## 1

**CP: Do the affirmative outside of debate. The 1AC operates from the position of the intellectual— acting as the interpreter of the truth to debate community as a revolutionary mass. They are just another part of the productive process.**

**Berardi**, Franco " Bifo " Berardi (born 2 November 1948 in Bologna, Italy) is an Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism, Precarious Rhapsody, **2009**, [www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/PrecariousRhapsodyWeb.pdf](http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/PrecariousRhapsodyWeb.pdf) ///AHS PB

The role of **intellectuals** is central in the political philosophy of the twentieth century, and particularly in communist revolutionary thought. In What is to be Done?, Lenin asks himself how it is possible to organize collective action, and how the activity of intellectuals can become effective. For Lenin intellectuals are not a social class; they have no specific social interests to uphold. They **are** generally **an expression of parasitic profit and** can make ‘purely intellectual’ choices, **turn**ing **themselves into intermediaries and organizers of a revolutionary consciousness descending from philosophical thought. In this sense intellectuals are very similar to the pure becoming of the ‘spirit,’ to the Hegelian unfolding of self-consciousness. On the other hand, the workers,** still bearers of social interests, **can only pass from a purely economic phase** (the Hegelian ‘in itself’ of the social being) **to a politically conscious phase** (the ‘for itself’ of selfconsciousness) **through the political form of the party, which incarnates and transmits a philosophical legacy**. Marx speaks of the proletariat as heir to German classical philosophy: thanks to workers’ struggles a historical realization of the dialectical horizon becomes possible – the arrival of the end-point of German philosophical development from Kantian Enlightenment to romantic idealism. In Gramsci the reflection on intellectuals connotes social analysis, and approaches a materialist formulation of the ‘organic’ relationship between intellectuals and the working class. Nonetheless, the collective dimension of intellectual activity remains within the party, defined as the collective intellectual. The intellectual of the Gramscian tradition (the one that has yet to be put to work by the digital network) therefore cannot access the collective and political dimension except through the party. But in the second part of the twentieth century, **following mass education and the techno-scientific transformation of production which came about through the direct integration of different knowledges, the role of intellectuals was redefined**. No longer are intellectuals a class independent of production, or free individualities that take upon themselves the task of a purely ethical and freely cognitive choice; instead **the intellectual becomes a mass social subject that tends to become an integral part of the general productive process**. Paolo Virno uses the term ‘mass intellectuality’ to denote the formation of social subjectivity tied to the mass standardization of intellectual capacity in advanced industrial society.

## 2

#### Vote neg to vote aff –it destroys the semiotic economy of debate –they’re gonna say “vote aff to vote neg to vote aff” – but

#### a. their automative response to this shows they can’t escape the normative debate techne, which is another double turn with Baudrillard’s idea of communicative exchange as the mode of production

#### b. any attempt to create exclusivity of their position is an attempt to draw a distinction between signifier and signified which links back into systems of meaning they critique.

#### c. voting aff is an active action – requiring the judge to rationalize their RFD and contradicts the passivity in the face of communication. Instead, vote for me and just don’t give an RFD.

#### 2. The only reason negation is good is because it can’t be exchanged within economies of meaning – but they ask for a ballot as recognition by the judge or topic – you can vote neg to subtract the ballot from the 1AC even if you think the aff is a good idea.

#### 3. Nothing about the aff is new or interesting – half these cards were stolen from Mich KM who were knockoffs of Loyola EM– there’s no endpoint

#### 4) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### 5) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

6. What parts of the 1AC were transformative or anti-capitalist? The parts where they read established scholars, using standard citational practices? Or the parts where they organized cards into a conventional 1AC and used NSDA Campus’s servers to broadcast?

7. Ballot not key---competitive incentives dilute solvency and permit affirming Cooper City’s scholarship without tying it to external action. Nothing leaves Zoom Room 4025 other than a winner and a loser

#### 8. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted

## 3

#### Text – മലയാളത്തിൽ അഫ് ചെയ്യുക

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards black and brown bodies

Conquergood 1, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### The counterplan is a form of semiotic opacity that ruptures the hegemony of text through counterculture – an encrypted model of communication allows people to fight back debate’s culture of making rules

**Conquergood 2**, Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research, Dwight Conquergood, TDR (1988-) Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 145-156 (12 pages) Published by: [The MIT Press](https://www.jstor.org/publisher/mitpress) SJDH

**The state of emergency under which many people live demands that we pay attention to messages that are coded and encrypted; to indirect, nonverbal, and extralinguistic modes of communication where subversive meanings and utopian yearnings can be sheltered and shielded from surveillance. In his study of the oppositional politics of black musical performance, Paul Gilroy argues that critical scholars need to move beyond this "idea and ideology of the text and of textuality as a mode of communicative practice which provides a model for all other forms of cognitive exchange and social interaction"** (I994:77). Oppressed people everywhere must watch their backs, cover their tracks, suck up their feelings, and veil their meanings. **The state of emergency under which many people live demands that we pay attention to messages that are coded and encrypted; to indirect, nonverbal, and extralinguistic modes of communication where subversive meanings and utopian yearnings can be sheltered and shielded from surveillance.** Gilroy's point is illustrated vividly by Frederick Douglass in a remarkable pas- sage from his life narrative in which he discussed the improvisatory performance politics expressed in the singing of enslaved people. It is worth quoting at length:3 But, on allowance day, those who visited the great house farm were peculiarly excited and noisy. While on their way, they would make the dense old woods, for miles around, reverberate with their wild notes. These were not always merry because they were wild. On the contrary, they were mostly of a plaintive cast, and told a tale of grief and sorrow. In the most boisterous outbursts of rapturous sentiment, there was ever a tinge of deep melancholy [...]. I have sometimes thought that the mere hearing of those songs would do more to impress truly spiritual-minded men and women with the soul-crushing and death-dealing character of slavery, than the reading of whole volumes [...]. Every tone was a testimony against slavery [...]. The hearing of those wild notes always [...] filled my heart with ineffable sadness [...]. To those songs I trace my first glimmering conceptions of the dehumanizing character of slavery [...]. Those songs still follow me, to deepen my hatred of slavery, and quicken my sympa- thies for my brethren in bonds. ([1855] 1969:97-99) Enslaved people were forbidden by law in Igth-century America to acquireedged the deeply felt insights and revelatory power that come through the em- bodied experience of listening to communal singing, the tones, cadence, vocal nuances, all the sensuous specificities of performance that overflow verbal content: "they were tones loud, long, and deep" (99). In order to know the deep meaning of slavery, Douglass recommended an experiential, participatory epistemology as superior to the armchair "reading of whole volumes." Douglass advised meeting enslaved people on the ground of their experience by exposing oneself to their expressive performances. In this way, Douglass anticipated and extended Johannes Fabian's call for a turn "from informative to performative ethnography" (1990:3), an ethnography of the ears and heart that reimagines participant-observation as coperformative witnessing: If any one wishes to be impressed with a sense of the soul-killing power of slavery, let him go to Colonel Lloyd's plantation, and, on allowance day, place himself in the deep pine woods, and there let him, in silence, thoughtfully analyze the sounds that shall pass through the chambers of his soul, and if he is not thus impressed, it will only be because "there is no flesh in his obdurate heart." (Douglass [1855] 1969:99) Instead of reading textual accounts of slavery, Douglass recommended a riskier hermeneutics of experience, relocation, copresence, humility, and vulnerability: listening to and being touched by the protest performances of enslaved people. He understood that knowledge is located, not transcendent ("let him go" and "place himself in the deep pine woods, and there [...]"); that it must be engaged, not abstracted ("let him [...] analyze the sounds that shall pass through the chambers of his soul"); and that it is forged from solidarity with, not separation from, the people ("quicken my sympathies for my brethren in bonds"). In this way, Doug- lass's epistemology prefigured Antonio Gramsci's call for engaged knowledge: **"The intellectual's error consists in believing that one can know without under- standing and even more without feeling and being impassioned** [...] that is, with- out feeling the elementary passions of the people" (I97I:418). **Proximity, not objectivity, becomes an epistemological point of departure and return**. Douglass recommended placing oneself quietly, respectfully, humbly, in the space of others so that one could be surrounded and "impressed" by the expressive meanings of their music. It is subtle but significant that he instructed the outsider to listen "in silence." I interpret this admonition as an acknowledgment and subversion of the soundscapes of power within which the ruling classes typically are listened to while the subordinate classes listen in silence. **Anyone who had the liberty to travel freely would be, of course, on the privileged side of domination and silencing that these songs evoked and contested. In effect, Douglass encouraged a participatory understanding of these performances, but one that muffled white privilege.** Further, because overseers often commanded enslaved people to sing in the fields as a way of auditing their labor, and plantation rulers even appropriated after-work performances for their own amusement, Douglass was keenly sensitive to how one approached and entered subjugated spaces of performance. The mise-en-sc&ne of feeling-understanding-knowing for Douglass is radically different from the interpretive scene set forth by Clifford Geertz in what is now a foundational and frequently cited quotation for the world-as-text model in ethnography and cultural studies: "The culture of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong" (1973:452). Whereas Douglass featured cultural performances that register and radiate dynamic "structures of feeling" and pull us into alternative ways of knowing that exceed cognitive control(Williams 1977), Geertz figures culture as a stiff, awkward reading room. The ethnocentrism of this textualist metaphor is thrown into stark relief when applied to the countercultures of enslaved and other dispossessed people. Forcibly excluded from acquiring literacy, enslaved people nonetheless created a culture of resistance. **Instead of an "ensemble of texts," however, a repertoire of performance practices became the backbone of this counterculture where politics was "played, danced, and acted, as well as sung and sung about, because words [...] will never be enough to communicate its unsayable claims to truth"** (Gilroy 1994:37). In addition to the ethnocentrism of the culture-is-text metaphor, Geertz's theory needs to be critiqued for its particular fieldwork-as-reading model: "Doing ethnography is like trying to read [...] a manuscript" (Io). **Instead of listening, absorbing, and standing in solidarity with the protest performances of the people, as Douglass recommended, the ethnographer, in Geertz's scene, stands above and behind the people and, uninvited, peers over their shoulders to read their texts, like an overseer or a spy**. There is more than a hint of the improper in this scene: **the asymmetrical power relations secure both the anthropologist's privilege to intrude and the people's silent acquiescence (although one can imagine what they would say about the anthropologist's manners and motives when they are outside his reading gaze)**. The strain and tension of this scene are not mediated by talk or interaction; both the researcher and the researched face the page as silent readers instead of turning to face one another and, perhaps, open a conversation.

## 4

#### Interpretation: The aff must explicitly specify a comprehensive advocacy text in the 1AC where they clarify how their offense links back to the role of the ballot, is it post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense and a clear explanation of the advocacy’s actor, action and object

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Standards:

#### 1. Engagement – Knowing their advocacy is a prerequisite to making meaningful arguments, so its impossible to engage the aff. Our interp ensures that I read something relevant to your method, and knowing pre-fiat or post-fiat offense gives us a standard for what is relevant. This is true of kritikal affs since there is no norm on what “symbolic terrorism” is in the same way there is for what counts as a plan. Few impacts:

#### a) Education – When two ships pass in the night we don’t learn anything - This also guts novice inclusion because now they can never learn arguments in round.

#### b) Link turns the aff – Your impacts are premised on engaging with issues of oppression, but no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with

#### c) Strategy Skew – You can recontextualize your advocacy to make up reasons why my links and offense don’t link in the 1AR

#### Framing: You can’t use the aff to exclude my shell. My shell simply constrains how you read your advocacy. My method is your advocacy with specification, so if I’m winning comparative offense, the shell outweighs even if method debates in general preclude theory.

## Case

#### The role of the ballot and the role of the judge is to vote for the better debater

#### **Baudrillard is a sexist-vote them down to be accountable for the authors they get away with reading every round. There are plenty of other semiocap that aren’t raging sexists, why not read them?**

#### **Gallop 86,**

Gallop, Jane. 1986. “French theory and the seduction of feminism”

**Baudrillard is**, to my knowledge, **the male French theorist who most explicitly** and most frontally **adopts an adversarial relation to feminism. I would like to quote you a passage** from the first chapter of De la séduction where the theoretical contradiction occurs within Baudril- lard's pronouncement of the proper course for women: 'Now, **woman is only appearance**. And it's the feminine as appearance that defeats the profundity of the masculine. **Women instead of rising up against this "insulting" formula would do well to let themselves be seduced by this truth,** **because here is the secret of their power** which they are in the process of losing by setting up the profundity of the feminine against that of the masculine' (22). When he writes 'insulting formula', he puts the word 'insulting' (; injurieuse ) in quotation marks. **He does not consider it an insult to say that woman is only appearance**. Baudrillard is writing against the history of writing against appearances. He is for appearances, and against profundity, so that when he says that 'woman is only appearance' it should be taken as a compliment. Nonetheless, **when I read this passage, as a woman, I feel insulted**. **Baudrillard would have it that my feeling of offence is a great error** which stems from my inscription within the sort of masculinistic essentialist thinking which condemns appearances as misleading mediations of essences, realities, and truths. Yet, in considering the passage carefully, I decide that it is not what he says about 'woman' that offends me so much as what he says about 'women': 'Women would do well', he advises, 'to let themselves be seduced by this truth.' It is the phrase 'would do well' ( feraient bien de) that irks me. **Although he puts 'insulting' in quotation marks, he uses the word 'truth' ( vérité) straight. He knows the truth - the profound or hidden truth, I might add - about woman, and women 'would do well to let themselves be seduced' by the truth he utters.** He speaks not from the masculine or masculinist position (which he identifies as against appearances and for profundities), but from a position that knows the truth of the feminine and the masculine and can thus, from this privileged position beyond sexual difference, advise women how best to combat masculine power. **It is his assumption of this position of superiority, of speaking the truth - more than any content of 'truth' that he may utter - which offends me. Women, he warns, are in danger of losing their power, but if they would only let themselves be seduced by what he says ... A line if ever I heard one.**

#### Outweighs

#### 1 – Testimony - you reading Baudrillard is injecting sexist scholars within debates and appealing to his moral authority – highest layer since it causes psychological violence and has tangible impacts is perpetuating masculine culture which prevents debaters from engaging in your system of symbolic death. 2 – Solves their offense – even if his args are valuable, just read them as analytics or use another philosopher. You have to justify the action of reading Baudrillard himself. it doesn’t matter if his theory is good for sexism

#### 3 –turns the aff because sexism is rooted in the idea that men have a duty to produce and women have a duty to facilitate that production of labor – the aff reproduces the capital relations of sexism

#### 4. Yikes - Baudrillard has literally advocated for killing women as an edgy experiment. He views women as objects to be acted upon and for men to sacrifice—he perpetuates rape culture because he thinks women who say they’ve been abused are lying and hysterical—the cherry on top is he blames failure of revolutionary thought on women because feminist scholars don’t agree with his misogynist theories

#### 5. Objectification – he literally says to be women are only to be appearance and attempting to resist this is futile. That’s Gallop. Objectifying women is probs bad - This is literally engrained in his theories

#### 6. Subjection location – Baudrillard claims not to speak from the masculine viewpoint but the position of truth where he can advise women… but he just masks his privilege recreating patriarchal norms

#### Also drop them for reading baudrillard 3 more reasons

#### Baudrillard has consistently displayed orientalist and racist representations of Asian peoples.

**Krishna 93**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 1993 [Sankaran, Alternatives, Summer, p. 403-404]

Consider Baudrillard. Besides his facile equation of "traditional" with "primitive" in his discussion of the Third World,'" he also notes the following: The [womxn] women of Thailand are so beautiful that they have become the hostesses of the Western world, sought after and desired everywhere for their grace, which is that of a submissive and affectionate femininity of nubile slaves—now dressed by Dior—an astounding sexual come-on in a gaze which looks you straight in the eye and a potential acquiescence to your every whim. In short, the fulfillment of Western men's dreams. Thai women seem spontaneously to embody the sexuality of the Arabian Nights, like the Nubian slaves in ancient Rome. Thai men, on the other hand, seem sad and forlorn; their physiques are not in tune with world chic.... What is left for these men but to assist in the universal promotion of their [womxn]women for high- class prostitution?" The Orientalist and racist nature of this passage hardly deserves elaboration." Similarly the "Third World" is a largely forgotten area in the writings of a Lyotard whose essentialized distinctions between Orient and Occident in terms of "the most highly developed societies" versus the primitive societies serve as an example of such a politics of forgetting."

#### 2). Baudrillard’s relativism justifies ignoring atrocities – conflict is real, denying it is worse.

Every ‘7

[Peter, Department of Computing at Coventry University. “The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War.” <http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War>] pat

Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: “Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war‐games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real‐world, factual possibility” (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: “Exchanging war for the signs of war” (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail‐safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard’s eyes, such a claim would be “banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy” (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) ‐ offering a delusory refuge from the “knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood” (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty’s position in “Contingency, Irony and Solidarity” in which: “To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there ‐ cannot exist independently of the human mind ‐ because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there”. (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty’s position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving ‘eye witnesses’ to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber’s existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real – Virilio’s ‘interruptions’ – such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye‐witness survivors. Baudrillard’s take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: “There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive ‘simulacrum’ of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation” (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post‐modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard’s “(un)truth claim” lost its own persuasive appeal – breaking the bounds of virtually every consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled “La Guerre du Golfe n’a pas en lieu” (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation ‐ An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that “this ‘simulated’ war has not been entirely a product of mass media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country’s infrastructure” (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the ‘facts’ had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: “If we have no practical knowledge of this war ‐ and such knowledge is out of the question ‐ then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more ‘virtual’ than the events themselves, not to re‐establish some criterion of truth ‐ for this we lack the means” (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox ‐ that in the same article he can admit the ‘facts’ as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error ‐ both cannot be true.

#### 3). Baudrillard over-totalizes and is western centric

Robinson 13 (Andrew, political theorist and activist, weekly contributor to Ceasefire magazine, author of *Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social movements, networks and hierarchies*, “Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique”, Ceasefire Magazine, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/)//Elmer

One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise. Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has notended older modalities of brutality. At times, Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’. This may be because his works were mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911. Another problem is a lack of a Southern dimension. Like many Northern authors, Baudrillard’s approach mainly applies to the functioning of capitalism in the North. The penetration of the code is substantially less in countries where information technology is less widespread. In parts of Africa, even simple coding exercises such as counting votes or recording censuses are extremely difficult. This is for the very reasons of respondent reflexivity which Baudrillard highlights. People will under-record themselves to stay invisible, or over-record themselves to obtain benefits. And without massive resources to put into its bureaucracies, the system is unable to find enough people who will act as transmitters for the code. Instead, people use their power to extract what they can from the system. Explosions still happen regularly in the South. Furthermore, a contracting system ‘forcibly delinks’ large portions of the globe. Its power on the margins is lessened as its power at the core is intensified. As the system becomes ever more contracted and inward-looking, liberated zones may appear [around the edges](http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Anonymous__Desert.html). Without an element of border thinking, Baudrillard tends to exaggerate the system’s completeness and effectiveness. Baudrillard assumes that any excess is everywhere absorbed into the code. He ignores the persistence of borderlands. And when he talks about the South, he admits that the old regime of production might still exist here: people still work seeking betterment; colonial wars are fought to destroy persisting symbolic exchange; Saddam was not playing the Gulf War by the rules of deterrence. The Arab masses are still able to become inflamed by war or non-war; Iran and Iraq can still fight a real war, not a simulated non-war. So perhaps only a minority, only thse included layers within the North, are trapped within simulation and the ‘masses’. Perhaps reality has not died, but been displaced to the South. It seems, therefore, premature to suggest that the system has encompassed all of social life in the code. To be sure, its reach has expanded, but it has also forcibly delinked large areas of the globe. The penetration of simulated reality into everyday life varies in its effectiveness. At the limit, as in Somalia, simulated states collapse under their own irrelevance. In other cases, an irrelevant state hovers over a largely autonomous society. And the struggle Baudrillard advocated in his early works against subordination as labour-power is not simply theoretical. In fact, there is a constant war, fought at various degrees of intensity, between the system and its others, especially in highly marginal parts of the global South: Chiapas, Afghanistan, the Niger Delta, Somalia, West Papua, rural Colombia, Northeast India, the Andes.

#### Hyper-Reality isn’t true, it’s unfalsifiable, and the Alt Fails

TlMOTHY W. LUKE 91 [\*], Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard. By: Luke, Timothy W., Social Science Journal, 03623319, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3, Ebsco //Elmer

Baudrillard's critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and contradictory tendencies in contemporary society that are usually labelled as "postmodernity." Nonetheless, there are considerable weaknesses as well as great strengths in Baudrillard's system of analysis. The tenacity of "reality" or "modernity" in several spheres of everyday life, for example, often still overshadows "hyperreality." Thus, it seems that Baudrillard's major flaw is mistaking a handful of incipient developments or budding trends for a full-blown or completely fixed new social order. The total break with all past forms of social relations cannot be verified either from within or from outside of Baudrillard's frameworks. While he denies finding much systematicity in hyperreal capitalism and sees the end of "production" and "power" in the rise of seduction, Baudrillard still clings to the image of a powerful exploitative system in his call to the masses to recognize "that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic."( n21) This twist in his thinking raises important questions. Why does a social order that no longer really exists need his theoretical intervention to be transformed by mass resistance **if it is not real**, powerful or productive? Likewise, if the history of power and production has ended, then why does Baudrillard envision today's best radical opposition to capital and the state assuming the form of hyperconformity by pushing "the system" into a hyperlogical practice of itself to induce the crisis that might abolish it?¶ On the other hand, Baudrillard's strategy of "hyperconformity," as a means of radical resistance, does not seriously challenge the consumerist modes of domination intrinsic to transnational corporate capitalism. Moreover, its ties to consumer subjectivity do not even begin to address other possible strategies of resistance following lines drawn by gender, race, ethnicity, language or ecology. Unlike Lyotard, he does not advance any new conceptions of postmodern justice or articulate alternative principles to represent meaningful narratives about values in hyperreality. Thus, Baudrillard also can be tarred with the brush of neoconservatism, like many other postmodernist critics of society.( n22) Baudrillard tends to misplace the concreteness of the relations that he is investigating, lumping everything into the category of "seduction" which, in turn, totally subsumes such complex factors as power, production, sex, and economy into one universal force. He claims somewhat contradictorily that "seduction . . . does not partake of the real order." Yet, at the same time, "seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation--without which neither power nor production would even exist."( n23) While Baudrillard makes these claims, he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence.

#### US military influence solves every threat---satellite and tech leadership sustain military overmatch, but decline emboldens rivals and causes miscalc and arms races that escalate.

Hal Brands 18. Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “Chapter 6: Does America Have Enough Hard Power?” American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump; pp. 129-133.

Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps impossible.5 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy that will eventually be punished. Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

#### Shifts in the relative distributions of power cause transition wars even if every actor is benign

Yoder 19 Brandon K. Yoder, Ph.D., Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Centre on Asia and Globalisation, January 28th, 2019, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, Issue 1, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-019-09606-1>, EO

A prominent subset of realist scholars has compellingly argued that this is often the case: large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals, such that uncertainty about others’ intentions is intractable and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions [9, 12, 45, 53]. This is because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak, by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraininßg from attempting to revise the international order. These realists argue that for hostile risers the costs of foregoing immediate revision are outweighed by the prospects of avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future. As such, if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers alike, such signals are non-credible, and declining states should remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s future intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma, and gives declining states strong incentives to take preventive action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior.

#### Cap net reduces war

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order \

Elites react with war – if goods don’t cross borders, then soldiers will.

Liu ’18 [Qian; November 2; Economist, Managing Director at Greater China, citing the economist Thomas Piketty and political scientist Samuel Huntington; Project Syndicate, “From economic crisis to World War III,” p. 1-2; RP]

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.