

1

Interp - The aff must defend the whole resolution

Violation - Aff specifies a plan (govt and worker spec)

Standards:

1] Clash

There is no way I can comb through billions of pages of evidence or engage with every hyper specific aff advocacy, which means we can't have a good clash, since every warrant is speculative; and none of my disads will ever link. Spec affs give negs an infinite research burden which can never be fulfilled so negs can never win.

2] Prep-skew

Aff has infinite prep time to come up with their minute interpretations of the aff, the neg can only prep for stock arguments and the resolution as it is given to us. It makes Affs completely unpredictable and borderline impossible to engage with. We can't possibly prepare for the entirety.

3] Accessibility

Small schools and disadvantaged people may not have the resources to find the right evidence or have people to make numerous plans for debaters to overrun the neg with. It means that advantaged debaters will continue to have a greater advantage over disadvantaged debaters, and the losing debaters will stop debating. Diversity is important to keep debate educational.

4] Ground

Hyper Specifying the aff kills ground since generally specifications of the aff fall under counterplan ground. By specking parts of the aff, the aff forecloses the ability for the neg to utilize unique offense against them and properly engage. Anything that is not written in the resolution is neg ground, and if I can't access ground I can't make the best arguments against your case.

Voters:

1] Fairness

People want to win, but if they go into a round knowing it is unfair and the probability of them winning before they even enter the round is low, because of factors out of their control, then they won't debate.

2] Education

Schools fund this activity since it is academic and educational. If we can't clash or get anything out of the round, schools won't fund it and it will collapse.

Paradigm Issues:

1] No RVI

RVI Chills Theory, the point of initiating theory is to point out abuse that has already happened and correct it to make the debate space better. If someone is proven not guilty in court it doesn't mean that they should prosecute the judge. If neg can easily win off their abuse by manipulating theory, then they will continue to be abusive. The Neg can still negate the shell, put-up a counter interp and at best win presumption which checks friv theory on my side since it can be stopped.

2] C/I over Reasonability

Just like with any other argument, it is imperative as debaters that we address the core warrants of the arguments made against us. If my opponent wants to justify their position, let them justify it with real arguments not insubstantial calls to negative because they "have to" be right because it is seemingly logical.

3] DTD

The abuse has already happened, I can't respond to the arguments that my opponents have made because instead I need to get into theory. DTD will teach the opp that this isn't a fair practice and make them choose not to do the saem violation again.

2

1] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.

Gregory Fernando **Pappas 16** [Texas A&M University] "The Pragmatists' Approach to Injustice", The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the "denotative method" (LW 1:371).¹⁸ What Dewey means by "denotation" is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are concerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry "as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience" (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revision of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by

concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to **start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them**.

Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its

causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his *Logic*, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical practice, one that they both use to make their points.¹⁹ The doctor’s starting point is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or problematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”²⁰ The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solutions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to suggest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”²¹¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their conceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doctor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something individualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contextualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”²² Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her inquiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s characterization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the illness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. **To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the**

concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ **Making**

problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem **is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and**

designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its amelioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, **our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice.** The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

2] Our Framework comes lexically prior to any other: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – my fw comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their framework.

4] We win precision- Governments have a unique responsibility for consequences.

Enoch 07 – David. “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State” The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 9-13-2007. Published by: Legal Theory.

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. **Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance.**

This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, **individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may.** But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.⁴⁴ **In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken.** Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient **a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients** (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely **when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing**

that if it allows⁴⁵ the doctor to give the drug to today's patient, the death of tomorrow's patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable.

Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):⁴⁶ perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of **states and governments.** They **have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.**⁴⁷

States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

5] Scenario analysis valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs epistemic biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” *International Studies Perspectives* 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? **Scenario analysis** is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis **is thus typically seen as serving** the purposes of corporate planning or as a **policy** tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to** these uses. **This** section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of **juxtaposing current trends** in unexpected combinations in order **to** articulate **surprising and yet plausible** futures, often referred to as **“alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China's slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC's decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuert 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council's series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.⁴ As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund's EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful** for policymaking.⁵ Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine** let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm **is constrained by** their **existing mental models and** maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known **cognitive bias tendencies** such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of **scenarios** lies in their ability to **help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.

Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether

different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.⁶ The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.⁷ Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.⁸ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which

these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

3

Unconditional Right to Strike empowers unions, it's the primary mechanism needed for them to work.

Bahn 19

<https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/>

Strikes have historically been one of the strongest tools used by unions to ensure they have power to engage in collective bargaining. But striking was viewed as a

negative attribute in the survey done by Hertel-Fernandez, Kimball, and Kochan. Yet, when they presented workers with the hypothetical choice of a union exercising strike power with other attributes of unions, such as collective bargaining, support increased.

Unions are racist, the aff increases the power of unions which increases occurrence of union-related discrimination.

Watson 21 Watson, Travis, and Travis Watson is the creator of ADOSConstruction.org and chair of the Boston Employment

Commission (BEC). Appointed by former Boston mayor and current US Department of Labor Secretary Martin J. Walsh. “Union Construction's Racial Equity and Inclusion Charade (SSIR).” *The Racism of Labor Union Construction and Boston's 'White Way'*, 2021, ssir.org/articles/entry/union_constructions_racial_equity_and_inclusion_charade

Union construction jobs are not just good jobs, they are great jobs. They have a relatively low entry barrier and offer world-class training, great pay, and benefits that allow members to retire with dignity. However, **what's often overlooked is union construction's racism, and that those great jobs, particularly leadership positions, are designed to remain filled by white men.**

Thanks to construction workers, activists, and journalists, there are countless documented examples of the widespread racism that Black people face in interactions with construction unions. **From being called racist names to being administered tests designed to ensure their failure, a gamut of discriminatory practices make it difficult for Black workers to enter, remain, and grow in the industry.**

In order to create a more diverse and inclusive industry, and to avoid the same mistakes in the future, we first need to learn from this shameful past. Referencing historical examples—primarily found in researchers David A. Goldberg and Trevor Griffey's *Black Power at Work: Community Control, Affirmative Action, and the Construction Industry*—I describe the six strategies that have made **the process of joining a construction union[can be]** as frustrating as possible for Black people. **So frustrating and exhausting[for black people],** in fact, **that many** Black people **would rather give up trying, or not try at all. And, when a particular strategy fails to dissuade Black applicants, white union members resort to intimidation and erecting other barriers for entry, such as devising a racially biased entrance exam that projects racism as a kind of failure onto Black people. Other times it's openly calling Black workers the "N-word" and explicitly telling them that they aren't welcome into a construction union.** I then turn to the case study of union construction in the Boston area to examine how racism manifests today.

Err Neg on ev about racism in the status quo. Aff's ev is unable to provide a holistic representation of the squo.

Quarcoo 20

Ashley Quarcoo, "Global Democracy Supporters Must Confront Systemic Racism," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 15, 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/global-democracy-supporters-must-confront-systemic-racism-pub-82298>

Quarcoo spent over a decade supporting peacebuilding and democratic development in post-conflict countries and countries transitioning out of authoritarianism. She previously worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) where she supported strategy, policy, and program development for a nearly \$300 million democracy, human rights, and governance foreign assistance portfolio. In this role, she helped to lead major U.S. Government responses to political transitions in Ethiopia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and South Sudan. Between assignments at USAID, Quarcoo served at the State Department, leading the development of U.S. strategy for United Nations peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan. As a Presidential Management Fellow from 2008 to 2010, Quarcoo served as a legislative aide to Congresswoman Nita Lowey, supporting the State and Foreign Operations portfolio, and also served on the Haiti Task Team following the 2010 earthquake. Prior to government service, Quarcoo worked on access to justice and human rights in Africa, including for the Carter Center and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation based in South Africa. <https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1748>

THE DATA PROBLEM. **The collection of data related to racial issues is a serious shortcoming in numerous Western democracies.** The European Union's Racial Equality Directive of 2000 prohibits discrimination based on racial and ethnic origin in its member states, but **a dearth of official data make it difficult to monitor the**

implementation of antidiscrimination laws. In Germany, ignoring racial issues has been a conscious choice, borne from a fear of the ways that Nazis used race science to try to prove the superiority of white people. Discussion of race has been so intimately tied up with World War II atrocities that Germany and many other **EU member states do not collect official statistics on race or ethnicity.** France stripped the term “race” from all of its laws in 2013 and imposes criminal penalties on the use of the concept in employment—though it does have strong policies to combat hate speech and discrimination. **In** other countries such as **Denmark, there is little political support to collect racial or ethnic data because of the belief that discrimination is not a problem there. European civil society organizations informally collect and monitor data related to discrimination, harassment, and violence against minority communities. But the limited amount of available data only provides a snapshot of potential discrimination patterns. The lack of racial demographic data limits governments’ ability to accurately identify and prevent patterns of race-based discrimination, as well as to address the social, public health, and economic needs of certain communities that may be deeply impacted by structural racism. It ensures, in fact, that structural racism goes unseen. And the damaging effects of this failure are evidenced by, for example, the higher coronavirus infection and death rates among Black populations.** Canada, which has not been gathering racial demographic data on coronavirus infections, is now facing increasing pressure to change its color-blind data collection policy, which health officials say disadvantage minority communities likely to be more directly impacted. Brazil’s government only began to collect coronavirus-related data by race in late April, well after the Ministry of Health flagged high death rates among Afro-Brazilians. As in the United States, structural racism in employment, healthcare, and housing have dramatically influenced the virus’s impact on Brazil’s Black communities

51

Racism causes trust deficits which delegitimizes democracy and perpetuates backsliding.

Quarcoo 2

Ashley Quarcoo, “Global Democracy Supporters Must Confront Systemic Racism,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 15, 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/global-democracy-supporters-must-confront-systemic-racism-pub-82298>

Quarcoo spent over a decade supporting peacebuilding and democratic development in post-conflict countries and countries transitioning out of authoritarianism. She previously worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) where she supported strategy, policy, and program development for a nearly \$300 million democracy, human rights, and governance foreign assistance portfolio. In this role, she helped to lead major U.S. Government responses to political transitions in Ethiopia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and South Sudan. Between assignments at USAID, Quarcoo served at the State Department, leading the development of U.S. strategy for United Nations peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan. As a Presidential Management Fellow from 2008 to 2010, Quarcoo served as a legislative aide to Congresswoman Nita Lowey, supporting the State and Foreign Operations portfolio, and also served on the Haiti Task Team following the 2010 earthquake. Prior to government service, Quarcoo worked on access to justice and human rights in Africa, including for the Carter Center and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation based in South Africa. <https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1748>

The movement against anti-Black **racism has put the failures of U.S. democracy on display** and sparked solidarity protests around the world. Occurring in the midst of a global pandemic, the protests have exposed the wide reach of systemic racism in many Western democratic societies, particularly within policing and criminal justice institutions. More broadly, **the protests have revealed that deep trust deficits exist between Black communities and their governments. If Western democracies wish to maintain some credibility as lead advocates for human rights and democratic governance, they must seek to fully understand and address the role that racism plays in undermining the** legitimacy of their institutions. THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF DEMOCRACY. The global narrative on the use of police violence

against Black people rightly centers around the problem in the United States: the country's incarceration rate is the highest in the world, Black people make up one-third of the entire prison population but only 12 percent of the total population, and the recent murder of George Floyd has accentuated a history of brutal killings of Black people. Moreover, Floyd's death finally seems to have moved public opinion. In a recent survey by the Pew Research Center, two-thirds of Americans now express support for the Black Lives Matter movement. Yet focusing exclusively on the United States neglects the extent to which systemic racism deeply permeates law enforcement and criminal justice in other highly developed Western democratic countries. A study in Canada on fatal police encounters from 2000 to 2017 found that Black people made up nearly 37 percent of the victims in Toronto, even though they comprised only 8 percent of the population. In Australia, Black Lives Matter solidarity protests sparked protests against the police killings of indigenous Australians, who are also grossly overrepresented in Australia's prisons relative to their small population size. And like in the United States, there is rarely any accountability for police brutality; in the United Kingdom, for example, there has not been a successful prosecution for a death in police custody in over fifty years. Racial profiling of Black people is also widespread, even in countries often held up as models of democratic governance by the international community. For example, for the last three years, Freedom House has rated Finland as one of the freest countries in the world, earning a perfect score in the Freedom in the World Index. However, according to the "Being Black in the EU" survey, administered by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights across all twenty-eight EU member states in 2018, Finland recorded the highest rates of race-based harassment and violence. Participants in a separate three-year study of racial profiling in Finland described in detail their experiences of being stopped in public spaces predominantly because of their race or ethnicity—including in railway and metro stations, cars, shops and parks, and restaurants and bars and on the way to work and school. The study notes the variety of state security actors engaged in profiling, including the police, border guards, and customs officers, as well as private security guards, bouncers, and salespeople. Such pervasive levels of **harassment and surveillance of Black people in many**

Western democracies stand in sharp contrast to the accolades often given to these

"free" societies. In the United States, **racial bias** in policing and the violence it can generate have eroded the state's

relationship with Black communities, **diminishing trust and lowering expectations for what residents**

of a democratic country should expect from their government. There are signs that

similar trends are also occurring in other Western democracies, where Black people who

experience police brutality or other kinds of racial discrimination **feel they have no recourse.** According to the "Being Black in

the EU" survey, a majority of **victims of racist physical attacks by police officers did not report the**

most recent incident because they felt doing so would not change anything or because

they did not trust or were afraid of the police. Because of a lack of trust, Europeans of African descent are also not

reporting incidents of discrimination, such as being unable to obtain access to employment or housing. According to the survey, only 14 percent

of victims of race-based harassment reported their experiences to the police, human rights institutions, or any other authority, despite knowing about such institutions and the relevant antidiscrimination laws.

THE HIGH STAKES OF LEAVING RACISM UNSEEN. The breadth and depth of global protests have demonstrated that governments can no longer stay silent on systemic racism. **Democracies will continue to lose credibility and legitimacy in the**

eyes of an increasing number of citizens if they fail to take concrete action to eliminate

state violence against racial minorities and to hold those that perpetrate it

accountable. In a democracy, the state should be held to a higher standard. The rise of

far-right political movements in many Western democracies has also **highlighted the**

risks of staying silent. **Racialized politics have** increasingly **gained currency** in many

countries through powerful actors who have weaponized it for political purposes. But

these actors are only successful because the racial discourse is grounded in unconscious racist bias or explicit racist beliefs that still exist in

democratic societies, institutions, and culture. **Racism is a breeding ground for fascism, oppression, and**

the abuse of human rights. To be credible and effective advocates for global democracy, Western **democracies**

should work urgently to repair their social compacts with minority communities and **address racism within**

their institutions.

Strong democracy is key to preventing extinction – collapse is worse and turns every impact

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order/>]

Democratic decline would **weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation** abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, **democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies**. Similarly, **authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries**, then, **would provide a broader platform** for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the **formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system**.

Recent examples support the empirical data. **Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy** under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi **have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia**. Likewise, **democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia**, in part **to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing**.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, **the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited**. Consequently, **further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront** today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as **climate change, migration, and violent extremism** demand the **coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril**. Put simply, **the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships** with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would **weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect**. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western **democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet**. **Autocracies**, in contrast, **promote state control over the Internet**, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, **the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together**. For example, **the Chinese-created Asian**

Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—**provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.**

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that **democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines.** Moreover, **within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement** away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” **would increase global instability.** Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to **experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.** In this way, **democratic decline would significantly strain the international order** because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s

Case

The aff recognition of an unconditional right to strike undermines any chance of solvency.

Garneau 19 [Marianne Garneau is a labor educator and organizer with the historic IWW, Industrial Workers of the World. She’s the publisher of the website Organizing.Work. “Why Don’t Strikes Achieve More?” Organizing Work. May 1, 2019.
<https://organizing.work/2019/05/why-dont-strikes-achieve-more/>] HW Alex Lee

Under this legal framework, **strikes are a blunted tactic**, quite intentionally so. They do accomplish something – in each of the three cases described above, workers would almost certainly have got a worse deal had they not struck. There are also strikes that yield apparently better deals, such as the contract bargained by Unite Here with Marriott hotels – arguably in part because contracts at seven different bargaining units expired simultaneously, allowing almost 8,000 workers to strike at once. But **strikes don’t change the big-picture balance of power between employers and workers.** Most of the time, strikes are like a fistfight in which one side gets a bloody nose, the other gets a black eye, and **each walks away saying “You shoulda seen the other guy.”** At best, a win looks like **giving the other side two wounds while you only suffer one.** Where do we go from here? Strikes can nonetheless be powerful, of course: it remains the case that withholding production is the greatest tool workers have. **Strikes are most effective when they contain an element of surprise, when the employer does not see them coming,** or when they skirt the framework described above. **Quickie strikes and sit-downs can resolve a problem before things even escalate to appealing to the labor relations infrastructure (grievances, lawyers, arbitration).** Fairly spontaneous, mass strikes do frighten and intimidate employers and tilt **things in workers’ favor.** It’s important for us on the left to maintain our ability to accurately analyze and assess strikes and their resolutions. **If you were to look at union press releases following strikes, you would never know they were incorporating two-tiers or other losses. Unions tend to minimize the damage, so as not to demoralize workers or shake their faith in the union. However, if we keep calling losses (or pyrrhic victories) wins, we may lose the ability to discern wins and losses, and the difference. And we will lose sight of what makes a strike effective.**

