## Case

#### [1] The US dominates all aspects of space

Greico 22 - Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, The Diplomat, January 19, 2022 “The China-US Space Race Is a Myth” [https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/] Accessed 1/29/22 SAO

The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the wrong direction. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in 1969. Still, the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources. The United States faces real and significant security threats in space, but efforts to develop an effective space strategy must begin with a more clear-eyed net assessment. The promotion of space cooperation with China would also help to dampen hype around a space race. While the Wolf Amendment limits U.S. government agencies, such as NASA, from cooperating with Chinese space agencies, the United States and China stand to mutually gain from collaboration for civil space exploration and science. Excluded from participation in the International Space Station or NASA’s Artemis Accords, the Chinese have had little choice but to develop their own space station and lunar base. These parallel space missions create a sense of a stark competition and fuel the space race narrative. Mutually beneficial scientific cooperation between the United States and China mitigates the risks of turning all China-U.S. relations into zero-sum competition. Let the missile gap myth be a cautionary tale.

#### [2] Chinese space companies are all hype, they have NO LEGAL RIGHTS NOW, State owned industries dominate the sector

Hines 21 - R Lincoln Hines has a PhD in Government from Cornell University, East Asia Forum, May 5th, 2021 “Can China’s commercial space sector achieve lift off?” [https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/05/can-chinas-commercial-space-sector-achieve-lift-off/] Accessed 1/29/22 SAO

China’s space industry is dominated by two state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). These massive SOEs and their subsidiaries have allowed China to send humans into outer space and a probe to the far side of the Moon. Like in the United States, the emergence of commercial space companies — those which seek profits rather than simply implementing government goals — is changing the landscape of China’s space industry. By focussing on private investment, commercial space companies may be more agile than SOEs in navigating market pressures, and thus produce more cost-effective and innovative capabilities. For example, in the United States, SpaceX has pioneered reusable rocket technology which [could reduce](https://www.inverse.com/innovation/spacex-elon-musk-falcon-9-economics) costs for spaceflight. But critics [claim](https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/22/america-is-losing-the-second-space-race-to-china/) the opposite is happening in China. Propped up by the state, Chinese companies are insulated from market pressures. This protection might even allow Chinese space companies to provide more affordable launches, satellites and imaging services than their genuinely private American counterparts. But the reality is more complex than either of these arguments suggest. [China’s commercial space sector](https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx) consists of state-owned, mixed-ownership and private companies. Many of these companies are also supported by provincial governments rather than Beijing, which provides for considerable autonomy in their operations. China’s commercial space companies play a largely complementary role to government-sponsored activity. Whereas SOEs are tasked with [high-profile projects](https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/06/05/lm-5-and-lm-5b-giant-leaps-for-chinas-space-dream/) such as landing on the [Moon](https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/coping-with-the-challenge-of-chinas-growing-space-power/) and [Mars](https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29004/china-s-space-program-is-driven-by-a-desire-for-prestige-not-military-might), commercial companies fill niche gaps overlooked by state players. The majority of Chinese space companies focus on building satellites and their components, including microsatellites and small satellite constellations in low Earth orbit. Exceptions include the firms Landspace, iSpace and OneSpace, which focus on small launch vehicles. Yet, expanding beyond this marginal role in China’s overall space ecosystem may bring China’s private space companies into competition with the SOEs that currently dominate the industry. Insulated from market pressures, these SOEs tilt the playing field to their advantage over commercial space companies. And although it may be in China’s economic interests to increase competition domestically, it is hard to imagine the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abandoning its national champions, which have allowed it to accrue prestige with domestic audiences. Although some analysts worry about Chinese space companies receiving unfair government assistance, the government may actually not have done enough to promote the country’s space companies. Unlike other major space powers, China does not have a [national space law](https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/13/chinas-commercial-space-sector-shoots-for-the-stars/). Without one, commercial space companies and industry investors alike are unclear about their legal rights and restrictions and uncertain about the market. It is perhaps for these reasons that Chinese companies are less bullish about their prospects than pundits. Chinese companies have far less confidence about the trajectory of China’s commercial space industry than outside observers. Even greater constraints lie abroad. Regardless of how independent Chinese commercial space companies may be from the central government, they have an inherentbrandingproblem. There is a [widespread perception](https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2021/02/swf-and-caelus-foundation-release-paper-lost-without-translation-identifying-gaps-in-us-perceptions-of-the-chinese-commercial-space-sector/) in the United States among commercial space actors that Chinese space companies receive nearly unlimited access to central government funding. This perception that Chinese space companies are simply an extension of the state may repel potential international customers wary of interacting with the CCP or the People’s Liberation Army. This creates problems for Chinese space companies seeking to expand their operations outside of Chinese borders. While countries with [close geopolitical ties](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Chinese_Aerospace_Along_BR.pdf?ver=2020-06-26-085618-537) to China may readily welcome business opportunities with Chinese space companies, countries with more adversarial relations with China may be reluctant to engage with its space companies no matter the price. For Chinese space companies, the looming presence of China’s government constrains its global market potential. More concretely, export controls and other restrictions by the United States and its allies and partners place hard limits on China’s abilities to import space technologies and expand into international markets. Still, this may only be a short-term constraint on China’s commercial space sector. In the long term, it may well benefit from focusing, by necessity, on indigenous innovation. While it is too soon to determine the trajectory of China’s complex and evolving commercial space sector, its strengths are often exaggerated and its limitations ignored. Chinese space companies have a long way to go before they can compete with their American counterparts. Exaggerated threats about China’s commercial space sector will only further strain an increasingly tense US–China relationship — both on Earth and in space.

#### There’s a diff between, we buy stuff from Chinese and Russian companies, doesn’t mean anything

#### [2] No solvency and Turn: The Aff can’t solve great power appropriation which is the internal link to all their conflict scenarios. That’s offense because companies empirically warm relations between countries. They have a financial incentive to maintain peace to facilitate cross-border commerce.

Kaesar 20 - Joe Kaeser, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Siemens Energy, World Economic Forum, January 9th, 2020 “What can companies do to de-escalate the US-China trade war?” [https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/companies-deescalate-us-china-trade-war/] Accessed 1/30/22 SAO

So, what can multinational companies do to prevent a decoupling of China and the US? The answer is co-opetition: cooperate and compete – with a clear stance and eyes wide open. For cooperation to work, all parties involved must benefit. Win-win is the watchword. And this is critical in a world that is more connected than ever before. That’s what we at Siemens advocated at our first Belt and Road International Summit in Beijing in June of 2018. The response was overwhelming. Over 1,200 representatives from over 30 countries took part. If the BRI becomes a zero-sum game, international support will wane and ultimately projects will fail. **To be able to compete, a company must** lead in innovation and invest in training, education, and infrastructure; it must **adopt best practices** and meet highest governance standards; and it must serve society wherever it does business. Whether friend, enemy, or frenemy, no one is interested in a second-rate company. In 1985, Siemens was the first multinational company to sign a cooperation agreement with the Chinese government. **The agreement resulted in an unprecedented transfer of technology and knowledge**. It went far beyond the sale of products. It called for founding joint ventures and providing local training and education. Just 10 years later, Siemens operated 30 joint ventures in China. Today, the company generates annual revenue of about €8 billion in China and employs more than 33,000 people. It’s one of the largest foreign-invested companies in China, with interests in 89 local companies. Both China and Siemens have benefited enormously from co-opetition. And that is how multinational companies can and should prevent decoupling in the future.

#### On China Heg

#### [1] Domestic political issues including instability, poor economic performance, and an ageing population impair leadership.

**Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu specializing in Northeast Asian affairs, The Washington Quarterly, 2020** [“China Won’t Achieve Regional Hegemony” [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734301 accessed 10-22-2021](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734301%20accessed%2010-22-2021)] mre

Internal Factors China exhibits weaknesses in its hegemonic potential, some of them self-inflicted. Serious political instability inside China would undercut attempts to play a regional leadership role. Yet Xi Jinping’s re-centralization of political power since 2012 has made the Chinese political system more brittle. Eliminating the term limits for his leadership tenure adds to the enemies Xi has made through his anti-corruption campaign. Many ambitious elites outside of Xi’s protégés now see no opportunity to rise up in the ranks of power.23 Some of them might resort to working against Xi, hoping to benefit from a leadership crisis. Xi’s accumulation of unchecked power has also intensified the danger that he will make a disastrous national policy decision that might otherwise be avoided by a collective leadership arrangement. Indeed, the Party’s movement in the early post-Mao era from rule by a single all powerful paramount leader to rule by a small group of top Politburo members was a reaction to the profound harm done to China by Mao’s unchecked decision-making, including his launch of the Great Leap Forward (1958–62) and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Xi has now restored that discredited leadership model. Furthermore, Xi has increased the likelihood of a disruptive socio-political crisis inside China through his accelerated authoritarianism. Xi’s approaches to managing large groups of people considered possible threats to the authority of the Party have been heavy-handed rather than skillful. These approaches include crackdowns against Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese Christians, mass incarceration and attempted indoctrination of Uyghurs, prematurely dismantling the autonomy promised for Hong Kong, and revived constraints on intellectuals and advocates of a stronger civil society in China. Overreliance on the available tools of oppression in the short term risks worsening public anger and desperation in the longer term. A simmering cauldron of various discontents at home does not help China project power abroad. Cracks in China’s Economic Foundation An exceptionally strong economy is a necessary foundation for projecting hegemonic power. China has established itself as the top supplier of manufactured goods to the Indo-Pacific countries, creating a common perception of growing Chinese economic domination. China’s economic strength, however, is easily exaggerated. Official Chinese statistics consistently overstate Chinese growth and wealth. Assessments of the size of China’s economy typically employ GDP adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP method, which controls for the different prices of the same commodities in different economies, artificially inflates the appearance of wealth in a relatively poor country being compared to a richer country. More generally, emphasis on GDP as the key indicator of economic vitality obscures the problem of what economists call “bad GDP.” This term refers to outcomes that do not contribute to national strength such as overproduction and unrepaid debt. Tellingly, China had a larger economy than countries such as Britain and Japan which militarily rode roughshod over China in the nineteenth century.24 An alternative, and in some ways more meaningful, measurement is GDP per capita. On this score, China was actually below the world average in 2018 (US$11,312) at US$9,771 and far below the US figure of US$62,641.25 Several serious structural flaws threaten China’s future economic growth. China’s banks are state-owned and lend mainly to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are largely unprofitable.26 The banking industry could easily collapse under even a moderate economic shock, dragging down the entire financial system.27 Tackling the country’s massive air and water pollution problems will be a drag on Chinese economic growth far into the future.28 Many Americans are deeply concerned that US debt is now over 100 percent of US GDP—but China’s debt has reached 300 percent of China’s GDP.29 Although large, China’s economy is not especially productive, lagging far behind the United States.30 The International Monetary Fund calculates that growth in China’s total factor productivity, or the amount of production not accounted for by increased inputs, has averaged only about 2 percent annually since the global financial crisis that began in 2007.31 Continued nominal rapid economic growth in China is uncertain. Even according to Chinese official statistics, which are often intentionally inflated, during 2019 China saw its slowest GDP growth rate since 1992, and the slowdown was not a result of China’s trade war with the United States. Rather, it is consistent with a decade-long trend of decline based on gradual changes within the Chinese economy.32 China is far from guaranteed to join the short list of countries that have successfully moved from middle-income to high-income, and China’s immense size will make the challenge relatively more difficult. China’s demographic trends suggest changes that will force Chinese economic growth into a longterm period of leveling off. China will certainly “grow old before it grows rich,” at least in terms of per capita GDP. China’s huge population will begin gradually declining around 2025, mainly because couples are choosing to have fewer children because of the rising cost of living and because the “one child” policy, combined with the cultural preference for boys, created a reduction in the female population, resulting in a drop in births. The cohort of workers aged 18 to 30, which supplies factory labor and is crucial to maintaining the country’s economic growth, is already shrinking.33 By 2030, China will have a retiree for every two working-age people,34 which will require both the state and individual families to divert a large amount of their resources into care for the elderly. Much of China’s economic dynamism of the post-Mao years resulted from harnessing a gigantic pool of low-cost labor created by young people moving from the countryside into urban factory work. But with 60 percent of China’s population now living in the cities35 and many other countries providing cheaper labor, China will need to find other ways of sustaining rapid growth. CCP elites recognize the need for economic restructuring but have struggled to implement it. Outgoing PRC Premier Wen Jiabao famously warned in 2013 that China’s economic growth was “unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”36 Since Deng Xiaoping began promoting major marketizing reforms in 1978, the Chinese government has struggled to find a balance between two contradictory imperatives: economic growth and stability. To ensure continued healthy economic growth, China needs to decrease central control, speed liberalization, and stop coddling loss-making SOEs. Such policies, however, damage the Party’s popularity by creating mass unemployment and social upheaval. The Chinese government led by Hu Jintao (2002–12) decided to implement the principle of allowing the market to determine the allocation of resources. Predictably, this effort floundered because it threatened the accustomed profitability of various powerful interest groups including bureaucracies, provincial governments, industrial sectors, and the military. Xi ascended to paramount leadership in 2012 with a mandate to restart the marketization of the Chinese economy, but, against the usual opposition, he has achieved only modest reforms despite vigorously suppressing dissent and removing many of his enemies. Xi’s efforts are at least partly negated by countervailing policies such as strengthening Party control over business decisions, favoring chosen SOEs over the private sector, increasing political interference in the judicial system, tightening the restrictions on discussion of political issues in China, and requiring China’s best minds to divert their attention away from innovative activities to read Xi Jinping Thought.37 The CCP seems trapped by its unwillingness to tolerate the political consequences of the changes necessary to unlock China’s economic potential. The required capabilities for hegemony are a relatively large and healthy economy, a technologically advanced military that can project decisive power far beyond national borders, and a government that is able to pursue a coherent and effective strategy without being impeded by domestic political or social conditions. China need not solve all of its internal problems as a prerequisite to dominating its region—having only a moderately wealthy society, for example, would not necessarily prevent the PRC from having a wealthy state that could pour resources into enhancing national military strength. It is possible that China could muddle through its domestic political, economic, and social challenges for the next few decades while maintaining a solid growth rate and fielding Asia’s strongest military forces. The standard for hegemony, however, is higher than this. It seems unlikely that China will overcome its internal challenges to achieve a sufficiently strong and stable platform from which to attempt to dominate the region.

#### [2] China will not achieve regional dominance – it lacks the international support to expand its sphere of influence and doesn’t have the military capabilities to challenge the US.

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China will not achieve regional dominance for several reasons. The first is that most of the Indo-Pacific countries will resist, rather than facilitate, a change in regional leadership. Some hegemonies are more popular than others. Historically, a hegemon establishes a regional order—arrangements, rules, and norms of international relations—that suits its own interests.6 The willingness of the dominant power to accommodate the preferences of other states in the region can vary. The United States has been a relatively benevolent hegemon. On two occasions when member states tried to extricate themselves from the Soviet order in Eastern Europe, for example—Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—Moscow intervened to quash these movements with military force. By contrast, the US military withdrew from two valuable bases in the Philippines in 1992 when the Philippine government refused to extend their leases. Support among regional middle and smaller powers for American preeminence is relatively high because many of these states see their economic and security interests well-served by the US-sponsored order’s openness and liberal values.7 Conversely, many regional countries have historically-based fears of Chinese domination.8 Vietnam, for example, has suffered a total of nearly a thousand years of Chinese occupation and cultural imperialism during its history. Recent actions such as China’s claim to own nearly the entire South China Sea in contravention of the UN Law of the Sea Treaty (which Beijing itself has signed) revive regional fears of recrudescent Chinese imperialism. China’s position as the main trading partner for regional states seemingly offers Beijing the prospect of gaining hegemony on the cheap—by leveraging the economic dependence of its neighbors, Beijing could get other governments to accept Chinese leadership on regional political and strategic issues and even to cede some of their autonomy to China. In recent years, Beijing has successfully used its economic weight to wrest concessions with political implications from large corporations and universities in many countries, including the United States.9 In Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines under the Duterte administration, PRC economic power appears to have induced policies supporting Beijing’s regional agenda.10 As much as Beijing would wish otherwise, however, China’s economic influence over Indo-Pacific states generally does not equate to a corresponding amount of political influence, nor does it automatically result in states siding with the PRC. Although China is the top trade partner for Australia and South Korea and is the top supplier of imports into Japan, all three countries remain US treaty allies that host US military forces. Australian Defense Minister Linda Reynolds recently expressed a commitment to work more closely with “nations that share our values” against “countries prepared to flout the rules-based order.”11 China is also the largest trading partner of Indonesia and Singapore. After years of trying to stay out of the South China Sea territorial dispute, Jakarta’s policy has recently taken a hard turn against China’s position: renaming a portion of China’s claim the North Natuna Sea, destroying trespassing Chinese fishing boats, and beefing up Indonesian military forces based on Great Natuna Island. While China often criticizes the US military presence in the region, Singapore is so supportive that it built a pier at its Changi Naval Base to accommodate visiting US aircraft carriers. Recently, the Indo-Pacific region has seen a backlash against perceived Chinese attempts to exploit business and trade relationships for political purposes. Canberra sided with Washington to bar Chinese corporation Huawei from providing undersea internet cables for Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Upon his return to power in 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad reviewed his country’s economic relationship with China, warning of “new colonialism” that “has the effect of diminishing the freedom of action of other countries.”12 Insufficient Military Power to Impose Hegemony If China cannot buy political fealty, the alternative—imposing hegemony upon an unwilling Indo-Pacific—would be immensely difficult and expensive. China lacks the military strength to capture hegemony by force. Unquestionably, China’s military buildup and modernization have advanced during the past two decades from a badly outclassed potential conventional US opponent to one that might successfully frustrate US military operations in some scenarios. The Chinese military could seize and hold a disputed South China Sea island from one of the rival claimants, for example, and could threaten serious damage against US forces entering the theater the protect a friendly country. China has the advantages of geographic proximity to likely conflict sites and proficiency in missile technology, both especially useful for the task of warding off an attempt by the United States to surge forces into the region. Nevertheless, the US military is still the world’s most capable across the full spectrum of combat and logistical capabilities.13 China also has significant military disadvantages. First, over half of China’s official defense spending goes toward internal security, mostly in restive areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.14 Second, China probably cannot leapfrog its way to technological parity with the US military. The increased complexity of military technology has made it harder for competitors to free-ride on research and development and to simply copy leading-edge weapons systems. Despite the opportunities presented by economic globalization and even with China’s massive state-sponsored efforts to steal advanced technology, the Chinese continue to fall short of the standard-bearers in some kinds of weapons systems such as submarines and advanced fighter aircraft.15 Finally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suffers a dramatic deficit in combat experience relative to the US military. US forces have fought overseas every decade since the beginning of the Cold War, including continuous large-scale military operations in the Middle East for nearly two decades. The US armed forces consequently have deep reservoirs of experienced warfighters at all levels from frontline troops to general officers. By contrast, PLA forces have not fought a war since their 1979 incursion into Vietnam, when they performed less than impressively against Vietnamese troops and withdrew after one month. Overreach in the South China Sea Chinese foreign policy under Xi represents another error that, in the long term, makes achieving Chinese hegemony more difficult. Before Xi took power, China was well-positioned for the long haul in the South China Sea. While diplomatically holding to the maximum Chinese claim and continuing the charade of negotiating a Code of Conduct, Beijing was busily building patrol vessels at a rate no rival claimant could match. Xi got greedy. He approved the rapid construction of a network of PLA naval and air bases in the middle of what the rest of the world regards as an international waterway. For the short-term gain of improving China’s military position vis-à-vis the other claimants, Xi’s action galvanized international public opinion into viewing China as an assertive, revisionist, and even expansionist power. This move intensified distrust of Chinese intentions in regional capitals16 and spurred increased anti-China security cooperation, seriously undercutting a major Chinese foreign policy objective. A Robust Pro-US Security Network The United States has a far stronger network of security partners than does China. Beijing has a single formal ally in North Korea plus an informal alliance with peripheral (although nuclear-armed) Russia. The other substantial countries in the region not only generally support the US-sponsored regional order and oppose Chinese attempts to establish a sphere of influence, but most of them also have either mutual defense treaties or robust security cooperation with Washington. These countries, designated as “major non-NATO allies,” include Japan, Australia, South Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, and the Philippines. US relationships with many non-allies are far deeper than Chinese military cooperation even with the PLA’s sole ally. Singapore allows US forces to use its air and naval bases and hosts a US Navy logistics office. Malaysia is neither a US ally nor an outspoken critic of China, yet it quietly demonstrates that it values America as a strategic partner. The US and Malaysian navies have held joint training drills for 25 years, and last year, for the first time, the two countries’ coast guards also participated, underscoring rising Malaysian concern about Chinese encroachment into Malaysia’s claimed exclusive economic zone.17 Despite the fact that both China and Vietnam are ruled by Communist Party governments, the threat from China has pushed Hanoi into growing security ties with the United States.18 Washington gave Vietnam six coast guard vessels in 2017, and in 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made a port call to Da Nang, leading to Vietnam’s participation for the first time in the US Navy’s Rim of the Pacific exercises in Hawaii. These arrangements indicate not only a broad predisposition in the Indo- Pacific to side with the United States but also, especially in the case of formal allies, an established foundation of infrastructure and experience to make joint military action effective. In a scenario where China tried to bully its way to regional dominance, China would have little help from friends, while a resisting United States could invoke security relationships from most of the rest of the region. Caution Resorting to Force If the Chinese government expects resistance from a militarily strong United States and several mid-sized US security partners, Beijing is unlikely to fight for hegemony. There is a discernable pattern of caution in China’s behavior— China consistently seeks cheap gains while avoiding costly consequences. This pattern is in keeping with traditional Chinese strategic culture, which calls for indirect approaches to counter the moves of a strong opponent and eschews Pyrrhic victories. Despite consistently tough talk in recent years about a commitment to fight for Chinese territory,19 Beijing’s actions have been relatively risk-averse. The recent Chinese actions that some characterize as bold or assertive have remained below the line likely to trigger a military response from other countries. The Chinese government, for example, correctly assessed that the United States would not attempt to physically prevent the construction of Chinese military bases in the South China Sea. The patrols by PLA ships and aircraft around Taiwan and near Japanese islands are menacing signals, but they are clearly not attack runs. In disputed seas, firing on foreign vessels to disable or drive them away would likely bring retaliation in kind, so the Chinese have employed the less provocative but often effective tactic of ramming or threatening to ram. Chinese vessels have repeatedly damaged and occasionally sunk the boats of rival claimants in the South China Sea through intentional collisions, and in 2013, a Chinese ship maneuvered into the path of a US Navy cruiser and then stopped in an effort to drive the US ship out of the area. Beijing attempts to enforce its claims in the South China Sea with fishing boats or with white-hulled Chinese Coast Guard or maritime enforcement vessels, keeping PLA Navy ships on the sidelines unless needed for backup. Beijing specifically criticized the Philippines for breaching this etiquette by calling in a gray-hulled Philippine Navy vessel to arrest Chinese fishermen at Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Despite fears and expectations to the contrary, the Chinese government has not declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, likely because Beijing believes interference in commercial traffic is a red line for China’s potential adversaries. As Singapore-based analyst Alan Chong observes, China wants to avoid “driving ASEAN into the arms of the United States.”20 Many analysts contend that, given China’s fragile economic and domestic political situation, the CCP leadership fears a war with the United States could put the survival of the regime at risk. Therefore, Beijing will be cautious about engaging in a conflict it does not consider politically necessary.21 Even on the issue of preventing Taiwan independence, unquestionably a core interest for Beijing, the CCP government refrained from attacking as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly stated in public, “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country.”22 Beijing may want to be the strongest power in the region, but not badly enough to go to war for it. For the foreseeable future, both China and the United States can maintain formidable military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region that will discourage either country from starting a war against the other. Both countries also maintain large and survivable strategic nuclear forces. Thus, China is not poised to wield its newfound military power to impose Chinese domination upon the region. Rather, the former condition of previously unmatched US supremacy is evolving toward a rough military balance that could last decades. China will enjoy increased security over the territory it indisputably owns, but Chinese moves to capture either disputed or unambiguously non- Chinese territory by force will remain prohibitively risky for Beijing.

## CP

#### CP text: The USFG should overturn the Wolf Amendment and take proactive bilateral steps to increase cooperation and coordination with the PRC in space.

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Finally, a lack of coordination increases the risks for lunar crewmembers, once these arrive on the moon. The disruptions of the kind described above should be self-explanatory in their risk to humans attempting to establish a permanent presence. However, more insidious factors also abound. One of these is the lack of standardisation driven by a bifurcation into geopolitical blocs of lunar activity. As has been pointed out, widely adopted standards of lunar exploration promise considerable benefits[16]. A balkanisation of standards would do the opposite, limiting any attempt of future cooperation in exploration and scientific endeavour. In the most extreme cases, it endangers lives. Mutual aid is a core tenet of both the Outer Space Treaty and the Artemis Accords. Yet, a lack of universally accepted technological standards for lunar (and beyond) crewed operations potentially makes such action considerably more difficult. As the ISS has proven, any inter-operational system must be designed from the outset to be inter-operational. For future lunar activities, this presently seems impossible. Though currently remote, the possibility of the loss of life due to conflicting standards of crewed lunar technology is nevertheless a tragedy worth contemplating. Again, the described issues are most likely to occur should terrestrial geopolitical tensions between the US and China preclude proactive coordination and information sharing. While the establishment of separate lunar operations can, at this point, be taken as a given, it is far from too late to establish functionally sufficient coordination mechanisms to prevent a major international incident. While US-China coordination is limited by the Wolf Amendment, it is not wholly precluded, as indicated by NASA’s monitoring of the Chang’e 4 mission, utilising the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter[17], and, more recently, an exchange of data to mitigate the risks of an orbital collision of Mars orbiters[18]. Ideally, therefore, the United States would proactively take the necessary bilateral steps to work with China to coordinate its respective beyond-Earth surface activities and prevent harmful interference. Alongside, and regardless of, these efforts, it will be the task of members of international bodies, such as The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to facilitate coordination activities. In the midst of such efforts, ESA member states are primary actors eligible for leading such initiatives, with ESA having engaged in collaborative activities in space with both the US and China. While diplomats active within UN COPUOS will be well aware of these issues, and their role in enabling such necessary coordination, it is incumbent upon national governments allied to the US to recognise these flashpoints and spearhead broader policy responses to proactively support coordination and the activities of their diplomats at the UN. The UK government, whose diplomats already play a major role in coordinating international space activities, must lend them its full support. Beyond the moon, the issue of geographically concentrated sites of interest is only likely to prevail. While space is boundless, areas of economical or scientific value are nonetheless often concentrated. Some preliminary analysis, for example, places the number of economically viable near-Earth asteroids at around only ten[19], due to the fact that metallic, accessible, and economically viable near-Earth asteroids are comparatively rare in number. Given the considerable geographic challenges associated with on-asteroid operations, the need for multi-actor coordination will only become more pressing, especially if terrestrial US-China competition intensifies. Failures to Coordinate The risks outlined above are non-exhaustive, and do not touch upon the military dimension of space which carries equal if not greater weight. However, they demonstrate clearly the fact that US-China coordination in space will become ever more pressing as the exploration and commercialisation of space advances. Such risks will only manifest themselves if the US and China are unable to coordinate their activities sufficiently and allow geopolitical tensions to obstruct this crucial work. Looking forwards, all third-party actors in space should closely monitor terrestrial US-China relations and map these to their own activities relating to space (be this in the realm of space exploration or applications), taking mitigating measures as necessary should tensions spill over beyond Earth. In tandem, states with notable diplomatic influence should increase further efforts to enable frictionless coordination and information sharing between the two great powers. Crucially, should formal coordination mechanisms in orbit, on the moon, or beyond be in sight, imperfect coordination should be prioritised if institutional gridlock driven by the pursuit of national interest is the alternative.

#### That solves the aff. We solve the root cause of why escalation happens which is a lack of clarity and trust. We also outweigh the aff, because they can only solve one potential flashpoint between the US and China but we open an avenue for cooperation that can spill over to other terrestrial conflicts.

## Orientalism K

#### Link 1: The US China space race is myth driven by racist cold war logic. The US dominates all aspects of the field and reports to the contrary are an attempt to justify increased military spending and are the root cause of escalation.

Greico 22 - Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, The Diplomat, January 19, 2022 “The China-US Space Race Is a Myth” [https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/] Accessed 1/29/22 SAO

The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the wrong direction. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in 1969. Still, the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources. The United States faces real and significant security threats in space, but efforts to develop an effective space strategy must begin with a more clear-eyed net assessment. The promotion of space cooperation with China would also help to dampen hype around a space race. While the Wolf Amendment limits U.S. government agencies, such as NASA, from cooperating with Chinese space agencies, the United States and China stand to mutually gain from collaboration for civil space exploration and science. Excluded from participation in the International Space Station or NASA’s Artemis Accords, the Chinese have had little choice but to develop their own space station and lunar base. These parallel space missions create a sense of a stark competition and fuel the space race narrative. Mutually beneficial scientific cooperation between the United States and China mitigates the risks of turning all China-U.S. relations into zero-sum competition. Let the missile gap myth be a cautionary tale.

#### Link 2: The 1ACs fear of Chinese nuclear weapons justifies liberal militarism and colonial humanism which are the root cause of all the affs impacts. Turns case

Lockwood 19 - Katie Lockwood, E-International Relations, March 3rd, 2019 “Is the International System Racist?” [https://www.e-ir.info/2019/03/03/is-the-international-system-racist/] Accessed 4/20/2019 SAO

The international system is socially constructed (Wendt, 1992: 395), meaning that how we conceptualise the social world has huge implications for reality. Consequently, if perceptions of global politics are filtered through an artificial civilised/uncivilised dichotomy, it will become real, manifesting in the foreign policy decisions of the actors who shape the system. Therefore race does not have to be a biological fact to be a social reality (Castles, 2000: 167) – the system can be ‘racist’ without ‘race’ being objectively real. While racist structures are of central importance, this essay is [does] not seeking to deny the agency of the Global South. Structure is not the all-pervading determinant of behaviour, and the Subaltern always has some agency (Giddens, 1984: 16), but their chances and choices are necessarily delimited in a racist international system. This essay shall adopt a historical perspective in order to expose the continued salience of race in international politics. The role of discourse is also given central importance due to the intimate connection between discourse, knowledge and power (Abrahamsen, 2003: 199-200). In order to demonstrate the racist nature of the international system, this essay shall first depict how racism underwrites the global economy. The influence of race shall then be examined in the context of nuclear weapons, the asylum process, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, the racial construction of terrorism will demonstrate that the international system is racist. The entrenched inequality of the global political economy is predicated upon racism. Until historical wrongs are rectified via reparations (Plessis, 2003: 645), the Global South will continue to be unable to overcome its subjugation, and the global economy’s racist past will continue to cast a shadow on the future. The continued disparity between rich and poor is no accident: the Global North actively perpetuates its advantage. Despite the myth of sovereign equality in international law, the Global South’s sovereignty is undermined by its continued economic dependence (Nkrumah, 1968: ix). Rich states are citizens of the international community whereas poor states are subjects. For example, the Global North was able to rig the system to its advantage through instituting the ‘Grand Bargain’ in 1994 (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 52). The Global South accepted the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) in 1994, crystallising their position within the international division of labour, and stifling their emergent upward mobility (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 52). Some may object that although the structure of the global economy is unfair, it is not racist, as this would further require inequality to be justified in racial terms. However, this essay holds that sensitivity to history exposes the racialised colonial foundations of the contemporary international division of labour (Jones, 2008: 924). The racialised discourses propagated by colonialism sustain the assumption that the Global South is somehow naturally destined to be a mere passive exporter of raw materials. This discourse has permeated the International Monetary Fund (IMF), manifesting in its recommendations that Ghana concentrate on the production of gold and cocoa beans as in colonial times (Kampfner, 2001). Some may object to this focus on the external causes of underdevelopment (Rawls, 1999: 108), arguing that poverty is primarily the product of poor internal choices such as Mozambique’s accumulation of vast debts (Plank, 1993: 428), or Nigeria’s corruption (Albin-Lackey, 2007). While an important point, colonialism is actually the root cause of these supposed ‘internal’ problems. Corruption and poor governance partly spring from colonial policies which undermined traditional belief systems and forms of social organisation necessary for good governance (Trebilcock and Prado, 2011: 254). Colonial ‘divide and rule’ spawned civil wars which continue to undermine development: the civil war in Burundi (1993-2005), for example, grew out of Belgium’s strategy of recruiting the Tutsi to govern the Hutus (Marshall, 2016: 128). While these underlying maladies go uncompensated, aid will continue to merely treat the symptom, not the problem. International financial institutions reflect the normative fabric of the international community (Boniface, 2002: 366), and therefore embody its racism. This is evident in the ‘structural adjustment’ programmes peddled by the World Bank and IMF during the 1980s, demanding loan recipients to liberalise and privatise their economies in accordance with strict budget discipline (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007: 3). The results were disastrous, failing to promote economic growth, and forcing developing nations to implement economic policies favourable to the hegemon underwriting the financial institutions (Plank, 1993: 417). Such neoliberal logic has since re-emerged through the new ‘Good Governance’ norm, which assumes underdevelopment to be the product of domestic political and economic environments, and so seeks to educate these states to create the preconditions for development (Gallagher, 2014: 333). Plank (1993: 428) makes a persuasive case that IMF policy is not racist, but driven by a misguided faith in economic orthodoxy. The Bretton Woods institutions were established to facilitate European post-war recovery, therefore infantilising the colonisers as much as the colonised (Schifferes, 2008). While initially persuasive, this challenge fails to appreciate the changes the global economy has experienced since the end of the Bretton Woods system which has made ‘late development’ far less obtainable (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 48) – the initial post-war manifestation of the World Bank and IMF cannot be paralleled with their contemporary manifestations. The ‘neutral’ economic language of international financial institutions harbours unacknowledged racist ideas. The ‘Good Governance’ norm promotes a paternalistic narrative reminiscent of the ‘white man’s burden’ of the colonial era (Henderson, 2013: 72), constructing a child-like Global South that needs to be educated by the firm parental hand of the West. Racism constructs an Us/Other dialectic which distances the Western donor from the non-white recipient, making the horrifying human costs of economic fundamentalism less disturbing. In practice, the policy of ‘full cost recovery’ in Ghana means forcing people to pay for the essentials of life including water – a resource widely assumed to be a right, and publicly subsidised in the developed world (Kampfner, 2001). International racism means the subaltern experience is woefully ignored. Racism makes this destitution appear natural rather than the product of international choices, legitimising the human costs of neoliberal reforms primarily designed to advance the economic interests of the dominant powers in the system. Racism is unavoidably bound up with the production of knowledge, and constructs the legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy dominating discussion of nuclear weapons. Some scholars hold that irresponsible non-Western states with nuclear weapons represent an objective threat to international order (Sagan, 1994: 68). They claim that this is not an irrational racist fear, but a recognition of the facts. However, it is the position of this essay that these ‘facts’ are socially constructed, based on a false ‘Orientalist’ (Said, 2003: 4) characterisation of the Self as rational and responsible, and the Other as irrational and irresponsible. This Orientalism is exemplified in the way North Korea is continually othered in Western media. False accounts of Kim Jong Un having his uncle fed to dogs were unquestioningly reproduced by outlets such as Fox News (DeMarche, 2015), creating a caricature of Oriental despotism. Such Orientalist narratives create fear that deterrence will not work on ‘barbaric’ non-Western regimes, when in reality the logic of nuclear weapons will compel non-Western leaders to act much like their Western counterparts, as all fundamentally wish to survive (Waltz, 2012: 4). This erroneous presentation is useful to the West, as it conditions acceptance of the existing ‘nuclear apartheid’ (Gusterson, 1999: 113) which is conducive to Western interests. Orientalism means that a single North Korean nuclear weapon is presented as an existential threat to the international community, whereas hundreds of US nuclear weapons are not (Wendt, 1992: 397). As Cox (1981: 128) rightfully asserts, ‘theory is always for someone, and for some purpose’ – racism constructs reality to the benefit of the West. The West defines its interests as synonymous with those of the international community, silencing legitimate concerns of non-Western states. For example, Kim Jong Un’s logical reasons for seeking nuclear weapons are silenced by Western media, with MSNBC propagating the false psychological narrative that he is simply a ‘madman’ (Al Jazeera, 2017). Such erroneous analysis filters into the subconscious of Western leaders, heightening distrust, undermining faith in negotiated solutions, and increasing the risk of fatal miscalculations (Al Jazeera, 2017). Historical narratives of oriental barbarism intersect with contemporary concerns surrounding nuclear weapons, thereby determining America’s overreaction to allegations that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (McQeeney, 2014: 299). Western populations willingly swallowed this justification for the use of force, suggesting that contrary to the contention of democratic peace thesis (Kant, 2017: 7), democracy is not always a constraint on belligerence as irrational, racist logic subverts people’s perceptions of their real interests. Racism produces irrational international actors, driving dangerous behaviour in the international system.

#### Alternative: The Alternative is a postcolonial intervention. This is an experience in responsibility which rejects civilizational discourses. This is wholly different performance from the 1AC which cannot be permed. The Role of the ballot is to refuse cultural hierarchies in debates about nuclear escalation

Mathur 18 - Ritu Mathur, ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, October 15th 2018 “Postcolonial perspectives on weapons control” [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02185377.2018.1526694?needAccess=true] Accessed 4/20/19 SAO

Several months ago, I received an invitation from the editorial board of the Asian Journal of Political Science to serve as a guest editor for a special issue of this journal. This unexpected invitation came as a pleasant surprise when I was mulling over the possibilities of postcolonial interventions to decolonize practices of arms control and disarmament. The efforts to decolonize cannot be undertaken alone but need a forum and multiple voices that can collectively represent the efforts of postcolonial scholars to engage with the problem of weapons. The scholars contributing to this special issue have long struggled individually to represent the subalterns struggle for equality and justice within the field of arms control and disarmament. It is now that they come together collectively with their myriad perspectives to interrogate contemporary practices of weapons control. This undertaking is critical especially at a time when the field of International Relations is being critiqued for its Eurocentrism and there is a resurgence of populist civilizational discourses juxtaposing the West and the Rest. This appears as an opportune moment in history to accept the challenge of decolonizing practices of arms control and disarmament. It is not simply a cliché that the field of arms control and disarmament has long been defined and dominated by the West’s military superiority in arms. The struggle against this dominance has been launched by critical security studies scholars that question practices of Orientalism in warfare but refrain from probing more specifically into the problem of weapons. Postcolonial interventions are an exercise in responsibility as they engage with civilizational discourses of difference articulated in terms of race, technology, law and culture. A study of the performative power of these civilizational discourses of difference is critical to cultivate understandings of not only how differences reinforce hierarchies but also to generate reflexivity on the struggles for power, justice and emancipation waged continuously by the subaltern. This Special Issue of the Asian Journal of Political Science is an effort to make more visible the engagement of postcolonial scholars with the problem of arms control and disarmament. It is an effort to resist a resurgent tide of dominant discourses seeking to constitute and reconstitute the field of arms control and disarmament representing the interests of the West to address problems of nuclear proliferation, counterproliferation and nuclear terrorism. While these efforts have their own niche in the field of security studies they cannot be guided by assumptions representing the West as the vanguard of maintaining order and stability in the international system. These dominant representations of the West as the guardian and custodian of the field of arms control and disarmament have often blighted and marginalized contributions of the Global South to weapons control. These efforts have been further stymied and marginalized as some actors from the Global South have striven to join the nuclear club and their practices have been typologized as co-optation or imitation of the behaviour of great powers in the international system