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## China PIC

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#### Counterplan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities in the People’s Republic of China is unjust.

## Mining DA

#### Next off is the mining disad –

#### Commercial asteroid mining is coming now – lower costs and improving tech make it economically viable – and the legal basis is already in place in multiple countries– that helps acquire water for rocket fuel and rare earth metals

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**Space exploration is back**. after decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel **front and center**. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: **mining on the Moon**, Mars and **asteroids**.

While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively **beginning the era of commercial space mining**. Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently.

As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear **virtually unlimite**d compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos imagine heavy industry moving to space and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance.

Start with the fact that space belongs to no country, complicating traditional methods of resource allocation, property rights and trade. With limited demand for materials in space itself and the need for huge amounts of energy to return materials to Earth, creating a viable industry will turn on major advances in technology, finance and business models.

That said, there’s no grass growing under potential pioneers’ feet. Potential economic, scientific and even security benefits underlie an emerging geopolitical competition to pursue space mining. The United States is rapidly emerging as a front-runner, in part due to its ambitious Artemis Program to lead a multinational consortium back to the Moon. But it is also a leader in **creating a legal infrastructure for mineral exploitation**. The United States has adopted the world’s first spaceresources law, recognizing the property rights of private companies and individuals to materials gathered in space.

However, the United States is hardly alone. Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates (you read those right) are racing to codify space-resources laws of their own, hoping to attract investment to their entrepot nations with business-friendly legal frameworks. China reportedly views space-resource development as a national priority, part of a strategy to challenge U.S. economic and security primacy in space. Meanwhile, Russia, Japan, India and the European Space Agency all harbor space-mining ambitions of their own. Governing these emerging interests is an outdated treaty framework from the Cold War. Sooner rather than later, we’ll need new agreements to facilitate private investment and ensure international cooperation.

What’s Out There

Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter.

In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are **incredibly valuable**. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make **rocket propellant**, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “**rare earth” metals** are also **potential targets** of asteroid miners intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) **are required for electronic**s. **And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage.**

#### However, the legal framework that strikes the best balance of providing economic incentives for mining while preventing unbeneficial land claims requires a doctrine of appropriation – the plan prevents that

**Meyers 15** Meyers, Ross. J.D. candidate at the University of Oregon Law School. "The doctrine of appropriation and asteroid mining: incentivizing the private exploration and development of outer space." Or. Rev. Int'l L. 17 (2015): 183. Italics in original. [Quality Control]

The **doctrine of appropriation** is a reasonable rule for adjudicating asteroid claims, and it could **easily be modified to apply to asteroid mining**. In the context of water rights, the doctrine of appropriation requires that the claimant be a landowner in order to claim the right to use a water source. It does not make sense, however, for the international community to grant complete ownership over asteroids toa single entity, so the landowner requirement of the rule should be removed. A similar modification would need to be made to the "beneficial use" language of the doctrine.

In the context of water rights, an appropriator obtains rights only to water that he or she can reasonably put to beneficial use. The metals contained in asteroids have a high level of marketability. For that reason, a mining entity could potentially put any amount of obtained metal to beneficial use, in the sense that the resources can be sold. This, however, would defeat the purpose of the rule, which is to limit such unreasonable claims. To ameliorate this problem, the doctrine of appropriation could be modified to define "beneficial use "constructively by providing that beneficial use is assumed for any resources that have been removed from the asteroid that the mining entity can reasonably hope to transport to market in a return journey. With the **astronomical cost** of undertaking a trip to such an asteroid, this modification would limit mining entities to only what they can carry back, thereby leaving the untapped resources available to other entities capable of making the same trip. Considering the size and profitability of metal deposits on asteroids, this modification to the doctrine of appropriation would **not be overly burdensome to corporate interests**. At the same time, it would **satisfy the economic imperative of promoting the rapid development of asteroid resources.**

By changing the landowner requirement, and qualifying the “beneficial use" language, the doctrine of appropriation would be essentially ready for application to asteroid mining claims. The only other changes necessary would be some additional requirements that are common to other space related provisions, like those found in the Outer Space Treaty of 1968. For example, a reporting requirement or clause guaranteeing asylum for other astronauts. A functional rule might read something like this:

*State parties or private entities may, upon actual possession, lay claim to natural resources found on or below the surface of asteroids. Rights to appropriate are given in order of seniority, starting with the first party to land on the surface of the asteroid and establish control over the resources, be it water, methane, metal, or any other beneficial substances. A party will be said to have established control over a resource once he has mined the substance and removed it from the asteroid. A senior appropriator may use as much of the asteroid's resources as he can take from the asteroid and put to beneficial use, and may continue to enlarge his share until another junior appropriator begins to appropriate resources from source for beneficial use. For the purposes of this Agreement, "beneficial use “refers to the amount of resources that an appropriator has removed from the asteroid that the actor may reasonably hope to bring home in a return voyage. Resources in excess of what an appropriator can reasonably hope to transport to market in a single voyage do not qualify as having a beneficial use, and are therefore not yet claimed. This means that the extraction of metal from an asteroid does not serve to provide ownership if the appropriator plans on letting the resources languish until another voyage is undertaken to secure the resources and bring them back to Earth. Junior appropriators receive rights in the source of resources (the asteroid) as they find it, and may prevent the senior appropriator from enlarging his share to the junior appropriator’s detriment under a no-injury rule. No state party will attempt to hinder other parties from landing on or using the asteroid, and parties will assist other entities on an asteroid, should they need emergency assistance. Mining claims on asteroids will be reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and state parties agree to release the location of the asteroid, and any scientific findings to the United Nations, the general public, and the scientific community. In the event that the asteroid is on a collision course with any other celestial body, all state parties agree to follow the course of action suggested by the United Nations. Should the United Nations decide the asteroid must be destroyed, no state party may claim liability for resources contained within the asteroid, but not yet captured. This provision applies only to asteroids as classified by the scientific community, and does not apply to planets, comets, meteorites, or any other celestial body not mentioned.*

There is no doubt that asteroids may be **extremely beneficial to mankind,** both as a **source of resources** and as a jumping-off point to **far off locations in space**. The human-race has progressed scientifically and technologically to the point that space travel is within commercial reach, and the need for new international laws governing the ownership of space has never been more apparent. The Outer Space Treaty of 1968made great strides in developing rational rules for space and many of its provisions should be maintained in their original form. However, by allowing ownership of asteroids under the doctrine of **appropriation**, the international community can **incentivize the exploration and development of space in a way that reflects the needs of society in general**, **without vesting an absolute monopoly in a single entity.** The doctrine of appropriation helped drive American westward expansion, and its application to space mining would help drive the human race in its expansion into the space, the final frontier.

#### Asteroid mining offsets terrestrial growth that ruins the environment and enables solar power satellites – both solve climate change

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The mission is essential, Joyce declares, to save Earth from its **major problems**. First of all, the fictional billionaire wheels in a fictional Nobel economist to demonstrate the actual truth that the entire global economy is sitting on a **mountain of debt**. It has to keep growing or it will **implode**, so we might as well take the majority of the **industrial growth off-world where it can’t do any more harm to the biosphere.**

Secondly, there’s the **climate change fix**. Suarez sees asteroid mining as the only way we’re going to build **solar power satellites.** Which, as you probably know, is a form of uninterrupted solar power collection that is theoretically more effective, inch for inch, than any solar panels on Earth at high noon, but operating 24/7. (In space, basically, **it’s always double high noon).**

The power collected is beamed back to large receptors on Earth with large, low-power microwaves, which researchers think will be harmless enough to let humans and animals pass through the beam. A space solar power array like the one China is said to be working on could reliably supply 2,000 gigawatts — or **over 1,000 times more power than the largest solar farm currently in existence.**

“We're looking at a 20-year window to **completely replace human civilization's power infrastructure,**” Suarez told me, citing the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the coming catastrophe. Solar satellite technology “has existed since the 1970s. What we were missing is **millions of tons of construction materials** in orbit. **Asteroid mining can place it there.”**

The Earth-centric early 21st century can’t really wrap its brain around this, but the idea is not to bring all that building material and precious metals down into our gravity well. Far better to create a whole new commodities exchange in space. You mine the useful stuff of asteroids both near to Earth and far, thousands of them taking less energy to reach than the moon. That’s something else we’re still grasping, how relatively easy it is to ship stuff in zero-G environments.

#### Environmental destruction is profoundly unjust – prioritize environmental justice over primarily human concerns

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**Extinguishing species** through the continued expansion of human economic activities appears to be morally acceptable to Kareiva, Marvier and some other Anthropocene proponents, as long as this destruction does not harm people themselves. But this view is **selfish and unjust**. Human beings **already control more than our fair share of Earth's resources.** If increased human population and economic demands threaten to extinguish the polar bear and many other species, then we need to **limit our population and economic demands**, not make **excuses** that will just lead to **greater ecological damage.**

Conservation biologists, with our knowledge and appreciation of other species, are the last people who should be making excuses for their displacement or making light of their extinction. It is particularly inappropriate for Peter Kareiva to do so, given his position as chief scientist at the Nature Conservancy, an organization dedicated to preserving biodiversity. TNC's fundraising rests in part on appeals to a strong and widely shared moral view that other species have a right to continued existence. Much of the conservation value of TNC's easements and land purchases depends on society-wide moral and legal commitments to preserve threatened and endangered species and their habitats. Kareiva and Marvier state that they "do not wish to undermine the ethical motivations for conservation action," or presumably, conservation law. Yet their articles do precisely that, with potentially disastrous implications for practical conservation efforts, particularly in the long term.

To be clear: We do not think there is anything wrong with people looking after our own legitimate needs. This is an important aspect of conservation. Kareiva and Marvier are right to remind us that protecting ecosystem services for human beings is important. They are right that concern for our own wellbeing can sometimes motivate significant biodiversity preservation. We believe that people should preserve other species both for their sakes and for ours.

But it is a mistake to reduce conservation solely to concern for our own well-being, or to assume that it is acceptable to extinguish species that do not benefit humans. Such an overly economistic approach to conservation leads us **astray morally**. It makes us **selfish**, which is the last thing we want when the **very existence** of so many other life forms is at stake. **Fairly sharing the lands and waters** of Earth with other species **is primarily a matter of justice, not economic convenience.**

#### Solves AC because US could be world leader in Green energy transition but the AC prevents that

## On Case

### Overview

#### Not about appropriation it’s about Chinese presence in space how does aff solve satellites and

#### Appropriation is establishing property rights in something formerly un-owned

Dominiak 17

Łukasz Dominiak (Associate Professor at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Poland; he holds a PhD and habilitation in political philosophy and is a Fellow of the Mises Institute). “Libertarianism and Original Appropriation.” Historia i Polityka, 29/2017: 22. Pp. 43-56. JDN. <https://apcz.umk.pl/HiP/article/view/HiP.2017.026/13714>

Ownership1, or property, on the other hand is a normative concept. To own a thing is to have a right to possess it, i.e. to be in such a juridical position that one’s claim to deal with the thing at will is a justified claim whereas claims of other persons are unjustified or less justified than the owner’s. As Barnett puts it, “rights are those claims a person has to legal enforcement that are justified, on balance, by the full constellation of relevant reasons, whether or not they are actually recognized and enforced by a legal system” (2004). To recognise someone’s ownership is therefore to assert that his possession of a thing is just, rightful, lawful, licit or reasonable etc., is to conclude that he ought to possess the thing if such is his will, even if he actually does not possess it. As Kinsella writes, “ownership is the right to control, use, or possess, while possession is actual control” (2009). Thus, ownership is a threefold normative or juridical relation between the owner, the thing owned and the rest of mankind such as the owner may control the thing to the exclusion of others because he has the best title to do it. Hence, the distinction between possession and ownership is a distinction between factual and normative relation. Having drawn the above distinction between possession and ownership, we are ready to define original appropriation. Thus, original appropriation is acquiring ownership of unowned things. To originally appropriate is to establish property rights, i.e. justified claims to physical things that at the moment of acquisition are unowned. What is important to underline again, is that original appropriation is not about taking factual possession of things that are unpossessed or unowned – this process is called occupation and can be conceived as one of the possible investitive facts that can result in original appropriation but should not be confounded with the latter. Neither is it about acquiring ownership of things already owned. It is about instituting new property rights to unowned things. As Nozick puts it, the topic of “original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held” (2014), i.e. come to be owned. Hence, original appropriation is about creating normative relations between persons and things.

### AT China Rise

#### Fake news, China losing now- their authors- I post date

Beckley and Brands, 21 -- Professors of political science and global affairs

[Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Hal Brands, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, "The End of China’s Rise," Foreign Affairs, 10-1-2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise, accessed 12-18-21]

The prevailing consensus, in Washington and overseas, is that China is surging past the United States. “If we don’t get moving,” President Joe Biden has said, “they’re going to eat our lunch.” Countries everywhere are preparing, in the words of an Asian diplomat, for China to be “number one.”

Plenty of evidence supports this view. China’s GDP has risen 40-fold since 1978. China boasts the world’s largest financial reserves, trade surplus, economy measured by purchasing power parity, and navy measured by number of ships. While the United States reels from a shambolic exit from Afghanistan, China is moving aggressively to forge a Sinocentric Asia and replace Washington atop the global hierarchy.

But if Beijing looks to be in a hurry, that’s because its rise is almost over. China’s multidecade ascent was aided by strong tailwinds that have now become headwinds. China’s government is concealing a serious economic slowdown and sliding back into brittle totalitarianism. The country is suffering severe resource scarcity and faces the worst peacetime demographic collapse in history. Not least, China is losing access to the welcoming world that enabled its advance.

### AT China Weaponizing Space

#### All overblown- Cold War FOBS proves

Buono, 21 -- postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation

[Stephen, "Fear about China’s new space weapon echoes older worries about war from space," Washington Post, 10-26-21, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/10/26/fear-about-chinas-new-space-weapon-echoes-older-worries-about-war-space/, accessed 12-18-21]

Look up! The ghosts of space weapons past have once again darkened our cosmic doorway. Recently Britain’s Financial Times reported that China flight-tested a new breed of space weapon when it launched a massive “Long March” rocket tipped with a nuclear-capable, hypersonic glider. The missile briefly entered orbit before descending on its target, which it missed by roughly two dozen miles. The report suggested that the test was evidence that China has “made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and [is] far more advanced than US officials realised.”

As one might expect, some commentators have seized upon the test to call U.S. security into doubt. And why not? The glider’s physical capabilities are truly impressive. Its high lift-to-drag ratio, for instance, means that it can descend on its target unpowered and can fly much farther than the reentry vehicles of normal ICBM warheads. Hypersonic gliders zip along at lower altitudes and can maneuver, enabling them to hide from radar and missile defense systems. Not least, there is the weapon’s ludicrous speed: Hypersonic weapons travel at speeds that literally change the surrounding molecules, either by breaking them apart (dissociation) or picking up electrical charge (ionization). That’s fast.

The Chinese test has disentombed long-buried fears of orbital bombardment that hark back to the Cold War. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union developed and tested a terrifying weapon that preoccupied U.S. leaders for more than two decades: the “fractional orbital bombardment system” (FOBS). Like the purported Chinese glider, FOBS permitted the Soviets, in theory, to orbit a nuclear warhead and deaccelerate it out of orbit onto earthly targets. Though the Kremlin abandoned the program in 1983, having never orbited a single warhead, FOBS’s political and military significance continued to resonate long after the Cold War ended. Indeed, the history of the FOBS scare tells us much about how space weapons have figured in the American imagination and offers us a window into why the Chinese test isn’t a cause for panic.

By the time the American public first learned of FOBS in 1967 — the CIA had speculated about development of the system five years earlier, shortly after design work began — Cold War paranoia and an exploding science fiction literature had been priming readers for the news for more than 20 years. As early as July 1945, U.S. Army intelligence was regaling journalists with details of a massive Sonnengewehr, or “Sun Gun,” that Nazi scientists had modeled for use in combat. Their blueprints called for a gigantic mirror that would harness solar rays and redirect them onto enemy cities and armies. Months later, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, physicist Louis Ridenour immediately connected the devastating power of the atomic bomb to satellite technology in a short story for Fortune magazine. “Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse” ends when an underground command center outside San Francisco confuses an earthquake with an all-out nuclear strike from space, precipitating a cataclysmic world war. After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in October 1957, dozens of novels and short stories — Jeff Sutton’s “Bombs in Orbit” (1959) and Robert Heinlein’s “The Moon is a Harsh Mistress” (1966), for example — employed space-based bombardment as a dramatic device. These imaginative works reflected a threat that many serious observers felt was imminent. In the United States, the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division and the Rand Corporation conducted numerous studies that weighed the military benefits of orbital weapons. High-ranking generals hailed satellite bombardment as the “next logical step” of deterrence. Books by defense analysts and military thinkers included orbital bombardment in their projections for the future of war. The Soviet Union, for its part, leaped in headfirst. The Kremlin initiated the first of three separate FOBS programs in March 1961. Within a few years, the other two prototypes were on display in Red Square parades. Radio Moscow bragged that “the main property of missiles of this class is their ability to hit enemy objectives literally from any direction, which makes them virtually invulnerable to antimissile defense means.” Bluster and bluff perhaps, but it contained an element of truth. Unlike ICBMs, which traveled roughly 600 to 1,200 miles above the planet, FOBS missiles could dip as low as 125 miles. This lower flight path would dramatically reduce the 15 minutes of warning time U.S. ground stations could typically count on for missiles launched from Soviet territory. Because they used Earth’s naturally occurring orbits, moreover, FOBS missiles could enjoy an unlimited flight range — a space bomber that need not refuel midflight. Most bone-chilling, FOBS weapons could deorbit along a polar axis, from south to north, thus bypassing the comprehensive system of radars the United States had established along stations in Alaska, Greenland and England, the vaunted Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. “We can launch missiles not only over the North Pole, but in the opposite direction, too,” Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted in March 1962. “As the people say, you expect it to come by the front door, and it gets in the window.” It was easy, at the time, to believe that the superpowers were on the brink of a strategic revolution based on space weapons. Lawmakers, pundits and military leaders aggressively petitioned for a more aggressive posture against the Soviet Union in space, including crash programs for orbital bombardment, antisatellite weapons, even a lunar base. Barry Goldwater made it a pillar of his 1964 campaign for president. That same year, Phyllis Schlafly, who later gained notoriety for her opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, established herself as a defense intellectual with “Strike from Space,” in which she argued that the Kremlin had deliberately lured the United States to Vietnam as a distraction from FOBS. The only solution was to build an even stronger fleet of space weapons to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. For policy entrepreneurs, fear itself had become a useful weapon. But what happened next contradicted the logic of the arms race and the Cold War more broadly. Scientists, and even some members of the military community, questioned the technical foundations of orbital bombardment and argued that FOBS was an inefficient delivery system compared to land- and submarine-launched ICBMs. Propelling a FOBS missile into orbit meant compromising on warhead mass, for example. Orbits made their paths predictable, and thus, possible to intercept. The Pentagon meanwhile abandoned its early studies on orbital bombardment in favor of a more tempered regime of reconnaissance and military support satellites. Official thought in the Kennedy and Johnson years held that if the United States refrained from weaponizing space, the Soviets might stay their hand as well. Over the course of 1966, U.S. and Soviet negotiators collaborated on an international agreement to govern the use of space “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The resulting Outer Space Treaty, which entered force the following year, banned the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit, on celestial bodies or “in outer space in any other manner.” Within a few years, dozens of countries had ratified the accord.

Though FOBS tests continued for several years, the Soviet Union never orbited a bomb and instead phased out the program piece by piece. Fractional orbital bombardment never became the monster its phobics predicted it would be.

The moral? Don’t overreact.

Though China’s hypersonic glider appears to be just the kind of radical technology that could ignite a frantic new arms race, the history of FOBS demonstrates that the development of a weapons system, whether in the imagination, on a blueprint or on a factory floor, does not ensure its power to change the game.

Context will always be queen. Rather than drive the strategic debate, FOBS unfolded amid the scare of the Cuban missile crisis, a robust nuclear arms control agenda and a U.S.-Soviet rivalry over which government could project the more peaceful and beneficent space program. The challenges faced by today’s decision-makers are different, but certainly no less profound. New space weapons, though, will require the same things as the old: poise, patience and more than a dash of diplomacy. Here’s hoping the recipe is around here somewhere.

### AT Heg

#### No risk of US-China war or escalation

**Lieven ‘20** [Anatol Lieven holds a doctorate in political science from Jesus College, Cambridge, is a professor at Georgetown University and a visiting professor at King's College London, “Stay Calm About China,” 8-26-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/china-existential-threat-united-states-xi-jinping/]

Rivalry with China should thus be conceptualized by the U.S. foreign and security establishment as a limited competition in particular areas, not a universal and existential struggle between good and evil. Apart from anything else, to center the whole of U.S. policy on struggle with China will be a terrible distraction from what are in fact much greater threats to the well-being of U.S. citizens: at home, economic inequality and racial tensions; in the world as a whole, climate change and its consequences. The coronavirus pandemic should also help the United States better to understand the real interests of ordinary Americans. Whatever the administration of President Donald Trump may now be trying to suggest, it has been a virus (albeit made worse by Chinese and U.S. governmental incompetence), and not a rival great power, that at the time of writing has killed more Americans than died in the Vietnam War and Korean War put together. **U.S. competition with China** is real, serious, and bound to increase. That is inevitable, both for economic reasons and because of the incompatibility between Chinese ambitions and the U.S. establishment’s determination to maintain U.S. global leadership. However, it **is not** an **existential** struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems, nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. A comparison with basic features of the Cold War should make the difference clear**.** China is not promoting communist revolution around the world. In fact there is no evidence at all that it is aiming at the overthrow of existing states. As a great capitalist trading power**, it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and** the safety of Chinese **investments**. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states, it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. Chinese influence operations in the West are real and should be resisted, but they are intended to influence Western policies toward China, not cause state collapse and revolution. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system, the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. As a capitalist trading state, China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system. Unlike the Soviet Union, it needs a degree of rules-based international order—though not if (as seen from China) this means a system in which the United States sets all the rules and then breaks them whenever it wishes. On the other hand, China has certainly sought with great determination to increase its international influence through international capitalism. Some of these efforts (like Huawei’s role in fifth-generation telecommunications technology) must be strongly resisted. They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. The impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. The defense and strengthening of U.S. capitalism in competition with China is indeed essential, but needs to be seen not just in terms of tariffs on Chinese imports (as the Trump administration has seen it), but as requiring a massive program of U.S. domestic economic reform and investment in infrastructure and technology—in other words, the way the Chinese government conducts this competition. When it comes to hard geopolitical influence and the expansion of Chinese military power, with one important exception China has proceeded with great caution. In the Indian Ocean, until now the Chinese program of port construction has been entirely commercial (except for a small refueling and repair station in Djibouti, next to a much bigger U.S. one). The Chinese naval presence in the region is insignificant compared to that of the United States, let alone the United States plus India. Above all, China has not sought to exploit U.S. difficulties in the Middle East, despite multiple opportunities to do so. The contrast between the strategies of Beijing and Moscow in this regard is extremely marked. Readers may wish to imagine, for example, the impact on the United States’ position in the region if China were to devote even a fraction of its resources to a full-scale program of strengthening Iran economically and militarily. The reasons for this Chinese abstinence are not of course altruistic. In the first place, China as the world’s greatest energy importer depends on the stability of the Persian Gulf—far more than does the United States, since thanks to fracking the United States is now virtually self-sufficient in oil and gas. Secondly, as a Chinese official told me a decade ago, China has studied the repeated and disastrous messes that the United States has gotten into (and sometimes caused) in the Middle East, and has no desire to follow suit. There is no evidence that this very sensible approach has changed in the years since.

#### No impact to US leadership – not key to multilat and can’t shape the global agenda

**Feffer 3-11**-21 [John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, is a senior associate at the Asia Institute in Seoul, “Multilateralism and the Biden Administration,” https://rosalux.nyc/multilateralism-and-the-biden-administration/]

Indeed, as it looks to engage more deeply on these issues, the Biden administration faces a number of obstacles to realizing even its modest multilateral restoration: congressional opposition, corporate lobbying, public indifference or hostility, the mistrust of allies, and bureaucratic inertia. It also must deal with a set of interlocking crises on the home front, from the pandemic and the resulting contraction of the U.S. economy to crumbling infrastructure, endemic racial inequality, political polarization, and rising poverty rates. Finally, the administration must reckon with challenges within the multilateral project itself, including a democratic deficit and the problem of non-compliance. But on certain key issues, such as global health and environmentalism, progressives will have an opportunity to push U.S. policy in the direction of greater equitable international engagement during the Biden years. On a case-by-case basis rather than through a transformative agenda, then, the Biden administration might alter—or be pushed to alter—the way the United States engages the world. The Trajectory of American Global Engagement The United States helped to build the existing multilateral order. It played a key role in establishing the United Nations and drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was a prime mover behind the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank) and in making the U.S. dollar the effective world currency. During the Cold War, it created regional multilateral institutions such as NATO and its short-lived Asian cousin SEATO. American expertise was critical even in the development of agreements—like the International Law of the Seas and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—that the U.S. Senate has yet to ratify. The ambivalent relationship that the United States has maintained with multilateral institutions reflects a deep division within the American elite over the extent to which the country should accede to the rules of the international order, even if those rules are written in large part by the United States. This tension could be seen in the refusal of Congress to back Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to bring the United States into the League of Nations all the way to a similar congressional resistance to the Rome Statute and Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Accord over the objections of some even within his own administration. This ambivalence prevented the United States, at the end of the Cold War, from taking advantage of an extraordinary opportunity to rewrite the rules of a global order born in the wake of World War II and shaped by the bipolar confrontation of Washington and Moscow. Instead of negotiating new rules, however, the United States pursued a strategy of inclusion into existing structures: inviting the countries of East-Central Europe into NATO, bringing China (and others) into the World Trade Organization, and facilitating entry into the UN for countries like the two Koreas, former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, and new states like Timor-Leste. By contrast, the United States chose not to collaborate in replacing NATO with a larger multilateral security system from the Atlantic to the Urals, restructuring the WTO or any of the international financial organizations, or transforming the UN Security Council to reflect modern geopolitical realities. On this last point, although An Agenda for Peace (1992) and An Agenda for Development (1994) led to some changes in the UN structure and new bodies have been created like the Human Rights Council (2006) and the Green Climate Fund (2010), the Security Council has remained intact in terms of permanent members (still the original P5) and non-permanent members (stuck at 10 for more than half a century). The Clinton administration supported the inclusion of Germany and Japan in the Security Council, and Obama sort of backed India’s bid for a permanent seat, but nothing came of this, largely because of the expected vetoes of other P5 members. As David Bosco explains, the United States has not had much of an incentive to back any major changes in the Security Council: “On many issues, it can use the council to help share burdens, amplify its voice, and endow policies it favors with the force of international law. When Washington doesn’t find the council convenient, the veto power means it can work around the body without risking an official reprimand.” As senator and then vice president, Joe Biden has long paid attention to UN issues, but his focus has been on peacekeeping. Give that a Senate vote is necessary to ratify any amendment to the UN charter, Biden is not likely to expend his limited political capital on any major UN initiatives beyond restoring U.S. funding for UN operations. In the economic realm, the United States did indeed support changes in multilateral institutions, but these changes were about policies not structure. The World Bank, for instance, was focused on infrastructure development and, later, poverty alleviation. The IMF imposed certain austerity measures, such deficit reduction, but these were short-term and “the Fund retained a neutral stance about the relative role of states and markets in national economies.” Beginning in the 1980s, by using its disproportionate influence in both the World Bank (15.85 percent of the weighed votes) and IMF (16.52 percent), the United States pushed both institutions toward a laissez-faire, pro-deregulation orientation through the application of longer-term “conditionalities” to loans that required receiving governments to change national policies to remain eligible. Privatization of state properties, reduction of government services, and the weakening of the regulatory apparatus became part of the “structural adjustment” packages imposed on recipient countries. This emerging “Washington consensus” facilitated economic globalization through the reduction of barriers to trade and facilitated greater access to markets, particularly in the Global South, for transnational corporations. Although the United States was an enthusiastic booster of these changes, it also suffered economically from the greater global fluidity of capital, whether measured in terms of deindustrialization, wage stagnation, or greater income polarization. Instead of translating the unipolar moment of the early 1990s into a new kind of multilateralism, then, the United States sought to preserve its economic and military dominance through existing global structures. In practice, this approach can be described as “a la carte multilateralism,” a commitment to “multilateralism when we can but unilateralism when we must.” This philosophy can be traced through Bill Clinton’s policies toward former Yugoslavia, George Bush’s handling of the Iraq War, Barack Obama’s incorporation of drone strikes in the “war on terrorism,” and Donald Trump’s trade policies with both allies and adversaries. This a la carte multilateralism positions the United States about halfway along a policy spectrum with aggressive American exceptionalism at one end and an equitable internationalism at the other. The American public is similarly conflicted on these issues. According to Pew polling, Americans line up in predictably partisan ways on multilateralism, with Republicans generally less enthusiastic about active U.S. global engagement and Democrats more enthusiastic. But these positions have changed over time. The partisan gap, at least in terms of support for the United Nations, was only 7 percent in 1994. It has grown to 46 percent in 2020, with 85 percent of Democrats positive about the UN compared to only 39 percent of Republicans. There is also a certain perversity to American attitudes. Democratic enthusiasm for global engagement was quite low during most of the Obama years and only began to rise in his last two years in office. Republican enthusiasm, meanwhile, was rather high during the Bush years and only began to fall precipitously when Obama took office. In 2019, after more than two years of Trump, the enthusiasm levels of both Republicans and Democrats rose significantly. On this central issue of multilateralism, the American public tends to mirror in reverse the policy approach of the administration, which does not bode well for those hoping for a groundswell of popular support for progressive multilateralism under Biden. In response to this intermittent commitment to multilateralism and, as importantly, the often-wild swings in policy from one administration to another, **the rest of the world has taken steps to establish multilateral institutions that are independent of U.S. control**. In the security realm, U.S. allies have built up their own military capacities. The European Union has invested in the “strategic autonomy” of its European Defense Fund to the tune of 8 billion euro in the most recent EU budget. South Korea has not only significantly increased its military spending but now produces many of its own major weapons systems. As it gradually breaks out of its “peace constitution,” Japan has been assuming more and more of the alliance responsibilities once handled by the United States even to the point of planning to take over the new military base at Henoko on Okinawa. The Philippines, despite an ongoing conflict with China in the South China Sea, has paradoxically explored closer security ties with Beijing. In perhaps the most extreme example, Israel long ago opted for its own nuclear weapons instead of sheltering under a U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the economic realm, meanwhile, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) orchestrated an end run around the U.S. dominance over international financial institutions when they established the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai. The bank, the first run by emerging markets, focuses on the same kind of infrastructure development as the World Bank (dams, ports, power plants) but also has a commitment to sustainability, issuing its first green financial bond in 2016. In five years, it has put together a $21 billion portfolio of lending to its member states and plans to expand its membership to more countries in the developing world. China has also established its own multilateral lending alternative to the World Bank: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Headquartered in Beijing but with members from all around the world, the AIIB was intimately connected to China’s One Belt One Road project of building up infrastructure not only around China’s periphery but also further afield. In 2020, the AIIB devoted $13 billion to COVID-19 response and is also pivoting more resolutely in the direction of sustainability, pledging to commit half its approved financing by 2025 to climate investments. Although European countries are members of the AIIB, the United States has pointedly refused to join. As these examples suggest, the United States faces a much more complex multilateral order that is no longer entirely dependent on policy decisions made in Washington. The de facto policy of **a la carte multilateralism has created a world order in which the U**nited **S**tates **is no longer in control of the menu**. The Biden administration is thus operating in a different context than what the Obama administration faced. When it comes to multilateralism, the Biden team couldn’t establish Obama 2.0 even if it wanted to do so. The spread of COVID-19 in 2020 and the sharpening of the climate crisis have only confirmed this reality.

### A2 Space Debris

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#### 1. They solve 0% of this advantage- satellites don’t count as appropriation because no territory is being permanently claimed as a company’s property, just being temporarily occupied

#### 2. Be extremely skeptical of their internal links: a] no internal link to nuclear war- the OST bans use and deployment of nukes in space b] all of their scenarios for escalation are extremely nebulous- which actors escalate? c] even without NewSpace, countries already have satellites and ASATs in space that inevitably trigger their impacts d] they have no evidence that says appropriation is key