### 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

Violation is they garner offense from their method and performance – their rotb of the best orientation towards death proves because you can only meet it with a method which is extra t

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny

#### 3 impacts:

#### First is fairness—debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs:

#### A] decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### B] probability: voting aff can’t solve any of their impacts but it can solve ours. All the ballot does is tell tab who won which can’t stop any violence but can resolve the fairness imbalance in this particular debate.

#### Second is switch side and idea-testing and reserach --- only a limited topic that leaves a role for the negative allows contestation and second-order testing that overcomes polarization. Switching sides forces them to scrutinize their own beliefs, which is valuable for developing and defending their own convictions more robustly.

#### Third—small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### Topical version—defend private appropriation being an instance of attempting to avoid death.

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves and is better because it promotes switch-side debate

#### Winning their aff doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model and t is an epistemic indict.

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

### 1NC – DA

#### Xi is tightening control over the PLA but completing goals are critical.

Krishnan 21 – Ananth, 11/18/21, [‘Xi tightened control over the PLA’, TheHindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-tightened-control-over-the-pla/article37549460.ece>] Justin

The new resolution on history passed last week by China’s ruling Communist Party has said that President Xi Jinping had tightened control over the military to address the party’s “obviously lacking” leadership of the armed forces under his predecessors.

The full text of the resolution, released on Tuesday evening, listed some of the actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Mr. Xi, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission. These included what the document described as “major operations related to border defence”.

No specifics

It did not specify what those major operations were. China has unresolved land borders with India and Bhutan. In April 2020, the PLA mobilised two divisions and carried out multiple transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, sparking the worst crisis along the border in many years. Talks to resolve the tensions are still on-going.

“The armed forces have remained committed to carrying out military struggles in a flexible manner to counter military provocations by external forces, and they have created a strong deterrent against separatist activities seeking ‘Taiwan independence,’” the resolution said.

“They have conducted major operations related to border defence, protecting China’s maritime rights, countering terrorism and maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, fighting COVID-19, peacekeeping and escort services, humanitarian assistance, and international military cooperation.”

Last week’s resolution on history was only third such document putting forth the official view on party history, following resolutions passed by Mao Zedong in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping in 1981.

The new resolution dealt more with the future than the past. It essentially reaffirmed the official view on history, saying that the “basic points and conclusions” of past resolutions “remain valid to this day.”

It repeated the conclusion reached in 1981 on Mao’s errors noting that “mistakes were made” and that “Mao Zedong’s theoretical and practical errors concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly serious” leading to the disasters of the Cultural Revolution.

Criticism of predecessors

Much of the new resolution focuses on emphasising Mr. Xi’s leadership and calling for the party to support his “core” status. It only briefly mentioned Mr. Xi’s predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and implicitly critcised some aspects of their leadership including on military matters.

“For a period of time, the party’s leadership over the military was obviously lacking,” it noted. “If this problem had not been completely solved, it would not only have diminished the military’s combat capacity, but also undermined the key political principle that the party commands the gun.”

The document said Mr. Xi’s leadership had tightened supervision on the military including boosting “troop training and battle preparedness”, and it repeated China’s stated goals of completing the modernisation of its armed forces by 2035 and building a “world class” military by 2050, which observers see as meaning on par with the U.S.

‘Working vigorously’

“To build strong people’s armed forces, it is of paramount importance to uphold the fundamental principle and system of absolute party leadership over the military, to ensure that supreme leadership and command authority rest with the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), and to fully enforce the system of the CMC chairman assuming overall responsibility,” the resolution said, adding that “setting their sights on this problem, the Central Committee and the CMC have worked vigorously to govern the military with strict discipline in every respect.”

#### The commercial space sector is one of the PLAs central goals – the plan is a 180.

Bartholomew & Cleveland 19 – Carolyn and Robin, 4/25/19, Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Section is written from Michael A. McDevitt, US Congressperson, [“HEARING ON CHINA IN SPACE: A STRATEGIC COMPETITION?,” <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/April%2025%2C%202019%20Hearing%20Transcript%20%282%29.pdf>] Justin

As the Chairman said, China is determined to become a leading space power, which requires continuing to boost its innovation capabilities, both in its civilian and military sectors. The People’s Liberation Army is closely involved in most if not every aspect of China’s space program, from helping formulate and execute national space goals to overseeing China’s human spaceflight program. Coverage of China’s space program must treat seriously the implications of the reality that in many cases the boundaries between the military and civil silos of China’s program are thin, if they exist at all.

Our second panel today will address the application of what China calls its “military-civil fusion” strategy to its space sector. Military-civil fusion, a strategic concept designed to harness civilian sector innovation to power China’s military and technological modernization with the goal of leapfrogging the United States and becoming a technological powerhouse. Space has been designated as an especially important sector for military-civil fusion, and the impacts of this campaign on China’s burgeoning commercial space sector—itself a recipient of generous government support and protection—will be crucial as Chinese companies increasingly seek to compete in the international marketplace. Military-civil fusion is especially worthy of attention due to its continued reliance on technology transfer, by hook or by crook, to fuel China’s industrial and military growth.

Our third and final panel today will examine China’s military space and counterspace activities. Since its direct-ascent kinetic antisatellite test in 2007, which was responsible for a large amount of all space debris currently in Earth’s orbit, China has continued to invest in a variety of offensive antisatellite capabilities. Indeed, China’s counterspace arsenal contains many options: earlier this month, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan said China “has exercised and continues to develop” jamming capabilities; is deploying directed-energy counterspace weapons; has deployed an operational ground-based antisatellite missile system; and is prepared to use cyberattacks against U.S. space systems.

#### That triggers backlash – they don’t support restrictions on the space sector and will do everything to convince leaders not to do the plan – that causes circumvention

Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 4/9/2014, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation]

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, in. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. [FOOTNOTE] [10]It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. [END FOOTNOTE] If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.

#### An unhinged PLA triggers Himalayan war – goes global

Chellaney 17 [Dr. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Why the Chinese Military’s Rising Clout Troubles Xi Jinping”, The National, 9/9/2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/why-the-chinese-military-s-rising-clout-troubles-xi-jinping-1.626815?videoId=5754807360001]

China’s president Xi Jinping has stepped up his domestic political moves in the run-up to the critical 19th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party next month, but he is still struggling to keep the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in line. China’s political system makes it hard to get a clear picture, yet Mr Xi’s actions underscore the troublesome civil-military relations in the country. Take the recent standoff with India that raised the spectre of a Himalayan war, with China threatening reprisals if New Delhi did not unconditionally withdraw its forces from a small Bhutanese plateau, which Beijing claims is Chinese territory. After 10 weeks, the face-off on the Doklam Plateau ended with both sides pulling back troops and equipment from the site on the same day, signalling that Beijing, not New Delhi, had blinked. The mutual-withdrawal deal was struck just after Mr Xi replaced the chief of the PLA’s joint staff department. This key position, equivalent to the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was created only last year as part of Mr Xi’s military reforms to turn the PLA into a force “able to fight and win wars”. The Doklam pullback suggests that the removed chief, Gen Fang Fenghui, who has since been detained for alleged corruption, was an obstacle to clinching a deal with India. To be sure, this was not the first time that the PLA’s belligerent actions in the Himalayas imposed diplomatic costs on China. A classic case happened when Mr Xi reached India on a state visit in September 2014. He arrived on Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s birthday with a strange gift for his host, a predawn Chinese military encroachment deep into India’s northern region of Ladakh. The encroachment, the worst in many years in terms of the number of intruding troops, overshadowed Mr Xi’s visit. It appeared bizarre that the military of an important power would seek to mar the visit of its own head of state to a key neighbouring country. Yet Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s earlier visit to New Delhi in 2013 was similarly preceded by a PLA incursion into another part of Ladakh that lasted three weeks. Such provocations might suggest that they are intentional, with the Chinese government in the know, thus reflecting a preference for blending soft and hard tactics. But it is also possible that these actions underscore the continuing “disconnect between the military and the civilian leadership” in China that then US defence secretary Robert Gates warned about in 2011. During his 2014 India trip, Mr Xi appeared embarrassed by the accompanying PLA encroachment and assured Mr Modi that he would sort it out upon his return. Soon after he returned, the Chinese defence ministry quoted Mr Xi as telling a closed-door meeting with PLA commanders that “all PLA forces should follow the president’s instructions” and that the military must display “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the party”. Recently Xi conveyed that same message yet again when he addressed a parade marking the 90th anniversary of the PLA’s creation on August 1, 1927. Donning military fatigues, Mr Xi exhorted members of his 2.3-million-strong armed forces to “unswervingly follow the absolute leadership of the party.” Had civilian control of the PLA been working well, would Mr Xi repeatedly be demanding “absolute loyalty” from the military or asking it to “follow his instructions”? China does not have a national army; rather the party has an army. So the PLA has traditionally sworn fealty to the party, not the nation. Under Mr Xi’s two immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, the PLA gradually became stronger at the expense of the party. The military’s rising clout has troubled Mr Xi because it hampers his larger ambition. As part of his effort to reassert party control over the military, Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaign to ensnare a number of top PLA officers. He has also cut the size of the ground force and established a new command-and-control structure. But just as a dog’s tail cannot be straightened, asserting full civil control over a politically ascendant PLA is proving unachievable. After all, the party depends on the PLA to ensure domestic order and sustain its own political monopoly. The regime’s legitimacy increasingly relies on an appeal to nationalism. But the PLA, with its soaring budgets and expanding role to safeguard China’s overseas interests, sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of nationalism. To make matters worse, Mr Xi has made many enemies at home in his effort to concentrate power in himself, including through corruption purges. It is not known whether the PLA’s upper echelon respects him to the extent to be fully guided by his instructions. In the past decade, the PLA’s increasing clout has led China to stake out a more muscular role. This includes resurrecting territorial and maritime disputes, asserting new sovereignty claims, and using construction activity to change the status quo. China’s cut-throat internal politics and troubled civil-military relations clearly have a bearing on its external policy. The risks of China’s rise as a praetorian state are real and carry major implications for international security.

#### Extinction.

Caldicott 17 – Helen, 2017, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility [“The new nuclear danger: George W. Bush's military-industrial complex,” The New Press]//Elmer

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reac­tion. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear [war] holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth

### 1NC – CP

#### CP Text: Vote negative to inject the affirmative advocacy with a radical loss.

**Genosko 16** - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [<http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf>] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those whso are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

#### The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize. It’s try or die for the CP under their role of the ballot.

**Robinson 12** - Andrew Robinson, Ceasefire, August 24th, 2012 “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: From Revolution to Implosion” [<https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-10/>] Accessed 3/9/20 SAO

Baudrillard and resistance Last week, this column explored Baudrillard’s account of the collapse or implosion of capitalism. What does all of this mean for political resistance? For one thing, it means that the dominant system must continue to be opposed. For Baudrillard, there is always something missing from the code. It is always incomplete, leaving a radical remainder. The system is based on a split. The code is differentiated from reality. It has to be, to avoid symbolic exchange. It cannot achieve the complete inclusion which comes about with generalised reversibility. Yet the code tends to take over all of social space. Its “other” disappears or becomes invisible. It tries to be a complete system, a total reality. It largely succeeds in sucking intensity from social life. Yet it also remains vulnerable, because of the exclusion on which it is based. Baudrillard theorises resistance in terms of the irruption of the symbolic in the realms controlled by the code. It is something like what Hakim Bey terms the ‘return of the primitive’. We really need the dimension of the ‘secret’. Its forced revelation is destructive and impossible. The return of the symbolic is discussed in various ways in different texts. Resistance arises when subjects come to see their own programmed death in the accumulation, production and conservation of their subjectivity. They become fiercely opposed to their reduction to the regime of work-buy-consume-die. Resistance becomes increasingly nihilistic, in response to the programming of the universe. It becomes resistance to the code as meaning, and at the same time as lack of intensity. In seeking to restore intensity, it resorts to the modalities of symbolic exchange. The impossibility of “revolution” It is important to differentiate Baudrillard’s view from standard accounts of revolution. To be sure, this is the position from which Baudrillard emerges. In the early work, The Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard argued that the regime of the code could only be destroyed by a total revolution. ‘Even signs must burn’. Baudrillard’s early work can be read as a call for a Situationist-style overthrow of capitalism through a revolution in the everyday, which breaks the power of the code and of signs. In more recent works, Baudrillard rethinks this view. He claims that revolution is now impossible. Baudrillard makes this claim because of the end of production. Revolution was historically seen as the liberation of the productive energy of humanity from the confines of capitalism. But if production no longer exists, this kind of vision has no hold. Labour has become another sign. There is no tendency for it to liberate itself by moving beyond capitalism. Baudrillard is deeply critical of standard leftist responses to neoliberalism. He criticises revolutionaries of his day for seeking a return to the “real”. He sees this as nostalgia for the previous, Fordist period of capitalism. People seek to get rid of the code, and go back to the earlier kind of simulation. Or they seek to identify something which is not yet signified in the system and which ought to be – for instance, excluded groups who should be included. This actually ties people to the prior forms of the dominant system. For Baudrillard, the weapons of the previous period are already neutralised in the order of the code. Revolution is a casualty of the end of the period of system-expansion. Explosions and revolutions are effects of an expanding order. This expanding order is an effect of the regime of production. But simulation is instead an inward-looking order. It is ‘saturated’ – it cannot expand any further. As a result, explosion will never again happen. It has been replaced by the ‘cold’ energy of the simulacrum. Instead, there is constant implosion. The world is saturated. The system has reached its limits. It is socially constructed as dense and irreversible, as beyond the ‘liberating explosion’. Baudrillard believes that we are past a point of no return: the system can’t be slowed down or redirected to a new end. We are in a ‘pure event’, beyond causality and without consequence, and every effort to exorcise hyperreality simply reinforces it. These are little fractal events and gradual processes of collapse which no longer create massive collapses, but exist horizontally. Events no longer resonate across spheres. It is as if the forces carrying the meaning of an event beyond itself have slowed to a standstill. The London ‘riots’ or the student fees protests, for example, do not turn into generalised rebellions in Britain as perhaps they still might in Egypt or Greece. We are in an era of ‘anomalies without consequences’. But the system will nevertheless come to an end, by other means. Even if people can’t revolt, a reaction is certain. Explosive violence is replaced by implosive violence, arising from a saturated, retracting, involuting system. The system has lost its triumphal imaginary because of its saturation. It is now in a phase of mourning, passing towards catastrophe. Things don’t get transcended anymore, but they expand to excess. Baudrillard sees this as the culmination of a kind of negative evolution. Systems pass through stages: a loose state produces liberty or personal responsibility; a denser state produces security; an even denser state produces terror, generalised responsibility, and saturation. Beyond saturation there is only implosion. Anti-consumerism is another target of critique. Criticising consumer society for doing what it claims to do – for supplanting ‘higher’ virtues with everyday pleasures – is a false critique which reinforces the core myth of consumerism. Consumer society functions as it does, precisely because it does not provide everyday pleasures. Rather, it simulates them through the code. Baudrillard also criticises moral critique and scandal, such as Watergate. He argues that the system requires a moral superstructure to operate, and the revival of such a superstructure sustains the system. What is really scandalous is that capital is fundamentally immoral or amoral. Moral panics serve to avoid awareness of this repressed fact. Similarly, critiques of ideology risk reaffirming the system’s maintenance of the illusion of truth. This helps cover up the fact that truth no longer exists in the world of the code. Since there is no reality beneath the simulacrum, such analyses are flawed. It is now the left (or the Third Way) that tries to re-inject moral order and justice into a failing system, thereby protecting it from its own collapse. Baudrillard implicitly criticises theories such as Laclau’s, which seek to re-inject meaning and intensity into politics. For Baudrillard, this task is both impossible and reactionary. Baudrillard sees the system as creating the illusion of its continued power by drawing on or simulating antagonisms and critique. There is thus a danger that critique actually sustains the system, by giving it a power it doesn’t have. Trying to confront and destroy the system thus inadvertently revives it, giving it back a little bit of symbolic power. He also sees conspiracy theories and current forms of Marxism as attempts to stave off awareness of the reality of a systematic code. In any case, the energy of the social is simply a distorted, impoverished version of the energy of “diabolical” forces (i.e. of symbolic exchange). Baudrillard thinks that societies actually come into being, not for the management of interests, but coalesce around rituals of expenditure, luxury and sacrifice. Politics itself was a pure game until the modern period, when it was called upon to represent the social. Now politics is dead, because it no longer has a referent in reality. This is because it lacks symbolic exchange. The absence of symbolic exchange leads also to an absence of possibility of redistribution, either North to South or elite to masses. Fascism also resists the death of the real, in a similar way. It tries to restore in an excessive way the phenomena of death, intensity and definite references, in order to ward off the collapse of the real. Fascist and authoritarian tendencies revive what Baudrillard terms ‘the violence necessary to life’ – they keep up some kind of symbolic power. (Baudrillard’s Lacanian heritage is clearly shown in this idea of a necessary violence). Baudrillard has a certain sympathy for the desire to escape hyperreality in this way, but also sees it as futile. People doing this – both left and right – are trying to resuscitate causes and consequences, realities and referents, and recreate an imaginary. But the system deters such efforts from succeeding. Le Pen for instance is ultimately absorbed, as the mainstream integrates and repeats his racist ideas. This analysis could also be applied to various “fundamentalisms” and ethno-nationalist movements today. This kind of resistance is ultimately reactionary, seeking to restore the declining regime of signs. But it can only be understood if its basis in energies of resistance to simulation is recognised. It is because it channels such resistance that it is able to mobilise affective forces. Baudrillard’s analysis is here similar to Agamben’s view that the sovereign gesture is now exercised everywhere because of the rise of indistinction and indeterminacy. The paradox is that the performance of fundamentalism often leads back towards the world of simulation and deterrence. Such movements map symbolic exchange onto the state, restoring some of its reality, but ultimately contributing to the persistence of simulation. Resistance from inside the regime of power is impossible because of deterrence. Baudrillard suggests that it’s now impossible to imagine a power exercised inside the enclosure created by deterrence – except for an implosive power which abolishes the energies preventing other possibilities emerging. He also suggests that the loss of the real is irreversible. Only the total collapse of the terrain of simulation will end it, not a test of reality. A truly effective revolution would have to abolish all the separations – including the separation from death. It cannot involve equality in what is separated – in survival, in social status and so on. The strategy for change is now exacberation, towards a catastrophic end of the system. Baudrillard believes that the resultant death of the social will paradoxically bring about socialism.

### 1NC – CP

#### Hey, I just met you

#### And this is crazy

#### But here’s my number

#### So call me maybe

#### And all the other boys

#### Try to chase me

#### But here’s my number

#### So call me maybe

**Arnould 96** – Élisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield received her Licence and Maîtrise de Lettres from Lycée Henri IV and the Sorbonne University (Paris IV). She completed her Ph.D. in Literature from the University of California at San Diego and taught at Johns Hopkins and the University of Kentucky before coming to the University of Colorado, Boulder, in 2002. Her research and teaching interests include poetry, critical theory, philosophy, animal- and ecological-studies.

Elisabeth Arnould, “THE IMPOSSIBLE SACRIFICE OF POETRYBATAILLE AND THE NANCIAN CRITIQUE OF SACRIFICE” Diacritics , Summer, 1996, Vol. 26, No. 2, // sam (hi eshkar)

When, at the very center of his Inner Experience, Bataille arrives at what he call "uppermost extremity of non-meaning," he stages for us one of the principal scenes "sacrifice of knowledge." It depicts Rimbaud, turning his back on his works, making the ultimate and definitive sacrifice of poetry. This scene, which complements two o representations of the "supplice" of the experience-the crucifixion of God and oncoming madness of Hegel-rounds out the triple sacrificial vocation of an exper of nonknowledge, at once "a-theological," "a-gnoseological," and "a-poetological." extends to poetry and language the critical and sovereign imperative of an experience can only be called "inner" insofar as it renounces truth, knowledge, and, ultim speech. What exactly, however, does this sacrificial renunciation of words represent for Bataille and why did he choose to load it with all the transgressive weight of the experience of nonknowledge ("non-savoir")? Why place the self-sacrifice of poetry at the very center of a book that would be annulled by an immolation of speech? Indeed, why make this final "supplice"-a sacrifice of words performed and dedicated "to" "nothing"-into the core of the book's interior rapture? Isn't this figure of death and silence incurably equivocal? Does it not attribute the traditional traits of a "nothingness" to this "rapturous heart" of finitude that Bataille always wanted to designate as the "impossible" object of his experience? And is it not, therefore, condemned to appropriate, through this representa- tion, the nonmeaning of a finitude that Bataille, far from conceptualizing as simple nothingness, usually prefers to designate ambiguously as "nonknowledge"? Such are the questions I shall address in reevaluating Bataille's concept of sacrifice in light of Jean-Luc Nancy's critique. In his article "The Unsacrificeable," Nancy was the first to point out the problematic nature of the sacrificial model in Bataille's conceptualization of finitude. According to Nancy, sacrifice, including the self-sacrifice of Rimbaud so important to Bataille, is the vehicle of an "ontotheological" appropriation. And it is through sacrifice that Bataille's reflection on finitude attempts to domesticate death while claiming to abandon it to the aporetic enunciation of a "nonknowledge." I shall thus examine the problematic figure of poetry's self-sacrifice in order to expose, with Nancy, the equivocality of its conceptual appropriation. In light of Bataille's multiple stagings and interpretations of this figure, however, I shall also attempt to demonstrate how his writing on and of sacrifice already contains the seeds of its own critique and attempts to exceed itself. Bataille did not simply want to reveal, in Rimbaud's self-sacrifice, the inexpressible truth of finitude; he also wanted to denounce the comical lie of the sacrificial appropriation. And it is this double valence of the Rimbaldian self- sacrifice that I shall try to bring forth. Before elucidating the meaning and function of this figure in the specific context of Inner Experience and questioning its possible duplicity, one must examine the general notion upon which it is modeled. Poetry's self-sacrifice is the "consummate" form' of a sacrifice that we find in the form of stagings and commentaries in Bataille's work. As is well known, the question of sacrifice has always occupied a central place in Bataille's thought. He has not only studied this protean ethnological phenomenon we call "sacrifice" but has also wanted to give sacrifice, beyond traditional "ontotheological" interpretations and recent anthropological reconstructions, a meaning that far exceeds these restricted determinations. Sacrifice is not simply, for Bataille, a theoretical object. A paradigmatic manifestation of the sacred and its transgressions, it marks rather a limit to conceptualization and constitutes a stumbling block to thought. As such, it is, for Bataille-or, as he himself maintains, for all thought-the locus of an interruption. Cross-culturally, sacrifice delineates the limit thought comes up against when it faces what it cannot think. As the negation of our corporeal and intellectual limits, as the bloody excess that erupts before the fascinated eyes of a spectator, sacrifice "represents," for Bataille, simultaneously death and interruption. It is this interruption that he proposes as a model for his "a-theological" reflection and writing. It is the same interruption that practically structures the entirety of the experience of nonknowledge, since each and every form of this experience-mystic, erotic, or poetic-is defined as sacrifice: be it the sacrifice of the profane world, of women's bodies, or of words. In Bataille, sacrifice performs the task of something like an absolute comparative, unifying under its name all empirical variations of the experience; and it is difficult to find, in all of Bataille's work, a more exemplary model. Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment.

### Case – Rotb

#### 1] The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### A] Consequences first.

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### B] Weighability – its impossible to weigh between an orientation towards the world and the material consequences of a praxis – only centering the debate on praxis puts the 1ac and the 1nc on even ground

#### C] Ivory Tower DA – weigh the debate on the level of praxis to avoid creating a culture of ivory tower theorizing that fails to grapple with changing the world in favor of just thinking about it better.

#### D] Fairness – anything else makes 1nc strategy impossible because we have to negate ideas rather than actions – we can generate disads to an implementable praxis but not to a set of ideological beliefs. Fairness first – it’s a constitutive element of debate that outweighs everything else – if fairness doesn’t matter vote for us to be unfair.

#### 2] Yes epistemology matters but consequences overdetermine epistemology and not vice versa – our representations don’t exist in a vacuum, and the same justification be ethical or unethical depending on what it’s justifying – for example, the desire to protect your home can be used to justify indigenous sovereignty or xenophobia – which means analyzing our epistemology first is incoherent because it begs the question of consequences which answers their ROB cards

#### 3] Vote neg – people should have the choice between life and death

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, **attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person**, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. **If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she values it**. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the **primary** **injustice** done to a person is to deprive the person of a life **he or she may think valuable**. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — **friendships, family, life goals, etc**. — which are subjected to de facto **self-assessment** for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

#### 4] Err aff on the risk life is good

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

By engaging in such comparisons of future lives, the conclusion is reached by deprivation theorists that death is only an evil for the person if the future lost is one that offers better prospects for the person than death itself. Death itself is typically conceived of as the destruction of the self; the non-existence of the self; the non-state of non-being. How can we respond to this assessment that death can be said to benefit a patient when the patient’s future prospects in life seem so grim? The non-state that death brings in its wake is seen as being preferable to the continuance of life. Yet, are persons who make and act upon such calculations objectively justified in opting for death? Can it truly be a rational act for a person to choose the destruction of self over the continuation of self, even a self racked by the severe impositions of pain and suffering? 65 Philip Devine attempts to criticise the logicality of a decision to self-kill by stating what he considers to be the obscurity of what we can know about death. 66 He argues that if rational choice requires that a person knows what he or she is choosing (a leap in the dark not sufficing), **then it cannot be rationally possible to intentionally choose death because of the ‘opaqueness of death’.** 67 As Devine says, ‘. . . a precondition of rational choice is that one knows what one is choosing, either by experience or by the testimony of others who have experienced it or something very like it’. 68 Death **cannot** be rationally commensurated against, for **we do not know what we are comparing life to**. Life cannot simply be judged an overall evil and acted against by intentionally embracing death, for the ‘overall evil of life’ cannot be rationally traded in for the ‘opaqueness of death’. For Devine, choosing death is simply akin to **leaping into the bowels of radical uncertainty that cannot function as a useful ground for objective rational choice.**

### Presumption

#### Neg on presumption – 9 warrants

#### Ballot has no meaning – zero reason why voting affirmative can materialize any impacts of the aff – that means negate

#### Ballot offense – they reify the parts of debate they criticize by making the ballot anything more than an evaluation of whether or not the resolution is on balance a good idea – giving debate power over our subjectivities is net worse if they win debate bad

#### Aff can’t change institutional attitudes that are the major drivers of their impacts – even if all three of us entirely adopt your ethos that can never change the way the USFG decides to take actions

#### They bite into the being/becoming distinction on the side of being – the idea that we can statically impose a relationship with death on others generates the violence they criticize because not everyone wants to laugh in the face of Thanatos

#### The 1ac is incompatible with slack – they invest in productivity just as much as we do, which means double bind – either affirming does something in which case they invest agential power in debate or it doesn’t in which case vote neg on presumption

#### Plan text in a vacuum – only evaluate offense that proves the appropriation of outer space is bad – anything allows for infinite 1ar shiftiness that forces an impossible 2nr restart that the 2ar can always answer new and win – if we win plan text in a vacuum vote negative because the politics of laughter aren’t resolutional or in the advocacy of the aff.

#### They weren’t funny and didn’t make you laugh

#### The 1ac didn’t laugh either – proves they aren’t a politics of laughter

#### Vote neg to vote aff to vote neg to vote aff to vote neg

#### Vote negative as an act of gift giving – give the glorious sacrifice of the ballot to Bob, manifested as Appleton North

### Offense

#### Their rejection of universalist ethics causes takeover by the Alt-Right by undermining narratives necessary to check the growth of the alt right

Tuttle 16 Ian Tuttle is a National Review Institute Buckley Fellow in Political Journalism, The Racist Moral Rot at the Heart of the Alt-Right, April 5, 2016, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/433650/alt-rights-racism-moral-rot>

Last week, Breitbart writers Allum Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos took it upon themselves to pen an apologia for the “Alternative Right,” or Alt-Right — the grab bag of ostensibly right-wing anti-liberal ideologies whose disciples, of late, are thrilling to the rise of Donald Trump. The Alt-Right has evangelized over the last several months primarily via a racist and anti-Semitic online presence. But for Bokhari and Yiannopoulos, the Alt-Right consists of fun-loving provocateurs, valiant defenders of Western civilization, daring intellectuals — and a handful of neo-Nazis keen on a Final Solution 2.0, but there are only a few of them, and nobody likes them anyways. In other words, anyone familiar with Yiannopoulos’s theatrics, or Breitbart’s self-appointment as Donald Trump’s Pravda, will not be surprised to learn that the article is a 5,000-word whitewash. But it is valuable, in this way: It exhibits, albeit inadvertently, the moral and intellectual rot at the heart of the Alt-Right. The Alt-Right’s origin story will sound familiar: Conservatives, the Breitbart writers say, refused to defend “humanism, liberalism, and universalism” against “black and feminist identity politics” and “left-wing moral relativism.” They “turned a blind eye to the rise of tribal, identitarian movements on the Left while mercilessly suppressing any hint of them on the Right.” (Something like this tale of woe is used by Trump supporters to explain, and to justify, his rise.) This is largely false. It’s simply nonsense to suggest that American conservatism was willfully complicit in the rise of the identity-politics Left. It’s simply nonsense to suggest that American conservatism was willfully complicit in the rise of the identity-politics Left, or that conservatives have wholly forsaken their commitment to constitutional, and generally Judeo-Christian, values. For decades, conservatives have fought against racial favoritism, against the normalization of sexual perversion, against the “Hey, hey, ho, ho! Western Civ has got to go!” ethos that animates so much of progressivism. Furthermore, it’s entirely plausible that, where conservatives have endorsed policies — high levels of immigration, for example — that have ended up undermining certain “core Western values” (the importance of the rule of law, say), it was out of a commitment to other high-minded principles also in keeping with the Western tradition. SHARE ARTICLE ON FACEBOOKSHARE TWEET ARTICLETWEETBut this is not about the Gang of Eight bill. Most on the Alt-Right do not only reject the “conservative Establishment” or some other contemporary bogeyman; they also reject the ideals of classical liberalism as such. That rejection grounds the thinking of Jared Taylor, and Richard Spencer, for instance — representative “intellectuals” of the Alt-Right, according to Bokhari and Yiannopoulos. These men — the founders of the publications American Renaissance and Radix Journal, respectively — have not simply been “accused of racism.” They are racist, by definition. Taylor’s “race realism,” for example, co-opts evolutionary biology in the hopes of demonstrating that the races have become sufficiently differentiated over the millennia to the point that the races are fundamentally — that is, biologically — different. Spencer, who promotes “White identity” and “White racial consciousness,” is beholden to similar “scientific” findings. RELATED: Why White-Nationalist Thugs Thrill to Trump And it’s worth noting that the favorite slur the Alt-Right flings at conservatives they dislike is at bottom about miscegenation: “Cuckservative” refers to a form of sexual fetish in which a man, usually white, is aroused by watching his wife have sex with another man, usually black. As the curator of the “Dark Enlightenment” blog writes: “Among the central principles of neo-reaction — one of the top two, I’d say — is that long-separated human populations differ, innately, in significant ways, and that human cultures, when correctly understood to be part of our extended phenotype, reflect this underlying biological variation.” “The Dark Enlightenment” is the name, first and foremost, of a fuzzily argued manifesto of sorts, penned by Nick Land, formerly a lecturer in continental philosophy at the University of Warwick, and another of Bokhari’s and Yiannopoulos’s go-to “intellectuals.” Land is a more sophisticated thinker than Taylor or Spencer, but his “neo-reaction” is rooted in the same fundamental rejection of egalitarianism. The differences are less important than the similarities; the race realists call on evolutionary biology and cognitive science; Land and his followers invoke postmodern philosophy. Both, with the help of an influential Alt-Right contingent among computer scientists, draw on cognitive science. There is, then, contra Bokhari and Yiannopoulos, continuity on the Alt-Right, from the more interesting thinkers to the “1488ers.” This label comes from 14, for the “14 Words” of neo-Nazism (“We Must Secure the Existence of Our People and a Future for White Children”), and 88, for the eighth letter of the alphabet, H, doubled, HH, ergo “Heil Hitler.” Clever, eh? Some want to put people in ovens; some just want an ability to “exit” multicultural society for an ethno-national arrangement. But they’re all in agreement: “All men are created equal” is not true. What follows is a 21st-century version of Blut und Boden — Blood and Soil — on one hand, or technological apocalypticism, on the other. But the two are not so different, as the Nazis understood. (And to that point, it’s telling that, as Bokhari and Yiannopoulos note, some Alt-Right thought has its roots in the thinking of Giulio Evola, a mid-century Italian philosopher whose apocalyptic vision of the world derived from his own woolly syncretism and eccentric mysticism.) Adherents of the Alt-Right not only conceive of the “Establishment” as traitorous; they also seem to think that liberal democracy itself was an abstraction tyrannically imposed on an unwilling populace. It wasn’t. It was a slowly and painfully forged response to centuries of challenges. The Western, liberal-democratic order is wracked with problems, of course; but it always has been. The question is, Has it been more fruitful, more liberating, more constructive in promoting the common good than have the various orders that came before it? And if so, is there a compelling reason for throwing it over in favor of the ancient belief that some men are, indeed, born with saddles on their backs, and a favored few born booted and spurred, entitled to ride them? This is the question the Alt-Right poses. As it happens, it’s an old question, and one to which our forebears gave powerful answers. But every generation has to relearn them. The larger the Alt-Right grows, the clearer it is that ours hasn’t.

#### Comic Politics fails and is dangerous.

Torgerson ’99

(Douglas Torgerson is Professor of both Political Studies and Environmental and Resource Studies at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. The Promise of Green Politics. October 1999 – available via http://www.ecobooks.com/books/promisegreen.htm)

"What would be the consequences of viewing green politics more as a comedy than as a tragedy? The very suggestion might seem frivolous, but the advantages of thinking in terms of comedy rather than tragedy were strongly suggested by Joseph W. Meeker's The Comedy of Survival, which appeared during the early phases of the green movement but has unfortunately not received the attention it deserves. "The problem with an unequivocal endorsement of a comic politics seems obvious. Without clear principles to guide action toward appropriate goals, there is a risk of ineffectiveness, opportunism, and cynicism. As Meeker himself emphasized, the comic protagonist is seldom much of a hero, and is more likely to be a rogue, rascal, scoundrel, knave, fool, picaro, tramp -- a survivor, perhaps at any cost. Comic politics, if it takes an ironic stance outside the spectacle of politics, risks a lack of concern about either principles or consequences, a lack of purpose."--p.86

## Line by Line

### Bataille

#### 1] Always VtL – conditions for improvement are always possible and existence isn’t rigid which your authors agree with – means even if we don’t have value to life now we can get it later – you haven’t proven that we won’t ever be fulfilled.

#### 2] Knowledge is good – learning more about the world may never be perfect but will slowly improve the way we relate to things –

#### 3] We don’t link to their universalism bad arguments – everyone gets something different out of life and some people don’t get anything but the point is that the choice is ours – preserving the conditions for planetary life is key to any non-universal understanding of life because it allows us all to live life on OUR terms – the 1ac is a much more majoritarian imposition of a certain way of living in the world.

### Bordun

#### 1] Triviliazation Disad – during a global pandemic is not the time to laugh in the face of death – debaters have lost family members, even if your aff isn’t death good its perceived as delegitimizing those debater’s personal experiences which is violent and outweighs on pre-fiat violence.

#### 2] No brightline for what is taking yourself seriously – you are trying to win debates, cutting cards, etc

#### 3] We don’t believe ourselves to be immortal – this is so empirically false, mortality is something everyone grapples with at some point

#### 4] We are the best internal link into not viewing our existence as more important than others – that was the totalization argument on the Bataille evidence