# Deleuze Kritik

### Link – State:

#### Any legal conception of personhood is intrinsically normative --- people are identified under the law i.e people used to be considered property. This means the state attempts to make us legible --- this generates unending exclusion through hierarchal difference. WEHELIYE 14:

[Weheliye, Alexander G. “Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human.” Duke University Press. 2014. // LHP MK]

**We are in** dire **need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood** that dominates our world, **and**, in addition, **to not lose sight of what remains outside the law**, what the law cannot capture, what it cannot magi- cally transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity- based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on inclusion, recognition, and equality based on **a** narrow **legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only hinders the eradication of violence against trans people and other vulnerable populations but actually **creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”**22 If **demanding recognition and inclusion** remains at the center of minority politics, it **will lead** only **to a delimited notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others**, thus **allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of** the **mainstream** feminist, civil rights, and lesbian-gay rights **movements, which facilitate** the incorporation of **a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the still and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 **To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law** itself **has been thoroughly violent** in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. **Instead of appealing to legal recognition**, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with **practices of “maroon abolition”** (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settle- ments in the Americas) **to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird anti- prison work**,” while **also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.24 Relatedly, Spade calls for **a radical politics** articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,” which **redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprotesters that the existence of trans people is impossible.”**25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the in- compatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable lim- inal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered. The idea of bare life as espoused by Giorgio Agamben and his followers discursively duplicates the very violence it describes without offering any compelling theoretical or political alternatives to our current order. Paradoxically, **by insisting on a limited notion of the law at the cost of neglecting so many other facets that flow into the creation of bare life**, Agamben pre- empts a rigorous and imaginative **thinking of the political imaginary that rests in the tradition of the oppressed**. Agamben’s impoverished conception of the political comes into view most clearly in the lack of current or past alternatives it offers to our current order and when we consult the eshly testimonies of and about subjects that inhabit the sphere of mere life (the enslaved, political prisoners, concentration camp detainees, for instance). Still, **these voices should not be construed as fountains of suffering authenticity but as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary, which refuses to only see, feel, hear, smell, and taste bare life in the subjectivity of the oppressed.**

### Link – Lib Phil

#### Their attempt to ascribe a unified essence to the subject – that individuals are classified as complete and homogenous – fails to acknowledge the different creative contexts that truly merit our philosophic inquiries. The particular can never follow from the universal as it is built upon the exclusion of difference – only a focus on the complex process of subject production can we open up new possibilities

Arnott [Stephen J. Arnott, Canberra, ACT, Australia. “Liminal Subjectivity and the Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm of Félix Guattari”] AA

Before we begin this task in earnest, it will be necessary to say something about the concept of subjectivity as it is developed throughout Chaosmosis. **The emphasis is always on the production of subjectivity, a thesis** which opposes itself **to any** theory or **philosophical inquiry** **which conceives subjectivity as** given, either **wholly or partially**, **which**, in other words, **insists** **on its a priori or transcendental status**. This at once distances Guattari's approach from that of Turner, who while conceding that social and political structures are produced for the most part due to organizational requirements, presupposes a unity of the individual which to some extent remains immune to the effects of structure and stratification. Turner's individualism, however, is in no way a necessary requirement of his thesis, and in fact often seems to be at odds with it. For the moment we must emphasize that Guattari admits no such essential unity, for **one because we have no grounds, empirical or otherwise, for maintaining this presupposition, and** for another **because treating subjectivity in the light of the complex processes of production by means of which it is constituted in all its** heterogeneity or **diversity opens up ever new possibilities for its future production and also permits an optimism which might be denied to proponents of essential qualities of human individuation.**¶The term **'production' gives rise to images of production-lines, of highly** **mechanized techniques for producing objects according to preconceived design specifications** and economic viability. **The processes of production constitutive of subjectivity take on an altogether different character**, **but will include mechanized production in their midst.** Guattari opposes mechanism to 'machinism', and employs the latter to characterize production as it relates to subjectivity. Machinic production is invoked to access the extreme complexity of contributing factors and the enormous variety and variability of connectivity. **Factors contributing to the production of subjectivity will not be limited to biological arrangements**, **familial circumstances and social milieu,** **although all these will be included**. **Technology, media, art, institutions, machinic encounters of all kinds must be seen to have an active role in the production of subjectivity**. **Machines of extreme diversity,** **not simply scientific** or technological **machines**, **but desiring-machines**, aesthetic or literary machines, organic and inorganic, corporeal and incorporeal, all contributing, **all making their effects felt in varying degrees of intensity** - on the basis of this machinic background subjectivities are produced. By means of this machinic ontology, this machination of ontological textures, we are able "to decentre the question of the subject onto the question of subjectivity" (C p. 22). We no longer need recourse to a universal or transcendent subject, **but instead diagnose processes of subjectivation operating on biological, psychic, resource etc. materials in diverse and ever-changing ways**.¶ In **seeking to identify** and understand the effects of **factors implicated in the** **production of subjectivity within** **both historical and present cultural and social contexts**, **we can hope to highlight those factors** whose contribution appears to be detrimental, **which** in other words **steer both individual and collective subjectivity down paths of self-destruction and at the same time pinpoint potentially creative or positive factors which have been blocked in** one way or another **and thus been unable** **to be realized** in any effective capacity. This is not to say that we can foresee in advance what effects certain kinds of tendency or paradigm are going to have, although we can hazard an educated guess, though not without risks. This conveys something of the force of Guattari's call for the reappropriation of the production of subjectivity: **initially to try to be aware of or at least have a story about factors and processes which play an active part in the production of subjectivity**, **and then to be ready to experiment with new factors**, **as they present themselves** or are created, **without**, however, **having any clear ideas about the results** of such experiments. **For example, within an ethical perspective, we might identify the prevalence of** **transcendent principles licensed by religion** **or other kinds of moral dogma** **in the production** **of subjectivity in certain social contexts or historical periods.** **While we can recognize** manifest positive effects of such moralities such as the institution of **fairly stable communities** **of like-minded subjects**, **we can also see** all-too-plainly **the** insularity and **prejudices of such subjects** and communities. Perhaps **we** can find a way to preserve or enhance the positive effects by other means while at the same time lessening the negative ones. Guattari suggests that this might be achieved by **the** **introduction of a** certain **'narrative element'** of tolerance based on a conception of 'constellations of Universes of value' which **would facilitate a respect** **amongst proponents of** **belief systems of different** or even opposing **types**. **Such considerations might seem distant** **from the multicultural societies** which many of us now occupy, **in which the recognition of** **the diversity of value** and systems of belief **is** supposedly **acknowledged**. It is still the case, however, that political decisions are often made on the presupposition of shared community values which in actuality amount to little more than the propagation of values that are dominant rather than shared. For example, the current perceived need to introduce mechanisms of government instituted and controlled censorship of the Internet presupposes shared moral standards which demand the restriction of certain kinds of information being disseminated. Little regard is given, however, to the far-reaching effects that such censorship would illicit - for example, electronic or hypertext versions of Anti-Oedipus­ would be censored by mechanisms currently under consideration due to its use of profanity and words such as incest, masochism and so on.¶ **If there is no general prescription as to how we might steer the production of subjectivity along positive and creative paths**, **Guattari** nonetheless **argues that we might** **attempt to ensure increased diversity**, **creativity and experimentation**, **without at the same** **time contributing to antagonistic tendencies**, **through the institution of a broadly aesthetic** **paradigm**, **which would achieve primacy** **over scientific,** **moral, religious or other paradigms**. With the intention of clarifying and elaborating this ethico-aesthetic paradigm, I want now to introduce two important concepts developed by Victor Turner in the context of an analysis of the sociological effect of ritual practices in various preindustrial societies. The first of these is 'communitas', which describes a state of community which is in patent opposition to the mode of hierarchical community engendered by 'normal' social organization and stratification and which is effected on specific and relatively infrequent occasions within structured society by means of rituals of various kinds. The second is 'liminality', which derives from limen, meaning threshold but also implying margin or outskirts. Communitas and liminality for Turner constitute one half of a dialectical relation defined as 'anti-structure' which maintains an antithetical position with regard to the other half of the dialectic, that being structure or social organization

### Impact – Reinscribes Oppression:

#### They recreate the oppression they try to fight --- in attempting to eliminate difference through a politics of inclusion, they in turn target individuals who represent deviancy. EVANS ’10:

Brad Evans, 2010 “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424.

Imposing **liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war.** While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. **With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it:** ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of **liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war**. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . **The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’** (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is **fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . .** What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how **liberalism gains its mastery by posing** fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by **a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative** (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be **for the unification of the species**. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood **that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life.** Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say **that politics is the continuation of war by other means**. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which **the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies**. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. **Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life.** Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, **what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity** – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, **doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference**, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the **biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm**, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from **the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within** – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire **populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter** in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only **through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’** (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous **political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian**, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is **to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form** (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, **there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter**. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

### Impact – Facism:

#### The majoritarian logic the aff forces individuals to adhere to is what allows facism to insert itself on the macro level – think about the orders in a totalitarian state – without the saying yes to totalitarianism, we cannot have it. The reason people do consent to it is because of the desire for the complexities to be smoothed out into coherence i.e you’re a real American or of the arian race – the K deconstrucst this commitment to an identity – this means the K is a prior question to politics.. DELEUZE AND GUATTARI:

[Deleuze & Guattari 80 (Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari “A Thousand Plateaus” pp. 214-215). Print. CEFS]

It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with ¶ compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each ¶ segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on ¶ top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic ¶ perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against ¶ administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, ¶ it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not ¶ localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing ¶ line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves ¶ them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into ¶ microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when ¶ they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and ¶ totalization of the rigid segments.I0 We would even say that fascism implies ¶ a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian ¶ State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship ¶ type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only ¶ at the macropotical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of ¶ totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, ¶ before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural ¶ fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's ¶ fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, ¶ family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole ¶ that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1¶ ' There is fascism when a war ¶ machine is installed in each hole, in every niche. Even after the National ¶ Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it ¶ unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." ¶ Daniel Guerin is correct to say ¶ that if Hitler took power, rather then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal ¶ microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to ¶ penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple ¶ segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if ¶ capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of ¶ view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the egmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less ¶ fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical ¶ power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film has often depicted these molecular focal ¶ points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms ¶ spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own ¶ repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do ¶ they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they ¶ tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex ¶ assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from ¶ microforma-tions already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, ¶ expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated ¶ instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered ¶ setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes ¶ molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. ¶ Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too ¶ easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist ¶ inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with ¶ molecules both personal and collective.¶ Four errors concerning this molecular and supple segmentarity are to be ¶ avoided. The first is axiological and consists in believing that a little suppleness is enough to make things "better." But microfascisms are what ¶ make fascism so dangerous, and fine segmentations are as harmful as the ¶ most rigid of segments. The second is psychological, as if the molecular ¶ were in the realm of the imagination and applied only to the individual and ¶ interindividual. But there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the ¶ other. Third, the two forms are not simply distinguished by size, as a small ¶ form and a large form; although it is true that the molecular works in detail ¶ and operates in small groups, this does not mean that it is any less coextensive with the entire social field than molar organization. Finally, the qualitative difference between the two lines does not preclude their boosting or ¶ cutting into each other; there is always a proportional relation between the ¶ two, directly or inversely proportional.

### Alt – Reject Faciality:

#### The alternative is to dismantle the face --- this undermines the faciality machines that they seek recognition through and their normative value. BIGNALL ’12:

[Bignall, Simone. “Dismantling the Face: Pluralism and the Politics of Recognition.” University of New South Wales. 2012. LHP MK]

Deleuze and Guattari assert: ‘If the face is a politics**, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings’ (1987: 188). While faciality involves a politics of territorialisation and form, dismantling the face involves a politics of deterritorialisation and transformation. The starting point for such a transformative politics is the face itself:** ‘the white wall of the signifier, the black hole of subjectivity and the facial machine are impasses, the measure of our submissions and subjections; but we are born into them, and it is there we must stand battle’ (189). For Deleuze and Guattari, battling the face requires the cultivation of an intimate knowledge and awareness about the face one inhabits, and they warn: ‘find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight’ (188). Dismantling the face therefore requires a careful analysis of the signifying discourses and representations that make up one’s social context, as well as a critical and reflexive understanding about how these shape identity. This includes analysis of how it is at times possible for one to selectively constitute one’s own identity in relation to the multiplicity of established significations one is ‘born into’. The ‘ruin of representation’ is a central aspect of Deleuze’s task in Difference and Repetition and indeed forms a consistent thread through his entire oeuvre, including his work with Guattari (see Olkowski 1999). The aim in Difference and Repetition is to shake off the ‘four iron collars of representation: identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception’ (Deleuze 1994: 262). In A Thousand Plateaus, the discussion of faciality likewise involves a critique of representation; in particular, how **faces ‘form loci of resonance that select sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality’(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 168). For Deleuze, at the heart of representation and aligned forms of political practice is the misconception that the established regime of power/knowledge (the face) causally structures the productive force of desire and assemblage**. Within this model of causation, an established signifier or set of significations predetermines the possibility of recognition and limits the potential for inventing new configurations of meaning and, hence, of social organisation. The **imposition of an already given order of meaning upon an actual variety of subject-forming events reduces them to a limited and predetermined interpretation of experience**. This is described, for example, by the limiting formalities that circumscribe and regulate political participation in liberal democracies, which ask citizens to choose between particular sets of already-existing features. According to Deleuze and Guattari, all interpretation then becomes assimilated to an existing structure of meaning: ‘You don’t so much have a face as slide into one’ (1987: 177). Deleuze and Guattari encourage us to understand alternatively that **the subject and the signifier are not the (already-given) causes of signifiance, but are in fact themselves reactive effects of a process in which meaning is constructed through the association of elements into a coherent form** (see for example Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 129). They assert: ‘concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an abstract machine of faciality (visigéité), which produces them’ (1987: 168). This engendering involves **the process of ‘facialisation’, in which the face ‘takes shape’ and ‘begins to appear’ as certain regular features are inscribed and emerge as fixed strata upon a mobile ‘surface’, thereby forming the landscape of the face with the repetition of their occurrence over a period of time (ibid.). These features are not inevitable characteristics of the facial landscape, however; they occur according to a particular and contingent coding of elemental conjunctions to define a particular emergence of faciality. Thus, a ‘concrete face’ is always defined by the assembly rules embodied within the ‘abstract machine of faciality’** that causes the face to emerge as such. When the established regime of the face is erroneously taken as the cause of signifiance, it operates as a ‘site of transcendental illusion’ which suggests the apparent inevitability of that regime of signs (Deleuze 1994: 265). When everything must conform in advance to a regime of signification already given, then there is no room for creative divergence in the productive process. There is nothing new, no new desires or alternative associations that might construct different expressions in the established face, which grimly sets its features into a representative order. In this way, in the rigid structures of a formed face, ‘the whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected to the requirements of representation, and to the dreary games of what is representative and represented in representation’(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 54). It is helpful to read ‘Plateau 7 – Year Zero: Faciality’ in conjunction with ‘Plateau 5–587BC–AD70: On Several Regimes of Signs’. Here, Deleuze and Guattari analyse ‘a certain number of semiotics displaying very diverse characteristics’ (1987: 135). They explain that there is such diversity in the forms of expression, such a mixture of these forms, that it is impossible to attach any particular privilege to the regime of the ‘signifier’. If we call the signifying semiotic system semiology, then semiology is only one regime of signs among others, and not the most important one. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 111) In fact, any particular regime of signs subsists in a milieu where competing regimes circulate. Similarly, any given discourse is not a fixed or closed system of signification, but is flexible and relative to other modes of expression and possible interpretations. An object might occupy many classifications simultaneously, and thus can transfer between meanings. A complex ‘mixture’ of various semiotic regimes constitutes a ‘milieu’ or ‘landscape’ that furnishes material for the constitution of the sense of a particular body. The milieu constitutes an exterior context in which any particular organisation of meaning subsists. At its points of contact with this milieu, a representation is fundamentally unstable, as its elements combine, shift, transfer and pass between other regimes of sense. Thus, there are possible ‘passages’ between regimes of signs, enabling movements of destratification or the mixing and translation of established regimes of signification. Whereas the semiotic regime of the signifier works by capturing and reducing diverse meanings to a uniform representation of ‘truth’, alternative and polyvocal regimes of sense and expression are always possible (136; see also Deleuze 2004). **The potential for discovery of these alternative and contesting regimes of sense, however, ‘requires a rethinking of the majoritarian face and a willingness to envisage more than one system of comprehension and function for the face’ (MacCormack 2004: 138). Deleuze and Guattari suggest: when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits disappear, we can be sure that we have entered into another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings-molecular, nocturnal deterritorialisations overspilling the limits of the signifying system. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 115) Fanon writes: I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence. In the world in which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself.** I am a part of Being to the degree that I go beyond it. (Fanon 1967: 229) Because dominant meanings are always open to a contextualising milieu in which mixed and conflicting regimes of signs subsist, their stability is challenged as they come into contact and are forced to shift and morph in partial destratifications in order to accommodate such conflicting significations. Thus, **‘dismantling the face’ involves locating the points at which meaning shifts and becomes unstable: searching for the points in a collection of social discourses where meaning is contradictory, or the points in one’s own identity where one occupies multiple and contradicting classifications**. One may be simultaneously altruistic and selfish, active and passive, free and constrained, wilful and aimless, friend and lover, parent and professional, and so forth. In finding such points of ambiguous identification, one is potentially able to apply pressure to the signifying system in which one is embedded, perhaps provoking an ‘uncertain moment’ where conventional significations collapse and established meanings shift (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 189). At such moments, **the ‘abstract machine of faciality’ that shapes the emergence of particular and concrete facial assemblages may become (partially) transparent. The increased visibility of the constructive mechanisms underlying a set ‘face’ undermines its pretensions to inevitability and stability**.

### ROB – Edu:

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debate that best interrogates the oppressive politics of recognition, education grounded in majoritarian thought leads to real-world regulation. CARLIN AND WALLIN:

[Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121. LHP MK]

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘**the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’** (p. 6). Where **education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its** modes of production have taken as their teleological **goal** the **production of a ‘majoritarian people’**, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where **education aspires to invest desire in the** production of a ‘**majoritarian’** or ‘molar’ **public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed**, not only through the paucity of enunciatory **forms and images available for thinking education** in the first place, but further, **through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection**, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, **the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the** singular, the ‘**majoritarian’** **and standardizing** **impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production** **the reification of common sense**, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). **Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’,** common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, **where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited** and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: **common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression**. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, **while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking** – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.