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Interpretation— The Affirmative must defend the whole resolution by defending all just governments and all workers.

Violation: They specify a subset of workers

1] Indefinite articles like “a” or “an” are used to represent generalities. This is from the UWash English Dept.

<https://depts.washington.edu/engl/askbetty/articles.php>

5. Generic reference **Sometimes when writing you are not referring to just one member of the class or to specific entity; instead you want to refer to the whole class or every member of that class. In other words, you want to generalize what you are saying.** There are two main ways to do so, 5.1

Use the plural form of noun By pluralizing a noun, you can make it generic. This makes sense because the plural form indicates that there is more than one instance, and that what you say applies to all of these instances, as in: 5.1.1 I like to eat apples and oranges. 5.1.2 Parents will always love their children. In both of these examples, the nouns are in their plural forms ("apples", "oranges", "parents" and "children"), and so have generic meanings. That is, the speaker in 5.1.1 likes all apples and all oranges, while the speaker in 5.1.2 is making assumption that all parents—without exception—love their children. If you choose this

option, do not forget to use the plural form of verb as well to agree with the plural subject noun. 5.2 **Use the singular form with the definite article**

"the" This option gives you the same generic reference as the plural option above. However, you have to be careful because this option is not as widely applicable as the first option. Some nouns cannot be used with the article "the" to signal generic reference. Nouns that can be used with this option are usually those that refer to occupations (e.g., the student, the doctor, the patient, the soldier, the farmer, etc.), names of animals (e.g., the lion, the turtle, etc.), body parts (e.g., the lungs, the heart, etc.), and human inventions (e.g., the telephone, the computer, etc.). Choosing this option, you need to have a singular form of verb. 5.3 **Use the singular**

form with the indefinite article "a" or "an" This is the least used option because its use is very restricted. It is usually used when you explain the components of something, as in: 5.3.1 An essay has three main parts: the introduction, the body, and the conclusion. 5.3.2 A bicycle has two wheels. In both examples, the speaker is talking about the components of an essay and a bicycle in general; she or he means that every essay and every bicycle will have those components. Note that the generic reference above will be lost if you say, for example, 5.3.3 I received a letter in the mail. 5.3.4 A bicycle was stolen from the store. In these two sentences, the indefinite article just introduces a new information that the hearer or the reader has not heard before, and it does not refer to letters and bicycles in general. The following sentence also sounds odd because of misuse of the indefinite article to signal generic reference: 5.3.5 A lion is an endangered animal. For this sentence, you need to say "Lions are an endangered animal" or "The lion is an endangered animal". This is because "an endangered animal" includes the whole species, but by saying "a lion," you're just referring to a member of the whole species.

“A” before “just government” is an indefinite article and “workers” is a bare plural which means that they express a generalization.

2] We win UQ- Indefinite articles can ONLY be used when the identity of the noun is unknown. That means they don’t get to spec govts or workers since in the context of semantics, we don’t know which govts or which workers.

Butte College English Department, Another Academic institution telling us about English/Grammar Rules
<http://www.butte.edu/departments/cas/tipsheets/grammar/articles.html>

Following are **the three specific rules** which **explain the use of** definite and **indefinite articles. Rule #1 - Specific identity not known: Use the indefinite article a or an only**

with a singular count noun whose specific identity is not known to the reader. Use a before nouns that begin with a consonant sound, and use an before nouns that begin with a vowel sound. **Use the article a or an to indicate any non-specified member of a group or category.** *I think an animal is in the garage. That man is a scoundrel. We are looking for an apartment.*

Additionally Prefer—

1] Prep-skew- Negs can only prep for the resolution as it is given to us. Specking affs makes them completely unpredictable and puts an infinite research burden on the neg. I can spend a million hours preparing and still never be prepared for the affs interpretation of the resolution.

2] Accessibility- Small schools and disadvantaged people may not have the resources to find the right evidence or have people to make numerous plans for debaters to overrun the neg with. It means that advantaged debaters will continue to have a greater advantage over disadvantaged debaters, and the losing debaters will stop debating. Diversity is important to keep debate educational.

5] Limits— Even if your aff is predictable, your interp is severely under limited. Supercharged on this topic because there are 200+ governments the aff can defend, the aff can spec to defend an unconditional RTS for any category or specific group. There are thousands of specific affs that are permissible if we don't accept my interp, generating an infinite caselist.. Limits are key to fairness since we can't prep for a thousand affs.

6] Semantics First- — any other interp justifies the aff jettisoning words from the resolution at will; it's ridiculous to expect us to prepare for things outside of the topic.

Nebel 15 - (Jake [Marshall Scholar of Philosophy, Princeton University] "The Priority of Resolutional Semantics"

<http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/>) GHS//GB

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, **topicality involves two "interpretations."** **The first is an interpretation**, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it.

The second is a rule—namely, that the affirmative must defend the resolution.² If we don't distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative's view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, **the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach.** This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: **it would be unfair to expect the negative to prep** **are** **against anything other than the res** **olution**, because

that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; **the educational benefits** **that are unique to debate stem from** **clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand.** **The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple.** Consider the following argument: **We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X.** **The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second**

premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

Voters

Fairness & Education

TVA – you could have just [...]

Solves abuse

- a. You can read country specific evidence, you just need to apply it to all countries or argue why it would apply.**
- b. You could've even read the same plan just under a whole res advocacy, just make it a contention or advantage so my arguments can still link.**

Paradigm Issues:

- 1] No RVI- RVI Chills Theory, the point of initiating theory is to point out abuse that has already happened and correct it to make the debate space better. If someone is proven not guilty in court it doesn't mean that they should prosecute the judge. If neg can easily win off their abuse by manipulating theory, then they will continue to be abusive.**
- 2] Use competing interps – it's key to norm setting – judges endorse the best interpretation instead of allowing abuse, checking a race to the bottom**
- 3] DTD- Abuse has already happened, I can't respond to the arguments that my opponents have made because instead I need to get into theory. DTD checks future abuse by teaching the opponent this isn't acceptable.**

2

Global tech innovation high now.

Mercury News et al 6/4 [Mercury News and East Bay Times Editorial Boards, June 4, 2021, "Editorial: How America can Win the Global Tech War"]

<https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill//gord0>

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech's impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that **the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China** has been **closing the tech gap** in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. **This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose.** It's imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. **Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016.** Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill's final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. **Khanna would like Congress to authorize \$100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies.** The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to \$50 billion or \$75 billion. **They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang's March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025.** The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending \$612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China's \$514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending \$33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount. The bill would authorize 10 technology hubs throughout the nation designed to help build the infrastructure, manufacturing facilities and workforce needed to help meet the nation's tech goals. **Building tech centers throughout the United States should also create more support for the industry across the country.** Tech's image has taken a beating in recent years — the emergence of the term "Big Tech" is hardly a positive development — and the industry will need all the support it can muster in Congress. The United States continues to have a crucial tech edge over its competitors, most notably China. The only way we can hope to win the 21st century is to make significant investments in research and development that will spark the next wave of innovation.

Strike efforts are increasing – they slow innovation, specifically in the tech sector.

Hanasoge 16 [Chaithra; Senior Research Analyst, Market Researcher, Consumer Insights, Strategy Consulting; "The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," Supply Wisdom; April/June 2016 (Doesn't specifically say but this is the most recent event it cites); <https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/>] Justin

The result: Verizon conceded to several of the workers' demands including hiring union workers, protection against outsourcing of call-center jobs, and employee benefits such as salary hikes and higher pension contributions, among others and thus bringing an end to the strike in June.

The repercussion: **The strike witnessed several instances of social disorder, violence and clashes,** ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, **as a result of the strike, Verizon reported lower than expected revenues in the second quarter of 2016.**

Trade unions/ labor unions aren't just this millennia's product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. Unions, to ensure fairness to the working class, have gone on strike for better working conditions and employee benefits since the industrial revolution and are as strong today as they were last century. With the advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today's work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable?

As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government departments across Australia went on a series of strikes over failed pay negotiations, disrupting operations of many government departments for a few days. Besides such direct effects, there are many indirect effects as well such as strained employee relations, slower work processes, lesser productivity and unnecessary legal hassles.

Also, union strikes can never be taken too lightly as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the Verizon incident that was a crucial example of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as 'anti-working class'. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

However, aside from employee concerns, such incidents are also determined by a number of other factors such as the country's political scenario, economy, size of the overall workforce and the unions, history of unionization, labor laws, and culture. For example, it is a popular saying that the French are always on strike as per tradition (although recent statistics indicate a decline in frequency). In a communist government like China, strikes have steadily risen in number. In 2015, China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based workers' rights group recorded 2,700 incidents of strikes and protests, compared to 1,300 incidents in 2014. Most of them have stemmed out of failure by the government to respect the basic rights of employees and address labor concerns.

Interestingly, unions have not been able to gain a strong foothold in the IT-BPO industry. While many countries do have a separate union to represent workers from the sector, incidents of strikes like Verizon have been relatively low.

However, workplace regulations, in addition to other factors mentioned could be a trigger for such incidents, even if on a smaller scale. For example, a recent survey that interviewed several BPO employees in India revealed that while forming a union in the BPO sector was difficult, irksome workplace regulations such as constant surveillance, irregular timings and incentives have prompted employees to express their resentment in smaller ways such as corruption of internal servers and so on. Such risks are further enhanced in a city like Kolkata, which carries a strong trade union culture.

Victories like the aff mobilizes unions in the IT sector.

Vynck et al 21 [Gerrit De; Carleton University, BA in Journalism and Global Politics, tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News; Nitashu Tikur; Columbia University, BA in English, New York University, MA in Journalism, Washington Post's tech culture reporter based in San Francisco; Macalester College, BA in English, Columbia University, MS in Journalism, reporter for The Washington Post who is focused on technology coverage in the Pacific Northwest; "Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech," The Washington Post; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/>] Justin

In response to tech company crackdowns and lobbying, **gig workers have shifted their strategy to emphasize building worker-led movements** and increasing their ranks, rather than focusing on employment status as the primary goal, says Veena Dubal, a law professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. **The hope is** that with **President Biden in the White House and an even split in the Senate, legislators will mobilize** at the federal level, **through the NLRA or bills such as the PRO Act, to recognize gig worker collectives as real unions.**

Technological innovation solves every existential threat – which outweighs.

Matthews 18 Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox.
<https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good>

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. **The 7.6 billion people now living**, after all, **amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future.** It's reasonable to suggest that those **quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do.** That's the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead's 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, "On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future." It's a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It's not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned "long-termism" into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does **prioritizing the far future even mean?** **The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction**, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity's continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. **But** in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that **while that's certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity** (which he calls "**targeted**" approaches to the far future) **have to complement "broad" approaches**, where instead of trying to **predict what's going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can**, so that it is, as a whole, **well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future,** not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. **In other words, caring about the far future doesn't mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation: it also means acting on pressing needs now.** For example: **We're going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress.** And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn't get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. **So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to** improve school systems — here and now — to **harness** the group economist Raj Chetty calls "lost Einsteins" (**potential innovators** who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or

very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: **improve incentives and norms in academic work** to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X "If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute," Beckstead writes. "An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards." Look at those examples again: It's just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party's platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren't that special, or at least maybe we don't have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol' do-goodery.

3

1] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.

Gregory Fernando **Pappas 16** [Texas A&M University] "The Pragmatists' Approach to Injustice", The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the "denotative method" (LW 1:371).¹⁸ What Dewey means by "denotation" is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are concerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical **inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are.** Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry "as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience" (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revision of our theories. **Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them.** Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to "point" in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one's theory or

theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its

causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his *Logic*, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical practice, one that they both use to make their points.¹⁹ The doctor’s starting point is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or problematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”²⁰ The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solutions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to suggest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”²¹¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their conceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doctor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something individualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contextualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”²² Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her inquiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s characterization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the illness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis.

To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶

Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its amelioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, **our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice.** The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

2] We win precision- Governments have a unique responsibility for consequences.

Enoch 07 – David. “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State” The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 9-13-2007. Published by: Legal Theory.

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance.

This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.⁴⁴ In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows⁴⁵ the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable.

Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):⁴⁶ perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.⁴⁷

States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

3] Lexical prerequisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

4] Extinction outweighs under any framework

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World" Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we're consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world.** This is for the familiar reason that there are **so many people who could exist in the future** – there are **trillions upon trillions**... upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that **reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight** as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there's nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there's a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But **that is a huge mistake.** Non-consequentialism is the view that there's more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; **it is not the view that the latter don't matter.** Even John Rawls wrote, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good,** from an impartial point of view. They'd thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn't significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one's character. What's even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial "point of view of the universe," indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to

reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one's own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don't care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler's recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I'd have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I've just argued that there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters,** it is at least arguable that, **from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It's possible they'll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, **all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive

period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly." (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

5] Scenario analysis valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs epistemic biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "'Imagine a World in Which': Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? **Scenario analysis** is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering "what if" questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis **is** thus **typically seen as serving** the purposes of corporate planning or as a **policy** tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet** scenario analysis **is not** inherently **limited to** these uses. **This** section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPF were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of **juxtaposing current trends** in unexpected combinations in order **to** articulate **surprising** and **yet plausible** futures, often referred to as **"alternative worlds."** Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China's slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC's decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning "helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present" (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council's series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of "alternative worlds" approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.⁴ As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the

latter is the German Marshall Fund's EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make scenario analysis** particularly **useful** for policymaking.⁵ Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine** let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm **is constrained by** their **existing mental models and** maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known **cognitive bias tendencies** such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of **scenarios** lies in their ability to **help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.

Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to **envision and thereby adapt to something** altogether **different from the** known **present**. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of "exogeneity"—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.⁶ The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to "simplify, then exaggerate" them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.⁷ Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.⁸ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios

are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which

these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

3

Labor unions effective – no need for more strikes

Graham 16' Graham, James. "A Reconsideration of the Right to Strike." *The Catholic Lawyer* 9.2 (2016): 4.

Employers in certain industries almost always bow to union demands because, having banded together in collective bargaining associations with their competitors, they are in a position to make the public pay the price of increased wages or shorter hours. This is an oversimplification, of course, but it would not be naive not to suppose, for example, that at least one effect of the inflated wage scales in the building trades is to make it more difficult for the lowerincome groups to increase their earnings and someday to buy a **home.** **Conclusion In any 'event, it would appear that government neutrality in labor disputes is fast becoming a thing of the past.** The Kennedy administration has to date shown no reluctance to invoke the Taft-Hartley injunction procedures in labor disputes affecting the national welfare. **A proposal by former Secretary of Labor Goldberg that government representatives participate as "observers" in major negotiations was greeted with a cry of indignation from George Meaney and a chilly "no thanks" from management spokesmen,** but Goldberg's proposal does reflect an increasing concern for the public interest in labor-management disputes. It seems that government mediators often will intervene in disputes that only remotely affect national defense interests. **Perhaps this tendency has been influenced by the widely-held view among labor practitioners that public tolerance for strikes is much lower today than during the years when unions were organizing in the mass production industries.**^{3 6} **In conclusion, it is safe to say that additional legislation to curb illegal strikes and to compel arbitration in**

certain industries may not only be inevitable but necessary as well. We also can expect government regulation over other areas of collective bargaining unless the powerful unions pay heed to the principle enunciated by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno **that the right to strike should be exercised only as a last resort and in situations where it needs no justification.**

Global inequality decreasing---cap is key.

Tupy 15 (Marian L [a senior policy analyst at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity]; Stop obsessing about inequality. It's actually decreasing around the world; Jan 8; www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/01/08/stop-obsessing-about-inequality-its-actually-decreasing-around-the-world/)

Is **inequality** increasing or decreasing? The answer **depends on our point of reference.** In America, the income gap

between the top 1 percent and the rest has grown. But **if we look not at America, but the world, inequality is shrinking.**

We are witnessing in the words of the World Bank's Branko Milanovic, **"the first decline in global**

inequality between world citizens since the Industrial Revolution." For most of human

history, incomes were more equal, but terribly low. Two thousand years ago, GDP per person in the most advanced parts of the world hovered around \$3.50 per day. That was the global average 1,800 years later. But by the early 19th century, a pronounced income gap emerged between the West and the rest. Take the United States. In 1820, the U.S. was 1.9 times richer than

the global average. The income gap grew to 4.1 in 1960 and reached its maximum level of 4.8 in 1999. By 2010, it had shrunk by 19 percent to 3.9. **That narrowing is**

not a function of declining Western incomes During the Great Recession, for example, U.S. GDP per capita decreased by 4.8

percent between 2007 and 2009. **It rebounded by 5.7 percent over the next 4 years and stands**

at an all-time high today. Rather, the narrowing of the income gap is a result of growing incomes in the rest of the world. Consider the spectacular rise of

Asia. In 1960, the U.S. was 11 times richer than Asia. Today, America is only 4.8 times richer than Asia. To understand why, let's look at China. Between 1958 and 1961, Mao Zedong attempted to transform China's largely agricultural economy into an industrial one through the "Great Leap Forward." His stated goal was to overtake UK's industrial production in 15 years.

Industrialization, which included building of factories at home as well as large-scale purchases of machinery abroad, was to be paid for by food produced on collective farms. But the collectivization of agriculture resulted in famine that killed between 18 and 45 million people. Industrial initiatives, such as Mao's attempt to massively increase production of steel, were equally disastrous. People burned their houses to stoke the fires of the steel mills and melted cooking wares to fulfill the steel production quotas. The result was destruction, rather than creation of wealth. Deng Xiaoping, Mao's successor, partially privatized the farmland and allowed farmers to sell their produce. Trade liberalization ensured that Chinese industrial output would

no longer be dictated by production quotas, but by the demands of the international economy. But **Following liberalization in 1978,**

China's GDP per capita has increased 12.5 fold, rising from \$545 in 1980 to \$6,807 in 2013. Over the same time period,

the Chinese poverty rate fell from 84 percent to 10 percent. **What is true of China is also true in much of the**

developing world. As Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gertz of the Brookings Institution wrote in 2011, **"poverty reduction of**

this magnitude is unparalleled in history: never before have so many

people been lifted out of poverty over such a brief period of time."

Developing countries have made strides in other areas too. Take life expectancy. Between 1960 and

2010, global life expectancy increased from 53 years to 70. In the U.S. over the same period it rose from 70 to 78. **Similar stories can be told**

about child and maternal mortality, treatment of communicable diseases,

and the spread of technology. Many Americans **point to globalization as a**

bogeyman, robbing our country of good jobs and resources. But really, **the phenomenon has ushered a period**

of unprecedented prosperity in many poor countries

Even as we struggle with economic problems at home let us remember the global – and largely positive – perspective on the state of the world.

cracies have problems. And yes, the march toward democracy has slowed since 2005—and even reversed in some countries, such as Thailand and Venezuela. But in many more—from Brazil to Mongolia to Senegal—democracy has deepened. Never before in history have so many developing countries been so democratic. As states have become wealthier and more democratic, conflict and violence within them have declined. Those who think otherwise should remember that as recently as the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the world was aflame, from Central America to Southeast Asia to West Africa. There were half as many civil wars in the last decade as there were in the 1980s, and the number of people killed in armed conflicts has fallen by three-quarters. Three major forces sparked this great surge in development progress. First, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the superpowers' support for some of the world's nastiest dictators and reduced the frequency of conflict. As ideas about economic and political governance began to change, developing countries introduced more market-based economic systems and more democracy. Second, globalization created vast new opportunities for economic growth. Increased flows of trade, investment, information, and technology created more jobs and improved living standards. Third, new and more effective leaders—in politics, business, religion, and civil society—began to forge deep change. Where courageous figures, such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, stepped forward, countries progressed; where old-style dictators, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, remained in power, countries languished. This incredibly wide-ranging progress should not obscure the considerable work that remains: progress has not reached everyone, everywhere. One billion people still live in extreme poverty, six million children die every year from preventable diseases, too few girls get the education they deserve, and too many people suffer under dictatorships. Countries such as Haiti, North Korea, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe lag far behind. But the fact remains that an enormous transformation is under way—one that has already substantially improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. WIN-WIN The United States should welcome and encourage this progress. For starters, broad-based development enhances global security. It is not true that poverty necessarily breeds terrorism, as some argue—after all, most poor people are not terrorists, and many terrorists are not poor. But it is true that poor states tend to be weak states unable to prevent terrorist and criminal networks from operating on their soil. Sustained development strengthens government institutions and reduces the need for outside intervention. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers." Development also builds states' capacities to fight pandemic disease. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were overwhelmed by Ebola in 2014 largely because they all had weak health systems. The same was true in many of the countries hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS epidemic decades ago. As poor countries grow wealthier, however, they become better equipped to fight diseases that can spread quickly beyond their borders. A more prosperous developing world also benefits the U.S. economy. The spread of economic growth creates new markets for American businesses not just in China but also in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and beyond. Developing countries are buying more and more aircraft, automobiles, semiconductors, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, consultancy services, and entertainment. Although the growth in trade with developing countries has slowed during the last year, their economies will no doubt remain major market opportunities for U.S. companies. In 1990, such states accounted for one-third of the global economy; today, their share is half, and they purchase more than half of U.S. exports. In 2011, Walmart spent \$2.4 billion to acquire a controlling share of a holding company that operates more than 350 retail stores in South Africa and 11 other African countries, signaling a level of interest in African consumers that would have been unimaginable two decades ago. To be sure, emerging markets also create competition for U.S. businesses and hardship for American workers who lose their jobs as a result. But they also create many new jobs, as American firms expand abroad and as companies in the developing world send more capital to the West. Moreover, developing countries are increasingly coming up with their own innovations and technologies, in medicine, agriculture, energy, and more. The United States should respond to this growing competition not with protectionism but by strengthening its own capacities: rebuilding its infrastructure, improving its educational system, and investing in new technologies. Finally, development helps spread and deepen the values that Americans hold dear: openness, economic opportunity, democracy, and freedom. These values tend to go hand in hand with growing prosperity: as incomes rise, citizens demand greater freedoms. History suggests that even governments that do not welcome these ideas eventually embrace them or are replaced by those that do. And as more developing countries achieve progress under market-based economic systems and democracy, other countries seek to emulate the model. The United States and Europe have a strong self-interest in encouraging this process, since it will enhance global stability and add to the number of like-minded partners that can help address future challenges.

SUSTAINING THE SURGE What makes all this progress especially impressive is that it has continued despite a number of major shocks that in an earlier age could well have stopped it: the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, the 9/11 attacks, the global food crisis of 2007–8, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In each case, pundits predicted that the disaster of the day would set back progress. Yet in each case, the gains continued. There are good reasons to believe they can continue well into the future. The forces that sparked these changes were fundamental, not transitory. Governments have learned from their mistakes and gotten much better at managing inevitable downturns. Global integration has made critical technologies available to more and more people. State institutions have become more effective, with improved (if imperfect) legal systems, clearer property rights, and greater respect for individual liberties. Democratic rules and norms governing the transfer of political power, free speech, and accountability have become more deeply entrenched. Civil society groups are more active. These deep-seated changes have put enormous additional gains well within reach. If economic growth proceeds along the lines of most projections over the next two decades, some 700 million more people will escape extreme poverty. Per capita incomes in poor countries will double again, millions of childhood deaths will be avoided, tens of millions of children will get the education they deserve, hunger will decline, and basic rights and freedoms will spread further. At least, that's what should happen—but none of these future gains is guaranteed. Growth has slowed markedly since 2008 in emerging economies such as Brazil and China and throughout the developing world. Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela have turned less democratic, and South Africa and Turkey seem to be headed in that direction as well. The Middle East has seen the return of conflict and authoritarian rule. China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea could spark a major conflict that could kill tens of thousands of people and devastate the region's economies. Outbreaks of SARS and the H1N1 and Ebola viruses underscore humanity's vulnerability to disease, and many doctors worry that growing resistance to antibiotics could reverse some of the hard-fought gains in health. Meanwhile, global population is on track to exceed nine billion by 2050, and the combination of more people, higher incomes, and warmer climates will place enormous strains on the world's supplies of fresh water, food, and energy. Although there are ample grounds for pessimism, the doomsayers continue to underestimate humanity's growing ability to cooperate in the face of new challenges. In the eighteenth century, when Thomas Malthus looked at population growth and foresaw catastrophic famine, he failed to appreciate the advances in agriculture, health, and governance that human ingenuity could create. The same was true for those that predicted a population disaster in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the problems facing developing countries are plain to see, while the new ideas and innovations that will overcome them are harder to picture. Continued progress isn't automatic or guaranteed. But with smart choices, it is within reach. LEADING BY EXAMPLE Most of the key choices will be made in developing countries themselves. Sustaining progress will require leaders there to reduce their countries' dependence on natural resources, make their economies more inclusive, invest more in health and education, expand opportunities for women, and strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Yet the future of development will also depend on the actions of the world's leading countries, since poorer countries can prosper only in a strong global system. The United States must do its part by regain[ing] its economic leadership through major investments in infrastructure, education, and technological advances in health, agriculture, and alternative fuels. It must act to fix its long-term budget problems by improving the solvency of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid and strengthen the financial system through better regulation. The country must also do a much better job of leading by example on democracy. Deep political polarization, the lack of substantive debate, the unwillingness to compromise, misguided foreign policy adventurism, and the Great Recession have made liberal democracy look unattractive and ineffective. That malaise matters, because many developing countries are now engaged in a battle of ideas over which economic and political model they should follow. On the one side stands the model that has prevailed in the West since World War II: market capitalism coupled with liberal democracy. On the other is the model practiced by China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and, increasingly, Russia, among others: state capitalism coupled with authoritarian rule. And there's yet one more option, with a smaller but more dangerous following: religious fundamentalism, as promulgated by Iran and Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria. As the Western countries struggle and China continues to rise, authoritarian capitalism is becoming more appealing. Consider Beijing's ties to Africa. China purchased \$26 billion in imports from the continent in 2013; the United States purchased \$9 billion. Chinese investment in Africa has been growing by 50 percent per year since 2000, whereas U.S. investment is growing by 14 percent per year. Make no mistake: many Africans still prefer to follow the American model and view China with suspicion. But those attitudes are beginning to shift, and Beijing's apparent ability to get things done will only enhance China's

appeal, especially if Washington seems to talk big but deliver little. THE NEXT SURGE FORWARD Aside from the broader task of getting their own houses in order, **the United States** and other Western powers **should** also **assert leadership** in several specific areas **to keep the progress going**. The first is climate change, which presents one of the greatest threats to poverty reduction. Most of the world's poor countries had little to do with creating the problem, yet they will bear the brunt of the damage. Rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and dwindling water supplies will derail progress, will undermine global food production, and could engender major conflict. Developing countries have an important role to play in curbing emissions, but they will not switch to low-carbon fuels and other clean technologies if their developed-world counterparts do not. Washington has taken important first steps to reduce power-plant emissions and raise automotive fuel-efficiency standards, but there is a very long way to go. Second, **leading countries**—especially the United States—**should invest more in technological innovation**. Much of the credit for recent improvements in living standards goes to vaccines, medicines, high-yielding seed varieties, cell phones, and the Internet. These **new technologies** (alongside old ones such as electricity and paved roads) **have not yet reached everywhere, so** simply **making them** more **widely available would do wonders**. But **sustaining progress for** the next several **decades will** also **require significant investments** in new vaccines, more powerful drugs, drought- and heat-resistant seeds, desalination techniques, and clean energy.

Cap is good, solves a litany of impacts

Kelly, Cambridge engineering professor, 2013

(Michael, "Why a collapse of global civilization will be avoided: a comment on Ehrlich & Ehrlich", July, <http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/280/1767/20131193.short#corresp-1>, Idg)

The population explosion (and its Malthusian societal disruptions) that Ehrlich FRS predicted for the 1990s has not come about [5,6], and the concerns in this present Ehrlich paper are not tempered by the mounting evidence of the demographic transition that occurs when the majority of people live in cities and have access to education

Some studies indicate that a peak of 9 billion people in 2050 will be followed by a decline to a population of approximately 6 billion in 2100—less than

[8]. If we look at the waste in the contemporary food chain, at the point of growth, in transit to the market and into the homes of consumers, and compound that loss by the amount of food thrown

out rather than consumed, we generate the quantity of food to feed the 9 billion today with the systems in place if we were less wasteful and could distribute it [9]. **Animal protein is now being generated in the laboratory and not on the farm** [10]. Where is the discussion of the impact of

mega-cities being self-sufficient in animal protein from factories within their city boundaries 40 years from now? **This is the time scale on which synthetic fibre comprehensively displaced wool from most of its markets**

Indeed, rather than speak of peak oil, we can speak of peak farmland—we will need smaller areas in future to feed the world, and we will oversee the managed return of excess land to the wild [11]. The starkest example in the consideration of material overconsumption is **the smart phone** [12]. This was developed within the paradigm of business as usual to improve the way in which we communicate. Two points are

relevant. **First, the small piece of metal, plastic and semiconductor that fits in the palm of a hand contains the functions of a camera, radio, telephone, answering machine, photo album, dictaphone, music centre, satellite**

navigation system, video camera and player, compass, stop-watch, Filofax, diary and more, which were all separate and bulky items only 20 years ago. This represents the great dematerialization of modern civilization, well ahead of any imminent collapse of natural resources. The shape of high streets and retail centres are changing to reflect this evolution. Indeed, the recycling of electronic systems will enhance further this capability of doing more with less material, and the market for extended time between recharging.

No 1AC Solvency – The Affirmative’s legal approach to reformism is part of the political imaginary that works to regulate and control gendered and racialized bodies for the production of more sovereign will. (

Kandaswamy 12 (Priya Kandaswamy is the associate professor of Women’s Gender & Sexuality Studies, Race Gender & Sexuality Studies Department Head . Edward Hohfeld Professor of Social Sciences “The Obligations of Freedom and The Limits of Legal Equality,” Southwestern Law Review, Vol.41)//JP

Despite a vast array of critiques that have elucidated the ways in which the U.S. state is deeply invested in maintaining social relations of racism, capitalism, and heteropatriarchy, it is still quite commonplace to assume that to remedy social injustices one must turn first to the law. The pursuit of legal equality is frequently understood as the most pragmatic approach and a necessary first step to any kind of broad scale social change. In practice, however, legal equality struggles have failed to deliver substantive social justice for many groups. Frequently written off as a sign of the incompleteness of legal change, these failures are often invoked as evidence of the need for further legal reform rather than prompting the serious consideration of the law’s actual capacity to effect change that perhaps they should. Even those critical of legal strategies frequently fall back on them, citing legal reform as a necessary evil, the best that can be achieved in the current political context, or the first step toward broader changes. In this way, the law maintains a fierce hold on the political imagination. In this essay, I argue for the importance of severing that hold. The assumptions that legal reform is a pragmatic and necessary first step to social justice is a reflection of the boundaries that circumscribe what is imagined as politically possible within dominant discourse rather than the essential truths they are often taken to be. To the extent that legal interventions will always simultaneously reinforce the legal authority of the U.S. state, legal reform is bound to reiterate rather than transform unequal distributions of power. Pinning political possibilities to the law circumscribes the boundaries of change in very narrow ways. Instead, movements for social justice must seek to open up possibilities for transformation and evaluate their engagements with the law in terms of the future possibilities those engagements might open or foreclose. In other words, rather than presume legal equality is the answer, it is necessary to engage with the more complex questions about what freedom should and could look like and locate legal interventions in relation to this broader vision. In order to illustrate these points, I turn first to the historical example of emancipation and the consequent conferral of citizenship to formerly enslaved people, a quintessential moment in the expansion of legal rights in U.S. history. I look to Reconstruction Era struggles over the meaning of citizenship specifically because they mark a particularly defining

moment in the reconfiguration of racial violence through the construct of the liberal subject. Given the ways that U.S. citizenship had been defined against blackness, **the Fourteenth Amendment's extension of citizenship rights** to freed people forced the nation to grapple with what racially inclusive citizenship in a nation forged through racial violence would look like. Therefore, considering the legacies of this historical period raises crucial issues for contemporary struggles for inclusion, equality and the extension of legal rights, particularly given the role emancipation has played as an important historical reference point for these struggles. Emancipation marked a moment of great possibility, and freed people held broad and diverse visions of freedom that included reparations, land ownership, freedom of mobility, and other self-defined mechanisms of individual and collective self-determination.¹ However, as Saidiya Hartman shows, **legal recognition as citizens worked to constrain and curtail these more expansive possibilities of freedom by locking freedom for black people into an idiom defined by obligation, indebtedness, and responsibility.**² Rather than mitigate the significance of racial difference in the national imagination, the conferral of citizenship rights collaborated in "the persistent production of blackness as abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, dependent, irrational, and infectious"³ and obliged freed people to shoulder the responsibilities and burdens of perpetually having to demonstrate their preparedness for and deservingness of citizenship in a context where their blackness marked them as otherwise.⁴ This was evident in the ways that state institutions prioritized enforcing labor and sexual discipline amongst freed people.⁵ As the Virginia Freedmen's Bureau's Assistant Commissioner Orlando Brown wrote, if freed people were to be citizens, it was necessary "to make the Freedmen into a self-supporting class of free laborers, who shall understand the necessity of steady employment and the responsibility of providing for themselves and [their] families."⁶ **As Hartman shows, anti-black racism fundamentally shaped recognition as a liberal subject.**⁷ While for white male citizens liberal individualism had afforded a kind of entitlement and self-determination, for freed people, **recognition as a liberal subject rendered one responsible and therefore blameworthy.**⁸ This was particularly evident in the workings of contract. A key distinction between the free person and the slave was selfownership signified primarily through the capacity to enter into contract.⁹ The understanding of legal freedom as self-possession meant that there was no inherent contradiction between subordination and freedom as long as subordination was secured through a freely entered into contract, a phenomenon most clearly illustrated by the labor and marriage contracts.¹⁰ For freed people who had both been structurally denied access to other material resources through slavery and who were subject to vagrancy laws that criminalized the refusal to enter into long-term labor contracts, contracts were very much coerced.¹¹ However, despite the fact that they functioned to limit black people's mobility, secure the hyper-exploitation of black labor, and provided the ground for the development of carceral institutions directed at the punishment of black people,¹² entering into the labor contract became discursively understood as the quintessential sign of freedom.¹³ In fact, freed people were called upon to demonstrate their independence and deservingness of freedom by fulfilling the terms of the labor contract.¹⁴ In this way, contract provided a rubric for reinventing relations of subordination by obscuring national responsibility for the injustices of slavery and instead displacing this responsibility onto the shoulders of the formerly enslaved.¹⁵ Freedom was rewritten as obligation and independence manifested as a burden.¹⁶ Liberal concepts of freedom also functioned as a mechanism of regulating gender and sexuality through the marriage contract. While marriages and other kinship ties were not legally recognized under slavery, one of the first rights freed people gained was marriage recognition.¹⁷ However, as Katherine Franke points out, the extension of marriage rights was grounded in the belief that marriage as an institution would help civilize freed people by instilling heteropatriarchal gender norms.¹⁸ A key element of the rationalization of slavery was the construction of black inferiority as marked by a lack of the gender differentiation that was seen as characteristic of civilization.¹⁹ As Matt Richardson describes, "early attempts to congeal racist taxonomies of difference through anatomical investigation and ethnographic observation produced the Black body as always already variant and Black people as the essence of gender aberrance, thereby defining the norm by making the Black its opposite."²⁰ While marriage recognition did provide some tangible protections to married freed people, the belief in marriage as a civilizing institution simultaneously reiterated and valorized white supremacist beliefs that black people's inferiority was evidenced in their lack of appropriate gender and sexuality.²¹ Additionally, the extension of marriage rights provided the ground upon which alternative sexual arrangements were criminalized and rationalized state austerity toward black people by constructing the self-sufficient household as the means to economic security.²² As a result of the legal recognition of black marriages, many freed people faced convictions for adultery, fornication, cohabitation, and the failure to provide for their legal dependents.²³ In this way, much like the labor contract, the extension of rights in fact created new obligations and new grounds upon which black people might be punished. Michel Foucault argues that one of the distinguishing features of the modern state is the emergence of biopower.²⁴ Unlike sovereign power that is expressed in the capacity to take life, biopower is invested in the production of knowledge about and regulation of populations, processes of normalization and regularization, and ultimately the capacity to "make live" in particular ways.²⁵ However, Foucault also notes that sovereign power does not simply disappear but rather that the state continues to exercise sovereign power alongside

biopower.²⁶ This process is delimited by state racism, which “introduc[es] a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.”²⁷ **As biopower becomes concerned with regulating the life of the population, racism marks the bodies upon which sovereign power must still be exercised. 28 Killing the internal or external racial threat becomes understood as a necessary element to making the population stronger.**²⁹ **Scholars such as Ann Stoler and Scott Morgensen have elaborated on Foucault’s rather scant discussion of racism showing the ways in which biopower in fact emerges in relation to and as a function of colonial violence.**³⁰ Hartman’s analysis of anti-black racism and the constitution of the liberal subject complicates Foucault’s analysis and adds to scholarship that highlights the central role of racial violence in the elaboration of state power.³¹ As Hartman shows, during Reconstruction, black people were simultaneously subject to the normalizing and violent powers of the state, or perhaps more accurately normalizing processes became yet another vehicle for state violence.³² On the one hand, freed people were subject to constant surveillance as their moral capacity for citizenship was always in question, and any failure to comply with labor or marriage contracts was read as evidence of this incapacity.³³ **On the other hand, contractual freedom provided a basis for the state’s total disinvestment in black life, thereby making it more or less impossible to live up to the ideals of citizenship.**³⁴ **In this way, the seeming contradictions between racial inclusion and racial violence were effectively displaced by locating responsibility for state violence in those who suffered from its effects. The black subject was thus brought into the fold of citizenship but as a subject always in need of reform or punishment.** This historical example powerfully illustrates the ways in which **inclusion into citizenship rights can operate as a technique of domination** and the role the construct of the liberal subject plays in maintaining state racism.³⁵ Certainly, laws have changed a great deal since Reconstruction. However, the differentiated structure of citizenship grounded in anti-black racism that Hartman describes still operates.³⁶ **For example, contemporary political struggles over marriage reflect the processes by which marriage can secure entitlements for one social group while exacting social obligations from another. On the one hand, a mainstream, predominantly white gay and lesbian movement seeks access to a wide array of property and social rights through same-sex marriage recognition.**³⁷ **On the other hand, marriage incentive programs and increasingly punitive welfare regulations cast marriage and the economic self-sufficiency that supposedly comes with it as an obligation for welfare recipients who are most frequently represented as black women.**³⁸ **Another terrain upon which racially stratified constructions of citizenship are evident is in struggles for state protection from violence. Legislation that has increasingly criminalized violence against women and hate crimes against LGBT people holds out the promise of greater equality and freedom for some by expanding a system of mass incarceration that targets women of color and queer and transgender people of color.**³⁹ **In fact, the increasingly punitive and austere orientation of the U.S. welfare state and the expansion of the prison industrial complex can be understood as the logical extension of the processes** of liberal subjection that Hartman outlines.⁴⁰ On the one hand, the state disinvests in black life.⁴¹ On the other hand, processes of criminalization hold individuals responsible for the effects of that disinvestment, displacing responsibility for state violence onto those who feel its effects most and punishing those bodies for their structural location.⁴²