# Colonialism AC

#### The role of the ballot is to use the flow to identify and vote for the debater who best performatively decolonizes debates about the right to strike. This means form-level offense comes first and precludes theory

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Decolonial ethics is not without its tensions, some of which I explore in this section. In principle, the above two aspects of pluriversality cut in different directions. The pluriversal as that which is formed through inter-cultural dialogue points in the direction of a dialogue in which positions are not excluded in advance (even if this dialogue may take place, initially at least, only amongst the oppressed), and in which no particular standard or value is valid in advance of dialogue.7 Taken alone, this form of pluriversality raises questions. Does inter-cultural dialogue have any limits or constraints? Are values justified solely by virtue of having emerged through inter-cultural dialogue, or is it possible for a value to be wrong, normatively speaking, despite emerging from this process? Are any and all views allowed to the table, or ought certain views be rejected? What about those views that reproduce colonial narratives or values that have done so much to silence, undermine and oppress those on the underside of the colonial matrix of power? Taken alone, this aspect of pluriversality cannot provide an account of whether there are views, practices and modes of engagement that should not be allowed in discussion. Nor can it rule out, as illegitimate, views, values, practices or policies that, despite emerging from discussion, may nonetheless go on to oppress others. It is here that pluriversality as a value enters. Pluriversality as a value suggests that practices, worldviews, values or policies are legitimate only if they remain compatible with the existence of other worlds. In this sense, pluriversality sets a standard of legitimacy that would judge as morally wrong any worldview, value or practice that does not accept the existence of, or that works to shut down, other worlds. That is not necessarily to say, though, that those holding such views ought to be excluded from dialogue. There is a tension, then, between the two aspects of pluriversality. Giving ultimate priority to one aspect cannot solve this tension. Without any reflection on its emergence from pluriversal dialogue, the substantive value of pluriversality would become a new abstract, already-universal design and would undermine all commitment to taking seriously as producers of knowledge those that are marginalised. Without the substantive value, there is no way of identifying why a dialogue that takes seriously multiple cosmovisions is a morally good thing. Nor would there be any way of casting any judgment on or identifying as morally wrong certain visions – racist visions, sexist visions, visions that advocate a form of modernity that inevitably reproduces coloniality. Both aspects of pluriversality must remain, and decolonial global ethics must find ways of navigating (if not resolving) any tension between them. It will be for pluriversal dialogue to find ways of navigating this potentially irresolvable tension. To offer some ideas to any such discussion, it is worth noting that the substantive value of pluriversality has emerged, in practice, through pluriversal exchanges in indigenous, peasant (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2014), feminist (Leinius 2014) and World Social Forum praxis (Conway and Singh 2011). Having emerged as an abstract value through concrete, inter-cultural dialogue, it can, in turn, retrospectively account for why it is that such dialogue is, normatively speaking, a good thing. One might also note that the abstract value of a world in which other worlds are possible does not give rise immediately to concrete values, practices, policies and attitudes. Understanding what kind of practices, policies and modes of behaving and living enable other worlds to exist, and fostering the kind of respect for other worlds that such practices and ways of living may require, requires pluriversal dialogue, for it is through such exchanges that it will become apparent that certain demands and ways of living can and do result in the oppression of others. Both aspects of pluriversality can thus be mutually enriching in practice, despite the potential for tension between them. Whilst there is not room to introduce them in depth here, any readers inclined to think that this tension makes decolonial ethics unworkable, hopelessly idealistic and of no use in the ‘real world’ would be advised to explore the practices of the social movements that navigate these tensions. Related to this difference between the two aspects of pluriversality are tensions between decoloniality as an option and decoloniality as an imperative. For Mignolo, there will be no place for one option to pretend to be the option. The decolonial option is not aiming to be the one. It is just an option that, beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the rest are also options. (2011, 21) Similarly, what we put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will actively engage, politically and epistemically, to advance projects of epistemic and subjective decolonisation and in building communal futures. (2011, xxvii) This weaker version of decoloniality appears not to rule out, as incompatible with decolonial global ethics, other visions. ‘Western civilization’ would then, Mignolo (2011, 176) suggests, ‘merely be one among many options, and not the one guide to rule the many.’ The decolonial option serves to add another option to the table. It does not necessarily reject Western modernity, liberal cosmopolitanism or other positions, provided that they, too, present themselves only as an option. When understanding pluriversality in terms of its procedural aspect, this makes perfect sense. It would be wrong to set out, in advance, one option as an imperative, as one we ought to follow, albeit in different ways. The worry with this weaker version, however, is that it risks ‘losing the ability for critique’ (Alcoff 2012, 6) and becoming a relativism of anything goes. For Grosfoguel (2012, 101), by contrast, pluriversality is not ‘a relativism of anything goes’. Similarly, for Dussel (2012, 19), a decolonial perspective does ‘not presuppose the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between cultures’. Instead, it acknowledges that some cultures, cosmovisions and livelihoods are systematically threatened by others and cannot survive in the face of cosmovisions and lifestyles that are inextricably tied to the ceaseless extraction of resources, the dispossession of people and poor working conditions. These perspectives follow when the substantive value of pluriversality is invoked. If the practices, institutions and lifestyles that we associate with modernity continue to depend upon and be constituted by coloniality, then these are not compatible with a world in which other worlds fit. It is for this reason that Dussel suggests that decolonial liberation is ‘impossible for capitalism’ and must not accept the colonial matrix of power ‘as a whole’ (Dussel 2013, 138). Though Mignolo primarily presents decoloniality as an option, at other times he suggests that ‘pluriversal futures … are only possible if the reign of economic capitalism ends’, on the basis that economic capitalism provides space only for practices that can be turned into, or do not obstruct, profits, and hence does not allow different worlds to exist on equal terms (Mignolo 2011, 292). This article is not the place to analyse the validity of Mignolo and Dussel’s accounts of capitalism. The point is to suggest that decoloniality should be considered an imperative, and not just an option to be placed on the table. So understood, decolonial global ethics goes beyond a relativism of anything goes. Any option that inevitably depends upon the systematic destruction of other words would violate the principle of a world in which many worlds fit. Decoloniality, and its central value – pluriversality – invoke stringent demands that rule out a number of worlds, practices and lifestyles. It identifies as wrong a world of economic capitalism if and insofar as it inevitably depends on, and cannot be reformed to prevent, the destruction of other worlds. It identifies as wrong practices of resource extraction, if and insofar as they destroy the livelihoods of peasant and indigenous peoples. It identifies as wrong highly polluting lifestyles, if and insofar as they lead to the destruction of the lives and cosmovisions of those who are dispossessed and displaced as a result of environmental change. It means, finally, that Western civilization as we know it cannot be one legitimate option among many if and insofar as it is constituted through, and cannot be separated from, coloniality. If decolonial global ethics is to unpick the colonial matrix of power and liberate people (s) from domination, it must be an imperative. It must be understood, as it is by Mignolo (2011, 23) in one of his stronger statements, as a project ‘which all contending options would have to accept’. This does not mean that decoloniality and pluriversality offer a singular and rigid global design. A pluriversal world is one in which multiple options are possible – a world in which many worlds can co-exist. Whilst other options would be circumscribed insofar as they would have to accept the decolonial imperative of working towards a pluriversal world, this still leaves room for many options, many possible lives, livelihoods and cosmovisions. Only those worlds that involve, inextricably, the continued domination of others are judged as wrong (though it may well be the case that such views should not be excluded from dialogue, given that dialogue itself may help enrich the kind of mutual respect that would lead to the abandonment of such views). Far from invoking a relativism of anything goes, this principle is a demanding one, with radical implications for global social structures and ways of living. The building of a pluriverse is and must be an open-ended project, fed by dialogues amongst actors from across the world. Moreover, the demand of a pluriverse may be impossible to meet fully; in an interconnected world, it may be impossible to ensure that it is not the case that the actions of some constrain the worlds of others. This does not mean, however, that some worlds, practices, livelihoods, lifestyles and institutional designs are not more compatible with a pluriverse than others. Recognising interconnectedness – and the long history of interconnectedness – only increases the importance of striving for a pluriversal world in an attempt to build a world free from the domination and destruction of the colonial matrix of power. Decolonial theory makes a distinctive and valuable contribution to global ethics. It begins with an analysis of coloniality as the inextricable darker side of modernity. In reflecting on what it would mean to decolonise, decolonial theory offers a fundamentally global ethics that is distinct from individualistic and universalistic cosmopolitan theory. It begins with those perspectives threatened by a colonial matrix of power, and proposes inter-cultural dialogue across diverse cosmovisions. In so doing, it refuses to specify, in advance, what is of fundamental moral significance. Finally, it embraces pluriversality. Plurversality refers, on the one hand, to a way of constructing values. A value is pluriversal if, rather than being set up as an abstract and already-universal value, it is constructed through dialogue across multiple cosmovisions. Pluriversality also refers to a value of a world in which many words fit. Pluriversality thus offers an account of both a global process through which global values can legitimately be formed, and a value that can be used to judge particular practices, policies, processes or social structures. Pluriversality as a value is demanding and judges as morally wrong practices and social structures that inevitably dispossess others. But it is not equivalent to those universal, global designs central to the colonial matrix of power. It is not equivalent, in part, because it embraces radical difference and seeks to multiply options, rather than close them down. It also differs in that it has emerged from, and can only be fleshed out through, a process of pluriversal exchange. Decolonial theory has been constructed alongside and through social movement practice. The above presentation of the value of pluriversality, and of the distinctive features of decolonial theory more broadly, has only been possible in light of the work of peasant, indigenous, feminist and World Social Forum activists contesting various aspects of the colonial matrix of power. Taking decolonial global ethics seriously opens avenues for further work judging whether, how, and why given practices, policies, processes and structures are compatible with pluriversality in both senses of the term. If this article encourages global ethicists to explore further these questions, then it would have played its small part in contributing to the construction of an ethical framework that can take seriously and challenge the legacy of colonial rule.

#### Prefer my Role of the ballot

#### [1] Representations and form first because our approach to the world determines our material actions which means it controls the IL to policy change. And additionally, it ensures reflexivity

Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 “Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy%20Thesis.pdf] Accessed 8/13/21 SAO

Vital for the aims of this thesis is the ability to use reflexivity when discussing representation in/and research and to this end a postcolonial ecofeminist perspective is helpful as it allows for the analysis of Subject constructions, in this case those that are constructed over the lives of non-white, non-Western, colonized, or indigenous peoples. Simone de Beauvoir discusses how representations are created from partial perspectives that transcend into absolute truths when created by those with hegemonic power. “Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth” (de Beauvoir, 1972: 161). Those privileged within the hierarchy have the power to represent the Other. Representation is therefore an important focus of this thesis because we see that the power to re-present is concentrated in the hands of elites, in this case the Global North holds the power to re-present indigenous peoples. The ways in which the indigenous Other is re-presented through the Subject construction devised by the Global North creates the oppressive dualism necessary for the colonization of indigenous knowledges through acts of biopiracy. Said’s extensive exploration of the ways in which the Oriental Other is represented by the Occidental Subject in literature and academia is relevant here. In his important text, Orientalism, Said asserts that a “phenomenologically reduced status” is placed upon the Oriental that can only be accessed by a Western expert (1978: 283). Since Western re-presentations of the Orient began to arise, the Orient has been unable to represent itself as hegemonic Western representations engulf any attempt. Thus knowledge of the Orient can only be deemed credible once it had been refined by the Occidental’s work (283). This process of re-presenting through Western eyes that Said speaks of is supported by institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery and doctrines (Said, 1978) hence representation’s power which is performed through discursive meaning which is both constructing of and constructed within social spheres. When representing the Other, their agency to represent their own experiences becomes obscured and removed. Taking up this issue in her seminal paper, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak (2010) met her question with the answer of a resounding no: a response that exemplifies the lack of ability one has to represent oneself as a hyper-oppressed individual or collectivity. Mohanty moves beyond Spivak’s assertions and invites us to consider the possibility of a shift in the politics of representation and states, “it is time to move beyond the Marx who found it possible to say: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Mohanty, 2003A: 354). Thus, as these arguments make clear, it is imperative that whilst conducting research and theorizing one is attentive to representation - the act of speaking about and for another. The use of a postcolonial standpoint can assist me in remaining sensitive to the forms of colonialist power relations that frequently shape knowledge production. In this way, postcolonialism can help me to interrogate my partial perspective and privileged standpoint (Haraway, 1988). It offers a reflexive approach that foregrounds the way one’s positionality influences what knowledge is produced in the research process, while drawing attention to the partial perspective (Haraway, 1988) that one necessarily inhabits in this process. This reflexive approach is also relevant to the political interests of this thesis. Perpetually interrogating the claims and assumptions one makes whilst theorizing from one’s own standpoint helps to reduce the prospect of reproducing hierarchies and perpetuating colonial re-presentations. I must critique my own gaze and be careful not to encode my own representations as truth, so as not to marginalize other alternative readings. In this way I can aim to avoid conducting research through imperial eyes (Smith, 2012). Through the analysis and discussion I will attend to the Global North’s behaviour and the effects this has on the lived experiences of indigenous peoples in postcolonial India with regards to resources, knowledge and the politics of representation. In doing so I do not wish to speak for indigenous peoples or perpetuate essentialist tropes of indigenous peoples as Mother Nature’s carer. I wish to destabilize this, to untwine the tangled woman-nature-nurturer knot that has been dreamt up. I wish to de-essentialize the image of indigenous peoples through showing that the reason why the homogenized scientific and modern Global North seeks the knowledges of indigenous peoples is due to the complexity, creativity and fruitfulness of these knowledges. Again, I must be aware of not glorifying sites of indigenous knowledges as green utopian paradises capable of offsetting global environmental degradation, but instead attend to them as an alternative modernity based on differing values that demonstrate alternative knowledge production and deserved recognition, protection and selfdetermination. Furthermore, despite the urgent need to pay attention to non-Western knowledge – knowledges that sit outside of the dominant knowledge paradigm -, it remains pertinent to remind oneself of the violence and oppression within the Global South and indigenous communities with regards to gender, sexuality, religion and class (Shome, 2012: 200). The idea is not to reverse the nature/culture binary or create an indigenous-centrism as opposed to a Global North-centrism but instead move beyond these dominating dualistic ways of perceiving the world (200).

#### [2] Resolvability: Semantic representations of truth aren’t reliable.

Kienpointner 96 – M. Kienpointner in the Journal Argumentation, November 1996 “Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, world view and argumentation” [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00142980] Accessed 9/18/19 SAO

An extreme case of linguistic expressions which let premises appear as indubitable truths or norms are tautologies. In classical two-valued predicate and propositional logic, tautologies are defined as necessarily true statements which only convey redundant information (cf. e.g. 'A is A'/'As are As', 'If p, then p', 'Either p or not p' and their formal equivalents: 'Vx [P(x) -- P(x)]', 'p --> p', 'p v -,p'; note that the last tautology becomes a contingent proposition in logical systems with three or more truth values). Different from their purely formal logical counterparts, tautological utterances in natural languages do convey additional semantic information, while sharing the appearance of absolute necessity with formal tautologies. It is not surprising, then, that tautological sentences are used in everyday argumentation to convey a message like: 'My arguments are irrefutable'. In the remainder of this chapter, I will describe the function of tautologies in everyday argumentation and criticize the implicit ideological messages they often convey. But first, I will give a short review of the relevant literature. Tautologies and their communicative functions have been the subject of quite a number of contributions in recent linguistic literature (cf. Wierzbicka, 1987, 1988; Fraser, 1988; Ward/Hirschberg, 1991; Farghal, 1992; Okamoto, 1993). A main point of the controversial discussion has revolved around the question whether natural language tautologies are uninformative by themselves and only convey meanings via inferred Gricean implicatures or whether they do have language-specific meanings which are encoded by grammatical and semantic features of the linguistic system. The first alternative was favored by representatives of the 'radical pragmatics' approach. Following Grice (1975), Levinson (1983: 125) considered tautological utterances like 'Boys are boys' as meaningless if out of context. The actually existing semantic information conveyed by such utterances, which seem to violate the Quantity and Relevance maxims of Grice, is inferable only via implicatures (e.g.: 'That's the kind of unruly behavior you would expect from boys'). These implicatures depend on the particular context of the utterance. Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 511) tried to generalize this approach and to formulate explicit principles for the interpretation of tautological utterances as generalized Cricean implicatures. They see the main function of tautologies (e.g. 'War is war') in the implicit rejection of alternative utterances (e.g.: 'War is a crime', more generally: 'A is B' or 'If p, then q' etc.). The second alternative was supported by Wierzbicka (1987, 1988), who argued for a 'radical semantics' approach. According to this approach, tautologies cannot be considered as meaningless if out of context (1987: 96ff.): firstly, they differ considerably across languages. One and the same syntactic structure can have differing meanings in different languages and quite often, tautologies occurring in one particular language do not even exist in this form in another language (e.g. 'Boys are boys' does not exist in this form in French, German or Russian: compare \*'Les garqons sont les (des?) gargons', \*'Knaben sind Knaben', \*'Mal'iki mal'6iki'). Secondly, within one and the same language, a number of formally different types of tautological sentences can be systematically associated with different meanings. A third alternative has been suggested by Fraser (1988: 217f.) and refined by Farghal (1992) and Okamoto (1993). According to this approach, which I consider to be the most convincing one, both the 'radical pragmatics' and the 'radical semantics' approach have shortcomings: the first cannot explain that many tautological utterances do have conventional core meanings, even apart from specific contexts (and at least generalized implicatures come close to conventional meaning). Moreover, there are obvious formal and semantic differences between tautological utterance across languages. The latter cannot explain the full range of possible meanings associated with a particular tautological construction. Several counter examples have been given as to the suggested meanings of English tautologies as described by Wierzbicka (pointed out by Fraser, 1988: 218f.; Ward/ Hirschberg, 1991: 512f.) and a variety of contextual meanings of one and the same tautological construction cannot be explained without the use of pragmatic principles like the Grixean maxims (cf. Farghal, 1992: 226f.; Okamoto, 1993: 462f.). For instance, the Japanese tautology 'X wa X' (where 'wa' is a topic marker) can be assigned the core meaning of category immutability: no matter how marginal the particular instantiation of category X may be, it must be accepted as an instance of X (Okamoto, 1993: 439). But in addition, 'X wa X may plausibly be used to convey other meanings, in particular attitudinal meanings, such as resignation, tolerance, defiance, obligation, criticism, or soberness' (1993: 462). For example, the specific tautology 'Oya wa oya' ('A parent is a parent') can be used to call special attention to a parent even if he or she cannot be considered an ideal parent (obligation), to ask for understanding of the typical behavior of a parent (tolerance), to request gratitude for the efforts of a parent (appreciation) etc. Similarly, Farghal (1992: 232f.) points out that Jordanian Arabic tautologies like 'Hi:h hi:h' (lit. 'She she', that is, 'She is she' or 'She'll never change') can be used both for expressing admiration and condemnation. I will now return to the function of tautological expressions in everyday argumentation. In my opinion, the discussion of the status of tautologies and their functions in various natural languages (among them English, French, Russian, Polish, Arabic, Japanese) seems to have shown that many (if not all) varieties of tautological utterances can be used in argumentative discourse according to one and the same argument scheme. The tautologies themselves and the core meaning conventionally implied by many of them, namely, that they preclude the possibility of other alternatives and that this will remain so in the foreseeable future, belong to the premises of this argument scheme (cf. Wierzbicka, 1987: 109; Ward Hirschberg, 1991: 511): Tautological Argument (= TA): If A is A, A is not B. A is A This is the only possibility. This will not change (in the foreseeable future). Therefore: A is not B (not C, not D ... ).This scheme could easily be modified to include other types of tautological utterances (e.g.: If p, then p; or: Either p or not p etc.) and other types of conclusions (e.g.: Not q (not r, not s .. .)). Note that 'A is A' and other types of tautologies need not always express factual propositions ('Boys are boys'), but can also indirectly express **obligations and other types of** normative propositions **(**e.g.: 'A mother is a mother', meaning that one has certain obligations towards one's mother, which should be fulfilled). To illustrate this scheme and its applications in argumentative discourse, I will use some of the examples provided by Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 512ff.). They are all taken from authentic passages of spoken or written English. See for example (the abbreviations are Ward/Hirschberg's): 1. GW:Why would you want to hack in Paoli eight hours a day? DE: A job's a job. (6 March 1985) 2. Jim Gardner: The defense claimed White had asked him to kill her. The prosecution countered with the claim 'Murder is murder'. (Channel 6 Action News at 6, 8 June 1985) 3. But we do not believe there should be one set of scientific principles for the whole world, and a different set for experiments involving cigarettes. Science is science, Proof is proof. (New York Times Magazine, 14 April 1985) 4. Host: Either a ham has a bone or it doesn't have a bone. Where'd they get a name like 'semi-boneless' form? (WNSR radio, 10 December 1987) 5. MK: I really should learn how to find the other entrance [to the Holland Tunnel]. DL: What good will that do? If it's crowded, it's crowded. (2 February 1986) Example 1 to 3 illustrate the use of 'equative' tautologies ('A is A'), which are by far the most frequent type (67.5%) in a sample of 169 tautological utterances collected by Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 511). In example 1, DE reacts to the question of GW, who challenges DE's willingness to do a rather unattractive job. DE provides a tautological argument which leads to an implicit conclusion like: 'There is no alternative to the kind of job I'm doing' or 'There are no really nice jobs which would be available'. Similarly, in example 2, the prosecution counters the defense's attempt of finding mitigating circumstances with a tautology implying a conclusion like: 'There is no excusable type of murder' or 'There is no pardonable kind of intentional killing a person'. In example 3, the conclusion drawn from the two tautological arguments is spelled out explicitly ('But we do not believe . . .'): there are no alternative types of science nor are there alternative types of proof. Example 4 and 5 provide instances of 'disjunctive' and 'conditional' tautological utterances. In both cases, the conclusion is indirectly expressed with the help of incredulous (rhetorical) questions: 'Where'd they get a name like 'semi-boneless' from?' implies that there is just no possible source whatsoever from where one could get 'semi-boneless' ham because there are only two alternatives: 'either p or not p' (and no further alternatives q, r, . . .). 'What good will that do?' implies that it is useless looking for 'less crowded' or even 'uncrowded' entrances because there is no alternative q (or s, t, .. .) for p. All tautological arguments presented above invite a similar sort of criticism: despite the appearance of absolute certainty because of the alleged absolute identity between 'A' and 'A' or 'p' and 'p', in reality, no particular instances of entity A **(or state of affairs p)** are completely identical. After all, that is why people start to argue about particular instances of jobs, assassinations, scientific proofs etc.! Therefore, many tautological arguments following the TA-pattern can be criticized as instances of the fallacy called 'petitio principii' or 'begging the question' (cf. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1983: 290ff.; Walton, 1994; 1996: 54). Moreover, Okamoto (1993: 439) quite correctly observes that, by uttering 'equative' tautologies ('A is A'), 'all argument over categorization is refused, and category immutability is simply insisted on with no logical explanation'. Likewise, in the case of disjunctive tautologies ('Either p or not p') the danger of committing 'Black and White'-fallacies arises: only rarely are there only two contradictory alternatives. In most cases, at least a third **alternative q** has to be considered. Therefore, arguments according to the TA-pattern are only rationally acceptable if they are accompanied by additional evidence which justifies the assumption of only one existing possibility (cf. Mackenzie, 1994: 234f.; Colwell, 1994: 259 on similar requirements for apparently fallacious circular arguments). But in this case, the tautological utterances are merely used as stylistic strategies which support and reinforce the power of the independently formulated justification of the controversial standpoint. See the following example (Ward/ Hirschberg, 1991: 513), where a mother vehemently defends a liberal standpoint in education ('You should allow your children to go out in the evening') against possible counter arguments. Only in addition to her detailed arguments does she use a tautological utterance ('Kids are kids') to make them even stronger: 6. 'It was a normal, typical Saturday night,' said Catherine Belardo, an auburn-haired woman in a housecoat. 'They get dressed up, they go out together. I don't want people saying, 'Well where were her parents?' Her parents were here. Her mother was home her father was home. You can't keep your kids in a tube. They go out. Kids are kids. You have to show them you trust them. Then they go out the door and who knows, really, what can happen? You tell them to walk in groups. You tell them to walk where it's light. You tell them never to talk to strangers. And they did everything they were told.' (Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 February 1985) In this example, C. Belardo provides enough additional arguments to make the implicit conclusion of the tautological utterance 'Kids are kids' quite plausible, namely, that there is no possible alternative like, for instance,'Kids are adults' or 'Kids can be educated in a way that they behave like adults though still being kids'. That arguments according to the TA-scheme are far from being trivially true and convincing can also be shown ('ex contrario') with examples for self-contradictory, yet sensible utterances of the type 'A is not A'. Though apparently being necessarily false, these utterances can nevertheless be used as stylistic devices for stressing differences between seemingly identical tokens of category A. This should not be possible, if tautologies, like in formal logic, would be trivially true, and contradictions, like logical antinomies, would be trivially false by definition. However, in natural language, certain contradictory utterances, **which I prefer to call 'rhetorical paradoxes'**, are **frequently used as quite** acceptable stylistic devices of everyday argumentation. See the following three examples in German, taken from a TV talk show and advertisements (cf. Kienpointner, 1983: 95; 1992; 328): 7. Nenning: ... vielleicht ist des a Ant/ah eine Art Antwort, Herr Schroder, net, i mein, Arbeit und Arbeit is net unbedingt dasselbe. (Club II, 12 February 1980) 8. Tee ist nicht gleich Tee. Zum Beispiel Tee aus Kenia: Liebe und Sorgfalt lassen auf charaktervollem Boden unverwechselbare Qualitat gedeihen Stern, 7 April 1983) 9. Indien ist nicht gleich Indien. Und Indien-Rundreise nicht gleich IndienRundreise. Dazwischen k6nnen Welten liegen. Nicht etwa im Sinne von zurickgelegten Kilometem, was wir hier meinen, ist- Qualitat. (Profil, 21 October 1985) In all three passages, the apparently clear contradictions 'Arbeit und Arbeit is net unbedingt dasselbe' (lit.: 'Job and job isn't necessarily the same thing', that is, 'A job isn't a job'), 'Tee ist nicht gleich Tee' ('Tea is not tea'), 'Indien ist nicht gleich Indien. Und Indien-Rundreise nicht gleich Indien-Rundreise' (lit.: 'India is not the same as India. And tour of India is not the same as tour of India') make sense, given the context and the additional arguments provided in the context. In 7, the speaker defends a drug addict against the reproach that the latter does not want to work regularly. Using the paradoxical formula 'A job isn't a job', Nenning takes up previous remarks where he pointed out differences between more and less attractive opportunities for work. In 8 and 9, the respective enterprises try to point out differences in quality between their own products (tea, tours of India) via rhetorical paradoxes. All these examples show that in everyday argumentation, different from formal logic, contradictions can make sense. Generally speaking, it completely depends on the verbal context whether tautologies and contradictions are to be accepted or rejected. A final critical remark I would like to make brings us directly back to the link between language, world view, and argumentation. Tautologies often convey stereotyped assumptions about states of affairs, values, social groups etc., which belong to the stock of shared assumptions in a speech community (cf. 'Business is business', 'A job is a job', 'War is war', 'Boys will be boys', 'Girls will be girls' etc.). This is especially important if the tautologies are not newly created in a specific communicative interaction, but belong to the traditional norm of a language (in the sense of Coseriu, cf. ch. 3). Due to the apparently compelling logical form, these tautologies can effectively reinforce standard ideologies in a society because they seem to express unquestionable facts or values. The clear weaknesses of arguments according to the TA-scheme notwithstanding, powerful groups, which are often at the same time majority groups, can use them to immunize conservative or even fundamentalist standpoints (cf.: 'There will always be bad jobs, so there is no need to provide higher education for everybody'; 'There will always be natural differences between boys and girls, so there is no need for equal opportunities in the educational system').

#### [3] Subversion: We manipulate the academy into making space for minoritarian thought

Paperson 17 - la paperson, June 1, 2017 also known as K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego “A Third University is Possible” [https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/884701be-04f4-4564-939d-d9905d0e80d9#cvi] Accessed 3/8/18 SAO

It is in Ferguson’s frame of queer desiring machines that I consider the scyborg (by associating with and deviating a bit from Donna Haraway’s formulation of the cyborg) as the agentive body within the institutional machinery. If we think of the university as a machine that is the composite of many other machines, these machines are never perfect loyalists to colonialism —in fact, they are quite disloyal. They break down and produce and travel in unexpected lines of flight—flights that are at once enabled by the university yet irreverent of that mothership of a machine. This same disloyalty applies to the machined people, you. And thus there’s some hope, the hope of the scyborg. Organisms in the machinery are scyborgian: as students, staff, faculty, alumni, and college escapees, technologies of the university have been grafted onto you. Your witch’s flight pulls bits of the assemblage with you and sprays technology throughout its path. The agency of the scyborg is precisely that it is a reorganizer of institutional machinery; it subverts machinery against the master code of its makers; it rewires machinery to its own intentions. It’s that elliptical gear that makes the machine work (for freedom sometimes) by helping the machine (of unfreedom) break down. The lopsided bot, the scyborg, the queer gear with a g-limp—if there is anything to fear and to hope for in the university, it could be you, and it could be me. Scyborgs have made a third university. The scyborg is essential in producing the third world university. The scyborg is machined person, technologically enhanced by legitimated knowledge and stamped with the university’s brand. S-he is the perfect masculine expression of education: an autonomous individual who will reproduce the logics of the university without being told. The scyborg is the university’s colonial hope. Albert Memmi describes being a Tunisian Jew at the Sorbonne in the 1950s, wondering whether he would be allowed to take his exams. “It is not a right,” said the president of the exams jury. “It is a hope. . . . Let us say that it is a colonial hope.”[2] Scyborgs are creatures of colonial desire: please be successful, be pretty, be human. The scyborg’s privilege is a manifestation of the first world university’s noblesse oblige. Thus a successful scyborg proves that the university is ethical. However, on the flip side, the scyborg is a source of colonial anxiety: please do not fail us, reject us, betray us. The scyborg has hir desires too. Hirs is a decolonial hope. S-he is never a completely loyal colonialist and can often be caught in the basement library, building the third world university. To recognize the scyborg, I return to the three examples of colonial schools in Kenya, North America, and the Philippines. I do so to ask that we recognize the nineteenth- and twentieth-century scyborgs that Christian missions, the U.S. Army, and other colonial machines might have created by accident. I opened this book with Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s memoirs of Alliance High School and wartime Kenya. The importance of starting with a Black example, and an African example, is to choose a starting point that does not disaggregate Indigeneity and Blackness in the conversations about colonialism, even though the modes of operation of colonialism upon the Black and the Indigenous are very divergent. At Alliance High School, wa Thiong’o was inspired by Oliver Twist, in part out of identification with the story boy’s hunger; in part, perhaps, he aspired to be Charles Dickens. If so, I believe he accomplished it. However, what the Dickens he became is not something that missionary schools could have recognized. He published his first novel in English while at the University of Leeds in 1964. Returning to Kenya, he organized the highly successful but politically explicit theater production of his 1977 play Ngaahika Ndeenda (I will marry when I want), which was shut down by the Kenyatta regime. Wa Thiong’o was imprisoned for a year in the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison. There he wrote the first modern novel in the Gĩkũyũ language, Caitaani mũtharaba-Inĩ (Devil on the cross), on prison-issued toilet paper. Luther Standing Bear was one of the first students at Carlisle Industrial School for Indians when it opened in 1879 and, indeed, a model student who looked up to the founder, Captain “kill-the-Indian-save-the-man” Pratt. He even became a recruiter for the school. However, he went on to oppose the Dawes Act that privatized Indian land held in common; to argue for bilingual education for Native children; and to challenge the paradigms of property, Eurocentric history, and assimilation—arguments and alliances that successfully brought about the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which officially reversed the Dawes Act and assimilationist schooling and provided pathways for tribes to reestablish sovereignty and tribal government. Troy Richardson, drawing from Gerald Vizenor, writes that Standing Bear’s thoughts and deeds suggest a “shadow curriculum” of a deep sovereignty beyond their immediate referents in the (English) world. “Shadows are possibilities, neither empty nor over-determined by words or referents but instances of possibilities.”[3] For such aviators of Indigenous futurity, “consciousness is a rush of shadows in the distance.”[4] As a third example, the U.S. Army began educating Filipino schoolchildren in 1900 as a strategy of conquest in the Philippine–American War. Officers served as school superintendents, enlisted men as teachers, enrolling fifty thousand students in 1904 and more than one million in 1935. Colonial schools were considered part of military operations, serving a strategic purpose in quelling resistance. In The Miseducation of the Filipino, Renato Constantino asserts, “Education, therefore, serves as a weapon in wars of colonial conquest.”[5] But like the graduates of the boarding schools of Kenya, many of the graduates of these colonial schools defied the schools’ intended purpose of making colonial middle management by coming to the United States— exploiting the unintended loophole that colonized Filipinos were U.S. nationals. As Veta Schlimgen explains, the desires and ambitions cultivated in the “culture of education” created a new—and unanticipated—(im)migration dynamic when, during the 1920s, Filipino students retraced the steps of American colonizers. They migrated to the mainland states, and they sought college degrees. Filipino student migration during the 1920s increased remarkably. In 1919, about 450 Filipino students studied in the states. Five years later, nearly 2000 did and, in 1930, the number of enrolled students hovered around 3000. These numbers might seem small to us now but in the context of student migration during the interwar years, they are significant. During the 1920s, Filipino students constituted about twenty percent of non-native born students.[6] Furthermore, “during the first half of the 1920s, students (rather than laborers) made up the majority of Filipino migrants to the mainland U.S.” This unexpected product of the colonial desiring machine ultimately helped to mobilize history on the side of brown labor unionists in West Coast farms and canneries. Notable organizers within the Cannery Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union were first accomplished students. Victorio Velasco, after earning a degree in journalism, was shunted into cannery work and farm labor in Seattle. He went on to edit Filipino community newspapers that were critical to creating a collective Filipino workers’ political voice. Chris Mensalvas quit law school because, as a U.S. “noncitizen national” from the Philippines, he was prohibited from practicing law. “I spent three years in college and then I went to organize our people on the farms.”[7] Trinidad Rojo, who completed his PhD in sociology at Stanford University, became president of the Cannery Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union in 1939. Their work became one root of the United Farm Worker movement best associated with Dolores Huerta and Cesar Chavez. The technological fact of the matter is that Rojo, Mensalves, Standing Bear, and wa Thiong’o are scyborg, and their flights through the colonial assemblages reveal a warp in the patterning of power. Scyborgs are possible “men” fit for assimilation—the colonial hope is that the whiteness of the normative human can be extended to the very people who were premised as non-human, gender-deviant savages. Thus I have selected these male examples to bring attention to how, upon entry into schooling, they were all already premised as not men. Natives must get haircuts and Western suits; African boys need to be converted into Christian men; even with suits and Christian names, Filipino men were feared as sexual contagions in white working-class society. You can infer how these same masculinizing technologies are appended onto those of you who are not cis-men and how, despite your colonial equipment, you will never become a complete colonialist stud. The first world university wants you to become masculine in the most disciplined sense of the word and will provide you with the necessary prosthesis and will cut off your tail. But you, as scyborg, might use these technologies to bend the fabric of power to suit your decolonial desires.

#### [4] Solidarity: Our advocacy solves battle fatigue

Brady 17 - Janelle Brady, University of Toronto, Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education, May 29th, 2017 “Education for whom? Exploring systems of oppression and domination” [https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cjnse/article/view/30801] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO brackets in original text

Knowledge systems and ways of knowing are rooted in people’s social locatedness and help them to understand certain phenomena. Alcoff (2007), again drawing on Code’s work, asserted that there are epistemic advantages and disadvantages to ways of knowing and knowledge systems. In relation to the epistemology of ignorance of objectivity, those whose knowledges are validated and legitimized are part of the dominant group, whereas those whose knowledges are disenfranchised are part of the oppressed group. According to Dei (2014), knowledge is based on its historical, as well as ancestral and spiritual underpinnings, and cannot be pinpointed to one contextual moment. Epistemological advantages or disadvantages may play out in education when educators or students become ascribed knowers in particular contexts. One might be the “South Asian Food expert” or the “Indigenous history expert,” and they may experience some level of epistemological advantage in knowing; however, their knowledge is still Othered and compartmentalized into particular moments in time and removed from history. In an educational context, Othering people’s knowledges, histories, and identities to become stagnant points in history or single stories takes the onus away from school administrators and curriculum developers whose responsibility is to delve into South Asian history beyond samosas and Indigenous history beyond Pow wows. This is because the epistemologically advantaged become responsible for sharing their knowledge in educational contexts. However, their knowledge is not solely contextualized to that particular moment in time, but deeply entrenched in history and implicated by the history of others. Questions in the educational context can be asked about why South Asians were denied entry into Canada through racist immigration policies (Ralston, 1999; Thobani, 2007) or why and how Indigenous residential schooling, forced assimilation, the building of pipelines and the like continue to affect Indigenous communities to this very day (Coulthard, 2014). The contextual experts carry the burden for the ignorant who dominate, thus reinforcing the idea of “sharing their subjective experiences.” As Lorde (1984) stated, People [of colour] are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are expected to educate the heterosexual world. The oppressors maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions. (p. 115) Thus, it becomes the work of the oppressed to become educators to share their stories and their subjective histories and realities for the dominant group, when the dominant group deems it appropriate to do so. The oppressed become the bearers of the oppressor’s ignorance while also living through their own oppression. It is important to be critical of such dynamics so that people of colour do not bear all of the responsibility for the privileged to learn and unlearn about their privilege.

#### [5] Performativity: They presuppose that their epistemology will be valued which means contestation proves our role of the ballot is a prerequisite to all evaluation

#### [6] Epistemology: Our role of the ballot answers a metaethical question that precedes normative framing. Refusing all epistemic hegemony is a prerequisite to cognitive deliberation and a lack of hierarchies across normative structures means I get permutations.

Poppe 16 - R.C Poppe, Utrecht University Repository, 2016 “APPLYING DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES TO CLIMATE ETHICS” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/334548] Accessed 10/9/19 SAO

Relation and contribution to climate ethics As stated in the beginning of the previous chapter, moral epistemology is a branch of metaethics that concerns itself with the justification for moral statements. Moral epistemology, however, must also be a branch of epistemology, because if justification for moral statements is to be evaluated, there needs to be a justification for the (type of) knowledge employed to execute such evaluation**.** Therefore, moral epistemology needs to account for both ethical and epistemic considerations. As Timmons argued, there is no neat separation between normative ethics and metaethics: they are intertwined. So, if one were to engage in an inquiry to normative (applied) ethics, at least some attention has be given to moral epistemology. It matters greatly, however, what epistemologies one employs as basis for that inquiry. The way decolonial thinking thus relates to climate ethics is that it can be used to address epistemological issues in the current climate ethical debate. The argument that will be explained below is going to say that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice (Santos 2008, p. 258). In a nutshell, this means that an ethical form of mitigation policy cannot be achieved if the epistemology(-ies)employed to justify the evaluation of justification of moral statements (moral epistemology) is in conflict with epistemologies and relations to nature of the people affected by that policy. Management approaches interfere with global cognitive justice Different relations to nature The argument regarding global cognitive justice draws upon indigenous relations to nature. According to Enrique Salmon, indigenous ways of relating to nature should be understood as a kincentric ecology (Salmon, p. 1328). This means that indigenous people regard themselves and nature as part of the same family. Salmon argues that the best way to understand such a relation to nature is through the Rarámuri (an indigenous community in eastern Mexico; the Sieraa Madres) concept of iwígara, which he explains as the following: Poppe 35 “Iwígara is the total interconnectedness and integration of all life in the Sierra Madres, physical and spiritual”…”Iwí also makes reference to the Rarámuri concept of soul. It is understood that the soul, or iwí, sustains the body with the breath of life. Everything that breaths has a soul. Plants, animals, humans, stones, the land, all share the same breath. When humans and animals die, their souls become butterflies that visit the living. The butterflies also travel to the Milky Way, where past souls of the ancestors reside. Iwí is also the word used to identify a caterpillar that weaves its cocoons on the madrone tree (Arbutus sp.). The implication is that there is a whole morphophysiological process of change, death, birth, and rebirth associated with the concept of iwí. Iwí is the soul or essence of life everywhere. Iwígara then channels the idea that all life, spiritual and physical, is interconnected in a continual cycle. Iwí is the prefix to iwígara. Iwígara expresses the belief that all life shares the same breath. We are all related to, and play a role in, the complexity of life. Iwígara most closely resembles the concept of kincentric ecology.” (Salmon, p. 1328) The concept of kincentric ecology, iwígara, is at the heart of the Rarámuri land management philosophy (Salmon, p. 1329). It is a reciprocal relationship in which the Rarámuri are one of the relatives of the family of the land, of which they regard themselves as guardians (Salmon, p. 1329). The Rarámuri conception of nature and their relation to it is quite different from Western conceptions. Singer, for example, argues that the atmosphere (which is a part of nature) is to be perceived as a resource and that for the sake of justice in mitigation policy, the entitlements to this resource need to be allocated fairly. Similarly, Escobar argues that the conception of capital in political economy is undergoing a significant change with regards to nature. He calls this the ecological phase. Nature, he says, is no longer exploitable and external to capital, but rather it has become internal to capital (Escobar 1996, p. 326). “No longer does nature denote an entity with its own agency, a source of life and discourse, as was the case in many traditional societies, with European Romantic literature and art of the 19th century. For those committed to the world as resource, the ‘environment’ becomes an indispensable construct. As the term is used today, environment includes a view of nature according to the urban-industrial system.” Poppe 36 (Escobar 1996, p. 331) As mentioned in Singer’s section, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) recognizes a right to sustainable development, because of the assumption that economic progress is essential for combatting climate change. According to Escobar, however, this is counterintuitive, because economic growth and capital accumulation are largely the source of environmental degradation (Escobar 1996, p. 329). Therefore, the ability of sustainable development to preserve nature is questionable and the question should be asked whether this is even the main aim of the project. Referring back to the reflection on Singer, the preservation of nature seems to be subject to the preservation of political and economic systems. “The sustainable development strategy, after all, focuses not so much on the negative consequences of economic growth on the environment, as on the effects of environmental degradation on growth and potential for growth. It is growth (ie capitalist market expansion), and not the environment, that has to be sustained. Since poverty is believed to be a cause, as well as an effect, of environmental problems, growth is needed with the purpose of eliminating poverty and with the purpose, in turn, of protecting the environment.” (Escobar 1996, p. 330) Escobar says this is perhaps most visible in discussions regarding the biodiversity in rainforests. Their preservation through sustainable development is not to save the rainforest for the sake of saving the rainforest. Rather it is to save the rainforest as a resource; the resource being the genes of the species living in this environment that can be used for bioengineering (Escobar 1996, p. 334-335). “Nature and local people themselves are seen as the source and creators of value-not merely as labour or raw material. The discourse of biodiversity in particular achieves this effect. Species of microorganisms, flora and fauna are valuable not so much as ‘resources’, but as reservoirs of value-this value residing in their very genes-that scientific research, along with biotechnology, can release for capital and communities. This is one of the reasons why communities-particularly ethnic and peasant communities in the tropical rainforest areas of the world-are finally recognized as the owners of their territories (or what is left of them), but only to the extent that they Poppe 37 accept viewing and treating territory and themselves as reservoirs of capital. Communities in various parts of the world are then enticed by biodiversity projects to become ‘stewards of the social and natural “capitals” whose sustainable management is, henceforth, both their responsibility and the business of the world economy’.” (Escobar 1996, p. 334-335) These ethnic and peasant communities are the indigenous peoples that inhabit these territories (Escobar 1996, p. 334). Key to the argument of global cognitive and social justice here is that, as Escobar says above, these peoples are expected to view and treat these territories and themselves as reservoirs of capital. According to Lohmann, however, “a resource is something whose value lies in being a ‘source’ of something else”…”a commodity is something whose value lies in what it can be swapped for or what price it can fetch” (Lohmann et al, p. 55). Therefore, it seems that Escobar’s use of the term resource can perhaps better be swapped for commodity. Although this makes little difference for the argument to come, it means that what Escobar calls reservoirs of value can be interpreted as resources. What this means for indigenous peoples, on the one hand, is that they have to abide the ideology of efficiency that is central to modern economics (Lohmann et al, p. 54). For example, as Lohmann says, this means that indigenous peoples might be forced to divide their land into permanent forest areas and permanent agricultural areas, even though many indigenous communities use areas periodically (they use a piece of rainforest as agricultural land for some time, then move on to another area to let nature run its course on the previously used area) (Lohmann et al, p. 54). On the other, it means that they consequently have to redefine themselves, their relation to nature, and their everyday practices. No global social justice without global cognitive justice Before it is possible to construct a sound argument, it is important to define social justice and cognitive justice. Michael Novak claims social justice is social in two ways: 1) it is social in the sense that it requires cooperation to attain justice; and 2) it is social in the sense that it aims at all members of a community (whether it be local or global), not at a single individual only (Novak, p. 12). The second claim can be understood as an entitlement to an equal notion of justice: justice applies to everyone equally. Cognitive justice, as Santos argues, should be understood as a “just relationship among different kinds of knowledge” (Santos 2008, p. 258). This means that no a priori supremacy should be granted to any kind of knowledge (Santos 2008, p. 258). Poppe 38 Justice is in itself a challenging philosophical concept. Referring back to Timmons, normative questions about how to attain justice are inevitably subject to metaethical questions of what justice is and how a concept of justice can be justified. Even though decolonial thinking regards universalist tendencies as problematic, there is need for a common ground in the understanding of the concept in order to have a normative discussion about global justice. Therefore, perhaps the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the best model to work with, since it expresses that the “…recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UDHR, preamble). In the making of the social and cognitive justice argument, I will draw upon Article 18 of the Declaration: Article 18: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” (UDHR, 1948) Santos’ argument, as previously mentioned, is that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice. So what exactly in climate ethics interferes with global cognitive justice? As mentioned in the previous chapter, Singer’s principles of fairness are aimed at allocating the burden of mitigation fairly. This burden, however, is expressed in economic terms: the monetary cost of reducing emissions. For indigenous peoples such as the Rarámuri, however, it is not so much a material problem as it is an epistemic one. As illustrated above, their knowledge and beliefs do not fit in the epistemic framework of rationality and scientific thought; they employ a spiritual epistemology. Their philosophy of land management is directly related to their spirituality. Their use of land, such as a periodical use, is not arbitrary or random, but it is a manifestation of their spiritual beliefs. The Rarámuri, for example, only harvest plans in areas where their Iwígara (their life breath) is strong, so that the plants with a weak Iwígara may strengthen (Salmon, p. 1330). This way they believe to maintain a balance in the interconnectedness of life (Salmon, p. 1330). By demanding that indigenous peoples view and treat nature and themselves as resources (reservoirs of value) to preserve biodiversity, they need to adjust their practices in Poppe 39 order to secure such preservation (like setting permanent forest and permanent agricultural areas). The problem, therefore, is that mitigation policy through management approaches interferes with the manifestation of indigenous beliefs in practice, which is a violation of Article 18 of the UDHR. Assuming that the UDHR is indeed an adequate standard for what is just, this means that management approaches (and therefore climate ethics operating under a management framework) fail to bring about social justice. Having established this, why is there need to discuss cognitive justice as a prerequisite for social justice? Is it not possible to simple adjust policy in such a way that it does not interfere with social justice? As mentioned in the introduction, policy-decisions regarding climate change come predominantly from Western countries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Office in 1988 (Singer, p. 184), includes no representatives of indigenous peoples (Lohmann et al, p. 38). Yet, as discussed above, the policies constructed affect and disrupt these peoples way of living. It seems, then, that the construction of policy is paternalist in nature; indigenous peoples have no say in the construction of policy, even though they are affected by it. This implies that the policy-makers know better what is best for indigenous peoples than themselves. Consequently, this can be interpreted as a rearticulation of coloniality through the rhetoric of development: the Western policy-makers being the developed and the indigenous peoples the undeveloped. According to Giovanna Di Chiro, this is exactly the claim of the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. They claim that conventional environmental organizations and policy-makers employ a managerial top-down approach with a technocratic rationality that is “disempowering, paternalistic, and exclusive” (Di Chiro, p. 306). As Escobar argued, however, people living in what are now labeled as developing countries did not use to define themselves in terms of development, even though billions of these people now do. Indigenous peoples, however, even though they often live in these developing countries, still do not define themselves in terms of development. Mark Plotkin, an Amazonian ethnobotanist, argues that the reason why indigenous peoples often live isolated should be regarded as a form of resistance, precisely because they do not want to comply with Western thinking and way of life (Plotkin, 2014). This resistance can thus be understood as the previously mentioned epistemic disobedience; indigenous peoples reject the epistemic hegemony of rational and scientific thought. Consequently, following decolonial Poppe 40 reasoning, qualitative statements regarding indigenous ways of life in terms of development or rationalism are inappropriate, because indigenous peoples do not employ a rationalist epistemology nor regard development as the meaning and direction of history (see Santos’ monoculture of time). As mentioned in the introduction, policy-decisions regarding mitigation policy come from the global actors empowered to make such decisions and conventional policy takes a management approach towards mitigation policy. These are the developed (Western) countries, because they have a stronger economic and political position than developing countries. Important to keep in mind is that mitigation policy is an international endeavor; the developed countries do not construct policy on their own and enforce them nationally, but this is managed globally by intergovernmental organizations such as the IPCC. Since the Western epistemic framework assumes an epistemic supremacy of rationality and scientific knowledge, according to decolonial thinking, policy-decisions reflect this assumption. Therefore, the construction of mitigation policy reflects the rhetoric of development, because policy-makers would consider Western knowledge to be more sophisticated and thus believe the employment of such knowledge to be capable of benefitting everyone, including indigenous peoples, more than other knowledges. Management approaches in policy show the same paternalistic tendency, because they globally impose the assumption that nature is a resource to be managed and preserved as to sustain capital (Escobar, p. 328). As has been illustrated above, however, such reasoning leads to the interference with indigenous ways of life and even their fundamental human rights. Therefore, from a decolonial perspective, there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice in the construction of mitigation policy. Consequently, climate ethical theory or principles that operate in a management framework cannot achieve social justice, because the employment of a management framework in international policy-making implies the epistemic hegemony of one knowledge over others (a lack of cognitive justice). Therefore, cognitive justice is a prerequisite of social justice.

#### [7] Using extinction as a motivation for action obfuscates colonialism and papers over structural violence

Mitchell 17 - Audra Mitchell, Worldly, September 27, 2017“Decolonizing against extinction part II: Extinction is not a metaphor – it is literally genocide” [https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/category/colonisation-and-settler-colonialism/] Accessed 10/19/18 SAO

Extinction is not a metaphor… Extinction has become an emblem of Western, and white-dominated, fears about ‘the end of the(ir) world’. This scientific term is saturated with emotional potency, stretched and contorted to embody almost any nightmare, from climate change to asteroid strikes. In academic and public contexts alike, it is regularly interchanged with other terms and concepts – for instance, ‘species death’, global warming or ecological collapse. Diffused into sublime scales – mass extinctions measured in millions of (Gregorian calendar) years, a planet totalized by the threat of nuclear destruction – ‘extinction’ has become an empty superlative, one that that gestures to an abstract form of unthinkability. It teases Western subjects with images of generalized demise that might, if it gets bad enough, even threaten us, or the figure of ‘humanity’ that we enshrine as a universal. This figure of ‘humanity’, derived from Western European enlightenment ideals, emphasizes individual, autonomous actors who are fully integrated into the global market system; who are responsible citizens of nation-states; who conform to Western ideas of health and well-being; who partake of ‘culture’; who participate in democratic state-based politics; who refrain from physical violence; and who manage their ‘resources’ responsibly (Mitchell 2014). Oddly, exposure to the fear of extinction contributes to the formation and bolstering of contemporary Western subjects. Contemplating the sublime destruction of ‘humanity’ offers the thrill of abjection: the perverse pleasure derived from exposure to something by which one is revolted. Claire Colebrook detects this thrill-seeking impulse in the profusion of Western blockbuster films and TV shows that imagine and envision the destruction of earth, or at least of ‘humanity’. It also throbs through a flurry of recent best-selling books – both fiction and speculative non-fiction (see Oreskes and Conway 2014; Newitz 2013; Weisman 2008). In a forthcoming intervention, Noah Theriault and I (2018) argue that these imaginaries are a form of porn that normalizes the profound violences driving extinction, while cocooning its viewers in the secure space of the voyeur. Certainly, there are many Western scientists, conservationists and policy-makers who are genuinely committed to stopping the extinction of others, perhaps out of fear for their own futures. Yet extinction is not quite real for Western, and especially white, subjects; it is a fantasy of negation that evokes thrill, melancholy, anger and existential purpose. It is a metaphor that expresses the destructive desires of these beings, and the negativity against which we define our subjectivity. But extinction is not a metaphor: it is a very real expression of violence that systematically destroys particular beings, worlds, life forms and the relations that enable them to flourish. These are real, unique beings, worlds and relations – as well as somebody’s family, Ancestors, siblings, future generations – who are violently destroyed. Extinction can only be used unironically as a metaphor by people who have never been threatened with it, told it is their inevitable fate, or lost their relatives and Ancestors to it – and who assume that they probably never will. This argument is directly inspired by the call to arms issued in 2012 by Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang and more recently by Cutcha Risling-Baldy. The first, seminal piece demonstrates how settler cultures use the violence of metaphorical abstraction to excuse themselves from the real work of decolonization: ensuring that land and power is in Indigenous hands. Risling-Baldy’s brilliant follow-up extends this logic to explain how First People like Coyote have been reduced to metaphors through settler appropriation. In both cases, engagement with Indigenous peoples and their relations masks moves to innocence: acts that make it appear as if settlers are engaging in decolonization, while in fact we are consolidating the power structures that privilege us. In this series, want to show how Western, and white-dominated, discourses on ‘extinction’ appear to address the systematic destruction of peoples and other beings while enacting moves to innocence that mask their culpability and perpetuate structures of violence. As I argued in Part I of this series, extinction is an expression of colonial violence. As such, it needs to be addressed through direct decolonization, including the dismantling of settler colonial structures of violence, and the resurgence of Indigenous worlds. Following Tuck, Yang and Risling-Baldy’s lead, I want to show how and why the violences that drive extinction have come to be invisible within mainstream discourses. Salient amongst these is the practice of genocide against Indigenous peoples other than humans. …it is literally genocide. What Western science calls ‘extinction’ is not an unfortunate, unintended consequence of desirable ‘human’ activities. It is an embodiment of particular patterns of structural violence that disproportionately affect specific racialized groups. In some cases, ‘extinction’ is directly, deliberately and systematically inflicted in order to create space for aggressors, including settler states. For this reason, it has rightly been framed as an aspect or tool of colonial genocides against Indigenous human peoples. Indeed, many theorists have shown that the ‘extirpation’ of life forms (their total removal from a particular place) is an instrument for enacting genocide upon Indigenous humans (see Mazis 2008; Laduke 1999; Stannard 1994). Specifically, the removal of key sources of food, clothing and other basic materials makes survival on the land impossible for the people targeted.

#### And: Theory is violent and should be rejected.

#### [1] Appeals to a neutral educational meritocracy buy into a universalist fiction that sanctions racialized violence

Brady 2 - Janelle Brady, University of Toronto, Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education, May 29th, 2017 “Education for whom? Exploring systems of oppression and domination” [https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cjnse/article/view/30801] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO

On the matter of objectivity, Code (as cited in Alcoff, 2007) stated, “objectivity requires taking subjectivity into account” (p. 41), and within a guise of objectivity, ignorance prevails and is produced and reproduced. An implication of objectivity within education is that it is presented as the ideal-truth and something one ought to strive for, thus subjectively located realities are assumed to be weak in nature and not scientific in assumptions and arguments. For example, the reproduction of objectivity is presented in educational curricula as students strive to follow a scientific model in order to seek a supposed truth, but this misses the significant situatedness of knowers, group identities, and an analysis of systemic foundations of oppression (Alcoff, 2007, p. 40). As such, students who are the knowers of their own realities become silenced and disenfranchised from the dominant perspectives presented in Canadian curricula. Students’ experiences and knowledge should be centered in the classroom to create multicentric ways of knowing (Dei, 1996), which involves multiple epistemologies and debunks universality, as opposed to unicentric ways of knowing. The epistemological ignorance of objectivity is rarely raised in education, thus reproducing systems of oppression which become ontological reality. Dei (2016) posited that “objectivity is the dominant’s subjectivity” (G. J. S. Dei, personal communication). Without this epistemological bias being called into question, objectivity is presented as the ultimate truth. King (2015) highlighted the need for liberation from “ideological myths, masquerading as objective scientific or academic knowledge, that rationalize and obscure dominating power relations” (p. 180). In Kindergarten to grade 12, students are rarely encouraged to question the philosophical canons and all-knowing mathematicians and scientists (Abawi, 2016-2017)—the keepers of knowledge—who are white men. Thus, non-white students are unlikely to find people who represent their lived experiences or look like them as part of their normal encounters with subject material (Smith, 2010). Furthermore, according to Smith, educators have a difficult time in providing multiple sites of teaching and learning within the classroom, because identities, which do not fall under a white, patriarchal supremacist ordering, are deemed as Others and are only provided in juxtaposition to or as additives on the normative base. In an effort to achieve objectivity in education, the focus on essentializing difference through liberal democratic discursive practices oftolerance, respect, and fairness depicts racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples through a deficit perspective (Abawi & Brady, 2017; Dei, 1996). Therefore, Alcoff’s (2007) epistemology of ignorance of objectivity demonstrated how the subjugated are questioned: their values, experiences, and lived realities are labelled as subjective and henceforth weak, non-encompassing ways of knowing. This leads to Alcoff’s discussion of the third epistemology of ignorance, which highlights the epistemic advantages and disadvantages to knowledge and ways of knowing. Knowledge systems and ways of knowing are rooted in people’s social locatedness and help them to understand certain phenomena. Alcoff (2007), again drawing on Code’s work, asserted that there are epistemic advantages and disadvantages to ways of knowing and knowledge systems. In relation to the epistemology of ignorance of objectivity, those whose knowledges are validated and legitimized are part of the dominant group, whereas those whose knowledges are disenfranchised are part of the oppressed group. According to Dei (2014), knowledge is based on its historical, as well as ancestral and spiritual underpinnings, and cannot be pinpointed to one contextual moment. Epistemological advantages or disadvantages may play out in education when educators or students become ascribed knowers in particular contexts. One might be the “South Asian Food expert” or the “Indigenous history expert,” and they may experience some level of epistemological advantage in knowing; however, their knowledge is still Othered and compartmentalized into particular moments in time and removed from history. In an educational context, Othering people’s knowledges, histories, and identities to become stagnant points in history or single stories takes the onus away from school administrators and curriculum developers whose responsibility is to delve into South Asian history beyond samosas and Indigenous history beyond Pow wows. This is because the epistemologically advantaged become responsible for sharing their knowledge in educational contexts. However, their knowledge is not solely contextualized to that particular moment in time, but deeply entrenched in history and implicated by the history of others. Questions in the educational context can be asked about why South Asians were denied entry into Canada through racist immigration policies (Ralston, 1999; Thobani, 2007) or why and how Indigenous residential schooling, forced assimilation, the building of pipelines and the like continue to affect Indigenous communities to this very day (Coulthard, 2014). The contextual experts carry the burden for the ignorant who dominate, thus reinforcing the idea of “sharing their subjective experiences.” As Lorde (1984) stated, People [of colour] are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are expected to educate the heterosexual world. The oppressors maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions. (p. 115) Thus, it becomes the work of the oppressed to become educators to share their stories and their subjective histories and realities for the dominant group, when the dominant group deems it appropriate to do so. The oppressed become the bearers of the oppressor’s ignorance while also living through their own oppression. It is important to be critical of such dynamics so that people of colour do not bear all of the responsibility for the privileged to learn and unlearn about their privilege. The idea of knowing and the relentless pursuit of knowledge is another issue that comes into play when addressing the ignorance of objective epistemologies and ontologies. Objectivity, falling under a moderncolonial logic, is presented as all-knowing and truth-seeking. However, this is counter to Indigenous knowledges—which anticolonial scholars (e.g., Dei, 2008; Simpson, 2004) believe should be centered in curricula—with one of the major tenets of Indigenous knowledges being the humility of knowing (Shields, 2005). The humility of knowing—where the learner does not seek mastery of knowledge, but instead knowledge is gained through sharing, learning, and unlearning—is in contrast to what becomes sought after in colonial education, which is rooted in individualism and the ultimate quest for knowledge, meritocracy, and excellence. Students who are from non-dominant groups are forced to attempt scholarly excellence in institutions based on individualism while their very ancestral, family, and community settings are contradictorily based in holistic and community-based ways of knowing and organizing. Therefore, the consumption of knowledge does not become a sharing process, but a process based on individual ownership of knowledge, and those with access to such value systems succeed while those who come with humility are pushed out of schools (Dei et al., 1997). This focus on individualism is further exacerbated through neo-liberalist education. In this context, while education promotes group work, academic success advantages individuals (Giroux, 2003). The danger here is that students begin to believe their academic success is based on their own merit rather than the systems which afford them privilege. This results in mantras of equality falling under the veil of liberalism, sameness, and meritocracy. This individualism also creates chants like “All lives matter,” which is critical of the Black Lives Matter movement and supports the belief, built on an epistemology of ignorance, that all lives are subjected to the same trials. This perpetuates ignorance and objective knowledge systems, while negating and furthering the expendable nature of Blackness, Indigenousness, and Black and Brown bodies. Hence, scholars have explored the dangerous nature of claiming that “All lives matter” (Adjei, 2016; Carney, 2016; Orbe, 2015; Yancy & Butler, 2015), believing it upholds white supremacy and denies the police brutality of Black people, the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, and Islamophobic attacks. Such a claim to innocence becomes key to upholding systems of oppression, which are often silenced and denied by the dominant group. Therefore, educators, students, community members, and parents/families need to trouble the ideal of equality and claims to fairness for all in reimagining new possibilities for hope and change.

#### [2] Notions of fairness in agonistic games are hopelessly vague and ideologically reinforce conquest

Lee 17 - Jonathan Rey Lee, Analog Game Studies, March 20th, 2017 “CAPITALISM AND UNFAIRNESS IN CATAN: OIL SPRINGS” [http://analoggamestudies.org/2017/03/capitalism-and-unfairness-in-catan-oil-springs/] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Before the first turn was over, I knew I had won—a circumstance typically only achievable through overwhelming skill, prognostication, or cheating. In this case, however, the game itself gave me an insurmountable advantage via my starting position. It’s tempting to label this as poor game design1 since it certainly violates the principle of fairness almost universally assumed in competitive gaming. Yet in a world where the myth of a ‘level playing field’ obscures and authorizes ongoing social inequalities, problematizing the notion of ‘fairness’ in gameplay may provide unique insight into the ‘fairness’ of capitalist culture. This insight is possible because contemporary games are cultural phenomena that have also become media phenomena. Games, that is, need not merely reflect culture, but have critical potential for reflecting on culture. The following reflections work toward developing such a critical paradigm by showing how the Oil Springs scenario for The Settlers of Catan plays out ethical dilemmas raised by the emergent and systemic inequalities generated by capitalist systems. In order to analyze these inequalities, this paper first explores game balance as the interplay between emergent inequality (how games determine winners and losers through the inputs of skill and chance) and systemic inequality (how an asymmetrical game state may privilege certain players).2 This paper then analyzes how the Oil Springs scenario for Catan links resource generation to land ownership, the runaway leader problem to the tendency of capital to accrue capital, and industrialization to market destabilization and ecological catastrophe. Finally, I reflect on the experience of enacting inequality within an unbalanced game system. Throughout, I suggest that while competitive games are typically designed to produce emergent inequality from within a level playing field (systemic equality), the rules that govern such emergent inequality are systemic in ways that allow for critically engaging systemic inequality. Fair and Balanced While not all games are competitive,3 the history of games is thoroughly intertwined with agon (or ‘contestation’**)** as an organizing principle of Western culture. According to French sociologist Roger Caillois, agonistic games play out agonistic culture “like a combat in which equality of chances is artificially created, in order that adversaries should confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible of giving precise and incontestable value to the winner’s triumph.”4 With mathematical precision, agonistic games create balanced contests that reflect the ideal of agonistic culture: a perfectly level playing field that produces a genuine meritocracy. Yet, even while reflecting this agonistic ideal, the complicated balancing act performed by actual games demonstrates the limits of this ideal. Recognizing that fairness is problematic even within the carefully-controlled medium of games should also call into question the very possibility of a level playing field in arenas as complex as global capitalism. Fairness, like beauty, is left to the eye of the beholder. What standards determine which is most fair: that everyone gets the same amount of pie (equality), that everyone gets pie according to their need for pie (equity),5 or that everyone gets pie in proportion to how much money or labor they invested in the pie (meritocracy)? There are similarly divergent ways of considering fairness in games. Caillois is adamant about the fundamentality of fairness, arguing that games of both skill and chance (agon and alea) “require absolute equity, an equality of mathematical chances of most absolute precision. Admirably precise rules, meticulous measures, and scientific calculations are evident.”6 Taken together, however, skill and chance presuppose contradictory paradigms of equality, making it difficult to determine what counts as fair for games that incorporate both (as most contemporary tabletop games do). Similarly, although Caillois argues that “The search for equality is so obviously essential to the rivalry that it is re-established by a handicap for players of different classes,”7 notion of fairness behind the handicap does not reinforce but rather undermines the agonistic ideal. Such contradictory messages suggest that fairness is a highly subjective notion. That is: standards of fairness vary not only according to individual preferences, but also by context (casual gaming vs. tournaments), game genre (wargames vs. party games), and even circumstance (games are generally only ‘unfair’ when one is losing). Unsurprisingly, this variability amongst subjective standards yields a spectrum of paradigms for promoting balance, a somewhat vague negative term that presents fairness as ‘not unbalanced.’ Most commonly, games that tend towards symmetry tolerate emergent inequality but very little systemic inequality: symmetrical games allow skill and chance to separate players as the game progresses, but provide roughly parallel pathways to victory. In such games, the inevitable asymmetries are typically either minimized (playing first often confers an advantage, but usually a minimal one) or counterbalanced by other asymmetries of relatively equal value (the komi in Go compensates black’s advantage in going first with a point bonus given to the white player). Asymmetrical games extend this latter technique by counterbalancing different ways of playing (via differing pieces, abilities, rules, goals, etc.) to create a more or less equal game balance. Thus, asymmetrical game design provides two possibilities for exploring systemic inequalities. Balanced asymmetrical games can explore themes of inequity while maintaining an environment of fair play that adopts a perspective of critical distance—the player observes the interplay of differences that contribute to inequity without being immersed in the experience of inequity itself. By contrast, deliberately unbalanced asymmetrical games can explore inequity both thematically and procedurally, immersing players in a fundamentally inequitable world. To advocate critical play with and against capitalist systems, there are good reasons to challenge any standard of competitive balance that supports the myth of capitalism as a level playing field. Insisting on perfectly balanced games is not just an impossible ideal; it is a problematic one. Balanced games imagine idealized worlds that may reinforce the deep cultural assumption that contestation is a practical and ethical way of organizing society. Yet, there is a substantial disconnect between the fair and balanced worlds of gameplay and the many systemic inequalities that emerge in everyday societies. In practice, major genres of competitive game design—such as wargames, race games, betting games, and economic strategy games—often uncritically invoke and thereby reinforce broader forms of cultural contestation. Strategic wargames, for example, may intellectualize war tactics while glossing over the cost of violence. Similarly, economic strategy games may glamorize profiteering while failing to represent exploitation. For instance, Monopoly depicts rents as an arena for capitalist competition but ignores the consequences for tenants, worker placement games often reinforce the dehumanizing representation of laborers as human resources,8 and Catan fails to represent the violence of settler colonialism.9 And even as these games ignore disenfranchised populations, they ask players to become complicit in the systems that produce such disenfranchisement: the participatory medium of games often entangles player agency with the logic of capitalism by promoting a particularly capitalist model of agency—a self-interested agonistic impulse that plays out within a quantifiable, rule-governed system of exchange. Monopoly board There is perhaps no clearer example of the intersection of games and capitalism than Monopoly, of which Caillois writes, “The game of Monopoly does not follow but rather reproduces the function of Capitalism.”[ref]Caillois, p. 61.[/ref] Ironically, the game industry appropriated Monopoly from a game explicitly designed to demonstrate social inequality—The Landlord’s Game (patented 1904; this image from 1906) by Elizabeth Magie. Originally designed to demonstrate Henry George’s notion that the infrastructure of renting properties consolidated wealth in the hands of landowners at the expense of their tenants, The Landlord’s Game has resonances with the issue of land ownership discussed in the next section. (CC Wikimedia Commons) Although the way that games are more generally implicated in capitalism10 (and vice versa)11 deserves more critique, this parallelism may also provide games like Catan with a special critical potential to expose systemic inequality. For instance, in The First Nations of Catan, game designer and scholar Greg Loring-Albright describes how he developed “a balanced, asymmetrical strategy game” that “creates a narrative for Catan wherein indigenous peoples exist, interact with settlers, and have a fair chance of surviving the encounter by winning the game.”12 As discussed above, this type of game represents a critical intervention into historical inequalities while minimizing systemic gameplay inequalities, such as ones that might give the indigenous peoples a less than “fair chance.” By contrast, Catan and its Oil Springs scenario are mostly symmetrical and, if not actually unbalanced, certainly balanced unstably. With respect to Catan, Oil Springs makes more explicit the thematic connection to capitalism and, in a related move, makes the game balance even less stable “to draw attention to important challenges humanity faces, in relation to the resources that modern society depends on.”13 It accomplishes this by adding to the five original pastoral resources in Catan the modern resource of Oil, which is simultaneously more powerful (it counts as two standard resources), more flexible (it can be used as two of any resource), and more dangerous (its use triggers ecological catastrophes). By raising the stakes in these ways, Oil Springs further unbalances Catan to make a point about emergent social inequality tied to the unequal distribution of resources. Playing Capitalism Capitalism is far too multifaceted for any game—even one with as many variants and expansions as Catan—to model fully. Yet, games can indeed critically play with capitalism by condensing capitalist principles into their game systems through the systemic constraints and affordances that structure game interactions. Rather than describing capitalism, many agonistic games are themselves simple capitalist systems in which self-interested players engage in more or less free market competition with each other. Certain game designs, therefore, are not only tied to the agonistic logic behind capitalism, but are unique microcosmic economies that can represent specific facets of capitalism. The abstraction of Catan, for instance, obscures the history of settler colonialism and the exploitation of labor to focus instead on portraying land ownership as a lynchpin of modern capitalism, both in relation to resource generation and the tendency of capital to accrue capital. Similarly, the mechanics in Oil Springs focus on the role of the natural resource of oil as fuel for industrial capitalism by showing how industrialization accelerates resource production and exploits the environment. For Karl Marx, ownership of private property14 precludes fair compensation of workers by granting the capitalist (the holder of capital[refMarx defines capital thusly: “Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labor and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilized in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labor and new means of subsistence. All these component parts of capital are creation of labor, products of labor, accumulated labor. Accumulated labor which serves as a means of new production is capital.” See Robert C. Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, p. 207.[/ref]]) legal ‘rights’ the value generated by production without requiring that they contribute any labor towards generating that value. Land in Catan reflects this model by automatically generating resources which are given directly to the player/landowner, completely bypassing the question of labor. Instead, the emergent inequality is between rival capitalists played by the game participants. Although class differences are not represented, these emergent inequalities are structurally linked with class differentiation. Indeed, private property is problematic for Marx primarily because it forms the conditions for emergent inequalities to become systemic inequalities through wealth consolidation. Thus, private property parallels an emergent asymmetry known in game design as the runaway leader problem, in which it becomes increasingly difficult to catch the lead player as the game progresses. This occurs in any game design—such as Catan—that links point accumulation and resource generation, creating a feedback loop such that the further one is towards achieving victory the more resources one gains to reinvest in that progress. In contrast to a game like Dominion, in which accumulating victory points can actually reduce the effectiveness of one’s resource-generating engine, in Catan the closer one is to victory the faster one should move toward victory.15 The idiom it takes money to make money captures this fact about capitalism, which Marx describes as “the necessary result of competition” being “the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form” (70). In fact, emergent and systemic inequalities often do synergize in this way as the material consequences of emergent inequalities become concretized as systemic as they are passed down from generation to generation, maintaining fairly resilient wealth disparities between different social and ethnic groups. Catan For Marx, these problems with land ownership are only intensified in industrial capitalism, in which ownership over the machinery of production further disenfranchises the industrial worker. This is precisely the shift in emphasis behind Oil Springs, which introduces Oil not just as one more roughly equivalent commodity, but one which radically unbalances Catan’s market economy. Representing the increasing pace of production from pre-industrial to industrial societies, one unit of Oil is worth two resources. In fact, it is worth two of any resource, which means that the strategic value of a single Oil resource ranges from two to eight resources (since it can take up to 4 resources to trade for a resource of one’s choice), making Oil so much more valuable than other resources that it seriously unbalances the game. In addition, Oil is required for building a Metropolis, the most powerful building in the game. Depicting how new industrial processes destabilize existing economic relationships, Oil Springs shows how the problems of capitalist land ownership are compounded when such land contains scarce resource reserves that are essential to industry. Such resources encourage relationships of dependence not only over renters and laborers (who are nowhere represented in Catan), but also over other industrialists who require these resources. Thus, the game makes the inequality between different starting positions more dramatic to depict a shift in modern geopolitics away from territory being valued primarily for it land, population, and location to being valued primarily for its strategic resources. While Oil Springs does have mechanisms that restore some balance, such as keeping Oil off the highest-probability hexes and capping the amount of Oil a player may hold at one time,16 its primary mechanisms for balancing Oil ironically further unbalance the game. By making Oil use precipitate ecological disasters, Oil Springs highlights the costs of industrial capitalism and makes an implicit ecocritical statement about how environmental consequences affect us all. They affect us, that is, randomly but not equally. Demonstrating that even negative consequences can be exploited by the industrial capitalist, the game’s two forms of environmental disaster turned out to be less damaging to me than to other players. The first environmental disaster, in which rising water levels destroy coastal settlements, played in my favor because I planned to exploit Oil and therefore avoided building coastal settlements.17 The second disaster, representing ‘industrial pollution,’ randomly strikes individual hexes, causing them to permanently cease to produce resources. More precisely, it does this to the ‘natural’ resources—affecting all hexes except for Oil Springs, which continue to produce after a reduction in the shared Oil reserves. Thus, because I was disproportionally less accountable for the consequences of my actions, I was able to safely initiate risky behavior that the risk-averse players suffered from. As risk and accountability can become unhinged in a free-market society that pushes for deregulation, Oil Springs speaks to the fact that those most responsible for climate change—be they individuals, corporations, or nations—do not generally bear the brunt of the consequences.18 Oil Springs The Disaster Track from the Oil Springs Scenario. Every time an Oil resources is used, it moves a marker along this track, triggering an ecological disaster if it reaches the final space (this takes 5 Oil in the 3-4 player game and 8 Oil in the 5-6 player game). If this occurs 5 times in total, the game immediately ends and no one wins. Image used for purposes of critique. In all the aforementioned ways, the game systems of Catan and Oil Springs use emergent inequalities to reflect on various systemic inequalities. This conflation, however, raises another question of fairness, namely how systemic inequalities emerge. In the case of Catan, this question becomes how to distribute land that has such intrinsically unequal value that it is sometimes possible to accurately predict the winner based on the starting positions (as in my case). The game attempts to solve this by using a snake draft to organize how players select their starting positions. Fairness is achieved not by creating equal spaces, but by assigning fundamentally unequal spaces using the mechanisms of emergent inequality: skill and chance (agon and alea). There is a fundamental difference, however, in the role these two forms of emergent inequality play in the deep interpenetration of games and culture. For Caillois, whereas agonistic games reflect the meritocratic ideal of cultural contestation, aleatory games play with the fundamental uncertainty of life—they are ludic, even carnivalesque experiments in fatalism. Unlike the triumphalism of agon, therefore, the aleatory elements of games explore consequentiality beyond the limits of human agency. This explains, for Caillois, how aleatory social institutions such as gambling and lotteries counterbalance the fundamentally agonistic structure of society by providing a faint hope that any individual may leap out of a condition of systemic inequality through an emergent (but rare) inequality. This demonstrates how capitalism balances itself by using the possibility of upward mobility to obscure its systemic conditions for economic immobility. This also reveals a way in which game design struggles to represent systemic social inequality: games often achieve balance by using aleatory elements to subsume systemic inequality within emergent inequality, sacrificing the critical experience of systemic inequality in order to maintain the ideal of balance. Thus, the emergent inequalities in Catan fail to represent how historical inequalities are invariably systemic as race, gender, class, and nationality play prominent roles—how in America, for example, the original occupants were dispossessed by force of arms and land was redistributed according to explicitly discriminatory laws.19 It also fails to represent how even after more recent legislation has eroded many of these practices, their legacy20 necessarily lingers within a capitalist system where ownership is passed down from generation to generation. There are limitations, therefore, to representing social inequality exclusively through emergent mechanisms—when games create a genuinely level playing field, they become incompatible with capitalism, which perpetuates the myth of a level playing field while in fact perpetuating systemic inequalities. Playing with Privilege It was only upon further reflection that I began to tie my play experiences to the preceding forms of social inequality. In the moment, however, my focus was more narrowly focused on executing my strategy—or, to put it bluntly, on winning. At the same time, this was tinged with a growing sense of discomfort that can only be described by an even more uncomfortable word: privilege. Certainly, my ability to win the way I did was due to a privileged starting position, which tilted the balance of power in my favor. Yet, privilege is an attitude as well as a condition: being able to focus exclusively on strategy and winning is itself a form of privilege. Games (even so-called serious games) are not theories of social inequality—as embodied, performative spaces, games express a procedural rhetoric21 in which players develop perspectives by exploring the consequences of their decisions and actions as they play out within the game system. To play certain games in certain ways, therefore, is to play as capitalists and play out capitalism. Games like Acquire encourage us to play as capitalists. As mentioned above, the procedural rhetoric of Oil Springs is paradoxically predicated on privileging the very strategies of industrial capitalism that this ecocritical game otherwise censures. This presents players with a dilemma, in which playing to win may require performing actions that are thematically represented as ethically problematic. Thus, the primary reason I received such advantageous placement in my case study is that I ruthlessly pursued Oil from the start, whereas several of my opponents hesitated to do so (possibly due to their ecological consciousness). Sometimes gamers attempt to justify a win-at-all-costs mentality by claiming they are merely following the dictates of the game (indirectly valorizing the cultural ideology of agon), or that they are merely solving an abstract puzzle without regard to thematic considerations. While these are valid ways to play a game, they nonetheless represent an active choice on the part of the player rather than some ‘objective’ or ‘default’ position.Indeed, the phrase “win at all costs” itself admits that such play necessitates a cost. While I can understand why some players would choose to play in this way, this position is not viable for game scholarship. To properly study a game, one must account for the interplay of its many facets. Theme, which can evoke representational content and complex psychological and affective22 responses, is an essential facet of a game as text. When players respond to a game’s theme, they are performing a genuine textual engagement worthy of analysis. Thus, this section draws on my own play experience to reflect on possible consequences of systemically privileging certain positions. If I had to sum up my experience, I would say that playing and subsequently winning this particular game was no fun at all. And, although I cannot speak for the other players, I imagine it was not much fun them either. Working from an advantaged position altered the game experience in ways that counteracted much of the enjoyment I typically derive from gameplay. I say ‘working from’ rather than ‘playing from’ because rather than playfully exploring new strategies, I found myself merely implementing the most obviously advantageous strategy. My narrow focus on winning imposed an inappropriately results-driven framework on play, something I typically value more for the experience than the results. This focus was driven, moreover, less by the rewards of victory than by the fear of failure23—even while my privileged position robbed winning of much of its merit, losing would have been still worse. Although the game was unbalanced in my favor, an increased probability of winning did not, in my case, lead to an enriched game experience. This is because the value of a game experience cannot be reduced to winning, which is why games—even agonistic ones—are distinct from non-playful tests or contests. This is surprisingly analogous to Marx’s argument that capitalism not only inequitably distributes resources, but also reduces human experience to something instrumental and transactional. Indeed, Marx suggests that even while the capitalist is materially advantaged over the laborer, both are equally alienated by being reduced to their respective roles within the capitalist system. Systemic inequality, that is, is dehumanizing for all its participants—whether privileged or marginalized. Systemic inequality in games is, of course, less consequential and more voluntary than social inequalities,24 but it can alienate players in similar ways. In fact, most games eschew systemic inequality because it tends to be unpleasant for everyone involved. Players in privileged positions may find their roles overdetermined by the game structure, resulting in a narrowing of strategic, exploratory, or playful possibilities (for example, I had no reason to trade with other players when I could acquire all the resources I needed on my own). Similarly, players in less privileged positions may find their choices narrowed by their limited resources as the runaway leader problem renders their choices increasingly inconsequential. Systemically unequal game design, that is, looks like a lose-lose situation. Yet, it is not that inequality deprives play of choice, but rather that it overdetermines the consequences or relative viability of various choices. In the right conditions, therefore, such unbalanced play may add a unique dimension to the play experience. Rather than playing as an industrial capitalist, for instance, I could have chosen to play as an environmentalist. Instead of using Oil, I could have chosen to ‘Sequester’ Oil by permanently removing one of my Oil resources from the game each turn, gaining 1 Victory Point (VP) for every three Sequestered Oil, and an additional VP for sequestering the most Oil. Simple mathematics suggests that this is a terrible strategy: 1 VP is a paltry reward for the relative value of three Oil.25 This discrepancy underlies a model in which industrial capitalism is systematically more viable than environmentalism. Yet, what counts ‘viable’ can be called into question. Precisely because sequestering is ‘bad’ strategy, it offers an interesting thematic possibility: role-playing as an environmentalist knowing that one is not likely to win. From a thematic perspective, this strategy could be quite rewarding. Whereas my privileged play would lead either to failure or a victory deprived of merit, pursuing sequestering could offer either an impressive victory or a loss offset by the satisfaction of maintaining a moral position. These benefits, however, are psychological rather than ethical. While environmentalism is certainly much needed, playing environmentalism in a game is no more intrinsically beneficial than playing industrial capitalism. Critical gameplay requires more than importing real-world values into games; it requires interrogating the assumptions players bring to the game and the positions they adopt within the game. To sequester Oil solely for the sake of feeling morally superior is not a critical position (although it could certainly be an attractive one). Precisely because environmentalism matters, it deserves critical attention and critical gameplay. After all, activism can be problematic in, for example, replicating colonial attitudes towards the developing world or performing a kind of ‘conscience laundering.’26 Critical play,27 that is, is not an outcome but a method. Or, as Marx puts it, “I am therefore not in favor of setting up any dogmatic flag. On the contrary, we must try to help the dogmatics to clarify themselves the meaning of their own positions” (13). The potential consequences of such reflection are not just two, but many. Beyond simply stating that one way of playing (environmentalism) is superior to another (industrial capitalism), critical play provides an opportunity for players to self-reflectively engage the decisions and feelings of occupying different subject positions within inequitable systems. Critical play encourages reflection. Coda Games have not historically been on the forefront of discussions on social inequality.28 This is partially because the fundamentality of agon in games reinforces certain cultural logics, partially because the carnivalesque nature of play tends not to revolutionize prevailing systems,29 and partially because social inequality presents a special challenge for game design. To reverse this trend will require a critical perspective that pushes the limits of the game medium, such as the imperative toward balance at the heart of competitive game design—especially in a world where ‘fairness’ alternatively means ‘light-skinned,’ and the myth of a level playing field is used to justify a clearly uneven one. As Oil Springs demonstrates, experimenting with the interplay between emergent and systemic inequality is one way games can explore capitalism as similarly rule-governed, self-interested systems. In deconstructing the myth of the level playing field, it becomes clear that emergent inequalities in capitalism are develop systemic qualities. As a rule-governed agonistic system, capitalism legally positions the capitalist to leverage the rights of ownership to exploit the worker’s labor. Similarly, capitalism promotes the runaway leader problem by passing down capital via inheritance rather than need or merit. Furthermore, despite all claims to neutrality, economic hierarchies in capitalism are historically intertwined with other social hierarchies, such as race and gender. The problems of social inequality, therefore, are necessarily multiple and intersectional. Games have historically also lacked nuance with respect to intersectional analysis.30 If they represent categories like race and gender at all, most games do so either via problematic stereotypes or via visual and narrative means that bypass the procedural rhetoric that makes games so distinctive. I suspect that most game design avoids systemic unfairness at the level of identity politics to avoid alienating players who identify in diverse ways. At least on the surface, class—an extrinsic marker of social identity—seems easier to dissociate from sensitive identity politics and, thereby, more implementable in games like Catan.31 However, critical play must resist the ways that games by their nature simplify and abstract what they represent. Instead, critical play draws upon but moves beyond such simplification and abstraction to respond to complex social realities. And the reality of capitalism, as discussed above, is that class is intertwined with race and gender. Indeed, an intersectional perspective on critical play may provide a way of exploring the paradoxical unity and disunity of player and role that complicates the gameplay experience. After all, despite the common association between criticism and distance, critical play is still an experience—an embodied calling into question of certain social systems. –

#### [3] We can cross apply the aff to theory. Solves ideological dogmatism and content exploration and turns every standard

Koh 13 - Ben Koh, NSD Update, October 1st, 2013 “Breaking Down Borders: Rethinking the Interaction Between Theory and Ethics” [http://nsdupdate.com/2013/breaking-down-borders-rethinking-the-interaction-between-theory-and-ethics/] Accessed 8/14/20 SAO

First: Fairness is at its basis is an ethical concept. For instance at its basis, fairness as Rawls explains is, “a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission.” That is to say, the basis of fairness rises from benefiting from cooperation. In the debate context, the “benefit” as Rawls refers to could be the actual ability to debate, or speaking without interference etc. In the same way that it’s considered immoral under most ethical systems to take without recompense, fairness is relevant due to it being the “recompense.” Additionally, equality’s importance is as a moral concept. The utterance that we ought to both start with the same amount of speaking time is morally relevant for it guides or at least constrains our actions, or the rightness and wrongness thereof (i.e. if I go a minute longer in the NR, I would usually be dropped or at least penalized due to its wrongness). Second, Fairness is normative: A) The idea that there is a consequence to a certain unfair act implies its relevance to our action. Debaters generally don’t read theory just because they wanted to point out something interesting or amusing, they do so to win or to rid the round of the problematic argument. B) The voluntary concession of the basic rules for the round renders fairness as being “obligatory.” Loland explains, “the obligation of fairness does not arise unconditionally. One basic premise is that the parties are voluntarily engaged. They have chosen participation in favor of nonparticipation and have thus more or less tacitly agreed to follow the commonly accepted rules and norms of the practice play the game. Loland further explains that “in sporting games, the predominant distributive norm is meritocratic. The norm on equal tratemnt, then, becomes a necessary condition for a game to take place. To be able to evaluate the relevant inequalities satisfactorily, participants have to compete on the same terms. All competitors ought to be given equal opportunity to perform.” The implication is that an argument that questions ethical assumptions (or even more basically assumptions at all) needs to be open to criticism. In the same way debaters now take into account the theoretical implications of their frameworks (i.e. the line of arguments centered around whether or not “ought is defined as maximizing well-being” is a fair interpretation), debaters should take into account the ethical implications of their theory arguments. Analyzing the way we debate theory further exposes these assumptions. Theory is debated typically in a very utilitarian fashion. Debaters tend to weigh between theory standards under assumed criterions of “what would a policy maker do,” how easy the calculation is, etc. They answer the question of drop the debater vs. drop the argument commonly in terms of solvency, whether or not there is a deterrent effect, etc. It’s no surprise in my mind that most “LARPers” are generally as proficient on the LARP as they are on the theory debate due to the reproduction of skill. To keep theory argumentation at a standstill in its variation is to deny the basic value in LD in the first place. There’s no reason why we should not question the assumption of how we debate or think about theory in the same way we question the assumptions of right and wrong in LD. A question that follows then is what occurs if we debate theory in a more Kantian sense? Or a more Nietzschean one? Etc. I’m not persuaded by the idea that ethical arguments cannot apply to the context of theory debate. Examples: 1) If the argument against consequentalism is true that there are infinite consequences, is norm setting ever possible? 2) If an intention based framework is true, and the violation was not made intentionally, should the one violating still be held culpable for the violation 3) A polls framework would outline why community consensus is most ethically relevant. If a certain practice is common, would that implicate its moral permission? Beyond the voter, concepts like competing interpretations, which in some variations claims that only one interpretation is objectively/ absolutely true, could easily be criticized with postmodern arguments. Massumi (a Deleuzian contemporary) would probably argue that the attempt to instill a certain worldview of the round is indicative of state philosophy, where “The end product would be ‘a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society’ – each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.” Security K type arguments that criticize the idea of deterrence claiming that mindset is the root cause of the threats it attempts to be prevented can easily apply to drop the debater justifications about norm setting. Apprehension to introduce this type of argumentation into the debate sphere can be tracked most likely to the tendency of judges to either a) paradigmatically assume fairness is important to avoid annoying and assumptive debates about whether or not fairness is a voter or b) judges not voting on these arguments frequently in the past. However, this line of thought I present does not attempt to claim that fairness is absolutely not a voter. This type of argument generally does not contest if theory itself is unfair or resolvable in a theoretical way, i.e. in the fashion most “fairness not a voter” arguments are made. The goal rather is to reframe the lens of which we analyze theory debates, or analyze “fairness not a voter arguments.” The application fosters discussion about what fairness ethically should imply, not in attempt to create more “frivolous theory debates” or figure out ways to make theory irresolvable. In fact, this mindset would produce better philosophical discussion. By examining the full implication of an ethical argument, debaters could more fully understand what it means to argue X or Y is the correct moral framework beyond just the resolution at hand. Whereas debate about animal rights or compulsory voting does allow for that form of philosophical analysis, this viewpoint allows for full education of ethics to even more frequent, real world concerns of fairness and education. Additionally, most of the historical unwillingness is probably rooted in tendency for debaters to use this avenue of argumentation in a blippy fashion. However in the same way that arguments that are more fleshed out or have definitive warrants are given priority over others, debaters ought to argue this similarly. Rather than treating ethical arguments against theory as a “back up strategy,” this should become a more full, centralized approach. The purpose of this article is that fairness as an ethical idea, with the same ethical discussion, etc., should not be absent from questioning. The implementation, function, correctness of a conception of fairness, etc., should all be open for debate in the same way that we try to figure out if death is really morally bad after all. The even broader implication is that LD debate should continue to foster questioning**.** To take a firm stance on basic assumptions is to deny the role of philosophical questioning in the first place. To quote Rebar Niemi, “the notion that any one of us could set some determinate standard for what debate should be is preposterous, uneducational, sanctimonious, and arrogant. I think that the notion that we should teach the already privileged population of debate to be inflexible, dogmatic, and exclusive in their belief sets creates worse citizens, worse people, and ultimately a worse world.

### Offense

#### Advocacy text: Ill defend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I am not role playing the state, just stating the current state of affairs is unethical.

#### That affirms:

### **[1] Workplace practices are built on colonialist exploitation**

Zhang 19 – Muqing M. Zhang, Muqing M. Zhang is a freelance writer and law student, “Colonialism is alive in the exploited tech work force”, The Outline, June 6th, 2019, [https://theoutline.com/post/7533/colonialism-is-alive-in-the-exploited-tech-work-force] Accessed 10/22/2021 AHS // AP

In an age in which “fake news” can tip elections and online extremist content fuels white supremacist terror attacks, social media content moderation has become a battleground when it comes to online security and censorship. Facebook, for one, earlier this year announced a [ban](https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/standing-against-hate/) on “white nationalism and white separatism” content in the wake of white supremacist attacks committed by people [motivated](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/05/22/what-alt-reich-nation-facebook-group-fbi-investigating-possible-hate-crime-university-maryland/335961001/) in part by extremist content on its platforms. But too often left out of the conversation on social media content moderation are the workers, most of whom are in the Global South, who are tasked with keeping hate speech, pornography, beheadings, and other banned content off of Facebook and other social media platforms. In 2014, *Wired* [reported](https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/) on U.S. tech and outsourcing companies that outsource content moderation to the Philippines for American mega-corporations like Facebook. While social media users in the West peruse social media sites like Facebook and Instagram, we are largely unaware of the invisible chain of workers in the Global South who are subjected to excruciatingly violent, pornographic, and other disturbing content while being paid a fraction of U.S. wages. This tech outsourcing infrastructure that exploits workers in the Global South who undertake the underpaid and at times traumatic labor of moderating social media content is not just an example of global inequality and the outsourcing of labor for the sake of Western comfort. It is an extension of Western colonization. U.S. corporate reliance on content moderation labor and outsourced tech labor in former Western colonies such as India, Vietnam, and the Philippines exploits the colonial identification and Western cultural fluency that has resulted from these countries’ colonization. For example, the English language fluency that is often a remnant of U.S. and British colonization in formerly colonized countries has now become commodified by tech companies, who turn these remnants of colonization into profit for their tech corporations. Thus, the global tech infrastructure that tech companies have built that exploits outsourced social media content moderators and tech workers in Global South formerly colonized countries is a vestige of U.S. and British colonialism — one that massively wealthy Silicon Valley tech companies exploit for their own profit. Content moderation is not simply a “low-skill” job — it is a role that requires a kind of cultural fluency and an ability to filter content that is likely to offend a particular audience’s sensibilities. Sarah T. Roberts, an assistant professor of information studies at UCLA, calls this form of labor [“commercial content moderation.”](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283421772_Commercial_Content_Moderation_Digital_Laborers'_Dirty_Work) In her 2016 book *Commercial Content Moderation: Digital Laborers' Dirty Work*, Roberts explains that this form of labor relies on workers having a familiarity with “an imagined audience” or “set of values.” Similarly, Eric Friginal, an associate professor of applied linguistics at Georgia State University, [wrote in a 2007 paper](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-971X.2007.00512.x) that “The Philippines has become one of the major centers for outsourcing because of its tradition of bilingual education, affinity to the American culture, and cheap labor market.” In fact, the Philippine’s colonization by the U.S. [has been](https://www.helpdesk247.com/why-outsourcing-to-philippines-makes-business-sense/) explicitly [touted](https://www.flatworldsolutions.com/articles/10-benefits-of-outsourcing-to-philippines.php) as a [reason](https://diversifyoss.com/newsroom/tholons-report-2018-outsourcing-philippines/) to outsource tech and content moderation to the Philippines, because it creates a [“strong affinity to Western culture”](https://www.igtsolutions.com/blog/philippines-the-new-hub-of-outsourcing/) and English language fluency, which in turn supposedly enables workers to better screen American and Western social media content. Thus, the exploitative labor of Filipino and other former U.S. and U.K. colonies can be understood as a symptom of the continued wound of colonialism. Silicon Valley’s content moderation labor chain depends on a fundamental colonial principle: forced acculturation and assimilation. Under U.S. colonial rule, the English language was the [foundation](https://www.buzzfeed.com/inabarrameda/inglisera-philippines-american-colonialism) of the colony’s universal public school system. The schooling system became a force for the “civilizing mission” of U.S. colonialism — what historian Renato Constantino [called](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7735/865e2ea8fd8d9662f3916ffe41cc14376706.pdf) the “miseducation of the Filipino.” The English education system was a tool for training Filipinos to speak, think, and act like “superior” white Americans. These are the very skills that now fulfill the demand of U.S. social media corporations. Commercial content moderation is not the first industry that has turned to a postcolonial labor force for its Western cultural fluency. In her 2018 book [*A Nation on the Line: Filipino Call Centers as Post-colonial Predicament*](https://www.dukeupress.edu/a-nation-on-the-line), Jan Padios describes the call-center industry as one that “incites both national pride and deep anxiety about the nation’s future and its colonial past.” Padios, an associate professor of American Studies at the University of Maryland, argues that the economic relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines relies on “Filipino/American relatability,” an identification on the part of Filipinos with the U.S. — one that is a consequence of the material and emotional aftermath of U.S. empire. Thus, the violence of colonialism, including efforts such as Christian proselytizing, English language schools, and the erasure of indigenous Filipino culture and language, has created both the cultural and economic contexts in which Facebook and other corporations turn to cheap, acculturated, colonized labor. Describing the intensification of “affective demands and psychological repercussions” for Filipino workers, Padios [argues](https://www.dukeupress.edu/a-nation-on-the-line) that the deleterious effects of content moderation represent the impact of “capital’s colonization of the human psyche.” In India, 200 years of British colonialism and English education and acculturation similarly found postcolonial incarnations in call centers for Western companies. Indian call-center employees, many of whom are [aggressively](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/09/india-call-centres-accent-neutralisation) [coached](https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-09-12/want-dominate-call-service-game-its-all-accent) to “[Americanize](https://www.academia.edu/1259697/Whos_On_the_Line_Indian_Call_Center_Agents_Pose_as_Americans_for_US_Outsourced_Firms)” their accents, have become a punchline in the American imagination. Meanwhile, India has quietly become a hotbed for commercial content moderation. Facebook [employs](https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/facebook-content-reviewers-in-india-complain-of-low-pay-high-pressure-report-1468087-2019-03-01) more than 1,400 content reviewers in India through third party contractors. These employees are required to review some 2,000 Facebook and Instagram posts in a single eight-hour shift. Notably, in 2015 and 2016 Facebook [drew mass protests](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets) in India when it attempted to implement its “[Free Basics](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/india-net-neutrality-activists-facebook-free-basics)” program, a program that would give Facebook monopoly power over Internet experience on mobile phones — vastly expanding Facebook’s censorship and surveillance apparatus — in the name of “digital equality.” This system of Western consolidation of data, intellectual property, and platforms thus [consolidates](https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/digital-colonialism-threatening-global-south-190129140828809.html) what has become known as “digital colonialism” — one unsurprisingly underpinned by the underpaid labor of formerly colonized peoples. Meanwhile, third-world content moderators who are traumatized by the content they filter are often left with little support to deal with the emotional aftermath such as in the case of the content moderation outsourced company in the Philippines at the center of this   [*Wired* piece](https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/). Jane Stevenson, head of the occupational health and welfare department for Britain’s National Crime Squad, saw so many investigators traumatized by the images they screened that she has since become an advocate for social media companies to provide support for content moderators. “From the moment you see the first image, you will change for good,” Stevenson [told *Wired*](https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/). The affective and economic violence that content moderation enacts on third world workers is a testament to the limits of reformist approaches to social media monopolies like Facebook. Too often, Global South participation in the “global economy” of information capitalism means traumatic, underpaid labor that exploits colonial acculturation and identification. Silicon Valley’s modern colonial labor chain is a reminder that white supremacy in tech doesn’t just come from its users: the legacy of colonialism is alive and well in Silicon Valley’s hidden chambers abroad.

### [2] Strikes resist the workplace cultural hierarchy

Gourevitch 18’ – Alex Gourevitch, I am an associate professor of political science in the Department of Political Science. I have been an assistant professor at McMaster University, a Post-Doctoral Research Associate at Brown University's Political Theory Project, and a College Fellow at Harvard University. I received my Ph.D in political science from Columbia University in 2010, “The Right to Strike: A Radical View”, Brown University, American Political Science Association, June 24th, 2018, Accessed 11/01/21 AHS//AP

The right to strike protects an interest in non-exploitation in the labor market. It does so by ensuring that bargaining power between labor and capital is roughly equal.29 As such, the social democratic argument takes us some way to explaining why the right to strike must include some reasonable chance of success in striking. Absent that reasonable chance, the right would be a useless instrument for increasing the bargaining power of workers. Therefore, any proper right to strike must include not just permission for workers to use a range of tactics, but, also and therefore, more legal restraints on rights of property, managerial authority, and contract so as to secure the fair conditions for the exercise of this right. So, on the social democratic view, there is a potential double injustice that workers face. The first is the inequality of bargaining power of capitalist labor markets, the second is inadequate protection of labor rights that they ought to enjoy or, what is nearly the same thing, excessive legal prerogatives for capital owners and managers. That is to say, failure to properly institute labor rights, wherever that failure exists, constitutes its own, companion form of oppression because workers are denied an important freedom that they ought to enjoy. There is one potentially confusing feature of the social democratic argument. As presented above, it is an argument for why workers ought to enjoy a right to strike and, at least implicitly, an argument for what that right to strike would look like in an adequately social democratic society. But, on the best versions of the social democratic view, that is a moral argument for why workers should have a legal right to strike and what that legal right would look like. It is not an argument that workers under conditions of oppression would have the same right to strike. Instead, the aforementioned version of the social democratic argument for labor rights is part of an overall theory of when to count a socioeconomic order as oppressive. In that sense, the social democratic argument is compatible with a version of the radical right to strike. When workers lack (social democratic) labor rights and/or when their bargaining conditions are unfair, then they are justified in using a range of strike tactics, potentially including some that would not be permissible in an ideal social democratic regime, to resist that oppression. Notably, some figures historically associated with social democracy have made versions of that argument. Social democrats in the United States have claimed Samuel Gompers, John Lewis, even Eugene Debs for their tradition, while in Europe social democrats will draw on a long line of thinking originating with figures like Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky.30 In their time, those figures defended enormously disruptive, coercive, and illegal strikes as a response to the actual injustices of their times, while arguing that workers should enjoy robust labor rights including a legally protected right to strike. Whether each of these individuals is properly understood as a ‘social democrat’ as opposed to, say, a ‘socialist,’ is less relevant than the basic point. The best version of the social democratic argument for a right to strike is two-pronged. Primarily, it is a moral argument for why workers ought to enjoy a legal right to strike as part of the fundamental economic liberties of the ideal constitution. But, secondarily, the social democratic argument is compatible with the radical right to strike because it recognizes the strike as a permissible way of claiming rights and resisting economic injustice. To the degree workers are denied their rights and face economic injustice, a social democrat could say, they enjoy a right to strike whose shape would not be determined by the shape of the right to strike they should ideally enjoy but, instead, by the fact that they have a right to resist oppression. As far as it goes, then, there is a family resemblance between the social democratic and the radical right to strike. The two versions will overlap when social democrats, in virtue of their conception of economic justice, have reason to argue that workers enjoy a right to strike that is best understood as a right to resist oppression. However, the views come apart with respect to the nature and scope of the relevant oppression. After all, on the social democratic view, one can secure distributive justice without correcting the basic class structure of actual societies and, in particular, without fundamentally challenging the inequalities in who is forced to work and who exercises control over the workplace. The primary social democratic claim, instead,is that the central distributive injustice to which labor rights respond lies in the unequal bargaining position of workers when it comes to hours, benefits, and wages. That leaves aspects of both structural and interpersonal oppression in the workplace either insufficiently modified or undertheorized as sources of complaint. As a consequence, the scope of strikes is implicitly limited because those forms oppression aren’t taken as objects against which strikes might legitimately be directed. It looks like the main point of unlawful and coercive strikes is to try to claim labor rights, like the right to strike, as a legal right. The central political purpose of strikes will be constrained. The private monopolization of wealth, the unequal distribution of coercive work obligations, and the hierarchical organization of the workplace are all consistent with the social democratic view. This will lead the social democrat to argue that certain kinds of strikes, say industry-wide strikes or political strikes against certain distribution policies or strikes over workplace control are outside the legitimate scope of permitted strikes—a view reflected in the labor law of some actual social democracies.31 On the radical view, however, the sources of oppression are more extensive and inter-related in a class society, which is why the right to strike has a wider scope.