# 1NC vs K Aff

## 1NC---OFF

#### The role of the judge and ballot is to endorse the better debater -- anything else is arbitrary and self-serving and is poor scholarship in a competitive space.

#### Interp: The affirmative must only garner offense off of the consequences of hypothetical policy implementation of the resolution: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. To clarify, affs cannot be extra-T.

#### Violation:

#### 1] Garnering offense from form implies their speech act is an advocacy. CX proves and hold the line – at best, they’re Extra-T which still links to our predictability offense.

#### 2] The 2nd card pretty clearly indicts debate and the entirety of the 1AC is about rhetoric NOT consequences. If I read a DA, they’d claim performative offense.

#### 3] The aff affirms rhetorical decolonization within member states – the topic pretty clearly doesn’t say anything about decol

#### Vote neg—

#### 1] Predictable limits – not affirming the resolution makes debate impossible because they get to affirm anything – literally thousands of aff. Their interp incentivizes affirming uncontestable statements like “2+2=4” or “racism bad” and the lack of a stable mechanism means they can always de-link from the few responsive generics.

#### 2] Strategy skew – the aff is incentivized to solve any disad if they can go beyond a topical action

#### Voter for Dogmatism— impeding on neg ground prevents detailed strategies that test the aff – they create echo chambers that function in existing structural privilege and defers to whoever’s in power without self-questioning and refinement of strategies—turns the aff. It’s key to produce better debaters who challenge hierarchies.

#### 3] TVAs: There’s a bio colonialism aff for goodness sake – affirm ending IP that derives medicines from indigenous knowledge.

#### It's okay if this doesn't solve their offense—the disads to the TVA are neg ground. This teaches debaters to work within imperfect situations for marginal gains, and forces them to refine their arguments round to round which hijacks their survival arguments.

#### T is drop the debater and competing interps—

#### The round has been irreparably skewed—I had to read T in order to engage the aff and that altered allocation on other issues which means you risk making the incorrect decision on substance especially if they don’t read a counter interp for debate

#### It’s an indict of their advocacy—they don’t defend topical action so if I win T their entire advocacy goes away and you have to default neg

## 1NC --- OFF

#### Unchecked capitalist expansion guarantees escalating global violence and destruction – their politics of individualized micro-practices fractures the necessary political condensation required to overthrow capital while the alt solves case.

Jodi Dean 15, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2015, “Red, Black, and Green,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 396-404

A defining characteristic of capitalism is the differentiation between state and economy.2 More than an economic system for the production and circulation of value, capitalism refers to a form of society (Marx 2008, 14). In contrast with, say, feudalism, capitalist society relies on the differentiation of the economic system from the political system. That state and economy are differentiated does not mean that they are separate from one another. States are deeply involved in economic life: they issue and maintain currencies, create and preserve property and markets, devise and extend the policy infrastructure of global trade, and so on. The differentiation between state and economy also does not imply complete independence, as if states themselves were not economic actors with, for example, massive purchasing, employing, and investing power. Rather, under capitalism the differentiation between state and economy points to different relations to capital accumulation, with the state focused generally on the terms and conditions of accumulation and the economy focused on the circulatory processes of accumulation itself. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012, 4) speak of the “relative autonomy” of capitalist states. Political logics, rationalities, or governmentalities (to use Foucault’s term) are irreducible to economic considerations. Capitalist states have capacities to act on behalf of the system as a whole—capacities anchored in an array of institutions, laws, and policies. At the same time, they are constrained by their dependence on capital accumulation. States secure and reproduce capitalism, whether by protecting capitalists from themselves through taxes and regulatory oversight, protecting capitalists from the people through aggressive policing and surveillance, or protecting people from capitalists in those increasingly frequent emergency responses that have taken the place of planning and social welfare. The state—particularly in its contemporary extended, decentralized, and networked form—gives capitalism its durability. It responds to capitalism’s inevitable crises, keeping the system running even when its components break down. Under globalized capitalism, an international policy architecture aimed at securing capital flow provides massive advantages to multinational banks and corporations. The structural adjustment policies and austerity measures imposed by the IMF, World Bank, European Central Bank, and U.S. Treasury determine (although not fully or exclusively) the lives of billions of people, impacting basic social structures such as education and medical care, property, markets for agricultural products, transportation, currency value, energy, and the availability of potable water. The viability of communism, as an egalitarian political and economic arrangement anchored in the sovereignty of the people and in production based on need, depends on seizing, dismantling, or redirecting this system. Naomi Klein (2014, 66–9) tells a story that illustrates the limits the global trade architecture imposes on local actors. In 2009, the Canadian province of Ontario announced the Green Energy and Green Economy Act. Its goal was to shift Ontario away from dependence on coal. As Klein explains, “The legislation created what is known as a feed-in tariff program, which allowed renewable energy providers to sell power back to the grid.” A key element of the plan was ensuring that “local municipalities, co-ops, and Indigenous communities could all get into the renewable energy market” (67). This was to be achieved by a provision requiring that a certain percentage of materials and workforce come from Ontario. Although there were various setbacks and complications, after several years the legislation seemed to have been largely successful. That’s when Japan and the EU went to the World Bank with the complaint that the local materials and workforce requirement discriminated against equipment producers outside Ontario. The World Bank agreed; the buy local provisions were illegal. The absence of a powerful Left enables the political Right (in part by shifting what had been the center). The intensified inequality of the last forty years of neoliberalism testifies to the impact of left political defeat.3 Neoliberalism’s subjection of all of society to its economic criteria of efficiency and competitiveness has been carried out as a political project.4 The political system has been the instrument through which neoliberalism has dismantled the achievements of the welfare state, installed competition in ever more domains, expanded the finance sector, and imposed austerity. This is the setting, then, for my appeal to the Left to assemble itself into a party. Key determinants of our lives occur behind our backs—currency valuations, monetary policies, trade agreements, energy concessions, data harvesting. To insist on a politics focused on isolating and archiving singular micropractices abstracted from their global capitalist context obscures the workings of state and economy as a capitalist system, hinders the identification of this system as the site of ongoing harm (exploitation, expropriation, and injustice), and disperses political energies that could be more effective if concentrated. More fundamentally, in treating economic practices as the primary locus of left politics, such an insistence effaces the gap between politics and economics such that questions of strategy, of how to win, are displaced. Morrow and Brault supply a striking example of this effacement when they ask, “What is communism for, if not to improve our everyday lives?” Communism, which previous generations rendered as the world-historical struggle of the proletariat, diminishes into yet another option for individual self-improvement; the abolition of exploitation, expropriation, and injustice replaced by economic determinations of immediate satisfaction. As Ramsey rightly notes, Healy similarly substitutes economic alternatives for political antagonism. Two ideas voiced in the present discussion impress the urgency of the need for a left party oriented toward communism: racism (Buck 2015) and the Anthropocene (Healy 2015). Given anthropogenic climate change, the stakes of contemporary politics are almost unimaginably high. They range from the continued investment in extractive industries and fossil fuels constitutive of the carbon-combustion complex (see Oreskes and Conway 2014), to the dislocations accompanying mass migration in the wake of floods and droughts to the racist response of states outside what Christian Parenti (2011, 9) calls the “Tropic of Chaos” (the band around the “belt of economically and politically battered post-colonial states girding the planet’s mid-latitudes,” where climate change is “beginning to hit hard”), all the way to human extinction. That one city, state, or country brings carbon emissions under control—while certainly a step in the right direction—may be irrelevant from the standpoint of overall warming. Perhaps its carbon-emitting industries were shipped elsewhere. Perhaps another country chose to expand its own drilling operations. Climate change forces us to acknowledge that we can’t build new worlds (Helepololei). We live in one world, the heating up of which threatens humans and other species. Not all communities, economies, or ways of life are compatible. Those premised on industries and practices that continue to contribute to planetary warming have to change significantly, and soon. Forcing that change is the political challenge of our time. Given the persistence of racialized violence and the operation of the state as an instrument for the maintenance not only of capitalist modes of production but also and concomitantly of racialized hierarchy, the challenges of organizing politically across issues and identities are almost insurmountably daunting. No wonder the Left resorts to moralism and self-care instead. It’s easier to catalog difference than it is to build up a Left strong enough to exercise power, especially given the traversal of state power by transnational corporations, trade, and treaties. It’s also easier to go along with the dominant ideology of individualism, which enjoins us first and foremost to look after ourselves, than it is to put ourselves aside and focus on formulating a strategy for using collective power to occupy, reconfigure, and redirect institutions at multiple levels. Here again, not every vision of community is compatible with every other. Those premised on fantasies of racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic purity directly oppose those premised on diversity. Those premised on reproducing structures of class hierarchy directly oppose those insisting on equality. If something like a party of the radical Left can stretch beyond Greece and Spain, if it can be imagined in North America, it will only be possible as a combination of communism, antiracism, and climate activism. I use “red, black, and green” as a heuristic for the coalition of concerns necessary for such a party. I invoke the heuristic here to double down against critics who prefer a thousand alternatives to the party form. A thousand alternatives (see Healy 2015) is no alternative. It leaves the political system we have—the one that puts all its force behind the preservation of capitalist class interests—intact. Some ideas need to be chosen, systematized into a program, and defended.

#### The aff’s analytic reduces the nuance of class differences and collapses the racial cap complexities to a settler/indigenous binary which fractures solidarity

Bhandar and Ziadah 16 Brenna BHANDAR, senior lecturer @ SOAS, AND Rafeef ZIADAH, postdoc @ SOAS, 2016 “Acts and Omissions: Framing Settler Colonialism in Palestine Studies,” Jadaliyya, January 14, 2016

The forging of a new academic field of settler colonial studies risks potentially creating unnecessary binaries between studies of colonialism and settler-colonialism. It is clear that techniques of colonial dispossession traveled throughout networks of trade and leisure established during and throughout the British Empire. Such tools include the surveillance and criminalization of colonized populations, land appropriation, resource extraction, the perversion or indeed, attempted erasure, of native legal systems, and control over the mobility and political citizenship of colonized populations. English colonial administrators and freelance entrepreneurs traveled, during the nineteenth century, between the Indian subcontinent, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Caribbean, the United States, the African continent, and of course the United Kingdom. They imported and exported the legal and political infrastructures required for colonial modes of expropriation. With the advent of the Mandate system, Palestine became another scene of exchange and implementation of European colonial modes of governance tested elsewhere. While many scholars have revealed the formative influence of European models of nationalism and colonial ideology on early Zionist movements (Raz-Krakotzkin 2007; Lloyd 2012), the detailed work of excavating the way in which the political and legal techniques of dispossession travelled between different colonial sites remains underexplored. (Although see Lowe, 2014 an Saldaña-Portillo 2016 for exemplary exceptions to this claim).

Another binary inherent to the settler colonial analytic is that between the colonizer and colonized. While adopting a settler colonial framework is critical to analyzing Israel’s modus operandi as a colonial power, there is a need to contextualize Israel’s settler colonial project within the particular class and racial differences inside Israel and amongst Palestinians. Ella Shohat’s critical work on the racial hierarchy within Israel’s settler society is a strong example that highlights the historical marginalization of the Mizrahim, Jews of Arab origin. Racialized immigrants occupy both the position of settler in relation to Indigenous communities and the subaltern in relation to the dominant place of the white European settler. Some scholars in North America, and particularly in Hawai’i have grasped how the racialization of particular immigrant communities in settler states complicates the settler colonial framework.

On the other hand, a settler colonial framework must also contend with the emerging class differences in Palestinian society exacerbated by the impact of the Oslo Accords. This is especially relevant when contending with the question of how Palestinians can challenge the logic of the Oslo process while the Palestinian Authority, adhering to a fundamental neoliberal agenda (Hanieh 2013), remains intact. The Palestinian Authority continues to formulate Palestinian liberation in terms of truncated statehood on small sections of Palestinian land and celebrates symbolic acts such as raising the Palestinian flag at the United Nations while prospects of Palestinian sovereignty over land continue to diminish daily. Sadly, the PA’s focus continues to be building a neoliberal state apparatus as a way to “convince” Israel and international donors that Palestinians are able to run their affairs. For all intents and purposes, Israel has succeeded in outsourcing its military occupation to a segment of Palestinians - this is evident in the relatively large budgets of the security forces of the PA and the continued security coordination with Israel. In our view, such differences within both the settler society and the colonized need to be brought out and fully incorporated into the settler colonial analytical framework.

Racially inscribed dispossession and the capitalist modes of accumulation that subtend expropriative practices have developed in spatially and temporally differentiated ways in the colonies, as elaborated by scores of post-colonial theorists. In other words, capitalist development in the colonies has not mirrored the transition from feudal economies to capitalist ones in Europe. The terms “postcolonial capitalism” and “racial capitalism” both denote ways of understanding capitalist forms of dispossession that profit from, and reinforce class hierarchies, patriarchal formations, and racist ideologies lodged in colonial imaginaries that persist into the present. These terms do not neatly fit into a settler-colonial framework and yet are critical to understanding the political-economic, juridical and social complexities across various sites of inquiry. Forcing them into a single analytical category risks losing this richness and undermining forms of political solidarity across colonized spaces.

Darwish’s masterful poem, “The Red Indian’s Penultimate Speech to the White Man” begins with an epigram from the Duwamish Chief Seattle. The dispossession of native land that Columbus’ ill-fated voyage inaugurated, binds together the fates of Native Americans and Palestinians, who resist colonial dominance over land, time, history, memory, and place. As Chief Seattle asserts, “there is no Death here, there is only the change of worlds.” We in turn are looking for our own counter-narration, a language to explain the ongoing violence of dispossession in multiple contexts. We are reminded of the words of Mike Krebs and Dana Olwan:

We want to build solidarity without reproducing and enacting the same colonial logics and asymmetric relationships of power on which settler colonialisms hinge. We believe that our futures are connected and that we are especially powerful when we enact solidarity by words and actions. To expect solidarity, we must be willing to give it, share it, and maintain it. To do otherwise is to risk producing solidarity on the very colonial terms that our movements seek to challenge and undo.

#### The grouping of indigenous groups with land justifies romantic myths about cultural identities that provoke militarization and scapegoating – they foreclose the globe as a common where no identity is entitled to land

**Dean 15** [Jodi, Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “This Changes Some Things,” March 17. 2015, Politics, Theory, Action, <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2015/03/this-changes-some-things.html>]

The second problem is Klein's association of communities with indigeneity and land. Klein writes, "communities with strong ties to the land have always, and will always, defend themselves against businesses that threaten their ways of life" (309). Here again she denies division, as if everyone in a community agreed on what constituted a threat, as if they were all similarly situated against a threat, as if they were never too deluded, tired, or exploited to defend themselves, as if they could never themselves constitute a threat to themselves. Cities, towns, states, and regions make bad decisions all the time; they stimulate industries that destroy them. Klein, though, has something else in mind, "a ferocious love" that "no amount of money can extinguish." She associates this love "with an identity, a culture, a beloved place that people are determined to pass on to their grandchildren, and that their ancestors may have paid for with great sacrifice." She continues, "And though this kind of connection to place is surely strongest in Indigenous communities where the ties to the land go back thousands of years, it is in fact Blockadia's defining feature" (342). Participants in my seminar found this description racist or fascist. Even though this is not Klein's intent, her rhetoric deploys a set of myths regarding nature, and some people's relation to nature, that make some people closer to nature (and further from civilization) than others. It also justifies an intense defense of blood and soil on the part of one group's attachment to a place such that others become foreign, invaders, rightly excluded as threats to our way of life, our cultural identity. Given that climate change is already leading to increased migration and immigration and that the US and Europe are already responding by militarizing borders, a language of cultural defense and ties to the land is exactly what we don't need in a global movement for climate justice. Klein's argument, though, gets worse as it juxtaposes indigenous people's love of place with the "extreme rootlessness" of the fossil fuel workforce. These "highly mobile" pipefitters, miners, engineers, and big rig drivers produce a culture of transience, even when they "may stay for decades and raise their kids" in a place. The language of rootless echoes with descriptions of cosmopolitan Jews, intellectuals, and communists. Some are always foreign elements threatening our way of life. In contrast, I imagine climate politics as breaking the link between place and identity. To address climate change, we have to treat the world itself as a commons and build institutions adequate to the task of managing it. I don't have a clear idea as to what these institutions would look like. But the idea that no one is entitled to any place seems better to me as an ethos for a red-green coalition. It requires us to be accountable to every place.

#### Vote negative to affirm the form of the party. The method of the Party is distinct and exclusive with the method of the 1AC – a negative ballot foregrounds political organization and commonality against capital

Dean and Mertz 16 (Jodi Dean, Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Chuck Mertz, Host at This is Hell!, The JFRP: For a New Communist Party, aNtiDoTe Zine, Jan 23 2016)

* Political good – create change
* AT Party Racist
* Individualism bad – trades off with collective solidarity
* BPP, activist groups, occupy, red square, labor strikes
* AT Communism Failed

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to **take over** part of **government**. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as **something to seize**.¶ The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the **political process is so corrupted** that we have to **completely refuse it,** and leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and **disperse** and **become fragmented**.¶ CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the **collective** action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn.¶ Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s **just what a party** **does**, why not make a party that is not repressive and **does not exclude or diminish** people on the basis of **sex, race, or sexuality**?¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think that’s just a capitalist **sellout**. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all.¶ CM: So does identity politics **undermine collectivism**? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it **too much about identity** rather than as an element in **building collective solidarity**.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?”¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: We can think about the **Black Panther Party** as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to **galvanize social power**. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ Or we can think about parties in terms of **local elections**. **Socialist Alternative** has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about **local and regional elections**.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case.¶ And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. **That has to change**. **We don’t need** that kind of **sectarian purity** right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and **horizontalism**, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with **each individual, their interests,** their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized.¶ I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a **liberal assumption**. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that **politics begins in** **groups**. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. **Class** is what **determines** where our **political interests** come from.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist **Party** again as a **force**—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a **new radical left party**.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is **overthrowing capitalism**. The goal is being able to **build a communist society** as capitalism crumbles.¶ Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were **never really communist**—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that **state socialism made these mistakes**, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to **use the power** that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count.¶ But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party.¶ I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be **more tactical**. How do we **use the tools we** **have**, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the stupid myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the **collectivity of us against them.** It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

## Case

### Presumption

#### Solvency –

#### Voting affirmative doesn’t spill over or scale up – your politics are constrained within the round so you should presume neg if they don’t do anything materially – they haven’t answered the question of why vote aff

#### If the aff argues their speech act is valuable, the impacts should have been actualized in the round already – no unique reason you should get the ballot, the aff’s just an FYI

#### Inherency –

#### People read performances all the time but nothing changes – just another argument that doesn’t change anything about the structure of debate or how individuals in this space engage with each other

#### You’ve also read this aff before and no structural change has occurred

#### Don’t let them weigh the performance of the aff – they should only be able to weigh the consequences of the advocacy text. None of our args tell them to not read something

### Method

#### The aff groups settlers with communities of color – that is a form of distraction politics that perpetuates settlerist thought—the endpoint of their advocacy is the cultivation of settlers of color. Tuck and Yang 12

Eve Tuck SUNY-New Paltz, and K. Wayne Yang, UC-San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 (2012): 1-40, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630/15554> // JPark

The impossibility of fully becoming a white settler - in this case, white referring to an exceptionalized position with assumed rights to invulnerability and legal supremacy - as articulated by minority literature preoccupied with “glass ceilings” and “forever foreign” status and “myth of the model minority”, offers a strong critique of the myth of the democratic nation- state. However, its logical endpoint, the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism. Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler. For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not. “Following stolen resources” is a phrase that Wayne has encountered, used to describe Filipino overseas labor (over 10% of the population of the Philippines is working abroad) and other migrations from colony to metropole. This phrase is an important anti-colonial framing of a colonial situation. However an anti-colonial critique is not the same as a decolonizing framework; anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole. This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land. Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject. Equivocation is the vague equating of colonialisms that erases the sweeping scope of land as the basis of wealth, power, law in settler nation-states. Vocalizing a ‘muliticultural’ approach to oppressions, or remaining silent on settler colonialism while talking about colonialisms, or tacking on a gesture towards Indigenous people without addressing Indigenous sovereignty or rights, or forwarding a thesis on decolonization without regard to unsettling/deoccupying land, are equivocations. That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority / people of color / colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.

#### Specifically, the Vats 15 ev – i’ll insert a link

As CRT scholars from Richard Delgado to Keith Aoki contend, telling stories in legal contexts shifts the purportedly race neutral language, representations, and emotions around which law is crafted, in ways that are invisible and seemingly unproductive but important. The Love Symbol, Beast Mode®, and the TKDL make claims of inclusion alongside radical claims to dignity and humanity, which are effective even though (intellectual) property law continues to be rigged against people of color. Telling legal stories about the personhood of people of color in intellectual property terms pushes back against the foundational racism and racial sentimentality of copyrights, patents, and trademarks. These examples provide a useful starting point for thinking about how people of color can become intellectual property fugitives, thereby confronting the two-body problem that Stephen Best notes arose with the decoupling of physical labor and intangible labor. Such decoupling transformed people of color, particularly Black people, into commodity forms that, because they were the objects of property ownership, definitionally could not own their own intangible labor. The Love Symbol, Beast Mode, and the TKDL refuse this decoupling, by occupying and reclaiming the spirit of fugitivity. That occupation is a decolonizing move, which begins a long, arduous process of delinking intellectual property from modernity/coloniality and its implications. Returning to Best’s analysis of the relationship between the fugitive and embodiment—specifically that Fugitive Slave Laws gave rise to a two-body problem that allowed whites to treat Black people as “living property”— creates a bridge to a new and productive rereading of fugitivity, a concept that can be occupied to create a radical approach to intellectual property politics. Fred Moten, before defining the same term, asks, “How do we think the possibility and the law of outlawed, impossible things?” 41 He responds to that inquiry by writing on fugitivity as a resistive concept, practice, and mode of being: This fugitive movement is stolen life, and its relation is reducible neither to simple interdiction nor bare transgression. What can be attained in this zone of unattainability . . . is some sense of the fugitive law of movement of black social life ungovernable, that demands a para-ontological of the supposed connection between explanation and resistance. 42 Harney and Moten’s conception of fugitivity describes a “stolen life,” 43 in which anti-racist and anti-colonialist scholars and activists “do not come to pay their debts, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone.” 44 Harney and Moten continue: We cannot be satisfied with the recognition and acknowledgement generated by the very system that denies (a) that anything was ever broken and (b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for recognition and instead we want to take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls . . . once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming. 45 The intellectual property fugitive, a figure I have sketched out through the examples in the previous chapter, engages law with the knowledge that intellectual property law can never be effectively reformed, even if it periodically benefits people of color, because it is too deeply intertwined with racism and racial capitalism to be redeemable. Moreover, the intellectual property fugitive performs radical resistance to copyright, patent, and trademark regimes that are mired in national identity, citizenship, and racial capitalism through consistent acts that “tear down the structure.” The goal of the intellectual property fugitive is not only a series of policy proposals to tinker with intellectual property law but a hegemonic commitment to constant critique, particularly storytelling that rescripts racial formations, remakes racial feelings, and creates possibilities for more spacious conceptions of belonging, in knowledge and human cultures. Mat Callahan, in an article titled “Why Intellectual Property? Why Now?” writes: Under these conditions, capitalist interests view IP not merely as an opportunity to seek profit, but more fundamentally as the underpinning of a global regime, especially the trade treaties and international agreements that dictate the flow of all goods and services be they material or intellectual. Indeed, the threat many movements pose . . . is not primarily one of piracy or “theft” of the intellectual property of one corporation or another; rather, the threat is to the foundation of private property and the ownership of ideas as a conceptual framework for law or governance of any kind. In other words, within any and every conflict revolving around IP are the core principles of capitalism: possessive individualism, private appropriation of public wealth—especially natural resources—and the despoiling or destruction of the commons. Thus, what makes IP a vital battlefront for our time is that the stakes are capitalist enslavement or human liberation. 46 Though Callahan focuses on the issue of economics, he does not discuss the issue of race, which also underpins contemporary systems of intellectual property law. Specifically, race and economics are intertwined in ways that guarantee the valuation of particular kinds of ideas with particular kinds of owners. Reimagining creatorship, infringement, citizenship, nation, and personhood in intellectual property law requires answering fundamental and pressing questions about race and capitalism. Those questions will become increasingly important in coming years, as intellectual property becomes an even more central space for the negotiation of economics, politics, and humanness. For Harney and Moten, fugitivity as concept is adversarial toward state-based policy reforms as the ultimate mechanisms for producing equality. White supremacy guarantees failure as well as ontological collusion with a racist system invested in destroying people of color. Given that intellectual properties are legally constructed through domestic and international institutional action, the knee-jerk response is to intervene legally. Unlike Harney and Moten, I do not conclude with the notion that individuals can never ask for inclusion or recognition within the state. Rather, I understand fugitivity, particularly when read alongside decoloniality, as metaphorical shorthand for the need for constant vigilance about the underlying racial investments of the state and publics as well as an epistemological break with the seductive forces of law, even when they seem appealing. Letting go of the illusion that, as Bell counsels, law can bring radical change and embracing, instead, that legal gains are frequently rolled back partially or completely, leaves space for committing to continuing anti-racist and anticolonial struggle. The legal and performative aspects of engaging in that struggle, which come in a variety of individual and institutional forms, are the path to treating people of color not as objects decoupled from their creativity and innovation, but as whole persons with dignity, humanity, and the capacity to occupy the category of creatorship in all its pluriversal forms.

#### The aff is privileged handwashing – the fact that their advocacy is only about them but posited as a way to break down the structural category of Model Minority is a settler move to innocence that attempts to relieve settler guilt and naturalize them as a good, ethical subject.

“endorse my cold and bracing failure”

1AC osajima – “a world dynamically ‘in the making” – logic of settler colonizliasm about how the world is always changing

Eve Tuck SUNY-New Paltz, and K. Wayne Yang, UC-San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 (2012): 1-40, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630/15554> // JPark

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.8 She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence’, “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335). Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call ‘settler moves to innocence’. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

#### The 1AC is methodological ventrilioquism – academic spaces speak for the indigenous and decide what’s in their interest.

**Tuck and Yang write:** Tuck, Eve and Wayne, K. Yang Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, SUNY New Paltz and Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego “R-Words: Refusing Research” *Humanizing Research*. 2014. RP

**One major colonial task** of social science research that has emerged **is to pose as voicebox, ventriloquist, interpreter** of subaltern voice. Gayatri Spivak’s impor- tant monograph, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (2010), is a foundational text in post- colonial studies, prompting a variety of scholarly responses, spin-offs, and counterquestions, including *does* the subaltern speak? Can the colonizer/settler *listen*? Can the subaltern *be heard*? Can the subaltern *act*? In our view, Spivak’s question in the monograph, said more transparently, is *can the subaltern speak in/ to the academy*? Our reading of the essay prompts our own duet of questions, which we move in and out of in this essay: *What does the academy do? What does social science research do?* Though one might approach these questions empiri- cally, we emphasize the usefulness of engaging these questions pedagogically; that is, posing the question not just to determine the answer, but because the rich con- versations that will lead to an answer are meaningful. The question—What does or can research do?—is not a cynical question, but one that tries to understand more about research as a human activity. The question is similar to questions we might ask of other human activities, such as, why do we work? Why do we dance? Why do we do ceremony? At first, the responses might be very pragmatic, but they give way to more philosophical reflections. Returning to Spivak’s question, in *Can the Subaltern Speak?* Spivak casts Foucault and Deleuze as “hegemonic radicals” (2010, p. 23) who unwittingly align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideo- logy with a continuistic “unconscious” or a parasubjective “culture” . . . . In the name of desire, they tacitly reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power . . . (pp. 26–27) **Observing Foucault and Deleuze’s almost romantic admiration for the “real- ity” of the factory, the school**, the barracks, the prison, the police station, and their insistence that **the masses know these** (more) real **realities** perfectly well, **far better than intellectuals**, and “certainly say it very well,” (Deleuze, as cited in Spivak, 2010, p. 27), Spivak delivers this analysis: “The ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern is the left intellectual’s stock-in-trade” (2010, p. 27). Spivak critiques the position of the intellectual who is invested in the ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern for the banality of what serves as evidence of such “speech,” and for the ways in which intellectuals take opportunity to conflate the work and struggle of the subaltern with the work of the intellectual, which only serves to make more significant/authentic their own work (p. 29). All of it is part of a scheme of self-aggrandizing. Rosalind Morris, reading Spivak, criticizes nostalgia in the academy that “bears a secret valorization and hypostatization of subalternity as an identity—to be recalled, renarrated, reclaimed, and revalidated” (2010, p. 8). Subalternity is less an identity than what we might call a predicament, but this is true in a very odd sense. For, in Spivak’s definition, it is the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed. To the extent than anyone escapes the muting of subalternity, she ceases being a subaltern. Spivak says this is to be desired. And who could disagree? **There is neither authenticity** nor virtue in the position of the oppressed. There is simply (or not so simply) oppression. Even so, we are moved to wonder, in this context, what burden this places on the memory work in the aftermath of education. What kind of representation becomes available to the one who, having partially escaped the silence of subalternity, is nonetheless pos- sessed by the consciousness of having been obstructed, contained, or simply misread for so much of her life? (Morris, 2010, p. 8) **We take this burden of speaking** in/to the academy, **while being misrecognized as the speaking subaltern** or being required to ventriloquate for the subaltern, as a starting dilemma for the work of representation for decolonizing researchers. It is our sense that there is much value in working to subvert and avert the carrying out of social science research under assumptions of subalternity and authenticity, and to refuse to be a purveyor of voices constructed as such. This is the place from which we begin this essay, inside the knowledge that in the same ways that we can observe that the colonizer is constituted by the produc- tion of the Other, and Whiteness is constituted by the production of Blackness (Fanon, 1968; Said, 1978), the work of research and the researcher are constituted by the production and representation of the subaltern subject. Further, as we explore in Axiom I, representation of the subject who has “partially escaped the silence of subalternity” (Morris, 2010, p. 8) takes the shape of a pain narrative.

#### Research forces the indigenous to present themselves as weak to get white sympathy, denying agency.

**Tuck and Yang write:** Tuck, Eve and Wayne, K. Yang Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, SUNY New Paltz and Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego “R-Words: Refusing Research” *Humanizing Research*. 2014. RP

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that **educational research** and much of social science research **has been concerned with documenting damage**, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. **Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be** recorded or **proven** **in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of addi- tional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments**. Eve has described **this theory of change** as both **[is] colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated**, and because **it requires disenfranchised communities to posi- tion themselves as both singularly defective and powerless** to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” re**parations rarely become reality**, and that in many cases, **communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken.**

Passivity DA – voting for decol doesn’t actually cause decol to happen but rather lets the judge feel good about themselves as if they actually did something – vote negative to create a sense of discomfort so you’re actually motivated to fight set col

#### Implications:

#### (a) Can’t go for your discussion good or voting aff key arguments – your ability to pose the question and [Judge’s name] ability to evaluate is what is wrong in the first place also means u can’t leverage ROB to take this out, that’s a link

#### (b) Even if you win the aff it’s a question of forum you have to win why vote aff and if they don’t, presume neg. Try or die framing is violent because letting the state do whatever is the logic that justified the Trail of Tears on the risk that the Cherokees would actually get the land Andrew Jackson promised them.

#### Academic disruption locks in resilient social control that maintain contemporary neoliberalism - the impact is the absorption and harnessing of the aff’s insurgent energy into the biopolitical apparatuses of capture that sustain global oppression

Luke 15 T.W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, “On Insurrectionality: Theses on Contemporary Revolts and Resilience,” October 29, 2015, published on *Globalizations*

These theses on insurrection are only a provisional assessment. They attempt to assay certain logics of change and containment apparently at work in new radical appeals for direct action, like those made in The Coming Insurrection (2009), The Democracy Project (2013), or Two Cheers for Anarchism (2012). While these calls for upheaval are provocative, this analysis suggests one should ask to what extent the politics touted by such programmatic manifestos now are becoming, and already have been for some good while, interwoven into the existing order of power in the subtle dialectics of resilience? For months, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) activists organized public protests and teach-ins against economic and political inequality all across the USA during 2011 and 2012. Thousands joined this peaceable uprising against corporate power. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security kept it under continuous watch for terrorist intentions at its peak of popularity, but then classified it as a ‘peaceful movement' when its appeal waned. OWS popularized, and in many ways glamorized, popular resistance, but its inchoate critiques of embedded corporate and state power seem to have only made the top 1% much more resilient as the decisive social force at work in business and government. This outcome leads one to suggest that insurrectionists now are an intrinsic part of a robustly resilient social order that justifies itself, and legitimizes its own expansive controls, in part, by tolerating the possibility of constant revolts while continuously containing their impact? Also in 2011, thousands of Egyptians rose up against President Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square, toppling his government with the assistance of the nation's armed forces in less than two weeks. A new elected regime of Islamist partisans from the Muslim Brotherhood led by President Mohamed Morsi quickly was elected as well as a new constitution installed to appease the insurrection. Yet, this regime also met its own quick demise at the hands of new uprisings centered in Tahrir Square. That renewed insurrection in the streets then turned to the Egyptian military and General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to take control of the state. This complicated cycle of embedded regime collapse, and then reconstruction, could be characterized as a useful case study in ‘insurrectionality’. Like other parallel ideologies of good works, like ‘accountability’, ‘diversity’, or ‘sustainability’, the logics of insurrectionality appear to be another facet of flexible control in a new regime of resilient power. This emergent system of maintaining social order seems to mobilize disorder to generate its power and knowledge. It is affected, in part, by achieving a loose containment of insurrectionists as well as by accepting, to a degree, the legitimacy of insurrectionism as a general civil/political/social freedom, if not, a new type of right. For a world in which 85 elite rich individuals own as much wealth as one half of the entire Earth's population, and where the number of billionaires has doubled since 2008 (even as most of the 99% of world's population is floundering economically), insurrection is attractive. For too many people everywhere, their nearly insignificant existential meaning and financial net worth are at best stagnant. This lack of purpose and wealth amidst tremendous affluence is associated with their growing sense of anomie, disempowerment, and impoverishment. Insurrectionality, then, can flare up here in all of the conflicted complementarities crackling between their frustrated aspirations and growing hopelessness (Baudrillard, 1996). The widespread outbreaks of insurrectionist political movements in open defiance of today's dominant economic and social order perhaps are a defining quality at this juncture in history. From the ‘Arab Spring' uprisings, to the ‘color revolutions' in Eastern Europe, to the worldwide ‘Occupy' movements, to numerous attacks of pre-mediated violent terrorist action, this new politics of insurrection has been unfolding rapidly during the twenty-first century (Graeber, 2013). In some instances, these movements often appear to be quite radical, but also not necessarily progressive. They seem very popular, but not always seeking emancipation for all people. They have political complaints, but also have not usually pursued conventional governmental means of redress within the workings of modern state structures as they stand (Dussel, 1985). Most distinctively, despite the open, and quite often aggressive, defiance of these insurrectional movements there is little transformation coming from their activities. Such discontinuities raise questions: do insurrections pose significant challenges to the existing social order, have they taken different epistemic or ethical positions that put them in complete opposition to prevailing systemic authority, and do their insurrections challenge conventional humanist conventions of secular, statal, and social identity (Elden, 2007)? Working to advance some provisional responses here to these fascinating developments could cast new light on how contemporary insurrections, and systemic transformations that they profess to pursue, are either closely connected or completely contradictory historical changes that appear to have very low probabilities of success no matter how intensely their supporters push for them. Insurrection is an old word, and one whose meaning resonates across time and space from its Latin origins in the notion ‘insurgere' to ascend, rise up or rebel. Close to the idea of insurgency, insurrection also implies being mutinous, rebellious, or revolutionary in open acts of rebellion against civil authority, ruling elites, or government power. To be insurrectional, or incite insurrection, and rise up, as an insurrectionist does not imply, however, that those who rise in rebellion necessarily will continue to stay up or succeed in their would-be ascension to power (Bartelson, 1995; Giddens, 1985). Consequently, insurrection can be seen as some latent potentiality, a quality of being at readiness for, an instance of launching into, or a need for rising up, which allows one to discuss simultaneously the intermittent emergence and persistent embeddedness of insurrectionality as a crucial characteristic in the governance of contemporary life (Luke, 2012). As Miller and Rose (2008, p. 149) claim. the emergence of professionals in the conduct of conduct, professionals whose expertise lies in the shaping of this self-steering mechanism of others in relation to certain norms grounded in positive knowledge, may be seen as a decisive event in the exercise of authority. Therefore, one must pay heed to the management of insurrectionality by expert professionals. It follows fresh scripts in which less rigid and resilient forms of authority become exercised via the machinic unconsciousness imprinted in the assemblages of everyday life (Guattari, 2011). One wonders how protests against debt, unemployment, and dispossession in America's contemporary capitalist economy are, in fact, a strategic mediation of ‘a government of “each and all”, evincing a concern for every individual and the population as a whole’, which essentially ‘involves the health, welfare, prosperity, and happiness of the population' such that ‘to govern properly, to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the population, it is necessary to govern through a particular register, that of the economy' (Dean, 1999, p. 19). Accepting economic and political crisis, therefore, becomes an effective strategy to communicate, control, and command the containment of popular uprisings via unwritten constitutional provisos for such insurrectionality. By accepting mediagenic street demonstrations and colorful site occupations, if only for a short stretch of time, as liminal movements in which direct actions by ‘the people' to engage in the popular review, legitimation, or alteration of the existing regime, does the exercise of sovereign authority and disciplinary practice provisionally reinvent ‘the regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within that territory' (Dean, 1999, p. 20) by turning to such unorthodox means of governance via insurrectionality? 2. Risk to Sustain and Develop Resilient Rule This brief analysis, therefore, plays off contradictions, conflicts, and contagions in the contemporary events around the world to find the patterns in these variations of power. From Paris in 2005, Athens in 2008, Tunis in 2011, Kiev in 2012, Bangkok in 2014, or innumerable other instances of organized violence, popular turmoil, civic unrest, or social mayhem in smaller cities and towns going back years, if not decades, all over the world, many have foretold of the coming of grand insurrections from all of these seemingly disparate events (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Nonetheless, crisis management by corporations and states has been refining its practices as a mode of governance since the 1960s to the extent that it essentially risks revolt to sustain and develop resilience as a logic of rule (Luke, 1978, pp. 56–72). Plainly, for 50 years, fresh waves of insurrectional activity have erupted, only to be disrupted, and then crushed, contained, or captured to dissipate or redirect their activism (Scott, 2012). These are distinctive trends in today's ‘risk society' (Beck, 1992). Its incumbent authorities at many levels of administration often accept and manage the risk of insurrection, like any sets of collective social risk. The coevolutionary coexistence of established power and emergent insurrection iterate this logic of insurrectionality. In keeping the media looking for unrest, citizens ready to engage in mayhem, and flexible state power mobilized to defend with considerable force the existing order against unruly street mobs, strategic elite decision-makers nurture resilience through revolts. That is, they continue draining off, or cultivating, more limited aspects of the credible, helpful, or useful normative policy agendas borne by the programs of insurrectionists when and where they appear in orderly demonstrations as spectacles of free assembly, conscience, and speech. Insurrection, then, never truly disappears with the development of modernizing urban industrial societies (Luke, 1990). On the contrary, it must persist. The enduring promise of revolt perpetuates its never fully fulfilled promise with precepts and possibilities that portend their advocates can never be manageable, disreputable, or contained ‘the next time’. These recurring tendencies must be explored, because one rightly can ask if there are new strategic practices at work within these manifestations of insurrectionality, which have been integral to the survival and strength of the existing order (Dean, 2008). Is it possible that the culture of resilience, now so cherished by the existing order, cannot be implemented, and then continuously refined, without conflicts, contention, or crises to degrade everyday economic, political, and social processes to the point that their crisis-ridden eventuation's must, and can, ‘bounce back' resiliently to keep new cycles of neoliberal economic growth and social reform expanding? Many of these revolutionary movements’ key ‘representational spaces' do generate insurrectionist spatiality, like Tahrir Square, the Maidan, or Zuccotti Park, that feed into the mythos of new world order grounded in vigilant resilience, but those shifts become more feasible only with microelectronic information and communication technologies. Diversely imagined communities of incumbent and insurgent forces interact through ‘space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and the space of “inhabitants” and users … this is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate' (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39). Both sets of contending imaginative forces will change and appropriate the acts and artifacts of insurrection in many small ways that affirm the resistance of insurrections as well as actualize the resilience of the authorities they challenge. These calculated and intelligible workings of power are neither so formulaic nor inspired that they appear unprecedented. Rather they are continuously emergent, and deeply embedded, aspects of post-Cold War relations of power, which ‘are both intentional and non-subjective’, making them as Foucault would argue, ‘imbued, through and through, with calculation: There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives' (Foucault, 1978, pp. 94–95). Resilience certainly has objective aims as a mode of governmentalizing rule. Nevertheless, it seemingly accepts some aspects of sustainability, insurrectionality, complexity, or reflexivity as harnessed oppositional energies. These elective affinities cannot be tracked back to ‘the choice or decision of an individual subject’, even though it is readily apparent that each one's operational ‘logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable' (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). Insurrectionality unfolds, like sustainability, as another layer in the contemporary codes of global performativity. Resilient authority structures at work in the deep state collaborate continuously through never-ending police operations to contain, shape, or manage insurrectionable development. In so doing, they refine appear to refine their ‘systems of neutralization and equivalence' to select those motifs, styles or traits of insurgency that become ‘comparable within the capitalistic economy of flows’, even though it often will be ‘necessary to hide them, cut them off, make them over, or better yet transform them from the inside' (Guattari, 2011, p. 79). Organizing new anti-capitalist insurrections through tweets, posts, and blogs is not that dissimilar from enforcing their pacification through commercial counter-tweets, anti-posts, and reactive blogs. Systemic stability arguably presumes episodes of failure, interruption, and turbulence. Otherwise, it is less effective at maintaining operational resilience in all ‘the functions of opening and reclosing signifying assemblages' for the distributed and resilient power grids maintaining today's precarious social peace (Guattari, 2011, p. 79). Insurrectionality might well improve these networks of order by bringing new social demands to light, but so too does it strengthen the resilience of those authorities who may concede or crush these demands. 4. Resilience is Insurrectionable Development The rapid urbanization of planet Earth transmutates cityscapes and countrysides into a profusion of man-made conurbanations (Virilio, 2000). Still the metropolis is not just this urban pile-up, the final collusion of city and country. It is also a flow of beings and things, a current that runs through fiber-optic networks, through high-speed train lines, satellites, and video surveillance cameras, making sure that this world keeps running straight to its ruin. (Invisible Committee, 2009, pp. 58–59) Maintaining cohesion and coherence against any and all insurrectionists under these circumstances basically is improbable, if not impossible. Hence, an ethos of accepting risk and accommodating it resiliently unfolds to rejoin shattered pieces and reintegrate suddenly incoherent practices as viable and enhanced forms of life (Miller & Rose, 2008). Rather than pretending to be invulnerable and steady, resilient state power may well concede its tendencies to fail even as it labors to stay up and running. It is precisely due to this architecture of flows that the metropolis is one of the most vulnerable human arrangements that has ever existed. Supple, subtle, but vulnerable … the world would not be moving so fast if it didn't have to constantly outrun its own collapse. (Invisible Committee, 2009, 60) Frequently, the resilience thinking behind current-day governmentality accedes that the Earth's environment as such is becoming a continuous catastrophe. Instead of struggling to guard pristine ecologies against all probable threats, the ethos of endangerment at the core of resilience affirms that all environments must persist through punctuated incidents of toxic catastrophe. The relation of state power to the masses in resilience regimes recognizes ‘the environment is nothing more than the relationship to the world that is proper to the metropolis and that projects itself onto everything that would escape it' (Invisible Committee, 2009, p. 75). Indeed, the modalities of insurrectionable development concede that the metropolis is a terrain of constant low-intensity conflict, in which the taking of Basra, Mogadishu, or Nablus mark politics of culmination … no longer undertaken in view of victory or peace, or even the re-establishment of order, such ‘interventions' continue a security operation that is always already in progress. War is no longer a distinct event in time, but instead diffracts into ‘a series of micro-operations, by both military and police, to ensure security’. (Invisible Committee, 2009, pp. 56–57) These institutional developments arguably are also part of the effects following from the advent of walled states and waning sovereignty. This couplet of order and disorder is taking hold across many societies around the world, but especially in those regimes that rest upon building physical barriers between the starkly divided classes of technologically competent, obsolescent, and superfluous workers proliferating in divisive cultures and exploited societies trapped in a globalized world economy. Wendy Brown focuses her attention on the border walls between the USA and Mexico running from California to Texas and Israel's security walls on the West Bank in the Sinai, and near Gaza (2010, pp. 28–42) to spotlight these contradictions. Such ‘security fences' seem often fail as impermeable barriers, and therefore create little security (Nevins, 2002; Weizman, 2007). Yet, they never were intended to be impermeable secure barriers. Rather they are the most massive markers of how far more tangible divides already are always being erected between businesses and communities, the rich and poor, racial majorities and minorities, or the top and bottom of society over the last 50 years. Through the practices of urban redevelopment, freeway construction, public housing, gated communities, secure skyscrapers, guarded campuses, and other ‘defensible spaces' around the world, the walled state has morphed into the sine qua non of civil society. As Brown suggests, ‘walls respond to and externalize the causes of different kinds of perceived violence to the nation, and the walls themselves exercise different kinds of violence toward the families, communities, lands, and political possibilities they traverse and shape' (2010, p. 38). While she regards them as ineffective security mechanisms per se, one wonders how insurrections are the material effects of when and where ‘walls inadvertently subvert the distinction between inside and outside that they are intended to mark' as well as ‘what contingent effects they have in contouring nationalisms, citizen subjectivities, and the identities of political entities on both of their sides' (Brown, 2010, p. 41). To solidify the logics of resilience, then, walls prove to be important mechanisms to effectuating the insecurities that resilient rule requires. In too many ways, the growing inequalities and social divisions in post-Fordist neoliberal economies are barriers very rarely experienced everyday in mass behavior. The fabrication of walls, fences, checkpoints, and other dividers simultaneously imply insurrections can be both fueled, and actively contained, by the structural violence of neoliberal dispossession (Lazzarato, 2012). In stimulating and then sparking insurrection, then, how normalized is insurrectionality becoming in these decades-old patterns? And, after multiple cycles of insurrection-and-suppression, to what extent have resilient responses become, in fact, an emergent regimen of governance rather than entrenched embattlement? Inequality is growing, insurrectionality persists, and injustice is rife. Yet, the prevailing powers concede openly these realities by reimagining themselves always improving how they will respond to injustice-fueled mayhem, insurrectional destruction, and inegalitarian turmoil. Events like Watts, California; Detroit, Michigan; Liberty City, Florida; South Los Angeles, California; and Ferguson, Missouri from the 1960s through the 2010s in the USA unfold different manifold variations of insurrectionality, but the growing resilience of civil municipal authority and police powers in facing these events matters also evolves. They are being tested, refined, and readied for the next insurrectionable developments waiting to be triggered by a traffic stop, a street fight or an ID check involving a cop and citizen. Inside and outside now coincide in the logics of resilience-as-rule. 5. Insurrectionality: Governance through Resilience With the militarization of municipal, regional and national police forces in the USA and other OECD countries (one here can think about the overly aggressive display of military-grade weaponry in response at Ferguson, Missouri or Keene, New Hampshire to civil rights protest or student mayhem that was not wholly unlike that of Egyptian military and police forces in Tahrir Square), new global trends of social control and organization, rooted in resilient styles of governance, are gelling in the turbulence of insurrectionality. Add to these rapid response forces, the securitized surveillance system of closed-circuit television, cybertracking, biometric scanning, and addressable individual tracking devices; and, the withering away of many other streams of popular ideological resistance as corrective feedback loops, the powers that be, have been, and will be seem, if they are truly sophisticated, to be adding insurrection to their risk society calculi. Indeed, these new integers for innovation justify building and enforcing a potent mix of resilience tactics, which are tested as ideology and practice for continued elite empowerment. Rising up in the streets against authority in the fury of intense insurrection is acceptable, but standing up slowly to truly assume power has become much less likely. Still, the collapse of economic growth, the decay of middle and working class job opportunities, civic infrastructure decay, loss of public goods, and degradation of private markets are all generating and maintaining a high level of insurrectional energy (Luke, 2012). Now the elite discourses embedded in the reproduction of existing power structures knowingly accedes to insurrection, and even can concede conceptually, its justifiable bases, which endorses its existence as ‘insurrectionable development'. Instead of a ‘clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996), these arrangements for a resilient adaptation to recurrent anarchy are the nuts and bolts needed for ‘governing the present' (Miller & Rose, 2008). Governance games on this scale harness legitimate corrective impulses from the outsiders, underclasses, and superfluous populace to make improvements in some state and non-state services, which usually enhance systemic resilience, regime stability, and the sustainability of ruling alliance/elite/bloc/class power (Guattari & Negri, 2010).