

Framing:

Death is bad and o/w—ontologically destroys the subject.

Paterson 1 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is **death** per se that is really the **objective evil** for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the subsequent non-participation. Rather, **death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject—it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightning strikes.**⁸⁰ The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, **independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced** in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. **Death** is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that **is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything**, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional), **that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil** for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidence of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, **death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.**⁸¹ In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that **any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue** for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.⁸²

Scenario analysis valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs epistemic biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? **Scenario analysis** is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis **is thus typically seen as serving** the purposes of corporate planning or as a **policy** tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet** scenario analysis **is not** inherently **limited to** these uses. **This** section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of **juxtaposing current trends** in unexpected combinations in order **to** articulate **surprising and yet plausible** futures, often referred to as **“alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asai 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic

planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.⁴ As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the

latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make**

scenario analysis particularly **useful** for policymaking.⁵ Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in

often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine** let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm

is constrained by their **existing mental models and** maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known **cognitive bias**

tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of **scenarios** lies in their ability to **help individuals break**

out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.

Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to **envision and thereby adapt to something** altogether

different from the known **present**. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.⁶ The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.⁷ Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.⁸ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which

these scenarios might come to pass, **participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the**

assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts **from anticipating and understanding** the pivotal junctures that arise in

international affairs.

The state should be used as a heuristic to learn from it. Its the internal link to your pessimistic activism
Zanotti 14

Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance. “Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects' relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. **Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to "rejection," "revolution," or "dispossession" to regain a pristine "freedom from all constraints" or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them.** This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Governmentality as a heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of "power," romanticizations of the "rebel" or the "the local." More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to "what happens" instead of fixations on "what ought to be."⁸³ Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine "freedom" to be regained. **Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices.** To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault "my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism."⁸⁴

Even if things can't get better, they can certainly get worse. Without engaging we leave the system to right wing politics.

Boggs 97

Boggs 97 — Carl Boggs, 1997 ("The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America," Theory & Society, Volume 26, Issue 6, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SpringerLink, p. 773-775)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here — localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology — intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: **a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation.** [end page 773]. **The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved** — perhaps even unrecognized — **only to fester more ominously** into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. **By diluting the life of common involvements, we**

negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.⁷⁴ In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.⁷⁵ This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites — an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise — or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.⁷⁵ [end page 774]¶ The historic goal of recovering politics in the Aristotelian sense, therefore, suggests nothing less than a revitalized citizenry prepared to occupy that immense expanse of public space. Extension of democratic control into every area of social life requires insurgency against the charade of normal politics, since the persistence of normal politics is just another manifestation of anti-politics. If authentic citizenship is to be forged, then information, skills, and attitudes vital to political efficacy need to flourish and be widely distributed throughout the population, without this, “consciousness transformation” is impossible, or at least politically meaningless. A debilitating problem with the culture of anti-politics, however, is that it precisely devalues those very types of information, skills, and attitudes.

Legality can deconstruct oppression and doesn't have to affirm its ethicality.

Smith 12

Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement,” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648842>)

In the debates prevalent within Native sovereignty and racial justice movements, we are often presented with two seemingly orthogonal positions – long-term revolutionary extra-legal movements or shortterm reformist legalist strategies. Short-term legal strategies are accused of investing activists within a white supremacist and settler colonial system that is incapable of significant change. Meanwhile, revolutionaries are accused of sacrificing the immediate needs of vulnerable populations for the sake of an endlessly deferred revolution. The reality of gender violence in Native communities highlights the untenability of these positions. Native women's lives are at stake now – they cannot wait for the revolution to achieve some sort of safety. At the same time, the short-term strategies often adopted to address gender violence have often increased violence in Native women's lives by buttressing the prison industrial complex and its violent logics. While this reformist versus revolutionary dichotomy suggests two radically different positions, in reality they share a common assumption: that the only way to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that that reinforce the appropriate moral statement (for instance, that the only way to address violence against Native women is through the law and to make this violence a ‘crime’). Because the US legal system is inherently immoral and colonial, however, attempts to moralise the law generally fail. It is not surprising that the response to these failures is to simply give up on pursuing legal strategies. However, the works of Derrick Bell, Christopher Leslie, and Sarah Deer, while working in completely different areas of the law, point to a different approach. We can challenge the assumption that the law will reflect our morals and instead seek to use the law for its strategic effects. In doing so, we might advocate for laws that might in fact contradict some of our morals because we recognize that the law cannot mirror our morals anyway. We might then be free to engage in a relationship with the law which would free us to change our strategies as we assess its

strategic effects. At the same time, by divesting from the morality of the law, we then will also simultaneously be free to invest in building our own forms of community accountability and justice outside the legal system. Our extra-legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial civil disobedience tactics designed to shame a system that is not capable of shame. Rather, we might focus on actually building the political power to create an alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler colonial state.

AT: Analytics

If we risk extinction there is no hope, its just game over

FIAT IS GOOD - its the internal link to scenario analysis and education which lets us imagine alternative relaties and solutions to set col

1] Pummer 15 explains aggregation is possible, even if you by that it can't always be calculable it can be boiled down to death bad, and extinction is the worst form of death.

2] Even if pain and pleasure is subjective death still outweighs since its an objective bad.

4] Patterson proves that death is the worst form of ontological violence.

You can't is/ought fallacy blum, we're binary beings its either dopamine or no dopamine, you can't make an is/ought argument about biology

Pummer 15 - Trillions of people that could exist means you have to prefer preventing extinction

PerfCon

1] you also read kant which is another old white dude that is the complete opposite of your fw 0> commodifying the ballot

Top Level:

The NC has to say that private entities aren't unjust and they haven't!

Even if states are bad, they NEED the private sector to do their dirty work for them. Double bind because a] the aff is good because it limits state violence b] it forces the state to be violent which can be used to exploit the state.

Klinger, J. M. (2018). *Rare earth frontiers: From terrestrial subsoils to lunar landscapes*. Cornell University Press. DOA 2/19/22

On November 24, 2015, US president Barack Obama signed the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, which grants US citizens the legal right to claim outer space resources and to bring civil suits against entities that pose "harmful interference" to the exercise of private property rights in outer space. Chapter 513, section 51303 states: "A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States." This legislation, which passed with bipartisan support,²⁴ is an oblique attack on the reigning res communis regime espoused in the OST and the Moon Treaty. By granting US citizens property rights, primarily over asteroid resources and secondarily over "space" resources, the legislation attempts to present itself as consistent with the very international treaty obligations it undermines. It is physically

impossible to mine rare earths for profit on the Moon or on any other body in outer space in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of the OST. **Mining obliterates a given landscape, while profiteering requires exclusive access. This is precisely why mining is so useful for extending territorial control to historically elusive places: because it quite simply, brutally, and unambiguously eliminates the possibility for other uses of the site in question.** If it is a US company, rather than a US public venture, that establishes an exclusive mining site in outer space, the geopolitical ambitions of

the United States would, in theory, be served either way. **In this case, the private sector can do the dirty work²⁵ of fulfilling the state's geopolitical agenda while the public sector provides protections and guarantees to the private sector.** But in fact, **a distinction between the public and private sector obscures more than it clarifies.** After all, many of the new space industries were founded by former state space agency personnel, and many of the most effective advocates for the privatization of space have backgrounds in both finance and government. **State promotion of the private sector in**

pursuit of lunar mining closely resembles the cases reviewed in the previous two chapters, wherein the private sector was selectively enlisted to execute the territorial agenda of the state. In this case, **the national government provides force and backing** to a risky and illegal venture in exchange for **anticipated geopolitical advantages**. This is where critical geopolitics helps us see further than conventional geopolitics. Conventional geopolitics would hold that this is simply twenty-first-century statecraft instrumentalizing

the private sector to further national interests. For the moment, this particular contrivance of a public-private divide is conceived as enabling US actors on all sides to maximize benefits and dodge international treaty obligations while they territorialize the Moon. The flaw in this reasoning is the assumption that all interests are wedded to the US national interest, so the newly empowered private sector is imagined as acting as an extension of government interests. But there is no such guarantee. Critical geopolitics, by contrast, challenges fixed notions of the state and therefore fixed notions of public and private sector interests. Private sector firms, newly empowered by the US government to sue any entity that damages their private interests in outer space, are free to contract with any paying customer regardless of their national origin or the integrity of their enterprise. With the case of the Moon, the stakes of the state's investment in private sector mining differ from those discussed in previous chapters. It is not just a matter of pursuing profit and geopolitical control, but of maintaining the status quo of the global political economy. Under the terms of the OST—to which all state actors advancing space mining are party—any mineral extracted from the Moon would have to be distributed in a way that is "to the benefit of all peoples" on Earth. To pursue lunar mining in compliance with the OST would fundamentally change the global political economy of resource production and consumption from profiteering to sharing. There is no having it both ways—the terms of the OST have made it thus. Any state or nonstate entity doing otherwise would clearly be operating with impunity

regardless of the verbal gymnastics involved in legislative attempts at the national scale to sidestep these agreements. But by insisting on a false premise of legal ambiguity at best and "chaos" at worst (Whittington 2013), **private sector actors can do the dirty work of the state, until such time that international treaties are supplanted or other parties acquiesce to violation as the new norm.** For a particular government to assert the right of its citizenry to mine resources in any particular place, and to secure for that citizenry the right to pursue

punitive legal action against any entities who interfere with the exercise of their property rights is, by definition, an assertion of sovereignty over those places, whether they are scattered across multiple celestial bodies or consolidated in one place, such as on the Moon. Such claims directly and unambiguously contradict existing international treaty obligations of the United States. The SPACE Act attempts to evade this by concluding with a Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty, elaborated in Section 403: "It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body." The United States need not assert sovereignty over an entire celestial body in order to claim a particular territory therein. After all, that is how the political geography of Earth is organized: no single state controls the entirety of the celestial body we call home, but that does not negate the sovereignty of 192 national governments over their respective territories. The verbal gymnastics of the SPACE Act do not succeed in side-stepping the OST's prohibition of assertions of national sovereignty "by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" (UN 1967, Article II). None of this is to suggest that a coherent agenda exists between the state and the private sector. Advocates of privatized space exploitation have multiple perspectives on the role of the state. Some denigrate civilian space exploration as too slow (Wingo, Spudis, and Woodcock 2009) and bogged down in bureaucracy, which inhibits the fantastic innovation potential of the private sector (Jones 2013). Others see the state as critical to securing their investments. Of the signing of the SPACE act of 2015, Eric Anderson, cofounder and cochairman of Planetary Resources, Inc. gushed: "This is the single greatest recognition of property rights in history. This legislation establishes the same supportive

framework that created the great economies of history, and will encourage the sustained development of space" (quoted in Navarro 2015). Regardless of their perspective, **private sector interlocutors are working toward capturing maximum possible support** and minimal regulatory intervention **from the public sector**. This effectively translates into massive transfers of public wealth to private hands while reducing oversight mechanisms concerning the use of that wealth. This coheres with the extensively theorized relationship between the "re-treat of the state" and the "financialization of everything" under contemporary neoliberalism. But as with other cases examined in this book, this is not simply a case of deregulation, but also of reregulation. **The proliferation of commercial space agencies represents not a retreat**

of the state per se, but rather a reconfiguration of state functions to support a program of redistributing public assets into the private sector in the name of beating a bogeyman from the East. **the government should focus on its role as enabler.** (Whitehorn 2005).

Indeed, the most vociferous political, public, and legal opinion holds that the private sector should lead the way, and that **the government should focus on its role as enabler.** (Whitehorn 2005). This is overwhelmingly compatible with the US government's approach since the end of the Cold War (United States House of Representatives 1998).

Line by Line:

1] On Paperson 17 - think intuitively, our options become either using the state to change it, or outright rejecting it. If the end goal is rights, then use legal measures.

2] Rifkin 14 - a] Even if native americans are being ontologically eliminated, death still outweighs, in the status quo its not genocide. B] using the state as a heuristic and strategies such as extra

3] On Grande 18 - a] Death is ontologically prerequisite, if we're all dead then nothing matters b]

On the Alt - No way your form of pess can ever solve for material conditions, the very notions of an alt or to claim that abolition is possible link turns the cruel optimism. It puts you in a double bind a] either progress is possible which means your method collapses to mine or b] its not and your being cruelly optimistic