## 1NC

### 1NC---OFF

#### Interp: if the aff defends that appropriation of lunar heritage site by private entities is unjust, they must define what a lunar heritage site is in a delineated text in the 1AC

#### Vote neg for stable ground — there is no global definition of lunar heritage site since UNESCO is yet to recognize any heritage sites on the moon, the US’s definition is not predictable on a global topic and nebulous - for example, the NASA website excludes chinese landing sites but their aff ev refers to heritage sites as past landing sites - that decks predictable neg ground because they can delink from DA by redefining the aff - for example, they could adopt a narrow definition of heritage sites to delink from DAs like mining or innovation, or pivot to a broad definition if they’re behind on solvency

#### Independently, vote neg on presumption - private entities will just interpret heritage sites narrowly as possible eg UNESCO heritage sites which don’t exist on the moon

#### Fairness is a voter—it’s a gateway issue to the ballot. Educations a voter because it’s the only portable skill we get from debate

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### CI- Reasonability is arbitrary and we don’t know the brightline while prepping. Collapses since it uses an offense/defense paradigm to win it.

#### No RVIs- A] Illogical- you don’t win for being fair B] Encourages baiting theory which proliferates abuse C] Chills checking abuse for fear of the RVI d] norming I can’t concede the counter interp which forces me to argue for bad norms – turns their standards

### 1NC---OFF

#### [Private Entities] ought to submit a proposal regarding the appropriation of outer space by private entities to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for a National Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact Assessment providing necessary resources, staffing and otherwise, for prioritization of this Assessment. States ought to implement the least environmentally damaging alternative identified in the Environmental Impact Statement.

#### Counterplan competes and creates the the least environmentally damaging version of the aff.

**Haroun et al 21** [Fawaz Haroun, Shalom Ajibade, Philip Oladimeji, and John Kennedy Igbozurike, authors are all faculty of law for the University of Lagos in Nigeria. 03-19-2021, "Toward the Sustainability of Outer Space: Addressing the Issue of Space Debris," New Space, [https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0047 accessed 2/16/22](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0047%20accessed%202/16/22)] Adam

The need for environmental impact assessment

The requirement of environmental impact assessment is contained in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration. The principle provides:

Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.

Before any activity is carried out that is likely to affect the environment, an assessment is to be carried out to know the exact nature of the effect it would have on the environment. The assessment allows the proper consideration of the environment while decisions are being made.[39](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0047#B39) EC Directive 85/337/EEC[40](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0047#B40) was the first international instrument to grant the principle recognition.

In the space context, any activity that is to be undertaken should necessarily require an environmental impact assessment, to know the exact effects of such an activity on outer space. After such assessments have been made, decisions should then be made in line with the assessments. In the case of the launching of spacecrafts into outer space, the trajectory of the spacecraft and the possible effects must be well considered. In addition, in a bid to prevent the increase of space debris, a disposal regime must be created for the spacecraft. Such a disposal regime shall allow the removal of the craft from outer space after it has served its purpose, or at least to have it moved to a safer part of outer space, to prevent the vicious increase of space debris.

#### Nasa uses existing NEPA guidelines in outer space – the counter plan extends that to private entities

**Nasa No Date** [Nasa and the National Environmental Policy Act, No Date, "NASA," Nasa, [https://www.nasa.gov/green/nepa/itm\_NEPAProgram.html accessed 2/16/22](https://www.nasa.gov/green/nepa/itm_NEPAProgram.html%20accessed%202/16/22)] Adam

NASA AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all Federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and the reasonable alternatives to those actions. NASA follows the NEPA regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and has developed agency-specific NEPA policies and regulations to ensure compliance with the NEPA statute, implementing regulations, and related Executive Orders.

NASA’s NEPA Program is managed by the Environmental Management Division, NASA Headquarters, and NASA NEPA Managers who oversee its implementation at the NASA Centers and component facilities. The program ensures that NASA is proactive in meeting its Federal stewardship responsibilities while ensuring mission success and lowering environmental liability. Early implementation of NEPA in the planning stages of NASA programs and projects can be critical to lowering the risk to mission schedules and costs, as well as risks to the environment.

The Agency stands behind its NEPA Program, ensuring that missions are implemented with the least possible impact to the environment. NASA knows that every mission, even exploration of other planets, starts with protecting our home, planet Earth.

**Extinction. EIA is key to preserve space resources, stop resource wars, and extra-terrestrial environmental damage.**

William R. **Kramer**, Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies @ University of Hawaii, **'17**, In dreams begin responsibilities – environmental impact assessment and outer space development, ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE, VOL. 19, NO. 3, 128–138

**Benefits of extraterrestrial environmental impact assessment** Most publications regarding outer space resources maintain that those resources are nearly limitless, and many business models for exploitation do not imagine that resources on Mars, for example, will ever be exhausted (Lewis, 1996; Zubrin, 1996; Renstrom, 2016). Ever is a long time. While the statement may be figuratively true for some mineral ores that may last through an individual company’s project timeline, it is not necessarily true for long-term planning. **There will likely be competition for the rarest (most valuable) minerals**. Without some form of planning and regulation, they may be extracted in an inefficient and environmentally damaging manner and be **quickly depleted** (as exemplified by hydraulic mining for gold on Earth, which wasted much of the resource and resulted in extensive environmental damage) (Merchant, 1998).

How might resources be put to their highest and best use unless regulated? Both the Moon and Mars have water ice which will be **crucial for human survival**, but water also has lucrative industrial uses; it is potentially the raw material for manufacturing both rocket fuel and oxygen. **Conflicts over resource allocation** may be better addressed during an **assessment process** that seeks to balance highest and best use with discovery and first use. Who gains access to specific areas for mining becomes more problematic in that the Outer Space Treaty does not allow “ownership” of extraterrestrial territory; there is no guarantee that companies such as those listed previously will gain access to the most productive sites. The China National Space Administration is planning to place a crew on the Moon by 2024, so **competition for the best sites will be intense** (Kramer, 2015b; China Digital Times, 2012).

Space industries generally are not considering that their proposed actions may preclude alternative uses such as scientific research and human settlement. There will be a stream of not yet imagined uses that could be adversely affected or foreclosed. Many of the same conflicts between land use and human habitation experienced on Earth may emerge on extraterrestrial sites. On the Moon, for example, there are preferable sites for collecting solar energy. These “peaks of eternal light” are areas nearly always or constantly exposed to sunlight at the poles. They are very limited in both distribution and size (Elvis, Milligan, and Krolikowski, 2016). If a mining operation were to determine such areas suitable for their operations, or if mining created a constant plume of dust that would diminish the effectiveness of solar panels, how might such a situation be resolved?

Should potentially dangerous industries such as fuel manufacturing or storage be located near living areas? Would hydraulic fluid pipelines be closely monitored for leaks that may affect subsurface ice deposits mined for drinking water? How might vibrations from detonations affect unrelated structures or scientific instrumentation, such as telescopes? And how might a search for life, whether extinct or still living, be affected by human presence and our trail of bacteria and organic wastes? Humans’ biological pollution of Mars, for example, may greatly affect the results of any search for extraterrestrial life there (Kramer, 2009; McKay, 2009). Peter Doran of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee of the NASA Advisory Council offered, “The big issue with all missions to Mars is we don’t want to create a situation where we are impacting future life-detection science. Picture humans … walking around shedding microbes everywhere we go. Space suits as we know them do not take care of this problem (Mack, 2016).”

#### The CP’s binding and substantive mandate reverses the Trump era reforms that circumvent the obligations of the NEPA --- the plan would exacerbate the legitimacy crisis

**Murphy 20** (Jim Murphy, Senior Counsel and Director of Legal Advocacy with the National Wildlife Federation, JD from Boston College Law School, “Undercutting Environmental Law’s Magna Carta,” Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 35, Issue 1, Summer 2020, pp. 50-52)

Passed in 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, is considered the Magna Carta of environmental laws. On its face, NEPA only sensibly requires that for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement" be prepared that, among other things, consider the environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, and alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C 4332. Other than this "hard look" at the environmental impacts of major federal actions, NEPA demands little. The agency need not choose the least environmentally damaging alternative, abandon, or change the project as a result of its "hard look." Yet, the statute has been revolutionary in its vision and impact. After decades of relatively unchecked pollution, its purpose was "[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." 42 U.S.C. 4321. NEPA represented a fundamental value shift; under NEPA, the costs and impacts of our actions on the environment no longer would be ignored in decision-making processes. Early on, courts made clear that the requirements of NEPA must be carried out "to the fullest extent possible" (see, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)), and that Congress was concerned with "all potential environmental effects that affect the quality of the human environment" (Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 1973)), including cumulative effects (Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)), and indirect effects. Minn. Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322 (8th Cir. 1974). Since 1978, the mandates of NEPA have been implemented through Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations and a substantial body of federal case law that preceded and has evolved along with those regulations, as well as agency specific rules and guidance. During this time, NEPA has worked to help move federal projects in a direction that has resulted in environmental benefits and wiser use of taxpayer dollars. Now, the Trump administration has proposed sweeping changes, claiming that "the outdated regulations have slowed and impeded the development of needed infrastructure in communities across the nation." Fact Sheet: CEQ's Proposal to Modernize its NEPA Implementing Regulations. These changes would turn this paradigm shifting statute into a mere check-the-box exercise, **effectively gutting it.** The existing CEQ NEPA regulations require all agencies to perform an environmental assessment for major federal action where the agency must determine whether to perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) or issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). 40 C.F.R. parts 1500-08. These regulations, inter alia, require that the agency broadly consider the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts, as well as all reasonable alternatives of a major federal action. They also ensure meaningful opportunities to engage the public and other federal, state, tribal and local agencies in the NEPA process. The regulations further allow for many actions to escape individual review altogether through the use of categorical exclusions. The environmental benefits of these regulations have played out in the following three water resources projects: (1) preparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement led the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to save more than 4,300 acres of wetlands that would have been destroyed had the Corps followed its original plan for raising levees along the Mississippi River; (2) environmental review of the proposed Bolinas Lagoon dredging project in California demonstrated that the Corps' proposal would cause extensive harm to one of the most pristine tidal lagoons in California and was not necessary, saving taxpayers $133 million; and (3) the environmental review process exposed the devastating environmental impacts of the Yazoo Backwater Pumping Plant project in Mississippi, prompting the George W Bush administration to veto the project. This saved taxpayers more than $220 million and protected 200,000 acres of wetlands-an area the size of all five boroughs of New York City. And the regulations have had similar beneficial effects in other projects including highways, pipelines, airports, and other federal actions. Contrary to CEQ's claim that the existing regulations pose a roadblock to economic growth, the vast majority of NEPA reviews are carried out in a very short time frame, in large part because of the flexible structure of the current rules. According to the Government Accounting Office, approximately 95 percent of all projects subject to NEPA are carried out through the categorical exclusion process, another four percent of projects are reviewed through environmental assessments, and less than one percent of projects are reviewed using the more comprehensive EIS. Government Accountability Office, National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information Exists on NEPA Analyses, GAO-14-370 (Apr. 2014) at 8. The Congressional Research Service thus has concluded that "there is little data available to demonstrate that NEPA currently plays a significant role in delaying federal actions." Congressional Research Service, The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Background and Implementation, RL33152 (Jan. 10, 2011) at 26. Despite this, the Trump administration has proposed a rule that would **severely hobble NEPA.** Described below are some of the most significant ways in which the proposed rule would weaken NEPA. Eliminate NEPA review for many projects. The proposed rule excludes many projects from NEPA review. It changes the definition of "major federal action" to allow for projects with significant impacts to escape review under certain circumstances. It also allows agencies to exempt a project from NEPA review by determining that an analysis under a different statute could serve the same purpose, even if that analysis is not as searching or the agency lacks environmental expertise. Ignore many impacts. The proposed rule severely limits the types of impacts examined when a NEPA review is carried out. It boldly states that analysis of cumulative effects "is not required" (Proposed 40 C.F. R. 1508.1(g)(2), 85 Fed. Reg. 1684, 1729 (Jan. 10, 2020)), thus likely eliminating review of a project's role in exacerbating climate change and many other types of harm to the environment, public safety and health. Agencies also could ignore many types of severe impacts based on the proposed rule's elimination of all references to "indirect" effects, and its directive to review only impacts with a "reasonably close causal relationship" to the proposed action. These changes would **encourage agencies to ignore long-term impacts** such as toxic pollution from gold or copper mines, the risks of new levees diverting floodwaters onto other communities, and the loss of wetlands caused by reservoir management practices that starve a river of the water flows needed to sustain those wetlands. Significantly weaken review of alternatives. The proposed rule significantly weakens the assessment of alternatives during a NEPA review, **dramatically undermining NEPAs** fundamental **purpose** of exploring less environmentally harmful approaches to achieving the project purpose. The proposed rule eliminates the requirements to "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives" and to consider reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency. It instead directs a much less extensive review, requiring only that agencies "evaluate reasonable alternatives to the proposed action." Proposed 40 C.F.R. 1502.14, 85 Fed. Reg. at 1721. These changes, along with the proposed changes to the "purpose and need statement" which gives undue weight to the applicants said purpose, virtually guarantee that many cost-saving, reasonable alternatives with fewer adverse environmental impacts will not be considered. Allow agencies to ignore critical public input. The proposed rule would let agencies **ignore public comments** that they deem are not "specific" enough or do not include references to data sources or scientific methodologies. It improperly places the burden on the public to list any and all possible impacts of a proposed project, to provide specific language changes, and to "explain why an issue raised is significant" to the consideration of impacts to the environment, the economy, employment and potential alternatives. Proposed 40 C.F.R. 1503.3(a), 85 Fed. Reg. at 1722. Comments most likely to be ignored as a result of this change include those from the general public, those from frontline communities without resources to fund technical reviews, and those that rely on traditional knowledge rather than technical data. Eliminates conflict of interest safeguards. The proposed rule eliminates longstanding safeguards designed to protect the independence and **integrity of environmental reviews.** Under the current regulations, federal agencies prepare NEPA reviews, and agencies can only hire consultants to assist in a NEPA review after obtaining disclosures of any conflicts of interest or financial stakes the reviewing consultant may have in the project. The proposed rule, however, lets companies proposing a project prepare their own NEPA reviews - despite their clear interest in obtaining project approval. Agencies also could hire contractors without obtaining a conflict of interest disclosure. These extensive changes would **transform NEPA**'s action-forcing mechanisms **into** little more than **a paperwork "check-the-box" exercise** that **ignores major impacts** and **stymies public input.** Today, as we face unprecedented challenges of a global public health crisis and the impacts of climate change on our daily lives, the need to incorporate thoughtful consideration of how proposed projects impact our environment is more important than ever. We should be strengthening the NEPA decision-making process to better ensure that the full costs of our actions on the environment are known, not seeking to hide these costs. If we ignore these costs, one way or another, they will come due.

#### Adherence to NEPA solves global ecological sustainability

**Caldwell 98** (Lynton K. Caldwell, Professor Emeritus of Political Science & Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, MA in History and Government from Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago, “Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act,” 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 203, Lexis)

\*\*\*note --- edited for gendered language & grammar, marked in brackets

A distinguishing feature of any society is its prevailing assumptions about its relationship to the Earth. The history of cultures--especially of religions--reveals a great number of cosmologies, the perceived relationships of people to their planetary environment. Today the **survival** of living species may depend first, upon the degree to which [hu]mankind's concept of its environmental situation corresponds to biophysical realities and second, upon what humans value, and how these values are expressed in relation to these realities. Archeology has recorded the failure of societies that have misconceived the requirements for environmental sustainability. During the earlier centuries of human history the impact of society on its environment was relatively light and local. If an environment, for whatever reason, became unsustainable, people could often move on to new lands, often displacing or destroying the original inhabitants. When degradation of the environment was slow or scarcely perceptible, the consequences of its decline often were not felt until they were irreversible. Where human numbers were small relative to space, migration permitted impaired environments to recover, at least partially. But many areas of the Earth have never recovered from the degradation of centuries-long misuse, and still more are headed toward impoverishment. In a world filled with people and settlements, the option of migration is increasingly unavailable. Recognition of narrowing environmental options has led in recent decades to conservation practices assisted by the growth of science, to the comparative measurement of environmental change, and to forecasts of the probable consequences of present trends. The conservation of natural resources movement has had a paradoxical effect upon human perceptions of environmental realities. While the conservation movement contributed both to the emergence of applied ecology and public environmental concern, many conservationists rejected environmentalism (often called preservationism) as uneconomical, unrealistic and anti-social. Economy and efficiency in the wise use of resources has been the essence of "conservation," which sees the environment as infinitely manageable--capable of sustained productivity under the guidance of experts knowledgeable of science. In this respect, conservationism [\*236] is fundamentally consistent with the Western worldview, especially that which prevailed during the era of U.S. Progressivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. n82 Environmentalism emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century from a convergence of changing perceptions of the human condition in fields as diverse as ecology, public health, demography, climatology, cosmology, and ethics. When its true dimensions, assumptions, and expectations are understood, environmentalism is, as Robert Nisbet observed, revolutionary. n83 Its effect upon human society is comparable to the changed views of reality inherent in the Copernican cosmic revolution in the seventeenth century and the Darwinian evolution revolution in the nineteenth century. To some, this conclusion may seem to be an exaggerated estimate of the influence of environmentalism and its future prospects. Following initial successes of environmental protection efforts, there has been in many countries (including the United States) an anti-government reaction that has sometimes been violent. n84 It is doubtful that in the long run the "green backlash" will prevail. Its angry proponents are chiefly natural resources industries, land developers and speculators, libertarians, and their allies in public office. Still the counter-intuitive behavior of social systems makes any forecast of the future uncertain. Nevertheless there are ascertainable, measurable trends in today's world that strongly suggest the impending negative impact of powerful coercive environmental events upon human society in the twenty-first century. Adherence to principles like those expressed in NEPA may become more a matter of necessity than of voluntary choice. The way in which people and their governments respond to the prospect of these coercions will **shape the future of the world.** The timing of effective response is equally important. The longer the delay, the more [\*237] difficult the task and the greater the possibility of irremediable damage. Because the future of the world in the twenty-first century cannot be foreseen, we can only conjecture the true location of NEPA on the trajectory of history. I offer the following assessment of the significance of NEPA, fully realizing that, at least in the short run, the world is capable of unpredictable turns. NEPA is most fully understood as a national policy for henceforward into the future. "Environment" may be understood as a surrogate term for a concept more comprehensive than is usually appreciated. Our language tends to lag behind new insights. Among our most persistent and pervasive misconceptions is the artificial dichotomy of economy/ecology. Their true relationship might be suggested by the time-space concept in physics. The concepts of ecology and economy are not the same--they are distinguishable, but, paradoxically, also inseparable.n85 In mundane reality there are obvious conflicts within and between the "domains" of economy and the environment. Yet both these aspects of our world are in actuality inextricable--separable by cultural convention and for analytic purposes. In reality they should have a common inclusive name. Achievement of a national policy for the environment requires awareness of the ecology/economy interrelationship, of the direction toward which the world appears to be moving, and a growth of consensus on the kind of future that is desirable and sustainable. A national policy for the future of the environment cannot be achieved in isolation from other major societal issues. Issues of population, material growth, property rights and obligations, and basic social equities involve choices which many people would prefer not to make. But the world today is not a "new age of Aquarius," free from ultimate accountability to nature, if not to humanity. Regardless of what we may deny or resist, our society will in one way or another be compelled to accommodate its behaviors [\*238] to the inexorable workings of the world. But **apocalypse** need not be a preordained outcome for a society that marshals and moves its moral, material, intellectual, and organizational capabilities toward attainment of a preferred and sustainable future. IX. AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE The National Environmental Policy Act may be seen as a charter and agenda to guide this nation toward rational strategies for coping with the critical environmental problems that are present and growing. The United States has the material and intellectual capabilities for setting a[n] non-hegemonic **example for the world.** Whether it can generate a collective moral purpose to do so remains uncertain. As individuals, there is little that people can do to reverse destructive socio-ecological trends. Voluntary local initiatives may help where there is a sense of community purpose. But our fundamental environmental problems transcend manmade boundaries and require solutions commensurate with the problems, which are increasingly seen to be transnational, even global. The 1968 Biosphere Conference and the 1972 and 1992 U.N. conferences on the environment testify to an international recognition of [hu]mankind's environmental predicament. Yet in a world governed by nations, national action is necessary, not only for each nation, but for **international cooperation.** Action on any major social issue requires a **credible** collective purpose, catalytic **leadership,** and popular receptivity. There is strong evidence that the last of these--public support for environmental action--already exists. A goal-directed agenda is necessary to focus and activate social effort, for without such a codification of purpose, there can be no concerted action. Translation of social purpose into action is a function of leadership. To cope with the environmental predicament of [hu]mankind, leadership must be national and participatory, involving all sectors of society, but with an indispensable responsibility in government which is the affirming and coordinative institution for nationwide and international effort. For the United States, NEPA provides a comprehensive agenda for the environmental future. NEPA creates a foundation for a **unifying national effort** and **legitimizes** its goals and principles as [\*239] national policy. Beyond NEPA, specific, targeted action programs are needed to achieve its intent. NEPA may be regarded, in effect, as a constitution for the environment--principles to guide the nation toward an enhanced quality of life and an enduring environmental future.

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Infinite abuse claims are wrong- A] Spikes solve-you can just preempt paradigms in the 1AC B] Functional limits- 1nc is only 7 minutes long

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### Condo is good proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

#### Process CPs are good – key to testing the intrinsicness of the 1AC enforcement mechanism which allows for more in depth clash and education over real world process

## Case

### 1NC---AT: Solvency

#### The activity that happens on lunar heritage sites is tourism – that isn’t appropriation.

#### Appropriation means permanent control over a region of space.

Trapp 13, Timothy Justin. "Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty." U. Ill. L. Rev. (2013): 1681. (JD Candidate at UIUC Law School)//Re-cut by Elmer

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217

[\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]

The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were try3ing to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Space Tourism is explicitly temporary.

Hall et Al 15, Colin Michael, Stefan Gössling, and Daniel Scott, eds. The Routledge handbook of tourism and sustainability. Vol. 922. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. (C. Michael Hall is currently Professor (Ahurei) in Marketing and Tourism in the Department of Management, Marketing & Entrepreneurship, School of Business, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, having joined the department in 2007. He is also currently Visiting Professor and Docent in Geography, University of Oulu, Finland; Visiting Professor in tourism, School of Business & Economics, Linneaus University, Kalmar, Sweden)//Elmer

Space tourism is the temporary movement of people for non-military and scientific reasons beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. The Kármán line, at an altitude of 100 km (62 miles) above sea level, is conventionally used as the start of outer space for regulatory purposes, such as the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty.

### 1NC---AT: Prolif

#### No impact to prolif

--aggression is rare, only in states with severe territorial threats

--most likely is expansion of existing disputes, but that has modest empirical effect

--accidents are disproven by seven decades of previous proliferation

--examples of accidents are all correlated with compellance, not prolif

--terrorism hasn’t happened, despite predictions

--no state would share weapons with non-state actors given obvious attribution

Dr. Jonas **Schneider 20**, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, Former Post-​Doctoral Fellowship at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, PhD in Political Science from the University of Kiel, Former Research Associate at the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel, “Nuclear Proliferation and International Stability”, in Understanding Global Politics: Actors And Themes In International Affairs, Ed. Larres and Wittlinger, p. 418-419

Subsequent research has detailed the conditions under which new nuclear powers adopt these courses of action. Bell (2016) has argued that only those **few** new nuclear states who face **severe territorial threats**, such as Pakistan, opt for **aggress**ion, using their nuclear weapons as shields to deter nuclear and extensive conventional retaliation. Similarly drawing on Pakistan’s increased conflict propensity following its nuclear acquisition, Kapur’s (2007) research suggests that it is the **rare** combination of revisionist ambitions and conventional inferiority that leads new nuclear powers to pursue aggressive military policies toward their rivals. Importantly, while they offer different explanations, the two **studies concur** that aggression is a **fairly unlikely** effect of nuclear acquisition.

Meanwhile, according to Bell (2016), new nuclear states undertake an expansion of their foreign policy interests if their territory is not threatened and their relative material power is rising. Historically, such **expansions** have been **more** common than **aggression**: upon acquiring nuclear weapons, the US, South Africa, Israel and the Soviet Union all initiated several militarised disputes targeting states with whom they had no previous conflict (Bell and Miller, 2015: online appendix). Despite the mostly **low intensity** of these disputes, such **expansive** conflict behaviour can hardly be considered stabilising. Overall, then, new nuclear states seem to have a **moderately** destabilising influence on world politics: they initiate new disputes and take greater risks. At the same time, however, acquiring nuclear weapons **rarely** facilitates **severe** aggression.

Reconsidering nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism

The notion that the spread of nuclear weapons would someday lead to tragic nuclear **accidents** or even nuclear **terrorism** has long been among proliferation pessimists’ foremost concerns. However, as reliable datasets on all (attempted) nuclear terrorism plots and on nuclear safety incidents in all nuclear states and proliferators have proved elusive, **empirical** scholarship has **not kept pace** with **theoretical** work. Hence, research has been limited to deductive analyses, buttressed by empirical illustrations. Even so, the **more sophisticated** of those **studies** have called the **pessimists**’ claims into question.

For instance, Cohen (2016, pp. 432–434) revealed that the vast majority of the gravest nuclear accidents that Sagan (1993, p. 9) points to as support for his logic occurred during global crises in 19**62** or 19**73**, when leaders sought to leverage their nuclear arsenals for **coercive bargaining**. It was, in other words, **not** organisational pathologies that raised the specter of accidental nuclear war, as Sagan holds, but rather the deliberate attempts at nuclear compellence. These accidents, then, represent the actual ‘effects’ of nuclear compellence: while the compellent threats did not affect the trajectory of either crises (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2017, pp. 207, 220–224), they led to precarious nuclear safety incidents.

Other critics have rightly pointed out that, **seven decades** **in**to the nuclear age, the fact – however fortunate it is – that the world has **still no**t experienced a catastrophic fatal nuclear accident should **give proliferation pessimists pause** (Sechser, 2013, pp. 184–186). Obviously, the **bounded rationality** of such organisations alone does **not** make tragic nuclear accidents **nearly as likely** as the pessimists contend. Their fear, hence, seems to be **overstated**.

The **same** must probably be said about nuclear **terror**ism. Determinate predictions that a terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons was bound to occur **soon** (Allison, 2004, p. 15; Graham, 2008, p. VI) have **come and gone** without **anything** happening. Sceptical experts have argued that this outcome is **not surprising** at all, given the **formidable practical obstacles** such a terrorist scheme would encounter (Levi, 2009). Moreover, to the extent that fissile materials from nuclear weapons can now be **traced** back to specific state arsenals, the idea that a nuclear power could **willingly share** its arsenal with terrorists and hope to remain anonymous has been **challenged** as **lacking plausibility** (Lieber and Press, 2013).

#### Their evidence is biased punditry---the empirical record disproves escalation

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Both the classic proliferation optimism-pessimism debate and the recent empirical scholarship have studied the spread of nuclear weapons largely through a systemic lens: they have focused on how further nuclear proliferation affects international stability. For the **world as a whole**, as we have seen, the effects of **prolif**eration must be described as **(only) moderately** destabilising.

Crucially, however, these moderate overall effects are distributed unequally across states in the international system. As Kroenig’s work (2009, 2010, 2014b) stresses, states that are capable of projecting conventional military power over long distances are most affected by the consequences of further proliferation, regardless of whether their rivals or allies build the bombs. If rivals get nuclear weapons, then such power-projecting states lose their ability to coerce and invade these rivals. If junior allies acquire an arsenal, power-projecting states lose sway over the ally’s policies because they can no longer manipulate its military dependence. In contrast, states with little or no power-projection capability are affected by proliferation only if it occurs in their own region, but have little to lose from proliferation in other parts of the world because they did not have the capability to intervene in far-away countries in the first place and do not extend security guarantees to nations in other regions.

Given these differential effects, it is no surprise that regional military powers like France, West Germany and China have often refused to sacrifice economic benefits to prevent proliferation (Kroenig, 2014b; Müller, 1990), whereas nonproliferation has been at the forefront of US grand strategy throughout the nuclear age (Gavin, 2015). Equipped with the strongest conventional forces and the ambition to make its influence felt in every corner of the globe, the US has had the most to lose from the spread of nuclear arsenals: rivals with nuclear weapons might be better able to resist pressure from Washington, bolster other US adversaries or engage in aggression against the US or its allies and partners, while nuclear-armed allies may act more independently of, or even thwart, American interests (Bell, 2016).

Facing such daunting scenarios, the US has consistently opposed proliferation by foes and friends alike. To prevent others from building nuclear weapons, Washington has wielded all tools of US statecraft, ranging from security guarantees (Gavin, 2015), vigorous bilateral diplomacy (Schneider, 2016; Miller, 2014a) and mandatory US sanctions (Miller, 2014b) to collective technology denial (Burr, 2014) and even sustained collusion with its chief adversary, the Soviet Union (Coe and Vaynman, 2015). Remarkably, when these preventive efforts failed, the US more than once cut secret deals committing the new nuclear power to forgo nuclear testing so as to avoid, at least, triggering further proliferation (Miller and Rabinowitz, 2015).

Today, virtually every policymaker, official and **pundit** in the US intuitively opposes the spread of nuclear weapons as extremely dangerous, no matter where it occurs (Carus, 2016; Gavin, 2012b). The same can be said about many officials and experts from states that are US allies or close partners (Gibbons, 2015; Schwartz, 2014). Yet as we have seen, such **alarmist appraisals** are **not borne out** by the **empirical record** about how nuclear weapons have influenced international stability, but appear to be a **consequence** of the **differential effects** of proliferation. Thus, these **excessively concerned** voices do **not** abstract themselves from the **specific policy interests** of their states (Betts, 2001, pp. 64–65): They see an international order underwritten by US military primacy and American political leadership as preferable to any alternative.

Every official who shares that outlook must view proliferation as a major threat because it sharply limits Washington’s global influence and undermines the US-led international security order. Scholars, however, should be transparent about the fact that this appraisal is **coloured by specific policy preferences**. In contrast, an **equidistant** assessment of the available scholarship on nuclear proliferation can only conclude that, for the world as a whole, the spread of nuclear weapons appears to be destabilising, but **only moderately so**.

#### Horizontal & vertical prolif raises the threshold for conventional wars—those are more probable and deadly

Leah & Lowther 17 (Christine Leah, Former Chauncey Postdoctoral Fellow in Grand Strategy at Yale University and Adam B Lowther, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies Spring 2017. “Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Volume 11. Issue 1. pg. 14-24. <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-1/Leah.pdf>)

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a weaker state significantly complicates the decision-making calculus of a militarily superior state. For these reasons, power-projecting states fear nuclear proliferation to both allied and enemy states.5 This is a point worth underscoring and one that is often overlooked when nonproliferation is discussed and its rationale and purposes debated. These factors demonstrate that the “more may be better” view of nuclear weapons proffered by political scientist Kenneth Waltz is entirely relevant and accurate.6 Waltz famously argued that more nuclear weapons in the world would tend to increase deterrence among states. That logic is turned on its head in a world with far fewer nuclear weapons and a greater reliance on conventional systems, which may actually be destabilizing. This was true even before the advent of the atomic bomb. The awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons tended to overshadow the failure of conventional deterrence in the decades and centuries preceding the first use of nuclear weapons.7 Thomas Schelling, an economist and foreign policy scholar, also argued very specifically that more nuclear weapons might enhance strategic stability by increasing the survivability of a nation’s nuclear forces.8 Because states might be more risk acceptant with conventional forces and concepts of first and second strikes are much less well defined in the conventional realm, stability was much more fragile in the pre-nuclear age and would likely prove fragile in a world with fewer, or zero, nuclear weapons. Advocates of a world free of nuclear weapons often overlook this point. A world with fewer nuclear, but more conventional, forces is likely to bring forth new dynamics for arms races, which increase the likelihood of disputes and wars.9 Reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons does not remove proliferation problems from the agenda. Might we fear arms races in the second conventional age less because of the subnuclear consequences of an advanced conventional missile system, or should we fear it more because of the lower threshold to the use of armed force that might be involved? A world not anxious about nuclear proliferation is more likely to be anxious about the proliferation of advanced conventional systems. In that world, the knowledge that war might escalate to the use of an immediate and devastating nuclear strike is gone. This also raises new issues influencing the extent to which a conventional war may be more controllable than a nuclear one. As Lawrence Freedman, the doyen of British strategic studies, writes, “In principle, denial is a more reliable strategy than punishment because, if the threats have to be implemented, it offers control rather than continuing coercion. With punishment, the [adversary] is left to decide how much more to take. With denial, the choice is removed.”10 Nuclear Reductions, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Nuclear abolitionists have very different views on the nature of deterrence. Their efforts are based largely on a fundamental ideological dislike of nuclear weapons rather than a deep understanding or appreciation of them. Global nuclear disarmament, if considered in a vacuum, would make the world safer for US conventional power projection but would not necessarily promote strategic stability. This observation is made repeatedly by Russian and Chinese analysts, who clearly understand American conventional superiority. On this basis an argument can indeed be made that global disarmament disproportionately benefits the United States, not regional or global competitors like Russia and China. The effects of conventional capabilities are certainly a neglected topic when compared to the focus on nuclear arms control over the past seven years. They are generally said to bear, or lack, significance in comparison to WMDs. But does this argument still hold in a world with no nuclear weapons? A great deal of analysis is still needed to assess whether and how reductions could be managed to the point that no nuclear-armed state has more than a minimum deterrent. For even further reductions to occur, the process would necessarily have to be multilateral, including China, India, and Pakistan. While China and other states have indicated that they would potentially be willing to enter into negotiations once the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals, they have not specified at what level of forces this might conceivably take place. In any case, the process would involve complex calculations of deterrence equations involving changing sets of multiple actors as well as conventional imbalances that are, again, a major source of concern for many countries that may find themselves at odds with the United States. For the “P5” nuclear weapons states (those with permanent seats on the United Nations’ Security Council) such as Russia and China who are members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the issue of conventional imbalance compounds the difficulty they face in shaping the perception of some states who suggest that the P5 failed to take significant steps toward nuclear disarmament. Pakistan, for instance, has recently accused the United States and other countries of nuclear hypocrisy, with the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations saying that a handful of nuclear-weapon states advocate abstinence for others but are unwilling to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons or cease modernization efforts. The ambassador also stressed that double standards were not only evident on nuclear issues but also in the area of conventional arms: “While professing strict adherence to responsible arms transfers, some powerful states continue to supply increasing numbers of conventional weapons in our region, thereby aggravating instability in South Asia.”11 Indeed, from the Pakistani perspective, the international community does not give enough attention to the issue of vertical proliferation (arms buildup). Certainly, it should come as no surprise that Pakistan continues to stress the importance of nuclear weapons in acting as a deterrent to perceived Indian conventional military superiority.12 Pakistan has made efforts at addressing issues of conventional force imbalances with India in the past, but New Delhi has traditionally dismissed these efforts, instead focusing on its larger regional competitor, China.13 The problem in South Asia is therefore at least a trilateral one. However, the issue speaks to a much larger problem, and that is multilateral conventional arms control. If the India-Pakistan strategic situation offers any lesson, it is that weaker states (such as Pakistan) may desire to develop a “great equalizer” to achieve the security that they cannot find through traditional (conventional) means. With the United States and Russia undertaking a 90 percent reduction in their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, it is fair to say that these efforts have promoted neither goodwill nor a peaceful posture in countries like China or North Korea. We are not suggesting that American nuclear force reductions have pushed Beijing to expand its antiship ballistic missile inventory, place multiple warheads on its DF-41 ballistic missiles, build artificial islands with deployed military capabilities, or build bases in northern Africa. Nevertheless, it does show that there is little evidence to suggest that nuclear cuts necessarily lead to a more peaceful security environment. If anything, regional and global security evolve independently of the size and shape of one country’s nuclear arsenal. North Korea, in particular, has pursued a nuclear weapons program as a means of countering American conventional superiority, paying little or no attention to the United States’ declining nuclear arsenal. Conventional Arsenals, Crisis Stability, and Arms Race Stability Nuclear reductions have important consequences for both crisis stability and arms race stability. Conventional forces differ tremendously from nuclear forces in the way they are organized and operate and in their destructiveness. These distinctions influence the way in which arms-control arrangements aimed at conventional arms-race stability and crisis stability must be conceptualized in a world free of nuclear weapons but safe for conventional conflict. To be highly destructive, conventional forces need to be used en masse. Their successful application requires well-organized cooperation between many military units, often between different types of military forces (land, air, naval, cyber, and space), and, due to the globalization of conflict, also the participation of several allied states granting military support and access. Conventional forces most often seek military victory, which requires they first defeat adversarial forces before the political objectives of the conflict can be achieved. Also, to be militarily effective, conventional forces need upto-date technology and well-trained troops that are capable of effectively employing weapons of war. Crisis stability is a term that was perfected in its use during the nuclear age. Crisis stability aims at developing incentives for using the lowest level of military force possible—all while seeking to prevent escalation. It also seeks to control the emotions that are prevalent in conflict, providing procedures to cope with a crisis. Nuclear reductions and disarmament may make a paradoxical and undesired contribution; reducing expected levels of death and destruction if war comes might actually increase the probability of the onset of war. Even if two states went to war, one would expect the nuclear sword of Damocles to incentivize them to end the conflict as soon as possible. In addition, the historical record clearly shows there is not the same taboo or norm against using conventional missiles and bombers as there is against using an atomic version.14 Not a single nuclear warhead has been delivered by any delivery system since 1945. By contrast, over the past 45 years, ballistic missiles were employed in at least six different conflicts: the Egyptian and Syrian missile attacks on Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1980–88 war between Iraq and Iran, the Afghan civil war of 1988–91, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Yemen civil war of 1994, and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Indeed the duration and controllability of a war becomes important here. As antinuclear advocate Randall Forsberg admits, The main role of nuclear weapons has always been to deter conventional war among the world’s “big powers” (the USA, the USSR, the UK, France, West Germany, China, and Japan) by posing a clear risk that such a war would escalate to nuclear war. If ballistic missiles were abolished, raising again the prime strategic question of the 1950s—could a conventional war be fought without going nuclear, and if it went nuclear, could it be won?—it would diminish nuclear deterrence of conventional war.15 (emphasis in original) The fog of war could become much thicker. Even if lower-yield nuclear weapons were used, they could still significantly disrupt command, control, communication, and intelligence. In the conventional world this would be less of an issue because of the smaller level of destruction, over a much more protracted amount of time, thus enabling more time to react. In the nuclear age, time becomes much more compressed. Moreover, assuming that deterrence was still desirable, states would have to rethink how to reorient their forces toward achieving a conventional second-strike capability. This might lead to a different type of arms race. This concept was already present before the advent of the bomb, in discussions about the importance of airpower and having enough aircraft to deter aggression among European states.16 All these issues raise the importance of focusing on conventional arms control as much as nuclear reductions, especially in the Asia-Pacific. Arms race stability aims at lowering incentives to further build up military forces. Thus we might conceivably ask: if the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals to a few hundred warheads each— and other nations to a few dozen—might we see a nonnuclear arms race to fill a nuclear void?17 As the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states, “fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years—including the growth of unrivaled US conventional military capabilities [and] major improvements in missile defenses . . . enable us to fulfill . . . objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons . . . without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals.18 If one accepts this statement, and if opponents of nuclear modernization are truly concerned about reducing global instability, they should be urging the administration to cancel and eliminate a number of conventional capabilities that are far more concerning to our adversaries. Granted, such a position is irrational, but if stability is the key then this is the logical position to hold. Indeed, even with successful elimination of nuclear weapons, the tasks of strategic deterrence, extended deterrence, and arms control do not go away. Instead, they become more difficult to manage. This is especially true for conventional arms control, because nuclear weapons tend to make deterrence much easier, or so the historical record would seem to indicate. If one argues for further nuclear reductions and nuclear disarmament, then one needs to be responsible and also think seriously about conventional arms control. Conventional imbalances and any remaining system of deterrence would increasingly become the focus of deterrence and would serve as the source of instability.19 This is especially true because, in many instances, the imbalance and insecurity of a conventional-only world have remained obscured during the nuclear age.20 With Article VI of the NPT obliging nuclear-weapon states to work toward general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, would such a treaty be required or feasible in a conventional world? This possibility raises an important question: to what extent should nuclearweapon states focus on reducing their arsenals as a precondition for conventional disarmament? We have tended to think that it would first be a good idea to reduce nuclear weapons before reducing conventional forces. However, nuclear weapons are but one component of the overall military balance among states. In an age without nuclear weapons, it is also conceivable that deterrence relationships will simply not work without boosting some aspects of conventional arsenals. The more-maybe-better logic that Schelling (and others) applied to nuclear weapons may also carry into an entirely conventional era. That is, fewer nuclear weapons in the world would likely entail more conventional forces to compensate, which would not necessarily be a stabilizing development. For advocates of “global zero,” the implications of a world free of nuclear weapons are assumed to be inherently positive. However, the reality of such a world may be far less positive because the psychological effect achieved by the understood destructive power of nuclear weapons will no longer push risk-acceptant national leaders to allow caution to prevail. Given that no current leader of a nuclear-weapon state was even alive prior to the development of the atomic bomb, the security and stability of a nuclear-free world should not be taken for granted. Instead, much more work is required to understand the implications of such a fundamental change to a proven and stable approach to constraining great-power conflict. Conclusion If the past offers any lessons for the future, it is not unreasonable to believe that a world free of nuclear weapons is a world in which standing armies grow larger, defense expenditures (as a percentage of gross domestic product) increase, and conflict becomes more frequent as the perceived risks to a nation and its leaders decline. National leaders are not always rational, because they do not effectively weigh costs and benefits or risks and rewards, which would lead them to overvalue the prospect of a loss and undervalue the prospect of a gain. The certain loss caused by any prospective use of nuclear weapons has caused decision makers to exercise great restraint when contemplating the prospective use of force.21 History appears to suggest that, to some degree, nuclear weapons do cause decision makers to see the use of nuclear weapons as ensuring losses, with few gains—causing restraint. Thus, eliminating nuclear weapons may well reduce perceived risks and increase perceived gains from fighting—making the world safe for conventional conflict. Such a state of affairs would not have the same absolute risk associated with it that nuclear warfare poses (that of total annihilation), but it would increase the risks of proliferating conflict, which may lead to a dramatic increase in conflict-related casualties.

#### Iranian nuclear weapons are key to regional deterrence.

O’Grady 19 (Sean, Associate Editor, The Independent, “Let Iran have its nuclear weapons – it would make the world safer for us all,” https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iran-drone-us-cold-war-nuclear-weapons-a8967091.html, 6/20/2019, 7/5/2019) DG

Drone down. No one hurt. There ain’t gonna be no war. Iran's revolutionary guards managed to shoot down a Yankee drone. Big deal. Embarrassing for the Americans, but they’ve had worse. At least it shows they’re keeping an eye on their troublesome foes. It was bound to happen, such is the state of relations between the two countries, and such is the sheer volume of unmanned aircraft activity in the region. Downing stray aircrafts is the sort of thing that happens in cold wars, just as it did in the US-USSR Cold War in the 1960s. And America and Iran have long been engaged in a cold war that has lasted about as long as the one they fought with the Russians, and is laced with even more hatred. For 40 years they have been spying and bugging each other, engaged in economic warfare and sanctions, fighting proxy wars in Iraq, Syria to Yemen, engaging in propaganda and counter-propaganda, exchanging insults, backing state-sponsored terrorism. The lot. The (probable) Iranian mining of oil tankers in the Gulf – the oil coming from US allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – is just another shady, disputed incident between the two sides. Since the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the seizing of the American hostages in the Tehran embassy, America and Iran have been at war. Only the short-lived international nuclear proliferation treaty signed under the Obama administration in 2015 represented much of a truce in their incessant hostilities, and of course that has now been rescinded by Donald Trump. The Great Satan versus the axis of evil? It’s not such a new story. What is novel is that the Iranians are now winning their cold war with Tehran – and it is the fault of President Trump and his predecessors. Iran looks to Kim Jong-Un, fellow axis of evil/rogue state club member, and Iran’s secret nuclear collaborator, for help and inspiration. Despite the harshest of US and UN economic sanctions, and with a notorious disregard for the welfare of his own citizens, Kim has developed nuclear weaponry such that he is now immune from US military aggression. He can easily hit Japan and South Korea with his missiles, and might be able accurately to reach US interests in Guam and Hawaii, maybe even the west coast, if the hermit king of Pyongyang got lucky. Whatever. The Americans know that he has the ability to hit them and their allies very hard. He has acquired a nuclear deterrent. End of story. Now America, and Donald Trump of all people, wants to talk to him. A first strike attack on North Korea is today unthinkable and impractical, and a “hot” war between America and North Korea impossible. Instead the US wants to hold summits with Kim, treat him as an equal, blessing him with the prestige granted to a nuclear power. His regime is unassailable. The dynasty is assured. The reckless programme to acquire nuclear weapons and the ability to project that power far out into the Pacific worked. Successive American presidents failed to restrain him diplomatically or militarily, and now Kim has to be appeased. Talk of regime change in North Korea is done, as it is not when the Americans discuss Iran. Well, if you were a policy maker watching the world from Tehran what lesson would you take from such developments? What Donald Trump should have done is leave the Iran nuclear deal (formally the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action also guaranteed by Germany, France and Britain) well alone, because it at least offered the possibility of slowing and containing the Iranians. Maybe they were insincere, maybe Iran cheated. Perfectly possible. But what is now 100 per cent certain is that they are accelerating their already advanced nuclear project. There is nothing the Americans can do about that, even with air strikes, given that a land invasion would make the long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan combined look like a White House tea party for the Boy Scouts of America. Then again, if Iran acquitted nuclear weapons it might, ironically, prevent America and Iran from ending up in a “hot” war. Of course they are an unstable, over excitable bunch (and I mean the characters in the White House as well), but the traditional and durable doctrine of the deterrent and the fear of “mutually assured destruction” might keep at least prevent a full-scale military/naval confrontation with the US. America probably only has a matter of months left before Iran becomes a fully-fledged, albeit minor, nuclear power, securing its status as a regional superpower and player. No amount of oil sanctions or drones or aircraft carriers around the Strait of Hormuz will then alter that transcendent fact, with US military strikes provoking unthinkable retaliation. Iran and its government will be safe. Like Kim, Trump will have no option but to make peace, and treat them as an equal. A further humiliation for an American president at the hands of Iran, but in the long run, one that might lead to a more realistic settlement of the two sides’ differences. Of course, it will still be appalling for the poor civilians in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere that have been the victims of the proxy wars between Iran and its allies (usually Russia and Turkey) and America’s (the Saudis, UAE, Israel and the rest of the West). During the frostiest years of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, their conflicts too were pitilessly played out with other people's lives, from Angola to Vietnam. Proxy wars were fought, spy planes and civilian airliners were periodically shot down by panicky air forces, spies arrested and exchanged, and the ultimatums and tensions sometimes escalated to terrifying heights (Cuba in 1962, Afghanistan in 1980). Still, seeing as we are all still here, we never did perish in that global thermonuclear conflict that we all once feared Kennedy and Khrushchev, Reagan and Brezhnev would inflict on us. So if nuclear deterrence is good enough for the Russians and Americans, why not the Iranians or the Saudis, and, for that matter, other undeclared nuclear states such as Israel, India, Pakistan and, of course, North Korea. The irony is that an inter-state Middle East war is less likely once everyone realises that Iran, and Israel and possibly Saudi Arabia too have nuclear weapons and would, in certain circumstances, use them. Much the same goes for why India and Pakistan never quite go to war, despite all the crises, and shot down planes and festering grievances. The back-channels open up, tempers calm, and they always end up drawing back from the brink. Nuclear weapons are an obscenity, but they have their uses.

#### The threat of Iranian prolif alone deters conflict – prefer historical analysis – talks of prolif lead to military restraint, not conflict

Fuhrmann 17 (Matthew, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, “The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3052231, 10/13/2017, 7/5/2019) DG

Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities date back to the late-1960s, when it carried out reprocessing activities at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. More recently, Iran developed an advanced uranium enrichment capability. In April 2006, after Iran enriched uranium to a level sufficient to fuel a nuclear power plant, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proclaimed that Iran had “joined the club of nuclear countries.” 54 Iran’s enrichment capacity triggered an international crisis and raised the possibility of an American attack against the country’s nuclear infrastructure. Despite a period of sustained tension, there was not a serious military confrontation. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear program subsided (at least temporarily) with a diplomatic settlement in 2015. Washington was threatened by the possibility of an Iranian bomb. To be sure, there was bipartisan consensus in the United States that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could produce a number of undesirable effects: limiting U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East, encouraging Tehran to adopt a more assertive foreign policy, triggering a regional arms race, and generally raising the risk that nuclear weapons would be used in war. One might instinctively expect that these fears would prompt U.S. military action against Iran. However, as expected by latent nuclear deterrence theory, the United States exercised military restraint. Washington did so in part because it feared that attacking Iran would foment nuclear proliferation. A U.S. military strike would have exacerbated Tehran’s insecurity, thereby heightening its need for a nuclear deterrent. An attack may also have induced Iran to withdraw from the NPT or refuse to have its facilities inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would lower the barriers to proliferation.55 An attack may have nonetheless occurred if Washington believed that it could lower the probability of an Iranian bomb by destroying critical infrastructure. Some advocates of the military option argued that this was the case.56 However, it was far from obvious that preventive strikes could have degraded Iran’s nuclear capacity to a degree that was acceptable to U.S. policymakers. The U.S. military certainly had the capacity to destroy the sites about which it knew, including those that might have been buried underground. Yet there was still a possibility that critical technology or materials existed in secret locations.57 Unlike the 1981 Israeli raid against Iraq’s nuclear reactor – when destroying a single facility could substantially curtail the program – multiple sites would need to be located and destroyed in order for a raid against Iran to be operationally successful. In the best case scenario, a U.S. attack could have set Iran’s nuclear program back by a few years. However, because Iran was already a latent nuclear power, it could rebuild sensitive plants with relative ease. Given that an attack would also increase Iran’s appetite for a nuclear arsenal, the net effect of using military force would be to increase the likelihood of an Iranian bomb, especially in the medium to long term. U.S. officials, including those at the highest levels, accepted this assessment. A secret study carried out during the presidency of George W. Bush reportedly concluded that bombing Iran would be counterproductive. As then Central Intelligence Agency director Michael Hayden put it, Bush’s advisers believed that striking the Iranians “would drive them to do what we were trying to prevent.” 58 This view persisted during the Barack Obama administration. According to Colin Kahl, who served as deputy assistant to the U.S. president and national security to the vice president from 2014 to 2017, “Obama regularly talked about a military strike buying a few years but motivating Iran to go all the way to deter a future attack.” Kahl added that “while Obama was willing to use force as a last resort if Iran made a mad dash for the bomb, he strongly believed that only a diplomatic solution – not a military one – offered an enduring solution to the proliferation challenge posed by Iran.” 59 Officials outside of the United States held this view as well. For example, Carl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, the foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, wrote in 2012, “It is difficult to see a single action more likely to drive Iran into taking the final decision to acquire nuclear weapons than an attack on the country. And once such a decision was made, it would only be a matter of time before a nuclear-armed Iran became a reality [because Iran was already a latent nuclear power].” 60 American perceptions of Iran’s intentions played an important role in deterring an attack. Most officials in Washington believed that Iran’s nuclear future was uncertain. There was general consensus that Tehran wanted to maintain the capacity to build nuclear bombs, but little evidence that it was racing to proliferate as quickly as possible. As an oft-cited 2007 National Intelligence Estimate put it, “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” Obama’s view, as summarized previously, underscores that things might have played out differently if Washington believed that Iran was sprinting towards the bomb. Actions such as withdrawing from the NPT, expelling international inspectors, or diverting large quantities of nuclear material from civilian plants may have produced a latent nuclear deterrence failure, if those moves caused the United States to believe that nuclear proliferation would be immediate and inevitable in the absence of military intervention. That U.S. officials saw an Iranian bomb as possible but not inevitable in the absence of conflict bolstered latent nuclear deterrence. This case highlights the importance of conflict severity in latent nuclear deterrence. The Iranian nuclear crisis was not completely conflict-free. In fact, Iran and the United States experienced militarized disputes during the crisis. In January 2005, for instance, U.S. planes violated Iranian airspace, apparently to collect intelligence on the country’s nuclear activities. U.S. forces also conducted military operations in the Persian Gulf in March 2007 and, the next month, sent planes over Iranian territory at low altitudes as signals of resolve. These kinds of disputes are possible, according to latent nuclear deterrence theory, because postconflict threats to build nuclear weapons may lack credibility. The United States likely calculated that Iran would not race to obtain a nuclear arsenal just because of American displays of force, since these actions did not pose a large enough threat to Tehran. Thus, Iran’s development of nuclear latency may have invited low-level disputes but it did not trigger a large-scale attack. Although the possibility of inducing an Iranian bomb deterred the United States from attacking Tehran, it did not halt U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Washington instituted harsh economic sanctions against Iran, applied serious diplomatic pressure, and even engaged in covert actions to halt Iran’s progress such as the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment plant. Latent nuclear deterrence theory does not expect that states will accept an adversary’s nuclear capabilities without a fight, just that they should refrain from launching serious military attacks that heighten the latent state’s insecurity and lower the barriers to proliferation. In sum, this case satisfies the key conditions for latent nuclear deterrence theory. First, the United States opposed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, Iran’s enrichment program demonstrated the technological wherewithal to proliferate. U.S. officials did not appear to be confident that a military attack would reliably erode Iran’s capacity, especially not in the medium to long term. Third, Washington recognized that an attack would harden Tehran’s resolve to seek nuclear weapons, thereby facilitating the very thing that U.S. policymakers were trying to stop. Fourth, American leaders did not believe that Iran was hellbent on building nuclear bombs. The perceived flexibility in Iran’s nuclear intentions weakened arguments for preventive strikes. Fifth, the United States did not have salient reasons to fight that were unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program. Had Iran hardened American resolve to use military force – for example, by attacking Israel or seizing disputed territory from its Arab rivals – the benefits of fighting may have exceeded the costs

#### Iran prolif solves Middle East stability – otherwise Israel escalation is inevitable

Waltz 12 [Kenneth N. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. Foreign Affairs, 2012. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb]

Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.

#### Middle East turmoil goes nuclear.

Silverstein 21 “Iran-Israel tensions: The threat of nuclear disaster looms large,” Richard Silverstein [writes the Tikun Olam blog, devoted to exposing the excesses of the Israeli national security state], 23 April 2021 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-israel-tensions-threat-nuclear-war-looms-large> SM

Israel had a near-miss of potentially catastrophic proportions on Thursday. As it has done hundreds of times in the past decade, the Israeli air force attacked Iranian bases inside Syria. In response, Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles of a rather primitive Soviet model, one of which overflew its target and landed some 30 kilometres from Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. Israel said recently that it was bolstering its defences around Dimona for just such an eventuality.

Although an Iranian general taunted Israel, implying that Iran had some responsibility for the attack, that doesn’t appear to be the case. But the missile landing inside Israel does show that if Iran wanted to attack Dimona, it has the capacity. And despite Israel’s best efforts, an Iranian missile could hit its target.

With that, one of the worst nuclear disasters in the region’s history could unfold, including a Chernobyl-type radioactive leak that could endanger not only all of Israel, but also many of its neighbours.

A US general has assured a Senate committee that the Syrians weren’t intending to attack Israel. Rather, a misguided missile meant to target an Israeli warplane overshot its target. He blamed it on “incompetence”, as if that was supposed to be somehow reassuring; rather, it only reinforces how easy it is even for a mistake to cause a nuclear disaster.

Campaign of terror

Certainly, if either Israel or Iran wanted to bomb each other’s nuclear facilities, they could do so successfully. An Israeli attack would probably cause less catastrophic damage, but only because Iran’s nuclear programme is not nearly as developed as Israel’s. An Iranian direct hit on Dimona would cause incalculable damage due to the plutonium reactor at the facility.

Nor does this happen in a vacuum: Israel has maintained a decade-long campaign of terror attacks on Iranian military bases and nuclear scientists. Most recently, it bombed the Natanz nuclear facility, destroying the power generation source and damaging older-generation centrifuges. It also attacked an Iranian Revolutionary Guard spy ship off the Yemeni coast this month.

Iran has responded in its own limited way, restrained by its need to maintain good relations with nuclear-deal signatories.

For Israel, the attacks are a low-risk proposition. It defies US opposition (if there is any) with a wink and a nod, and the attacks look good on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s résumé. To weather his corruption trial and retain public support, he needs external enemies (and internal enemies, but that’s a different story). Iran provides these in spades.

Eliminating Israeli leverage

The US could exert control over this scenario by eliminating Israeli leverage. If it agreed to lift sanctions in exchange for Iran’s return to low levels of uranium enrichment, as designated in the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Israel’s rejectionist approach would become moot. The problem is that US President Joe Biden is running scared from Republican opposition to any nuclear deal with Iran. Besides, he has designated the Middle East a low priority for his administration.

There is some faint hope in the US announcement that it is ready to lift a partial set of sanctions. However, the list on offer is quite limited, and will certainly not satisfy the Iranians. Such half-measures present an example of the limitations of the Biden approach. He should instead make a full-throated commitment to end this dithering once and for all.

Israel is mounting a full-court press this coming week as it sends its Mossad and military intelligence chiefs, along with its army chief of staff, to Washington in an attempt to influence nuclear negotiations as they enter what may be a final stage. According to Haaretz, army chief of staff Aviv Kochavi “will also raise other issues, including Iran’s military expansion in Syria and the instability of Lebanon. Israel is concerned about the possibility that Hezbollah will try to … [foment] conflict with Israel.”

The hypocrisy of Israel’s refusal to acknowledge its own massive military interventions in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and even Iraq, while decrying Iran’s involvement in Syria, is almost breathtaking.

There is next to no chance that any of this will enter into the considerations of negotiators in Vienna. Unlike Israel, they are interested in doing a nuclear deal, not engaging in wishful thinking.

Combustible Middle East mix

Returning to the Biden administration’s global goals, the Middle East doesn’t care about presidential priorities. It contains a combustible mix of corrupt elites and overbearing dictators who do not shirk from causing mayhem in their domains. And one of them, perhaps a desperate Israeli prime minister or an ageing ayatollah eager to preserve his honour and legacy, could inadvertently (or intentionally) set the entire region aflame.

If Biden doesn’t act quickly and decisively, there is a sizeable risk that another missile from one country or the other will hit a target and cause devastation. That would mark a point of no return, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, which led to World War One. The difference is that in 1914, armies fought with guns, bayonets and artillery. Today, they will fight with F-35s, ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons.

#### And, it solves a US strike on Iran

Greenwald 12, Journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law, featured columnist at The Guardian and Salon (Glenn, The true reason US fears Iranian nukes: they can deter US attacks, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/iran-nukes-deterrence)

Cohen's surprise notwithstanding, numerous Iranian leaders, including Ahmadinejad, have long made the same point. And it's a point so obvious it should not even need to be made. No rational person takes seriously the claim that Iran, even if it did obtain a nuclear weapon, would commit instant and guaranteed national suicide by using it to attack a nation that has a huge nuclear stockpile, which happens to include both the US and Israel. One can locate nothing in the actions of Iran's regime that even suggests irrationality on that level, let alone suicidal impulses. That Iran will use its nuclear weapons against the US and Israel is rather obviously the centerpiece of the fear-mongering campaign against Tehran, to build popular support for threats to launch an aggressive attack in order to prevent them from acquiring that weapon. So what, then, is the real reason that so many people in both the US and Israeli governments are so desperate to stop Iranian proliferation? Every now and then, they reveal the real reason: Iranian nuclear weapons would prevent the US from attacking Iran at will, and that is what is intolerable. The latest person to unwittingly reveal the real reason for viewing an Iranian nuclear capacity as unacceptable was GOP Senator Lindsey Graham, one of the US's most reliable and bloodthirsty warmongers. On Monday, Graham spoke in North Augusta, South Carolina, and was asked about the way in which sanctions were harming ordinary Iranians. Ayman Hossam Fadel was present and recorded the exchange. Answering that question, Graham praised President Obama for threatening Iran with war over nuclear weapons, decreed that "the Iranian people should be willing to suffer now for a better future," and then – invoking the trite neocon script that is hauled out whenever new wars are being justified – analogized Iranian nukes to Hitler in the 1930s. But in the middle of his answer, he explained the real reason Iranian nuclear weapons should be feared: "They have two goals: one, regime survival. The best way for the regime surviving, in their mind, is having a nuclear weapon, because when you have a nuclear weapon, nobody attacks you." Graham added that the second regime goal is "influence", that "people listen to you" when you have a nuclear weapon. In other words, we cannot let Iran acquire nuclear weapons because if they get them, we can no longer attack them when we want to and can no longer bully them in their own region. Graham's answer is consistent with what various American policy elites have said over the years about America's enemies generally and Iran specifically: the true threat of nuclear proliferation is that it can deter American aggression. Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute and the New American Century Project has long been crystal clear that this is the real reason for opposing Iranian nuclear capability [my emphasis]: "When their missiles are tipped with warheads carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, even weak regional powers have a credible deterrent regardless of the balance of conventional forces … In the post cold war era, America and its allies, rather than the Soviet Union, have become the primary objects of deterrence and it is states like Iraq, Iran and North Korea who most wish to develop deterrent capabilities." He added: "The surest deterrent to American action is a functioning nuclear arsenal … "To be sure, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is a nightmare. But it is less a nightmare because of the high likelihood that Tehran would employ its weapons or pass them on to terrorist groups – although that is not beyond the realm of possibility – and more because of the constraining effect it threatens to impose upon US strategy for the greater Middle East. The danger is that Iran will 'extend' its deterrence, either directly or de facto, to a variety of states and other actors throughout the region. This would be an ironic echo of the extended deterrence thought to apply to US allies during the cold war." As Jonathan Schwarz has extensively documented, this is what US policy elites have said over and over. In 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned: "Several of these [small enemy nations] are intensely hostile to the United States and are arming to deter us from bringing our conventional or nuclear power to bear in a regional crisis." In 2002, State Department official Philip Zelikow said that if Iraq were permitted to keep its WMDs, "they now can deter us from attacking them, because they really can retaliate against us." In 2008, Democratic Senator Chuck Robb and GOP Senator Dan Coates wrote an incredibly hawkish Washington Post op-ed all but demanding an attack on Iran, and wrote: "[A]n Islamic Republic of Iran with nuclear weapons capability would be strategically untenable. It would threaten U.S. national security … While a nuclear attack is the worst-case scenario, Iran would not need to employ a nuclear arsenal to threaten US interests. Simply obtaining the ability to quickly assemble a nuclear weapon would effectively give Iran a nuclear deterrent." The No 1 concern of American national security planners appears to be that countries may be able to prevent the US from attacking them at will, whether to change their regimes or achieve other objectives. In other words, Iranian nuclear weapons could be used to prevent wars – ones started by the US – and that, above all, is what we must fear. (Graham's questioner said that she believed Iran was not committed to developing a nuclear weapon, and Graham responded that Israeli leaders had reached the opposite conclusion. That is simply false.) Whatever one thinks of Iran, the signal the US has sent to the world is unmistakable: any rational government should acquire nuclear weapons. The Iranians undoubtedly watched the US treatment of two dictators who gave up their quest for nuclear weapons – Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi – and drew the only reasoned lesson: the only way a country can protect itself from US attack, other than full-scale obeisance, is to acquire nuclear weapons. That is precisely why the US and Israel are so eager to ensure they do not.

#### That would collapse the economy

Kayani 9 [2009, Naushad Kayani, Brigadier in Pakistani Army,"ATTAINING STABILITY: A CASE FOR ACCEPTING A NUCLEARIZED IRAN," [www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500599.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500599.pdf)]

Analysts argue that “Iran’s best strategy might be to lash out in retaliation.” As previously indicated Iran has the capacity to influence events in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. 47 Furthermore, Iranian leadership is aware of the threat from the US and/or Israel and is likely taking preparatory measures to secure its program and deter or prevent such an attack. Iran has previously threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and otherwise prevent oil shipping in the Persian Gulf area if it was attacked. Thus, an attack on Iran could endanger Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the entire Middle East global oil supplies.48 A military attack on Iran by US/Israel might also initiate conflicts in other related “hot spots” with limited prospects for anything but the temporary cessations of hostilities. Conflict could also involve a resurgence of Shia violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza, and from Hamas elements operating from Syria, Yemen and the Sudan against cooperating Gulf States. The ramifications of regional conflict may vary from high oil prices leading to economic crisis/recession and/or an outright crash of stock exchanges worldwide. The interruption of the transit of oil tankers and the threatening or actual closure of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to an economic meltdown. Activities of the international terrorist organizations would likely receive renewed support and motivation to target US and Israeli interests worldwide and extremism will gain further strength with obvious adverse consequences for the regional countries…especially those surrounding Iran. Faced with increased violence, Israel would likely resort to additional retaliatory or pre-emptive attacks that further alienate and enflame the Arab world and indefinitely delay any prospects of resolving the Palestinian problem. Within this complex and volatile region, violence oftentimes begets greater violence and instability.

#### Econ decline causes world war – there’s no buffer now

* 08 recovery isn’t possible anymore
* Econ crisis + populism and threats cause miscalc and wars
* International system already fragile, draws in major powers
* Similar nationalism to the 30s
* All escalates even if unintended

Sundaram and Popov 2/12/19 [Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Vladimir Popov, a former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin. Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War. February 12, 2019. www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/]

KUALA LUMPUR and BERLIN, Feb 12 2019 (IPS) - Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened. Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers.

### 1NC---AT: Warming

#### Lunar observation fails and interplanetary space observation solves

Siegel 18. Ethan Siegel (Siegel is a Ph.D. astrophysicist, author, and science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges. He has won numerous awards for science writing since 2008), 10-25-2018, "Why Don't We Put A Space Telescope On The Moon?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2018/10/25/why-dont-we-put-a-space-telescope-on-the-moon/?sh=78be159a777f sean!

Yet observatories like Hubble, Chandra, Fermi, Spitzer and more have showcased how remarkably effective a space telescope can be. The views and data they've returned to Earth have taught us more than any similar observatory could have revealed from the ground. So why not put a telescope on the Moon, then? Believe it or not, it's a terrible idea in all ways except one. Here's why. The transmittance or opacity of the electromagnetic spectrum through the atmosphere. Note all the... [+] absorption features in gamma rays, X-rays, and the infrared, which is why they are best viewed from space. Over many wavelengths, such as in the radio, the ground is just as good, while others are simply impossible. The transmittance or opacity of the electromagnetic spectrum through the atmosphere. Note all the... [+] NASA The Moon, at first glance, seems like the ideal location for a telescope. There's practically no atmosphere at all, which removes all the light pollution concerns. It's far away from the Earth, which should greatly reduce the interference from any signals that humans produce. The ultra-long nights mean that you can observe the same target, continuously, for as long as 14 days at a time with no interruptions. And because you have solid ground to brace yourself against, you don't need to rely on gyroscopes or reaction wheels for pointing. It sounds like a really good deal. But if you start thinking about the way the Moon orbits the Earth, with the entire Moon-Earth system orbiting the Sun, you might start to realize some of the problems that a setup like this would inevitably encounter. First, if you put your telescope on the Moon, which side do you pick: the near side or the far side? Either one has drawbacks. If you place your telescope on the near (Earth-facing) side of the Moon, you will always have a view of the Earth. This means you can send-and-receive signals, control your telescope, and download-upload data in nearly real-time, with only the light-travel-time of signals across space limiting you. But it also means that Earth-produced interference, like radio broadcast signals, will always be a problem you need to shield yourself from. On the other hand, if you're on the far side of the Moon, you shield yourself from everything coming from Earth quite effectively, but you also have no direct path for data transfer or signal transmittance. There would have to be an additional mechanism set up, like a lunar orbiter or a link to a transmitter/receiver on the near side, just to operate it. The near and far sides of the Moon, as reconstructed with imagery from NASA's Clementine mission. The near and far sides of the Moon, as reconstructed with imagery from NASA's Clementine mission. NASA / CLEMENTINE MISSION / LUNAR & PLANETARY INSTITUTE / USRA Either way, you're going to have a slew of problems to contend with that you wouldn't encounter simply from going into the lonely abyss of interplanetary space. The two biggest are: Moonquakes. You think the Moon's a big deal because it's responsible for Earth's tides? The tidal forces that the Earth exerts on the Moon are more than 20 times greater than the Moon's tidal forces on Earth, enough to cause the Moon to experience considerable moonquakes. Temperature extremes. Because of the Moon's tidal locking to Earth and its extremely slow rotation, it's bathed in sunlight constantly for 14 days at a time, followed by 14 days of total darkness. Daytime temperatures can reach over 200 °F (nearly 100 °C), while night brings cold down to -280 °F (-173 °C). While a space-based telescope can control its temperature through either active or passive cooling (or a combination of both), a telescope must cool down below the temperature of the wavelengths it's trying to observe, or noise will swamp your intended signal. This would be a tremendous drawback for ultraviolet, optical, or infrared astronomy, all of which would have severe problems on the Moon for anything other than the goal of Earth (or Sun) observing. Engineering a telescope that can survive those temperature extremes and still function optimally is an extraordinary challenge. It's no wonder that the only lunar-based telescope we have, at present, is a UV-telescope on the Moon's near side, at wavelengths where the Earth's atmosphere absorbs almost all of the light. For most applications, going to space is going to be a superior option to going to the Moon. The lunar surface, in terms of temperature extremes and difficulties communicating with Earth, offers more drawbacks than having a surface to push against/build on offers.

#### They have two moon key warrants. Their evidence has zero highlighted warrants for either of these so default to 1NC explanation:

#### First, angular rotation – we have that tech already

Siegel 18-2. Ethan Siegel (Siegel is a Ph.D. astrophysicist, author, and science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges. He has won numerous awards for science writing since 2008), 10-16-2018, "This Is How Hubble Will Use Its Remaining Gyroscopes To Maneuver In Space," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2018/10/16/this-is-how-hubble-will-use-its-remaining-gyroscopes-to-maneuver-in-space/?sh=2427594b2ba8 sean!

In a space telescope, we don't have different components of our bodies to work with, but we do have different components of the telescope. And in the case of Hubble, we have an entire guidance system built on this principle. The reaction wheels allow it to change its orientation, and the fine-guidance sensor allows it to determine how to orient itself. According to NASA itself: To change angles, it uses Newton’s third law by spinning its wheels in the opposite direction. It turns at about the speed of a minute hand on a clock, taking 15 minutes to turn 90 degrees. But keeping the telescope stable needs a key ingredient: gyroscopes. Without those gyroscopes, tiny external forces would cause Hubble's orientation to drift over time, and would make long-exposure images impossible. But with them, we can keep the telescope stable.

#### Second is gas analysis – we have that too:

NASA 18. NASA, 7-11-2018, "NASA’s Webb Telescope to Inspect Atmospheres of Gas Giant Exoplanets," https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2018/nasa-s-webb-space-telescope-to-inspect-atmospheres-of-gas-giant-exoplanets/ sean!

When a planet crosses in front of, or transits, its host star, the star’s light is filtered through the planet’s atmosphere. Molecules within the atmosphere absorb certain wavelengths, or colors, of light. By splitting the star’s light into a rainbow spectrum, astronomers can detect those sections of missing light and determine what molecules are in the planet’s atmosphere. For these observations, the project team selected WASP-79b, a Jupiter-sized planet located about 780 light-years from Earth. The team expects to detect and measure the abundances of water, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide in WASP-79b. Webb also might detect new molecules not yet seen in exoplanet atmospheres.

#### Your authors concluded a year later that lunar observation is infeasible

Guo et al 18. Huadong Guo, Hanlin Ye, Changyong Duo, Jing Huang (All authors are researchers at the Key Laboratory of Digital Earth Science, Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth), 2-28-2018, "Error analysis of exterior orientation elements on geolocation for a Moon-based Earth observation optical sensor," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538947.2018.1513088 sean!

For a Moon-based optical sensor, the effect of the errors of exterior orientation elements has some characteristics. First, since the Earth–Moon distance is very large, a small error caused by the exterior orientation elements would lead to large geolocation errors and the image distort. Actually, one-second position error in both latitudinal and longitudinal direction can lead to geolocation error on kilometres level (Figure 7). One-second angular error of a Moon-based sensor will also result in thousands of metres error (Figures 8 and 9), while 0.1° angular error of an optical sensor onboard space-borne platform can only cause hundreds of metres geolocation error (Dou et al. 2014). Second, with the orbit and attitude of the Moon changing, the observation geometry is also different. The geolocation error varies with the changing Earth–Moon distance and angle (Figures 11 and 12). It’s worth noting that, the sensors can be equipped in the near-side of the Moon. The different locations on the lunar surface, the different look vector that the Moon-based optical sensor would have (Ye, Guo, and Liu 2017a). Similar to the look vector, equipping sensors at different positions of the Moon will also lead to different geolocation error (Figures 5 and 6). Third, some unique factors can lead to the error of the exterior orientation elements, such as lunar position and lunar libration (Folkner et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2017). A very small angular error (0.1″) of lunar libration can result in significant geolocation error (Figure 15). With the increasing concern of the lunar exploration, more and more sensors have been equipped on the lunar orbit or on the surface of the Moon, such as Lunar-based Ultraviolet Telescope (LUT) and Moon-based Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) imager (He et al. 2011; Wen et al. 2014). Some researchers studied the geolocation error. Qi presented the astrometric solution of LUT devised to solve the problem of accurate pointing and tracking of celestial objects (Qi et al. 2015). Yan analysed the observational data from EUV onboard Chang’E-3 mission (Yan et al. 2016). The effect of exterior orientation elements on geolocation here is different as from those studies. Since the observation target isn’t the same, when observing the Earth surface features, the EUV or LUT cannot offer the direct reference value for Moon-based optical sensors. According to the effect analysis of the exterior orientation elements, the results that we obtained can further give support to the study of the Moon-based Earth observation optical sensor from the perspective of the observation geometry and geolocation error. 5. Conclusions Geolocation error analysis, based on the observation geometry of the Moon-based platform and the Moon-based geometric image model, is proposed. We first performed a detailed image model applied to the Moon-based Earth observation. According to the model, a detailed explanation for the peculiarities of the observation geometry including the observation distance and the observation angle are shown. To analyse the geolocation error caused by the errors of the exterior orientation elements, we utilised some parameters such as RMSE and MAE to measure the offsets. Our analysis showed that equipping sensors at different positions of the Moon has different geolocation error under the condition of the same error of exterior orientation elements (Figure 6). The effect of the position errors showed the systematic feature in the image (Figure 7). The geolocation error will be larger when equipping sensors near the centre of the lunar disc under the condition of the same pointing error (Figures 6 and 7). We analysed the geolocation error variation during one orbital period and drew the conclusion that the geolocation error is not obviously influenced by the observation distance and Earth–Moon angle, especially in the mid-high latitude of the Moon. In addition, the spatial resolution magnitude associated with the geolocation error is investigated so as to give support to the image geometric correction and the spatial resolution determination. We find that, the image offsets have significant linear correlation with the increasing errors of exterior orientation elements. According to this regularity, a suitable spatial resolution can be evaluated from the perspective of error estimation. We also evaluated the error effects of the lunar position and lunar libration on geolocation and discussed the characteristics of the error effect of exterior orientation elements. Compared to the space-borne platform case, Moon-based Earth observations have larger distance and require higher pointing accuracy of the optical sensor. Besides, some unique factors need to be considered, such as lunar position and lunar libration. The effect of these errors cannot be neglected. Overall, these results and analysis reveal the pecularities of the error effect on geolocation for a Moon-based optical sensor. This will provide evidence for the study of the Moon-based optical sensors in the following.

#### Rood and Gibbons says adaptation is good, not that it solves warming

#### Their evidence concedes adaptation doesn’t solve – Ayala reads yellow

1AC Sears (, N., 2021. Great Powers, Polarity, and Existential Threats to Humanity: An Analysis of the Distribution of the Forces of Total Destruction in International Security. [online] ResearchGate. Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350500094> [Accessed 22 November 2021] Nathan Alexander Sears is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at The University of Toronto. Before beginning his PhD, he was a Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas, Quito. His research focuses on international security and the existential threats to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, climate change, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence. His PhD dissertation is entitled, “International Politics in the Age of Existential Threats”)-re-cut rahulpenu

Climate Change Humanity faces existential risks from the large-scale destruction of Earth’s natural environment making the planet less hospitable for humankind (Wallace-Wells 2019). The decline of some of Earth’s natural systems may already exceed the “planetary boundaries” that represent a “safe operating space for humanity” (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Humanity has become one of the driving forces behind Earth’s climate system (Crutzen 2002). The major anthropogenic drivers of climate change are the burning of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil, and gas), combined with the degradation of Earth’s natural systems for absorbing carbon dioxide, such as deforestation for agriculture (e.g., livestock and monocultures) and resource extraction (e.g., mining and oil), and the warming of the oceans (Kump et al. 2003). While humanity has influenced Earth’s climate since at least the Industrial Revolution, the dramatic increase in greenhouse gas emissions since the mid-twentieth century—the “Great Acceleration” (Steffen et al. 2007; 2015; McNeill & Engelke 2016)— is responsible for contemporary climate change, which has reached approximately 1°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). Climate change could become an existential threat to humanity if the planet’s climate reaches a “Hothouse Earth” state (Ripple et al. 2020). What are the dangers? There are two mechanisms of climate change that threaten humankind. The direct threat is extreme heat. While human societies possesses some capacity for adaptation and resilience to climate change, the physiological response of humans to heat stress imposes physical limits—with a hard limit at roughly 35°C wet-bulb temperature (Sherwood et al. 2010). A rise in global average temperatures by 3–4°C would increase the risk of heat stress, while 7°C could render some regions uninhabitable, and 11–12°C would leave much of the planet too hot for human habitation (Sherwood et al. 2010). The indirect effects of climate change could include, inter alia, rising sea levels affecting coastal regions (e.g., Miami and Shanghai), or even swallowing entire countries (e.g., Bangladesh and the Maldives); extreme and unpredictable weather and natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and forest fires); environmental pressures on water and food scarcity (e.g., droughts from less-dispersed rainfall, and lower wheat-yields at higher temperatures); the possible inception of new bacteria and viruses; and, of course, large-scale human migration (World Bank 2012; Wallace-Well 2019; Richards, Lupton & Allywood 2001). While it is difficult to determine the existential implications of extreme environmental conditions, there are historic precedents for the collapse of human societies under environmental pressures (Diamond 2005). Earth’s “big five” mass extinction events have been linked to dramatic shifts in Earth’s climate (Ward 2008; Payne & Clapham 2012; Kolbert 2014; Brannen 2017), and a Hothouse Earth climate would represent terra incognita for humanity. Thus, the assumption here is that a Hothouse Earth climate could pose an existential threat to the habitability of the planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018., 5). At what point could climate change cross the threshold of an existential threat to humankind? The complexity of Earth’s natural systems makes it extremely difficult to give a precise figure (Rockstrom et al. 2009; ). However, much of the concern about climate change is over the danger of crossing “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” climate change. For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost” could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. A recent study suggests that a “planetary threshold” could exist at global average temperature of 2°C above preindustrial levels (Steffen et al. 2018; also IPCC 2018). Therefore, the analysis here takes the 2°C rise in global average temperatures as representing the lower-boundary of an existential threat to humanity, with higher temperatures increasing the risk of runaway climate change leading to a Hothouse Earth. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change set the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperatures to “well below” 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. If the Paris Agreement goals are met, then nations would likely keep climate change below the threshold of an existential threat to humanity. According to Climate Action Tracker (2020), however, current policies of states are expected to produce global average temperatures of 2.9°C above preindustrial levels by 2100 (range between +2.1 and +3.9°C), while if states succeed in meeting their pledges and targets, global average temperatures are still projected to increase by 2.6°C (range between +2.1 and +3.3°C). Thus, while the Paris Agreements sets a goal 6 that would reduce the existential risk of climate change, the actual policies of states could easily cross the threshold that would constitute an existential threat to humanity (CAT 2020).

#### Adaptation is only as effective as policy implementation – even if fantastic adaptation exists post aff they have not read uq that says states are going to use them