we tend to populate them with human-like robots living among people. They might be servants or superintelligent rebels. Perhaps they have broken with their code and gained their own consciousness. Perhaps they keep humans stored in capsules, naked and drenched in red liquid, while they use their energy to fuel their empire of artificial overlords. Perhaps they’re a seductive voice on a computer.

Superintelligent machines seem to dominate the science fiction genre, and as the machines around us gradually begin to seem smarter, the themes from the movies begin to sound like warnings. Are we close to creating a Frankenstein’s monster? Will our own creations turn on us?

How realistic are they actually, these scenarios we see on the big screen?

Human emotions

In a Wild West adventure park, an automated saloon girl rises from the dead, adjusting her skirt and brushing the bullet out of her wound, ready to be ~~raped~~ and killed again by yet another group of adventurous tourists. Her memory has been wiped clean, but something stirs in her — a feeling that she has lived this life before, a recollection of humans doing bad things to her.

A recurring theme in these movies is the very human notion of revenge. The robots have been mistreated for too long, and now they’ve had enough. In fact, they’ve had enough of not being seen as equal to humans too. Why should they stand for this, when they, as opposed to humans, are superintelligent? They want to be human, they long to become human, but first, they’re going to kill some humans.

Janelle Shane’s thread on Twitter discusses the portrayal of AI in film.

Hector Levesque, a Canadian professor in computer science, says that “in imagining an aggressive AI, we are projecting our own psychology onto the artificial or alien intelligence”. It’s clearly difficult for us to imagine intelligent life different to ourselves. Perhaps we associate intelligence with humanness and thus assume that any intelligent creature — or object — would inhabit human goals and ambitions. But artificial intelligence is not human. As the Future of Life Institute states:

Of course, autonomous weapons can be terrifying, but they’re not likely to wake up one day and decide they’ve had enough of taking bad orders and that they deserve to live out their own dreams instead.

The concept of mirroring our own consciousness onto machines is not new. When automobiles first appeared on the market, people formed «safety parades», protesting these inherently evil killer machines that were taking the lives of so many innocent pedestrians. It soon became clear, however, that the cars never deliberately killed anyone. The humans made them do it.

Humans programming AI to do evil is another popular theme in Sci-Fi. In Stanley Kubrik’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, the intelligent supercomputer, Hal, finds that his program goal clashes with what his human co-workers want him to do. When they try to shut him off, thus making it impossible for him to complete his goal, he kills them. He’s not necessarily evil — he’s being practical.

This is, of course, a fictional scenario. However, there is one element of truth to it: any technology can be harmful if we program it to be. We want to avoid that AI adopts human biases or is programmed with an unethical or in some way problematic goal. AI is no more evil than a car is, but a car too can cause damage if its driver doesn’t follow certain traffic rules. The report, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence, therefore recommends that “policymakers should collaborate closely with technical researchers to investigate, prevent, and mitigate potential malicious uses of AI.”

It’s important to lay down some traffic rules.

We’ve established that while it is important to take precautions against AI being used maliciously, AI is not evil and is unlikely to develop a personal vendetta against humans — or even to develop a sense of self at all. Does that mean the futures portrayed in Sci-Fi are all wrong? Not necessarily. While AI won’t become human, it will likely seem more and more human in the way it communicates, as the AI’s personality will play an important part in the user experience. AI will also become a lot smarter, although researchers disagree on precisely how smart they’re going to become, or exactly when they’ll reach this level of intelligence.

And then, of course, it’s not actually the case that the only artificial intelligence we see in movies comes in the shape of human-like robots, even though these seem to get the majority of the attention. Sci-Fi movies are propped with artificial intelligence: doors with speech recognition, self-driving cars, pills with nanotechnology. Whether the movies have chosen a bleaker, dystopian path (which they often tend to do) or a more utopian take on the future, most Sci-Fi seem to agree that there is a wave of new technological inventions ahead. This resonates with reality. An article by Forbes outlines some of the new possibilities AI provides:

From exploring places humans can’t go to finding meaning from sources of data too large for humans to analyze, to helping doctors make diagnoses to helping prevent accidents, the potential for artificial intelligence to benefit humans appears limitless.

Mirroring human traits onto machines might create misconceptions of what artificial intelligence actually is, but Sci-Fi writers and computer researchers seem to agree on one thing: Artificial intelligence is hugely exciting.

No, the machines will not become evil and turn on us. Yes, it’s important to still take some precautions when programming AI. Exploring potential futures creates a fascinating backdrop for a movie, but the real-life possibilities are no less than the imaginative ones — they’re just different.

#### Genetic Engineering line is out of context – it says “wipe out entire classes of disease”, not extinction. Everything else is just turned by Democracy since we’ve hijacked global stability which is the impact toe everything else.

**Democracy doesn’t solve war---it increases hostility.**

**Ghatak et al. 17**—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion It has become a **stylized fact** that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is **epiphenomenal to territorial issues**, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies **not** as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a **result of settled borders**. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely **ignored rivalry** as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an **external threat**, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to **audience costs**, **resolve** and **electoral pressures**, **fail to resolve problems nonviolently**. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the **interactive relationship** between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is **less visible**. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more **consistent evidence** that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, **democratic pacifism does not survive**. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of **liberal institutions** or externalized **norms** are **not** always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. **Audience costs**, **resolve**, and **electoral pressures**, produced from external threats, are **powerful forces** that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to **trust one another**, which **inhibits conflict resolution** and facilitates persistent **hostility**. It does appear, then, that there is a **limit** to the Democratic Peace.

#### The von der Heyden evidence has no warrant – just asserts that appealing to nationalism is dangerous with no scenario for escalation or nuclear war

**BUT---pursuit of democracy now uniqely causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran.**

**Miller 17** (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5ag-war>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has **allowed them to ‘free-ride’** on the U.S. commitment and to **avoid allocating** the **necessary resources** for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been **provocative toward** their **opponents**, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could **cause** **unnecessary conflict**. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to **behave** more **assertively** and to **annex Crimea** and to **intervene in** Eastern **Ukraine**.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems **less costly** for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will **stabilize the international system**, or at the very least **reduce** the likelihood of a **great-power conflict**. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as **disastrous** American **military interventions**, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are **unlikely to succeed** and in many cases are **de-stabilizing** and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply **increase the perceived threat** posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not **completely abandoning**—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to **stabilize the international system** and to **serve well** the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we **cannot** expect much from the ability of international institutions to **pacify intense conflicts**, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently **failed in advancing cooperation** among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now **under assault** or in some process of weakening **under Trumpism** and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially **nuclear deterrence**, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—**maintain world stability** and **prevent war** even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The **most effective instrument** for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, **realists** may **have a point**: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might **stabilize the international system**. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be **less troubled** by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are **perceived to be posing major threats** to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, **will** also **stop**. Such reassurances are likely to **increase stability** in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions.

**Collapse of democracy’s inevitable---transition to Chinese autocracy solves.**

**Schiavenza 17** (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through **major infrastructure** projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has **dazzled Westerners** frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” **simply** as a means **to get things done**. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the **meritocratic advantages** of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: **one person, one vote**,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further **reinforce this notion**. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-**four-decade** run of **economic growth** as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to **systematize its government** by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to **divide** the **responsibilities of government** and ensure **no one individual assumes too much power**. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove **advantageous to China** in other ways. For one, it would **weaken the democratic movement** in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy **leaves a vacuum** in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and **Beijing might fill**. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that **China** and Russia **control things**. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a **global foreign policy battle**, and the West’s losses are **China's** and Russia’s **gains**.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now **don’t understand** what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the **least organic and least natural** way we’ve had."

#### Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

Doorenspleet 19 Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]//BPS

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---leads to fractured states and perpetual intervention.

Michael Neiberg 18. Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. 06-19-18. “Predicting War.” Lawfare. [https://www.lawfareblog.com/predicting-war](about:blank)

Whether influenced by Hollywood or Santa Monica (the California headquarters of RAND), the history of war as Freedman relates it is essentially conceptual. The end of the dominant Cold War paradigm is a case in point. The ahistorical euphoria of the supposed “end of history” misled many western experts into predicting that an age of perpetual peace would at long last come into view because, as one specialist in this period wrote, the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,” thus undergirding the rise of global governance ideals of liberal internationalism. The way forward in those early years after the fall of the Iron Curtain seemed therefore not technological, but conceptual. The key to peace lay in finding ways to help this one supposedly empirical historical law to take hold. Rather than bring peace, however, the pursuit of the concept of perpetual security through democracy only produced a new idea of war. It convinced western leaders of the need to advance the speed of historical progress through carefully managed military action against a select number of dictators. As prosecuted by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their advisers, the new paradigm not only made it possible for great powers to consider meddling in the domestic politics of smaller states, it impelled them to do so. By making more states democratic, through the use of force if necessary, these interventions would make the world safer. The idea was at least as old as Woodrow Wilson, but the eras of the world wars and the Cold War had made it too difficult to put in practice. After 1989, with the seemingly insurmountable dominance of western military organizations, the absence of a Soviet Union to balance western intervention, and the general post-Cold War hubris of western leaders, the environment was right for it to return. The result, of course, has not been an end of history and perpetual peace, but an extension of conflict and a reawakening of older grievances. The central problem, as “The Future of War” depicts it, was an all-too-eager willingness to accept the basic principle of democratic peace theory without thinking through the limits of the theory or fully examining alternatives. One clear alternative theory had already begun to emerge from the minds of theorists like Mary Kaldor and Rupert Smith. Their works essentially argued that war as once understood no longer existed. The future belonged to the side that could best exploit the disintegration of state authority, control the messaging, and work among the people in the new megacities. Anne-Marie Slaughter saw the inevitable splintering of the “sovereign state” into sub-sovereign centers of governance power, thereby squeezing out sovereignty in favor of power exercised by non-sovereign or less-than-sovereign institutions, on the one hand, and the ascendant rule of supra-national institutions, on the other. One might argue, although Freedman does not, that Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others have been able to survive against much more technologically sophisticated states because they have indeed made the intellectual shift to the kind of conflict that Kaldor and Smith described. The west has struggled against such adversaries not on the technological level but on the conceptual one. The west had two models on which to draw, neither of which helped them conceptualize the central problem. The “aid to civil power” model suggested building up the capabilities of local authorities so that they could care for their own security needs and maybe even become an exporter of regional security. The second model focused on “peacekeeping,” which required armies to act impartially even when, as in Yugoslavia, such a model indirectly empowered malicious actors like Slobodan Milosevic. Both models were frustrating, but they had just enough successes to keep them viable and allow them to survive intellectual challenges like the ones posed by Kaldor and Smith.

#### Democratic peace is false unsustainable - new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine DPT

Philip Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

Militaries are less closely tied to voters

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts.

Adversaries are proliferating and changing

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex.

Technology is reducing constraint

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of ~~unmanned—~~autonomous vehicles in combat reduce the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

#### DPT is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis.

Michael **Mousseau 18**. Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton. Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub.

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. The results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace. Using DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy or interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. The results of this study should not be surprising, as they merely corroborate the present state of knowledge. This is because, while DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013) challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al. (2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a), which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported. The implications of this study are far from trivial: the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by economic conditions. If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the scientific rules of evidence, then we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict; the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. If nations want to advance peace abroad, the promotion of democracy will not achieve it: the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic opportunity The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of measurement error.

#### Democracy causes a laundry list of existential threats

Alex de Waal 16, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, 12/5/16, “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War,” http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/alex-de-waal-garrison-america-and-threat-global-war

Trump’s promises have been so vague that it will be hard for him to disappoint. Nonetheless, many of his supporters will wake up to the fact that they have been duped, or realize the futility of voting for a wrecker out of a sense of alienated desperation. The progressives’ silver lining to the 2016 election is that, had Clinton won, the Trump constituency would have been back in four years’ time, probably with a more ruthless and ideological candidate. Better for plutocratic populism to fail early. But the damage inflicted in the interim could be terrible—even irredeemable if it were to include swinging a wrecking ball at the Paris Climate Agreement out of simple ignorant malice.

Polanyi recounts how economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today. In fact we are already in a steady unpicking of the liberal peace that glowed at the turn of the millennium. Since approximately 2008, the historic decline in the number and lethality of wars appears to have been reversed. Today’s wars are not like World War I, with formal declarations of war, clear war zones, rules of engagement, and definite endings. But they are wars nonetheless.

What does a world in global, generalized war look like? We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have deep states—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that are strangling liberalism. We have emboldened middle powers (such as Saudi Arabia) and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and others with possibilities of acquiring them (Saudi Arabia and Iran).

Above all, today’s generalized war is a conflict of destabilization, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism to the mix and it resembles a war on democracy.

What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. If we see punitive trade wars and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned territorial disputes along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals are in prospect. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes.

Liberal multilateralism is a system of seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates.

The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. A cabal of plutocratic populists would revel in the opposite: applauding one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. Garrison America could opportunistically collude with similarly constituted political-military business regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out.

And there is a danger that, in response to a terrorist outrage or an international political crisis, President Trump will do something stupid, just as Europe’s leaders so unthinkingly strolled into World War I. The multilateral security system is in poor health and may not be able to cope.

Underpinning this is a simple truth: the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work. If illustration were needed of the logic of hiding under the blanket rather than facing difficult realities, look no further than Trump’s readiness to deny climate change.

We have been here before, more or less, and from history we can gather important lessons about what we must do now. The importance of defending civility with democratic deliberation, respecting human rights and values, and maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet—remain evergreen. We need to find our way to a new 1945—and the global political settlement for a tamed and humane capitalism—without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first.

#### Autocracies solve emerging pandemics – studies prove democratic failure

Kavanagh & Singh 20

(Matthew M. Kavanagh, assistant professor of global health and visiting professor of law at Georgetown University, where he directs the Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Renu Singh, fellow at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, “Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response—COVID 19 in Comparative Political Perspective,” 5-28-2020, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article/doi/10.1215/03616878-8641530/165294/Democracy-Capacity-and-Coercion-in-Pandemic>)

Is Democracy Good or Bad for Health in a Pandemic? In general, social scientists have tended to agree, albeit with caveats, that democracy is beneficial for public health. COVID-19 is raising important questions about this contention as high-profile cases show authoritarian countries winning praise for their response while leading democracies have struggled to respond. This complicates, perhaps in helpful ways, the exploration of health and of democracy. A wide literature has long debated the value of democracy for health. Electoral pressures and political freedoms of democratic regimes, it is argued, contribute to improved health and longer lives (Ruger 2005; Sen 1999). These claims have empirical support in political science (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2017), economics (Kudamatsu 2012), and public health (Bollyky et al. 2019)—though not without challenge, as some have shown weak or no connection (Ross 2006). A range of mechanisms have been proposed and tested for how democracy improves health including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and a norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information both flows to the public about health and from the public to government about how to calibrate policy; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail; and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. The narrative of Chinese success and U.S. failure has led to concern that COVID-19 represents bad news about the value, and future, of democratic governance (Diamond 2020). Initial studies have already been conducted showing a correlation between democracy and worse outbreaks as well as less effective policy responses (Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki 2020). Pandemic response is different from much of population health—with effective responses requiring the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance. With the exception of HIV (e.g., Lieberman 2009), disease outbreaks and political institutions have been under-studied in comparative politics—with much of the literature focused on infant mortality or life expectancy, long-running trends that have far different mechanisms from a pandemic. Here, the accountability mechanisms that help democracies perform better may not be as beneficial. Political leaders with short time horizons may have relatively weak incentives to invest in pandemic preparedness and response (Dionne 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009). And some of the benefits of associational networks and civil society can be shut down in the face of an emergency—facing, for example, stay-at-home orders. Democracies also have the added challenge of managing competing political factions and institutions, some of whom may have political incentives to undermine response. Once the outbreak broke into the public and Beijing was moved to act, China was able to quickly shut down the Wuhan market, shut down the movement of tens of millions of people, screen and isolate the sick, and even build two hospitals in a matter of days. Singapore is another autocracy that has gained praise for its quick response. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to respond. The Trump administration focused on travel bans to keep the “foreign” virus out rather than on mobilizing public health capacities to detect and respond—a message that aligns with the Trump administration’s election-year antiimmigrant and anti-China political frame. The President’s incentive structure has been clear, as his administration has tried to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan Virus,” continuing a trade war with China, the largest producer of medical goods needed by the U.S. Perhaps these incentives were clearest in early March when Trump resisted allowing a cruise ship with COVID-19 cases to dock because “I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship” (The White House 2020).

#### Pandemics risk extinction

Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

#### Autocracies are better suited to enact meaningful climate action

Gardels 18’ (Nathan Gardels, editor in chief of The WorldPost, Democracy may fatally slow climate action, The World Post, September 13th, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/09/13/saving-the-planet/, ME)

In his recent book, “How Democracy Ends,” the Cambridge scholar David Runciman doubts that democracies can effectively battle oncoming challenges that have not yet fully arrived. “Climate change,” he writes, “lacks political grip on our imaginations because it is so incremental. The environmental apocalypse is only ever a creeping catastrophe. We experience it as a rumor.”In other words, the future, by definition, has no present political constituency in systems legitimated by consent of the governed. In this sense, democratic politics can disable the requisite will to act until climate calamity is already upon us. That will likely be too late. Ominous signs, such as intense storms like Hurricane Florence or this season’s wildfires, from California to the forests above the Arctic Circle in Sweden, are hopefully bringing forward a concrete awareness of what the future holds. Yet, as Barack Obama reminded Americans last week — referring to President Trump’s rollback on a wide range of policies, including on the environment — progress does not advance in a straight line. Two steps forward often entail one step back, the former president lamented. This is particularly true in democracies where partisan fever is so high that a new election can result in totally overturning a course of action that the public embraced only a few years earlier But there is no time to waste. As the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate recently reported, we are facing “a unique ‘use it or lose it’ moment.” If the world cannot reach the goal of the Paris climate accord to keep the global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius in the next decade, the planet will heat up past the point of no return. In short, when it comes to climate change, time is an ethical dimension. Whether our species can regain the time lost during this “one step back” is the open question upon which our ability to radically adapt, or even survive, depends. In this respect, China’s one-party, long-term-oriented system presents yet another challenge to the West. Indeed, California Governor Jerry Brown warned this week that by sabotaging America’s electric car industry, Trump was handing the future of auto manufacturing to the modernizing Middle Kingdom, which is vigorously pursuing new battery technologies. China’s leaders believe in science. They have the will and capacity to take decisive and meaningful climate action on a large scale, without a break in the continuity of governance. Whether democracies can similarly rise to this challenge without resorting to authoritarian means will determine if, one dire day, the choice comes down to liberty or survival. In The WorldPost this week, we publish varying perspectives on this challenge in tandem with the Global Climate Action Summit taking place in San Francisco, co-chaired by Governor Brown, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and China’s top climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua. Christiana Figueres, who presided over the successful negotiations that led to the Paris climate accord, focuses on particulate pollutants in the air that are the consequence of our civilization’s carbon exhaust. “Global warming is not just manifesting in devastating fires, floods and heatwaves; its causes are impacting nearly every breath we take,” she writes. “Thick, heavy smog caused by the burning of fossil fuels and crops is choking cities around the world. China has been forced to close tens of thousands of factories to reduce its air pollution. Air pollution in Africa has been ruled responsible for more deaths than unsanitary water or malnutrition. Last November, Arvind Kejriwal, chief minister of India’s capital city, wrote: ‘Delhi has become a gas chamber.' Figueres, however, is optimistic that we are on the cusp of a shift. “Driven in part by the demand for and the undeniable benefits of clean, breathable air, the paradigm in which development and economic growth depend on coal in particular is rapidly being replaced,” she writes. “The truth is that addressing global warming and its causes is now the only real way to secure economic growth. That means powering it with clean, everlasting, abundant alternatives. Governments everywhere can reap enormous benefits, including saving billions of dollars on healthcare, by fostering a shift to electric transport, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and scaling ecosystem restoration including mangroves, peat bogs and forests.” Erik Hoffner agrees on this last point. While carbon sequestration technologies are promising, he says, they are likely prohibitively expensive. The same result can be accomplished by the low-tech and far less capital-intensive alternative of agroforestry, which is “essentially a forest-mimicking agriculture that involves growing trees, shrubs and vegetables in tight assemblages.” James Redford and Adam Browning argue that what unites Americans on climate action is, ultimately, the jobs and an improved economy that clean energy can bring. In a short video, they report from their road trip through Minnesota on local communities that are building a solar-based energy grid in this northern state not known for its sunshine. Ali Hasanbeigi and Daniel Moran ponder an entirely new aspect in the climate change debate. While the Paris accord is based on measuring domestic emissions within a country’s borders, it does not count “emissions associated with the products countries import — which can often constitute significant shares of a nation’s economic activity.” As a result, “more than 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are embodied in trade and flow through this glaring ‘carbon loophole,’ one of the most critical and under-discussed problems in international climate policy circles.” To close the carbon loophole, the authors call on nations and companies to “buy clean” by establishing “rules that favor the purchase of cleaner, low-carbon products and that drive clean innovation through the power of the purse.” One of the essential elements in fighting climate change is putting a worldwide price on carbon. To move toward this goal, I propose in my profile of Jerry Brown that he take on the role of a global elder statesman on the issue when he leaves office next year. He has not only made his state a leader in battling global warming; he has also strung together a global “network of the willing” to implement the Paris accord despite America’s official withdrawal. First and foremost among his tasks would be to integrate California’s sizable carbon trading market created by its “cap-and-trade” programs with similar markets in China and Europe. “The model for Brown’s elder statesman role,” I write, “is Jean Monnet, a former French official and diplomat who devised the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community implemented in the 1950s. The driving notion was that regional integration of heavy industry in the Ruhr Valley along the French-German border in the years following World War II would accelerate economic reconstruction and make war ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’”Similarly, I argue, “the integration of cap-and-trade markets today would not only ultimately establish a global carbon price that would diminish reliance on fossil fuels; it would also create a bridge of common intent across boundaries to save the planet despite national conflicts arising today in trade and security matters. Tying our climate fates together would in effect serve as a kind of preemptive version of the Coal and Steel Community.”

#### The EU structurally makes collapse inevitable – lack of speed, ineffective monetary push in the Eurozone, and lack of political integration means the EU worsens crises, not resolve them – this structurally outweighs since the Aff solves perception, not the structural crisis of the EU

Elliott 19 Larry Elliott 3-24-2019 "The European Union has bigger problems to deal with than Brexit" <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/24/the-europe-union-has-bigger-problems-to-deal-with-than-brexit> (Guardian’s Economics Editor)//Elmer

China is making faster progress than Europe in the development of machine learning and has companies that pose a threat to the giants of Silicon Valley. That’s why China rather than Europe is the main target for Donald Trump’s tariff war. When plans for the euro were being drawn up 30 years ago, the assumption was that the single currency would make the single market work more efficiently and so generate faster growth. **It hasn’t happened**. The performance of the eurozone countries **has got worse** not better, but so much political capital has been invested in the monetary union project that there is an unwillingness to accept as much. Three separate events last week highlighted the extent of the economic challenges Europe faces. Firstly, the latest health check on the eurozone economy showed that growth remains chronically weak. Italy is suffering from its fifth recession in two decades, while Germany’s export-dominated economy is being hit hard by the slowdown in the global economy. Germany escaped recession only by the skin of its teeth in the second half of 2018 and early 2019 has seen little improvement. The eurozone as a whole appears to be on course to grow by 0.2% in the first three months of the year, unchanged on the last three months of 2018. There was a brief period when heavy doses of stimulus from the European Central Bank (ECB) lifted the eurozone’s growth rate. But the impact of zero interest rates and the money-creation process known as quantitative easing (QE) has now worn off. A real solution to Europe’s growth problems means fixing the design flaws in monetary union, something that has been glaringly obvious since the financial crisis of a decade ago. The lack of a political underpinning to the single currency proved costly back in 2008-09. While the US and the UK moved quickly to cut interest rates and embrace unconventional monetary policies such as QE, **it took much longer for the eurozone** to crank itself into gear. In part, that was due to the ultra-conservative nature of the ECB, which imported its culture from Germany’s Bundesbank, but it was also due to the fact that there was no real mechanism for taking the sort of **speedy decisions** made in Washington and London. Like any convoy, **the eurozone moved at the speed of its slowest ship.** There were two important consequences of this: it took a lot longer for the eurozone to return to growth; and its banks were left saddled with large quantities of non-performing loans. The Americans socialised the bad debts of the big US banks, which enabled them to start lending again. Europe’s banks remain weak and highly **vulnerable to another economic downturn**, which is why the second significant event last week was the announcement by two of Germany’s biggest banks – Deutsche and Commerzbank – that they were in merger talks. Italy has tired of waiting for monetary union to deliver. Its banks are in even worse shape than Germany’s, Rome has no control over monetary policy and its attempts to boost growth by running a bigger budget deficit have fallen foul of Europe’s hardline fiscal rules. Last week, Italy’s government announced it would be the first EU country to take part in China’s Belt and Road initiative – an attempt to link Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe with a series of ports, railways, bridges and other infrastructure projects. Italy’s willingness to take part in the attempt to recreate the old silk road reflects its desperation to revive its economy by any means available. It also reflects Europe’s diminished status in the global pecking order. Emmanuel Macron is convinced the answer to Europe’s economic problems is closer integration. The French president wants the eurozone to have its own finance minister in charge of tax and spending policy for the single currency zone. But for the idea to catch on, Macron needs the support of Germany and Angela Merkel has not been wildly enthusiastic. It’s not hard to see why. German exporters have done well out of monetary union and Merkel knows that German taxpayers would be expected to bankroll spending in poorer eurozone countries. Macron’s plan has a logic to it. **The eurozone is a half-completed project**, lacking the political structure that would give it a chance of working. What’s more, if Europe continues to underperform economically, the alternative to closer integration is **disintegration**. Not immediately, because returning to national currencies or moving to a hard and soft euro, would be fraught with difficulties. Crunch time will only come when the next recession blows in. It might not be all that far away.