

# 1NC vs Lackan

## 1 - T-fwk

**Interp:** The aff must defend the hypothetical implementation of the rez as a policy **‘Resolved’** preceding a colon indicates a **legislative forum**.

Blanche Ellsworth 81, English professor at SFSU and M.A. in English from UC Berkeley, 1/1/1981, *English Simplified*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, cc

**A colon** is also used to **separate** 3. THE SALUTATION OF A BUSINESS LETTER FROM THE BODY, Dear Sir Dear Ms. Weiner NOTE: In an informal letter, a comma follows the salutation: Dear Mary, Dear Uncle Jack 4. PARTS OF TITLES, REFERENCES, AND NUMERALS. TITLE: Principles of Mathematics: An Introduction REFERENCE: Luke 3:4—13 NUMERALS: 8:15 PM 5. PLACE OF PUBLICATION FROM PUBLISHER Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 6. **THE WORD RESOLVED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION** Resolved: That this committee go on record as **favoring new legislation**.

**Justice implies a desirable departure from the status quo – that means the aff must rectify an unjust social interaction**

**IHS n.d.** [(Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, non-profit organization that engages with students and professors) “What is Justice?”] JL

One of the most influential accounts of the origin and nature of justice comes from Plato’s Republic. According to Plato’s account, **we can think of the principles of justice as mutually agreed to principles for the coordination and structure of social interaction that would benefit all who are subject to them** What those principles are will depend on the society. In addition, there’s a second theory of justice that Plato offers that’s more general. According to this second theory, justice is “each getting what is rightfully theirs and no one getting what is rightfully another’s.” In other words, questions of justice always ask, “Who has a right to what?”

**Justice is a policy question**

**Merriam Webster ND** [(Merriam Webster) “Justice” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice>] BC

Essential Meaning of **justice**

1: **the process or result of using laws to fairly** judge and punish crimes and criminals

**Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space.**

TIMOTHY JUSTIN **TRAPP**, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.<sup>214</sup> The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “**property interests in outer space**.”<sup>215</sup> It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.<sup>216</sup> This **is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.**<sup>217</sup> [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“**Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.**”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.<sup>218</sup> In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.<sup>219</sup>

## Outer Space is considered anything that sits above the Earth's atmosphere

**Betz 21** [(Eric Betz, Science & tech writer for @Discovermag, @Astronomymag and others), "The Kármán Line: Where does space begin?", Astronomy, <https://astronomy.com/news/2021/03/the-krmn-line-where-does-space-begin>, March 5, 2021] SS

These days, spacecraft are venturing into the final frontier at a record pace. And a deluge of paying space tourists should soon follow. But to earn their astronaut wings, high-flying civilians will have to make it past the so-called Kármán line. This boundary sits some 62 miles (100 kilometers) above Earth's surface, and it's generally accepted as the place where Earth ends and outer space begins.

## Private entities are non-governmental corporations

**UpCounsel ND** [(UpCounsel is an interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help solely based on their preferences. "Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know", UpCounsel, <https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity#importance-of-private-entities>, No Date] SS

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

Unlike publicly traded companies, private companies do not have public stock offerings on Nasdaq, American Stock Exchange, or the New York Stock Exchange. Instead, they offer shares privately to interested investors, who may trade among themselves.

## Violation: They aren't topical

Prefer —

## 1] Focus on institutional change through policy making is empirically successful for the disabled

**DSQ 3:** DSQ 3, Disability Studies Quarterly, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/399/545>

The history of the efforts of the disability rights movement on behalf of legislation which would facilitate the attainment of its twin goals of the inclusion and empowerment of persons with disabilities can be said to begin in the 1950s. Specifically, it can be traced (Varela 1983: 35) to the "paralyzed veterans . . . fighting for more parking spaces, and for more accessible commodes . . ." and to the fight by people with disabilities "for local and state accessibility laws throughout the 1950s." The first significant federal legislation advancing the goals of the movement came in 1965 with the creation of the National Commission on Architectural Barriers to the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped. The Commission was to "study the problems involved in making all federal buildings accessible to disabled citizens" (Varela 1983: 36). However, the import of the work of the Commission on such problems is not limited to problems of access. As Varela (1983: 36) observes, "the work of the Commission, and, more importantly, of disabled activists . . . [changed] attitudes toward disability . . ." The change was from "an emphasis on services (that is, on doing something about 'those people') to "an emphasis on civil rights (that is, the notion that once certain obstacles were removed, disabled people would be able to do a lot more for themselves than society had imagined)" (Varela 1983: 36). In short, efforts to include those with disabilities became efforts to empower them as well. Moreover, the notion that environmental obstacles and not just the impairment of individuals were worthy of attention rendered it plausible to seek the enactment of laws and regulations that would do so. In other words, "environmental variables, unlike individual characteristics can be rectified through legislative and administrative action" (DeJong 1983: 25). In 1968, the Architectural Barriers Act was passed. It stipulated that any facility built with or merely receiving federal funds had to be accessible to all. However, enforcement was minimal (Varela 1983: 36). Fortunately, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in a provision welcomed by the disability right movement, established the Architectural

and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (A&TBCB) to investigate and enforce compliance with established standards. Unfortunately, it "never received the funding it needed to enforce the law or even to investigate all . . . violations . . . reported by disabled consumers" (Varela 1983: 37). Nevertheless, **the fight for accessibility did advance the cause of the disability rights movement. It helped make it clear that barriers included "social, political and intellectual obstacles,"** as well as physical ones" (Varela 1983: 37). Moreover, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act contained provisions in addition to the establishment of the A&TBCB which were important to the movement (Varela 1983: 40-41). It required the establishment, by state rehabilitation agencies, of selection methods that would ensure that people with severe impairments were not excluded from the agency's programs. In effect, then, the Act made it clear that no impairment, no matter how severe, was to be allowed as a consequence of a state agency's denial of services to become a disability. In addition, the 1973 act included provisions for client rights and for civil rights. Specifically, Section 504 prohibited discrimination against persons with so-called disabilities by any federally supported program. Thus, Section 504 was important to persons with so-called disabilities "who were looking for jobs . . . who wanted to use the same clinic as everyone else, who wanted the same choice of apartments, and who wanted to get into the polling places on election day" (Varela 1983: 42), who wanted simply to be an autonomous, contributing member of society. The next step in the history of legislation to empower and include people with impairments was the passage of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, originally called the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P. L. 94-142). IDEA set "forth a comprehensive scheme" to ensure "two basic substantive rights of eligible children with disabilities . . ." These were: "(1) the right to a free appropriate public education, and (2) the right to that education in the least restrictive environment" (National Council on Disability 2000: 28). The law applied in every state that receives federal funds under IDEA and to all public agencies authorized to provide special education and related services in a state that receives such funds. The Act was amended and reauthorized in 1997 (NCD 2000 30-31). In 1978, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments (P. L. 95-602) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act were passed. The amendments evinced Congress' endorsement of the autonomy premise of the social model described above. That is, the Amendments acknowledged that persons with disabilities should be involved in forming the policies and practices which affect their lives. Specifically, it mandated that a grant for an independent living center "provide assurances that handicapped individuals be substantially involved in [the] policy direction and management of such center, and will be employed by such center" (P. L. 95-602 as quoted by Varela 1983: 46). **Many, if not most, however, view the enactment of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) in 1990 as the crowning achievement of the disability rights movement.** That act (P. L. 101-336) extended provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1978 amendments well beyond the earlier application to federally supported programs and the state rehabilitation agencies and of the IDEA to special education. Indeed, it "codified into law important principles that would henceforth govern the relationship between [American] society and its citizens with disabilities . . . [and] altered public discourse about disability and about the role of people with disabilities in American society" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4-5). It did so, first, by, in effect, **making the marginalization, the exclusion of people with impairments from the mainstream of society in the United States, illegitimate. Specifically, it declared that "people with disabilities are an integral part of society and, as such, should not be segregated, isolated, or subjected to the effects of discrimination"** (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Furthermore, it sought **to enable "people with disabilities to take charge of their lives"** . . . by fostering employment opportunities, facilitating access to public transportation and public accommodation, and ensuring the use of our nation's communication system" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Moreover, the **principles of the ADA can serve as a basis to test and challenge public policies and practices not consistent with those principles and even to demand they be changed.** The ADA, then, **"upholds the principle that each individual has the potential, and deserves, the right to participate in, and contribute to, society"**

**2] the Aff doesn't defend a concrete government agent or mechanism, which makes cost benefit analysis impossible. The impact is violence—debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to solve material violence**

**Capulong 9:** (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana, Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009)

Motivating client **activism under dynamic social conditions requires the development and constant assessment and reassessment of a political perspective that measures that resistance and its possibilities. That task in turn requires the development of specific activist goals** within the context of such analyses, and perhaps broader, national and international strategy--what some call the political "next step." This is particularly true today, when the economic crisis plaguing capitalism, the "war on terror" and climate change undeniably have world-wide dimensions. **Instances of failure, too, need to be part of that analysis, because they teach us much about why otherwise promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements** of the sort to which we all aspire. Thus, the theoretical need is two-fold: to construct a broader organizing perspective from a political standpoint, and to consider activism writ large. Without reading the pulse of prevailing social conditions, it is easy to miscalculate what that next step ought to be. **We will not build a mass movement though**

**sheer perseverance--a linear, idealist conception of change at odds with dynamic social conditions. By the same token, we may underestimate the potential of such mass activism if we focus simply on the local dimensions of our work. The dialectic between a dynamic social context and political consciousness and action requires a constant organizational and political calibration and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship.** Without such a working perspective, we are apt to be either ultra-left or overly conservative. As Jim Pope put it recently in the context of new forms of labor organizing: "If we limit our vision of the future to include only approaches that work within the prevailing legal regime and balance of forces, then we are likely to be irrelevant when and if the opportunity for a paradigm shift arises." n449 The cyclical nature of labor organizing, he argues, mirrors politics generally: American political life as a whole has likewise alternated between periods characterized by public action, idealism, and reform on the [\*189] one hand, and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrenchment on the other. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of corruption and extremes of wealth and poverty that, sooner or later, ignite passionate movements for reform. n450 C. 'Activism': Towards a Broader, Deeper, Systematic Framework In progressive lawyering theory, grassroots activism is frequently equated with "community organizing" and "movement" or "mobilization" politics. n451 Indeed, these methods have come to predominate activist lawyering in much the same way as "public interest law" has come for many to encompass all forms of progressive practice. "Activism" is, of course, broader still. Even on its own terms, the history of community organizing and social movements in the United States includes two vitally important traditions frequently given short shrift in this realm: industrial union organizing and alternative political party-building. n452 In this section, my aim is not to catalogue the myriad ways in which lawyers and clients can and do become active (methodically or institutionally)--which, given human creativity and progress, in any event may be impossible to do--but rather to problematize three assumptions: first, the tendency to define grassroots activity narrowly; second, the notion that certain groups--for example "the poor" or the "subordinated"--are the definitive agents of social change; and finally, the conviction that mass mobilization or movement-building, by itself, is key to social transformation. 1. Grassroots Activism There are countless ways in which people become socially or politically active. Yet even the more expansive and sophisticated considerations of activism in progressive lawyering theory tend to unnecessarily circumscribe activism. For example, Cummings and Eagly argue that we need to "unpack" the term "organizing." n453 Contrasting two strategies of the welfare rights movement in the 1960s, these authors distinguish between "mobilization as short-term community action and organizing as an effort to build long-term institutional power." n454 In the same breath, however, they define organizing "as shorthand for a range of community-based practices," n455 even though at least some activism, for example union organizing or, say, [\*190] fasting, might not be best characterized as "community-based." What is required is a larger framework that takes into account the sum total of activist initiatives. Lucie White argues that we need to "map out the internal microdynamics of progressive grassroots initiatives ... observe the multiple impacts of different kinds of initiatives on wide spheres of social and political life ... and devise typologies, or models, or theories that map out a range of opportunities for collaboration." n456 This map would be inadequate--and therefore inaccurate--if we include certain activist initiatives and not others. But that is precisely what the progressive lawyering literature has done by failing to regularly consider, for example, union organizing or alternative political party-building. 2. Agents of Social Change: Identity, Class and Political Ideology As with our definition of activism, here, too, the problem is a lack of clarity, breadth or scope, which leads to misorientation. Have we defined, with theoretical precision, the social-change agents to whom we are orienting--e.g., the "people," the "poor," the "subordinated," "low-income communities" or "communities of color?" And if so, are these groupings, so defined, the primary agents of social change? By attempting to harmonize three interrelated (yet divergent) approaches to client activism--organizing on the bases of geography and identity, class and the workplace, and political ideology--modern community organizing simultaneously blurs and balkanizes the social-change agents to whom we need to orient. What, after all, is "community?" In geographic terms, local efforts alone cannot address social problems with global dimensions. n457 As Pope observed of workers' centers: "the tension between the local and particularistic focus of community unionism and the global scope of trendsetting corporations like Wal-Mart makes it highly unlikely that community unionism will displace industrial unionism as 'the' next paradigm of worker organization." n458 On the other hand, members of cross-class, identity-based "communities" may not necessarily share the same interests. In the "Asian American community," Ancheta explains: using the word "community" in its singular form is often a misnomer, because Asian Pacific Americans comprise many communities, each with its own history, culture and language: Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, Lao-Mien, [\*191] Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Samoan, Tongan, Guamanian, Native Hawaiian, and more. The legal problems facing individuals from different communities defy simple categorization. The problems of a fourth-generation Japanese American victim of job discrimination, a monolingual refugee from Laos seeking shelter from domestic violence, an elderly immigrant from the Philippines trying to keep a job, and a newcomer from Western Samoa trying to reunite with relatives living abroad all present unique challenges. Add in factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability, and the problems become even more complex. n459 Angela Harris echoes this observation by pointing out how some feminist legal theory assumes "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience [that] can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." n460 The same might be said of the "people," which, like the "working class," may be too broad. Other categorizations--such as "low-income workers," "immigrants", and the "poor", for example--may be too narrow to have the social weight to fundamentally transform society. In practice, progressive lawyers orient to the politically advanced among these various "communities." In so doing, then, we need to acknowledge that we are organizing on the basis of political ideology, and not simply geography, identity or class. Building the strongest possible mass movement, therefore, requires an orientation not only towards certain "subordinated" communities, but to the politically advanced generally. Otherwise, we may be undermining activism writ large. This is not to denigrate autonomous community efforts. As I have mentioned, subordinated communities of course have the right to self-determination, i.e. to organize separately. But the point is not simply to organize groups of people who experience a particular oppression, but rather to identify those who have the social power to transform society. Arguing that these agents are the collective, multi-racial working class, Smith explains: The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self-definition are [sic] what determine social class. Although income levels obviously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of middle class. And many people who consider themselves "middle [\*192] class" are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those who do not control the means of production and are forced to sell their labor power to capitalists are workers. n461 The practical consequence of this very well may be that we redefine who we represent as clients and consider activism or potential activism outside subordinated communities, for example union activity and alternative political-party building, as part of our work. 3. From Movementism to Political Organization Dogged as our work is in the activist realm, **any effort at fundamental social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership.** Such leadership, in turn, requires work not often associated with "activism," such as, for example, theoretical study. n462 "Movementism," n463 by which I mean the conviction that building a mass movement is the answer to oppression and exploitation, has its limitations. Even though activism itself is perhaps the best school for political education, we have an enormous amount to learn from our predecessors. In the final analysis, fundamental social transformation will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough, motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic in any struggle for power. "The problem," as Bellow astutely observed, "is not our analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject." n464 Such opportunities typically occur when there is a confluence of three factors: a social crisis; a socio-economic elite that finds itself divided over how to overcome it; and a powerful mass movement from below. As I understand the nature of social change, successful social transformations occur when there is a fourth element: political organization. Conclusion Client activism is not a monolithic, mechanical object. Most of the time, it is neither the gathering mass movement many of us wish for, nor the inert, atomized few in need of external, professional motivation. Rather, activism is a phenomenon in constant ebb and flow, a [\*193] mercurial,

fluid complex shaped by an unremitting diversity of factors. The key through the maze of lawyering advice and precaution is therefore to take a hard, sober look at the overarching state of activism. Are our clients in fact active or are they not? How many are and who are they? What is the nature of this period? Economically? Politically? Culturally? What are the defining issues? What political and organizing trends can be discerned? With which organizations are our clients active, if any? What demands are they articulating, and how are they articulating them? This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, development and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarching political perspective. My aim in this Article is to begin to theorize the various approaches to this evaluation. In essence, I am arguing for the elaboration of a systematic macropolitical analysis in progressive lawyering theory. Here, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive set of political considerations, but rather to develop a framework for, and to investigate the limitations of, present considerations in three areas: strategic aims; prevailing social conditions; and methods of activism. Consciously or not, admittedly or not, informed and systematic or not, progressive lawyers undertake their work with certain assumptions, perspectives and biases. Progressive lawyering theory would be a much more effective and concrete guide to action--to defining the lawyer's role in fostering activism--if it would elaborate on these considerations and transform implicit and perhaps delimited assumptions and approaches into explicit and hopefully broader choices. Over the past four decades, there has been remarkable continuity and consistency in progressive lawyers' use of litigation, legislation, direct services, education and organizing to stimulate and support client activism. The theoretical "breaks" to which Buchanan has referred n465 have not been so much about the practice of lawyering itself, but rather about unarticulated shifts in ultimate goals, societal analyses, and activist priorities, each necessitated by changes in the social, economic, and political context. That simply is another way of stating the obvious: that progressive lawyers change their practices to adapt to changing circumstances. The recurrent problem in progressive lawyering theory is that many commentators have tended to generalize these practice changes to apply across social circumstances. In so doing, they displace and often replace more fundamental differences over strategic goals, interpretation of social contexts, and organizing priorities with debates over the mechanics of lawyering practice. The argument is turned on its head: we often assume or tend to [\*194] assume agreement over the meanings and underlying conceptual frameworks relating to "fundamental social change," current political analysis, and "community organizing," and debate lawyering strategy and tactics; but instead we should be elaborating and clarifying these threshold political considerations as a prerequisite to using what we ultimately agree to be a broad and flexible set of lawyering tools. In effect, the various approaches to lawyering have become the currency by which scholars have debated politics and activism. The irony is that our disagreements are less about lawyering approaches per se, I believe, than they are about our ultimate political objectives, our analyses of contemporary opportunities, and our views of the optimal paths from the latter to the former. The myriad lawyering descriptions and prescriptions progressive lawyering theory offers are of limited use unless they are anchored in these primary considerations. How do we decide if we should subscribe to "rebellious" and not traditional "public interest" lawyering, for example, or "collaborative" over "critical" lawyering, if we do not interrogate these questions and instead rush too quickly into practical questions? The differences among these approaches matter precisely because they have different political goals, are based on different political analyses, and employ different political activist strategies. Activist lawyers already engage in these analyses--necessarily so. To foster client activism, they must read prevailing social conditions and strategize with their clients about the political next step, often with an eye toward a long-term goal. But I don't think we necessarily engage in these analyses as consciously, or with as full a picture of the history and dynamics involved or options available, as we could. Often this is because there simply isn't time to engage these questions. Or perhaps not wanting to dominate our clients, we squelch our own political analysis and agenda to allow for organic, indigenous leadership from below. But if we are truly collaborative--and when we feel strongly enough about certain political issues--we engage on issues and argue them out. In either event, we undertake an unsystematic engagement of these fundamental issues at our peril. If we adhere to the belief that **only organized masses of people can alter** or replace **exploitative and oppressive institutions and bring about lasting fundamental social change,** then, as **progressive lawyers, we need to be clear about which legal tactics can bring about such a sustained** effort in each historical moment. Without concrete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal practice will fail to live up to its potential.

### 3] Debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange—stasis and limits are key to engagement.

**Steinberg and Freeley 13:** David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And \*\* Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so **there must be a controversy**, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest **before there can be a debate.** If everyone is in agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. **Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question to be answered.** For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not

likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objective of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For example, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertisements even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audience or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal discourse occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumentation calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. **The proposition provides focus for the discourse and** guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to identify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates ("Vote for me!"); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) [I]t is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed ("the defendant is guilty!"). In academic debate, the proposition provides **essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge** after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or, worse, "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In academic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportunity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. **To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined.**

**4] their position explodes ground, limits, and predictability. They can defend anything from Wilderson to Baudrillard, or uncontestable statements like one plus one equals two, to "racism is bad" – the neg can't predict these, nor answer them if the ground is slanted to one side.**

**This outweighs other impacts**

**A] It skews your evaluation of the round – if their impacts seem true, it's because I couldn't answer them**

**B] They force the neg to generics like Cap, Word PICs, or Afropess against their position, which moots the entire 1AC and makes the discussion meaningless**

**C] Fair starting points are key to dialogue.**

**Galloway 7:** Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

**Debate as a dialogue** sets an argumentative table, where **all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position**. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, **taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure**. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. **According to fairness** norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. **When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other** participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. **A desire to be fair** is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that **takes the form of a demand for equality** of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, **fairness is a demand** for respect, a demand **to be heard**, a demand that a voice **backed by** literally months upon months of preparation, **research, and critical thinking** not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table **unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue**. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on...’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. **Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought** in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we **reach agreement which binds us to a common cause**...If we are to be equal...relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and **other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy**

**5] The 1AC kills accessibility for new circuit debaters, novices, small schools, pretty much any debater that hasn’t been on the circuit for at least a year.**

**Topicality is key to combat prep asymmetry and exclusion of non-circuit debater**

**McGinnis:** McGinnis, Dave [WDM Valley Coach] “In Defense of Topical Switch Side Debate” *NsdUpdate*, October 2014. RP

Further, **[I]t is not obviously the case that the people who benefit from the unfairness created by nontopical debate are also those who experience the greatest societal unfairness**. For one thing, the globe’s least advantaged are unlikely to be participating in debate in the first place. And it is unlikely that people living in the global south experience any real benefit as a result of being the subject of an American student’s critical debate position. Additionally, it is entirely possible that those who benefit from the advantage provided by nontopical advocacies are those with the greatest initial advantages. I recall an instance during the 2009-2010 season when **[A] male debater from a very wealthy suburban school ran a nontopical critique of “gender” in debate against a female debater from a less-well-off school**. His argument was that we should reject discussion of the topic in favor of advocating for more opportunities for female debaters. The round was a bid round; **[I]t the male debater won. Anyone** who is seriously concerned about issues of equity **should be disturbed by the practice of those with great privilege using the narrative experiences of those with much less privilege as a tool for winning** debate rounds, particularly since, in our community, the capacity to win debate rounds is, itself, another form of privilege. And finally, **I have no idea what** ! — or anyone —

would [to] say to a student from a less-well-resourced school who walked into a tournament — say, Blake — expecting to debate the topic published by the National Speech and Debate Association — the topic, mind you, that their coach informed them would be the subject of contestation at the event — only to find out that, instead, they would have to engage a position about something entirely different. I could certainly not forward the argument that this non-circuit debater was awfully fortunate that their opponent was fighting for greater fairness.

**6] Topic Edu - Policy debates create research burdens, allow us to have advocacy skills, and allow us to defend arguments against opposition which is the most important skill in life, since executing on an idea requires we are able to defend it in a meaningful way. Your aff just makes people sit on a couch and talk about things bad in the world since there's no incentive to defend it against opposition**

**7] Exclusions inevitable in debate – we can't debate every possible position – framework isn't violent**

**Anderson:** — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 ("Reply to My Critic(s)," Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my

goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

## **Engaging in politics solves material conditions**

**Debate should surround material consequences—ideal theories ignore the concrete nature of the world and legitimize oppression.**

Curry 14 [Dr. Tommy J; “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century”, Victory Briefs, 2014]

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighting in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations.

**Scenario analysis valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs epistemic biases and teaches advocacy skills**

**Barma et al 16** – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the

# Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, [http://www.naazeenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using\\_scenarios\\_in\\_political\\_science\\_isp\\_2015.pdf](http://www.naazeenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf))

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? **Scenario analysis** is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis **is** thus **typically seen as serving** the purposes of corporate planning or as a **policy** tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet** scenario analysis **is not** inherently **limited to** these uses. **This** section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC

were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of **juxtaposing current trends** in unexpected combinations in order **to** articulate

**surprising** and **yet plausible** futures, often referred to as **“alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuert 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects. 4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the

latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make scenario analysis** particularly **useful** for policymaking. 5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in

often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine** let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm

**is constrained by** their **existing mental models and** maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known **cognitive bias**

**tendencies** such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of **scenarios** lies in their ability to **help individuals break**

**out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.

Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to **envision and thereby adapt to something** altogether

**different from the** known **present**. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance. 6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details. 7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases. 8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which

these scenarios might come to pass, **participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars** and analysts **from anticipating and understanding** the pivotal junctures that arise in **international affairs**.

**The state should be used as a heuristic to learn from it. Its the internal link to your pessimistic activism**

**Zanotti 14**

Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance. "Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World" – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated "Version of Record" is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects' relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. **Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to "rejection," "revolution," or "dispossession" to** regain a pristine "freedom from all constraints" or an immanent ideal social order. **It is found instead in** multifarious and **contingent struggles that are** constituted **within** the scripts of **governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them.** **This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities** and of their interactions with non-liberal political players **and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems.** International **power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces** and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Governmentality as a heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It **invites** historically situated explorations and **careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of "power," romanticizations of the "rebel"** or the "the local." More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms **and** focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations **also foster an ethics of political engagement** to be continuously **taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to "what happens" instead of fixations on "what ought to be."**<sup>83</sup> **Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution** to come or hope for a pristine "freedom" to be regained. **Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices.** To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault "my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So **my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.**"<sup>84</sup>

**voters**

**TVA Solves — just defend States ought to ban appropriation of outer space by private actors---Advs about why space col, expansion, and mining is antiblack/promotes afro-orientalism based violence**

**Edu - Its the only reason why people debate and the activity exists**

**Fairness - Debate is a game, and the only thing that differentiates it from other educational activities is the competitive aspect. Unfairness collapses the activity since no one will debate.**

- 1. Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start**
- 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical**
- 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation**

## **Case**

### **Framing**

**1] The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff's a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate.**

**2] You should vote negative on presumption – no impact to reading this aff – just proves you out debated Ardrey Kell RG on tab – doesn't affirm what you are saying is true OR inspire research since it is unpredictable**

**3] If disabled debaters want to debate the topic your aff sucks, it treats them as monolithic**

## **T/L**

**Humanity is never closed and a priori orientations towards pessimism ignore lived experience – all social structures are relational and even if the future looks bleak giving up is worse**

**Gordon 15** --- Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVESBTQ>, presenting and discussing his book "What Fanon Said" \*\*\*Theonaturalism – religion based difference

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change they never think about *what a human being is* and this is something Fanon pays attention to. **Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predictable.** In fact, in Fanon's writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. **One problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings in terms of rigid closed systems is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations.** Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. It's hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody were maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is **many of us want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model.** So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don't understand is nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. **People talk about race – do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman.** Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood **people.** And we can go on and on. So **if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things.** And one of the other things we begin to realize is that **we commit a serious problem when we do political work.** And the problem is this. **The question about Wilderson for instance.** There is this discussion going on (and a lot of people build it out of my earlier books). I have a category I call, as a metaphor, **an antiblack world. You notice an indefinite article – an anti-black world.** The reason I say that is because **the world is different from an anti-black world. The project of racism is to create a world that would be completely anti-black or anti-woman. Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli. People don't seem to understand how recent this phenomenon we are talking about is. A lot of people talk about race they don't even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalusia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don't understand – from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years? But the one thing that we don't understand to is we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years. We study the 500 years as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting and resisting. Had they not been fighting and resisting we wouldn't be here.** And then we come into this next point because you see **the problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But human beings don't have prior knowledge. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act.** You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let's start with enslaved ancestors. The enslaved ancestors who were burning down those plantations, who were finding clever ways to poison their masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions, none of them had any clue what the future would be 100 years later. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn't for them. **One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me, individually get the payoff.** When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, you fight for liberation for other generations. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that's why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. The very fact that in many African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. What happens to people when they have no future? It now collapses the concept of maturation and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to **understand that in all political action it's not about you. It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand.** Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? **People have done it before. There were people, for instance, who fought anti-colonial struggles,** there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17<sup>th</sup> 18<sup>th</sup> century all the way through) and **we have no idea what we are**

doing for the 22nd century. And this is where developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them. Which means every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The system isn't actually closed.