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### Capitalism Inevitable

#### Cap inevitable - evolution means we are all selfish

Thayer 2000 Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

### Impact Turns (General)

#### Free market capitalism has drastically improved the world.

Empirical education in child mortality and increase in life expectancy, development of tech innovation in the private market k2 medical advances, food production increased with agriculture tech green revolution, also decreased armed conflicts

Feyman 14 Yevgeniy [adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He writes on health care policy, entitlement reform, and the Affordable Care Act. His research has focused on a variety of topics, including the physician shortage, the cost of health care reform, and consumer-directed health care. Feyman was previously the deputy director of health policy at the Manhattan Institute and is currently a research assistant in the department of health policy at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health] “The Golden Age Is Now” May 23, 2014. IB

In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World? Lomborg and a group of economists conclude that, with a few exceptions, the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message. The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted. Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation. People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, we can thank massive advancements in agricultural production unleashed by the free market. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly. Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, there has never been a better time to be alive.

### Impact Turn (CCS)

#### Carbon capture is necessary to reach emissions targets – we’ve gone past core tipping points and legitimately can’t decarbonize in time absent CCS

Moniz 9/23/19 - 13th Secretary of Energy (2013 to 2017) and is the founder and CEO of the Energy Futures Initiative

Fredd Krupp is president of the Environmental Defense Fund, Ernest Moniz, “Cutting Climate Pollution Isn’t Enough — We Also Need Carbon Removal,” Text, TheHill, September 23, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/462609-cutting-climate-pollution-isnt-enough-we-also-need-carbon-removal>.

It has been almost four years since the Paris climate agreement was signed. But as leaders gather in New York this week for the United Nations Climate Change Summit, the world remains far off track from meeting the Paris objective of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius -- and pursuing efforts at 1.5 degrees.

To meet that target, the world must achieve a 100 percent clean economy — one that produces net zero emissions, or no more climate pollution than can be removed from the atmosphere — soon after mid-century, with the United States and other advanced economies reaching that milestone no later than 2050. It’s a daunting but doable task.

The consequences of falling short are enormous. This year, the U.S. government’s fourth National Climate Assessment documented the huge economic and social impacts of unchecked warming. The Pentagon has repeatedly warned of the impacts on national security and our troops.

Achieving a 100 percent clean economy will require a swift transition to renewables and other zero-carbon energy sources. But we also need to face the reality that meeting the Paris target will require taking carbon out of the atmosphere at massive scale. In part, that’s because eliminating emissions will be very challenging for some sectors, especially the transportation industry and agriculture. Removing carbon from the atmosphere would also bring concentrations down, helping to stabilize the climate at safer levels. So, the push for clean energy must be supplemented by a suite of technologies known as carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

It is not a question of what we’d prefer. It’s a question of insurmountable math.

The crucial role carbon removal must play is becoming more widely recognized. The 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report stressed the importance of carbon removal, and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine late last year estimated that ten billion tons of CO2 will need to be pulled from the atmosphere annually by 2050, and double that by 2100. For context, today’s global emissions are less than 40 billion tons per year. If the 10 billion tons of CO2 from CDR were stored underground, that would be roughly double the world’s annual oil production.

The good news is that there are a surprisingly large number of promising pathways for carbon dioxide removal. Nature-based approaches include reforestation and forest management as well as agricultural practices that increase carbon stored in soils. Some of the attendant challenges include competition for land and permanence of the carbon sequestration.

Technological approaches include direct air capture — machines that actually suck carbon from the air — and technologically-enhanced natural processes, such as plants genetically modified with deep roots to fix carbon in the soil; enhanced mineralization, which uses certain reactive rocks to bind with carbon from the air; and accelerated ocean uptake in phytoplankton. These technologies are immature and require considerable research, development and demonstration to ensure viability and affordability at very large scale.

Despite the urgency, there is no dedicated federal effort to develop these crucial technologies; existing programs are piecemeal and largely focused on sequestering emissions from industrial and electricity generating sources.

The National Academies recommended the rapid establishment of a robust, focused, scalable and accelerated federal research program spanning the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Science Foundation, among others. Such a program would encompass the full range of technological pathways that can remove CO2 from the environment. ‘’Clearing the Air,’’ an analysis of CDR’s value and a proposed plan to deploy it, has been completed by the Energy Futures Initiative. Over the next decade, the program scale would be about a billion dollars a year.

Carbon dioxide removal is not a magic bullet. We must do everything we can to deploy innovative low- and zero-carbon methods to generate electricity, heat homes, fuel vehicles, and power industry, creating new economic opportunities in the process. Tackling the climate crisis also requires placing a declining limit and a price on carbon pollution, as well as a significant increase in energy technology innovation and deployment across the board.

But CDR is also not a “Plan B.” It is a critical part of any “Plan A” for climate, a necessary complement to emission reduction. It can provide more flexibility and optionality in policy planning, which could ease the transition to a carbon-neutral economy while minimizing transition costs and providing greater assurance that science-based climate goals can be met in a timely manner. It would eventually enable a net negative global economy that could bring the atmospheric carbon concentrations down — and global temperatures with it.

We have delayed meaningful action for far too long. As a result, the scale and urgency of the challenge is such that we cannot simply work on doing better in the future. We need to correct what we did in the past. Carbon removal is the enabler.

#### Try or die for rapid scale up of CCS – failure to quickly scale up requires future direct-air capture tech which fails and costs too much

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Akshat. “Humanity’s fight against climate change is failing. One technology can change that.” <https://qz.com/1144298/humanitys-fight-against-climate-change-is-failing-one-technology-can-change-that/>

Last resort

If people don’t change their mind about CCS and governments don’t invest to make deployment of CCS at large scale a reality, the world will soon exceed the carbon budget required to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. Some models suggest we’re already on track to cross that point, and the world will have to turn to some form of the “direct-air capture” technology currently being tested at a humble scale in Iceland. To suck up carbon dioxide from the air at the levels to stop global-temperature rise, we’d need to deploy hundreds of millions of the machine now working at the Hellisheidi plant.

That’s a scary prospect. CCS might seem expensive now, but direct-air capture in the second half of the 21st century will cost many multiples more. The reason is simple physics: CCS happens at the source of emissions, which typically contain more than 5% carbon dioxide in the exhaust gas mix. The concentration of CO2 in the air is just 0.04%—100 times more dilute. Far more energy would be required to pull carbon dioxide straight out of the air, and that means far more money. The most recent estimates suggest the cost of direct-air capture could be as high as $600 per metric ton—nearly 10 times the cost of carbon-capture technologies today.

That economic hit would hurt a lot more than deploying carbon capture at large scale today. But even that may not hurt as badly as uncontrolled climate change. The latest projections show that, as soon as 2027, the cost of rising temperatures will be $360 billion per year for the US alone. The damage to the rest of world could be four times as much.

Prevention is better than cure. And, for our dying planet, either is better than doing nothing.

### Impact Turn (War)

#### Cap key to peace – prefer 40 years of empirics

Mousseau 2009 [Michael, associate professor of International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security Vol 33 No 4, Spring, Muse]

One of the most important achievements in the study of international security has been the arrival and broad acceptance of the “democratic peace,” that is, the statistically significant absence of war between democracies. This discovery has produced a broader acceptance of domestic factors in the study of international conflict. It has also influenced public policy: since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have widely embraced democracy as a cause of peace. The extent to which scholars and practitioners can be convinced that democracy causes peace, however, depends on how confident they are in explaining it. Numerous studies have identified democracy as a cause of democratic peace, but none have yielded much meaningful, clear-cut, and nontrivial predictive power—achievements that lie at the heart of scientifically identifying causality. On the contrary, it appears increasingly likely that existing explanations for how democracy causes peace may be incomplete. Several studies have shown that the impact of democracy on peace may depend on the level of economic development.1 No compelling challenges to these findings have been offered, and some scholars who once confirmed the democratic peace now acknowledge the role played by economic conditionality.2 It follows that [End Page 52] democracy, alone, may not be the cause of the peace. Instead, some factor related to economic development either causes the peace or qualifies the impact of democracy on peace. This article advances the understanding of the democratic peace by demonstrating how a particular kind of economic development, contract-intensive development, appears to account for this peace. The economic conditionality of the democratic peace was originally predicted by economic norms theory, which identifies how liberal values may be rooted in the decisionmaking heuristics of a social market economy—that is, one where most people have the opportunity to choose, as individuals in the market, their sources of income and where to spend it.3 In this economy, sometimes called “advanced capitalism,” individuals habitually trust strangers in making contracts and depend on the state to enforce them impartially. They learn to prefer free choice and the equal application of law, and they expect their government to behave accordingly in foreign affairs. As a consequence, contract-intensive societies tend to agree on the preservation of the Westphalian order of sovereign states and the primacy of international law over power politics, and they are in natural alliance against any entity—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge this order. This study demonstrates that from 1961 to 2001 not a single fatal conflict occurred among nations with contract-intensive economies. In contrast, democracies without contract-intensive economies engaged each other in several fatal conflicts during this period, about the number to be expected if democracy in states without a contracting economy has no impact on foreign policy. These results are highly robust after consideration of many competing causes, few of which have any significant impact on war and peace once the role of the contract-intensive economy variable is considered. The existence of this variable, in contrast, has the strongest impact of all nontrivial variables normally observed in studies of international conflict. Several implications follow from this study. First, this research supports the claims of some critics of the democratic peace who have long argued that a third variable may cause both democracy and peace:4 that variable is a [End Page 53] contract-intensive economy. Second, although challenging the role of democracy as a cause of democratic peace, this study shows that a zone of peace does exist among democratic nations, but it is one that appears to be caused by economic rather than governing institutions. Third, whether or not shared democracy contributes to international peace is an important issue because U.S. leaders’ belief in this proposition has influenced their conduct of foreign policy. President Bill Clinton, for example, supported the United States’ “democratic enlargement” policy because he believed that “democracies don’t attack each other.”5 His successor, George W. Bush, explained that his administration promoted democracy because “democracies don’t go to war with each other.”6 President Barack Obama has asserted that “we benefit from the expansion of democracy” because democracies are “the nations with which we share our deepest values.”7 Although support for democracy may be good for a variety reasons, this article presents compelling evidence that the promotion of peace among nations is not one of them. The article is organized as follows. First, I review the emergence of the democratic peace literature and the evidence linking this peace to economic development. Next, I present several explanations for the role of economic conditionality. I draw out the implications of economic norms theory for explaining stable democracy and peace among nations. After discussing the test conditions, reporting the results, and exploring alternative explanations, I offer a case study of the economic peace involving Greece and Turkey to illustrate the usefulness of the theory. I conclude with several policy implications that follow from the analysis. Two pioneers in the study of the democratic peace were Dean Babst in the 1960s and Rudolph Rummel in the 1970s.8 Key articles by Michael Doyle and [End Page 54] Jack Levy brought increased attention to the concept.9 By the early 1990s, a large number of highly rigorous studies had widely confirmed the proposition that democracies do not go war with each other.10 There are two primary sources of continuing skepticism, however. First, because most explanations for the democratic peace were created after it was first observed—the primary exception being Immanuel Kant in 179511—empirical confirmation for any of them can come only with the observation of novel empirical facts.12 To my knowledge, there are few confirmed, clear-cut, nontrivial, and novel facts that have been explicitly deduced from any explanation for the democratic peace. The closest candidate is the war-winning hypothesis, an expectation deduced from several accounts. The weight of the evidence is mixed as to whether democracies tend to win their wars.13 [End Page 55] Second, the finding that the democratic peace may be conditioned on some level of economic development indicates that democracy, alone, is probably not an independent cause of the peace. The most compelling study in this regard appeared in 2003, when several scholars came together to examine their contending expectations.14 The following four hypotheses were tested: (1) the democratic peace holds firm without any conditions; (2) the democratic peace is conditioned by economic development;15 (3) the democratic peace is conditioned by trade;16 and (4) the interaction of trade and development accounts for the democratic peace.17 The test failed to support hypotheses (1), (3), and (4), and robustly reconfirmed hypothesis (2). Most other studies that have examined the role of economic conditionality have confirmed it, including those of some scholars who had once supported the democratic peace thesis.18 Some scholars have responded to this finding by stressing that the level of economic development at which democracy becomes significant is low enough that, at least in recent years, most democracies are included among [End Page 56] those nations that do not engage in war with each other.19 But in a previous study, I argued that the exact level at which democracy becomes significant is not important, for two reasons. First, the question probably cannot be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. The precise level is highly sensitive to the researcher’s choice of control variables, sample, and measure of economic development.20 Second, without theory, the predicted level of development at which democracy becomes significant poses the danger of the fallacy of induction. Scholars can be much more confident in predictions grounded in theories with established predictive and explanatory power. Not only have all theories of democracy acting alone in causing the peace been unable to produce compelling novel facts, but the economic conditionality of this peace strongly suggests that all of these theories are, at best, incomplete. The issue is not the level of economic development at which democracy becomes a significant force for peace: it is how development causes the peace. Economic Conditionality and Economic Norms Theory Following the first report of the economic conditionality of the democratic peace, several studies sought to explain it. Azar Gat offered a list of factors potentially associated with what he calls economic “modernization,” including industrialization, which has delinked territory from the production of wealth, and a cultural “feminization” of men caused by urbanization and the service economy.21 Erik Gartzke argued that openness of markets may be the cause of the economic peace: nations with freer capital markets are more dependent than others on international investors, who are likely to divest from a country about to engage in war. Policymakers first recognize which nations have free capital markets and which do not, and then give greater credibility to threats made by those with freer capital markets than those with controlled ones. In theory, this can cause countries with freer capital markets to be more peaceful than others. The role of development in the democratic peace is based, presumably, on the assumption that development and capital openness are related.22 [End Page 57] My explanation for the economic peace integrates two long-standing findings in social science.23 First, research in economics and sociology has established the notion of bounded rationality: that is, individuals economize on the costs of decisionmaking by forming cognitive habits—heuristics—for situations they repeatedly encounter.24 Second, studies in economic history and sociology have documented that dependency on ties with friends and families—clientelism—often constitutes significant portions of trade and services in middle- and lower-income countries.25 It follows that divergent everyday routines of individuals in clientelist and contract-intensive societies should give rise to divergent decisionmaking heuristics. In a previous study, I showed how these divergent heuristics can affect political culture and institutions.26 In clientelist economies, individuals depend on group leaders, called “patrons,” who promote loyalty by providing economic and physical security in the form of gifts. To obtain these gifts, clients learn to habitually signal their willingness to abide by all of their patron’s commands with alacrity. When clientelist societies face rapid change and leadership is fluid, political entrepreneurs offer themselves as new group patrons. To increase the demand for security, these political entrepreneurs promote fear of outsiders. This may explain why societies in civil anarchy or in transition between clientelism and advanced capitalism—when high unemployment rates often coexist with clientelist traditions in large cities—tend to give rise to extremist dogmas that fit in-group worldviews, such as nationalist, Marxist, fascist, and militant Islamist ideologies.27 In contract-intensive societies, in contrast, making contracts with strangers promotes loyalty not to patrons but to a state that enforces these contracts with [End Page 58] impartiality and equal application of the rule of law. Because bigger markets offer more contracting opportunities than smaller ones, and because contracts cannot be arranged unless all parties explicitly state their preferences, individuals habitually perceive it as in their interest to respect the preferences and rights of strangers. Compared with voters in clientelist-integrated societies, voters in contract-intensive societies are more likely to support candidates for office who stress individual freedoms, at home and abroad, and who advocate government transparency and equal enforcement of the law. Discussion of the causes of a nation’s transition from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy is largely beyond the scope of economic norms theory. Exogenous factors include those that make the benefits of trusting strangers in the market greater than the benefits of personalized ties. The theory identifies political factors as the primary cause of economic changes because a contract-intensive economy cannot exist unless government authorities make the decision to enforce contracts with impartiality. But this decision does not guarantee a contract-intensive economy: geographic factors, such as poor harbors or an absence of neighbors with contract-intensive economies, can constrain markets. 28 There is also a likely feedback loop from an emerging market culture to greater opportunities in the market. As increasing numbers of individuals decide to accept the risk of contracting with strangers—as a society approaches the “tipping point”29—the division of labor must grow increasingly complex. This in turn enhances opportunities in the market, causing more individuals to accept the risk of trusting strangers and their states. The shift in loyalty from group leaders to impartial states is not monotonic, however. Acontract-intensive economy can collapse for a variety of reasons, as the nascent capitalist and quasi-liberal political cultures of Classical Athens and Renaissance Italy did after defeats in foreign wars. In the modern era, the feedback loop seems to have started anew in Holland in the fifteenth century (possibly triggered by climate change), and was soon entered into by its neighbors with good harbors: England, northern France, northwestern Germany, and Scandinavia. Over time, contract norms reached more deeply into these societies. By the eighteenth century, however, in only two societies were [End Page 59] these norms in all likelihood highly institutionalized: possibly Switzerland and almost certainly the northern colonies of British North America, led foremost by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.30 By extrapolating from economic history and global migration patterns (because emigration can inversely reflect the level of opportunities in the market), I was able to determine that by the early twentieth century contract-intensive economies were highly institutionalized in all of the previously mentioned regions, as well as in the settler communities of the American West, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. But between World Wars I and II, global economic troubles stalled the diffusion of contracting, causing it to decline in northwestern Germany when hyperinflation wiped out the middle class. Drawing on data discussed below, I found that by the 1960s contract norms were institutionalized throughout much of West Germany, rural France, the southern United States, and northern Italy, as well as Austria, Finland, and Japan.31 By the end of the Cold War, much of the rest of Italy, as well as Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan seemed to have reached the tipping point. Since the end of the ColdWar, the peoples of Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, and Slovenia may have reached it as well. A broad range of research documents the crucial role of economic norms in influencing political and social phenomena. Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation highlights the transition from clientelist to contractual modes of exchange in Europe from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries.32 Studies in anthropology and archaeology document how economic conditions influence political and institutional preferences.33 As predicted by economic norms theory, there exists a correlation between high income and contracting and between low income and clientelism. Experimental studies have confirmed sizable differences in the way individuals from low- and high-income countries react in tests involving economic preferences.34 Studies in comparative politics have confirmed a strong linkage between economic development and stable, liberal [End Page 60] democracy.35 Survey and case studies in sociology and economics have linked in-group norms with collectivist preferences, and economic development with individualist preferences and higher levels of trust among strangers.36 The contract-intensive economy represents only one form of economic development. In the twentieth century, noncapitalist forms of development included fascism, communism, and petro-clientelism. Nations with these forms of development included totalitarian states (command economies—e.g., the Soviet Union), bureaucratic clientelist states (where authorities distributed wealth with an eye toward promoting and maintaining loyalty—e.g., Saudi Arabia), and “hybrid” states involving a mix of clientelism and totalitarianism (e.g., Nazi Germany). To test whether individuals in contract-intensive, higherincome economies think differently from those in other higher-income economies, I obtained data on levels of trust in nations from the World Values Survey project.37 Recall that contract-intensive economies are thought to foster the expectation that strangers will fulfill their contractual commitments, so a crucial prediction of economic norms theory is that, comparatively speaking, nations with contract-intensive economies should tend to have higher levels of impersonal trust than other nations. There are forty-four countries in 1997 with data on all variables. I regressed trust on gross domestic product (logged) and contract-intensive economy (see measure below). The result confirms this expectation: the contract-intensive economy variable, not higher income per se, is associated with higher levels of trust in nations.38 Both economic norms theory and classical liberal theory focus on the role of markets. But their assumptions and implications differ. Classical liberalism assumes that Adam Smith’s “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” is ingrained [End Page 61] in human nature, and that freer markets (less state regulation and more foreign trade) promote economic development.39 Economic norms theory suggests that the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange is learned from the sustained presence of market-based opportunities, and that these opportunities have geographic and political origins. In this way, economic norms theory identifies the origins and popularity of classical liberal and social contract theories in the sustained presence of market-based opportunities. When contracting in the market becomes the way of life, people begin to think of it as natural and conceive of democratic governance too as a “social” contract or as embedded in “natural” law.40 Economic norms theory thus offers an explanation for why the classical liberal, social contract, and natural law traditions emerged when and where they did: in the areas of northwestern Europe that were developing contract-intensive economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, in contrast to what classical liberalism advocates claim, heavy state regulation of the economy may well be a prerequisite for countries to build and sustain a social market economy. Examples include the Scandinavian countries that have both contract-intensive economies and extensive state redistribution and regulation policies. Economic norms theory predicts that the leaders of contact-intensive nations will be less likely than other leaders to visibly challenge the sovereign rights of other states. This is because the modern interstate system is itself based on contract norms of legal equality: the Protestant Reformation was the consequence of the initial rise of contract norms in northwestern Europe in the sixteenth century; and the Treaty of Westphalia, which settled the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, institutionalized these norms across nations.41 Leaders of contract-intensive nations thus tend to view the continuation of the [End Page 62] Westphalian system of legally equal sovereign states, and the supremacy of international law over brute power politics, as consistent with the values and interests of their domestic populations. At first glance, economic norms theory may seem to imply the monadic expectation that contract-intensive nations should be less likely than other nations to engage in militarized conflict. But nothing in this theory suggests this to be true: rather, it is how they perceive their interests that makes contract-intensive nations different from other nations. Because contract-intensive nations consider the preservation of the Westphalian order to be in their interest, they may engage in wars with non-contract-intensive nations that challenge this order: for example, they may oppose states that threaten other states for economic gain in ways that violate international law. Economic norms theory predicts instead two hypotheses, one dyadic and one conditionally monadic. The dyadic hypothesis predicts a peace among contract-intensive nations; the monadic hypothesis predicts that contract-intensive nations, which are almost always highly democratic, will refrain from fighting other democratic nations. Starting with the dyadic hypothesis, the theory predicts that contract-intensive nations not only will be at peace with each other but are in a natural alliance. The alliance is the result of their fundamental agreement across a range of global issues and their consequent tendency to be on the same side in militarized confrontations.42 When the comparatively rare militarized dispute does occur between two contract-intensive nations, they are more likely than others to settle short of deadly force because their domestic audiences— and domestic opposition leaders—are more likely than their counterparts in non-contract-intensive nations to accept resolution through legal arbitration. The monadic hypothesis is conditioned by democracy. Recall that economic norms theory identifies how a contract-intensive economy can cause a population to value liberal democratic government. It follows that voters in contract-intensive democracies expect their leaders to refrain from fighting other democracies, regardless of the latters’ actions or economic conditions. This expectation accords with Spencer Weart’s view that liberal ideology causes [End Page 63] democratic nations to refrain from attacking other democratic nations.43 The key difference between Weart’s thesis and mine is that I predict that liberal ideology originates in contract-intensive economies, and thus only contract-intensive democracies—not other democracies—are so constrained. In this way, economic norms theory offers an explanation for why the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad appears on the agendas of contract-intensive democracies, but seemingly not on those of democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, or nations with other kinds of political systems. If this monadic thesis is correct, then democratic dyads where at least one state has a contract-intensive economy will be peaceful. Tests that do not control for this pattern would yield misleading results. Constructing the Test Conditions To test my hypotheses, I closely followed the analytic procedures used in a previous study.44 I included all fatal militarized disputes and wars as identified in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set over the years 1961 to 2001.45 I made one modeling change to this previous study by [End Page 64] controlling for the development level of the more developed state in the dyad and its interaction with geographic distance.46 To my knowledge, two sources of direct contracting data across nations are available: investments in stocks and bonds and life insurance policies. Of all economic sectors to gauge, economic securities and life insurance are probably the most informative because it is the essential need for economic security that compels individuals to form loyalties to patrons or liberal states. Unfortunately, national-level data on stocks and bonds include foreign investment, and foreign investment does not reflect a society’s norms. Life insurance contracts, however, are not affected in this way. These contracts should also serve as an accurate indicator of contracting heuristics because, in predominantly clientelist societies, individuals normally protect their families in the event of death through ties with friends and extended families, as children inherit the debts of their parents as well as the favors owed them. In this type of society, few individuals are likely to trust strangers and the state enough to place their family’s welfare in an insurance contract; prevailing heuristics prevent most from even considering it. In societies where contracting is highly institutionalized, in contrast, comparatively few will have the personalized ties that are sufficiently strong and reliable that they will place their family’s security in them; comparatively larger numbers will act on prevailing heuristics and trust their family’s welfare to strangers in the form of life insurance contracts.47 [End Page 65] I gathered cross-national data on active life insurance contracts collected under the auspices of the World Bank from 1960 to 2000.48 Only sixty-five nations are included in the data, however, and many of these only after 1978. It is possible, however, to expand the data to most countries for this period by adopting a binary threshold and assuming that missing data reflect zero contract norms. This assumption follows from economic norms theory: contract-intensive societies are comparatively reliable providers of economic data because contracts must be enforced, and enforcement requires written records. States that promote markets also have an interest in collecting data on contractual transactions, so that they can monitor and promote contractual economic activity as well as tax it. In contrast, recording and tallying clientelist transactions are difficult tasks because they are framed as favors, which is why much more economic data exist on contract-intensive societies than on others, past and present. For instance, we know that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, merchants in Cairo engaged in extensive contracting with merchants in Spain, North Africa, the Levant, and even India, because many of these contracts were later discovered in a repository of Old Cairo called the Geniza.49 The insurance data are most comprehensive for the years 1979 to 2000, so I identified the contract-intensive nations as those with existing insurance policies above the median level over this period. Additional tests show that the choice of threshold has no effect on the results. I also obtained identical results, unreported, using the original continuous data with missing values treated as missing.50 Model 1 in table 1 confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and fatal militarized disputes from 1961 to 2001. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.10) is negative and highly significant, confirming the expectation of democratic peace when the presence or absence of contract-intensive economy is not considered. The performance of most of the control variables is similar to that found in these earlier studies.51 To test the dyadic hypothesis that contract-intensive nations refrain from engaging in militarized disputes with each other, I constructed a binary indicator for both states having contract-intensive economies, which I call “Both States CIE.” As can be seen in table 1, the test yields a startling result: the Both States CIE variable must be dropped from the estimate because it predicts peace perfectly; that is, in the sample from 1961 to 2001, no fatal militarized disputes occurred between two nations with contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this peace cannot be reasonably attributed to chance (p < 0.001). In contrast, with the binary measure “Both Coherent Democracies,” as defined by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder,52 ten fatal militarized disputes took place between democratic nations that lacked contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test suggests that this is about the expected number if democracy in countries without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations (p < 0.715). To test the monadic hypothesis, I distinguished democratic dyads where one state has a contract-intensive economy from those where neither state has one by including the variable “One State CIE” and its interaction with [End Page 68] DemocracyL. As can be seen in model 2 in table 1, the coefficient for the interactive term DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.20) is negative and significant. This confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between contract-intensive economy and democracy. Because the coefficients for constituent terms (DemocracyL) in interactive models are meaningful only for cases where the other constituent term (One State CIE) equals zero, the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) in model 2 confirms the results of the bivariate chi-square tests: in countries without a contract-intensive economy, democracy does not cause peace among nations.53 Models 3 and 4 in table 1 repeat the analyses for the onset of war, defined by convention as militarized interstate disputes that include more than 999 battle deaths. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.15) in model 3 is negative and highly significant. This confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and war from 1961 to 2001. In model 4 all cases where Both States CIE equals one are excluded because this variable predicts peace perfectly. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this absence of war among contract-intensive nations is probably not the result of chance (p < 0.10). In contrast, the data yield two wars among coherent democracies where both lacked contract-intensive economies over the sample period: Cyprus and Turkey in 1974 and the Kargil war fought between India and Pakistan starting in 1993 (this dispute continued to 1999 when it reached the war level while both countries were still democratic). A chi-square test indicates that this is approximately the number to be expected if democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not prevent wars among nations (p < 0.857).54 The remaining coefficients in model 4 are substantially identical to the results for fatal militarized interstate disputes in model 2. The coefficient for [End Page 69] DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.30) confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between a contract-intensive economy and democracy at the war level; the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) confirms that democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations. Identical results also appear, for fatal militarized disputes and wars, using the dyadic dummy variable for Both Coherent Democracies. One possible explanation for the insignificance of democracy may be that there are too few cases of democracies without contract-intensive economies. The data, however, do not support this conclusion. Economic norms theory predicts that a contract-intensive economy will cause and stabilize democracy: it is thus no surprise that 88 percent of contract-intensive nation-years from 1960 to 2000 are also coherently democratic.55 But non-contract-intensive nations can experiment with democratic government for a host of reasons, and 49 percent of coherent democratic nation-years do not have contract-intensive economies during this period. Because there are about as many democratic nation-years without contract-intensive economies as there are with them, a dearth of non-contract-intensive democratic cases cannot explain the insignificance of the democratic peace. Could the causal arrow point in the opposite direction, with democracy the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economies and peace? The evidence does not support this conclusion. Correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are excluded. If democracy was a direct cause of both contract-intensive economy and peace, then there would be some variance remaining, after its moderate correlation with contract-intensive economy is excluded, that links democracy directly with peace.56 The insignificance of the DemocracyL coefficients in models 2 and 4 in table 1 indicates that no such direct effect exists. In addition, the scholarly consensus is that higher income per capita, which correlates with the contract-intensive economy variable, is far more likely to cause democracy [End Page 70] than democracy is to cause development.57 Still, the analysis here is not designed to test for reverse causation, though performance of such a test would be a valuable addition to the literature. Robustness tests indicate that in analyses of wars, democracy remains highly insignificant under any examined circumstance. In analyses of fatal disputes, on the other hand, the removal of some control variables can cause democracy to reach significance at the 0.10 level, which is the lowest threshold statisticians normally assign significance. Further tests show that democracy is not significant with the removal of all control variables.58 Nor does democracy become significant under any circumstance when observing only bordering nations. This suggests that if peace exists among non-bordering democracies, it is because non-contract-intensive democracies usually have weak economies and thus refrain from fighting each other because they do not have the capability to do so. The results in table 1 support both aspects of the economic peace: the dyadic unconditional peace and the supplemental monadic peace conditioned by democracy. These patterns conform with the economic norms expectation that a contract-intensive economy promotes liberal values and consolidated liberal democracy. Common preferences and interests cause foreign policy agreement and peace among contract-intensive nations, whereas liberal ideology causes contract-intensive democracies to refrain from using force against other democracies, including those without contract-intensive economies. Democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, on the other hand, have no such constraints and do not perceive common interests within the Westphalian order; thus they tend to fight each other about as often as other nations do. Further calculations indicate that a contract-intensive economy is a powerful force for peace. I could not directly estimate the substantive impact of Both States CIE because it predicts peace perfectly, so I reestimated model 2 after combining the dyadic and monadic measures into a single “super” variable: “One or Both States CIE.” I then included the product of this variable and Both Coherent Democracies to identify cases where both states are democracies and at least one has a contract-intensive economy. The results—unreported for reasons [End Page 71] of space—indicate that, among bordering democracies, a change from neither to one or both states with a contract-intensive economy causes a 97 percent reduction in the probability of fatal dispute onset. None of the remaining variables has an impact of this magnitude.59 Exploration of Alternative Explanations This section examines the possibility that the results discussed above may be explained by variables that I have excluded thus far because economic norms theory predicts that they are at least partly caused by the contract-intensive economy variable. Because correlations among independent variables are not credited to any variable in a multivariate regression, economic norms theory predicts that inclusion of the variables below will reduce the impact of the contract-intensive economy variable. Therefore, this section cannot serve as a test of economic norms theory. Instead, it departs from the theory and examines the possibility that competing theories may account for the results discussed above. Economic norms theory identifies contract norms as a cause of economic development. It is also likely, however, that wealthier individuals are better positioned than poorer ones to engage in contracts. To ensure that the results of model 2 in table 1 are not a function of wealth, I added a control for economic development (see model 1 in table 2). The coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variables hold firmly, and the coefficient for DevelopmentL (0.05) is not significant. This means that the results of this study cannot be attributed to the fact that contract-intensive nations tend to be wealthier than other nations.60 Economic norms theory predicts that individuals in contract-intensive societies will be more likely than individuals in other societies to seek profitable contracts wherever they may find them. Because the nature of governance in contract-intensive nations is expected to reflect the contractualist worldview that good government abets the private pursuit of wealth, it predicts that governments of contract-intensive nations will be more likely than others to encourage foreign trade. Trade per capita is not the same as trade interdependence (trade/gross domestic product), however, and economic norms theory does not predict trade interdependence per se. But contract-intensive nations prefer law over brute force, and thus they are more likely to prefer trade over imperialism in foreign economic policy.61 Richard Rosecrance has argued that the decision to trade rather than to fight is a key factor in explaining peace among trading nations.62 Economic norms theory thus complements Rosecrance’s insights, and the contract-intensive economy variable can potentially account for the pacifying role of trade interdependence in international relations. But the reverse is also possible: trade interdependence may account for peace among contract-intensive nations. This is the view of economic liberals: interstate trade promotes market development, democracy, and peace.63 As can be seen in model 2 in table 2, the coefficient for Trade Interdependence (−0.59) is not significant. It thus appears that contracting is the more likely cause of both trade interdependence and peace among nations. Still, caution must be exercised: the trade variable is close to significant, and this regression model was not designed for resolving this issue. Also, scholars have not settled on how best to gauge trade interdependency.64 Further examination of the impact of trade in conflict is thus warranted. Some explanations for the democratic peace suggest that only democracies with mature or consolidated institutions might be peaceful. In addition, mature democracies may promote contract-intensive economies, suggesting the potential reversal of causation. In model 3 in table 2 the coefficient for Democratic MaturityL (−0.09) is not significant.65 It thus appears that even mature, consolidated democracies are not more peaceful with each other than [End Page 74] other nations. Rather, a contract-intensive economy is the more likely cause of both democratic maturity and the prevailing peace. Economic norms theory predicts that contract-intensive nations will perceive common security interests in the primacy of international law over power politics, causing them to form alliances. Common interests can develop for other reasons, however, and it is possible that alliances may account for the economic peace.66 In model 4 in table 2, the coefficient for Alliance (0.16) is not significant. The evidence thus favors the conclusion that contract-intensive economy partially accounts for the existence of both alliances and peace. As discussed above, Gat has offered several explanations for the peace among developed democratic nations.67 Most of these are broad and unfalsifiable, but he does offer urbanization and size of the service sector as variables, which he suggests make individuals less accustomed to the suffering of war and therefore opposed to it. But a service economy may be a function of contract norms, which encourage the commodification of services as well as of labor and capital. I gauge the variable Service Economy as the proportion of gross domestic product in the service sectors.68 In model 5 in table 2, the coefficient (0.01) is not significant. Analyses of urbanization show that dyads where both states are highly urbanized are significantly more likely than other dyads to engage in fatal disputes. Neither urbanization nor a service economy is thus a likely explanation for the economic peace. Also discussed above, Gartzke argues that free capital markets might explain the developed democratic peace. But these markets could be caused by contract norms, as states promote foreign trade and financial markets diffuse within, as well as across, international borders. Model 6 in table 2 reports the results using Gartzke’s measure. 69 The coefficient for Capital OpennessL (−0.15) is negative and significant, and coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variable also hold firmly. This suggests that, even if there is some causality stemming from the contract-intensive economy variable, free capital markets have an independent impact on the onset of fatal disputes. In short, the data support both Gartzke’s theory and economic norms theory. This result is reasonable, as the theories do not contain incompatible assumptions and are [End Page 75] not mutually exclusive.70 Further tests show that contract-intensive economy is the far stronger variable, with an impact about twice that of capital openness. Subsequent tests for war onsets produced identical results for all variables except Capital OpennessL, which is not significant at the war level. The Greek-Turkish Case An examination of a case study of recent changes in Greece’s economy and its relations with its neighbor Turkey illustrates how economic norms affect the domestic and foreign politics of nations. I chose this case because both countries have experienced many years of “coherent” democracy as defined above: Greece since 1975, with eighty-four years of democracy previously; and Turkey since 1983, with twenty-five years of democracy previously.71 Nevertheless, from 1960 to 2000, twenty militarized interstate disputes occurred between the two countries, five of which resulted in fatalities. If economic norms theory is correct, these tensions were a function of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes of voters on both sides. In 1990 Greece transitioned from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy. This offers a direct opportunity to test the economic norms expectation that Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy should have been followed by substantial moderation and rationalization of Greek domestic and foreign politics, including Greece’s relations with Turkey. As discussed earlier, an increase in the use of contracts is thought to have political and geographic root causes. For Greece, the political roots stem from a desire to join the European Community (EC) and the role played by the EC in giving politicians an “excuse” to make institutional changes, such as the equitable enforcement of banking and trade laws, which favors the transition to a market economy. Geographically, Greece’s entry into the EC was followed by a substantial increase in foreign investment into the country from 1980 to 1995.72 Starting in 1986, the rate of growth in life insurance contracting in Greece increased dramatically; it crossed the global median into contract-intensive status in 1990. Still, in the year 2000 Greece’s level of per capita life insurance [End Page 76] contracting was only one-twenty-fifth that of the contract-intensive standard-bearers Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Most observers agree that the mid-1990s was a turning point in Greek politics. Before then, the two main parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), were primarily agents of bureaucratic clientelism. As economic norms theory would expect, both parties were highly personalist and centered on charismatic leaders prone to populist and ideological bombast.73 Interparty relations were tense and based on opposing social identities and systems of patronage.74 The rule of law was weak,75 and distrust of the state ran deep76; in addition, the people identified with “the political parties rather than governments.”77 In foreign policy there was an “exclusivist notion of ‘Greekness.’”78 In the 1980s and early 1990s, PASOK won elections with the xenophobic, anticapitalist, anti-American, and anti-European rhetoric of its populist leader, Andreas Papandreou. In 1976 Greece confronted Turkey on issues in the Aegean over which the International Court of Justice later ruled the Greeks had no case. When a similar issue arose in 1987, Prime Minister Papandreou asserted that it was time to “teach the Turks a hard lesson.”79 The two countries came close to war in 1976, 1987, and 1996.80 Although during this period Greek and Turkish leaders made frequent attempts to resolve their differences, “these initiatives were not sustainable in the face of an adverse political climate, limited social contacts, high level of biases, and sensationalist press.”81 The watershed moment in Greek politics came in 1996, when Papandreou died and PASOK elected Costas Simitis to replace him. The gulf separating the two leaders was vast. Simitis was elected largely on the platform of [End Page 77] Eksynchronismos (modernization). In the words of Kevin Featherstone, “Simitis and his supporters advocated a greater separation of party from the state” and a break from the “bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past.” Whereas Papandreou “exercised a dominant authority over his party,” Simitis was “more managerial and technocratic.”82 As economic norms theory would expect, PASOK’s choice of a reformer reflected deep-seated changes in Greece’s political culture. The opposition ND also moved to the center, with the nationalist posturing and ideological bravado of both parties largely disappearing from Greece’s political discourse.83 A “cultural shift” occurred,84 as the new rhetoric of reform struck a strong chord with the electorate, which increasingly viewed the leaders of the country’s oldstyle politics as “dinosaurs.”85 Voters began to distance themselves from Greece’s political parties; legal institutions became more central to everyday life; and a “new sense of security changed the way ordinary citizens viewed public life.”86 Reflecting an increased respect for the rule of law, the two leading parties agreed on new protections for individual rights in the constitution. 87 Still, a minority continued to vocalize opposition to what many Greeks called Greece’s growing “Europeanization,” led by Archbishop Christodoulos. Both leading parties also backed fundamental changes in Greece’s foreign policy.88 For Europe, the country that was once viewed as the “black sheep” of European foreign policy had evolved into a more consensual partner.89 Prior to the late 1990s, Greece maintained an uncompromising approach in its relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and was widely viewed in Europe as the “bully of the Balkans.” In the late 1990s, however, a more cooperative attitude emerged, and Greece’s relations with these countries greatly improved.90 This realignment with other contract-intensive countries following Greece’s own transition to a contract-intensive economy, and its more cooperative attitude toward other democracies, accords with expectations of economic norms theory. [End Page 78] Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey also underwent fundamental change in the late 1990s.91 Reflecting a change in Greek attitudes, foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos—considered a hard-liner—asserted that “we Greeks must get over the old knee-jerk reaction that if something is bad for Turkey it is good for us.”92 The most significant change occurred in 1999, when Greece moved from perennial obstructer to supporter of Turkey’s membership bid to join the European Union (EU). In all likelihood, this move was not strategic but an outcome of deep-seated shifts in Greeks’ perceptions of their national interest.93 Greek scholars and think tanks have stressed that it is in Greece’s interest to have Turkey in the EU as a partner.94 From 2000 to 2004, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-five major agreements; from 1970 to 2000 there were none.95 It must be recalled, however, that fundamental differences remain over the division of Cyprus and exploitation of the Aegean seabed.96 Resolution of the deeper issues in Greek-Turkish relations would also require change in how Turkish leaders perceive their interests. Unlike Greece, Turkey has not transitioned to a contract-intensive economy. If economic norms theory is correct, then Turkish politics should appear similar to Greek politics before Greece’s transition; this would include strong party loyalties, intense identity issues, and fear of outsiders in the country’s political discourse. In foreign policy, compromise should be difficult, as opposition parties seeking to garner the nationalist identity seize any reason to criticize the government for “giving in” to outsiders. Most observers agree that the above description characterizes Turkish politics today. There is no significant liberal party concerned with individual rights, equal enforcement of the law, or transparency in government. The left is characterized as favoring the elite-led modernization project, which increasingly includes “an intensifying nationalism with an underlying xenophobia”; the right emphasizes communitarian religious identity and social conservatism.97 [End Page 79] Turkey’s national identity includes a strong ethnoreligious dimension, and communitarianism remains a prominent feature: it continues to be a criminal offense to insult Turkishness. The political parties are weakly institutionalized and headed by strong, charismatic leaders who compete over state rents with ideological and populist appeals. Voters identify with parties, and the parties offer competing images of national identity.98 Although Turkey has contributed in many ways to the rapprochement with Greece, domestic core values continue to place constraints on further progress. For instance, Turkey could grant more religious freedom to its Orthodox community. 99 But with the international community, Turks feel that they can rely only on themselves, and the EU concern over Turkey’s human rights record is widely viewed “as part of a design to undermine Turkish national unity.”100 Engagement with Greece is considered risky for any incumbent government because it tends “to generate widespread nationalist sentiments.”101 The opposition can easily brand concessions, even if mutual, as giving in to outsiders and contrary to Turkish interests. Public opinion surveys in Turkey show that there continue to be very low levels of trust in the society, and “popular sentiment towards Greeks tends to be quite negative.”102 Turkey may have engaged with Greece in part due to the “earthquake diplomacy” that occurred after the catastrophic earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999.103 Consistent with the economic norms expectation of a new universalism in Greek identity, many Greek individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities, in addition to the Greek government, offered substantial help to the Turks in their time of need. This opened a temporary window of good feeling toward Greece in Turkey that allowed Ankara to sign a number of confidence-building measures with Athens. [End Page 80] An alternative explanation for the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations might be the constraining and moderating role of the EU. It is true that Turkey’s constructive responses to Greek initiatives have been at least partly aimed at satisfying EU conditions for full membership. For instance, after refusing for decades to allow an international solution to the Cyprus dispute, Ankara acquiesced after the EU made doing so a condition of Turkey’s candidacy. In this way, the carrot of the EU acts as political cover for Turkish politicians, just as the EC once did for Greek politicians, offering leaders an “excuse” for “giving in” to the foreigners. Given Greece’s full membership in the EU since 1981, however, EU incentives do not offer a satisfying account for the changes in Greek politics and foreign policy in the 1990s. Recognition of the EC’s role in Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy suggests some promise for a more stable peace between Greece and Turkey in the years ahead. Like Greece in the 1980s, after Turkey became an official EU candidate, it experienced an explosion of foreign direct investment. 104 In the 1990s Turkey also experienced a rise in per capita life insurance contracting. If the rate of growth of the 1990s continues, the country will pass the contract-intensive threshold in the year 2019. If the time lag for political change after the economic transition in Turkey is the same as it was in Greece (seven years), significant moderation and individualization of Turkey’s political culture may occur around 2026. If the EU continues to act as an incentive for institutionalizing the market and as a source of foreign investment, Turkey’s change could come sooner.105 Economic norms theory would predict that when this happens, all of Turkey’s security-related issues with Greece will be positively and permanently settled; the enduring rivalry will end; and fatal militarized confrontations in this dyad will be a thing of the past. Conclusion Many policymakers and scholars of international relations believe that the promotion of democracy abroad will enhance global order and the security of the United States and its allies. Yet since the terrorist attacks on New York and [End Page 81] Washington on September 11, 2001, efforts to promote democracy as part of U.S. grand strategy in the Muslim Middle East only increased the influence of anti-U.S. factions in the region, including in Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. This study challenges the strategic assumptions of U.S. policymakers by showing that democracy is not a likely cause of peace among nations. Rather, domestic economic conditions appear to be the main factor in promoting peace. Scholars have erroneously linked democracies with peace because most contract-intensive nations are democratic. But this study showed that about half of all democratic nations lack contract-intensive economies, and these democratic countries are not peaceful. Indeed, all the potential exceptions to the democratic peace—such as the Spanish-American War, the Continuation War of Finland against the Allies during World War II, and the Kargil war between India and Pakistan—are easily accounted for in this study because in each of these wars the democracy on at least one of the sides lacked a contract-intensive economy. This article examined the implications of economic norms theory, which integrates the insights of bounded rationality with research by economic historians to show how voter preferences for democracy and respect for individual rights and equal protection under the law may be rooted in the conditions unique to social market economies, where individuals trust both strangers in making contracts and a state that enforces them with impartiality. In many middle- and low-income countries, in contrast, high structural unemployment encourages dependence on the patronage of friends and family. This dependency can promote the heuristics of identifying and trusting in-groups and their leaders, and distrusting strangers from out-groups and state institutions. The study traced the path of causation from economic norms to interstate peace across levels of analysis and methodologies and found that contract-intensive societies are associated with higher levels of trust. It is not this trust, however, that causes peace among contract-intensive nations: peace is the result of a fundamental agreement among voters and elites in these countries on the Westphalian order of sovereign states, including the primacy of international law over power politics and imperialist bullying. This agreement emerges from the heuristics of their common economic way of life. Leaders of states with contract-intensive economies thus perceive common security interests in defending the global status quo and are in natural alliance against any state or nonstate entity that seeks to challenge it. Although democracies are not inherently peaceful, there is a conditional role for democracy in the economic peace: Because contract-intensive economy [End Page 82] promotes the heuristics that value individual freedom and equitable government, most contract-intensive nations have liberal democratic governments. Valuing democracy, voters and elites in contract-intensive democracies tend to value the promotion of individual rights and democracy abroad. They therefore restrain themselves from fighting other countries perceived as democratic, regardless of their economic or foreign policy behavior. These patterns were confirmed in the quantitativ

### Impact D

#### Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts

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Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products. Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years. But regardless of the difference in timescale, capitalism and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems. And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well. If we consider democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized, the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf. Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: "Something will turn up."

### 1NC – Environment

#### I’ll concede transition on Earth occurs as a result of the global commons, but that’s bad:

#### No alternative to growth for emissions – EKC is true for developed countries – their datasets include countries that haven’t reached the tipping point.

Acaravci and Akalin 17 [Ali Acaravci & Guray Akalin 17. 1 Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Mustafa Kemal University. 2017. “Environment–economic Growth Nexus: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries.” International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 34–43.] Recut Jet

6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS Since the early 1970s, especially after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the relationship between production and environmental concerns has been handled by different methods in different disciplines. This is because the environment is of vital importance for human life, and they are confronted with serious environmental problems. The most important of these problems are as follows: The risk of going over the environmental pollution assimilation capacity; the difficulty in return of natural balance in the environment; large-scale health problems caused by environmental pollution; rapid depletion of natural resources; global warming and climate change, and the resulting related natural disasters such as floods; the reduction of biodiversity, air pollution, and soil pollution. Empirical studies on the environmental pollution–economic growth nexus explore the validity of the EKC hypothesis which states that environmental pollution will increase up to a certain threshold of income growth, and after this threshold, will begin to decrease due to the demand for a clean environment and structural and technological inputs. If the EKC hypothesis is valid, economic growth is both cause of and solution to environmental pollution. This approach is often used when arguing that countries should not compromise economic growth policies to reduce environmental effects. The EKC hypothesis is not valid in cases where economic growth that increased production is the only cause of environmental pollution. This has accelerated the search to replace the neoclassical growth strategy. Especially highlighted by the 1992 UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro, a win-win approach to understanding the appropriate account of the ecological paradigm has gained importance in recent years. Therefore, the validity of the EKC hypothesis is an important issue in formulating economic growth policies for all countries. In this study, the following two samples are used: (i) 40 highincome countries (OECD members and non-members) and (ii) 33 upper middle-income countries. These countries are selected according to data available from related income groups. The results from the dynamic panel data methods are as follows: (i) The Durbin–Hausman cointegration test shows that there is a long-term relationship between variables. (ii) The results from the CCE estimator indicate that there is evidence of validity of the EKC hypothesis in developed countries. (iii) The EKC hypothesis is not valid in the developing countries. These results show that economic growth is sufficient enough to safeguard environmental quality for developed countries. However, developing countries have not yet reached income levels high enough to be able to derive their turning points. Therefore, to reduce environmental pollution that comes with economic growth, developing countries should give importance to R&D activities and institutionalization of environmental awareness. An increase in environmental awareness is imperative and developing and developed countries must not forget the fact that the natural world of tomorrow will be created today. Also, our findings show that trade liberalization is not harmful for the environment in developed and developing countries. This means that the increase of trade volume will not produce more carbon emissions. Despite the results obtained for the developed countries, we cannot assume that environmental betterment will continue to accompany further growth of per capita income in developed countries. So that, future studies can examine the relationship between economic growth and other pollutants. Because, along with the economic growth it may increase the amount of other pollutants.

#### It’s sustainable – data proves we’re entering the golden age

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The past 30 years have seen immense progress **in improving the quality of life for much of humanity**. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 **billion to** around 650 **million**. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, **the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history**. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 **increased by 56%.** Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, **something has begun to change.** Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, **global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline**. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, **peak oil is upon us** — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative **decoupling** between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP **falling for the past 60 years**. This is the case even in countries like **India and China** that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track **to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth** — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 **and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade**. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people **have absolutely decoupled** emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. **While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions.** One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore **leakage**. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries **has actually declined over the past 15 years.** This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) **have jointly declined**. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. **Absolute decoupling is possible.** There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the **services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels** — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle **be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives**, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

#### Transition is worse for emissions– Socialist leaders value victories over the environment

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism] Recut Jet

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines. The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population

### 1NC – Poverty

#### Perceived status threats trigger psychological predispositions that favor authoritarianism – leads to extremism and far right backlash

Stenner and Stern 21 [Karen Stenner and Jessica Stern, 2/11/21, Foreign Policy, "how to live with authoritarians," https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/11/capitol-insurrection-trump-authoritarianism-psychology-innate-fear-envy-change-diversity-populism/, mm] Recut Jet

Even after the Jan. 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, 60 percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters still approved of Donald Trump's performance as president. Though this level of popular support baffles many Americans, it follows in the tails of an approval rating that while generally hovering around a modest 40 percent remained remarkably steady throughout Trump's blunderous presidency and near-constant assault on democratic norms and institutions. Knee-jerk Beltway attempts to explain away this loyal adherence tend to revert to suggestions that Trump supporters are uneducated or impoverished or both mostly angry at being 'left behind' by the new economy. Now, after a mob of Trump supporters quite literally laid siege to U.S. democracy, it's clear that there are more significant and enduring factors at play. Growing evidence suggests that Trumpism and right-wing populist movements like it must prompt a serious reckoning with vulnerabilities not just within the U.S. political system but within liberal democracy more generally. It may take years to arrive at a complete understanding of Trump's surprising mass appeal, but prior research and preliminary studies already suggest a more nuanced view of how authoritarians and malignant nationalists rise. Rather than tangible economic grievance, decades of cross-national empirical research show that feelings and perceptions of sociocultural threat are the principal drivers of surging authoritarian sentiment among the electorate and the demagoguery that rises up to service it. In a modern, multicultural society, certain citizens simply become overwhelmed by growing complexity and rapid change. These individuals fear a loss of their social order, status, and familiar way of life. Whether rational or not, this trepidation provokes intolerance of threats to the collective order, in which they are unusually invested. Trump's support, then, is derived in large part from those who believe he understands and speaks to these kinds of fears. This finding is not meant to excuse Trump, the overt racism of many of his supporters, nor the very real harm they have caused. It is simply derived from decades of research. About a third of the population in Western countries is predisposed to authoritarianism, which is about 50 percent heritable. Authoritarians have an inherent preference for oneness and sameness; they favor obedience and conformity and value strong leaders and social homogeneity over freedom and diversity. That diversity can take any form: whether based on racial or ethnic lines or moral and political difference. Authoritarianism is also associated with some cognitive limitations. Comparative data suggests that the United States may be somewhat overstocked with authoritarians, though they may simply be more easily identifiable in the country's high-arousal political environment. This predisposition to favor oneness and sameness exists on a spectrum, from very low to very high authoritarianism. Importantly, the predisposition which is stable and enduring but normally latent is activated and expressed when triggered by perceived political or social disorder. Once authoritarianism is understood in relation to suppressing difference especially in the face of threats to oneness and sameness a whole array of seemingly disparate Trumpian stances assume a more universal character: Whether in Washington or Warsaw, Western liberal democracy's ongoing struggle with populism is united by fear. People with innate authoritarian tendencies can be found on both the right and left of the political spectrum, although they are somewhat less common on the left. This leads us to a critical point: Authoritarianism is not the same as conservatism, although they are modestly correlated. Authoritarians' fundamental aversion to diversity complexity and variety is distinct from traditional conservatives' aversion to change which is more about novelty and uncertainty. When the status quo is a modern liberal democracy, traditional conservatives by nature ought to defend any established regime of institutions and laws designed to protect individual rights. Authoritarians, by contrast, can welcome vast social change and blithely overthrow established authorities and institutions if some charismatic strongman is promising them greater oneness and sameness on the other side of their revolution. This distinction may seem counterintuitive given the modern U.S. political system where erstwhile conservatism has largely become synonymous with Trumpism. But it also means that, under the right conditions, conservatives can be a liberal democracy's strongest bulwark against the dangers posed by authoritarian social movements. Still, the rapid demographic transformation of the United States likely provokes both authoritarians opposed to diversity and traditional conservatives averse to change. More nonwhite than white babies have been born in the country since 2013, and the United States will be majority nonwhite by 2043. In concert with the declining life expectancy of white American men, this trend away from a white majority has helped give rise to 'white genocide' and 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theories among white supremacists. Multiculturalism, changing gender norms, and rapid globalization can also provoke both groups some become overtly racist and anti-immigrant or enraged at the acceptance of LGBTQ rights and behaviors they view as morally deviant. Since classic authoritarian defensive stances are invoked to defend a whole regime of oneness and sameness, perceived threats in one domain can provoke defenses in other or all domains. For example, the strongest predictor of a Brexit 'leave' vote ostensibly rooted in racial and ethnic intolerance was support for the death penalty and for the public whipping of sex criminals. In a recent study[ by the Vanderbilt political scientist Larry Bartels, over half of Republicans agreed 'the traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it. 'More than 40 percent concurred that 'a time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands. 'But it's not just Republicans: Significant proportions of both Democrats and Republicans appear willing to endorse violence or violate democratic procedure to defend their values, especially where the president is concerned. A 2019 survey by political scientists at Louisiana State University and the University of Maryland found around18 percent of Democrats and 13 percent of Republicans thought violence would be justified if the opposing party won the 2020 election. In 2014, when Barack Obama was president and Republicans controlled Congress, 30 percent of Democrats supported the president closing Congress and governing without it 'when the country is facing very difficult times.' Still, Bartels's study reveals that the strongest predictor of anti-democratic attitudes among Republicans was not partisanship or political expediency; it was ethnic and racial antagonism. This vitriol was often explained as being rooted in concerns about the political power of immigrants, African Americans, and Latinos, as well as these groups' claims on government resources. An alternative explanation is that this grievance is partly a rationalization on the part of many white Americans and that their expressed racial antagonism is a product of and proxy for underlying authoritarian inclinations. All people have an innate bias toward those like themselves; studies confirm that humans are wired to be tribal. For authoritarians, this bias is greatly magnified. And when put under pressure or given leaders' approval, people may nurture and act on their biases against the 'other.' Prejudice evokes emotions like disgust, fear, pity, and envy but of all these, envy proves the most dangerous. An uptick in envy helps explain why violent hate crimes in the United States are on the rise. The social psychologist Michael Hogg of Claremont Graduate University has argued that dramatic social disruption can lead to highly aversive identity confusion, causing people to demarcate and identify with in-groups as opposed to people different from themselves. In these situations, he says, people may be drawn to extremist groups with exclusionary ideologies and 'strong, directive leadership.' Strongman authoritarians fit the bill. Some Trump supporters feel humiliated by rapid social change. Diana Mutz, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that the most important driver of electoral support for Trump in 2016 was a perceived status threat among high-status groups, which she delineates as white people, Christians, and men. Specific anxieties included declining dominance as a percentage of the overall U.S. population, African Americans' perceived rising status, and insecurity about U.S. global economic power which collectively left them feeling 'under siege.' A recent poll by the Pew Research Center shows that voters' attitudes about gender and race are even more divided today than they were four years ago. All of this paints a grisly picture. But are there any relevant policy lessons for the Biden administration? Joe Biden's electoral victory rested in part on his ability to embrace change and diversity while also representing more traditional values. Now in office, he will need to walk a very fine line to avoid triggering destructive fears among those in the electorate predisposed to authoritarianism .In terms of policy, the Biden administration's emphasis on making permanent the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program seems a promising start, since it has overwhelming public support probably because undocumented immigrants who arrived as children and never knew another home feel more like 'us' than 'them.' It might also be very fruitful for the administration to promote, early on, an emotionally compelling narrative about the critical role played by (loyal, self-sacrificing) immigrant health care workers in saving American lives during the pandemic. But most importantly, those who are predisposed to favor freedom and diversity over authority and conformity must recognize that the authoritarian preference for oneness and sameness is largely innate and unlikely to change. A polyglot, multiethnic populace of mixed morals and lifestyles will almost inevitably prompt flare-ups of both racial antagonism and political or moral intolerance, activating a latent longing for obedience and conformity even autocratic rule that will continue to threaten democracies periodically. The new U.S. administration should promote equity and justice while avoiding a loud and provocative display of stances and messaging that unnecessarily aggravates authoritarians. The progressive policy agenda shouldn't be amended; it should simply be promoted more subtly. Given the ongoing threats of right-wing extremist violence, this may seem unreasonable, if not wholly untenable. But it is achievable if the Biden administration recognizes that even creating the mere feeling or appearance of oneness and sameness can be reassuring to authoritarians. Critically, authoritarian predispositions are not a problem that can just be educated away: In fact, liberal democracy's loud and showy celebration of freedom and diversity drives authoritarians not to the limits of their tolerance but to their intolerant extremes. For this reason, a strong rhetorical focus on a unified Americanness can play a vital role in reassuring and deactivating the innately intolerant.

#### Cap solves poverty--Collapse is not inevitable and political reform is in the right direction – the plan cedes influence of left.

Teixeira and Judis 17—senior fellow at both The Century Foundation and American Progress AND editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, former senior writer at The National Journal and a former senior editor at The New Republic (Ruy and John, “Why The Left Will (Eventually) Triumph: An Interview With Ruy Teixeira,” <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/why-left-will-eventually-win-ruy-teixeira>, dml) Recut Jet

But if you look at other parts of the left, they are actually doing relatively well. If you look at the Netherlands election, the green left did very well, and if you add up the votes of the Socialist Party (a left-socialist party), the greens, Democrats 66 (a left social-liberal party) and the social democrats, the left **hasn’t been totally decimated**. What has really been decimated is the Party of Labor, as the social democrats in the Netherlands are called. We are seeing the same thing in France where the Socialist Party (the French social democrats) candidate did terribly, but [independent socialist Jean-Luc] Melenchon did quite well. The left **still has strength**, but it is **divided up among different political tendencies**. It is going to have to **reorganize itself around an economic program** that is going to deliver what people want, which is **better growth** and **better distribution**. Until that happens, the left will be **in a quagmire**. Judis: I want to look more closely at your argument that the left does better in good times and the right in bad times. Bill Clinton got elected in the wake of a recession in 1992, Barack Obama might not have won the presidency in 2008 if the financial crash hadn’t happened that September. The Populists came out of the farm crisis in 1880s and early 1890s; the New Deal out of the Great Depression. I am not saying that bad times is better for the left, but only that there isn’t a necessary connection in either case and that you are making too facile an assumption about which times promote which politics. Teixeira: Bad times do propel people into motion and produce protest and reaction, but looked at from when you can accomplish the goals of the left of **making society better** and **implementing important reforms**, I think it is **typically easier** when the economy is **expanding fairly rapidly** and **living standards are going up** than when the reverse is true. It is **not a perfect relationship**, but **by and large** I think it’s true. So yeah, Obama can get elected in a situation where he was aided by an economic downturn, but his ability to **put together a progressive coalition** that could **stick together for a long time** and continue to implement reforms was **very much undermined by the economic situation**. Judis: Let’s turn it around and look at the connection between the right and good and bad times. In America, the 1920s were relatively good times, and the Republicans controlled the government the whole decade. Teixeira: The 1920s were not nearly as good a time people think it was. It was a time of relatively slow per capita income growth. It was very unequally distributed, the industrial working class did somewhat well, but the rural areas did poorly, and there were four recessions between 1918 and 1929. It was not such a great time. It was relatively poor compared to the Progressive Era. Judis: So the Republicans did well in the 1920s because they were really bad times? Teixeira: There was a sense of real uncertainty, real economic paranoia. Judis: I don’t think you could call the 1920s bad times. You could call it uneven times. “Bad times” is stretching it. In addition, you have the real bad times of the Depression staring you in your face which is the time of the greatest advance in terms of a left and social democracy in our history. Teixeira: Desperate times make for desperate measure sometimes. There is **no guarantee they will help the left rather than the right**. I think that’s what we saw in the U.S. Obviously it didn’t work out so well in Europe. When I make the general analysis that the left is better off in a period of economic expansion and rising living standards, it doesn’t correspond exactly to the political outcomes you’ll have in those different periods. I am saying that **in a general sense**, the left has the **easiest time making advances** and **improving society** when things are going well **rather than when are going poorly**. Judis: Let’s look at Europe. In some of the countries in Northern Europe that are doing well, the center-right parties are in charge. Teixeira: Yes, but I think you can make the case the center-right parties aren’t exactly in charge in Europe. They also have their problems. The rise of populism in Europe is blowing apart the party system. Judis: You have got Holland, Denmark, Germany, and Austria. Those are all countries that are doing pretty well compared to the rest of the EU and that have center-right governments. Teixeira: The Netherlands is not doing that well. It’s all relative. Their recovery has been somewhat better. Their employment level has been high compared to other European countries, but there are a number of cuts in social services, wages haven’t been going up much, there is a lot more insecurity. Judis: Isn’t Germany doing well? Teixeira:. Germany is doing relatively well, but it hasn’t been a period of expansive growth for them either. There is a lot of wage stagnation and compression there. I **never meant to imply** that you can **perfectly predict social reform from economic outcomes**. But I think it **provides an important lens** on when the left does well and when the left does poorly. By and large when you look at Europe, you see the ~~straitjacket~~ [**dilemma**] that the Eurozone has created in the economies. People are **fearful**, they are **pessimistic**, they are **passive**. This is **very bad for the left**. Until you **break out** of that [dilemma] ~~straitjacket~~, the left is **not going to be able to do that well**, and the right is **going to continue to do relatively well** compared to them, and you’ll see the **continued rise in populism** because people have no faith in the system. So what I am trying to do is to get the left to focus on **getting to a new stage of capitalist growth** and **being able actually to deliver rising incomes**. There is No Alternative to the Left Judis: So let’s talk about how this political change will come about. What I took from your book is that we are currently suffering from secular stagnation, and that to get to a new stage of growth, we will have to implement the kind of left program that you describe. I worry that this argument contains a contradiction. On the one hand, the left can’t get its program enacted as long as times are bad. On the other hand, the only way to get out of bad times is for the left to get its program enacted. Teixeira: I see what you are asking. I think it is going to be **two steps forward**, **one step back**. We are sort of **slouching** toward the next stage of capitalism. I **don’t think it’s going to be pretty**. Political and economic factors are going to propel us in that direction. Ultimately, people want things to work better, they want their problems to be solved. And the **only way** we are going to get there is along the road I have described. I think this **equitable growth** approach that the Democrats united around is the future. The level of growth is going to vary over time, but I think the Democrats are the ones who are going to put us there and I think they are going to be rewarded for it. Judis:. But how does that happen? Isn’t there a crisis scenario implicit in your account? At some time, the current Third Way or neoliberal approach results in another Great Recession and at that point people will buy into a left-wing approach, the left-wing approach will create prosperity and at that time we will have an enduring left-wing or Democratic majority. Isn’t a step like this missing from your argument? Teixeira:. That certainly could be the way it goes down, but it’s **not clear we are required to have a recession** on the level we did in 2007 and 2008, or whether this sort of rolling crisis we have combined with other political events might do it. I don’t know, it’s hard to predict, but I think the great economist Herbert Stein said, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop. Judis: The great socialist Rosa Luxembourg said the choice was socialism or barbarism. I am not saying we are heading toward barbarism, but I think there is a determinism in your argument. I think you are saying that people will eventually choose a politics that will best help them. Reason will prevail. And I am not sure if that holds up historically. When you talk about the EU, you say eventually they will consolidate into a fiscal monetary union. I am not sure that is going to happen. It’s also possible that the Eurozone could break up and that there could be a lot of chaos. We have periods in history where things don’t happen in the best of all possible ways. Teixeira: The trajectory is **ultimately going to take us** to a **different** and **better place**. I think **eventually we will adapt** and we will **get something better** than we have because it is the **only solution to the ongoing problems**. **There is no alternative**. Judis: Countries are sometime structurally unable to do what is in their best interest. In the U.S., we have this strong anti-statist tradition going back to the revolution that seems to get in the way every time we want to do something like what you are proposing. It is possible that contrary to Hegel, the rational won’t turn out to be the real. Teixeira: Of course it is possible, but if you look at the history of the United States, **despite the anti-statist bias** and **despite all the other political problems**, the way the country has evolved over time is toward a **larger government** that **does more** and **provides more for people**. And we **obviously have evolved tremendously** in the social realm as well. Governments don’t do what is rational in the short term, at least rational in the sense you are describing it, but political systems **evolve over time** in a way that is consistent with the values and priorities of the left, and I expect that to continue over time. The 2016 Election Judis: Let’s talk about the 2016 election. Why did Clinton lose to such a weak opponent? Teixeira: The Democrats have an evolving majority that consists of groups like minorities, professionals, young people, single women and what have you, and that’s a true fact. It’s growing over time and it will continue to grow, but it was always mathematically true that if you take the declining group, the white non-college voters, and they move sufficiently in the direction of the other party, that will be enough to undermine your coalition. You won’t win. That’s exactly what happened in 2016. These voters moved rapidly away from the Democrats both in local and state races and in the presidential election. Judis: Why did they move? Teixeira: They do not have any faith that the Democrats share their values and are going to deliver a better life for them and their kids, and I think Hillary Clinton was a very efficient bearer of that meme. Whether she wanted to or not, the message she sent to these voters is that you are really not that important and I don’t take your problems seriously, and frankly I don’t have much to offer you. And that’s despite the fact that her economic program and policies would have actually been very good for these people. There was a study of campaign advertising in 2016 that showed Hillary outspent Trump significantly and that almost none of her advertising was about what she would actually do. Almost all of it was about how he was a bad dude. Voters were **fed up with stagnation** and with the Democrats and they **turned to someone who thought could blow up the system**. The way the Democrats and the left could **mitigate that problem** is to show these voters that they **take their problems seriously** and have their interests in mind, and could improve their lives. I **don’t think there is any way of doing that** without a **new model of economic growth**.

### 1NC – War

#### Capitalism solves war – its anti-imperialist.

Mousseau 19, Michael. "The end of war: How a robust marketplace and liberal hegemony are leading to perpetual world peace." International Security 44.1 (2019): 160-196. Props to DML for finding. (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida)//Elmer

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order

#### Transition wars – Low-growth world causes great power conflict

Drezner 16 [Daniel W. Drezner 16, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, May 2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IOS-Drezner-web-1.pdf>]

Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

#### Capitalism is sustainable – regulations will solve environmental problems

Fleisher 2009 [Chris, Valley News Business Writer, “Is Capitalism Sustainable?” http://www.vnews.com/01182009/5326844.htm]

And there is the physical melting of the polar ice caps amid rising temperatures, leading to warnings of global peril if climate change is not addressed immediately. The two problems are related, according to many who attended a conference at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business last week. In fact, the health of capitalism and the environment are intertwined, and must be managed together if either is going to survive. “Capitalism is sustainable in every sense of the term,” said Anant Sundaram, a professor of business administration at Tuck, during the opening chat last week. “With extremely important caveats.” The conference, which ran Thursday and Friday, posed the question of whether capitalism is sustainable, as an economic system and force on the environment. In panel discussions, professors, consultants, investment analysts and other corporate leaders considered the question and did their best to offer a way forward. Even if the economic circumstances surrounding the question are not pleasant, most of the panelists agreed with Sundaram that capitalism could function without destroying the natural world. But it might not be sustainable in its current form. If it is going to survive as a system of production and exchange, it would have to change, become much more forward thinking and acknowledge new restrictions to keep from gobbling itself whole. The question is more than a conversation topic for a Tuck-sponsored salon. It is being considered by plenty of people in the Upper Valley every day. “One thing that comes immediately to mind when you talk about the topic is our whole floodplain on 12A is covered with buildings,” said Judy Macnab, chairwoman of the Lebanon Conservation Commission, in reference to the Upper Valley's most notorious commercial strip. That development along the Connecticut River is what happens when capitalist impulses are given unchecked access to the natural environment, and a testament to the need for strong zoning laws, she said. Commercial interests are at stake, too. Poor design and heavy traffic have made West Lebanon's Route 12A an unpleasant place to visit, she said, driving shoppers away whenever possible. A better approach would be the path two other developers have taken in Lebanon. One is David Clem of Lyme Timber Co., she said, who has solicited feedback from residents in redeveloping the former Bailey Brothers building on Route 10. Another is a project planned near the crest of Route 120. The landowner, L-A Suncook LLC, owns 289 acres off the eastern side of Route 120, behind the former Wilson Tire building. Suncook, a Philadelphia-based private equity firm, intends to set aside 223 acres for preservation and develop the rest for offices and a hotel. “Both of those are much appreciated for their willingness to work with us, instead of push things down our throats,” Macnab said of the two projects. The incentive to do something that the community wants has some real economic value, according to P.K. Knights, local operating partner of L-A Suncook. The company might realize a higher profit if it were to pack all 289 acres with single-family homes, but there is also value in avoiding a long fight with the city by doing something the community wants. “It might be better to create something the community accepts and move forward in the near future,” Knights said. Going Green More than proper land use, however, there are the buildings themselves. Sustainable development, as it relates to so-called “green building,” was the subject of one Friday morning panel at Tuck. Environmentally sustainable construction is yet another area where profit motives and environmental concerns are becoming increasingly aligned, even during a recession, according to the panelists. “Growth (in the industry) is unbelievable,” said Jim Boyle, founder and CEO of Sustainability Roundtable Inc., a sustainable real estate consultant. The value of green building construction was estimated at $12.3 billion in 2008, according to the U.S. Green Building Council, and projected to be $60 billion in 2010. Dartmouth College has supported a number of sustainable projects and has three buildings on campus certified under the U.S. Green Building Council's LEED program, a benchmark for green buildings. There are different certification levels that consider a building's energy efficiency, use of native materials and other initiatives to reduce its environmental impact. LEED certification has become attractive to companies that want to advertise sensitivity to the environment. But beyond the marketing opportunities, it doesn't always make sense to get certified, said Paul Olsen, of Dartmouth's Real Estate office, who was one of the panelists. Getting certified is expensive, costing as much as $100,000 for a project. “In order to be a green building, it doesn't have to get certified,” Olsen said. “That money could be better spent.” The financial advantages of going green are something Wayne Bonhag considers every day as a principal of Bonhag Associates. His Lebanon-based engineering firm is working on several LEED projects for Southern New Hampshire University, which is watching its bottom line carefully amid the recession. “We are very much aware that we don't want to spend any more money on the capital side of things that won't be coming back to us in the short term,” Bonhag said. Sometimes it doesn't make sense, he said. One industrial client in New Hampshire wanted to line its roof with solar panels. But when Bonhag crunched the numbers, solar just didn't seem to make sense. It was too expensive. However, he was able to find another renewable energy option. “In this particular case, I was able to negotiate a wind purchase,” Bonhag said. “It's still green, and yet we were able to do this so they can buy power.” Not every problem is so neatly resolved. Especially in the financial sector. Socially responsible investing has grown in popularity in the past few years, but has been tested in this recession. The Wilderhill New Energy Global Innovation Index -- a benchmark for green investing -- is down 56 percent since June 30. By comparison, the S&P 500 was down 31 percent over the same six months. Carey Callaghan manages the Energy Alternatives Fund, a mutual fund through American Trust Co. in Lebanon. As its name suggests, the fund invests in companies that, in one way or another, address the twin concerns of climate change and energy supply shortages. Since it was launched last June, the fund has declined 44 percent, Callaghan said. The financial crisis has hurt short-term prospects for some of his companies, as addressing climate change takes a back seat to other pressing concerns. The collapse in energy prices has also affected perceptions about the need to develop alternative fuel. Still, he believes the need for solar technology and alternative fuel sources will not go away. And new regulations that result from this crisis -- for fuel standards, emissions and energy consumption -- could play to his advantage. If the crisis has resulted in anything, he said, it is a healthy skepticism of unbridled capitalism and calls for tighter regulation. “The blind faith of many adherents to capitalism has been put to the test because it's clear capitalism has flaws,” he said. “You need to impose some limits on capitalism.” Impure Capitalism The panelists at Tuck largely agreed. One speaker -- Greg Hintz of the consulting company McKinsey & Co. -- began his introduction with a couple straw polls. First, he asked the audience of about 60 whether capitalism -- simply as a system of exchanging goods -- was sustainable. Most raised their hands in agreement. Then, he wondered whether capitalism, in its pure form -- an open-market free-for-all, with no regulation -- was sustainable in terms of social and environmental needs, able to regenerate the resources upon which it fed. The other panelists wouldn't let him get that far. “No regulation?” Sundaram asked. Pure capitalism, Hintz repeated. The discussion broke down into a series of qualifying questions. No regulation at all? No contracts? Nothing? The question never made it to a vote, and Hintz moved on with his talk. But the provocative suggestion of “pure capitalism” never went away. Later, regulation came up again, and Hintz suggested that if capitalism relied so much on rules and law, then the answer to the conference's question was “no.” Capitalism wasn't sustainable. “I completely disagree,” Sundaram said. It is a system that needs regulation to function, even to establish a clearinghouse where trade can happen, the other panelists suggested. It requires policing to keep its practitioners' safe from their own worst impulses. The economic system upon which our modern world relies would be unworkable otherwise. “I won't accept a definition of capitalism that doesn't have a regulatory component,” said Michael Dworkin, a professor at Vermont Law School. “It becomes meaningless.”

### AT Unsustainable

#### Free market capitalism has survived and will survive again

The Australian, 09 (Staff Writer, “The Case for Capitalism,” 6-25 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685611-16382,00.html)

THE way Australians are selling out of shares will delight doomsayers, giving them additional evidence for their argument that capitalism has failed and that only the state can save us from privation. The number of shareholders has slumped by 14 per cent from 2004, when more than half of us had portfolios. But the problem with the cassandras' commentary is that while they are obviously accurate in pointing to the damage down by the global financial crisis, they have misunderstood the nature of the disease and are peddling a snake oil solution to an imaginary malady. Whatever critics, including Kevin Rudd, claim, there was no crisis in capitalism last year; the laws of market economics did not suddenly stop operating - to suggest they did is the equivalent of arguing that the principles of physics are optional. The immutable rule of supply and demand did not disappear in October, the way wealth is created did not change. In the real world, entrepreneurs continued to produce products and supply services to sell for a profit, just as they have done since humanity first grasped that free exchange on open markets is the only just way to create wealth. Last year's disaster on stock exchanges and in credit markets around the world had nothing to do with capitalism. Rather, it was caused by the folly of financial alchemists, who thought they could con investors that it was possible to make money from trading what were ultimately promissory notes based on the supposed value of bundles of loans. And it was also caused by the incompetence of regulators charged with stopping such market manipulation. According to Financial Times journalist Gillian Tett, the collapse of the $US12,000 billion market for these so-called securities precipitated the much broader slump. In the US, where regulators once required banks to hold reserves of $US800 million to cover loans with a face value of $US10bn, the amount required was reduced to just $US160m. This sort of exposure meant disaster was inevitable, and beyond the global scope of the problem there was little to distinguish last year's crisis from other get-rich-quick schemes throughout history. But critics, such as the Prime Minister in his now-famous essay in which he argued that the state must regulate the economy to protect ordinary people from the ravages of capitalism, miss the point. While the world requires efficient regulation to protect the gullible from corrupt credit markets, this is very different from constraining capitalism itself.

#### Commercial mining solves extinction from scarcity, climate, terror, war, and disease.

Pelton 17—(Director Emeritus of the Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University, PHD in IR from Georgetown).. Pelton, Joseph N. 2017. The New Gold Rush: The Riches of Space Beckon! Springer. Accessed 8/30/19.

Are We Humans Doomed to Extinction? What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up by humanity? The world is now hugely over populated, with billions and billions crammed into our overcrowded cities. By 2050, we may be 9 billion strong, and by 2100 well over 11 billion people on Planet Earth. Some at the United Nations say we might even be an amazing 12 billion crawling around this small globe. And over 80 % of us will be living in congested cities. These cities will be ever more vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other plights that come with overcrowding and a dearth of jobs that will be fueled by rapid automation and the rise of artifi cial intelligence across the global economy. We are already rapidly running out of water and minerals. Climate change is threatening our very existence. Political leaders and even the Pope have cautioned us against inaction. Perhaps the naysayers are right. All humanity is at tremendous risk. Is there no hope for the future? This book is about hope. We think that there is literally heavenly hope for humanity. But we are not talking here about divine intervention. We are envisioning a new space economy that recognizes that there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. Th ere is a new wealth of natural resources and clean energy in the reaches of outer space—more than most of us could ever dream possible. There are those that say why waste money on outer space when we have severe problems here at home? Going into space is not a waste of money. It is our future. It is our hope for new jobs and resources. The great challenge of our times is to reverse public thinking to see space not as a resource drain but as the doorway to opportunity. The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” In brief, we think there is new hope for humanity. We see a new a pathway to the future via new ventures in space. For too long, space programs have been seen as a money pit. In the process, we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above. It is important to recognize there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance. “New Space” is a term increasingly used to describe radical new commercial space initiatives—many of which have come from Silicon Valley and often with backing from the group of entrepreneurs known popularly as the “space billionaires.” New space is revolutionizing the space industry with lower cost space transportation and space systems that represent significant cost savings and new technological breakthroughs. “New Commercial Space” and the “New Space Economy” represent more than a new way of looking at outer space. These new pathways to the stars could prove vital to human survival. If one does not believe in spending money to probe the mysteries of the universe then perhaps we can try what might be called “calibrated greed” on for size. One only needs to go to a cubesat workshop, or to Silicon Valley or one of many conferences like the “Disrupt Space” event in Bremen, Germany, held in April 2016 to recognize that entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything [ 1 ]. In fact, the very nature and dimensions of what outer space activities are today have changed forever. It is no longer your grandfather’s concept of outer space that was once dominated by the big national space agencies. The entrepreneurs are taking over. The hopeful statements in this book and the hard economic and technical data that backs them up are more than a minority opinion. It is a topic of growing interest at the World Economic Forum, where business and political heavyweights meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss how to stimulate new patterns of global economic growth. It is even the growing view of a group that call themselves “space ethicists.” Here is how Christopher J. Newman, at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom has put it: Space ethicists have offered the view that space exploration is not only desirable; it is a duty that we, as a species, must undertake in order to secure the survival of humanity over the longer term. Expanding both the resource base and, eventually, the habitats available for humanity means that any expenditure on space exploration, far from being viewed as frivolous, can legitimately be rationalized as an ethical investment choice. (Newman) On the other hand there are space ethicists and space exobiologists who argue that humans have created ecological ruin on the planet—and now space debris is starting to pollute space. Th ese countervailing thoughts by the “no growth” camp of space ethicists say we have no right to colonize other planets or to mine the Moon and asteroids—or at least no right to do so until we can prove we can sustain life here on Earth for the longer term. However, for most who are planning for the new space economy the opinion of space philosophers doesn’t really fl oat their boat. Legislators, bankers, and aspiring space entrepreneurs are far more interested in the views of the super-rich capitalists called the space billionaires. A number of these billionaires and space executives have already put some very serious money into enterprises intent on creating a new pathway to the stars. No less than five billionaires with established space ventures—Elon Musk, Paul Allen, Jeff Bezos, Sir Richard Branson, and Robert Bigelow—have invested millions if not billions of dollars into commercializing space. They are developing new technologies and establishing space enterprises that can bring the wealth of outer space down to Earth. This is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be the economic reality of the 2020s. These wealthy space entrepreneurs see major new economic opportunities. To them space represents the last great frontier for enterprising pioneers. Th us they see an ever-expanding space frontier that offers opportunities in low-cost space transportation, satellite solar power satellites to produce clean energy 24h a day, space mining, space manufacturing and production, and eventually space habitats and colonies as a trajectory to a better human future. Some even more visionary thinkers envision the possibility of terraforming Mars, or creating new structures in space to protect our planet from cosmic hazards and even raising Earth’s orbit to escape the rising heat levels of the Sun in millennia to come. Some, of course, will say this is sci-fi hogwash. It can’t be done. We say that this is what people would have said in 1900 about airplanes, rocket ships, cell phones and nuclear devices. The skeptics laughed at Columbus and his plan to sail across the oceans to discover new worlds. When Thomas Jefferson bought the Louisiana Purchase from France or Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers that said such investment in the unknown was an extravagant waste of money. A healthy skepticism is useful and can play a role in economic and business success. Before one dismisses the idea of an impending major new space economy and a new gold rush, it might useful to see what has already transpired in space development in just the past five decades. The world’s first geosynchronous communications satellite had a throughput capability of about 500 kb / s. In contrast, today’s state of the art Viasat 2 —a half century later— has an impressive throughput of some 140 Gb/s. Th is means that the relative throughput is nearly 300,000 greater, while its lifetime is some ten times longer (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 ). Each new generation of communications satellite has had more power, better antenna systems, improved pointing and stabilization, and an extended lifetime. And the capabilities represented by remote sensing satellites , meteorological satellites , and navigation and timing satellites have also expanded their capabilities and performance in an impressive manner. When satellite applications first started, the market was measured in millions of dollars. Today commercial satellite services exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. Vital services such as the Internet, aircraft traffi c control and management, international banking, search and rescue and much, much more depend on application satellites. Th ose that would doubt the importance of satellites to the global economy might wish to view on You Tube the video “If Th ere Were a Day Without Satellites?” [ 2 ]. Let’s check in on what some of those very rich and smart guys think about the new space economy and its potential. (We are sorry to say that so far there are no female space billionaires, but surely this, too, will come someday soon.) Of course this twenty-fi rst century breakthrough that we call the New Space economy will not come just from new space commerce. It will also come from the amazing new technologies here on Earth. Vital new terrestrial technologies will accompany this cosmic journey into tomorrow. Information technology, robotics, artificial intelligence and commercial space travel systems have now set us on a course to allow us humans to harvest the amazing riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and even totally new ways of looking at the purpose of human existence. If we pursue this course steadfastly, it can be the beginning of a New Space renaissance. But if we don’t seek to realize our ultimate destiny in space, Homo sapiens can end up in the dustbin of history—just like literally millions of already failed species. In each and every one of the five mass extinction events that have occurred over the last 1.5 billion years on Earth, some 50–80 % of all species have gone the way of the T. Rex, the woolly mammoth, and the Dodo bird along with extinct ferns, grasses and cacti. On the other hand, the best days of the human race could be just beginning. If we are smart about how we go about discovering and using these riches in the skies and applying the best of our new technologies, it could be the start of a new beginning for humanity. Konstantin Tsiokovsky, the Russian astronautics pioneer, who fi rst conceived of practical designs for spaceships, famously said: “A planet is the cradle of mankind, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.” Well before Tsiokovsky another genius, Leonardo da Vinci, said, quite poetically: “Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.” The founder of the X-Prize and of Planetary Resources, Inc., Dr. Peter Diamandis, has much more brashly said much the same thing in quite diff erent words when he said: “The meek shall inherit the Earth. The rest of us will go to Mars.” The New Space Billionaires Peter Diamandis is not alone in his thinking. From the list of “visionaries” quoted earlier, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX; Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic; and Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft and the man who financed SpaceShipOne, the world’s first successful spaceplane have all said the future will include a vibrant new space economy. Th ey, and others, have said that we can, we should and we soon shall go into space and realize the bounty that it can offer to us. Th e New Space enterprise is today indeed being led by those so-called space billionaires , who have an exciting vision of the future. They and others in the commercial space economy believe that the exploitation of outer space may open up a new golden age of astral abundance. They see outer space as a new frontier that can be a great source of new materials, energy and various forms of new wealth that might even save us from excesses of the past. Th is gold rush in the skies represents a new beginning. We are not talking about expensive new space ventures funded by NASA or other space agencies in Europe, Japan, China or India. No, these eff orts which we and others call New Space are today being forged by imaginative and resourceful commercial entrepreneurs. Th ese twenty-fi rst century visionaries have the fortitude and zeal to look to the abundance above. New breakthroughs in technology and New Space enterprises may be able to create an “astral life raft” for humanity. Just as Columbus and the Vikings had the imaginative drive that led them to discover the riches of a new world, we now have a cadre of space billionaires that are now leading us into this New Space era of tomorrow. These bold leaders, such as Paul Allen and Sir Richard Branson, plus other space entrepreneurs including Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Blue Origin, and Robert Bigelow, Chairman of Budget Suites and Bigelow Aerospace, not only dream of their future in the space industry but also have billions of dollars in assets. These are the bright stars of an entirely new industry that are leading us into the age of New Space commerce. These space billionaires, each in their own way, are proponents of a new age of astral abundance. Each of them is launching new commercial space industries. They are literally transforming our vision of tomorrow. These new types of entrepreneurial aerospace companies—the New Space enterprises—give new hope and new promise of transforming our world as we know it today. The New Space Frontier What happens in space in the next few decades, plus corresponding new information technologies and advanced robotics, will change our world forever. These changes will redefi ne wealth, change our views of work and employment and upend almost everything we think we know about economics, wealth, jobs, and politics. Th ese changes are about truly disruptive technologies of the most fundamental kinds. If you thought the Internet, smart phones, and spandex were disruptive technologies, just hang on. You have not seen anything yet. In short, if you want to understand a transition more fundamental than the changes brought to the twentieth century world by computers, communications and the Internet, then read this book. There are truly riches in the skies. Near-Earth asteroids largely composed of platinum and rare earth metals have an incredible value. Helium-3 isotopes accessible in outer space could provide clean and abundant energy. There is far more water in outer space than is in our oceans. In the pages that follow we will explain the potential for a cosmic shift in our global economy, our ecology, and our commercial and legal systems. These can take place by the end of this century. And if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble. Our conventional petro-chemical energy systems will fail us economically and eventually blanket us with a hydrocarbon haze of smog that will threaten our health and our very survival. Our rare precious metals that we need for modern electronic appliances will skyrocket in price, and the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly ugly. A lack of affordable and readily available water, natural resources, food, health care and medical supplies, plus systematic threats to urban security and systemic warfare are the alternatives to astral abundance. The choices between astral abundance and a downward spiral in global standards of living are stark. Within the next few decades these problems will be increasingly real. By then the world may almost be begging for new, out of- the-box thinking. International peace and security will be an indispensable prerequisite for exploitation of astral abundance, as will good government for all. No one nation can be rich and secure when everyone else is poor and insecure. In short, global space security and strategic space defense, mediated by global space agreements, are part of this new pathway to the future.