### nc t

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Outer space refers to everything above Earth’s Karman line

**Dunnett 21** (Oliver Tristan, lecturer in geography at Queen’s University Belfast). Earth, Cosmos and Culture: Geographies of Outer Space in Britain, 1900–2020 (1st ed.). Routledge. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780815356301> EE

In such ways, this book argues that Britain became a home to rich discourses of outer space, both feeding from and contributing to iconic achievements in space exploration, while also embracing the cosmos in imaginative and philosophical ways.2

**INSERT FOOTNOTE 2**

2 **This book primarily uses the term ‘outer space’ to describe the realm beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, conventionally accepted as beginning at the Kármán line of 100km above sea level**. Other terms such as ‘interplanetary space’, ‘interstellar space’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘the heavens’ are used in specific contexts.

**END FOOTNOTE 2**

Cognisant of this spatial context, a central aim is to demonstrate how contemporary geographical enquiry can provide specific and valuable perspectives from which to understand outer space. This is an argument that was initiated by Denis Cosgrove, and his critique of Alexander von Humboldt’s seminal work Cosmos helped to demonstrate geography’s special relevance to thinking about outer space.3 The key thematic areas which provide the interface for this book’s research, therefore, are the cultural, political and scientific understandings of outer space; the context of the United Kingdom since the start of the last century; and the geographical underpinnings of their relationship.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny

#### 3 impacts:

#### First is fairness—debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs:

#### A] decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### B] probability: voting aff can’t solve any of their impacts but it can solve ours. All the ballot does is tell tab who won which can’t stop any violence but can resolve the fairness imbalance in this particular debate.

#### Second is switch side and idea-testing and reserach --- only a limited topic that leaves a role for the negative allows contestation and second-order testing that overcomes polarization. Switching sides forces them to scrutinize their own beliefs, which is valuable for developing and defending their own convictions more robustly.

Poscher 16

Ralf Poscher, Diat the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing. 2016.

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea.

In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case.

It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.

f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives

It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

#### Third—small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### Topical version—if society is anti-black explain how expansion into space expands that anti-blackness.

#### Global south is excluded from space

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves and is better because it promotes switch-side debate

#### Winning their aff doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

### nc cp

#### A is the Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating

#### B is the Violation:

Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message

Description automatically generated

#### Standards

#### 1] Small School Inclusivity – Disclosure levels the playing field for information and accessibility, and preparedness. Large schools have the ability to send large amounts of coaches to go scout rounds and get docs from those rounds that small schools don’t that the structural ability to do, but open source allows access to information and content equal to all debaters.

#### This outweighs and turns their offense

#### A] Black Scholarship- not everyone is privileged enough to go to enough tournaments to be exposes to a myriad of black scholarship. Disclosure makes sure debaters of color can have meaningful dialogue and engagement with identity arguments which comes prior to even them reading the aff

#### B] Arguments about a structural skew don’t matter since big schools will always have structural advantages and scouting teams which destroy competitive equity

#### 2] Educational Benefits

#### A] Research –Disclosure creates a high incentive to do deeper and more focused research, since debaters quickly learn the stock arguments and can-do specific research that they know will be useful. That Outweighs on exportability since the rigorous testing of arguments is something, we inevitably confront toxic positions in the real world. Only disclosue for rigorous research strategies which creates more nuanced understandings of arguments.

#### B] Academic honesty – Disclosure de-incentivizes miscutting or exaggerating evidence since opponents will recut your evidence and call you out. That creates habits of honesty and retains the intellectual integrity of the activity. This is the only standard that has clear out of round impacts. It comes prior to their impacts because we couldn’t clearly check their cards

#### They’ll say we are policing them- there is a few responses

#### 1] Disclosure applies to everyone- saying we are policing you assumes disproportionate enforcement which isn’t our interp.

#### 2] Endorsing a norm as a good idea is not policing just that we should have certain disclosure norms that are good

### nc case

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the aff is a good idea – this means weighing the material consequences of the action of the affirmative versus the consequences of the status quo or an alternative action. Three net benefits:

#### Weighability – its impossible to weigh between an orientation towards the world and the material consequences of a praxis – only centering the debate on praxis puts the 1ac and the 1nc on even ground

#### Ivory Tower DA – weigh the debate on the level of praxis to avoid creating a culture of ivory tower theorizing that fails to grapple with changing the world in favor of just thinking about it better.

#### Fairness – anything else makes 1nc strategy impossible because we have to negate ideas rather than actions – we can generate disads to an implementable praxis but not to a set of ideological beliefs. Fairness first – it’s a constitutive element of debate that outweighs everything else – if fairness doesn’t matter vote for us to be unfair.

#### They have no spillup claim – all the ballot does is tell tab who won

#### Viewning the ballot as currency for social movement is terminally unsustainbable

#### Presumption always flips neg against non-t affs –

#### Neg on presumption

#### 1] Ballot has no meaning – zero reason why voting affirmative can materialize any impacts of the aff – that means negate

#### 2] Ballot offense – they reify the parts of debate they criticize by making the ballot anything more than an evaluation of whether or not the resolution is on balance a good idea – giving debate power over our subjectivities is net worse if they win debate bad

#### 3] Aff can’t change institutional attitudes that are the major drivers of their impacts – even if all three of us entirely adopt your ethos that can never change the way the USFG decides to take actions

#### They presume a closed system and refuse action on the basis that “nothing will change” and ignore the history of Black resistance.

Gordon 15 (GOAT, the leading scholar of Fanon in the US, PhD from Yale, Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies at UConn) (Lewis, Lewis Gordon presents "What Fanon Said", Speech at Red Emma’s hosted by former Towson debater Ben Morgan, 6/10/2015, http://ontologicalummah.tumblr.com/post/122600387439/there-is-this-discussion-going-on-and-a-lot-of)

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change, they never think about what a human being is and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable. And in fact, in Fanon’s writing he gave an example in which he said: one of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. Now, one problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings in terms of rigid closed systems is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much, the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem—and I can just put it in a nut shell—nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody where maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is we want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, the question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is that what intersectionality is raising is important insight. Nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. People talk about race; do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman, or [inaud], you see what I’m getting at. Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on, a man, a woman, a color, and so forth. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology, we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on, and a lot of people build it on my early books. I have a category that I call, as a metaphor, an ‘anti-Black world’ – you notice the indefinite article: AN anti-Black world. The reason I say that is because THE world is different from an anti-Black world.

The project of racism is to create a world that would be anti-Black, anti-woman. Although that’s a project, it’s not a fait accompli. People don’t seem to understand how recent this phenomenon we’re talking about is… From the perspective of a species that’s 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years? And we create a false model of how we study those 500 years when we forget that people have been fighting and resisting. Had they not been fighting and resisting, we wouldn’t be here. The problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But humans don’t have prior knowledge. And in fact, what in the world are we if we need to have prior knowledge to act? You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact is, our ancestors, enslaved ancestors who were burning down the plantations and finding clever ways to poison the masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions – none of them had any clue of what the future would be 100 years later… But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn’t for them.

#### Lack of a libidinal economy warrant means there’s nothing intrinsic to the psyche that hardwires antiblackness --- neuroscience confirms that different attributes can be more or less salient and aren’t fixed around race

Sapolsky 19 Robert Sapolsky, American neuroendocrinologist and author, currently a professor of biology, and professor of neurology and neurological sciences and, by courtesy, neurosurgery, at Stanford University, “This Is Your Brain on Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2019.

TURBANS TO HIPSTER BEARDS

For all this pessimism, there is a crucial difference between humans and those warring chimps. The human tendency toward in-group bias runs deep, but it is relatively value-neutral. Although human biology makes the rapid, implicit formation of us-them dichotomies virtually inevitable, who counts as an outsider is not fixed. In fact, it can change in an instant.

For one, humans belong to multiple, overlapping in-groups at once, each with its own catalog of outsiders—those of a different religion, ethnicity, or race; those who root for a different sports team; those who work for a rival company; or simply those have a different preference for, say, Coke or Pepsi. Crucially, the salience of these various group identities changes all the time. Walk down a dark street at night, see one of “them” approaching, and your amygdala screams its head off. But sit next to that person in a sports stadium, chanting in unison in support of the same team, and your amygdala stays asleep. Similarly, researchers at the University of California, Santa Barbara, have shown that subjects tend to quickly and automatically categorize pictures of people by race. Yet if the researchers showed their subjects photos of both black and white people wearing two different colored uniforms, the subjects automatically began to categorize the people by their uniforms instead, paying far less attention to race. Much of humans’ tendency toward in-group out-group thinking, in other words, is not permanently tied to specific human attributes, such as race. Instead, this cognitive architecture evolved to detect any potential cues about social coalitions and alliances—to increase one’s chance of survival by telling friend from foe. The specific features that humans focus on to make this determination vary depending on the social context and can be easily manipulated.

Even when group boundaries remain fixed, the traits people implicitly associate with “them” can change—think, for instance, about how U.S. perceptions of different immigrant groups have shifted over time. Whether a dividing line is even drawn at all varies from place to place. I grew up in a neighborhood in New York with deep ethnic tensions, only to discover later that Middle America barely distinguishes between my old neighborhood’s “us” and “them.” In fact, some actors spend their entire careers alternating between portraying characters of one group and then the other.

This fluidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/out-group distinctions reflect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—fixed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders.

Humans are plenty capable of kinselective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically fixed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to flags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging.

Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively fixed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshuffle a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain-smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstockwearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our bigpicture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives—are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.