## 1NC – Off

### 1nc – AT – u/v [0:20]

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – [a] the resolution indicates the aff has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation [b] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

### 1nc – no 1ar theory [0:40]

#### No 1ar theory –

#### [1] 7-6, 2-1 skew proves its always skewed to the aff

#### [2] resolvability double bind – either the judge has to intervene to decide whether the 2ar’s answers to the 2nr’s Counter interp are sufficient or they auto accept every answer and you auto win. Intervention o/ws since it takes the round out of the debaters hands. That also means DTA on 1ar theory – they can initiate offensive DTD theory in the aff and in the 1ar while no judge would vote on 2n theory on severance.

#### [3] Responses to my C/I will be new, and I don't have a 3NR to respond, o/ws on reciprocity

#### 4). Spikes solve-read the shell in your 1AC [4] 2AR persuasion always win – ethos, meta weighing, and answers to 2NR weighing means a good theory debater will always win so it o/ws on norming. [5] Reject Infinite abuse claims a) there's a finite number of rounds and speaking time so it's incoherent b) if I win 1AR theory is abusive it meta precludes infinite abuse, because 1AR theory is also infinitely abusive – flips the script on you. C) NC is reactive [6] It scares novices from checking abuse via 1NC shells, because of fear of 1AR meta theory like combo shells or 'multiple shells bad' – o/ws on chilling and inclusion [7] Mooting – takes out 7 minutes of NC offense to collapse to the higher layer

#### 8). NC theory comes first if something we did was abusive its because the 1AC was abusive.

### 1nc – fwk [0:15]

#### The top level framing issue is that I’m conceding your korsgaard framing and winning under it –

#### [A] takes out all your TJFs – no reason you have an intrinsic benefit to your framing if both sides have offense under it – if they go for it, err neg on TJFs because presumption negates.

#### [B] To preempt any 1ar arguments, this is the best educational model of framework contestation – rather than reading generic util backfiles and them responding to “nO aCt omMisSiOn dIsTiNcTiOn” and the 2n going for extinction o/ws, we have an in-depth clash over nuances of one framework.

### 1nc – universality [0:40]

#### Kantianism is Homophobic: This isn’t just ad hominem but the logical conclusion of kantian philosophy.

#### [A] It holds that being gay is a contradiction in conception, since if everyone had homosexual intercourse, there would be no reproduction.

#### [B] Universality’s conclusion is that queer people literally are not human agents and can be killed with impunity.

Alan Soble, American philosopher and author of several books on the philosophy of sex. He taught at the University of New Orleans from 1986 to 2006. He is currently Adjunct Professor of philosophy at Drexel University in Philadelphia, Kant and Sexual Perversion, The Monist 86:1 (Jan. 2003), pp. 55-89, <https://philpapers.org/archive/SOBKAS> ///AHS PB

\*bracketed and crossed out words for gendered language\*

Given what Kant claims about the meager status of the masturbator and homosexual, that they are below the beasts and no longer deserve to be persons, we would have expected a better treatment by him of the principle(s) by which these practices are to be so severely condemned. (I suppose Kant was led here mostly by emotional disgust at the crimina carnis contra naturam.) This failure to provide a more solid principled foundation for his judgments about sexual perversion is especially surprising, since Kant's intellectual gay-bashing is supplemented**, in effect,** by the advocation of physical gay-bashing [Quote Starts]**:** ~~Man~~ [people] can only dispose over things; beasts are things in this sense; but man is not a thing, not a beast. If ~~he~~ [they ] disposes over ~~himself~~ [themselves], ~~he~~ [they] treats ~~his~~ [their] value as that of a beast. He who so behaves, who has no respect for human nature and makes a thing of himself, becomes for everyone an Object of freewill. We are free to treat him as a beast, as a thing, and to use him for our sport as we do a horse or a dog, for he is no longer a human being**.89** We can dispose of things which have no freedom but not of a being which has free will. A man who sells himself makes himself a thing and, as he has jettisoned his person, it is open to anyone to deal with him as he pleases. Another instance of this kind is where a human being makes ~~himself~~ [themselves] a thing by making ~~himself~~ [themselves] an object of enjoyment for some one's sexual desire [Quote Ends]**.90** Kant's sadistic leitmotifpermits if not encourages treating as lower than animals the animals or things that the masturbator and the homosexual, by their own deliberate choices, have become.

#### Vote neg – In-round reps matter –

#### [A] Inclusion – voting aff cements norms where endorsing violent and exclusionary advocacies is rewarded – that makes the debate space violent and excludes people who find these things traumatic and come to the debate space to escape. Your discourse causes psychological violence and has tangible impacts is perpetuating discriminatory culture which prevents engagements

#### [B] Reversibility – no 1AR apology can solve – reps aren’t reversible.

#### To preempt the 1AR – Indicts more than just kant as a person, we indict universality and neo-kantians so you still link.

### 1nc – kant negates [3:20]

#### Kant negates – to preempt the 1ar, we don’t endorse Kantianism, it just can’t affirm.

#### [1] Humans will make accidents when enforcing universalizable rules - but LAWS minimize errors with enhanced precision, which would make them more efficient moral enforcers

#### [2] No one should murder each other for their own ends, so displacing both intent and responsibility for murder onto LAWS is universalizable. I don’t endorse universality but it still negates.

#### [3] LAWs are autonomous by definition and have their own agency, which means they can have their own reasons for action and thus can reciprocate moral behavior

#### [4] Even if LAWS aren’t capable of true interpersonal moral relationships, 1) It’s non-unique since any technology mediates the moral relationship between the killer and killed 2) LAWS can reduce risk of collateral damage by humans – so states would be obligated to use LAWS to improve everyone’s safety.

Pfaff 19 (Respect for Persons and the Ethics of Autonomous Weapons and Decision Support Systems [C. Anthony Pfaff](https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge?author=589e5a426b8f5b3ad63a70db) [March 4, 2019](https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/3/4/respect-for-persons-and-the-ethics-of-autonomous-weapons-and-decision-support-systems) the Research Professor for the Military Profession and Ethics at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. A retired Army colonel, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department where he advised on cyber policy. The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the Strategic Studies Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or U.S. Government. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/3/4/respect-for-persons-and-the-ethics-of-autonomous-weapons-and-decision-support-systems)

The fact that systems driven by artificial intelligence cannot have the kind interpersonal relationships necessary for moral behavior accounts, in part, for much of the opposition to their use.[13] If it is wrong to treat persons as mere means, then it seems wrong to have a mere means in a position to decide how to treat persons. One problem with this line of argument, which Sparrow recognizes, is all employment of autonomous systems breaks the relevant interpersonal relationship. To the extent humans still make the decision to kill or act on the output of a decision support systems, they maintain respect for the persons affected by those decisions. However, even with semi-autonomous weapons, some decision-making is taken on by the machine, mediating, if not breaking, the interpersonal relationship. Here Scharre’s point is relevant. Morality may demand an interpersonal relationship between killer and killed, but, as a matter of practice, few persons in those roles directly encounter the other. An Islamic State fighter would have no idea whether the bomb that struck him was the result of a human or machine process; therefore, it does not seem to matter much which one it was. A problem remains, however, regarding harm to noncombatants. While, as a practical matter, they have no more experience of an interpersonal relationship than a combatant in most cases, it still seems wrong to subject decisions about their lives and deaths to a lethal artificial-intelligence system just as it would seem wrong to subject decisions about one’s liberty to a legal artificial-intelligence system. Moreover, as the legal analogy suggests, it seems wrong even if the machine judgment were the correct one. This legal analogy, of course, has its limits. States do not have the same obligations to enemy civilians that they do towards their own. States may be obligated to ensure justice for their citizens and not be so obligated to citizens of other states. There is a difference, however, between promoting justice and avoiding injustice. States may not be obligated to ensure the justice of another state; however, they must still avoid acting unjustly toward that other state’s citizens, even in war. So, if states would not employ autonomous weapons on their own territory, then they should not employ them in enemy territory.[14] Of course, while states may choose not to apply lethal autonomous weapons in their own territory in conditions of peace, the technology could get to the point where they would employ such systems under conditions of war precisely because they are less lethal. If that were to be the case, then the concern regarding the inherent injustice of systems driven by artificial intelligence could be partially resolved. Of course, it is not enough that a state treats enemy civilians with the same standards it treats its own. States frequently use their own citizens as mere means, so we would want a standard for that treatment that maintained a respect for persons. As Isaak Applbaum argues, “If a general principle sometimes is to a person’s advantage and never is to that person’s disadvantage, then actors who are guided by that principle can be understood to act for the sake of that person.”[15] So, to the extent systems driven by artificial intelligence do make targeting more precise than human-driven ones as well as reduce the likelihood that persons will be killed out of revenge, rage, frustration, or just plain fatigue, then their employment would not put any persons at more risk than if those systems were not employed. To the extent that is the case, arguably states are at least permitted, if not obligated, to use them. Because employing these systems under such conditions constitutes acting for the sake of those persons, it also counts as a demonstration of respect towards those persons, even if the interpersonal relationship Sparrow described is mediated, if not broken, by the machine.

#### [5] Anti-LAW arguments misunderstand human dignity – it’s not a violation of freedom to be killed by a non-agent, the same way dying of disease is not considered unethical.

**Pop 18** [Pop, Ariadna. “Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Threat to Human Dignity?” Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 25 Oct. 2018, blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/04/10/autonomous-weapon-systems-a-threat-to-human-dignity] Cookie JX

Can a Waldron-style understanding of human dignity come to the rescue and make better sense of anti-AWS arguments? Let us assume that human dignity consists in the high status that human beings occupy in the order of the universe. On such an understanding one might well argue that any use of force by an entity that occupies a lower status fails to grant human beings the respect and deference that they deserve and is therefore a violation of human dignity. The problem is of course that this is precisely *not* the understanding of human dignity that is typically presumed in anti-AWS arguments. As we have seen, proponents of a ban or moratorium on AWS typically rely on a value-based understanding of human dignity. Anti-AWS arguments are therefore either obscure by drawing unjustified inferences or, if the inferences can be justified, they must be based on a different conception of human dignity than the one that seems to be endorsed. Finally, note that endorsing a Waldron-style account of human dignity to make sense of anti-AWS arguments is also not without its difficulties. To begin with, itwould imply that it is also a violation of human dignity to be killed by other entities that occupy a lower status in the hierarch of beings, such as animals, bacteria, or even viruses. This strikes me as counter-intuitive. Moreover, it would have to be clarified why AWS that are endowed with artificial intelligence would necessarily occupy a lower status than human beings. It is problematic to simply stipulate that it is a matter of respect for the high-ranking status of human beings that they do not get hurt or killed by non-humans. This gives rise to the suspicion that ultimately, it all boils down to a form of speciesism: that in the hierarchy of being we simply consider ourselves to be the most valuable form of existence and demand to be treated accordingly, without bothering to explain why this is supposed to be the case. It might well be that proponents of a pre-emptive ban of AWS presuppose a very different understanding of human dignity which would make it much more evident why such a ban would follow. But if that is the case, they must make the relevant argument and spell out the specific understanding of human dignity they presuppose. Otherwise, the use of human dignity is reduced to a rhetoric maneuver, an empty shell, which, depending on the context and purpose of its use, has a very different theoretical underpinning. As I see it, this renders the employment of human dignity not only extremely unattractive in trying to make a specific legal or political argument. It also renders the concept vulnerable to manipulation and thereby undermines the credibility of the debate in question. Given the importance of a serious legal and political engagement with the possibilities and limitations of AWS, such an outcome should be avoided at all cost. In order to advance the AWS debate it is therefore preferable to refrain from using the concept of human dignity altogether, at least as long as no consensus regarding its proper meaning has emerged and the relevant assumptions remain unarticulated.

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#### [6] Lethal autonomous weapons don’t originate with states, but private manufacturers and companies.

**Rohrlich 19** Justin Rohrlich, 11-11-2019, "With no laws to stop them, defense firms are on track to make killer robots a reality," Quartz, <https://qz.com/1746154/lacking-regulation-firms-on-track-to-make-killer-robots-reality/> SJCP//JG

Weapons built by defense manufacturers that can think for themselves are getting smarter, which mean the much-feared killer robot could be a reality sooner than later. That’s the warning contained in a [new report from Pax](https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/slippery-slope), a nonprofit based in the Netherlands that campaigns for peace around the world. Killer robots, or lethal autonomous weapons systems, are designed to make life-or-death decisions on their own**,** without human control. It’s a worrying leap that’s been called the “third revolution in warfare,” after gunpowder and the atomic bomb. Both activists and military leaders have called for international regulations to govern these weapons, or even ban them outright, but key governments—like the United States and Russia—have so far resisted. As far as anyone knows, militaries have yet to actually deploy killer robots on the battlefield, at least offensively. But Pax has identified at least 30 global arms manufacturers that don’t have policies against developing these kinds of weapons systems, and are reportedly doing so at a rate that is outpacing regulation. The companies include US defense firms Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon, the Chinese state-owned conglomerates AVIC and CASC, Israeli firms IAI, Elbit, and Rafael, Rostec of Russia, and Turkey’s STM. “As long as states haven’t agreed to collectively come up with some kind of regulatory regime, or ideally, a preemptive ban, the fear is very real that companies will be crossing this plane and will develop and produce and eventually field weapons that lack sufficient human control,” the report’s author, Frank Slijper, told Quartz. Activists don’t believe that military use of some degree of artificial intelligence is problematic in it itself. The US military is already employing full autonomy in some of its defensive weapons platforms, like the US Navy’s Aegis shipboard missile defense system, which is designed to intercept enemy fire on its own. The US Army is [developing an AI-capable cannon](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2212982-the-us-army-is-developing-ai-missiles-that-find-their-own-targets/), which would select and engage targets on its own, as well as AI-assisted tanks that, as [Quartz first reported](https://qz.com/1558841/us-army-developing-ai-powered-autonomous-weapons/), will be able to “acquire, identify, and engage targets” at least three times faster than any human. But these systems still all require a person to pull the trigger, so to speak. PAX is more concerned about the potential deployment of AI in offensive systems that would select and attack targets on their own without human oversight. The group questions how these weapons would distinguish between combatants and civilians, or judge proportional responses. Legal experts still don’t know who would be held responsible if an autonomous weapon broke international law. And without lives on the line, these weapons could make it easier to go to war, and for those wars to escalate more quickly. The report warns that such weapons would “violate fundamental legal and ethical principles and would destabilize international peace and security.” What they’re building Defense firms don’t produce weapons in a vacuum, Slijper said. Instead, he said, these weapons are developed because companies believe that’s what militaries want in their arsenals. And unlike Google or Amazon, which have both faced public and internal backlash for their work on military systems, companies like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon do almost all of their business with militaries, so they face little risk from the negative reaction of consumers. For its report, Pax sent questionnaires to 50 arms manufacturers that produce military systems, asking each if it had policies regarding autonomous weapons**.** Just eight firms said they had in place principals guiding their AI work. The rest did not reply.

#### That negates – banning LAWs inhibits the sale of LAWs to states’ arsenals. That’s a form of restricting the free economic choices of individuals i.e. to set and pursue the end of exchanging goods.

**Richman 12**, Sheldon. “The free market doesn’t need government regulation.” Reason, August 5, 2012. // AHS RG

Order grows from market forces. But where do market forces come from? They are the result of human action. Individuals select ends and act to achieve them by adopting suitable means. Since means are scarce and ends are abundant, individuals economize in order to accomplish more rather than less. And they always seek to exchange lower values for higher values (as they see them) and never the other way around. In a world of scarcity, tradeoffs are unavoidable, so one aims to trade up rather than down. (One’s trading partner does the same.) The result of this, along with other features of human action, and the world at large is what we call market forces. But really, it is just men and women acting rationally in the world.

#### [7] states cannot verify how other states will act, which justifies possessing weapons to ensure security against non-Kantian states.

John Rawls, Dead Philosopher who taught at Harvard for a bit, The Law of Peoples: with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 2001, ///AHS PB

I shall only briefly mention the question of controlling nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Among reasonably just liberal and decent peoples the control of such weapons would be relatively easy, since they could be effectively banned. These peoples have no reason for going to war with one another. Yet so long as there are outlaw states—as we suppose—some nuclear weapons need to be retained to keep those states at bay and to make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or decent peoples. How best to do this belongs to expert knowledge, which philosophy doesn't possess. There remains, of course, the great moral question of whether, and in what circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used at all (see the discussion in §14).

#### [8] Autonomous weapons do not intrinsically interfere with anyone’s ends because they don’t involve unnecessary suffering – that makes banning illegitimate and a violation of liberty. Their problems are contingent not intrinsic. Outweighs – under an a priori conception agents wouldn’t know how LAWs are used so they wouldn’t unnecessarily ban something that could be useful.

#### the states not use their property the way it sees fit – that’s a violation of the freedom of states – that outweighs on probability – their args are merely speculative and not intrinsic to the action of banning LAWs

#### [10] Submitting to international limits on power is a contradiction in will – it weakens the republic and has no binding force.

Waltz 62 (Waltz, Kenneth N. "Kant, Liberalism, and War." The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 331-40. doi:10.2307/1952369.) //Lex VM

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger-and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.15 Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.'6 A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a common- wealth."'7 Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war. Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition.'8 There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights**.** They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as un- just; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."'19 More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable." Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.2' He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint...**.** 22 His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

#### [11] Put away your intentionality turns – there’s no a priori condition intrinsic to an autonomous piece of metal to have the intentionality of murdering individuals – insofar as it doesn’t have the capacity to reflect upon ends, it’s the same as a tree falling on someone and them dying which wouldn’t be unethical by the tree or the planter of the tree insofar as the act planting is consistent with willing universal maxims. Anything else is consequentialist and assumes the sole purpose is to kill, which is denied by how some are meant to kill mosquitoes, be defensive, etc

#### 12] Objects have no intrinsic nature—a Knife can be used to murder, but it can also be used to slice butter, or not at all. Entities have a prima facie right to own objects even if those objects’ use can be restricted—meaning a ban is an unjustifiable violation of freedom.

#### 13] In the state of nature, enjoyment of rights is uncertain and not guaranteed— limited objects of which humans have common desire means they’ll invariably have competing rights claims—the natural means of conflict resolution is force, which is coercive.

#### An omni-lateral will resolves this.

Ripstein 9 Arthur, Force and Freedom 2009. 7/5/18 AO

Kant characterizes the state of nature as a system of private rights without public right. The apparatus of private rights applies to transactions in it, but subject to three defects that make that application merely provisional. Each of the defects reflects difficulties of unilateral action. Objects of choice cannot be acquired without a public authorization of acquisition; private rights cannot be enforced without a public mechanism through which enforcement is authorized by public law; private rights are indeterminate in their application to particulars without a publicly authorized arbiter. Even the innate right of humanity is insecure in such a condition, both because no remedy is possible in case of a completed wrong against a person, and because even the protective right to defend your person against ongoing attack is indeterminate in its application. These problems can only be solved by a form of association capable of making law on behalf of everyone, and authorizing both enforcement and adjudication under law.

#### It negates.

Thomas Hobbes 68 [Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, was an English philosopher who is considered one of the founders of modern political philosophy]; Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Printed for Andrew Ckooke , at the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-Yard, 1651.

Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command; which command the sover- eign instituted, therefore hath, because the command of the militia, with- out other institution, maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore, whosoever is made general of an army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.

#### 14] International order is a state of nature—states ought not restrict their own power since they’re contractually obligated to their respective peoples.

Waltz ’62 (Waltz, Kenneth N. "Kant, Liberalism, and War." The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 331-40. doi:10.2307/1952369.)

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger-and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.15 Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.'6 A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a common- wealth."'7 Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war. Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition.'8 There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as un- just; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."'19 More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable." Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.2' He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint.... 22 His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

#### 15] Only robots can be legitimately employed in self-defense – human standing armies intrinsically treat their soldiers as means to an end.

Lippert-Rasmussen 09 [Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen works at the Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University and at the Philosophy Department at University of Tromsø.) "Kant On The Asymmetry Between Standing Armies And Citizens' Militias" Annual Review Of Law And Ethics, 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43593974, DOA:1-15-2021 // WWBW]

**Kant’s** non-contingent objection to standing armies is this. He **assumes that standing armies are made up of people who are paid to be soldiers and then claims that "being out hired out to kill or to be killed seems to constitute a use of human beings as mere machines** and tools in the hand of another (the state), a use which is incompatible with the rights of humanity in our own person".7 It would appear that Kant defines a standing army as an army of paid soldiers, so **standing armies are morally problematic, according to Kant, in virtue of their definitional properties.** While it is logically possible to imagine a world of nations with non-menacing, cost-constant standing armies, **it is not logically possible to imagine nations with standing armies that do not treat soldiers are mere machines and tools.** At least, this is what I take Kant to be claiming. On a natural reading, to treat someone as a mere machine is different from treat- ing him as a mere tool or means even if something that is treated as a machine is always treated as a mere means.8 To see the difference, consider a case where X wants Y's recognition so badly that he is willing to do anything that will enable him to achieve this aim, e.g. lie to Y, manipulate Y to irrationally change her views on what is admirable, or some such thing. Clearly, X does not treat Y as a mere machine - it makes no sense to want recognition from a machine - and yet X may well treat Y as a mere means in the sense that X uses and is disposed to use Y in whatever ways will serve X's ends regardless of how this affects Y's interests or conflicts with Y's moral claims. For present purposes, we can set aside this finer distinction. We can assume that **Kant's objection**, or at least part of it**, is based on the putative fact that soldiers are used as mere means.** If the state treated soldiers and machines in some way differently, e.g. because all soldiers receive training in acts of psychological warfare that can only be carried out by rational beings, and at the same time treated soldiers as mere means to win wars, Kant's objection to standing armies would still apply.

#### 16] LAWs are key to self-defense

Ackerman 15 Evan Ackerman 7-29-2015 "We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why" <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/we-should-not-ban-killer-robots> (senior writer for IEEE Spectrum’s award-winning robotics blog, Automaton. Since 2007, he has written over 6,000 articles on robotics and emerging technology, covering conferences and events on every single continent except Africa, Antarctica, Australia, and South America (although he remains optimistic). In addition to Spectrum, Evan’s work has appeared in a variety of other online publications including Gizmodo and Slate, and you may have heard him on NPR’s Science Friday or the BBC World Service if you were listening at just the right time.)//Elmer

What we really need, then, is a way of making **autonomous armed robots** ethical, because we’re not going to be able to prevent them from existing. In fact, the most significant assumption that this letter makes is that armed autonomous robots are inherently more likely to cause unintended destruction and death than armed autonomous humans are. This may or may not be the case right now, and either way, I genuinely believe that it won’t be the case in the future, perhaps the very near future. I think that it will be possible for robots to be as good (or better) **at identifying hostile enemy combatants as humans**, since there are rules that can be followed (called Rules of Engagement, for an example see page 27 of this) to determine whether or not using force is justified. For example, does your target have a weapon? Is that weapon pointed at you? Has the weapon been fired? Have you been hit? These are all things that a robot can determine using any number of sensors that currently exist. It’s worth noting that Rules of Engagement generally allow for engagement in the event of an imminent attack. In other words, if a hostile target has a weapon and that weapon is pointed at you, you can engage before the weapon is fired rather than after in the interests of self-protection. **Robots could be even more cautious** than this: you could program them to not engage a hostile target with deadly force unless they confirm with whatever level of certainty that you want **that the target is actively engaging them already**. Since robots aren’t alive and don’t have emotions and don’t get tired or stressed or distracted, **it’s possible for them to just sit there, under fire, until all necessary criteria for engagement are met.** Humans can’t do this.

### 1nc – AT – offense

#### The LBL

#### 1 point – a] defensive laws disprove, things for the purpose of defense. B] lethal can mean purposed for killing other laws which proves no offense

#### 2 point – a] state of war required to reconcile rights violations, conflicts, etc. b] laws aren’t always active and the card doesn’t warrant that

The taxation stuff – laws are developed by independent organizations

Tax wont decrease