
### Theory

#### Non-disclosure is a voting issue—

#### They have not disclosed anything from the current tournament.

#### Their wiki says “Email me for any files.” I did. It took 20 minutes to receive the documents, which is half of all my pre-round prep that I was denied access to, proving why consistent use of open source is key and ad hoc measures like contact info are insufficient.

#### It’s a voter for education—disclosure is key to depth of prep and engagement with the nuances of evidence, as well as increasing evidence access and role modeling for small schools and novices. Only dropping the debater prevents free riders from getting an unfair advantage through shady disclosure.



### FW

#### I affirm.

#### The value is justice, which is giving each their due as “is unjust” is the evaluative phrase.

#### Justice and morality are distinct concepts. For example, it is unjust to speed even if you think you have good reason to do so.

Morehouse 13

(Isaac Morehouse is the founder and CEO of Crash and the founder of Praxis.) “Justice and Morality”, Isaac Morehouse, NCS, DOA 3/19/22, https://isaacmorehouse.com/2013/06/21/justice-and-morality/

It seems there’s a difference between justice and morality. I’ve never quite come to a comfortable conclusion about the nature of the two concepts and their relationship, but it’s worth exploring. Suppose you jump in someone else’s car parked in the valet entrance at a hotel and speed away to get your wife in for an emergency C-section. You’ve saved the baby and possibly the mother. It would be strange to call this immoral. In fact, it might be very moral, even heroic. But it also seems clear that the owner of the car has been wronged. She was unable to make her meeting in time, some of her gas was used up, and maybe you even got a few dings in the door. She has suffered an injustice. So even though you acted morally, it’s possible you acted unjustly. Let’s say you have a deep hatred for your neighbor. One day an envious rage takes over so you pick up a rock and throw it at his new car, hoping to shatter the window. You miss. No one sees the action, and the rock rolls harmlessly into the weeds. It seems likely you’ve acted immorally by trying to destroy his property. But it would be odd to say any injustice was done. Your neighbor hasn’t suffered a wit from your failed attempt at vandalism. Justice is about living with other people, while morality is about living with yourself. Justice is about right relation to others as measured against the mores of society, while morality is about right relation to right itself, as measured against your own beliefs. Whether or not justice exists objectively or is entirely a social construct, it has an unmistakable universality. The particulars, and the process of discovering and remedying injustice differ in each society, but the basic tenets are the same. No society has ever praised or rewarded breaking a promise, stealing, or murder. There are instances where such acts are called by other names or given a pass under special circumstances, but that’s just it; they always require justification. The default human position is that coercion is bad, and social systems evolve to mitigate it. What would justice demand from you in the car theft scenario? The nice thing is, we don’t have to decide in the abstract. Justice always takes place in a social context, and the process seems just as important as the outcome. For productive cooperation, the systems that determine and deal with injustice are best when they are transparent, stable yet flexible, knowable in advance, and not applied preemptively. Even though everyone may acknowledge that your theft of the car was unjust, if the process allows arbitrators to consider circumstances, they may let you off, or they may ask only that you pay the owner a small fee. These contexts are rich, and the owner has a lot to consider as well. Perhaps she hears your story and decides not to pursue any recompense. Maybe she is really ticked and wants to, but realizes the social approbation she’ll get for doing so isn’t worth it, even though she would win her case. Since justice exists only in a social context, and for the use and benefit of humans, even if it is violated, there needn’t be black and white, always-and-everywhere rules demanding uniform punishment. Though a uniform and recognizable process is needed, uniform outcomes don’t seem to be. This is why common law is so much more effective than legislation at maintaining peace. Morality is trickier. I might be using the term differently than most people in this post (I have often used it more loosely myself, many times on this blog…don’t hold it against me!), but I think morality is something that exists in all of our minds, whether or not it exists “out there” objectively. We have a conscience. We have beliefs about right and wrong that are distinct from our sense of justice. That’s why nearly everyone would agree that you acted immorally in story number two, even though justice demands nothing of you. Our sense of morality changes over time, and is very different from person to person. Part of life’s journey is discovering it and constantly adapting to it. I’ve known people who genuinely believed it was wrong to have a drop of alcohol. Whether or not I agree, it was clear that if they did, they would feel a lot of guilt. They would be violating what they know to be right. Some of those same people’s views changed over time, to where years later they no longer thought it wrong to drink, and they could do it with a clear conscience. Morality doesn’t seem to be about the acts themselves like justice does. It seems to be about whether or not a person is violating their own sense of right. Many spiritual traditions talk of being in unity with oneself, being of one mind, or having an undivided heart. It’s easy to conflate justice and morality, in part because we deliberately do so with children. It’s more convenient to wrap everything up into right and wrong, and train kids to do and don’t do based entirely on these words. I don’t think it’s helpful for kids in the long run, but it requires less work, so most adults do it. Kids are told to say hi when someone says hi to them for the same reasons they’re told not to take Johnny’s toys; because it’s the right thing to do. Yet the first is not unjust and probably not immoral, while the second is definitely unjust and probably immoral. Children are also trained to obey the law because it’s right to do so. They’re not often told that justice demands an abstention from coercion, even if the law doesn’t, or that the law may ask them to do something they feel is deeply immoral. This oversimplification and lumping everything into basic right/wrong categories has the potential to result in atrocity. Those who allow the law to be a shortcut for justice or morality, for example, can find themselves rounding the neighbors up and sending them off to prison, or worse.

#### Justice is only possible under a unified rule of law. This is a sequencing question – ensuring a unified rule of law comes prior to evaluating consequences. Otherwise, the state lacks a legitimate monopoly on the use of coercion. Also, they can only effectively engage in policymaking if there’s a unified rule of law since it creates the required consistent pattern of conduct and institutions.

Waldron 96

Waldron, Jeremy [Professor of Law and Philosophy at the NYU School of Law]. “Kant’s Legal Positivism” Harvard Law Review, May, 1996, Vol. 109, No. 7 (May, 1996), pp. 1535-156

It is certainly not inappropriate to use force to achieve justice. But there is an affront to the idea of justice when force is used by opposing sides, confrontationally and contradictorily, in justice's name. The point of using force in the name of justice is to assure people of that to which they are entitled. But if force is being used to further contradictory ends, then its connection with assurance is ruptured. In such a situation, force is being used simply to represent the vehemence with which competing opinions about justice are held, and this use of force may well be worse than force not being put to the service of justice at all. Hence, there is the need for a single, determinate community position on the matter - one whose enforcement is consistent with the integrity and univocality of justice. Certainly, justice is affronted in another way if the position identified and enforced as that of the community (on, say, testamentary freedom) is morally wrong. But given the inevitable disagreement on that issue and given the symmetry, for all practical purposes, of the rival positions on the matter - each side is sincere, each side thinks that its view captures what is really just, each side believes that the other is objectively mistaken - there is no political way in which the prospect of this substantive affront can be precluded. All we can do, politically, for the sake of the integrity of justice is ensure that force is used to uphold one view and one view only - a view that anyone may readily identify as that of the community, whatever his substantive opinions on the matter. The integrity of justice, then, evokes the concept of positive law and the philosophical doctrine of legal positivism: law must be such that its content and validity can be determined without reproducing the disagreements about rights and justice that it is law's function to supersede.

#### Therefore, the criterion is respect for the rule of law. To clarify, I’m not saying that anything that follows from the rule of law is just. Instead, an action that fails to adhere to rule of law is unjust.

#### Prefer this criterion for 2 additional reasons.

#### First, A shared intuition of ethical theories reflects the idea that justice requires a sovereign.

Nagel 5

(Thomas Nagel - University Professor of Philosophy and Law, Emeritus, at New York University, where he taught from 1980 to 2016. His main areas of philosophical interest are legal philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics). “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring, 2005), pp. 113-147 (35 pages) Published By: Wiley Philosophy & Public Affairs, NCS, DOA 1/15/22, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3558011>

It seems to me very difficult to resist Hobbes’s claim about the relation between justice and sovereignty. There is much more to his political theory than this, of course. Among other things, he based political legitimacy and the principles of justice on collective self-interest, rather than on any irreducibly moral premises. And he defended absolute monarchy as the best form of sovereignty. But the relation between justice and sovereignty is a separable question, and Hobbes’s position can be defended in connection with theories of justice and moral evaluation very different from his. What creates the link between justice and sovereignty is something common to a wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend on the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force. Hobbes construed the principles of justice, and more broadly the moral law, as a set of rules and practices that would serve everyone’s interest if everyone conformed to them. This collective self-interest cannot be realized by the independent motivation of self-interested individuals unless each of them has the assurance that others will conform if he does. That assurance requires the external incentive provided by the sovereign, who sees to it that individual and collective self-interest coincide. At least among sizable populations, it cannot be provided by voluntary conventions supported solely by the mutual recognition of a common interest. But the same need for assurance is present if one construes the principles of justice differently, and attributes to individuals a non–selfinterested motive that leads them to want to live on fair terms of some kind with other people. Even if justice is taken to include not only collective self-interest but also the elimination of morally arbitrary inequalities, or the protection of rights to liberty, the existence of a just order still depends on consistent patterns of conduct and persisting institutions that have a pervasive effect on the shape of people’s lives. Separate individuals, however attached to such an ideal, have no motive, or even opportunity, to conform to such patterns or institutions on their own, without the assurance that their conduct will in fact be part of a reliable and effective system. The only way to provide that assurance is through some form of law, with centralized authority to determine the rules and a centralized monopoly of the power of enforcement. This is needed even in a community most of whose members are attached to a common ideal of justice, both in order to provide terms of coordination and because it doesn’t take many defectors to make such a system unravel. The kind of all-encompassing collective practice or institution that is capable of being just in the primary sense can exist only under sovereign government. It is only the operation of such a system that one can judge to be just or unjust. According to Hobbes, in the absence of the enabling condition of sovereign power, individuals are famously thrown back on their own resources and led by the legitimate motive of self-preservation to a defensive, distrustful posture of war. They hope for the conditions of peace and justice and support their creation whenever it seems safe to do so, but they cannot pursue justice by themselves. I believe that the situation is structurally not very different for conceptions of justice that are based on much more other-regarding motives. Without the enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on just institutions, individuals however morally motivated can only fall back on a pure aspiration for justice that has no practical expression, apart from the willingness to support just institutions should they become possible. The other-regarding motives that support adherence to just institutions when they exist do not provide clear guidance where the enabling conditions for such institutions do not exist, as seems to be true for theworld as a whole. Those motives, even if they make us dissatisfied with our relations to other human beings, are baffled and left without an avenue of expression, except for the expression of moral frustration.

#### Second, commitment to rule of law is a pre-requisite to challenging oppressive power structures

Rose 4

Jonathan Rose (Arizona State University College of Law). “The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview.” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 35, 2004. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1426343>

Perhaps. Thus, as many of the commentators suggest, adherence to the **Rule of Law is a matter of degree**, but certainly an aspirational democratic yardstick where the degree of consistency ought to be high and departures understood and justified. On balance, these questions may suggest that favoring the narrow, process oriented approach is preferable. It may be too difficult to incorporate content in a manner that is relatively clear and operationally satisfactory. A more limited role for the Rule of Law seems, on balance, a more useful approach. Developing a concept that guards against the arbitrary use of government authority, insures the protection of individual rights, and provides a mechanism for equitable dispute resolution is a laudable objective and no small accomplishment.

IV. Further Issues

Although the focus of the paper has been to explore the meaning of the Rule of Law and the differences between the two primary approaches, some further issues deserve mention. Apart from their inherent interest, some of these other issues have particular contemporary relevance.

A. Beyond Liberalism

This description and evaluation of the Rule of Law has been within the tradition of political liberalism. When one ventures outside that belief system, one encounters, not surprisingly, criticisms of a different kind. For example, civic republicans and communtarians have seen the Rule of Law’s association with rights-based liberalism as threatening or undermining communal values and elevating legalistic and individual values over community-based democracy. Such critics would reduce the Rule of Law to “ a much more humble position.”41 Post-modernists naturally view the Rule of Law at least with skepticism, if not outright hostility. One view asserts the need for an “internal” rather than an “external” view of the Rule of Law. It is connected to political action and must be experienced and lived.42 More radical post-modernists, members of the “Critical Legal Studies Movement such as Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, and Morton Horwitz, reject rights based liberalism and the associated Rule of Law as “value laden” and “an ideological cloak,” an instrument to conceal hierarchies and implement exploitation.43

Interestingly some on the left, including Marxists, have taken a much more benign view, even lauding the Rule of Law. In a famous essay, Douglas Hay noted how in 18th century England, law had a become the dominant ideology, a secular religion displacing traditional religion, and that this ideology included the notion that the ruling classes were subject to the rule of law.44 Although he viewed “legal ideology” as a significant instrument of class domination, he also argued that general acceptance of the Rule of Law as an ideology required the ruling classes to accept a degree of self-limitation and to insure that both the ruling and working classes were subject to and acted in accordance with the Rule of Law.45 E.P. Thompson was more explicit and enthusiastic in his acceptance of the Rule of Law.

Although he said that law was “clearly an instrument of the de facto ruling class and that Rule of Law was “another mask for the rule of a class,” he believed that any complex society required law. Moreover, although he said it was necessary to “expose the shams and inequities” of law, he asserted that “the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be **an unqualified** human **good.**”46 Thompson’s characterization of the Rule of Law as “an unqualified human good” caused Morton Horwitz, a prominent scholar in the post-modern Critical Legal Studies movement, to react strongly: “I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as “an unqualified human good ”! Horwitz went on to state that while the Rule of Law created formal equality, it promoted substantive inequality and enabled “the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its [procedural justice’s] forms to their advantage” and ratifie[d] and legitimate[d] an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic conception of human relations.”47

As these criticisms confirm, the Rule of Law has been closely identified with classic liberal theory and its focus on individual rights. But is it necessarily associated with only this political view? It would seem useful to think about how the Rule of Law might apply in other political systems. In doing so, however, it is important to be sensitive to the possibility that the cultural and ideological aspects of other political systems might make the Rule of Law inapposite. Initially, consideration should be given to the propriety of adopting at least the narrow version in socialist or theocratic political systems. Recent scholars have discussed applying the Rule of Law more broadly. One recent work has pursued the relation between civil society and social networks in China to develop alternatives models regarding the relation of the individual and the state.48 While one might think that this may only be an outsider’s perspective, **such advocacy has come from within such countries.** In a most interesting development, several Chinese legal scholars “have created a sensation in Chinese intellectual circles” with a proposal to enforce constitutionally guaranteed individual rights and to “steadily advance the rule of law” in place of the current mere governmental “homage” to it.49 Another scholar has noted that **leaders and dissidents in both Western and non-Western countries have advocated** the **Rule of Law** as a governmental aspiration.50 He noted that they have exhibited “an extraordinary degree of agreement about one prescription that would benefit all, that is: the rule of law”51 and that “the touting of the rule of law is not just a mantra of lecturing Western liberal democracies,”52 as the “testimonials . . . have come from governing officials of various kinds of economic, cultural, and political and religious systems and societies.”53 Although he identifies several concerns about broadly embracing the Rule of Law, he answers the question posed by his title, The Rule of Law for Everone? “in the affirmative, at least conditionally” and that Rule of Law is a realizable “universal human good.”54 In terms of expanding its use, another question is its relevance to international law. A feature of today’s world is the increasing attention to global issues and disputes. Many of these disputes involve adjudicating the rights of individuals and trial of war criminals. Human rights have become a frequent concern. In expanding the Rule of Law outside the political system of a single state, the narrow approach seems much more feasible and appropriate. Such an expansion of the broader Rule of Law would only seem to compound the difficulties of the substantive approach, noted above. Thus, novel and interesting questions also arise as to how to apply or use the Rule of Law in developing and multicultural and multiethnic states as well as in relations between states..

B. Departures From the Rule of Law

Another interesting question is what, if anything, justifies departures from the Rule of Law. It would seem that the various conceptions of the Rule of Law implicitly recognize that adherence is not always possible nor even desirable. Although some of the various commentators explicitly recognize this possibility, the surveyed scholars do not provide much detail on this issue. Moreover, it seems likely the problem is more interrelated with the narrower, process oriented approach than with the broader content inclusive one as it seems more likely that the former is likely to coexist with conditions justifying departure. For example, how should one deal with the civil disobedience such as that by racial equality advocates in the American South? Although the existing conditions may fail the substantive test, they might well, as discussed above, comply with the procedural version of the Rule of Law. Thus, one must come to grips with the issue of whether the intentional violation of the law is justified.55 Perhaps, one way to view the matter is asymmetrically. In other words, it is government (and its officials) who must adhere to the Rule of Law. It is not relevant to measure individual behavior. On the other hand, individual behavior can undermine the Rule of Law . But perhaps the answer is that regimes that do not embody the Rule of the Good Law must abide by the Rule of Law in dealing with protesters.

A more general question of departures is raised by wars and other emergencies. War time measures often use summary procedures that derogate civil liberties and that would seem to depart from the Rule of Law. Threats to national security or public order in case of non-war emergencies are advocated as justifications for swift and harsh government action. Federal appellate judge and University of Chicago law professor, Diane Wood said that the recent terrorist attacks and the resulting policies and attitudes “call into question the extent to which any society can adhere to the rule of law when it perceives itself to be threatened by hostile powers or groups.” She noted that such events produce very contrasting attitudinal responses, one viewing the Rule of law as a “luxury item” and the other viewing it as taking on “heightened importance.”56 A famous historical example involves the Civil War abolition of habeas corpus. An interesting lesser known example involves Mau-Mau violence in Africa. Brian Simpson’s has recently revealed that the eminent conservative jurist Lord Devlin believed that the British colonial government’s adoption in Africa of emergency measures to maintain law and order in the face uprisings and violence violated the Rule of Law.57 On this question of departure, it would seem that the analysis ought to begin with the process by which the alleged departure from the Rule of Law occurred. Legislative and executive branch decisions in such matters ought to have a presumption of validity. Unlike local police action, they occur through a recognized constitutional and political process. On other hand, that does not immunize such decisions from criticism and being viewed as unjustified departures from the Rule of Law.

C. Terrorism and Other Current Events

Related to both expanding the Rule of Law to the international arena and emergency justified departures from the Rule of Law are the actions of the United States and other governments and organizations to current terrorism and the accommodation and understanding of world political changes. Two major international developments seem to be the catalyst. One is terrorism and the post 9/11 events. The other is the less recent, but continuing, transition of former socialist political and economic systems. On both these issues, it is interesting to note the surge in scholarship invoking the Rule of Law that has been prompted by these two types of recent events. With regard to the current terrorism, the United States government has adopted several measures, some of them extreme, which raise serious questions of compliance with the Rule of Law relying on the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution.58 Judge Wood, after reviewing many of the post World War II developments concluding with the recent terrorist attacks, asked “Where, if at all, does the rule of law fit into such a dangerous world?” Her answer was clear: “the rule of law not only can, but must, continue to be the guiding star for the United States and all other freedom-loving countries.” After reviewing numerous judicial decisions and legal developments occurring during the Cold War and Vietnam War, she concluded that “the lesson one can take from this history is that American institutions, especially the courts . . . on balance stood firm.”60 With regard to the current situation, she identified a number of the United States’ responses to international terrorism and asserted that they “pose[d] a significant threat to continued observance of the rule of law,” evaluating the propositions asserted by the government by using Professor Fallon’s criteria.61 Nevertheless, she believes that the “rule of law can be upheld even during times of stress.”62 Yale law professor Peter Schuck has pointed to September 11 as event critical to the rule of law. Viewing war as “incompatible with the rule of law,” he saw the consequences of fight terrorism and invading Iraq as raising serious questions for American constitutional law and the international rule of law.63 Others have connected the Rule of Law to the operation of the United Nations. One commentator asserted that a “‘rule of law’ approach to force was required by the UN Charter and was the best long term strategy for assuring the security of the United States.64 Also, an United Nations official saw the Kosovo’s hopes for democracy dependent on the Rule of Law.65 Other commentators have focused on transitional economies. One has suggested increased interest as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, the **emerging economies in Eastern Europe**, and the needs of the developing countries of **Latin America and Africa have enhanced the interest in the Rule of Law.**66 Another one commentator has suggested the relevance of the Rule of Law in developing monetary policy for the transition economies of former socialist states as it is the vehicle for “the translation of legal independence into actual independence.67

V. Conclusion

As the scholarship identified above and this and other conferences68 indicate, the contemporary debate about the Rule of Law continues. Three reasons seem possible. First, despite its ambiguity and excess baggage, Rule of Law remains a critically and fundamentally important ideal and concept. The author and public intellectual, Paul Johnson, called the establishment of the Rule of Law “**the most important political development of the second millenium**.”69 He said that “its acceptance and enforcement in any society is far more vital to the happiness of the majority than is even democracy itself.” Moreover, Hutchinson and Monahan say that the rule of law “has been under mounting pressure in modern society.”70

### Contention 1 is arbitrariness

#### Any act of appropriation is indeterminate absent a common understanding of property found in law

Waldron 96

Waldron, Jeremy [Professor of Law and Philosophy at the NYU School of Law]. “Kant’s Legal Positivism” Harvard Law Review , May, 1996, Vol. 109, No. 7 (May, 1996), pp. 1535-156

The main subject matter of justice and right in Kant's political philosophy is property - the possession and use of external material resources. For Kant, the concept of property, and the allied concepts of empirical and intelligible possession, are amenable to philosophical exposition. (He expounds them in the first seventeen paragraphs of the Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right.) I will not bore the reader with the details; it is enough to say that, although the exposition is terribly convoluted, Kant does not indicate that he thinks the complexities of these concepts are the source of the disagreements we are trying to explain. Kant makes pretty clear, however, that the concepts he develops are likely to involve considerable difficulty and controversy in their applications. In a state of nature, to have property along Lockean lines or anything like it, people's rightful holdings would have to be based on a principle such as first occupancy. But occupancy, which Kant interprets to mean "taking control," is quite indeterminate: how do we correlate one's acts of control with an exact extent of land controlled? Besides, the question of how much exactly one comes to own when one takes control of a piece of land will be bound up in part with one's sense of the effect of one's action on others' situations. But it may be unclear how many others there are, or it may be a matter of dispute how many of all the others there are (everywhere) one is supposed to take into account. Inevitably, disputes will also arise about who is (or who was) the first occupant of a piece of land. That prospect is more or less unavoidable, given Kant's account of appropriation. To appropriate X is not only to take X under one's physical control, but to do so in a way such that one's right in X will be violated if, subsequently, another person uses or encroaches upon X even while the initial appropriator is not actually in physical control of X. In the state of nature, however, if one appropriates a piece of land and then wanders off, how is another to know whether the land has already been appropriated or is still available for first occupancy? (This problem is particularly acute in a theory like Kant's that does not insist on any mark of occupancy, such as labor.) Notice that these difficulties of application are not matters on which reason offers no guidance or matters to be settled by arbitrary stipulation, like the rule about which side of the road to drive on. Surely, of two people wrestling for control of a piece of land, one or the other was in fact the first occupant; surely, there is a right answer to the question of whether someone, in violation of the Lockean proviso, has taken more than his share. Moreover, the fact that people think there is a right answer will likely inspire each party to struggle vehemently for his view of the matter; in contrast, nobody fights very hard over questions like which side of the road to drive on. The trouble with the application of acquisition principles is not that, in theory, no right answers exist, but that there is no basis common to the parties for determining which answers are right.

#### The only legal regime in place for outer space expressly forbids private appropriation

Tronchetti 7

Fabio Tronchetti (International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands). “The Non-Appropriation Principle Under Attack: Using Article II of The Outer Space Treaty In Its Defence.” 50 PROC. L. OUTER SPACE 526, 530 (2007). JDN. <https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf>

However, it must be said, that nowadays there is a general consensus on the fact that both national appropriation and private property rights are denied under the Outer Space Treaty. Several ways of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8. Private entities are allowed to carry out space activities but, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they must be authorized to conduct such activities by the appropriate State of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9. It has been also suggested that the prohibition of national appropriation implies prohibition of private appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase. Thus, summing up, we may say that prohibition of appropriation of outer space and its parts is a rule which is valid for both private and public entity. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space 3 and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, the need to protect the non-appropriative nature of outer space emerges in all its relevance.

#### That links to the framework—ignoring the standing law would violate the rule of law

Waldron 96

Waldron, Jeremy [Professor of Law and Philosophy at the NYU School of Law]. “Kant’s Legal Positivism” Harvard Law Review , May, 1996, Vol. 109, No. 7 (May, 1996), pp. 1535-156

How we think about disagreement on matters of public concern will determine how we think about politics, and - because law is the offspring of politics - how we think about disagreement will determine, in some measure, how we think about law. For example, the members of a community may be divided on the question whether a testator should have the power to exclude a surviving child from the enjoyment of his estate. Imagine that some citizens, celebrating testamentary freedom, say that he should - it is, after all, his property that is passing by his will. Others say that he should not - once he is dead, the importance of respecting his arbitrary freedom diminishes in comparison to the importance of securing the welfare of his dependents. The issue is a political one not simply because the citizens disagree, for we disagree about all sorts of things - for instance, the virtues of the modern novel, the causes of the Punic Wars - on which no political decision is necessary. The issue of testamentary power is a political onebecause those who disagree on the merits nevertheless agree that the community needs to reach some determinate resolution. Testamentary freedom is not something on which we can agree to differ. Or, rather, we can agree to differ in our opinions, but it is necessary, all the same, that we arrive at some position on the issue to be upheld and enforced as the community's position on the testamentary powers of property owners. Because we disagree about which position should stand and be enforced in the name of the community, we need a process - a political process - to determine what that position should be. And we need a practice of recording, respecting, and implementing positions of this sort by individuals and agencies acting in the name of the community - a practice that is resilient in the face of disagreement with the community position on the part of those entrusted with its implementation. If we call the position that is identified as the community's position the law of that community, then the resilience of the practice to which I have just referred is what we mean by the rule of law. Understood in this way, the rule of law is not simply the principle that officials should apply the law even when it disserves their own interests. It is the principle that an official should enforce the law even when it is in his confident opinion unjust, morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy. The enactment of the law in question is evidence of the existence of a view different from his own concerning the law's justice, morality, or desirability. In other words, the law's existence, together with the official's own opinion, indicates moral disagreement in the community. The official's failure to implement the law because he believes that it is unjust, or his decision to do something other than what the law requires because he believes that action would be more just, is tantamount to abandoning the very idea of law - namely, the very idea of the community taking a position on an issue on which its members disagree. It is a reversion to the situation in which each person acts on his own judgment and does whatever seems right or just to him. Would this result be such a calamity? It may be, if people's moral judgments are irrational, ill-thought-through, uninformed, or biased. But even assuming that each person does his best to ascertain what is really right or really just, there will still be problems to the extent that different persons arrive (however scrupulously) at different conclusions.

#### Turns are wrong—Alternative theories of property cannot solve the problem of indeterminateness

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[Arthur, "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy", Harvard University Press, 2009, accessed 1-14-22]

Kant’s understanding of the basic range of public powers is austere in one sense, yet permissive in another. The only powers a state may exercise are ones that fall under various aspects of its duty to create, maintain, and improve a rightful condition, and it may only do so in ways consistent with each citizen’s innate right of humanity. Yet the range of powers that can actually be exercised under that duty seems capacious and openended. The constraint that all powers be derived from the duty to create a rightful condition—parallel to the way that the power of a parent to “manage and develop” the child is derived from the duty to raise the child into a responsible being—is a real constraint, but it does not preclude most of the familiar activities of modern states. Even substantial changes can be understood as falling under the duty: fundamental land reforms that abolish forms of slavery or serfdom are the creation of a rightful condition. Even things that seem less directly related seem easy to accommodate to the Kantian account. We shall see in Chapter 9 that preventing private dependence underwrites a variety of public activities, and also that nothing in Kant’s account precludes overinclusive implementation. Kant makes space for even more state activity when he includes the state’s right to “administer the state’s economy and finances,”67 and still more when he suggests in Theory and Practice that when the supreme power “gives laws that are directed chiefly to happiness (the prosperity of the citizens, increased population and the like), this is not done as the end for which a civil Constitution is established but merely as a means for securing a rightful condition, especially against a people’s external enemies.”68 The only thing that is ruled out is organizing the state around private purposes. The only test imposed by the idea of the original contract is that it be possible to give public grounds of justification for such activities, that is, to relate them to the maintenance of a rightful condition. The flexibility of the Kantian account on such issues reveals the underlying difference between it and both libertarian and utilitarian/egalitarian accounts. From Kant’s perspective, the apparently intractable disagreement between the two extremes has the classic structure of an antinomy: the disagreements reflect a premise that both sides presuppose. The premise in question is that the purpose of political and legal institutions is to approximate a moral result that is perfectly determinate, even if imperfectly known, independently of them. A version of the same antinomy lurks in disputes between libertarian and utilitarian/egalitarian theories of the morality of property. The Lockean libertarian supposes property rights to be morally complete and fully determinate without reference to political institutions, and regards the state as a remedy to disagreements that, at least in principle, have complete answers. The utilitarian or egalitarian rejects the idea that anyone could have a morally basic right to property, and thinks that rules governing the dominion of particular persons over particular objects can only be designed so as to bring about a morally desirable result that can be described without any reference to anything like rules. As we saw in our discussion of private right, Kant conceives of private rights fundamentally differently. Their structure can be articulated without reference to legal institutions, but they do not apply to particulars outside of a rightful condition. Outside of legal institutions, property cannot be acquired conclusively, property rights cannot be enforced coercively, and disputes about them have no resolution consistent with the equal freedom of the parties. Again, although it can be shown as a general principle of private right that a person who is not party to a contract is not entitled to sue on it, or that a person who was deprived of the use of something to which he or she has no proprietary or possessory right has no claim against the person who damages the thing, in most cases concepts alone will not decide a particular case. Both the Lockean libertarian and a utilitarian/egalitarian see legal rules as trying to match something that is completely determinate without any reference to legal institutions. The Kantian sees legal rules as making determinate something that is morally binding but by itself partially indeterminate. In the case of public right, the parallel antinomy concerns the use of public power. Although the libertarian insists that public power can only be used in the minimal ways that citizens have actively authorized, and the utilitarian or egalitarian thinks that it can be used to bring about good results (perhaps subject to certain constraints), they share a premise according to which a public authority’s moral role is to bring about specific results that can be specified without any reference to a public authority. For the Lockean libertarian, the result is the protection of private rights to person and property, which are supposed to be fully determinate without reference to institutions charged with enforcing them. For the utilitarian or egalitarian, the morally relevant results are characterized differently and more broadly, whether in terms of welfare, prosperity, or a certain pattern of distribution. The structure of the account, however, is exactly the same: institutions are justified only insofar as they bring about results that can be specified without any reference to them. The Kantian approach rejects the common premise, and understands public right as requiring institutions in order to give effect to the structural features of a rightful condition. The public purposes are contained in the idea of a rightful condition, but so, too, is the requirement that properly constituted public authorities determine how to implement them. In so doing, public officials have no alternative but to exercise judgment about the significance to attach to competing considerations, subject only to the constraint that they make only laws that the people could impose upon themselves.

### Plan

#### Plan: The allocation of outer space through a UN Space Exploitation Registry auction regime is just.

### Contention 2 is efficiency

#### The aff doesn’t think this should come first, but to the extent that it’s relevant to their DAs, appropriation is inefficient and backfires:

#### A. is the Banking Problem

#### A first-come-first-served space race leads to inefficient resource distribution—auctions solve

Reinstein 99

Ezra J. Reinstein (JD, Associate at Kirkland & Ellis), Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 59 (1999). NCS. <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol20/iss1/7>

What if SpaceCorp, calculating that the value of owning Earth's moon outweighs the cost of setting up a bogus project, decides to mine the entire moon for dust. In doing so, SpaceCorp hopes to "bank" the moon and reap great rewards in the real estate market down the road. Such banking must be prevented. It is a tremendously wasteful activity that creates little or no wealth. It even discourages development by others: SpaceCorp, a monopoly owner of moon resources, could charge monopoly rents on those who would purchase moon sites to develop, and would therefore decrease production to monopoly levels.'05 SpaceCorp should not be rewarded for such a project with ownership of the moon. The moon is of potentially great value to humanity. We already have enough dust. A legal regime that rewards such activity is guilty of instigating massively inefficient behavior. The problem illuminated by this example can be restated more generally: Aside from applying for UNSER approval, what must one do to achieve ownership? The problem of asset banking is a difficult one, and I cannot offer a definitive answer. I will review four possible ways to combat banking, and recommend one.

They continue

Ezra J. Reinstein (JD, Associate at Kirkland & Ellis), Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 59 (1999). NCS. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol20/iss1/7

An auction system would also solve the banking problem. In order for the dust-miner to gain ownership of the entire moon, he would have to outbid everyone else (even groups of investors and international consortia) who had any interest in any of the moon. Even if the dust-miner succeeded in purchasing the moon, he would never be able to turn a profit. If half the moon was worth $1 billion to A, and the other half worth $1 billion to B, then A and B would have together driven the auction price up to a minimum of $2 billion. Thus the dust-miner would have had to pay more than $2 billion for ownership rights that he could only sell for $2 billion. The auction eliminates the incentive to bank property. Obviously, under an auction regime there is no need for UNSER's prioritization scheme. There is no need to police against a sabotage-infested land rush. Once a site is purchased, ownership rights (including the right to exclude) vest in the owner. The law automatically prioritizes the claim of the purchaser/owner over all others. Auctions, and space exploration in general, might be facilitated by bestowing rights on prospectors. We might make a rule: if a prospector submits information about a site to UNSER, the prospector shall get a percentage of the purchaser's earnings from that site. Such information would be made available to the public prior to auction. Of course, the rule will have to specify the requisite type of information and degree of detail. Bob Zubrin suggests that any private company using remote sensing to explore a portion of a celestial body with gamma ray spectrometer chemical analysis and photography to a resolution of lm2 per pixel deserves a royalty of 10 percent of all resultant profits.0 8 Higher percentages might be warranted by more detailed analysis. Prospector percentenaries should not affect the auction, since each bidder will be affected equally, and all will adjust their willingness-to-pay downward in proportion to the amount of profits that go to the prospector.

#### B) Fraud—private markets encourage anti-competitive practices; the plan better stimulates exploration

Reinstein 99

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It is clear that the prospector's "take" must be calculated based on eventual profits, not on the initial auction price. Although the initial auction price is easier to collect and is more certain, it also creates a significant danger of corruption. If the prospector takes a percentage off the auction price, it is in the prospector's best interest to inflate the price, even by misrepresenting the results of his exploration. By restricting the prospector to a percentage of actual earnings, the incentive to fraudulently inflate the auction price by falsifying data is eliminated. Building prospector rights into the property law creates an additional benefit: specialization. By rewarding space prospecting, the auction-based legal system makes it possible for companies to specialize in space exploration. A mining company could thus concentrate on mining techniques without concerning itself with remote sensing technology. Ordinarily, this could be accomplished through private bargaining: a company interested in learning about a site could contract with a private prospecting company. Within a public auction regime, however, if prospecting were left to the private market, CorpA could pay the prospector to deal exclusively with CorpA and not disclose information to competing bidders. As a result of the non-disclosure contract, CorpB and CorpC would either be forced to hire prospectors of their own (a huge waste of resources), or would be locked out of the auction for lack of information. In order to ensure that the auction runs competitively -- with maximally efficient results and minimum costs -- relevant information must be disseminated. But if prospectors are enjoined by law to disclose their research publicly, they are in no position to bargain for a fee for their services. If the law requires prospectors to "tell all," the law must also compensate them for their services. A percentenary, if set to a level that approximates a fair bargain between the prospector and the recipient of the information, should suffice. Zubrin suggests yet another benefit. At this time, exploration and prospecting are within current technological capabilities. Extensive space mining is not, however; therefore there is little incentive for the private sector to invest in space exploration. If prospectors were given rights at an auction, however, space exploration would have market value now. There might well be speculators willing to invest $100 million to assay an asteroid on the gamble that its percentenary would mature, when space mining becomes feasible and practical, to $10 billion or more.'0 9 Already, companies are planning to launch prospecting missions. SpaceDev, stating that they're "going to use common-sense business tactics to explore deep space," plans to launch a robotic Near Earth Asteroid Prospector ("NEAP") in the foreseeable future." 0 The NEAP will embark on a search for valuable asteroids, the information about which SpaceDev will then sell for "a profit.""' By reserving future financial rights for space prospectors, the legal regime would magnify the current value of prospecting, thereby stimulating private funding of space exploration

# 1AR

## Case

## Extensions

### FW

#### There is a distinction between morality and justice. Treating morality and justice as interchangeable justifies atrocities – this is an independent reason to reject their framing- that is Moorehouse 13

#### We can only achieve and secure justice if we have consistent standards of law. If the speed limit changes every day, that makes it hard for me to be able to plan and use the freeway- so I can’t exercise my freedom to use public transport, which is unjust. That’s Waldron 96

#### Extend the sequencing argument- we must first secure our freedoms before we can worry about the negative consequences. Absent stable legal fw, justice is impossible- that’s Waldron 86 and Gowder 13

#### All theories rely on coordinating the conduct of large groups, so a sovereign is needed to achieve justice for groups- that’s Nagel 5

### C1

#### We have no way of determining who owns what without a standard of law- appropriation without common understanding is indeterminate- that’s Waldron 96

#### Extend unjust private appropriation- Tronchetti 7 tells us that the OST denies private and national appropriation and going against standard of law is unjust

#### Extend violation of rule of law- what the aff is going for here is that our current standard of law does not support private appropriation of space- violating law is basically rendering it useless- Waldron 96

#### Extend indeterminateness- no other theory explains how we actually allocate property/decide whose property is what. Only government can make property determinate- that’s Ripstein 9 (takes out util and Locke)

### C2

#### The auction system is the best way to establish property rights in space, it solves the three most glaring issues with the neg approach to property rights.

#### First is the Fraud issue- since the auction system Restricts the profits Miners earn the incentive to falsify data is eliminated. Mining through the public sector means private entries can put all of their efforts in one area without fear of the innovation race in other sectors. The auction also ensures that important ventures have value, exploration and prospecting are possible now, extensive space mining is not yet. Which means that exploration is not incentivized, but with the auction regime there is an incentive to put money there. That’s Reinstein 99

#### Second is the Centralization problem- in the neg world the land goes to whomever gets there first, with the auction regime it goes to whoever values it the most, this solves wasteful use and increases efficiency. This also solves for land conflict, e.g. what do you do when 3 private entities claim the same spot in space. That’s Reinstein 99

## Neg

### AT Util

#### 1. Extend the sequencing argument- we have to first secure freedom before worrying about other consequences. Freedom comes first with the value of justice- that’s Ripstein 9.

#### 2. Government exists to uphold our natural moral rights. In order to care about consequences, we have to have a framework for securing freedom and rights

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The concession that a number of factors are potentially relevant to deciding how roads are to be paid for will seem, from a certain perspective, to be an abdication of the responsibilities of normative theory, which, it might be thought, is supposed to dictate to political processes and institutions, rather than listen to them. Kant is certainly committed to the idea that “right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right.”28 The only question is how this commitment is to be interpreted. For Kant, it means only that the fact that the demands of right are unpopular or inconvenient can in no way condition what right demands. It does not follow from this that right, even ideally, provides a template for every detail of social life, or mandates a priori a unique resolution of every conceivable dispute. Among the unfortunate but abiding legacies of Bentham’s utilitarianism is the view that an account of the legitimate uses of state power is incomplete or hopelessly indeterminate if it does not answer the sort of question, or at least specify which facts would be sufficient to answer it, even if there is uncertainty about them. For Bentham, institutions are tools for approximating a moral result that could, in principle, be fully specified if there were no institutions. Their only role, then, is to gather information, or coordinate behavior, more effectively than individuals might be able to do if left to their own devices. From such a perspective, the optimal design of the provision of government services depends entirely on factual questions, and so has a determinate answer apart from any institutions. From Kant’s perspective, however, the point of institutions is to act on behalf of the public, that is, the citizens considered as a collective body, providing things that must be provided publicly—a forum for dispute resolution, public codification of law, and public enforcement, as well as the conditions of the publicity of those institutions, including public roads. From this perspective, the only normatively interesting claim is that institutions must be created, and that the officials of those institutions must be empowered to exercise their judgment about how to carry out these mandatory public purposes. Officials act within their mandates if their decisions also reflect judgments about what people will find more pleasant or convenient, or what will make citizens find particular rules sensible or fair. The Kantian approach does not regard it as an unfortunate limitation that actual human beings will be given these jobs, because it does not suppose that their task is to match what an omniscient being, taking the point of view of the universe, would do in all of its particulars. Nor does it give them detailed criteria to apply. That there must be the requisite institutions can be established a priori: this is the respect in which politics must conform to right. It does not follow that there is a pre-institutional answer about what they should do in every conceivable case that comes before them. The Kantian approach provides a framework that tells officials how to think about questions of public provision, rather than what to think about them. It also provides a framework for citizens to engage in democratic deliberation and processes, the task of which is for the citizens to give themselves laws that are consistent with their lawmaking powers.

#### A2 goodin: didn’t do the legwork to prove the res is about policymaking; there’s no actor in res; also not concerning policy makers so reject this. Plus my fw doesn’t disprove the truth of theirs; it’s a sequencing question. The gov needs a standard of law to be able to consider what utilitarian consequences it achieves

**A2 moral: I’m not reading Kantian moral philosophy, I’m reading a portion of his political philosophy that literally only concerns whether sovereignty is needed to achieve justice. They needed to do the legwork to link these arguments and the 2n is too late, drop X**  
**A2 Impact exclusion: yes; if I’m winning my fw is a prior question then I will exclude impacts because they come second to the question of whether justice requires a sovereign. If it’s a concern you should be doing better work on the framework debate to prove your impacts should matter**

### AT Extinction First

#### 1. Freezes action- every action has a non-zero risk of causing extinction

#### 2. Set the burden high- they need to win literally every person dies, not a mere catastrophic scenario

#### 3. Reject extinction risks- they rely on the conjunction fallacy- every scenario relies on a near-zero chance of multiple steps independently occurring- multiplied together, that makes the scenario zero-risk

4. genocide

### PIC

1. If I win fwk, don’t wevlauate it
2. Perm do it under auctions
3. Net benefit of contention 2