1NC vs R3

1

Interpretation: Debaters must disclose new affirmatives on the wiki 30 minutes before they are read in round.

Violation: You didn't



Net benefits -

1 - Testing: There are hundreds of potential aff positions, disclosure of the aff directs pre-round prep which ensures the debate is about the substance of the position as opposed to generics, which is key to nuanced clash and in depth debate. Their interpretation forces the negative to read frivolous theory or kritiks with overly broad points of disagreement with the aff.

2 - PerfCon - if you had disclosed we could've had a better discussion, so clearly you don't want to maximize "k-edu" or "your knowledge production" which would supposedly challenge abelismwhich indicts the entire 1AC

Vote on fairness because it is axiomatically necessary to determine the better debater over the better cheater

Vote on education because it is the reason why schools fund debate

Use competing interps:

Reasonability is arbitrary which invites judge intervention or random unjustified thresholds.

Competing interpretations deters future abuse by creating consistent norms that debaters can be held to in the future.

No RVIs on 1NC Theory - you have plenty of time to respond to it and its k2 checking against 1AC abuse you don't get an RVI for "not being abusive"

Drop the debater:

Deters future abuse the greatest incentive in debate is competitive success so debaters won't read positions if they can't win on them.

2 - T-fwk

Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

This does not require the use of any particular style or type of evidence — only that the topic and a government policy should determine the debate's subject matter.

Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx) Ngong

Resolution

A legislative instrument that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN **TRAPP**, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, **'13**, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to "property interests in outer space."215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [**Start Footnote 217**Id. at 236 ("**Appropriation of outer space**, **therefore, is 'the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use' with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations' access to i**t.") (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). **End Footnote 217**]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

Violation: They aren't topical

Prefer —

FIRST – Focus on institutional change through policymaking is empirically successful for the disabled

DSQ 3: DSQ 3, Disability Studies Quarterly, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/399/545

The history of the **efforts of the disability rights movement on behalf of legislation** which would **facilitate** the attainment of its twin goals of the **inclusion and empowerment** of persons with disabilities can be said to begin in the 1950s. Specifically, it can be traced (Varela 1983: 35) to the "paralyzed veterans . . . fighting for more parking spaces, and for more accessible commodes . . ." and to the fight by people with disabilities "for local and state accessibility laws throughout the 1950s." The first significant federal legislation advancing the goals of the movement came in 1965 with the creation of the National Commission on Architectural Barriers to the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped. The Commission was to "study the problems involved in making all federal buildings accessible to disabled citizens" (Varela 1983: 36). However, the import of the work of the Commission on such problems is not limited to problems of access. As Varela (1983: 36) observes, "the work of the Commission, and, more importantly, of disabled activists . . . [changed] attitudes toward disability . . . ." The change was from "an emphasis on services (that is, on doing something about 'those people')" to "an emphasis on civil rights (that is, the notion that once certain obstacles were removed, disabled people would be able to do a lot more for themselves than society had imagined)" (Varela 1983: 36). In short, efforts to include those with disabilities became efforts to empower them as well. Moreover, the notion that environmental obstacles and not just the impairment of individuals were worthy of attention rendered it plausible to seek the enactment of laws and regulations that would do so. In other words, "**environmental variables**, unlike individual characteristics **can be rectified through legislative** and administrative **action**" (DeJong 1983: 25). In 1968, the Architectural Barriers Act was passed. It stipulated that any facility built with or merely receiving federal funds had to be accessible to all. However, enforcement was minimal (Varela 1983: 36). Fortunately, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in a provision welcomed by the disability right movement, established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (A&TBCB) to investigate and enforce compliance with established standards. Unfortunately, it "never received the funding it needed to enforce the law or

even to investigate all . . . violations . . . reported by disabled consumers" (Varela 1983: 37). Nevertheless, **the fight for accessibility did advance the cause of the disability rights** movement. **It helped make** it **clear** that **barriers included "social, political and intellectual obstacles,** as well as physical ones" (Varela 1983: 37). Moreover, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act contained provisions in addition to the establishment of the A&TBCB which were important to the movement (Varela 1983: 40-41). It required the establishment, by state rehabilitation agencies, of selection methods that would ensure that people with severe impairments were not excluded from the agency's programs. In effect, then, the Act made it clear that no impairment, no matter how severe, was to be allowed as a consequences of a state agency's denial of services to become a disability. In addition, the 1973 act included provisions for client rights and for civil rights. Specifically, Section 504 prohibited discrimination against persons with so-called disabilities by any federally supported program. Thus, Section 504 was important to persons with so- called disabilities "who were looking for jobs . . . who wanted to use the same clinic as everyone else, who wanted the same choice of apartments, and who wanted to get into the polling places on election day" (Varela 1983: 42), who wanted simply to be an autonomous, contributing member of society. The next step in the history of legislation to empower and include people with impairments was the passage of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, originally called the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P. L. 94-142). IDEA set "forth a comprehensive scheme" to ensure "two basic substantive rights of eligible children with disabilities . . . ." These were: "(1) the right to a free appropriate public education, and (2) the right to that education in the least restrictive environment" (National Council on Disability 2000: 28). The law applied in every state that receives federal funds under IDEA and to all public agencies authorized to provide special education and related services in a state that receives such funds. The Act was amended and reauthorized in 1997 (NCD 2000 30-31). In 1978, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments (P. L. 95-602) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act were passed. The amendments evinced Congress' endorsement of the autonomy premise of the social model described above. That is, the Amendments acknowledged that persons with disabilities should be involved in forming the policies and practices which affect their lives. Specifically, it mandated that a grant for an independent living center "provide assurances that handicapped individuals be substantially involved in [the] policy direction and management of such center, and will be employed by such center" (P. L.. 95-602 as quoted by Varela 1983: 46). **Many**, if not most, however, **view the** enactment of the Americans with Disability Act (**ADA**) in 1990 **as the crowning achievement of the disability rights movement**. That act (P. L. 101-336) extended provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1978 amendments well beyond the earlier application to federally supported programs and the state rehabilitation agencies and of the IDEA to special education. Indeed, it "codified into law important principles that would henceforth govern the relationship between [American] society and its citizens with disabilities . . . [and] altered public discourse about disability and about the role of people with disabilities in American society" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4-5). It did so, first, by, in effect, **making** the **marginalization**, the exclusion of people with impairments from the mainstream of society in the United States, **illegitimate**. Specifically, **it declared** that "**people with disabilities are an integral part of society and**, as such, **should not be** segregated**,** isolated, or **subjected to** the effects of **discrimination**" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Furthermore, it sought **to enable "people with disabilities to take charge of their lives** . . . by fostering employment opportunities, facilitating access to public transportation and public accommodation, and ensuring the use of our nation's communication system" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Moreover, the **principles of the ADA can serve as a basis to test and challenge public policies and practices not consistent with** those **principles and** even to **demand they be changed**. The **ADA**, then, "**upholds** the **principle** that **each individual has the** potential, and deserves, the **right to participate in**, and contribute to, **society**

THIRD IS MECHANISM EDUCATION—the Aff doesn't defend a concrete government agent or mechanism, which makes cost benefit analysis impossible. The impact is violence—debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to solve material violence

Capulong 9: (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana, Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009)

Motivating client **activism under dynamic social conditions requires the development and constant assessment and reassessment of a political perspective that measures that resistance and its possibilities. That task in turn requires the development of specific activist goals** within the context of such analyses, and perhaps broader, national and international strategy--what some call the political "next step." This is particularly true today, when the economic crisis plaguing capitalism, the "war on terror" and climate change undeniably have world-wide dimensions. **Instances of failure, too, need to be part of that analysis, because they teach us much about why otherwise promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements** of the sort to which we all aspire. Thus, the theoretical need is two-fold: to construct a broader organizing perspective from a political standpoint, and to consider activism writ large. Without reading the pulse of

prevailing social conditions, it is easy to miscalculate what that next step ought to be. **We will not build a mass movement though sheer perseverance--a linear, idealist conception of change at odds with dynamic social conditions. By the same token, we may underestimate the potential of such mass activism if we focus simply on the local dimensions of our work. The dialectic between a dynamic social context and political consciousness and action requires a constant organizational and political calibration and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship**. Without such a working perspective, we are apt to be either ultra-left or overly conservative. As Jim Pope put it recently in the context of new forms of labor organizing: "If we limit our vision of the future to include only approaches that work within the prevailing legal regime and balance of forces, then we are likely to be irrelevant when and if the opportunity for a paradigm shift arises." n449 The cyclical nature of labor organizing, he argues, mirrors politics generally: American political life as a whole has likewise alternated between periods characterized by public action, idealism, and reform on the [*189] one hand, and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrenchment on the other. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of corruption and extremes of wealth and poverty that, sooner or later, ignite passionate movements for reform. n450 C. 'Activism': Towards a Broader, Deeper, Systematic Framework In progressive lawyering theory, grassroots activism is frequently equated with "community organizing" and "movement" or "mobilization" politics. n451 Indeed, these methods have come to predominate activist lawyering in much the same way as "public interest law" has come for many to encompass all forms of progressive practice. "Activism" is, of course, broader still. Even on its own terms, the history of community organizing and social movements in the United States includes two vitally important traditions frequently given short shrift in this realm: industrial union organizing and alternative political party-building. n452 In this section, my aim is not to catalogue the myriad ways in which lawyers and clients can and do become active (methodically or institutionally)--which, given human creativity and progress, in any event may be impossible to do--but rather to problematize three assumptions: first, the tendency to define grassroots activity narrowly; second, the notion that certain groups--for example "the poor" or the "subordinated"--are the definitive agents of social change; and finally, the conviction that mass mobilization or movement-building, by itself, is key to social transformation. 1. Grassroots Activism There are countless ways in which people become socially or politically active. Yet even the more expansive and sophisticated considerations of activism in progressive lawyering theory tend to unnecessarily circumscribe activism. For example, Cummings and Eagly argue that we need to "unpack" the term "organizing." n453 Contrasting two strategies of the welfare rights movement in the 1960s, these authors distinguish between "mobilization as short-term community action and organizing as an effort to build long-term institutional power." n454 In the same breath, however, they define organizing "as shorthand for a range of community-based practices," n455 even though at least some activism, for example union organizing or, say, [*190] fasting, might not be best characterized as "community-based." What is required is a larger framework that takes into account the sum total of activist initiatives. Lucie White argues that we need to "map out the internal microdynamics of progressive grassroots initiatives ... observe the multiple impacts of different kinds of initiatives on wide spheres of social and political life ... and devise typologies, or models, or theories that map out a range of opportunities for collaboration." n456 This map would be inadequate--and therefore inaccurate--if we include certain activist initiatives and not others. But that is precisely what the progressive lawyering literature has done by failing to regularly consider, for example, union organizing or alternative political party-building. 2. Agents of Social Change: Identity, Class and Political Ideology As with our definition of activism, here, too, the problem is a lack of clarity, breadth or scope, which leads to misorientation. Have we defined, with theoretical precision, the social-change agents to whom we are orienting--e.g., the "people," the "poor," the "subordinated," "low-income communities" or "communities of color?" And if so, are these groupings, so defined, the primary agents of social change? By attempting to harmonize three interrelated (yet divergent) approaches to client activism--organizing on the bases of geography and identity, class and the workplace, and political ideology--modern community organizing simultaneously blurs and balkanizes the social-change agents to whom we need to orient. What, after all, is "community?" In geographic terms, local efforts alone cannot address social problems with global dimensions. n457 As Pope observed of workers' centers: "the tension between the local and particularistic focus of community unionism and the global scope of trendsetting corporations like Wal-Mart makes it highly unlikely that community unionism will displace industrial unionism as 'the' next paradigm of worker organization." n458 On the other hand, members of cross-class, identity-based "communities" may not necessarily share the same interests. In the "Asian American community," Ancheta explains: using the word "community" in its singular form is often a misnomer, because Asian Pacific Americans comprise many communities, each with its own history, culture and language: Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, Lao-Mien, [*191] Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Samoan, Tongan, Guamanian, Native Hawaiian, and more. The legal problems facing individuals from different communities defy simple categorization. The problems of a fourth-generation Japanese American victim of job discrimination, a monolingual refugee from Laos seeking shelter from domestic violence, an elderly immigrant from the Philippines trying to keep a job, and a newcomer from Western Samoa trying to reunite with relatives living abroad all present unique challenges. Add in factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability, and the problems become even more complex. n45 Angela Harris echoes this observation by pointing out how some feminist legal theory assumes "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience [that] can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." n460 The same might be said of the "people," which, like the "working class," may be too broad. Other categorizations--such as "low-income workers," "immigrants", and the "poor", for example--may be too narrow to have the social weight to fundamentally transform society. In practice, progressive lawyers orient to the politically advanced among these various "communities." In so doing, then, we need to acknowledge that we are organizing on the basis of political ideology, and not simply geography, identity or class. Building the strongest possible mass movement, therefore, requires an orientation not only towards certain "subordinated" communities, but to the politically advanced generally. Otherwise, we may be undermining activism writ large. This is not to denigrate autonomous community efforts. As I have mentioned, subordinated communities of course have the right to self-determination, i.e. to organize separately. But the point is not simply to organize groups of people who experience a particular oppression, but rather to identify those who have the social power to transform society. Arguing that these agents are the collective, multi-racial working class, Smith explains: The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self-definition are [sic] what determine social class. Although income levels obviously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of middle class. And many people who consider themselves "middle [*192] class" are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those who do not control the means of production and are forced to sell their labor power to capitalists are workers. n461 The practical consequence of this very well may be that we redefine who we represent as clients and consider activism or potential activism outside subordinated communities, for example union activity and alternative political-party building, as part of our work. 3. From Movementism to Political Organization Dogged as our work is in the activist realm, **any effort at fundamental social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership**. Such leadership, in turn, requires work not often associated with "activism," such as, for example, theoretical study. n462 "Movementism," n463 by which I mean the conviction that building a mass movement is the answer to oppression and exploitation, has its limitations. Even though activism itself is perhaps the best school for political education, we have an enormous amount to learn from our predecessors. In the final analysis, fundamental social transformation will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough, motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic in any struggle for power. "The problem," as Bellow astutely observed, "is not our analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject." n464 Such opportunities typically occur when there is a confluence of three factors: a social crisis; a socio-economic elite that finds itself divided over how to overcome it; and a powerful mass movement from below. As I understand the nature of social change, successful social transformations occur when there is a fourth element: political organization. Conclusion Client activism is not a monolithic, mechanical object. Most of the time, it is neither the gathering mass movement many of us wish

for, nor the inert, atomized few in need of external, professional motivation. Rather, activism is a phenomenon in constant ebb and flow, a [*193] mercurial, fluid complex shaped by an unremitting diversity of factors. The key through the maze of lawyering advice and precaution is therefore to take a hard, sober look at the overarching state of activism. Are our clients in fact active or are they not? How many are and who are they? What is the nature of this period? Economically? Politically? Culturally? What are the defining issues? What political and organizing trends can be discerned? With which organizations are our clients active, if any? What demands are they articulating, and how are they articulating them? This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, development and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarching political perspective. My aim in this Article is to begin to theorize the various approaches to this evaluation. In essence, I am arguing for the elaboration of a systematic macropolitical analysis in progressive lawyering theory. Here, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive set of political considerations, but rather to develop a framework for, and to investigate the limitations of, present considerations in three areas: strategic aims; prevailing social conditions; and methods of activism. Consciously or not, admittedly or not, informed and systematic or not, progressive lawyers undertake their work with certain assumptions, perspectives and biases. Progressive lawyering theory would be a much more effective and concrete guide to action--to defining the lawyer's role in fostering activism--if it would elaborate on these considerations and transform implicit and perhaps delimited assumptions and approaches into explicit and hopefully broader choices. Over the past four decades, there has been remarkable continuity and consistency in progressive lawyers' use of litigation, legislation, direct services, education and organizing to stimulate and support client activism. The theoretical "breaks" to which Buchanan has referred n465 have not been so much about the practice of lawyering itself, but rather about unarticulated shifts in ultimate goals, societal analyses, and activist priorities, each necessitated by changes in the social, economic, and political context. That simply is another way of stating the obvious: that progressive lawyers change their practices to adapt to changing circumstances. The recurrent problem in progressive lawyering theory is that many commentators have tended to generalize these practice changes to apply across social circumstances. In so doing, they displace and often replace more fundamental differences over strategic goals, interpretation of social contexts, and organizing priorities with debates over the mechanics of lawyering practice. The argument is turned on its head: we often assume or tend to [*194] assume agreement over the meanings and underlying conceptual frameworks relating to "fundamental social change," current political analysis, and "community organizing," and debate lawyering strategy and tactics; but instead we should be elaborating and clarifying these threshold political considerations as a prerequisite to using what we ultimately agree to be a broad and flexible set of lawyering tools. In effect, the various approaches to lawyering have become the currency by which scholars have debated politics and activism. The irony is that our disagreements are less about lawyering approaches per se, I believe, than they are about our ultimate political objectives, our analyses of contemporary opportunities, and our views of the optimal paths from the latter to the former. The myriad lawyering descriptions and prescriptions progressive lawyering theory offers are of limited use unless they are anchored in these primary considerations. How do we decide if we should subscribe to "rebellious" and not traditional "public interest" lawyering, for example, or "collaborative" over "critical" lawyering, if we do not interrogate these questions and instead rush too quickly into practical questions? The differences among these approaches matter precisely because they have different political goals, are based on different political analyses, and employ different political activist strategies. Activist lawyers already engage in these analyses--necessarily so. To foster client activism, they must read prevailing social conditions and strategize with their clients about the political next step, often with an eye toward a long-term goal. But I don't think we necessarily engage in these analyses as consciously, or with as full a picture of the history and dynamics involved or options available, as we could. Often this is because there simply isn't time to engage these questions. Or perhaps not wanting to dominate our clients, we squelch our own political analysis and agenda to allow for organic, indigenous leadership from below. But if we are truly collaborative--and when we feel strongly enough about certain political issues--we engage on issues and argue them out. In either event, we undertake an unsystematic engagement of these fundamental issues at our peril. If we adhere to the belief that **only organized**, politicized **masses of people can alter** or replace **exploitative and oppressive institutions and bring about lasting fundamental social change, then,** as **progressive lawyers, we need to be clear about which legal tactics can bring about such a sustained** effort in each historical moment. Without concrete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal practice will fail to live up to its potential.

FIRST IS ENGAGEMENT -- Debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange—stasis and limits are key to engagement.

Steinberg and Freeley 13: David, Lecturer in Communicatio22n studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so **there must be a controversy**, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest **before there can be a debate. If** everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. **Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question** or questions **to be answered**. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not

likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objective of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For example, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertisements even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audience or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal discourse occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumentation calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. **The proposition provides focus for the discourse and** guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to identify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) [I]t is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In academic debate, the proposition provides **essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the** debate **judge** after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In academic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportunity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. **To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined.**

FOURTH – their position explodes ground, limits, and predictability. They can defend anything from Wilderson to Baudrillard, or uncontestable statements like one plus one equals two, to “racism is bad” – the neg can’t predict these, nor answer them if the ground is slanted to one side.

This outweighs other impacts

A] It skews your evaluation of the round – if their impacts seem true, it’s because I couldn’t answer them

B] They force the neg to generics like Cap, Word PICs, or Afropess against their position, which moots the entire 1AC and makes the discussion meaningless

C] Fair starting points are key to dialogue.

Galloway 7: Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where **all parties receive a** relatively **fair opportunity to voice their position.** Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, **taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.** Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. **According to fairness** norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. **When one side excludes the other, it** fundamentally **denies the personhood of the other** participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. **A desire to be fair** is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that **takes the form of a demand for equality** of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, **fairness is a demand** for respect, a demand **to be heard**, a demand that a voice **backed by** literally months upon months of preparation, **research, and critical thinking** not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table **unable to** meaningfully **participate in a dialogue**. They are unable to "understand what 'went on…'" and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. **Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought** in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we **reach agreement which binds us to a common cause**…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective "counter-word" and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and **other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy**

FIFTH – The 1AC kills accessibility for new circuit debaters, novices, small schools, pretty much any debater that hasn't been on the circuit for at least a year.

SECOND IS THE EXCLUSION EFFECT – Topicality is key to combat prep asymmetry and exclusion of non-circuit debater

McGinnis: McGinnis, Dave [WDM Valley Coach] "In Defense of Topical Switch Side Debate" *NsdUpdate*, October 2014. RP

Further, **[I]t is not obviously the case that the people who benefit from** the unfairness created by **nontopical debate are also those who experience** the greatest **societal unfairness**. For one thing, the globe's least advantaged are unlikely to be participating in debate in the first place. And it is unlikely that people living in the global south experience any real benefit as a result of being the subject of an American student's critical debate position. Additionally, it is entirely possible that those who benefit from the advantage provided by nontopical advocacies are those with the greatest initial advantages. I recall an instance during the 2009-2010 season when **[A] male debater from a** very **wealthy** suburban **school ran a** nontopical **critique of** "**gender** in debate" **against a female debater from a less-well-off school**. His argument was that we should reject discussion of the topic in favor of advocating for more opportunities for female debaters. The round was a bid round; **[T]he male debater won. Anyone** who is seriously concerned about issues of equity **should be disturbed by the practice of those with great**

privilege using the narrative experiences of those with much less privilege **as a tool for winning** debate rounds, particularly since, in our community, the capacity to win debate rounds is, itself, another form of privilege. And finally, **I have no idea what I** — or anyone — **would [to] say to a student from a less-well-resourced school** who walked into a tournament — say, Blake — **expecting to debate the topic** published by the National Speech and Debate Association — the topic, mind you, that their coach informed them would be *the* subject of contestation at the event — **only to find out that**, instead, **they would have to engage** a position about **something entirely different**. I could certainly not forward the argument that this non-circuit debater was awfully fortunate that their opponent was fighting for greater fairness.

SIXTH - Switch Side Debate – read your stuff on the neg which non-uniques your offense and is net better since a Kritik on the neg has to be tailored to the aff– otherwise your discussion starts and ends at the 1AC.

SEVENTH – a well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion. This process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement. Only a resolution with ground on both sides allows for the most clash which controls the internal link to education. Committees outweigh because they discuss the best topic for a stasis point – even if some resolutions are bad it is net better for a group to create a topic rather than an individual.

Debates about space allows the creation of alternative realities that force inclusion of the oppressed---past failures should not foreclose the ability to reclaim futurism for liberation

TVA Solves — just defend States ought to ban appropriation of outer space by private actors---Advs about why space col, expansion, and mining is antiblack/promotes afro-orientalism based violence

T isn't violent – A] I don't have the power to impose a norm – only to convince you my side is better. T doesn't ban you from the activity – the whole point is that norms should be contestable – I just say make a better arg next time. B] Exclusion is inevitable – every role of the ballot excludes some arguments and even saying T bad excludes it – that means we should delineate ground along reciprocal lines, not abandon division altogether.

Edu - Policy debates create research burdens, allow us to have advocacy skills, and allow us to defend arguments against opposition which is the most important skill in life, since executing on an idea requires we are able to defend it in a meaningful way. Your aff just makes people sit on a couch and talk about things bad in the world since there's no incentive to defend it against opposition

T is DTD because it indicts the entire 1AC

3 - Berlant DA

Their framing evidence about "BALLOTS MAKE A DIFFERENCE" is laughable for the idea of changing debate - Embedding hope for liberation to an object like a ballot enacts cruel optimism that the 1AC's rhetoric sustains. Debate does not change anything – your performance will get you a W in which you go to the next round to commodify the people you talk about for another ballot – vote neg on presumption

Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. "Cruel Optimism" in Differences, 17.3. 2006.

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This **cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution**, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, **a good idea—whatever.** To phrase "the object of desire" as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as prox- imity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typi- cal misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). "**Cruel optimism**" **names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being**, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. **Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.** ¶ One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are prob- lematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But **some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates**, the very vitalizing or ani- mating potency of an object/scene of desire **contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment** in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition.¶ **To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling.** I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indi- rection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought

4 - CP

The negative advocacy is to endorse the entirety of the AFF, but use the word flesh instead of body. They don't get a perm if we win a disad to that rhetoric of the plan.

[Creamer] Only a focus on flesh enables meaningful solvency for the disabled body – it queers the categories of liberation

Creamer: Deborah Beth Creamer [Creamer is the author of Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities(2009), a book that encourages thought in new ways about categories like ability and disability.] Embracing Limits, Queering Embodiment: Creating/Creative Possibilities for Disability Theology. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 123-127

Betcher's move from body to flesh also **offers a** second **significant point of intersection and openness around issues of identity.** As she observes, Eiesland's The Disabled God and other **works that have focused primarily on a liberation ist model have been limited in their impact**—in part, as she notes, because disability is still conceived as an individual (rights-based) issue, and in part, as I and others have argued elsewhere, because the liberationist (or social/minority) model is not without limits and flaws itself. Beyond this, **the liberationist model attracts allies only insofar as we are seen to have common commitments and concerns.** Some may join with us out of a sense of duty or outrage; others may see ways in which the liberation of one group is tied to the liberation of others. **Thus, we may** work together in protest of inaccessible public transportation or **build coalitions around health care policies, but these alliances dissolve once an issue is closed or** energy and **funds are exhausted.** I would not want to argue that we let go of these alliances or identity politics—any day's newspaper will show how much remains to be done—and yet we have seen that **these movements are not enough. Identity politics can only take us so far, and clinging too firmly** to them **leads to fragmentation and isolation. Here, I see an invitation, from the flesh, to queer this discourse.** In Donald Hall's words, **queer theories** "work to **challenge** and undercut **any attempt to render 'identity' singular, fixed, or normal." Queering**, in this way, **means to question and complicate, to challenge and play, to propose and subvert, and to push continually toward complexity. It is a move beyond the body and into flesh.** It seems to me that disability theology is on the verge of making this shift, allowing us to claim our roots in (and continuing commitments to) liberation while simultaneously announcing that even more is at stake. We must be cautious in this, recognizing Robert McRuer's re minder that "crip theory" (his term for a queering of disability **discourse**) must not dematerialize disability identity. We have seen the dangers of moving too quickly to a dismissive "we are all disabled" perspective, and **we ought not let the queering of our discourse mean the erasure of material bodies, hungry bodies, bodies in pain. Yet what I see in this move to the flesh is a significant step toward queering our work by not just denying but also subverting the idea of a norm, challenging both stasis and separation, attending to identity politics and issues of justice while still opening new spaces and alliances.** I wonder, too, if **disability theology might** actually **help queer theology be more queer, through our attention to the disruptions, messiness, and unruliness of the flesh. It is**, I would argue, at the very least, **a generative locus for further conversation and interaction.**

[Creamer 2] Even if I lose the solvency, the net benefit still turns and outweighs the case. Focus on the body creates conceptual problems of wholeness – we conjure up mental images of a non disabled person

Creamer 2: Deborah Beth Creamer [Creamer is the author of Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities(2009), a book that encourages thought in new ways about categories like ability and disability.] Embracing Limits, Queering Embodiment: Creating/Creative Possibilities for Disability Theology. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 123-127

Betcher offers us some openings, some possibilities for conversational intersection. Her appeal to flesh, rather than to body, is one such space. Two important claims are embedded in her argument against body. The **first** is that **the use of body invites**, as she writes, **"the hallucinatory delusion of wholeness"** (108). In other words, **body has been taken to be another** (disembodied) **ideal that no one can attain.** The **second**, related but yet somewhat different, is that **we too often take body to be a generic term, leading to** what Betcher describes as **"naturalization or normalization."** In this way, **the term body had been taken as shorthand for "normal body," requiring a signifier for other kinds of bodies** (**"disabled body" being one example** among many). I would argue that these two errors are interrelated, as **we all have neither ideal nor normal bodies,** and yet that they must be unpacked or challenged from slightly different perspectives. **A corollary** here might be found in other areas of feminist discourse where **both the ideal woman and the generic woman have had to be deconstructed—the first to show** that **women were**, in fact, **human**, living, people; **the second to highlight ways in which the assumption of a generic type acts to "white"-wash** or erase critical differences **between and among these human, living, people.** I find the lens of disability to be a promising way to challenge both the ideal body and the normal body. Clearly, this is significant for people who already wear the label of disability, as we are often identified as those whose bodies are least normal—and, from this position on the margins, we can first make appar ent and then challenge the assumptions of the center. Yet it is also important to recognize that **this is not just a project for or of people "with disabilities**." Here I find Sallie McFague's proposal of attention epistemology to be helpful: "the kind of knowing that focuses on embodied differences." Betcher makes a similar claim when she invites us to focus on "that which we know to be true of lives" (108). **The illusion of the ideal body and the distortion of the normal body** begin to **fade away as** we begin to **see** bodies (or **flesh**) **with new levels of complexity, observing that normal only exists in our imaginations**, **and recognizing ourselves as** having limits and **"leaky bodies and boundaries**." **Once we recognize** that **limits are unsurprising**, **we can** then **begin to** move not only to a perspective where we **embrace** (value, accept, respect) the idea of **having limits** (as individuals and as communities)—**whether or not we claim disability as a label**—but can also notice ways in which these limits might embrace us, acting to make and unmake issues of identity, relationality, space, and place. As I have argued more fully elsewhere, a limits perspective has profound implications for theology and ethics, as well as self- and communal understanding. And again, while clearly there is relevance here for and within the discourses of disability theology, **it is not hard to recognize the ways in which the embrace of limits can engage other conversations, such as those emerging within postcolonial theory**, as they declare danger in binaries and dualisms and seek new ways of under standing and being.

In round discourse is a voting issue – evaluate the PIC prior

1] [Vincent] Discourse in round matters and this is a teachable moment

Vincent 13 – (Christopher [Debate Coach, former college NDT debater] "Re-Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability In Lincoln Douglas Debate"

Charles Mills argues that "the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview." For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities. In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate. This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill's argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said. Again for debaters of color, their performance is always

attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in

relation to the speech act. Whites are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of "should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies," it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities. As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution. Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it. Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and

be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

2] Rejecting the discourse is severance out of the 1AC since the word was used throughout. Severance is a voting issue – makes them a moving target and makes in depth engagement impossible – also link turns their method since they should be accountable for

Case

AT: Top Level

1. **You're spreading - thats ableist people with hearing disabilities can't follow which link turns the AC - then you say people that don't spread cant/shouldn't debate which further excludes people - you contradict your own args**
2. **You literally read most of the Mollow K before its not a new aff you're just too scared to disclosure which turns edu**
3. **You've read Mollow before nothing has disrupted**
4. **If disabled debaters want to debate the topic your aff sucks its treats them as monolithic?**
5. **We don't make the debate space better by killing it - we need a stasis point for engagement if debate is something that can ever be good, the AC is not an alt**

AT: Framing

1] Framework – the role of the judge and ballot is to determine whether the plan is a good idea through evaluation of consequences.

2] Don't let them weigh the sum total of their impact— a]they only get to weigh the unique amount solved by the affirmative. Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there's no impact to root cause if they don't solve it. b] there's no metric for "rupturing racism"

3] 20 years of Ks prove no solvency on the aff

4] Knowledge production good -- Impact turn – climate change knowledge production is a good praxis for resolving material violence that affects hundreds of millions of people because it fights climate skepticism - knowledge production about disability helps us make spaces (LIKE DEBATE) more accessible

5] Debate Good Double bind – either a) I win debate good and you vote for me, or b) they win debate bad which means hack against them to recuse them from this evil space

Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, **whatever** general **moral view we adopt**: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous **catastrophe**, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we're consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try **to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there's nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there's a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), **it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists**. **But that is a huge mistake**. Non-consequentialism is the view that there's more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; **it is not the view that the latter don't matter**. Even John **Rawls wrote, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account** in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." **Minimally plausible**

versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They'd thus imply **very strong reasons** to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn't significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one's character. What's even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial "point of view of the universe," indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one's own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don't care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler's recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that **most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations** of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I'd have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I've just argued that there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) **who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken,** and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk**. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, **reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world**. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It's possible they'll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good

future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly." (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)