# 1st off

#### Link 1: The power of the image is the image of power. The semiotic battle ground in which violence is constituted gives images of ethical deviation power by affirming their reality, something debate is entirely invested in. The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize by humanizing the system

Johnson 17 - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017 “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO \*brackets in original

The meaning and logic of a scandal exceeds these strictly ethical and juridical frameworks. Instead, transgressions are interpreted through and implicated in the reproduction of wider frameworks of intelligibility within war. Consider, for example, the revelation of ‘prisoner abuse’ within the Abu Ghraib detention facility. While this scandal clearly invoked the idea that these violences were a departure from the rule of law and widely accepted norms regarding the humane treatment of prisoners, this is not the only way in which these events were rendered intelligible. This moment was not simply read as an instance of violence that overstepped the line in a strictly juridical sense. As Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2007: 38) has argued, these violences were also interpreted through a ‘pre-constructed, heterosexed, racialised and gendered script’. The transgressive dimensions of ‘prisoner abuse’ in Abu Ghraib were not therefore solely, or perhaps even primarily, understood in relation to a set of codified ethical principles that were violated. The signification of these violences as scandalous also drew upon and reproduced a wider set of representational logics. As such, the dominant narrative of the violences at Abu Ghraib became an individuated story of ‘womanhood or sexuality gone awry’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 70). This fetishisation and denouncement of a ‘few bad apples’ serves to obscure a more systematic insight into the widespread use of extrajuridical and extra-territorial rendition, torture and killing that has defined the ‘war on terror’.3 Unpacking the first line-drawing manoeuvre in this way allows us to understand that scandals are not detached and dispassionate arbiters of ethical conduct. As opposed to approaches that focus upon adjudicating wartime conduct in terms of its adherence or deviation from standards and thresholds defined by pre-given ethical frameworks, this approach to the ethics of war draws attention to an everyday ethical vernacular (see Bubandt, 2005; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016): a diffuse, decentred and circulating discursive economy through which particular acts of violence are rendered intelligible. It is a way of thinking about ethical arguments about war that focuses less on how particular acts of violence are problematised in relation to defined and fixed norms. The process is less clearly determined. To understand the scripting of ethical failure, of scandalous transgressions, we must therefore come to understand the complex intersections and resonances between ethical imaginaries and other representational logics. It is therefore important to understand scandals as primarily political rather than epistemological events. The exposure of a scandal is not simply a process of correctly naming an event as such. Rather, scandals are constructed sites of hyper-visibility that exceed the ethical frameworks that they invoke.4 Such an understanding of scandals leads us away from the idea that they are, by exposing and disclosing hidden transgressions, a means of speaking truth to power. Instead, understanding this first line-drawing manoeuvre begins to demonstrate to us how scandals are a manifestation of the power of truth. Such an approach to scandals draws us away from an idea that they are determined by the intrinsic qualities of the act itself and instead urges us to reflect on the socio-political function of this process of signification. Second manoeuvre: Redrawing lines The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law. (Baudrillard, 1983: 27) The first line-drawing manoeuvre of a scandal allows us to note that a line has been crossed. As has been shown, the observation of transgression therefore offers us privileged insights into the existence, prevalence and location of these lines. By tracing these crossed lines, we gain an understanding of the everyday ethical vernaculars that reflect popular understandings of the relationship between war and ethics. The danger of understanding this first manoeuvre alone is that it largely leaves intact the heroic notion of scandals as a means of revealing ethical transgressions. The observation that the signification of scandals exceeds the ethical norms that they invoke could simply be read as a suggestion that to understand the scripting of ethical failure, we must understand how these events are embedded within broader representational regimes. Understood as such, scandals simply reflect the complex and contingent resonances between ethical imaginaries and other dominant discourses and stories. In this sense, the first manoeuvre is not really involved in line-drawing at all; it is simply observing that lines have been drawn. Taken on its own, what this manoeuvre gestures towards but fails to account for is the performative force of scandal: how the invoking of particular lines ‘produces the effect that it names’ (Butler, 2011: xii). We must therefore supplement this first manoeuvre with a second in which scandals are not simply read as the crossing of a line that exists independently of this apparent observation. Instead, scandals must be understood as a process of redrawing the line that has been transgressed. In this sense, the first and second manoeuvres are not really separate manoeuvres at all. Scandals do more than simply reference norms and principles; they are productive of them. The second manoeuvre points to how norms come to be revitalised and pursued with renewed vigour; it allows us to understand the constitutive function of the first manoeuvre. To be clear, the performative force of scandal is to regenerate the very principles that are distressed by their apparent transgression. Ultimately, this is the success of ethical failure. Scandals, and ethical engagements with war more generally, must be understood in terms of their ‘socio-political effects [which] impact on our collective understanding of war itself’ (Dauphinée, 2008: 50). The second manoeuvre draws our attention to a particular dimension of this effect. Specifically, it demonstrates the way in which scandals function as what Baudrillard (1994: 18) refers to as an example of ‘operational negativity’: a securing of a positive reality through the denouncement of its inversion, subversion or semblance. To help elaborate on this function, Baudrillard considers the doctrine of iconoclasm. The iconoclastic argument forbids the worshipping of images of the divine on the basis that ‘the divinity that breathes life into nature cannot be represented’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). What underpins iconoclasm is the assumption that there is a divine presence against which particular representations can be judged; there has to be a presence that allows for the identification of its absence. For Baudrillard (1983: 11), the denouncement of various signs as false representations of the real ‘masks the absence of a basic reality’. In this sense, God is not simply dead; rather, God never existed, and there has only ever been the simulation of a divine presence. The notion of operational negativity therefore offers Baudrillard a means to develop his wider thinking about simulation and the hyper-reality of the symbolic order through which social reality is constituted. While this potentially opens up interesting avenues regarding the ontological status of the ethical architecture of war, understanding the second manoeuvre requires us to explore a different dimension of the socio-political function of this logic. As has been shown, iconoclasm performs an important pedagogic role. If God cannot be represented, then God surely exists: this is the underlying message of the iconoclasts. Operational negativity highlights an absence in order to affirm the veracity of an invoked presence. However, this denouncement does more than reaffirm an underlying reality principle. It also performs a crucial regulatory function. The force of this denunciatory logic is to police conduct in accordance with the transgressed law: you shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above. Denunciation therefore attempts to resolve transgression by demanding conformity to a cherished principle or commandment. The effect of identifying deviation is to ensure a return to the norm. The tendency of denunciation is towards a re-solution, usually understood as a securing and reproduction of the status quo. Denunciation therefore performs a conjoined pedagogic-regulatory function in attempting to secure both the power of truth and the truth of power (Dillon, 2015). It is in both of these senses that we must understand Baudrillard’s (1983: 27) claim that: ‘The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law.’ Scandals, as an example of operational negativity, are therefore not necessarily moments through which particular principles come to be scrutinised or disputed. Instead, the function of operational negativity is often to: regenerate a moribund principle through simulated scandal, phantasm, and murder — a sort of hormonal treatment through negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression … Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. … Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. (Baudrillard, 1994: 18–19) From this reading, scandals do not emerge as a space for contesting or rethinking the legitimacy of a particular social order. Instead, what appears to be a moment of disruptive failure is actually crucial to the rehabilitation and regeneration of the very social order that appears to have failed. What is troubling from the perspective of this second manoeuvre is how critical arguments about the ethics of war become implicated in the very practices that they appear to challenge. Understanding this complicity in the conditions of possibility of military violence requires us to understand the ways in which scandals shape the possibilities and limits of critical responses to perceived ethical failures in wartime conduct. Baudrillard’s concern with thinking within the logics of the scandal is that it reduces critical thought to a logic of recrimination. Scandals present a simple decision in the face of an event: ‘to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 15, emphasis in original). It is these grammatical terms of the scandal that are particularly problematic as, through them, critical thought becomes confined to performing a regulatory function in support of the logics of a particular morality or rationality. To denounce a particular act ‘for not following the rules of the game’ accepts and affirms that if only these rules were followed, then a particular form of behaviour would be unproblematic. This account of critique as recrimination blunts the possibilities of critical thought, largely confining it to a logic of problem-solving whereby the ethical problem of war is reduced to the identification — through transgression — and re-solution of a series of problems through a return to the norm. Problematically, this not only leaves unquestioned and untroubled the norm that it invokes, but actively serves it as, understood in this way, the possibility of transgression implies that if transgression were eliminated, war would be a wholly moral exercise. Far from undermining the possibilities for war by exposing its apparent failures, scandals are involved in the production and reproduction of the very principles upon which contemporary warfare is made possible. This is the success of ethical failure. In short, the durability of the understanding of war as a legitimate enterprise comes to rely, in part, upon the managed exposure of its fragility. Ethical failure in warfare is therefore crucial to upholding the very principles that make violence possible. Perversely, no matter how well intentioned, scandals are complicit in a virtuous cycle that reproduces the legitimacy of virtuous war. In this sense, ethical failure comes to affirm and necessitate more successful forms of violence. Recriminations against the perceived breakdown of the relationship between the martial and the ethical are in danger of confining critiques of wartime violence to the process of policing conduct in war against a series of fixed standards and thresholds. It is in this sense that we should understand scandals as a watchdog on government; not as speakers of truth to power, but rather as speakers of the power of truth. Far from challenging the construction of war as an instrument of ethical foreign policy, the terms of critical engagement are such that opposition to particular forms of wartime conduct becomes implicated in the reproduction of the very thing that it may set out to challenge or dismantle. Of course, not all responses to scandals are motivated by this desire. For example, many responses must be situated within wider pedagogic efforts designed to learn from and improve the efficacy and ethicality of wartime conduct. Viewed from the perspective of this ‘fail again, fail better’ approach, scandals are a window of opportunity to refine rather than refute the terms of ongoing violence. The danger and tragedy of scandal is that it is hard to conceive of ways of critiquing war that escape this logic. Rather than creating spaces for imagining less violent futures, scandal overwhelmingly tends towards a politics of recrimination and the resolution of largely individuated moments of ethical failure through technical fixes. The problem of scandal is therefore that it threatens to make iconoclasts of us all: urging us to denounce and combat false or aberrant forms of violence in the name of a purer and truer form of violence that we are urged to pursue with a renewed zeal and vigour.

Johnson Continues - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017 “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO This article has focused on the interpretation and socio-political function of wartime scandals. It has presented both an opportunity and a warning: an opportunity in terms of exploring what scandals can tell us; and a warning in terms of understanding the performative force of what scandals are already telling us. Understood as a series of linedrawing manoeuvres, this article has outlined how scandals offer us a privileged insight into the character and reproduction of the normative architecture through which contemporary war is governed. This method for critically reading wartime scandals offers a number of important insights and opportunities for engaging with the ways in which contemporary wartime violences are enabled, excused and obscured. It is important to understand that the argument presented in this article does not entail a rejection of the possibility or desirability of ethical arguments about war. This may appear to be the direction in which Baudrillard gestures. Baudrillard’s provocation that there is no scandal may seem to be a vague, inadequate and potentially conservative response to acts of violence that many feel motivated to respond to. Just as it has been argued that denunciation is in danger of being intimately involved in the reproduction of the very violences that it seeks to problematise, it could be argued that refusing to accept that particular acts are scandalous runs the risk of forming a silent complicity with them. A commitment to normative politics does not, however, entail a choice between speaking out against violence or remaining silent**.** Put simply, to speak or not to speak is not the problem we find ourselves confronted with. Such a formulation proceeds from the assumption that scandals and recrimination are the only possible ways to articulate concern with particular acts. Understood as such, this article would appear to challenge this mode of critique, thereby eradicating or seriously limiting the possibility of expressing outrage at wartime violence. Only if we accept this premise are we confronted by the decision to speak or to remain silent. This article does not aim to restrict our ability to articulate outrage about particular acts of wartime violence. Scandals are not the only ways of narrating instances of death and injury in war. Other ways of speaking are possible and other stories can be told (Shepherd, 2006: 401). Realising this can only serve to expand, rather than limit, the vocabulary and possibilities of critical thought beyond a restrictive politics of recrimination. The point of this article is that it is because, not in spite, of the ‘truth’ of these violences that we must interrogate the socio-political function of this way of speaking, of bearing witness, of speaking truth to power. This article does not therefore dismiss the importance of ethical arguments; instead, it attempts to demonstrate just how important they are. Taking ethical arguments seriously requires us to recognise that they are not detached from the violences that they reflect upon. Bearing witness is not without consequences. Troublingly, this article has demonstrated that the denunciation of moments of ethical failure may, in fact, reproduce the very practices that appear to be disturbed. Scandals may therefore secure the legitimacy and necessity of more not less violence. This spiralling and bewildering causality highlights the complexity and ambiguity of critiquing war. The challenge for critical inquiries into war is therefore how we can formulate ethical arguments about war that do not reproduce the conditions of possibility for the very practices that they seek to contest. The challenge is to imagine what outrage might look like when it is not expressed through the logic of scandal. Put simply, this article has explored and unpacked the logics and performative force of wartime scandals; the challenge now is to think about how we might speak beyond them

#### Link 2: Images of suffering fuel violence

Alford 20 - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020 “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[<https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512>] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO

Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, the images of catastrophe and destruction presented by the news media are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. **Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads**. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” The Iran war effort is being pushed, as I write, by American media. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. The **New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies** about the glory of war, and how beautiful it is. Al Jazeera, the non-western source, simply reported the facts. The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that when the disaster market from around the world slows down, the west will turn inward and **produce its own spectacles of disaster**. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free television coverage in 2016 leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that the media always wanted him to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor Put children, including babies, in cages at the border Bullied a 15 year old climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and got impeached for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court Supported known child molester Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is **a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it**. Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his reelection. It is just too good for their bottom line. A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; **stop watching** disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to stop listening to the neo-liberal pundits, the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. **Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up**. When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering when we encounter it, and act to resolve it. Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.

#### The alternative is to reject the imperative for productivity in the academy and instead take a detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. The upsetting force of such a fatal attitude reveals the university as the marvelously absurd outgrowth of the enlightenment that it is. The content of our strategy will never change the equation, only complete apathy towards the forms of the system can accelerate them to the point of their vacuity and collapse. Signing the ballot NEG will be the completion of this act.

Hoofd 17 - Ingrid Hoofd, Utrecht University, 2017 “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration” [https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7] Accessed 8/24/19 SAO

The fundamental instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’ therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change—in the paradoxical gap prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This change however will then not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the “fatal strategy” that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of a host of problematic semiotic oppositions, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of technoscientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its compulsory optimism on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or perhaps even promise through death. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current sociotechnical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest for total transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “resists the imperatives of speed,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse—whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (‘know thyself’)—or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more fragile optimism that seeks to affirm the fundamental unknowability or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the first place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1 , every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a logic of increased visibility and transparency, they also render into visible form the perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’ everything and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged visual profusion of relative otherness. Since academic productivity and activism fi nd themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘unknown quantity’ that is inherent in all meaningful learning and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine, “the presupposition of not-knowing and especially not-seeing … restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the denial and attempted erasure of the religious or spiritual aspect of the university, so that, instead of being a vision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensified itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to welcome the upsetting force of such a fatal attitude towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’ as the true antidote, or perhaps even the quintessential shadow, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then finally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, the future may be more radically open than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance lies the potential of that ‘more originary’ responsibility. One of the consequences of bringing back fatality and fatalism means to acknowledge that the representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of omniscience and transparent communication. As I noted in Chap. 3 , it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘reversed’ theatre in which “the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientific description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as well as an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being seduced by that object (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps the only thing one can do is to destabilize and provoke the world around us**.** We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas! (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to let the auto-immune disease run its course therefore would entail firstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the ridiculous scam that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we follow a strategy of ‘fatal’ consciousness-raising in order to hopefully plant the seeds of future radical events regarding academia. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable collapse of its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps we should simply let the university bleed to death for now. Only such an apparent ‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hopedfor death of the contemporary university and its revival as a radically different entity. This book must therefore finally remain speculative and opaque, and mount this final chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and true emancipation. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.

#### No perms: A radical loss for the affirmative is the only way to undermine institutional accommodation. It’s try or die for the K under their role of the ballot and our method is the best strategy of epistemic disobedience thus even if I don’t win a link proper, as long as I prove I solve better it’s an easy neg ballot.

Genosko 16 - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (ds)functional skills of the loser.

# 2nd off

#### Vote negative to endorse the aff

#### The counterplan disrupts their Western understanding of scholarship as property and shatters imperial control of the academy. We are plagiarizing the AC.

Froomkin 13 - David Froomkin, The Morningside Review, Published in Partnership with Columbia University Libraries, Columbia Undergrad Student, May 1st, 2013 “Plagiarism as Revolution, Concept as Content: Apotheosizing the Author under the Aegis of Appropriation” [https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/TMR/article/view/5441] Accessed 9/29/21 SAO

“Art is either plagiarism or revolution.” —attributed to Paul Gauguin In “It’s Not Plagiarism. In the Digital Age, It’s ‘Repurposing.,’” Professor Kenneth Goldsmith writes about his course “Uncreative Writing,” which explores the concept of authorship. His students study the Internet’s impact on the proliferation of plagiarism. Goldsmith observes that “the sheer penetration and saturation of broadband . . . makes the harvesting of masses of language easy and tempting,” going on to discuss new artistic methods facilitated by the Internet that rely on appropriating previous artistic works (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). In his course, Goldsmith encourages—and even requires—his students to plagiarize. Worried about the conventional and clichéd way in which creative writing is often taught, with students told that their job as authors is to produce works of originality, Goldsmith established his course as an alternative: We retype documents and transcribe audio clips. We make small changes to Wikipedia pages (changing an “a” to “an” or inserting an extra space between words). We hold classes in chat rooms, and entire semesters are spent exclusively in Second Life. Each semester, for their final paper, I have them purchase a term paper from an online paper mill and sign their name to it . . . Students then must get up and present the paper to the class as if they wrote it themselves, defending it from attacks by the other students. What paper did they choose? Is it possible to defend something you didn’t write? Something, perhaps, you don’t agree with? Convince us. (“It’s Not Plagiarism”) By making his students express themselves in words not of their own choosing, Goldsmith forces them to confront what constitutes authorial intent. Though they copy, they engage in the significant job of arranging. Even in choosing which paper to plagiarize, his students necessarily express themselves. Moreover, as they are appropriating others’ ideas, the aesthetic value of their products must derive entirely from the method of composition. “Uncreative Writing” proposes a radical redefinition of authorship for the digital age, which would make context the new content. Indeed, it suggests that even if it is impossible to create substantively original works, art may still derive its aesthetic value from its conceptual basis. To justify his project, Goldsmith invokes the example of novelist Jonathan Lethem, whose February 2007 article in Harper’s Magazine, “The Ecstasy of Influence: A plagiarism,” epitomizes the kind of patch-written project Goldsmith extols. There is not a single new idea in Lethem’s essay; instead, it synthesizes the ideas of a great number of authors—and indeed does so without obvious attribution. As Lethem’s title points out, his entire essay is a plagiarism. Goldsmith writes, In academia, patchwriting is considered an offense equal to that of plagiarism. If Lethem had submitted this as a senior thesis or dissertation chapter, he’d be shown the door. Yet few would argue that he didn’t construct a brilliant work of art—as well as writing a pointed essay—entirely in the words of others. It’s the way in which he conceptualized and executed his writing machine—surgically choosing what to borrow, arranging those words in a skillful way—that wins us over. Lethem’s piece is a self-reflexive, demonstrative work of unoriginal genius. (“It’s Not Plagiarism”) That Lethem’s finished product succeeds stylistically is unquestionable. Despite his almost complete reliance on appropriation, Lethem manages paradoxically to create a brilliant work of art by synthesizing his influences so beautifully. As Goldsmith points out, it is the conceptually elegant method by which Lethem crafts his essay that gives it its appeal. Goldsmith characterizes copyright criticism as the centerpiece of Lethem’s argument. “Echoing the cries of free-culture advocates such as Lawrence Lessig and Cory Doctorow, [Lethem] eloquently rails against copyright law as a threat to the lifeblood of creativity,” he writes (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Yet, Lethem does much more than simply criticize copyright. Lethem’s observation that all works of art embody their antecedents leads him to argue that copying is not only inevitable, but desirable. Many masterpieces owe their creation to artists’ inspiration by predecessors. Thus, Lethem questions the traditional conception of authorship, which rests on the assumption that creators produce works of unique inspiration (63). This assumption underpins Jane Ginsburg’s 2009 article “The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright,” in which Ginsburg, a Columbia law professor, defends the traditional view of authorship. In stark opposition to Lethem’s critique, she views copyright as vital in protecting this tradition. “Vesting copyright in authors,” she writes, “made authorship the functional and moral center of the system” (148). Ginsburg believes that authorship is the basis of a social system of value. Lethem’s argument for copying, she suggests, is an affront to authorship. To allow anyone to plagiarize an author’s work would be to reduce its value and thus be an attack on the author. Ginsburg worries that “the advent of new technologies of creation and dissemination of works of authorship not only challenges traditional revenue models, but also calls into question whatever artistic control the author may retain over her work” (148–9). The prospect of authors losing their creative control scares her, because she equates authorship with originality and fears the demise of originality. Ginsburg criticizes advocates of a free culture who claim that copyright “somehow degrades the noble calling of disinterested creativity” (152), labeling them “techno-postmodernists.” She writes: “If the author is dead, or must be dethroned, then the reader not only lives, but reigns supreme. Readers give meaning to the texts they peruse; reading itself becomes a creative act” (151). The postmodern theory supposes that readers rather than authors give meaning to texts today in the act of reading them. This would undermine the traditional concept of authorship by devaluing the role of the author. Ginsburg views techno-postmodernism as nihilistic because it challenges her value system. Ginsburg argues that “the Internet gives concrete effect to the postmodernist theory of reader as creator, for all readers can remanipulate the text, and none can impose unilateral significance” (151). As Goldsmith points out in his article, the Internet makes appropriation easy, which Ginsburg would argue facilitates the dethroning of the author. It would be easy to label Goldsmith a techno-postmodernist and to interpret his course as an attack on authorship, yet the opposite is true. By reimagining what the author can be in the 21st century, Goldsmith defends authorship against those who would devalue it. Ginsburg might see the goal of the course as manipulating text to expose a lack of “unilateral significance,” fitting with her thesis about readers’ replacement of the author (Ginsburg 151). However, Goldsmith’s course is concerned not with the role of the reader, but of the writer. It is not a course in techno-postmodernism. The “new writing has an electronic gleam in its eye,” but “its results are distinctly analog, taking inspiration from radical modernist ideas and juicing them with 21st-century technology” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Indeed, Goldsmith rightly rejects the nihilistic notion that authorship is dead. He agrees with Ginsburg that this is a theory under which “individual creativity is discredited” (Ginsburg 152). Rather, Goldsmith argues that the new literature is “a writing imbued with celebration, ablaze with enthusiasm for the future, embracing this moment as one pregnant with possibility” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Ginsburg’s account of the techno-postmodernists does not reflect Goldsmith’s argument: he suggests that by copying, writers can create works of aesthetic value—and that this is perhaps the only source of creativity left to artists today. Goldsmith is trying not to dethrone, but to inaugurate, the author. Lethem represents better the idea behind Goldsmith’s course; indeed, his theory defends postmodernism from charges of nihilism, reinterpreting what postmodernism means in the context of authorship. Lethem examines T.S. Eliot’s preoccupation with attribution, implying that it reflects a broader social paradigm. Lethem argues that this obsession with citation “can be read as a symptom of modernism’s contamination anxiety. Taken from this angle, what exactly is postmodernism, except modernism without the anxiety?” he asks (62). Lethem suggests there is nothing nihilistic about this postmodern approach to creation. Rather, he reconciles postmodernism with a concept of authorship, suggesting that authors may still create original works of art using techniques of appropriation. Copying, Lethem says, allows authors to “make the world larger” (65). This strongly implies that he has not abandoned the possibility of creating works of originality. In light of Lethem’s claim that appropriation reinforces authorship, it is possible to consider Goldsmith’s course a reaction to the supposed nihilistic reductionism of Ginsburg’s techno-postmodernists. Goldsmith’s seeming willingness to concede the death of originality proves chimeric, as he ultimately suggests that copying allows his students to produce work of incredible creativity. Goldsmith observes that his students will at first invariably react with horror to his instruction that they copy. Yet, ultimately, they reconsider their objections. Goldsmith describes how “after a semester of my forcibly suppressing a student’s ‘creativity’ by making her plagiarize and transcribe, she will tell me how disappointed she was,” not because her creativity had been stifled, but “because, in fact, what we had accomplished was not uncreative at all; by not being ‘creative,’ she had produced the most creative body of work in her life” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Goldsmith’s seeming dismissal of authorship is an attempt to reclaim it in an age in which, to many, it seems impossible to create a substantively original work. Indeed, Goldsmith’s article can be interpreted as an articulation of a fundamental principle of authorship: that creation is as much about methodology as about material—and, moreover, that through plagiarism his students elevate method to material. For Goldsmith, the “trend among younger writers who take [Lethem’s] exercise one step further by boldly appropriating the work of others without citation, disposing of the artful and seamless integration of Lethem’s patchwriting,” reveals that “context is the new content” (Goldsmith 3). Modern technology has created an aesthetic sensibility that considers appropriation an essential aspect of authorship. What matters is no longer what one says, but the mode of her saying it. Still to Goldsmith, the postmodern writer gains authorship by creating a work of aesthetic merit. Thus, in a world in which “long-cherished notions of creativity are under attack, eroded by file-sharing, media culture, widespread sampling, and digital replication,” Goldsmith’s course “rise[s] to that challenge by employing strategies of appropriation, replication, plagiarism, piracy, sampling, plundering, as compositional methods” (“Uncreative Writing” 1). “Along the way,” he writes in his syllabus, “we’ll trace the rich history of forgery, frauds, hoaxes, avatars, and impersonations spanning the arts, with a particular emphasis on how they employ language” (1). Goldsmith’s course thus focuses on employing language to express old ideas in new ways, which he believes permits new authorship. Yet there is an ambiguity at the heart of Goldsmith’s idea. Writing of the beauty of plagiarists’ products, Goldsmith concludes that “far from being coercive or persuasive, this writing delivers emotion obliquely and unpredictably, with sentiments expressed as a result of the writing process rather than by authorial intention” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Goldsmith seems to distinguish between compositional method and creation, the latter alone associated with traditional views of authorship. In this, he channels postmodernist French philosopher Michel Foucault, who argues that authorship is a modern concept, sure to wither away. Foucault claims in his 1969 essay “What Is an Author?” that “the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction” (Foucault 119). Thus, he argues authorship is a characteristic of, rather than requisite for, a work. Authorship matters to Foucault only because it affects the perception of a work. Foucault anticipates presciently the controversy over the disappearance of authorship. Moreover, he argues that “the author function will disappear . . . in such a manner that fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function according to another mode, but still with a system of constraint—one which will no longer be the author, but which will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced” (119). Foucault expresses the postmodern theory that claims that authorship will be replaced by a different lens through which to interpret text. Foucault does not address Ginsburg’s concern, shared by Lethem and Goldsmith, about the demise of originality, but another idea from the same essay may better reflect the postmodern development in authorship. Foucault advances the concept of “discursivity,” a specific—and heightened—form of authorship in which creators establish not only an idea but an avenue for ensuing ideas. “Founders of discursivity,” Foucault writes, “are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts” (Foucault 114). He gives as his examples Freud and Marx, who pioneered fields of thought. Perhaps the new aesthetic sensibility of the digital age extends the realm of Foucauldian discursivity to include all works that are plagiarized by the “techno-postmodernists.” These works spawn methodological progeny in a parallel fashion to Marx’s and Freud’s inspiring their heirs. If Goldsmith’s methods of appropriation can indeed be considered an extension of the realm of discursivity, then the very plagiarism that Ginsburg decries as defacing an original work instead uplifts it, giving the original creator’s authorship a discursive character. Viewed this way, Goldsmith’s process could heighten authorship itself. Lethem provides perhaps the best extension of Foucault’s theory of authorship. Asking whether “our appetite for creative vitality require[s] the violence and exasperation of another avant-garde, with its wearisome killing-the-father imperatives,” Lethem suggests “we [might] be better off ratifying the ecstasy of influence—and deepening our willingness to understand the commonality and timelessness of the methods and motifs available to artists” (67). Lethem proposes to end discussions of modernism and postmodernism, and instead to embrace methods of reuse as a definitive aspect of authorship. To do so would be to embrace the collaborative character of authorship in contemporary times. This is exactly what Goldsmith does in “Uncreative Writing.” By employing plagiarism, Goldsmith revolutionizes the concept of authorship, which he says derives not only from the substance of a work but also from its very composition. Like Ginsburg, he maintains that authorship still lives, but he differs from her in his rejection of the limited view of authorship which she defends. Instead, sharing Lethem’s view that plagiarism allows contemporary artists to create works of originality, Goldsmith expands authorship twice: once by recognizing the significance of appropriation and again by extending Foucault’s discursivity.

#### Net benefits:

#### [1] There is a doublebind – Either you think the cp is wrong and intellectual ownership is good so you vote neg because they have failed to prove private ownership is bad, or you think the aff is true and its good to allow me to steal their intellectual labor because property rights are unethical and you vote neg because they have no arguments left in the round.

#### [2] It destroys the monopoly on what counts as knowledge inside of the academy. This allows for the inclusion of different forms of thought like minority epistemologies meaning that 1NC is a prereq to engaging in the epistemology of the aff.

#### [3] Destroys the free market of ideas and allows ideas to gain REAL value instead of monetary value which the aff would definitely say is a good thing.

# Case

## Overview on the aff

#### [1] No solvency and Turn: The Aff can’t solve great power appropriation which is the internal link to all their conflict scenarios. That’s offense because companies empirically warm relations between countries. They have a financial incentive to maintain peace to facilitate cross-border commerce.

Kaesar 20 - Joe Kaeser, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Siemens Energy, World Economic Forum, January 9th, 2020 “What can companies do to de-escalate the US-China trade war?” [https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/companies-deescalate-us-china-trade-war/] Accessed 1/30/22 SAO

So, what can multinational companies do to prevent a decoupling of China and the US? The answer is co-opetition: cooperate and compete – with a clear stance and eyes wide open. For cooperation to work, all parties involved must benefit. Win-win is the watchword. And this is critical in a world that is more connected than ever before. That’s what we at Siemens advocated at our first Belt and Road International Summit in Beijing in June of 2018. The response was overwhelming. Over 1,200 representatives from over 30 countries took part. If the BRI becomes a zero-sum game, international support will wane and ultimately projects will fail. To be able to compete, a company must lead in innovation and invest in training, education, and infrastructure; it must adopt best practices and meet highest governance standards; and it must serve society wherever it does business. Whether friend, enemy, or frenemy, no one is interested in a second-rate company. In 1985, Siemens was the first multinational company to sign a cooperation agreement with the Chinese government. The agreement resulted in an unprecedented transfer of technology and knowledge. It went far beyond the sale of products. It called for founding joint ventures and providing local training and education. Just 10 years later, Siemens operated 30 joint ventures in China. Today, the company generates annual revenue of about €8 billion in China and employs more than 33,000 people. It’s one of the largest foreign-invested companies in China, with interests in 89 local companies. Both China and Siemens have benefited enormously from co-opetition. And that is how multinational companies can and should prevent decoupling in the future.

#### [2] Turn: Property rights are key to incentivizing clean up

Werner 18 - Debra Werner, Space News, April 23, 2018 “Debris removal missions face technical, legal and financial hurdles” [https://spacenews.com/debris-removal-missions-face-technical-legal-and-financial-hurdles/] Accessed 1/11/22 SAO

Once those missions show active debris removal is possible, active debris removal ventures will face their biggest challenge: raising money for the ventures. Nobody has a clear idea how much active debris removal should cost, said Luc Piguet, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne scientific adviser. A series of commercial missions in the next few years will shed light on the cost of debris removal and reveal government and commercial demand for the service. “In today’s world, it is not enough to say, ‘I will do something because it advances technology and cleans something up,’” Innocenti said. “You also have to demonstrate a business link.” ESA member states agreed that e.Deorbit, the agency’s initiative to capture the defunct Envisat, was “a fantastic mission” and they would like to fund it, Innocenti said. “The problem comes when you have to prioritize with respect to a launcher, Earth observation, telecommunications support, science and all the rest. It’s a question of priority. If it had the commercial return, that would change the priority.”

#### [3] Turn: Property rights key identify who owns debris and hold them responsible for clean up

Muñoz-Patchen 18 - Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen, Chicago Journal of International Law, 8-16-2018 “Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty” [https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1741&context=cjil] Accessed 1/11/22 SAO

Despite Strahilevitz’s general view that chattel property can be unilaterally abandoned, he recognizes an exception for property without subjective or market value. 101 In practice, the abandonment of this type of property is often regulated and would not be categorized as unilateral abandonment.102 To be unilaterally abandoned, no other party can be the recipient of transferred property.103 For this reason, it is not unilateral abandonment when someone disposes of trash in a receptacle managed by a private or public disposal service.104 Property without subjective or market value—like trash, pollution, or, as this Comment argues, space debris—imposes costs on society if it is unilaterally abandoned.105 Because of this, the abandonment of trash and other unwanted goods is regulated to either prevent unilateral abandonment or force abandoners to bear the costs of cleaning up.106 The state may fine a litterer, demand that someone trying to dump larger property properly sell or dispose of it, or arrange for public trash disposal and contract with property owners to dispose of their trash for a fee.107 Governments also regulate pollution to prevent its release and require remediation by owners.108 The treatment of this type of debris also aligns with Professor Eduardo Peñalver’s view that unilateral abandonment is not the legal norm.109 Contrary to the general regime described by Strahilevitz, Peñalver argues that the common law is generally suspicious of abandonment and that the non-abandonment of land operates such that chattel abandonment is almost never unilateral; rather, it is bilateral because someone owns the land on which the property is abandoned.110 Thus, chattels can only be abandoned if the landowner consents. Otherwise, the law seeks to punish those who abandon rubbish, and both private and public disposal services are used (at a cost) to remedy the problem.111 In space there is no private land because it has been established as a commons.

## On the LBL

#### On smith

#### [1] This card is massively outdated – we have seen drastically similar trends in LD since 2013 – your proof of a shift away from anti-blackness in Policy was uniting the crowns and we’ve seen similar things with Zion Dixon winning TFA and TOC or not dropping a ballot at Harvard – we aren’t saying that this means anti-blackness doesn’t exist but rather a policy like shift has already happened.

#### [2] All of their problems such as hiring practices aren’t controlled by students, no-one in this room can do anything thus your aff just doesn’t solve. A first year reading a “woke” aff won’t change a 60 year old white man’s opinion

#### On Marshall 16

#### [1] Our refusal is the proper no – you feed into the system that allows problematic spaces like debate to thrive off of your advocacy but our refusal to engage forces its deconstruction and confrontation to change the way that it operates.

#### [2] Your aff justifies why the outside world is anti-black and consumed by racial capitalism but influences from the real outside world influence debaters’ mindsets meaning that any attempt to reformulate the effect of outside problems in debate will fail.

#### [3] You are the worst form of performative activism – just saying no to a larger structure isn’t equivalent to changing the way we understand debate – people have been refusing for decades but then pine after ballots and consume the current culture. Your aff just isn’t consistent with what Marshall is talking about.

#### [4] Mindset shifts in debate are bad – You force me to negate your mindset which causes psychological violence because either a. I agree with you and am forced to go against my own personal feelings that I feel very strongly about that affect me every day or b. I disprove YOUR worldview which makes you uncomfortable and harms your mental health.

#### [5] Graffiti turn - write the words destituent power and racial capitalism all over the ballot, say you want to affirm their strategy, and vote for us. This causes a stir up because people will see that this round was a screw bringing attention to this round and their discussion, this would create real meaningful change within the community.

[6] Outside platforms like the NDCA and Highschool Debate facebook pages and beyond resolved solve better - they are better platforms for discussion because more people would be involved, its not one sided, and instead of being forced to argue, we can truly discuss, the constitutive features of debate mean that your aff will always just be reduced to an affirmative argument instead of an attempt for meaningful change. This is uniquely key for community building and mindset shift arguments because it ensures no hostility and that black folk can find a home in the space.