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Advantage 1 - Democracy

Global democracy is collapsing now.

Freedom House 3/3 [Freedom House. Freedom House works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. We act as a catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action. Our analysis, focused on 13 central issues, is underpinned by our international program work. “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”. 3-3-2021. . <https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated>.] SJ//VM

Washington - March 3, 2021 — **Authoritarian actors grew bolder** during 2020 as major democracies turned inward, contributing to the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, according to *Freedom in the World 2021*, the annual country-by-country assessment of political rights and civil liberties released today by Freedom House. **The report found that the share of countries designated Not Free has reached its highest level since the deterioration of democracy began in 2006, and that countries with declines in political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with gains by the largest margin recorded during the 15-year period.** The report downgraded the freedom scores of 73 countries, representing 75 percent of the global population. Those affected include not just authoritarian states like China, Belarus, and Venezuela, but also troubled democracies like the United States and India. **In one of the year’s most significant developments, India’s status changed from Free to Partly Free,** meaning less than 20 percent of the world’s people now live in a Free country—the smallest proportion since 1995. **Indians’ political rights and civil liberties have been eroding since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014.** His Hindu nationalist government has presided over increased pressure on human rights organizations, rising intimidation of academics and journalists, and a spate of bigoted attacks—including lynchings—aimed at Muslims. The decline deepened following Modi’s reelection in 2019, and the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 featured further abuses of fundamental rights. **The changes in India formed part of a broader shift in the international balance between democracy and authoritarianism, with authoritarians generally enjoying impunity for their abuses and seizing new opportunities to consolidate power or crush dissent.** In many cases, promising democratic movements faced major setbacks as a result. **In Belarus and Hong Kong, for example, massive prodemocracy protests met with brutal crackdowns by governments** that largely disregarded international criticism. **The Azerbaijani regime’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh indirectly threatened recent democratic gains in Armenia,** while the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region dashed hopes for the tentative political opening in that country since 2018. All four of these cases notably featured some degree of intervention by an autocratic neighbor: Moscow provided a backstop for the regime in Belarus, Beijing propelled the repression in Hong Kong,

Turkey's government aided its Azerbaijani counterpart, and Ethiopia's leader called in support from Eritrea. The malign influence of the regime in China, the world's most populous dictatorship, ranged far beyond Hong Kong in 2020. Beijing ramped up its global disinformation and censorship campaign to counter the fallout from its cover-up of the initial coronavirus outbreak, which severely hampered a rapid global response in the pandemic's early days. Its efforts also featured increased meddling in the domestic political discourse of foreign democracies, as well as transnational extensions of rights abuses common in mainland China. The Chinese regime has gained clout in multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, which the United States abandoned in 2018, as Beijing pushed a vision of so-called noninterference that allows abuses of democratic principles and human rights standards to go unpunished while the formation of autocratic alliances is promoted. "This year's findings make it abundantly clear that we have not yet stemmed the authoritarian tide," said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. "Democratic governments will have to work in solidarity with one another, and with democracy advocates and human rights defenders in more repressive settings, if we are to reverse 15 years of accumulated declines and build a more free and peaceful world."

A need for reform in the United States While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in [Freedom in the World](#) has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama. Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States' current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general, punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence, police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president's shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States' credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country. "January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy," said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House.

"Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America's international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system."

"Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes," said Abramowitz. "But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world." The effects of COVID-19 Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government's handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power. In fact, many of the year's negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President

Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power. The resilience of democracy Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by [Freedom in the World](#) during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

The plan solves:

Civic engagement – strikes increase democratic participation which reinvigorates democracy.

McElwee 15 [Sean; Research Associate at Demos; “How Unions Boost Democratic Participation,” The American Prospect; 9/16/15; <https://prospect.org/labor/unions-boost-democratic-participation/>] Justin

Labor organizer Helen Marot once observed, “The **labor unions are group efforts in the direction of democracy.**” What she meant is that more than simply vehicles for the economic interests of workers (which they certainly are), **labor unions also foster civic participation** for workers. And **nowhere is this clearer than in voter turnout**, which has **suffered** in recent years **along with union membership.** Indeed, new data from the Census Bureau and a new analysis of American National Election Studies data support the case that **unions' declining influence has also deeply harmed democracy.** In 2014, voter turnout was **abysmal**, even for a midterm. Census data suggest that **only 41.9 percent of the citizen population over 18 turned out to vote.** However, as I note in my new Demos report Why Voting Matters, there are **dispiriting gaps in turnout across class, race, and age.** To examine how unions might affect policy, I performed a **new analysis** of both Census Bureau and American National Election Studies data. The data below, from the 2014 election, show the **differences in voter turnout between union and non-union workers** (the sample only includes individuals who were employed, and does not include self-employed workers). While only 39 percent of non-union workers voted in 2014, fully 52 percent of union workers did. As part of ongoing research, James Feigenbaum, an economics PhD candidate at Harvard, ran a regression using American National Election Studies data suggesting that **union members are about 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 3 points more likely to register** (after controlling for demographic factors) and individuals living in a union household are 2.5 points more likely to vote and register. This is largely in line with the earlier estimates of Richard Freeman. These numbers may appear modest, but in a close national election they could be enough to change the result.

Other **research has found an even stronger turnout effect from unions.** Daniel Stegmueller and Michael Becher find that after applying numerous demographic controls, **union members are 10 points more likely to vote.**

What's particularly important is that unions boost turnout among low- and middle-income individuals. In a 2006 study, political scientists Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler found that, "the decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the aggregate turnout of high-income individuals." In 2014, the gap between unions and non-union workers shrunk at the highest rung of the income ladder. There was a 15-point gap among those earning less than \$25,000 (40 percent turnout for union workers, and 25 percent turnout for non-union workers). Among those earning more than \$100,000, the gap was far smaller (49 percent for non-union workers and 52 percent for union workers).

Individuals living in union households are also more progressive than those in non-union households. I examined 2012 ANES data and find that union households aren't largely different from non-union households on many issues regarding government spending, but they are more likely to have voted for Obama, identify as Democratic, and support a robust role for the government in reducing income inequality. When looking at union members specifically, the gaps become slightly larger.

More upscale union members are far more progressive than their non-union counterparts. Non-union households with an income above \$60,000 oppose government intervention to reduce inequality by 11 points, with 32.2 percent in favor and 43.4 percent against. But richer union households support government intervention, with 42.5 percent in favor and 29.9 percent opposed. As Richard B. Freeman has pointed out, "union members are more likely to vote for a Democrat for the House or Presidency than demographically comparable nonunion voters." He similarly finds that "unionism moves members to the left of where they would be given their socioeconomic status," in line with the data I examined from 2012.

A 2013 study by Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer finds that union members are not only more likely to vote, but also more likely to belong to other associations, and to protest. They also find that these effects are strongest among people with lower levels of education, suggesting that unions may help mobilize the least politically active groups. A recent study of European countries finds union members vote more and identifies those aspects of union membership that contribute to the higher turnout.

The strongest factor is that workers who engage in democratic organizations in the workplace (via collective bargaining) are more likely to engage in democracy more broadly by, for instance, voting.

Other studies support the idea that civic participation creates a feedback loop that leads to higher voting rates. Another factor is that union members make more money, and higher income is correlated with voting behavior. Finally, union members are encouraged by peers and the union to engage in politics, which also contributes to higher levels of turnout.

It's not entirely surprising that politicians who savage unions often share a similar contempt for the right to vote. Democracy in the workplace leads to democracy more broadly throughout society. Workers with more democratic workplaces are more likely to democratically engage in in society. Further, when unions and progressives demonstrate that government can benefit them, Americans are more likely to want to participate in decision-making. For all these reasons, unions play a unique and indispensable role in the progressive project. As Larry Summers, certainly not a leftist, recently argued, "the weakness of unions leaves a broad swath of the middle class largely unrepresented in the political process."

Independently, our coordinated civic engagement is key to comprehensive climate action globally.

Fisher and Nasrin 20 [Dana R; Professor of Sociology and the Director of the Program for Society and the Environment at the University of Maryland. Her research focuses on questions related to democracy, activism, and environmentalism — most recently studying climate activism, protests, and the American Resistance. Her research employs a mixed-methods approach that integrates data collected through open-ended semi-structured interviews and participant observation with various forms of survey data; Sohana; University of Maryland, College Park, UMD, UMCP, University of Maryland College Park · Philip Merrill College of Journalism Master of Arts; “Climate activism and its effects,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Review; October 2020; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345455893_Climate_activism_and_its_effects] Justin

As **coordinated school strikes have taken place around the world to draw attention to the climate crisis,** they have mobi-lized an increasing number of participants in a growing number of locations. **This type of activism involves particular forms of civic engagement that specifically aim to pressure governments to take action that addresses the issue of cli-mate change.** Civic engagement is the term used to describe the manifold ways that citizens participate in their societies with the intention of **influencing communities, politics, and the economy.** Forms of **engagement range from tactics that involve citizens working directly to change their individual behaviors,** along with those that involve indirect efforts to bring about change through the political and economic systems (like school strikes). Tactics run the gamut and range from those that work within these systems to those that work outside of them (Meyer & Tarrow, 1997). Collective efforts are mediated by various organizational forms (Anheier & Themudo, 2002), which can either create or remove obstacles to participation (Fisher & Green, 2004; for more general discussion, see Gamson, 1975; McAdam, 1983). As has been noted by numerous studies, civic engagement is much higher in democratic countries where citizens are afforded rights to participate and to voice their opinions (DeBardeleben & Pammett, 2009; see also Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994; Schofer & Longhofer, 2011; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999; de Tocqueville, 2002; see particularly Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). At the same time, digital technologies have been found to facilitate the spread of various forms of activism while they connect countries and cultures (Bennett, 2013; Theoharis, Vitoratou, & Sajuria, 2017)

This paper reviews the specific ways that citizens have engaged civically around the issue of climate change, paying particular attention to the documented effects of these efforts on climate change itself. Our discussion provides a review of the range of direct and indirect forms of climate activism (for a general overview of the direct and indirect effects of social movements, see Snow & Soule, 2010). After this review, we present the case of school strikes as a specific tactic that has gained attention in recent years. In this section, we review the limited evidence that presents data collected from participants of climate strikes in 2019 to understand trends in the expansion of this popular tactic. As the world responds to the COVID-19 outbreak and activism (including climate strikes) more increasingly online, we discuss the potential implications of the pandemic on climate activism and engagement. The conclusion of this paper emphasizes that future research must pay more attention to the relationship between climate-related civic engagement and measurable environmental outcomes. It highlights the methodological challenges facing scholars who take on the difficult analytical task of assessing the outcomes of climate activism in a way that is scalable for a global movement aiming to stop a global crisis. 2 | ACTIVISM WITH DIRECT EFFECTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE There are limited forms of civic engagement that involve efforts to have a direct effect on individual greenhouse gas emissions. For example, some environmental movements and environmental groups encourage their members to make lifestyle changes that reduce their individual carbon footprints. These efforts focus on changing consumer behaviors, such as reducing car use, flying, shifting to rooftop fuel-based sources of electricity, and eating less dairy or meat (Blicks, Saunders, Walbridge, Smith, & Bardsley, 2015; Cherry, 2006; Cronin, McCarthy, & Collins, 2014; Ergas, 2010; Haefliger, Johnson, & Jones, 2012; Middlemiss, 2011; Salt & Layzell, 1985; Saunders, Blicks, Papafagioukou, Walbridge, & Smith, 2014; Stuart-Thomas, Donaghe, & Russell, 2013; Wynne, Nicholas, Zhao, & Donovan, 2018; for an overview on these measures, see Wynne & Nicholas, 2017). So far, there are only a limited number of case studies that measure the direct effect of participation in these types of movements as it relates to climate outcomes. In their study of the electricity use of 72 households in southern England, for example, Saunders and colleagues find an association between low levels of electricity use and contact with environmental organizations (Saunders et al., 2014). Similarly, in a longitudinal ethnographic study of a small number of participants in an environmental campaign in Sweden, Westergren and colleagues conclude that participants in an environmental campaign sustained reductions in plastic use and meat consumption over the period of their study (Westergren, Drury, & Chiew, 2018, 2019). There is a clear need for research on the material outcomes of these movements that aim to have direct effects on consumption patterns that goes beyond single case studies. At the same time, measuring direct effects of these efforts in a way that will lead to reductions in emissions. In other words, their goals are indirect: these forms of engagement target nodes of power—policymakers, regulators, and businesses—to change their behaviors and/or accelerate their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These forms of civic engagement involve providing the labor and political pressures to pressure political and economic actors to enact the kinds of emission-reducing policies recommended by scientists working with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change & Edenhofer, 2014, p. 19). Much of the research in this area looks at the role of internationally focused environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which tend to target international environmental negotiation processes (Bettini & Correll, 2008; Boll & Thomas, 1999; Fox & Brown, 1998). Within this research area, there are numerous studies that analyze 2 of 11 FISHER AND NASRIN quantitative data sets to understand the relationship between NGOs and a country's environmental impact comparatively (see also Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer, 2000; Grant, Jorgenson, & Longhofer, 2018; Jorgenson, Dick, & Shandra, 2011; Longhofer & Jorgenson, 2017; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). Other studies focus specifically on the relationship between NGOs and environmental impact within nations (Dietz, Frank, Whiting, Kelly, & Kelly, 2015; Grant & Vaa, 2017; Shown, 2011). In their quantitative analysis of the effects of world society on environmental protection outcomes in countries around the world, Schofer and Hironaka find clear evidence that the rise of an “international environmental regime,” which includes environmental NGOs, is associated with lower levels of environmental degradation, including reduced carbon dioxide emissions (Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). More recently, scholars have worked to understand this relationship within the context of development. For example, Longhofer and Jorgenson conclude that nations with the highest levels of membership in international environmental NGOs experience a moderate “decoupling” in the association between economic development and carbon emissions (Grant et al., 2018; see also Jorgenson et al., 2011; Longhofer & Jorgenson, 2017). Although these studies provide a good first step in understanding this connection, more research is needed about how exactly the existence of NGOs brings about lower emissions. Beyond these studies that explicitly analyze the relationship between NGOs and carbon emissions, there is a small but growing literature that assesses the broader consequences of activism, which aims to pressure policymakers to take action across a range of issues (Annetta, Caron, Charello, & Su, 2010; Gugli, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999; Soule & Ozkay, 2004). This research focuses specifically on the outcome of specific forms of engagement, or tactics (for an overview, see Carey, Ghoshal, & Riba, 2011). Some of the most common tactics that activists are employing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions indirectly are summarized in the sections that follow. 3.1 | Activism through litigation Litigation is one of the tactics that citizens, local governments, NGOs, and even corporations are using to pressure governments. This tactic aims to work through the judicial system to take action or enforce existing legislation (McComick et al., 2017; Peel & Lin, 2019; Peel & Oudijk, 2015; Setzer & Vanhala, 2015; see also Pfommer et al., 2019). In May 2017, UN Environment reported that climate change-related cases had been filed in 24 countries plus the European Union (UN Environment, 2017). In some cases, this tactic is being used to pressure businesses and governments to meet their policy commitments (Setzer & Vanhala, 2019; UN Environment, 2017). So far, however, there remains insufficient evidence regarding what effect these judicial efforts are having on greenhouse gas emissions. 3.2 | Activism targeting business actors At the same time, some groups focus their attention on targeting the economic sector and specific businesses. These efforts involve shareholder activism and cooperative board stewardship, as well as protest (Breg & Soule, 2015; Breg & Soule, 2015; Soule, 2015; Soule, 2015; Vito, et al., 2015). Shareholder activism focuses on investor response to corporate activities and performances (Gilan & Starks, 2007). It involves investors who are dissatisfied with the company's management or operation taking advantage of their role as shareholders to pressure the company to change (Branon & McEachery, 2015; Gilan & Starks, 2007). Cooperative board stewardship, in contrast, involves “jointly owned and democratically controlled businesses” that support renewable energy (Vardor, 2011, p. 757; see also Vito et al., 2015). Some of this business-focused activism involves working through transnational advocacy networks, which have been documented to target governments and corporations (Hadden & Jazmy, 2017; Keck & Sikkink, 2014; McAttee & Pulver, 2009). In their comparative study of shareholder activism in the Amazon region, McAttee and Pulver come to mixed conclusions, finding that one of the shareholder advocacy networks in Ecuador was successful in limiting oil development, while the other was not (McAttee & Pulver, 2009). Other types of activism that target business practices involve environmental groups working as part of a campaign to pressure institutional investors and universities to divest from fossil fuels. Groups employ “a range of strategies to shame, pressure, facilitate, and encourage investors in general, and large institutional investors in particular, to relinquish their holdings of fossil fuel stocks in favor of climate-friendly alternatives” (Ayling & Gunningham, 2017, p. 131; Franca, 2017; Gray-Benson & Sarathy, 2016; Heines & Hopke, 2019). Although research has yet to conclude FISHER AND NASRIN 3 of 11 that these efforts have a substantial effect on fossil fuel funding or greenhouse gas emissions (Tollefson, 2015; but see Bergman, 2018), a recent study of fossil fuel divestment and green bonds provides some evidence of success. In it, Glomrud and Wei model green investment scenarios that include funding allocation constraints due to divestment around the world. The authors find that these efforts yield notable emissions reductions (Glomrud & Wei, 2018, p. 3). 3.3 | Activism working within the political system Activism also frequently involves citizens working individually or in groups to take advantage of opportunities to pressure governmental actors from within the political system. These tactics involve lobbying elected officials or working to change political representation through democratic elections of candidates (for an overview, see Clemens, 1997; Scholzman, Verba, & Brady, 2012). Turning first to lobbying, there is some evidence that these efforts by civic groups have a positive effect on environmental outcomes. In their 2016 study, Ozkay and colleagues find that the number of environmental lobbyist organizations has a positive effect on the enactment of environmental legislation (Ozkay, Soule, Coddou, & Muñoz, 2016). Although the authors do not specifically document the effects of the legislation on material outcomes, more recent research has found climate laws to reduce carbon emissions (Eskander & Farkhausen, 2020). Even though groups representing both the general public and businesses engage in lobbying, research has found business groups have (and spend) more financial and human resources, which affords them “privileged access” to policymakers and policymaking (Freudenberg, 2005). In his study of the “climate lobby,” Brulle compares the amounts spent by different groups for lobbying around the climate issue in the U.S. Congress. He finds that the “major actors involved in lobbying were fossil fuel and transportation corporations, utilities, and affiliated trade associations. Expenditures by these sectors dwarf those of environmental organizations and renewable energy corporations” (Brulle, 2018, p. 289; see also Farnell, 2016). In some cases, representatives from business interests that have been lobbying against environmental policies are given opportunities to join the government. This process leads to “Regulatory Capture” by the specific business interest and is found to be associated with substantial negative public and environmental health consequences (for a recent example, see Dillon et al., 2018). Activism within the political system also involves citizens working through the electoral process to affect all sorts of social change (for a discussion of engagement in electoral politics as activism, see Fisher, 2012, 2019). In some cases, elections focus on the differences between candidates who are supportive of policies that include more aggressive climate change mitigation strategies. Although research has yet to analyze extensively the relationship between this type of election-related civic engagement and climate outcomes, there is already some evidence. For example, a 2019 study finds that individuals in the United States who installed solar panels participated more in elections (Mildenberger, Howe, & Milgrom, 2019). At the same time, other research has documented various forms of electoral backlash against climate policies, both individually (Ozkay, 2016, 2020), as well as in combination with other progressive agenda items (Muradian & Pascual, 2020). In their study of the success of “far-right movements” around the world and the concurrent election of “far-right” candidates, Muradian and Pascual note that far-right-leaning elected officials tend to have low concern for environmental issues and to deny climate change and disregard scientific evidence (Muradian & Pascual, 2020). Although they do not specifically look at the environmental outcomes of these officials holding office, given their common values and the empirical evidence coming out of the early years of the Trump Administration (Bombey, 2017; Fisher & Jorgenson, 2019), it is likely that these officials will contribute to the passage of policies that limit the effectiveness of climate-related plans, reduce enforcement of these plans, or block them outright. 3.4 | Activism outside the economic and political system At the same time, there is expansive research on the ways citizens with less access to resources and power participate by challenging the economic and political system from outside it (for an overview, see Meyer & Tarrow, 1997). These efforts include a range of more confrontational tactics, such as boycotting, striking, picketing, and direct action that target politics, policymakers, and businesses. Many studies have explained this type of activism using climate change as a case (Fisher, 2010; Hadden, 2015; Saunders, Grass, Oleson, Rainford, & Rootes, 2012; Swin, Geiger, & Langness, 2019; Wahlström, Wernberg, & Rootes, 2013; see also Fisher, Stanley, Bernman, & Neft, 2005; Walgrave, 4 of 11 FISHER AND NASRIN Wouters, Van Laer, Verhulst, & Keteleers, 2012). So far, however, only a handful of studies have explored the effect of these tactics on climate-related outcomes (but see Muñoz, Ozkay, & Soule, 2018; Ozkay et al., 2018). In their research on the success of environmental legislation in the U.S. Congress, Ozkay and colleagues find that some civic tactics have a more positive effect than others: while they conclude that the environmental lobbyist organizations is positively associated with the enactment of environmental legislation, which can lead to carbon emissions reductions, they also find that protest by constituents has no effect (Ozkay et al., 2018; see also Ozkay & Soule, 2009). In a 2018 piece, which uses more recent data to analyze the relationship between protest, politics, and greenhouse gas emissions across states in the United States, the authors come to different conclusions. They find that emissions in states decline when there is more pro-environmental protest (Muñoz et al., 2018).

A good deal of research has concluded that activism, including tactics such as protests or strikes played a large role in pressuring governments to create environmental laws and environmental agencies tasked with enforcing those laws around the world (Brulle, 2000; see also Longhofer, Schofer, Miric, & Frank, 2016; McCloskey, 1991; Rucht, 1999; Schreurs, 1997; Steinhardt & Wu, 2016; Wong, 2018). Moreover, research has documented how coalitions of activists achieved a degree of success when they protested environmentally damaging projects, including the Narmada Dam development in India (Khagram, 2004), and environmentally harmful nuclear power plants, dams, and airports in Japan (Aldrich, 2010). In her study of the campaign against coal mining and burning in South Africa, Cock finds that the campaign challenged inequality and generated solidarity (Cock, 2019).

4 | CLIMATE STRIKES AS A GROWING TACTIC

Climate strikes are a particular outsider tactic that aims to pressure both the political and economic system. On August 20, 2018, Greta Thunberg decided not to attend school and sit on the steps of the Swedish parliament to demand that the government take steps to address climate change (Gessen, 2018). Inspired by the national school walkout against gun violence in the United States that was organized after the Parkland School Shooting in Florida, the 15-year-old has spent her Fridays sitting with a hand-written sign protesting ever since. Fridays for Future—the name of the group coordinating this tactic of skipping school on Fridays to protest inaction on climate change—flourished due to its usage of digital technologies to engage young people and the tactic has spread.

In March 2019, the first global climate strike took place, turning out more than 1 million people around the world. Six months later in September 2019, young people and adults responded to a call by young activists to participate in climate strikes as part of the “Global Week for Future” surrounding the UN Climate Action Summit.¹ The number of participants in this event globally jumped to an estimated 7.6 million people (Rosane, 2019). Figure 1 presents the growth in the tactic of climate strikes in terms of the numbers of nations where strikes have taken place and the total number of participants involved.

Even before this movement had mobilized millions to strike, a narrative synthesis of studies that focused on youth perceptions of climate change from 1993 to 2018 documented how youth voices on climate change had become much more prominent and more widely publicized (K. Lee, Gjersoe, O'Neill, & Barnett, 2020). Specific research on this movement and its consequences has yet to be published in peer-reviewed publications (but see Evensen, 2019; Fisher, 2019b; Wahlström et al., 2013). However, in a series of pieces published in the Washington Post, Fisher presents analyses of data collected from participants in climate strikes during 2019 to understand how this tactic and the movement have grown in the United States (Fisher, 2019c, 2019d).

As an outsider tactic by school-aged children that aims to pressure governments to implement more radical climate policies that will lead to emissions reductions, school strikes are a popular example of activism with the goal of having an indirect effect on climate change. Measuring the outcomes of these efforts, in terms of political outcomes and emissions reductions is extremely challenging given the indirect nature of this activism. Such calculations are made even more challenging given the scale and scope of the activism, which has mobilized millions of people to act locally to pressure governments at the local, national, and international levels. Although the overall numbers are large, most of these strikes involve relatively small proportions of overall populations.

Climate change causes extinction.

Specktor 19

[Brandon writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years] 6-4-2019, **"Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change** Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html> Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. **General climate models** — like the one that the **United Nations' Panel on Climate Change** (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — **fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**, as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with **world governments "politely ignoring"** the advice of **scientists** and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, **the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many** of the trees in the **Amazon rainforest** (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); **and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability."** the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, **droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert.** Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, **destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees.** This mass movement of refugees — coupled with **shrinking coastlines and severe drops in food and water availability** — begin to **stress the fabric of the world's largest nations** including the United States. **Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely.** The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps **"the end of human global civilization as we know it."**

Organized and empowered labor secures reforms in every area and checks authoritarian tendencies, which is vital for global democracy; historical empirics prove.

Puddington 10 [Arch Puddington is currently Senior Scholar Emeritus at Freedom House. He also previously served as the Senior Vice President for Research at Freedom House. "The Global State of Workers' Rights: Free Labor in a Hostile World." https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/WorkerRightsFULLBooklet-FINAL.pdf]

Some 30 years ago, in August 1980, **workers in communist Poland formed the independent Solidarity trade union movement**, thereby **challenging** one of **the totalitarian system's** fundamental principles: control of labor organizations by the party-state. **The strike that led to Solidarity's establishment** was launched at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk. It **quickly spread throughout**

Poland and its program **escalated from workplace issues to a sweeping demand for freedom to create** the institutions that undergird **a democratic society**. After a decade of tumult and repression, Solidarity emerged triumphant, compelling the country's communist authorities to allow competitive elections that resulted **in a landmark victory** for the **democratic opposition**. **This** in turn **led to the domino-like collapse of communist rule throughout** Central and Eastern **Europe** and, two years later, the breakup of the **Soviet Union**.

The question some are asking today is whether a phenomenon similar to Solidarity might be possible in what is now the world's most powerful authoritarian country, China. In recent years, evidence of worker unrest there has steadily mounted. Strikes and other forms of labor protest occur regularly; just in the last few months, workers have called high-profile strikes at installations operated by some of the world's largest multinational corporations. As was the case in Poland, the official labor umbrella group, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), has played an obstructive role by trying to force striking workers back into their enterprises and in some instances acting as strikebreakers. There are also signs that some within the ACFTU, unlike in the official Polish union, see a need for change that seems to be lost on the leadership.

The burgeoning workers' resistance in China has drawn supporters and participants from many segments of the economy, including cab drivers, teachers, and factory workers. Despite their lack of experience as union activists, they have embraced the tried-and-true tactics of labor protest— sit-down strikes and roadblocks, for example—and have eschewed violence. These youthful workers have also used mobile telephones and the internet to draw attention to their causes. The stories they tell about conditions at the workplace are eerily familiar to anyone who is acquainted with the history of the trade union struggle in Europe and North America: low pay within the context of rapidly expanding inequality, punishing hours, harsh supervisors, and a consuming work routine that discourages family life.

The most recent **strike wave has taken** many observers outside **China by surprise**. The growth of the Chinese industrial juggernaut gave rise to myths about Chinese workers, who were widely regarded as docile, willing to work remarkably long hours without complaint, uninterested in unions or collective action, inspired by patriotic love for the Communist Party leadership, and unwilling to challenge authority. Among those caught unaware were the owners and managers of multinational corporations whose investments in China have been predicated on the assumption of cheap, compliant Chinese labor. Indeed, the American Chamber of Commerce in China was sharply critical of changes to Chinese labor laws that were adopted in 2008, issuing a thinly veiled warning that enhanced protections for workers would lead multinationals to look elsewhere for new installations.

Unlike the state-owned enterprises in communist Poland, the strike targets in modern China are foreign-owned, private firms. Accordingly, the strikers do not confront the state directly, and the strikes are thus not regarded as overtly political. Still, the increasing willingness of Chinese workers to risk arrest and jail to defend workplace rights is a potent signal to the government of the power of independent worker action.

The Chinese **case is a** cogent **reminder of the central role played by the struggle for worker rights** in the past century's broader movement **toward democratic freedom**. From South Africa to South

Korea, Chile to the Czech Republic, **the democracy and workers' rights movements have been closely linked. This relationship was well understood by fascist, communist, and authoritarian dictators who feared the strength of democratic trade unionists.**

A number of important qualities distinguish free **trade unions** from other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that **promote democratic reform**. First, unlike most NGOs, **they have a mass membership**. Second, if **they are run democratically**, they can **act as a training ground for democracy activists**, who learn how to **campaign** on issues, muster support, and **get** themselves **elected** to union offices. **And**

third, trade unions are one of the few NGOs that operate simultaneously in the social, economic, and political spheres, making them a potential counterweight to the concentrated power of economic and political elites.

It is no surprise, then, that a principal goal of totalitarians and dictators of both the right and the left has been to secure absolute control over organized labor and transform unions into pliant instruments of the party-state. Communist movements of the past, which claimed to draw legitimacy from the working classes, were particularly eager to capture and destroy independent labor organizations.

Today, repressive regimes are still wary of the power of organized workers. In a number of societies, unions and workers remain in the forefront of movements that seek human rights, fair elections, a free press, and laws to stem rampant corruption. Unions have played a crucial role, for example, in the effort to bring reforms to Zimbabwe in the face of murderous reprisals by the regime of President Robert Mugabe. In South Africa, it was the labor movement that

prevented the transshipment of Chinese weapons to Zimbabwe at a time when the government of

President Thabo Mbeki went out of its way to befriend Mugabe. In Iran, bus drivers and other workers have been important forces in the struggle for democracy; threatening statements issued in recent months by the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have paid special attention to the role of workers in the opposition. In Guinea, unions were a critical force in demonstrations that sought

democratic change, and union members were prominent among those massacred by the country's

military junta in September 2009. And in Venezuela, unions have strongly resisted attempts by President Hugo Chavez to bring the entire labor movement under his personal control. The political leaderships of many authoritarian countries—such as Russia, China, Iran, and Egypt—are acutely aware of the Solidarity example and are determined to forestall a repetition on their territory. However, only the most oppressive

regimes—North Korea and Cuba, for example—exert the degree of tight control that marked previous eras, and relatively few countries respond to trade union activism with the sort of thuggery employed by Mugabe. Just as they have developed sophisticated mechanisms to muzzle independent voices in the media, control the activities of civil society organizations, and marginalize opposition political parties, modern authoritarian regimes have devised more nuanced strategies to keep organized labor under control. Thus the Communist Party leadership in China has developed an approach that combines concessions to striking workers with efforts to restrict press attention to labor unrest, prevent labor complaints from reaching higher authorities in the state or party, and above all block the formation of a nationwide workers' movement that could become an autonomous source of power like Solidarity.

The problems of workers are not restricted to countries with authoritarian political environments. Societies that otherwise observe a wide array of democratic freedoms—those that tolerate robust debate in the media, are sensitive to the rights of minorities, and have adopted a series of policies to achieve gender equality—may still take steps to limit the power of trade unions as agents of collective bargaining and sources of independent political power. The most glaring example of this phenomenon is the United States. While the country has adopted laws that in principle guarantee the rights of workers to form unions, engage in collective bargaining, and conduct strikes and other forms of workplace protest, these rights have been circumscribed in practice over the past three decades through a combination of court decisions,

political initiatives, and government policies. The status of workers' rights must also be viewed within the context of a global decline in freedom of association. Authoritarian governments have singled out the institutions of civil society for special attention in recent years. Targets include democratic political parties, human rights organizations, women's advocates, groups that investigate corruption or monitor abuse by security services, organizations that seek legal reform, and groups that champion minority rights or religious freedom—organizations, in other words, that aim to provide ordinary people with a voice or influence on public policy.

Absent the aff, Democratic backsliding causes extinction.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; "How Democracy's Decline Would Undermine the International Order," CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order/>] Justin

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are the ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia's assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline. Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order.

In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom House report stated that the "acceptance of democracy as the world's dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years." Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today's global order.

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other

democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.

Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. **Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.**

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. [International relations literature](#) tells us that **democracies are less likely to fight wars** against other democracies, suggesting that **interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines**. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “**authoritarian hardening,**” would increase global instability. **Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure,** as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because **rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.**

Finally, widespread **democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States** and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. **This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.**

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of **instability**, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, **and sustained threats from terrorist groups** such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S.

preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While **rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor.** Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country.

From this perspective, **the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights.** A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. **Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes.** Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. **Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.**

Advocacy

WE affirm: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. PICS Affirm because they don't disprove my general thesis.

Just Govt

Anne-Marie **Slaughter**, 2-13-20**17**, "3 responsibilities every government has towards its citizens," World Economic Forum,
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/government-responsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/>

The oldest and simplest justification for government is as protector: protecting citizens from violence. Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan describes a world of unrelenting insecurity without a government to provide the safety of law and order, protecting citizens from each other and from foreign foes.

The horrors of little or no government to provide that function are on global display in the world's many fragile states and essentially ungoverned regions. And indeed, when the chaos of war and disorder mounts too high, citizens will choose even despotic and fanatic governments, such as the Taliban and ISIS, over the depredations of warring bands. The idea of government as protector requires taxes to fund, train and equip an army and a police force; to build courts and jails; and to elect or appoint the officials to pass and implement the laws citizens must not break. Regarding foreign threats, government as protector requires the ability to meet and treat with other governments as well as to fight them. This minimalist view of government is clearly on display in the early days of the American Republic, comprised of the President, Congress, Supreme Court and departments of Treasury, War, State and Justice. Protect and provide. The concept of government as provider comes next: **government as provider of goods and services that individuals cannot provide individually for themselves. Government in this conception is the solution to collective action problems, the medium through which citizens create public goods that benefit everyone.** but that are also subject to free-rider problems without some collective compulsion. The basic economic infrastructure of human connectivity falls into this category: the means of physical travel, such as roads, bridges and ports of all kinds, and increasingly the means of virtual travel, such as broadband. All of this infrastructure can be, and typically initially is, provided by private entrepreneurs who see an opportunity to build a road, say, and charge users a toll, but the capital necessary is so great and the public benefit so obvious that ultimately the government takes over.

Only unconditional solves since it sets a briteline legal precedent for the right to strike.

(Borman 2016) (David A. Borman, "Contractualism and the Right to Strike," DOI

10.1007/s11158-015-9316-8, Department of Political Science, Philosophy, and Economics, Nipissing University, Published Online April 8, 2016)

Philosophical treatments of the right to strike are scarce. A reasonably vigorous search turns up considerable debate over the justification for particular strikes where the public interest may be threatened, especially strikes among health care workers; but these presuppose as settled the question of a general justification for the right to strike. Within contractualism, there is to my knowledge no discussion of this topic whatsoever. 1 Indeed, even the related questions of the right to collectively bargain and the 'right to work' (an expression now grotesquely misappropriated by the political right-wing as opposed to the right to unionization) receive scarcely a word. On the side of the law, and beginning with the case of the U.S., there is, de facto, no right to strike: that is, workers do not have protection for the refusal to work at jobs which they continue to regard as their own; they do not have protections for preventing replacement workers from taking those jobs; and they are explicitly denied the right to strike in solidarity with workers employed by others. Protections against replacement are, in my view, central to the right to strike: without them, the right to strike is nothing but the right to quit which, outside of slave societies, has never been in dispute. For a few reasons, the de jure case is

more complicated. Consider, for instance, the state of international law on the subject: **The International Labour Organization (ILO) interprets its Convention 87**—on ‘Freedom of Association and Protection of a Right to Organize’—**to include[s] protection of the right to strike, though the latter is not explicitly stated. But this interpretation has not proved binding on member states** of the ILO, not even among those who (unlike the U.S.) have ratified Convention 87. Article 8 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976) explicitly grants a right to strike ‘provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country’. Given the domestic legal situation with respect to labour rights, the caveat largely taketh away what the right giveth. **The U.S. Constitution, for instance, does not include a distinct right to strike, while the jurisprudence around the question is a mess.** **The right has sometimes been assumed by legal opinions in the United States;** it appears in the National Labour Relations Act (1935), and was upheld by the Supreme Court’s overturning of key provisions in a restrictive anti-strike law in *Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations* [262 U.S. 522, at 540–544 (1923)]. **But rather than providing an effective precedent for constitutional interpretation, the Court never revisited or reaffirmed the right to strike and instead allowed increasingly severe restrictions on strikers, to the point of rendering them de facto unprotected.**

To wit: In *Lyng v. Auto Workers*, the Court assumed the existence of the right to strike, but held that denying food stamps to the families of striking workers did not infringe upon it [485 U.S. 360, at p. 368 (1988)]; in *NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.* [304 U.S. 333, at 345–346 (1938)], the Court upheld the right of employers to permanently replace striking workers; in *United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB* [341 U.S. 707 (1951)], the Court ruled secondary strikes unlawful; and in *Postal Clerks v. 1*. A partial exception is *Macfarlane* (1981). *Macfarlane* surveys a variety of ethical frameworks in relation to the strike, including Rawlsian justice. But the treatment of Rawls is thin and severed from context. For instance, *Macfarlane* writes: ‘Thus a practice like striking may be held to be just if persons in the original position would have found it compatible with the two principles [of justice]: that is to say if, given the relationship of capital and labour inherent in industrial society, they would as potential employers or workers have accepted that workers ought to have such a right’ (*Macfarlane* 1981, p. 27). However, it is a serious distortion of Rawls’ account to apply the device of the original position in this way, stipulating ‘the relationship of capital and labour inherent in industrial society’ as a premise *Blount* [325 F.Supp 879 (D.D.C.), affirmed 404 U.S. 802 (1971)] it upheld the legitimacy of prohibiting strikes by public sector workers (*Pope* 2004; *Pope* 2010; on the historical development of the right to strike in the U.S., see *Lambert* 2005). **In Canada, the right to strike is in a state of turmoil.** **The Canadian Labour Code,** modelled on the U.S. *Wagner Act*, **spells out the legal terms of strikes** and lockouts and recognizes as legitimate restrictions on the right to strike only serious dangers to the health or safety of individuals or communities (Section 424 [1][d]). **Yet in recent years, conservative federal and provincial governments have moved aggressively to intervene in labour disputes and to legislate against strike action** (against postal workers, rail workers, airline workers, and public sector employees generally), particularly through the use of ‘essential services’ legislation. Challenges mounted by labour groups against these restrictions were finally heard by **the[Canadian] Supreme Court** and, **in early 2015** (*Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan* [2015] SCC 4; hereafter, *Saskatchewan* 2015), the Court surprised even close observers by **revers[ed] their own 1987 decision, in which they had explicitly denied** that **the** associational clause of the Charter entailed a **right to strike** (Reference re *Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.)*, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313), by granting the right to strike—in the words of Justice Rosalie Abella, writing for the majority—‘constitutional benediction’ (*Saskatchewan* 2015, para. 3). Part of the reason for the surprise is that, as the dissenting Justices complained, the nature of the challenge did not obviously require dealing with the question of a stand-alone constitutional right to strike: Since collective bargaining has already been granted protection under the associational clause of the Charter, the case might have been decided solely on the matter of whether the essential services provisions undermined collective bargaining. Indeed, the decision remains ambiguous in its reasoning: certainly the dominant line of argument is **the Court’s repeated affirmation[is],** cited also in the test for an infringement, **that the right to strike is justified because it is necessary for meaningful collective bargaining,** and that ‘[t]he question of whether other forms of collective work stoppage are protected by s.2(d) of the Charter is not at issue here’ (*Saskatchewan* 2015, para. 2).² In this light, the decision seems to fall short of a standalone constitutional right to strike, per se. But elsewhere, the Court—noting the distinct history of striking and collective Bargaining—**suggest[ing] that striking, parallel to collective bargaining, protects the values that lie behind** the

associational clause of the Charter and is itself **‘an essential component of the process through which workers pursue collective workplace goals.’** The relevant values are wide-ranging and clearly moral in nature:

The ability to strike thereby allows workers, through collective action, to refuse to work under imposed terms and conditions. **This collective action at the moment of impasse is an affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of employees in their working lives.** (Saskatchewan 2015, para. 53) 2 In linking the strike instrumentally with bargaining, the Court also appeals to ILO jurisprudence (para. 69), and to parallel decisions by the European Court of Human Rights [Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turqui, No. 68959/01, April 21, 2009 (HUDOC)] and the German (para. 72) and Israeli courts (para. 73). While the decision is no doubt historic, and is clear in its assertion that striking is protected by the Charter, its precise consequences will for some time remain unclear. The government of Saskatchewan has been given one year to re-draft its essential services law in light of the ruling; and questions have been raised about the implications of the decision for existing restrictions in the Labour Code, for instance, regarding strike activity in relation to bargaining efforts, the terms of collective agreements, organization through a union association, and so on.

Enforcement through IFAs is normal means – that solves credibility concerns and legal loopholes which encourages striking.

Neill 12 [Emily CM; “The Right to Strike: How the United States Reduces it to the Freedom to Strike and How International Framework Agreements can Redeem it,” 1/1/12; Labor & Employment Law Forum Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 6; <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1047&context=lelb>] Justin

IFAs **open the door to collective bargaining** by creating a space that **alters** the traditionally **antagonistic employer-employee** engagement and is more **hospitable** to the organizing process.⁸³ MNC commitment to **respect** the core ILO principles of **freedom of association** and the rights to **organize** and **collectively bargain** through IFAs are **instrumental to realizing that purpose**.⁸⁴

1. The **Creation and Proliferation of International Framework Agreements**

An IFA **is an agreement** negotiated between an MNC (Multinational Corporation) and typically⁸⁵ a **global union**⁸⁶ **to establish an ongoing relationship** between the signatories **and ensure adherence to** uniform **labor standards** by the MNC in all countries in which it operates.⁸⁷ **IFAs are** the first and only **formally-negotiated instruments between unions and corporations at the global level** and a **significant development in labor relations**.⁸⁸ Since the signing of the first IFA in 1988, they have spread at a steadily increasing rate. ⁸⁹ Their proliferation since 2000 has been especially dramatic—with the number of IFAs signed in 2003-2006 nearly doubling the number signed in the first fifteen years.⁹⁰ By 2008, approximately sixty-five agreements had been concluded.⁹¹ At the end of 2010, that number had jumped to seventy-six.⁹²

2. Context of Framework Agreements: Corporate Social Responsibility

While **both corporate codes of conduct and IFAs** can be traced to a **consumer driven push for corporate social responsibility**, a key difference separates the two: **credibility**. In the late 1980’s, **MNCs in the United States began to respond to campaigns by non-governmental organizations accusing MNCs of international human rights abuses by elaborating internal codes of conduct.**⁹³ **These codes, unilaterally written and implemented, tend to be vague and provide for no enforcement mechanism.**⁹⁴ **The voluntary, self-enforcing nature of these**

commitments has led critics to conclude that they are mere marketing ploys lacking in credibility or having any real social impact.⁹⁵

IFAs were developed, in part, as an alternative to corporate codes of conduct to raise labor standards.⁹⁶ Unlike unilateral codes, IFAs are negotiated between the two principal actors—employers and workers—in the employment relationship.⁹⁷ Involvement of the very party the agreement is meant to protect attaches greater meaning and significance to the instrument.⁹⁸

The purpose of IFAs is to promote fundamental labor rights by regulating corporate conduct on a global level.⁹⁹ This brings us to another key distinction between corporate codes of conduct and IFAs: their concrete normative content.

3. Core ILO Principles as the Substantive Content of IFAs

Whereas codes tend to be vague in their commitments, MNCs commit themselves to concrete international labor norms through framework agreements. The key areas of IFAs are the acceptance of the four core labor standards, as articulated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.¹⁰⁰ The Declaration itself is typically not mentioned, but rather the four rights are referred to in IFAs by their convention numbers.¹⁰¹ Thus, apart from a very few exceptions, IFAs refer explicitly to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organize and collective bargaining, respectively.¹⁰²

As previously discussed, ILO standards are the principal source of international labor norms.¹⁰³ ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are perhaps the most important of ILO principles since the right to organize and bargain collectively is essential to the defense of working conditions like wages, hours, and health and safety through the collective bargaining process.¹⁰⁴

4. Scope of IFAs, MNCs and Supply Chains

One of the most important features of IFAs is their goal of addressing behavior not only within the signatory MNC, but along their supply chains as well.¹⁰⁵ According to one study, of the IFAs in existence as of 2008, eighty eight percent explicitly indicated that the norms of the agreements applied to their subsidiaries and seventy-three percent contained provisions defining their application to suppliers and subcontractors.¹⁰⁶ These provisions contain varying degrees of commitment on behalf of the signatory MNC. Some MNCs agree to place very concrete obligations on supply chain parties, going so far as to detail sanctions to be imposed upon non-compliant suppliers.¹⁰⁷ Others contain provisions that are less mandatory, limiting the MNC's obligation to informing or encouraging its suppliers and subsidiaries to respect the principles of the agreement. For instance, the PSA Peugeot Citroen IFA was amended in 2010, changing its once relatively firm language by which suppliers are "required" to make similar commitments to a much weaker provision in which the MNC agrees to "request" that its suppliers a similar commitment in respect of their own suppliers and sub-contractors.¹⁰⁸

III. ANALYSIS

The principal weapon workers have to leverage their bargaining power is the strike.¹⁰⁹ The permanent strike replacement policy renders [strikes] this weapon almost meaningless by subjecting workers that employ it to a risk of job loss. This practice deviates from international norms on freedom of association, the right to organize, and bargain collectively, as enunciated in Conventions 87 and 98, and reaffirmed in the ILO 1998 Declaration to the point of rendering the right to strike a mere freedom to strike.¹¹⁰ Fortunately, IFAs have the potential to bring many U.S. operating companies into compliance with international standards on the right to strike, which prohibits the use of permanent replacements.

This Section first addresses the effect of the permanent replacement doctrine on the right to strike in the United States. It next argues that as a member of the ILO, the U.S. is obligated to amend this policy to guarantee workers protection in their right to strike. Finally, it argues that even if the U.S. permits permanent strike replacements, certain U.S. companies are bound to IFAs that prohibit them from taking advantage of the policy.

A. Interference with the Right to Strike is an Abridgement of ILO Principles

Collective bargaining is the mechanism through which workers present their demands to an employer and, through negotiations, determine the working conditions and terms of employment.¹¹¹ The right to strike arises most often in the context of collective bargaining, though as a weapon of last resort.¹¹² The employment relationship is an economic one—with most workers’ demands encompassing improved pay or other working conditions.¹¹³ To bring balance to the employment relationship at the bargaining table, one of the primary weapons available to workers in defending their interests is the threat of withholding labor to inflict costs upon the employer.¹¹⁴ The principle of the strike as a legitimate means of action taken by workers’ organizations is widely recognized in countries throughout the world, almost to the point of universal recognition.¹¹⁵ The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association holds the position that the right to strike is a basic consequence of the right to organize.¹¹⁶

Interference or impairment of the right to strike is inconsistent with Articles 3, 8, and 10 of Convention 87 guaranteeing workers freedom of association and the right to take concerted actions to further their

interests. Article 3 recognizes the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities and to formulate their programs.¹¹⁷ Article 10 states that the term “organization” means any organization for furthering and defending the interests of workers.¹¹⁸ When read together with Article 10, Article 3 protects activities and actions that are designed to further and defend the interests of workers. Recall that strikes are recognized as an essential means through which workers further and defend their interests.¹¹⁹ Article 8 declares that no national law may impair the guarantees of the Convention.¹²⁰ Because strike action falls under the activities protected by Article 3, which are aimed at furthering and defending workers’ interests, limitations on the right to strike may contravene Conventions 87 and 98.¹²¹ This subsection addresses the lawful practice of hiring of permanent replacements for striking workers in the United States as it relates to ILO principles.

1. The Use of Permanent Strike Replacements Reduces the ‘Right’ to Strike to the Unprotected ‘Freedom’ to Strike

In refraining from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the United States government has insisted that U.S. law sufficiently guarantees workers protections of the principles of freedom of association, the rights to organize, and bargain collectively.¹²² While Section 13 of the NLRA addresses the right to strike,¹²³ in reality, enforcement of the NLRA falls short of its goals and departs from international norms, which afford the right to strike fundamental status.¹²⁴ The Mackay doctrine, permitting permanent replacement of strikers renders the right a mere privilege, or freedom, because it removes meaningful protection of the right by stripping employers of a duty to refrain from interference with striking.¹²⁵ Wesley Hohfeld’s famous account of legal rights provides a useful analytical framework for distinguishing between the colloquial uses of the “rights” and their implications.¹²⁶ Under this framework, rights are distinguished from what he calls privileges, or freedoms, by the existence or inexistence of a corresponding duty. All rights have a corresponding duty, or a legal obligation to respect the legal interest of the right-holder and refrain from interfering with it.¹²⁷ In the example of the right to strike, the correlative is the employer’s duty to not interfere with the employees’ right.¹²⁸ On the other hand, a “freedom” is the liberty to act, but without the imposition of a duty upon others.¹²⁹ When one has the freedom to act, others simply do not have a right to prevent her from acting.¹³⁰ In the strike context, if employees enjoy the freedom to strike, an employer does not have the right to stop the employees from striking, but does not have a duty to not interfere with the act of striking.¹³¹

In establishing the Mackay permanent strike replacement Doctrine, the Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘right’ to strike does not **destroy** an employer’s right to **protect and continue business** by filling the vacancies of the strikers.¹³² In so holding, the Court actually transformed the ‘right’ to strike it into the ‘freedom’ to strike by removing a **corresponding affirmative duty** not to interfere with the exercise of the right from the employer.¹³³ The hire of permanent replacements interferes with strike action by inflicting substantial repercussions upon the employees that undertake the action, loss of employment opportunities.¹³⁴

The Mackay doctrine forces an **employee** to choose to strike—at the **risk of losing the very job** that is the object of the **gains and benefits** sought— **rendering the act virtually useless.**¹³⁵ The **threat of being permanently replaced has, in fact, discouraged workers from exercising their ‘right’ to strike.**¹³⁶

Application of the Mackay doctrine produces results that are inconsistent with the NLRA’s provisions regarding protected activity, making the diminution of protection for striking employees even more apparent. In recognizing an **employer right to hire permanent replacements**, the Mackay Court created a **loophole** for employers who otherwise are **prohibited from firing striking employees** under the Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, **which proscribes retaliation against employees that engage in protected union activity.**¹³⁷ While the act of **permanently replacing strikers is lawful**, firing strikers is **unlawful**, although both acts **produce the same result: loss of a job as a consequence of striking.**¹³⁸ The **result renders the NLRA’s protections for striking workers a dead letter.** Although employers have a duty to refrain from **retaliation against workers engaged in union activity in the form of firing**, **employers do not have a duty to refrain from reaching the same result through a different tactic—permanent replacement.**¹³⁹ Thus, this removal of a duty to refrain from interference renders the ‘right’ to strike, an unprotected ‘freedom’ to strike that yields to an employer’s corresponding freedom to replace strikers.¹⁴⁰ In other words, the Mackay doctrine preserves the NLRA Section 13 reference to strike action as a lawful recourse for workers, but not one afforded the status of a protected right.

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1] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.

Gregory Fernando **Pappas 16** [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).¹⁸ What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are concerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical **inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are.** Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revision of our theories. **Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or**

diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its

causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his *Logic*, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical practice, one that they both use to make their points.¹⁹ The doctor’s starting point is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or problematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”²⁰ The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solutions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to suggest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”²¹¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their conceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doctor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something individualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contextualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”²² Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her inquiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s characterization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the illness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and

hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. **To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem;** as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ **Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point** rather than a diagnosis of the problem **is an important** and useful imperative for nonideal theories. **It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem.** These operations are instrumental to its ame-

lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, **our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice.** The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

2] We win precision- Governments have a unique responsibility for consequences.

Enoch 07 – David. “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State” The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 9-13-2007. Published by: Legal Theory.

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. **Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance.**

This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, **individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may.** But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.⁴⁴ **In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken.** Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient **a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients** (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), **but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended.** When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable.

Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):⁴⁶ perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of **states and governments.** They **have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.**⁴⁷

States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

3] Extinction outweighs under any framework

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World" Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact

try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we're

consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to

save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well.

There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk is easily the most**

important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are **so many**

people who could exist in the future – there are **trillions upon trillions**... upon trillions.

There are so many possible future people that **reducing existential risk is arguably the most**

important thing in the world, **even if the well-being of these possible people were given**

only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there's nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there's a good chance that many

existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives.

You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is

irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there's more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the

view that the latter don't matter. Even John Rawls wrote, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy."

Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with

promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They'd thus imply very strong reasons to reduce

existential risk, at least when this doesn't significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one's character. What's even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial "point of view of the universe," indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply**

strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one's own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don't care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). **To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be**

paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a

ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available [here](#)) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters**, it is at least arguable that, **from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, **all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of *On What Matters*)

5] Scenario analysis valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs epistemic biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” *International Studies Perspectives* 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? **Scenario analysis** is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company

Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis **is thus typically seen as serving** the purposes of corporate planning or as a **policy** tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to** these uses. **This** section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC

were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of **juxtaposing current trends** in unexpected combinations in order **to** articulate

surprising and **yet plausible** futures, often referred to as **“alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.⁴ As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the

latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make**

scenario analysis particularly **useful** for policymaking.⁵ Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in

often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine** let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm

is constrained by their **existing mental models and** maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known **cognitive bias**

tendencies, such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of **scenarios** lies in their ability to **help individuals break**

out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.

Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to **envision and thereby adapt to something** altogether

different from the known **present**. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.⁶ The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.⁷ Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.⁸ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC

UV

Research/Clash Module

A] Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose their current positions either on open source or cites 30 minutes before the round start time.

B] Violation: My opponent hasn't posted cites: I can provide screen shots if necessary.

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Ardsley Khitrov Neg

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Rounds
Round Reports

| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
|--------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------|-------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Glenbrooks | 1 | invalid | invalid | ✓ | | | |
| JW Patterson | 1 | Harvard-Westlake AT | Woodall, Lauren | ✓ | | | |


Cites


Expand/Collapse All

| Entry | Date |
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| ▼ Contact | 11/20/21 |
| ▼ Invalid | 10/8/21 |

Open Source



| Filename | Date | Uploaded By | Delete |
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| Ardsley-Khitrov-Neg-JW Patterson-Round1.pdf | 10/8/21 | zafirsayyed@gmailcom | |

R4 

 **Raghav Gopalakrishnan** <goraghav2005@gmail.com>
to kkhistrov06 ▾

10:36 AM (11 minutes ago) ☆ ↩ ⋮

Do you disclose your Negs?

 Reply  Forward

C] Prefer-

1] Research – disclosure increases research and gets rid of anti-educational arguments because debaters are forced to prepare cases knowing that people will have answers AND people get the opportunity to research answers to disclosed cases.

Nails 13 - (Jacob I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012.) "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)"

<http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/>) GHS//GB

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that **the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides.** First, **disclosure streamlines research.** Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, **the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of.** Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. **The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information [this] could trade off with quantity.** If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one's own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of **disclosure is that it motivates research.** **Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it.** Likewise, **debaters with access to their opponents' cases can do more targeted and specific research.** Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and advocacies employed by **other debaters.** The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there's little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, **disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student's cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed.** In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, **disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments.** I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. **If [theory spikes] these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies.** A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that **debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they're getting into prior to the round.** The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren't likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I've learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. **Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation.** That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the "better debaters" in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn't incentivize better debating.

2] Clash – Disclosure is the best method for increasing clash in debates because it allows debaters to substantively engage positions rather than relying on sketchy tricks to avoid the discussion. It also allows for more specific clash because debaters can see specific arguments disclosed instead of trying to link generic arguments in.

3. Inclusion

Disclosure is key to the inclusion of small schools—the current system just favors the “big” schools who bring more students.

Bietz 10, Mike (former President of the National Debate Coaches Association: debate coach at Harvard-Westlake School in Los Angeles.) "The Case for Public Case Disclosure." May 2010.) GHS//GB

Since disclosure happens anyway, it ought to be open to all competitors regardless of the number of teammates, coaches or friends one has at any given tournament. **The current “system” is exclusionary and often makes tournaments hurtful situations. It benefits large teams who either 1) bring many kids**

to tournaments or 2) have many judges in the judging pool, both of which go hand-in-hand. Finally, open disclosure provides the academic check and peer-review of research that is common in all of academia.

This link turns any arguments they make about why disclosure helps big schools and hurts small ones.

Voters -

Fairness & Edu

No RVI - Illogical, Baiting

DTD - Abuse has happened