# Glenbrooks R1

#### CP: A just government ought not recognize an unconditional right to strike for medical workers

#### Medical worker strikes have 4 negative consequences 1. Harms individuals’ health 2. Harms public health Thus 3. hurts economic growth and 4. Worsens socio-economic inequalities particularly in developing countries where economic growth and inequality is already worse Essien 18

Essien, M. J. (University of Uyo) (2018). The Socio-Economic Effects of Medical Unions Strikes on the Health Sector of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria. *Asian Business Review*, *8*(2), Art. #12, pp. 83-90. https://doi.org/10.18034/abr.v8i2.157

The study indicates that the positive socioeconomic effective of medical unions’ strikes include: increment of salaries, provision of medical equipment, improved welfare package for health workers and improved performance of health workers. This study seems to set the pace in this direction, in the sense that the researcher could not find literature that studied positive socioeconomic effects of medical unions’ strikes. It seems that previous studies were focused on negative socioeconomic effects of medical unions’ strikes. On the causes of medical union strike, the study also struck accord with previous studies. It indicates that the fundamental causes of medical union strike in Akwa Ibom included unpaid salaries, denial to salary review, unpaid leave grant and other entitlements, poor workings environment and dearth equipment, and default of MoU by government. Earlier studies by researchers have also identified these factors as the fundamental causes of medical workers strike (Kelly and Nicholson 1980; Adalsteinsson 2007; Chima 2013). In particular, this study corroborates recent cross-sectional descriptive study carried out by Obinna Oleribe and co-researchers about the causes of medical union strike in Nigeria between 2013-2015. In their findings, it was shown that the main cause of medical union's strike in Nigeria was demand for salaries review at 82%. In this study, demand for higher salary was the second most important cause of medical union strike in Akwa Ibom State at 22.7% following unpaid salaries which was identified as the most important cause if medical Union strikes in Akwa Ibom State at 40%. These findings are in line with what Maslow thesis that strike will always disrupt the flow of services if the basic physiological needs of the services providers are not adequately met while the reverse would be the case if such basic needs are met. Finally, on the measures that could be adopted to curb the negative effects of medical union strikes, the study shows the various measures that could help curb the negative effects of strikes if adopted. These included: timely payment of health workers salaries and other entitlement, adequate review of health workers salaries, A&E department should not retrieve medical serves, health care providers in private hospitals should operate at reduced cost, NGOs, CBOs, and CSOs should provide skeletal services (Figure 2). In this study, Figure 2 indicate that the two most important/useful measures to curb negative effects of strike are timely payment of health worker's Salaries/ other entitlements and adequate sales review which ranked 42% and 26% respectively.

The result of this study has serious social and economic implications for the society in terms of its effects on microeconomic and macro-economic indices of the country. The impact is usually higher in developing economies. In other words, in less developed economies, medical unions’ strikes further worsens already worse socioeconomic circumstances to the extent that citizens lack or have little options to turn to. From the study, 20% of the respondents reported that medical union strike worsen patients’ health conditions, 14.7% reported that it leads to spreading of disease, and 6.7% indicated that medical union strike increases social inequality (Figure 1). In Nigeria about 70% of the population **is reported to** live [in] below poverty line, this means that the little money individuals and household have is used to purchase essential services such as food, shelter, clothing and healthcare. Yet, healthcare is cheaper in government managed facilities. However, when the health workers within such facilities down tools, this decreases the ability of many individuals and households to obtain healthcare because they usually lack the wherewithal to finance such alternatives. This leads to worsening of the conditions of both inpatients and outpatients and also leads to spreading of diseases in the case of contagious diseases. This also means that the affected population would be less productive in terms of their involvement in pursuit of economic productive ends achieve through exerting labour. At the macro-economic level, the aggregate productivity of the national economy will be negatively affected. From the study, it was reported that medical Union strike leads to increased social inequality. This means that during strike the gap between the poor and the rich as well as between the male and female gender becomes increasingly obvious. Many rich people could obtain medical services at private clinics during which fewer poor could do same. In the same vein, fewer female than their male counterparts could obtain medical services at private healthcare facility. The impact of worsening social inequality implies that, most of the disadvantaged group could not contribute to economic growth at per capita level. This would also have negative effects on national aggregates. 12.7% of respondents indicated that medical union strike increases mortality rate (Figure 1); particularly that of children who are known to be more vulnerable to disease (Todaro and Smith 2012) Studies have indicated that healthier people earn higher wages. In Cote d' Ivoire it was reported that unhealthy people, that is people who were likely to lose a day of work per month due to illness earned 19% lower than healthy people (Todaro and Smith 2012). This further means that, a healthy population is a prerequisite for successful economic development. This study indicates that medical unions’ strike worsens outpatients' health and reduces the opportunity of the population to obtain healthcare services (Figure 1). Good health standard in a population is unimportant to achieve goals of poverty reduction. As Todaro and Smith (2012) note, "if parents are two weak, unhealthy, and unskilled to be productive enough to support their family, the children have to work. But if the children work, they cannot get the education they need, so when they grow up, they will have to send their own children to work "(p.403). Thus, the cycle of poverty and low productivity extend across generations. Health and education are pivotal to economic development (Todaro and Smith 2012). Strike itself is based on microeconomic self-interest. Umo (1993) noted that “the economic world draws its dynamism from the self-interest motivation of individuals, firms and governments in response to some desirable incentives” (p.3). Umo (1993) also noted that every economic activity is a response to a reward or loss system. The existence of appropriate incentives elicits appropriate (correct) economic behavior. The level of efficiency in public institutions depends on the structure of positive and or negative incentives facing the operators (Umo 1993). People work to earn a living. Health workers also work to earn a living. Their motivation to work is the reward that they get. However, when the incentive is distorted, they are bound to react. A restoration of these incentives means restoration of efficiency to the system. We can say that strike is an economic corrective mechanism necessary for the effective functioning of the work environment in terms of protecting the reward system of the economy thereby, ensuring efficiency and productivity. From the findings of the study, it can be concluded that strikes interrupt the smooth flow of medical services to citizens and it is slowly and irredeemably destroying the public health system. This is a result of incompatible demand of the employers and her employees. Also, the study also reveal that denial of salary review and accumulated salary arrears were identified as major causes of medical union strikes. It is noteworthy that the impact of industrial conflict is felt in the productive sector of the economy, both at microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. When people’s health conditions get worsened or there is high mortality rate due to strikes, they become unable to shoulder their responsibilities effectively and hence cannot make progress that will contribute to the growth of the society. This will also reduce labour force drastically both currently and in the future and will in turn affect aggregate production and income negatively. Poor health and negative economic growth are inextricably linked. Improving the health of a nation’s citizens can directly result in economic growth. When human capital is deteriorated, economic productivity is at stake. Health workers have been seen as valuable assets to the society. Their intrinsic value, in terms of human capital, should be respected rather than focusing on economic productivity that may be derived from it. Whenever that is ignored, labour unions utilize the threat of strike (Owoye, 1994). Poorly paid health workers are consistently searching for greener pastures, and may in turn resign from their current services to take up greener opporxtunities in foreign countries. When this happens, the health sector faces the problem of brain drain which results in the reduction of both internally generated income and foreign reserves. Effective public health systems are essential for providing care for the sick and for instituting measures that promote wellness. It breeds healthy citizens that make up a healthy labour force that determines the growth of the state and the country at large.

#### Next pandemic causes extinction- strong public health is key to solve

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[Nahid, MD, MALD, "What do we need to build resilience against the next pandemic?," Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases Policy & Research, 5-18-2021, https://www.bu.edu/ceid/2021/05/18/placeholder-blog-post/, accessed 10-18-2021]

What do we need to build resilience against the next pandemic?

We have lost close to 3.4 million souls to COVID-19 globally over the last year. By some estimates, the real number may be much higher than that because the excess deaths this year are closer to between 7 and 13 million, after accounting for those who died without a diagnosis and those who died because they could not receive timely care for another medical condition. And the pandemic, despite the receding cases in high-resource countries, is nowhere near its end.

Lives lost are the tip of iceberg. We cannot quantify the pain felt by family members remaining behind. Livelihoods and businesses have been devastated. The pandemic’s impact reaches into all recesses of our personal and public lives. It has and will continue to undo decades of work globally on reducing poverty, improving education and health, and empowering women. An IMF study last year showed how, in the five years after major epidemics, income inequality continues to increase in affected countries. Similar trends are already being seen in five countries with the heaviest death tolls from COVID-19. As communities around the world deal with the wreckage of their economies, 95 million more people have been pushed into extreme poverty, with another 200 million predicted to be at risk between now and the year 2030. And this does not even cover the multidimensional impact of poverty. How long will it take for us to recover from this pandemic? How do we take stock and pandemic-proof our communities?

More urgently, COVID-19 may not be the last pandemic we face in our lifetimes. The existential threat of pandemics doesn’t decrease because we are already facing one. In fact, this pandemic worsens the risk for new threats because our effort and resources are depleted, and our surveillance and healthcare systems are overstretched. And because the risk of new infectious diseases seeping into the human population from animal reservoirs is going to continue to grow as we see grow in numbers, require more land, raise more animals, put down more roads, use up more wetlands, and close the gap between us and natural habitats where yet undiscovered viruses lurk. How can we ensure that economically devastated communities coming out of this pandemic recover without worsening the tenuous balance we have with the world around us?

Within our own lifetimes, we have seen the impact of climate change, another existential crisis, transition from something we heard about in news reports to something we experience in our personal lives in the form of changing weather patterns, health effects, increased risk of natural disasters, and rising sea levels. Over the next decades, these factors will exponentially increase the incidence of many infections and change the distribution of others.

And as we tackle these complex problems, new challenges are arising: despite becoming ever more globally connected, our perceptions of reality continue to be disparate. In the deluge of digital data, many among us are falling prey to misinformation and disinformation. The urgency of outbreaks, the shifting scientific knowledge base that comes from tackling emerging pathogens, and political interference have all contributed to the signal getting lost in the noise. The role of disinformation is only going to expand in future emergencies. How do we share timely information in crisis? How do we, in government, science, and public health, earn and build the trust of our communities so ours is the voice they listen to during the fray? How do we listen more carefully to them? How do we involve them in making us all safer?

We can no longer ignore infectious threats on the other side of the world, and we can no longer practice isolationist policies. Because COVID-19 painfully instructed us that outbreaks aren’t just something that happen on the news in distant communities, but instead, they can reach into our homes and rip away our loved ones.

There are moments in history when our actions require collective metacognition and urgency. This has to be one of those moments.

The Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases (CEID) Policy & Research was founded because the time is now for collective transdisciplinary research and response. Every step of the way in this pandemic, the questions haven’t been just scientific, they have also been legal, economic, cultural, and ethical. CEID’s mission is to tug at the threads of all the complex systems that leave us vulnerable to new epidemics and help us answer some of the questions posed above. Through research, collaborative action, community engagement, and training, we hope to find ways to secure us against future global threats. I hope you will reach out with ideas, collaborate with us, and check back often to see where our work is taking us.

We are not rudderless as we head into this future. The COVID-19 pandemic, like recent Ebola virus disease outbreaks and other recent emergencies, has shown that investment in sciences, global collaboration, public health, and health-systems readiness can decrease our vulnerability. We need not only to invest in diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics but also find a new way of approaching the problems. My own experience serving as an outbreak responder in multiple emergencies has underscored for me again and again that epidemics fracture us along lines of existing weakness. Because at the terminus of all international surveillance for outbreaks are many communities that do not have access to care. When families can’t access care, we can’t stop cases from becoming clusters, which then become outbreaks. When communities can’t equitably access vaccines, it makes it harder for them to recover, and we continue to suffer collectively from the global economic impact and through the appearance of new variants. When structural racism keeps parts of our communities from being protected, diagnosed, and cared for, all of us are at risk. When it comes to infectious diseases outbreaks, health inequity is a threat to all our survival.

At the launch of our center, we asked public health experts and scientists, “What do we need to do to build resilience against the next pandemic?” Over the next few months, we will continue asking this question to different disciplines, covering those working on health and economic equity, lawmakers, the business community, artists and musicians, and those in media and journalism. Because the solutions, like the questions, require all of us.

## ON Case

### Terror: NC

#### ON Case

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---it increases hostility.

Ghatak et al. 17—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

#### \*\*\*Empirics prove---there’s no precedent for any of their impacts---AND, authoritarianism doesn’t cause them.

Kupchan 11 Professor of International Affairs – Georgetown University, April 8, (Charles A, “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out,” <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07977.pdf>)

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is not a necessary condition for stable peace. Although liberal democracies appear to be better equipped to fashion zones of peace due to their readiness to institu­tionalize strategic restraint and their more open societies – an attribute that advantages societal integration and narrative/identity change – regime type is a poor predic­tor of the potential for enemies to become friends. The Concert of Europe was divided between two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) and three absolute monar­chies (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), but nevertheless pre­served peace in Europe for almost four decades. Gen-eral Suharto was a repressive leader at home, but after taking power in 1966 he nonetheless guided Indonesia toward peace with Malaysia and played a leading role in the founding of ASEAN. Brazil and Argentina embarked down the path to peace in 1979 – when both countries were ruled by military juntas. These findings indicate that non-democracies can be reliable partners in peace and make clear that the United States, the EU, and de­mocracies around the world should choose enemies and friends on the basis of other states’ foreign policy behav-ior, not the nature of their domestic institutions.

#### Backsliding will produce electoral authoritarianism, not dictatorship---it’s the *new norm*.

Shirah 12 Ryan Shirah, Fellow @ Center for the Study of Democracy @ UC Irvine. “Institutional Legacy and the Survival of New Democracies: The Lasting Effects of Competitive Authoritarianism,” http://www.socsci.uci.edu/files/democracy/docs/conferences/grad/shirah.pdf.

Contemporary authoritarian regimes sport an impressively diverse array of political institutions. Nominally democratic institutions like elected legislatures and political parties are now a common feature of nondemocratic politics (Schedler 2002). While a signiﬁcant amount of work has been put into understanding the causes and consequences of this institutional variation, many questions have not yet been adequately addressed. In particular, as Brownlee (2009a) points out, “comparativists have delved less deeply into the long–term and post– regime effects of electoral competition” (132). Building upon previous work on unfree elections and democratization (Brownlee 2009b, Schedler 2009, Lindberg 2006a, Lindberg 2006b, Lindberg 2009a, Howard & Roessler 2002, Hadenius & Teorell 2007), this study examines how the adoption of competitive elections prior to a democratic transition affects prospects for long–term democratic stability and consolidation. 1 I engage the literature on hybrid regimes and political institutions under dictatorship in order to draw out implications for how the institutionalization of competitive elections prior to democratization might impact the stability of a democratic successor regime. Previously unaddressed implications of two competing arguments are presented. An event history analysis of 74 new democracies that transitioned from authoritarian rule between 1975 and 2003 shows that institutional legacies signiﬁcantly affect prospects for democratic consolidation. Speciﬁcally, competitive authoritarian regimes tend to make for longer–lived democracies following a democratic transition than regimes without minimally competitive elections. 2 The idea that political institutions have signiﬁcant and independent effects is hardly controversial in comparative politics. What has been less broadly accepted is the notion that nominally democratic institutions are anything but window dressing in regimes that do not allow for meaningful challenges to authority. By the late 1980s, a series of observed transitions led to the conclusion that there was no sustainable form of electoral authoritarianism. Huntington (1991) famously declared that “liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (174–5). Others had already begun drawing the same conclusion; regimes that adopted nominally democratic institutions did not represent a new variety or subtype of authoritarian regime, they were instead considered transitory states (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, DiPalma 1990, Przeworski 1991). For a decade, the literature on democratization treated dictatorships with electoral institutions as semi–democracies or states in the process of full liberalization. But by the turn of the century the observed facts made this a diffcult position to maintain. Dictators remained in power alongside legislatures, political parties, and electoral systems that they had created or inherited. It became clear that electoral authoritarianism was not an ephemeral and unstable state; it was a new kind of nondemocracy, and it was quickly becoming the norm (Schedler 2002).

#### Democracy causes civil war---credibility commitments and nationalism.

Savun 11 (Burcu Savun, Poli-Sci Professor @ Pitt, Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 233-246)

As Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2007) note, most theoretical and empirical treatments of the democratization-conflict link have occurred with a focus on interstate wars. In From Voting to Violence, Snyder (2000) provides one of the first exclusive systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict, particularly ethnic conflicts. Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics. According to Snyder, before democratization, the public is not politically active and hence its sense of belonging to a nation is relatively weak (35).3 Democratization increases the feeling of nationalism, especially with the provocation of the elites who feel threatened by the arrival of democracy. To maintain or increase their grab on political power, the elites may depict the political opponents and the ethnic minorities as traitors by invoking nationalist sentiments in the public (37).4 These polarizing tactics, in turn, create tensions among ethnic groups and hence increase the risk of violent clashes in the society.5 For example, during 1987 Milosevic skillfully used the Serbian state TV to convince the Serbian minority that Serbs in the Kosovo were suffering discrimination and repression at the hands of the Albanian majority. These kinds of inciting polarizing tactics by Milosevic and the Serbian nationalist elites were pivotal in contributing to violence in Kosovo. Violent struggles in post-communist regimes such as Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia during the 1990s are other examples of nationalist upheavals incited by the domestic political elites during democratization process. Snyder (2000) argues that the elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is particularly strong and damaging if the democratizing state has weak political institutions. If state institutions are strong, the institutions may be able to deter the elites’ opportunistic behavior and curb its potentially damaging impacts. However, during early phases of democratization, the institutions are usually new and fragile and the central authority is weak. The weakening of central authority gives the elites the opportunity to monopolize the media, create divisions in the society, and control the political discourse. Without the constraints of strong institutions and state authority, the political elites have more leeway to pull the society to any direction their interests dictate. Rustow’s (1970) seminal work on regime transition divides democratization into three phases. In the preparatory phase, a prolonged political struggle representing different interests takes place.6 Polarization of the elites usually ensues in this phase. In such an environment, a weakening of the central authority is inevitable. As the balance of power shifts from the old authority to the new actors in political life, a power vacuum emerges. The transition of power also weakens the state’s monopoly on the use of force as the military usually plays a key (and often independent) role in the democratization process, as was the case in most democratization episodes in Latin America. In addition, the early phase of a regime change usually renders the policing capacity of the state inefficient and thereby increases its vulnerability to attacks by domestic groups. The extant literature on civil war shows that organizationally and politically weak central governments make civil conflicts feasible due to weak local policing and inept counterinsurgency practices (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). The weaker the central government, the less likely it is to deter domestic groups from using violence. Weak states also provide the opportunity for rebellion because the rebels’ chances of scoring a victory increase. As the state capacity weakens and questions arise about its legitimacy, the rebels find it easier to recruit and thereby strengthen their base. During democratization, uncertainty also looms large (e.g., Gill 2000; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Teixeira 2008). As Rustow (1970) puts it, “a new political regime is a novel prescription for taking joint chances on the unknown” (358). Uncertainty of the regime change creates several credible commitment problems. First, the political elites have difficulty in trusting each other’s intentions and promises. As Karl (1990) suggests, during regime transitions political actors “find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents” (6). The new political elites and the old regime are wary of each other’s intentions and hence are unlikely to believe that any promises made or concessions given during the transition period will be honored once the central authority and institutions are consolidated. The key problem is that the elites perceive each other as “conditional in their support for democracy and equivocal in their commitment to democratic rules of the game” (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992, 31). The “equivocal commitment to democratic rules” increases the level of distrust and suspicion among the elites and thereby increases the risk of collapse of the political rule. Another credibility problem arises between the elites and ethnic groups in the state. The weakening of the state authority, combined with the uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity that comes with the transition (Pridham 2000). This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, a weak state authority, and rising nationalism. Weingast (1997, 1998) formally demonstrates that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. That is, institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other (Weingast 1998). The literature on democratization similarly contends that the new regimes are not usually successful in honoring their commitments and showing self-restraint (e.g., Huntington 1991). Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence based on fears of victimization is particularly low (Weingast 1998, 191). That is, it does not take much for the minority group to resort to violence out of its fear. The extant literature on civil wars shows that minority groups are more likely to resort to violence if they fear that there is a risk of annihilation in the future and the commitments made by the state are not credible (e.g., Fearon 1998; Walter 1997, 2002).

#### Civil conflict increases international terrorism via escalation effects---*statistical models* support.

Campos & Gassebner 13 Nauro F. Campos and Martin Gassebner, March 2013, Department of Economics, Brunel University, Uxbridge. “INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND THE ESCALATION EFFECT,” Economics and Politics, 25.1, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/ecpo.12002/asset/ecpo12002.pdf?v=1&t=ho2exidu&s=c29cfb9a44cae7b1645436dd13679644560dc702.

More than 10 years have now passed since the 9/11 terrorist attack. These have been followed not only by the Madrid and London bombings, which were equally hideous, but also by a wave of increasingly sophisticated terrorist attacks all over the world. Such atrocities have not only caused extensive loss of human life but also have had perverse economic consequences in terms of increased uncertainty, reduced productive investment, and larger shares of national output spent on antiterror activities (see, e.g., Sandler et al., 2008). Figure 1 illustrates these points. 1 It shows transnational terror attacks per country from diﬀerent regions in the world. Note that, ﬁrst, international terrorism attacks are distributed widely across countries and regions. Second, while the average yearly number of terror attacks has decreased, their sophistication increased as shown by the rising number of fatalities over the last 40 years. 2 Third, the most lethal attacks are from African, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries. The objective of this article is to examine the causes of international terrorism across countries and over time. This is an important question because there are still considerable disagreements. Recent research has made great strides in furthering our understanding of the aggregate behavior of terrorism over time, its economic and political costs and micro-foundations, but the debate lingers about its root causes. 3 The literature has produced a detailed investigation of the relative roles of economic conditions (GDP levels and growth rates, poverty, income inequality) and of political rights and democracy, among other factors. Yet, the resulting estimates still diverge in size, statistical signiﬁcance, and even sign. In this debate, little to no attention has been paid to the role of domestic political instability. The latter may play an important role in that domestic political instability may escalate into international terrorist acts. Terrorism is deﬁned as premeditated political violence against civilians with the objective of maximizing media exposure to the act and, ultimately, to the terror group and/or to its “cause.” 4 Terrorist acts differ from civil wars, guerrilla warfare, and riots because, among other reasons, they mainly target non-military facilities and/or personnel (that is, because the focus of terrorist activities are “civilian” targets). As the aim is to raise the proﬁle of the “cause,” one main objective of terrorism is to maximize media exposure so as to further the atmosphere of fear. As the relative importance of exposure vis-a-vis the terror act itself increases (the propaganda eclipsing the deed), planning and required skills become relatively more important. Attacks become fewer, but deadlier. This article puts forward a novel explanation for international terrorism: the escalation effect. It also presents supporting econometric evidence. The escalation eﬀect focuses on domestic political instability. The intuition is that (domestic) political instability provides the “learning environment” required to carry out increasingly sophisticated terror attacks. Using a yearly panel of 123 countries over 1973–2003 and data on various aspects of international terrorism, our main ﬁndings are that (1) civil wars, guerrilla warfare, and riots robustly predict the origin of international terrorism, while demonstrations and strikes do less so, (2) the data offer less support for the role of per capita GDP and democracy in explaining international terrorism, and (3) there are important differences in the strength of the escalation effect across levels of economic development, with the effect weaker in richer and stronger in poorer countries. These results hold for various indicators of domestic political instability, estimators, subsamples, subperiods, and the presence of alternative explanations.

**The risk of a nuclear attack is high---retaliation ensures *escalation* and nuclear war.**

**Patterson 16** (Ricard Patterson, member of the Council On Foreign Relations, 6/12/16, “No Time For Trump, Part Two: Nuclear Proliferation, ISIS And The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-north-patterson/no-time-for-trump-part-tw_b_9625282.html)>

Let’s take them at their word. And so, a question. Of all the threats we face, what fear most haunts our national security community? It is not massacres like those in Orlando or San Bernardino, as monstrous as they are. It is a threat which, while more remote, would be infinitely more devastating: a nuclear attack — including by terrorists like ISIS and Al Qaeda. This existential danger drives America’s efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, and to keep our country safe from a nuclear holocaust. And here lies the irony in the Republicans’ warning. For it is yet another compelling reason that a man as ignorant, irresponsible, unstable and unprepared as Donald Trump should never become president. True, Trump’s nativist scapegoating of all Muslims — including millions of loyal Americans, many of whom have served our military — increases the danger of more mass slaughters like Orlando, breeding alienation while attacking those whose vigilance could help prevent such horrors. But his xenophobia and lack of basic knowledge also enhances the most terrible prospect of all — nuclear terrorism. While the nuclear threat is horrifying to contemplate, its greatest dangers are little understood, or even discussed in public. In recent years, the public’s worry about nuclear proliferation has focused most particularly on Iran — a frequent subject of Trump’s crude and self-preening attacks on Obama’s supposed “weakness” in confronting threats to America. But it is unlikely that Iran would start a nuclear war: however aggressive, its regime has a return address, and a reprisal could annihilate Tehran. That is why nuclear terrorism by non-state actors is America’s ultimate nuclear nightmare. As debilitating as the mass slaughters we have suffered can be, only terrorism by nuclear means has the potential to destroy our economy, our security, our system of civil liberties, our commitment to democratic ideals, and our very trust in each other. In short those things which, at our best, make us who we are. This is why countries which could spawn nuclear terrorism are the greatest threats to our way of life. It is why Pakistan — not Iran — is the most dangerous place on earth. It is why our next president must have sound judgment, a stable temperament, and a sophisticated understanding of the of nuclear threat posed by Al Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS. It is why that president cannot — must not — be Donald Trump. The facts which make this so are as little-known as they are sobering. To start, Al Qaeda has long been obsessed with acquiring nuclear weapons, and Pakistan has always been its focus. Just before 9/11, bin Laden met in Afghanistan with a Pakistani nuclear scientist and an engineer, drawing up specifications for an Al Qaeda bomb. And after 9/11, bin Laden announced Al Qaeda’s intention to kill 4 million Americans in reprisal for the Muslim deaths he attributed to the United States and Israel, and issued a fatwa calling for the use of nuclear arms against the West. Bin Laden is dead. Al Qaeda is not. And a new force has emerged with the same apocalyptic desires — ISIS. Granted, perpetuating nuclear terrorism would require a high degree of organizational and logistical sophistication. But intelligence officials believe that ISIS is scouring Iraq for nuclear and radioactive materials for use outside the country. Indeed, it is known that they have already seized lower-grade nuclear materials from Mosul University. And the tragic attacks in France and Belgium have a disturbing nuclear coda. The terrorist cell which executed these attacks previously monitored an official at Belgian nuclear research sites housing highly enriched uranium — HEU — which could be used to fabricate a nuclear weapon. How do we know? Because Belgian authorities captured a surveillance tape taken by members of the cell. Why track the official? One theory is that the terrorists intended to kidnap a member of his family, meaning to coerce him to transfer nuclear materials. Another is that ISIS meant to precipitate a Fukushima type disaster by attacking a Belgian nuclear facility — a strike which could spew large amounts of radiation, rendering the surroundings uninhabitable and causing thousands of early deaths from cancer. This last ambition did not originate with ISIS — the planners of the 9/11 attacks considered crashing a plane into a nuclear facility near New York City. As for the mass slaughter executed by ISIS in Brussels, experts believe that this may have been a fallback operation, chosen over a nuclear-based scheme only because authorities were closing in. Whatever the case, terrorists have several potential openings to carry out such a plan — acquiring or fabricating a nuclear weapon; building a dirty bomb; or attacking a nuclear reactor. To obtain a bomb, they can steal nuclear weapons or materials; buy them on the black market; or recruit nuclear scientists to supply materials or expertise. There is, of course, precedent for nuclear trafficking on a massive scale — until 2004, A Q Khan, the director of Pakistan’s nuclear program, ran a black market through which he sold nuclear materials and technology to such nations as Iran, Libya, and North Korea. As for theft, the International Atomic Energy Agency — IAEA — has documented 18 incidents where highly enriched uranium and plutonium were lost or stolen. The threat persists — nuclear materials are stored at hundreds of research facilities in over 30 countries where security may be grossly inadequate. Thus, in relative terms, nuclear materials are even less secure than nuclear weapons. Constructing a nuclear bomb does not require extraordinary expertise, or knowledge of classified information. As for smuggling nuclear materials, Matthew Bunn of Harvard puts the matter starkly: “The immense length of national borders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, the myriad potential pathways across these borders, and the small size and weak radiation signal of the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb make nuclear smuggling extraordinarily difficult to stop.” Three countries are the most likely sources — North Korea, Russia and Pakistan. North Korea exists outside political and moral norms, even as it aggressively expands its nuclear capacity. One of our leading experts on nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, gave me this sober assessment: based on its past history as a nuclear purveyor, “there is no reason to believe that North Korea would not sell bombs or material to another state — or to ISIS.” Moreover, Dr. Allison adds, the sole potential deterrent on its conduct is the fear of retaliation, and North Korea’s young leader is inexperienced and unpredictable. Russia, at least, is not a rogue state. But it has the world’s largest nuclear stockpile and is vulnerable to corrupt insiders. Between 2010 and 2015 the FBI stopped four attempts by criminal gangs in Russia to sell nuclear materials to ISIS. There are links between home-grown Russian terrorists and ISIS. And there is no end of smuggling routes and smugglers to facilitate the movement of nuclear materials from Russia through the Middle East. But perhaps the biggest threat is Pakistan. Its arsenal of roughly 130 nuclear warheads is growing without restraint, and its chief motivation — fear and hatred of India — has yet to abate. The Pakistani government has declined to increase compliance with international rules for stopping the spread of nuclear materials. Even its denial of knowledge regarding A Q Khan’s activities is open to considerable doubt. Moreover, its nuclear arsenal is subject to extraordinary threats — both from corrupt insiders and armed extremists, whether inside or outside the military. There is no country with more active terrorists than Pakistan — it is the epicenter of Al Qaeda and related groups, most with close ties to the Pakistani security apparatus. In some combination, these allies could well cooperate in acquiring a nuclear weapon or materials. This concern is far from academic. Experts believe that terrorists have attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities at least three times in the last 10 years. So serious is the risk that the U.S. Army has trained specialized units to grab back Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that they are stolen. In turn, this has led to further lack of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan. Add to all this the risk of a jihadist take over of the Pakistani government, or the total collapse of the state — dangers exacerbated by serious concerns about the security of its nuclear arsenal. We don’t know where all the weapons are stored. The people who do — the military and the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, include highly-placed jihadist sympathizers. This is captured by a chilling remark from a former head of the ISI: “The same nuclear capacity that can destroy Madras, India can destroy Tel Aviv.” The scenario in which terrorists link with the ISI to steal a nuclear weapon is far from a Bondian fantasy. Indeed, the ISI itself is at the heart of Pakistani jihadism. It helped create the Taliban to fight the Russians in Afghanistan, and introduced its leaders to bin Laden. It created the terrorist group LET to carry out attacks against India, such as the bloody massacre in Mumbai. The military, the ISI and LET all recruit from the Punjabi, Pakistan’s dominant ethnic group, creating familial ties among all three. With the ISI’s protection, LET trains hundreds of jihadists every year. As for Al Qaeda, it is highly implausible that the ISI did not know of bin Laden’s whereabouts before he died. Moreover, Al Qaeda helped fund LET, and after 9/11 some of its leaders took refuge in LET safe houses. And some Al Qaeda soldiers and strategists have transferred their allegiance to ISIS — which emanated directly from Al Qaeda in Iraq. All three groups are Sunni, and share an implacable hostility toward the United States. And so their affinity enhances the already grave concerns of our national defense community about the possibility of nuclear terrorism in America. Whatever the potential sources of such a threat, we are surely vulnerable. To start, nuclear weapons or materials can be smuggled through the ports in Long Beach or New York, where we inspect a fraction of all cargo containers. Dr. Allison notes that there is greater cooperation between the FBI, local police and federal counter-terrorism personnel, and that our screening at ports has become more sophisticated and rooted in better intelligence. But he admonishes that there are many other means of smuggling nuclear materials, such as fishing boats and private planes. The risk is exacerbated by 1100 miles of seacoast and lengthy and unguarded borders, leaving us extremely vulnerable. Equally worrisome is that Americans fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq have been able to return with relative ease. And in the post-Snowden world, Dr. Allison observes, those bent on doing us harm know more about our counter-terrorism measures. A nuclear event in a major U.S. city could kill more than a half a million people, cost trillions of dollars, and trigger an exodus by residents of other major cities. Such an event would be economically, politically and psychologically devastating. It is all too easy to imagine Americans waiting for the next city to be destroyed, shattering our belief in our government, our system of civil liberties, or even our future as a democracy. We cannot let this happen. Enter Donald Trump. On the eve of the recent Nuclear Security Summit — initiated by President Obama to encourage nuclear countries to secure materials which can be used by terrorists — Trump unburdened himself on the subject of nuclear proliferation. Reversing decades of American foreign policy, he welcomed the idea of a nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea, arguing that it would save America the expense and trouble of defending Asian allies in an area shadowed by nuclear North Korea. He then topped this off by refusing to rule out using nuclear weapons in a European military conflict. To say the least, Trump displays a dangerous ignorance of the risks of nuclear proliferation, not to mention a shocking failure of imagination regarding the horrors of nuclear warfare. For 70 years, American presidents have worked to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Trump’s supposed hero, Ronald Reagan, said it well: “A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.” Since then, the bipolar world of the Cold War has evolved into something far more lethal: a multi- polar world in which the danger of nuclear warfare increases exponentially with the spread of nuclear weapons — including the risk that they will fall into the hands of terrorists. Only America’s influence and the assiduous work of its presidents has limited the number of nuclear-armed nations. That Trump seems not to know this, and even less to care, defines the dangers posed by his boundless ignorance, ego and instability. This required Obama to suggest that someone who failed to grasp the need for constraints on nuclear weapons should not be president. For Obama, cleaning up after this frightening ignoramus has become a cottage industry, starting with Trump’s counter-terrorism program — surveillance of Muslims at home, barring all Muslims from abroad, and labeling 1.6 billion Muslims around the world as incipient jihadists. His odious response to the tragedy in Orlando only increased the danger. He doubled down on his ban on Muslims, asserted that American Muslims at large “know what’s going on” with respect to terrorist threats” and congratulated himself on his foresight in scapegoating all Muslims at home and abroad. In doing so, he cemented his position as the single person in America who does the most to further the goals of ISIS. There is no better fuel for alienation than for our president to disparage loyal Americans — let alone those who could be indispensable in identifying potential terrorists. Nor could there be a greater gift to ISIS than to indiscriminately scorn every Muslim on the globe. Beyond the fact that it serves ISIS’s anti-Western narrative, as counter-terrorism Trump’s blanket ban on refugees from the terrible slaughter in Syria is misdirected. The best way to carry out terrorist operations in America is through home-grown terrorists or those who enter the country surreptitiously. No terrorist leader who wants to penetrate America would look to our slow, onerous and — despite Trump’s lies — extremely thorough process of vetting Syrian refugees as a promising pathway to success. Once again, Trump’s ignorance leads him — and any intelligent discussion of counter-terrorism — down a dangerous blind alley. All this enhances the terrorist threat to the United States — a self-inflicted wound reflective of a remarkable degree of thoughtlessness, irresponsibility, demagoguery and sheer stupidity by a candidate who has no business anywhere near the White House. Add to this Trump’s “program” for defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq, combining torture with mass bombings which would decimate civilians — not to mention his **musings about using nuclear weapons against ISIS** or in a European ground war. The net effect is a mushroom cloud of radioactive ignorance from a man incapable of better.

#### Party-based autocracies are key to defeat terrorism---a range of hard and soft CT options is key---empirical evidence supports.

Wilson & Piazza 13. Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza, October 2013, The Pennsylvania State University. “Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks,” American Journal of Political Science 57.4.

Terrorism poses a unique challenge to state security that is quite unlike those posed by armed civil conflicts or in- terstate wars.2 It refers to the strategic use of violence by clandestine and relatively few nonstate actors to attract at- tention, convey a political message, or influence (Lacquer 1977; Ross 1993; Schmid and Jongman 1988). Terror- ists are difficult to identify, do not have a fixed location, and are more indiscriminate in the application of violence (Jackson 2007; Lacquer 1977; Ross 1993; Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Unlike rebel groups in a civil war or countries prosecuting interstate wars, terrorist movements are not focused on gaining and controlling territory or achieving a conventional battlefield victory, as they have relatively weak capacity to project force (Sanchez- Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Because of this weakness, terrorism is a strategy employed by dissidents that makes use of asymmetrical threat advantages vis-a`-vis the gov- ernments they oppose. The determinants of terrorism are thus likely to be different from the determinants of civil wars or interstate wars.3

Terrorism’s distinctive features—the strategic use of violence as a political message, civilian targeting, clandes- tine perpetrators, the inability to control territory, and asymmetrical threats—make it particularly sensitive to regime type. While a state’s ability to respond to security threats posed by civil or interstate war is primarily de- termined by its capacity to mobilize and project physical force to defend its institutions, territory, and people, successful management of the threat of terrorism requires a mix of physical force and political and economic tools to monitor and channel dissent into behaviors that reinforce state control. Terrorism is a “faceless” form of po- litical violence that requires disproportionate intelligence and some level of community sympathy or support— fueled by underlying grievances—in order to be effective (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993). State response to terrorism must therefore be a careful balance of coercive and non- coercive strategies aimed at gathering intelligence about the terrorists, securing the cooperation of citizens in areas where terrorists operate, and, where possible, channeling dissidence into behaviors and structures that can be con- trolled by the state.

There is some indirect empirical evidence for these as- sertions. Walsh and Piazza (2010) determined that states employing strategies that abuse physical integrity rights of citizens are more likely to be attacked by terrorists, suggesting the limitations of a coercion-only counter- terrorism strategy. In their landmark empirical study of over 700 terrorist movements, Jones and Libicki (2008) determined that nearly half of all terminations of terrorist campaigns globally have involved bringing terrorists into a political process to air their grievances and to negotiate a settlement with the state; the remainder of termina- tions has involved either military defeat or factionaliza- tion. Empirical research by Li (2005) supports a more nuanced relationship between democracy and terrorism. He finds that constraints on executive power in democracies, which hampers the ability of officials to repress terrorist activity, boosts terrorism; political participation, which aids government ability to co-opt and manage extremism and dissent, reduces terrorism. These findings suggest that the capacity for a state to deploy multiple types of responses is important for explaining why some states are better at avoiding terrorism.

If the range of state response to terrorism—the “flexibility” to use both coercive state power to crush or disrupt terrorist movements and the capacity to co-opt would-be terrorists—is salient to explaining terrorism, it is crucial to understand the regime types that have a wider range of counterterrorism strategies. We theorize that there are three categories of responses a state can pursue in the face of terrorism: (1) mobilize coercion or repression against terrorists and their supporters or sympathizers; (2) co- opt terrorists and their supporters or sympathizers; and (3) pursue a mix of both coercion and co-optation.

Coercion, or repression, involves the use of sanctions to impose a cost on an individual or a group to deter specific activities and beliefs (Davenport 2007; Goldstein 1978). Specific examples might include arrest and im- prisonment, physical abuse, assassinations, curtailment of political participation or personal autonomy, surveil- lance, harassment, and threats. A consistent finding is that authorities generally employ some form of repression to counter or eliminate threats (Davenport 2007). Re- ported findings on the effects of repression on dissent are highly inconsistent, however (Choi 2008; Francisco 1996; Gupta and Venieris 1981; Gurr and Moore 1997; Hibbs 1973; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Moore 1998; Muller 1985; Piazza and Walsh 2010; Rasler 1996; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Ziegenhagen 1986). On the one hand, repression can raise the costs of collective action by threatening livelihood or life itself, thereby preventing potential recruits from becoming terrorists. On the other hand, repression increases the ideological benefit of fighting against the state (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). It also has a nega- tive impact on the economy, making the opportunity cost of becoming a terrorist lower (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Siqueira and Sandler 2006).

Leaders can also use positive reinforcements to buy off or “co-opt” potential opposition. An extreme example of the former type is President Joseph Mobutu in the now Democratic Republic of Congo, who handed out cash in exchange for political support (Le Billon 2003). Lead- ers who need cooperation can simply purchase it with rewards, perks, and privileges (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate that the size of the winning coalition relative to the selec- torate must be sufficiently large for the leader to choose to distribute goods publicly rather than privately. Below a certain threshold, it is more expedient to distribute rents to a select few to maintain office. On their own, however, rent-sharing systems are long-run inefficient and can re- tard economic growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2006; Haber 2006). Thus, in addition to sharing material spoils, a leader can induce cooperation by providing policy con- cessions, which involves the creation of forums for nego- tiating oppositional demands (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).

Offering a space for limited deliberation and rep- resentation encourages potential oppositional groups to negotiate their interests within the legal boundaries of the state. The creation of institutions such as a legislature, political parties, and bureaucratic offices generates positions that elites and opposition members can be used to fill, which is another form of co-optation (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008).4 Political office provides direct and indirect benefits to working with the regime for potential opposition members. In turn, their involvement helps to preserve the regime by forcing them to invest in it, so long as they value their positions and their “stake” in the game (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Gandhi 2008). Deliberative organizations also neutralize potential opposition by affecting the costs of coordination. For example, a strong party can be used to co-opt by distributing benefits and offices to elites and regularizing uncertainty regarding their positions, keeping them in the fold (Cox 2009; Gandhi 2008; Haber 2006).

### AT AI

#### ON Jain No AI war impact – too slow and ineffective

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The dustbin of **history is full of predictions of tech**nological **innovations that would surely change** the nature of **warfare**. Machine guns, tanks, and modern artillery were all supposed to change warfare radically, yet within a short time of their fielding, less tech-savvy forces were able to mitigate these advances through tactical innovation. Frequently, technological have-nots went on to seize victory against more technologically advanced adversaries. Will the Pentagon’s current pursuit of tech overmatch, with artificial intelligence (AI) as its crown jewel, pay off? Or, will resources devoted to AI risk crowding out investment in the enduring human determinants of battlefield victory or defeat? Will AI Be Revolutionary? Conflict in the future will take place in a battlespace that is shaped by artificial intelligence and other new technologies. Some more bullish observers suggest that this change will be revolutionary, that the leader in AI will rule the world, and that soon war may not even have humans involved. Though faith in the transformative potential of technology is tempting, hope that robots will replace humans in war is misplaced. Since the dawn of the industrial age, technological advantage has been as predictive of victory as a coin toss. Instead, human innovation has overcome technical disadvantages to deliver victory to those who most quickly exploit the battlefield. If force employment, doctrine, and tactical decisions made by humans trump technology in determining victory, too much focus on artificial intelligence could create blind spots that future adversaries will exploit. Though AI and other technology will be important in future conflicts, the best bet for future victory is developing the tactical, operational, and strategic innovators who will leverage battlespace conditions to achieve victory, regardless of the tech balance. Human intelligence and creativity will win the next war, not technology. Instead of seeking to replace it, virtual training environments should be used today to help develop the innovative potential that will deliver victory tomorrow. Michael Horowitz and Casey Mahoney reflected on the state of the conversation about AI over a year ago. A consensus seems to have grown, at least in the pages of War on the Rocks, that AI and other emerging technologies are changing the character of warfare, if not its nature. Though AI will be a powerful tool, **it’s unlikely that the world will be ruled by** those who develop **the most advanced AI**-based **weapon systems**. First, the glacially paced military change of recent memory suggests that battlefields fifteen years hence will likely look more familiar than some may think. Second, military analysts have been erroneously forecasting revolutionary change just around the corner for at least four decades. And third, research demonstrates that technological overmatch does not significantly increase the likelihood of military victory. The battlespace of 2035 is now fifteen years distant. I joined the Air Force a little more than fifteen years ago, and those years have been mainly characterized by slow evolution rather than revolutionary change. The 1960’s era radar system I first trained on is still our primary ground mobile radar system. A next generation replacement has been in the works since I joined, but after fifteen years of anticipation, the contract was recently cancelled and the Air Force is returning to the drawing board. Meanwhile, new generations of airmen are training on the same sixty-year-old radar system. Air operations have experienced evolutionary change since I trained as an air battle manager a few years later, and the systems we use for battle management and command and control still resemble home desktops in the 1990s more than the machines in our pockets today. If the last fifteen years are any indication of the next, we will continue to see incremental, evolutionary increases in capability even as we approach 2035 and the 50th year of the information age of warfare.

### AT Emerging Tech

#### ON Jain Emerging tech doesn’t cause war

**Talmadge ’19** [Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a core faculty member of the Security Studies Program, “Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today,” 8-22-19, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811]

Will emerging technologies such as cyber, precision, stealth, and remote sensing cause future conflict escalation?1 Widespread and influential commentary suggests that the answer is an unequivocal yes. For example, a prominent think tank report warns that ‘several new technologies,’ particularly cyber and robotics, ‘are changing the way deterrence and escalation operate between the United States and other actors’ in potentially dangerous ways.2 Another well-known expert argues that the speed, precision, and range of hypersonic vehicles will augur ‘a new and potentially dangerous arms race . . . where a crisis could touch off rapid and uncontrollable escalation.’ A former US defense undersecretary similarly worries that ‘emerging new military capabilities – cyber, space, missile defense, longrange strike, and . . . autonomous systems – are increasing uncertainties associated with strategic stability and creating potential slippery slopes of escalation. Unless measures are taken to cushion the consequences of these military trends,’ he writes, ‘conflict may become more probable and escalation more dramatic and severe.’ 4 Yet the future relationship between emerging technologies and escalation may not be as straightforward as these statements imply. The debate about emerging technologies tends to portray them as a powerful independent variable – an exogenous factor that is both necessary and sufficient to cause conflict escalation. This paper argues instead that emerging technologies are more likely to function as intervening variables; they may be necessary for escalation to happen in some cases, but they alone are not sufficient, and sometimes they will not even be necessary. **The strongest drivers of escalation will** actually **lie elsewhere, in** the realms of **politics and strategy**. As a result, concern about new technologies is warranted, but determinism is not. An overemphasis on the dangers of technology alone ignores the critical role of political and strategic choices in shaping the impact of technology, and also could lead to a misplaced faith in arms control or other means of trying to stuff the technological genie back in the bottle.5 The paper advances this argument in three steps. It first develops a framework for evaluating the causal role that technology could play in escalation, presenting both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of the claim. The ‘strong’ version posits that emerging technologies could cause potential inadvertent conventional or nuclear escalation if the technologies heightened first-mover advantages and contributed to wartime security dilemma dynamics in which states felt pressure to escalate even if they preferred not to. In this account, technology is an independent variable that is necessary and possibly even sufficient to cause escalation. A second, ‘weaker’ version of the claim treats technologies as an intervening variable – a tool that enables states to engage in deliberately escalatory behavior in the nuclear or conventional realms that they have already decided to undertake for other reasons. In this view, emerging technologies alone are not sufficient to cause escalation; they are at best necessary, but sometimes not even that. Adjudicating which of these claims best captures the likely relationship between emerging technologies and future escalation is difficult, given that by definition the technologies of most interest today are still immature. As a result, the paper’s second section turns to three carefully chosen cases from the Cold War about which we have actual data. Each represents an instance in which for various reasons we should expect to be able to detect the relationship between technology and escalatory risk, if there is one. Specifically, the section examines the role of then-new nuclear weapons technologies in potentially enabling intentional US nuclear escalation from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s; the role of then-emerging precision, stealth and electronic warfare technologies in fomenting potential inadvertent Soviet and US nuclear escalation in the 1970s and 1980s; and the role of early guided bomb technology in fostering intentional US conventional escalation during the Vietnam War. Overall, the **evidence casts doubt on** the strong version of the claims presented in the first section – the idea of **emerging tech**nologies **as an independent, primary driver of otherwise avoidable escalation**. The cases show that escalation and **escalatory risk arose** largely **independently of tech**nology **in important Cold War episodes**. Where the two were associated, technology mostly functioned as an intervening variable – an enabler of intentional escalation rather than a purely exogenous driver of inadvertent escalation. Furthermore, even in instances where technology did heighten the danger of inadvertent escalation, it did so only in combination with other major variables. Thus even though emerging technologies might have been necessary for escalation in these situations, they alone were not sufficient – and in some situations, new technologies were neither necessary nor sufficient.

### AT NATO

#### ON kagan Recent Russian military build-up near the Baltic states makes war likely – strong NATO ensures war

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Beyond disinformation campaigns, Russian foreign policy objectives of maintaining influence in the region are not changing. While the pandemic hit Russia hard, both in terms of health (as of May 27, it has the third-highest rate of infections in the world) and economically (Russian GDP could go decline by 5.5 percent in 2020, according to the IMF), Russian military exercises were not delayed. For instance, despite earlier announcements by Russian military officials about the suspension of exercises on NATO borders, a series of military exercises involving all branches of the Russian Armed Forces took place in Kaliningrad at the end of April. Moreover, the largest event of the combat training program for the Russian forces, Caucasus-2020, is still planned for September. It sends a clear signal to neighboring countries and NATO at large that Russian military priorities will not change even in the complicated circumstances of the pandemic.

The Kremlin’s focus on the military is also confirmed by its ongoin g incursion into Ukraine: At least 32 Ukrainian soldiers died in Donbass region in 2020 alone (as of May 21), while OSCE observers reported new evidence of Russian military hardware around the city of Luhansk. It leaves no doubt that the Baltic countries still face an unstable neighborhood and an assertive Russian foreign policy. Therefore, the Baltic political preference continues to underscore the need to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture on the Alliance’s Eastern flank, rather than an initiative by France to seek closer dialogue with Russia.

#### That goes nuclear

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[Joshua R., PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fellowships from the Dickey Center, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, and the Belfer Center, “Time to Consolidate NATO?” 04-26-2020, *The Washington Quarterly*, [https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01 63660X.2017.1302742?needAccess=true](https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01%2063660X.2017.1302742?needAccess=true), accessed 6-18-2020]

Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas. Whereas a conventional defense of Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, distance, reinforcement rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern Europe is not a realistic option today.19 War games by the Rand Corporation highlight the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising to bring NATO members’ collective strength to bear.20 If deterrence fails, however, and short of committing nearly all of NATO’s conventional ground and air power to the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East–West conflict. Yet here, NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO’s East European members.21 Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it cannot credibly commit to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so risks a strategic nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility crisis.22 Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States’ credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.23