# Conquest AC

## Ethical Reciprocity AC

#### The role of the ballot is to use the flow to identify and vote for the debater who performativity decolonizes debates about medicinal patents. This means form-level offense comes first and precludes theory

Dunford 17 - Robin Dunford, University of Brighton, Journal of Global Ethics, September 21st 2017 “Toward a decolonial global ethics” [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449626.2017.1373140] Accessed 10/1/20 SAO

Decolonial ethics is not without its tensions, some of which I explore in this section. In principle, the above two aspects of pluriversality cut in different directions. The pluriversal as that which is formed through inter-cultural dialogue points in the direction of a dialogue in which positions are not excluded in advance (even if this dialogue may take place, initially at least, only amongst the oppressed), and in which no particular standard or value is valid in advance of dialogue.7 Taken alone, this form of pluriversality raises questions. Does inter-cultural dialogue have any limits or constraints? Are values justified solely by virtue of having emerged through inter-cultural dialogue, or is it possible for a value to be wrong, normatively speaking, despite emerging from this process? Are any and all views allowed to the table, or ought certain views be rejected? What about those views that reproduce colonial narratives or values that have done so much to silence, undermine and oppress those on the underside of the colonial matrix of power? Taken alone, this aspect of pluriversality cannot provide an account of whether there are views, practices and modes of engagement that should not be allowed in discussion. Nor can it rule out, as illegitimate, views, values, practices or policies that, despite emerging from discussion, may nonetheless go on to oppress others. It is here that pluriversality as a value enters**. Pluriversality** as a value suggests that practices, worldviews, values or policies are legitimate only if they remain compatible with the existence of other worlds. In this sense, pluriversality sets a standard of legitimacy that **would judge as morally wrong any** worldview, value or **practice that** does not accept the existence of, or that **works to shut down, other worlds.** That is not necessarily to say, though, that those holding such views ought to be excluded from dialogue. There is a tension, then, between the two aspects of pluriversality. Giving ultimate priority to one aspect cannot solve this tension. Without any reflection on its emergence from pluriversal dialogue, the substantive value of pluriversality would become a new abstract, already-universal design and would undermine all commitment to taking seriously as producers of knowledge those that are marginalised. Without the substantive value, there is no way of identifying why a dialogue that takes seriously multiple cosmovisions is a morally good thing. Nor would there be any way of casting any judgment on or identifying as morally wrong certain visions – racist visions, sexist visions, visions that advocate a form of modernity that inevitably reproduces coloniality. Both aspects of pluriversality must remain, and decolonial global ethics must find ways of navigating (if not resolving) any tension between them. It will be for pluriversal dialogue to find ways of navigating this potentially irresolvable tension. To offer some ideas to any such discussion, it is worth noting that the substantive value of pluriversality has emerged, in practice, through pluriversal exchanges in indigenous, peasant (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2014), feminist (Leinius 2014) and World Social Forum praxis (Conway and Singh 2011). Having emerged as an abstract value through concrete, inter-cultural dialogue, it can, in turn, retrospectively account for why it is that such dialogue is, normatively speaking, a good thing. One might also note that the abstract value of a world in which other worlds are possible does not give rise immediately to concrete values, practices, policies and attitudes. Understanding what kind of practices, policies and modes of behaving and living enable other worlds to exist, and fostering the kind of respect for other worlds that such practices and ways of living may require, requires pluriversal dialogue, for it is through such exchanges that it will become apparent that certain demands and ways of living can and do result in the oppression of others. Both aspects of pluriversality can thus be mutually enriching in practice, despite the potential for tension between them. Whilst there is not room to introduce them in depth here, any readers inclined to think that this tension makes decolonial ethics unworkable, hopelessly idealistic and of no use **in the ‘real world’** would be advised to explore the practices of the social movements that navigate these tensions. Related to this difference between the two aspects of pluriversality are tensions between decoloniality as an option and decoloniality as an imperative. For Mignolo, there will be no place for one option to pretend to be the option. The decolonial option is not aiming to be the one. It is just an option that, beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the rest are also options. (2011, 21) Similarly, what we put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will actively engage, politically and epistemically, to advance projects of epistemic and subjective decolonisation and in building communal futures. (2011, xxvii) This weaker version of decoloniality appears not to rule out, as incompatible with decolonial global ethics, other visions. ‘Western civilization’ would then, Mignolo (2011, 176) suggests, ‘merely be one among many options, and not the one guide to rule the many.’ The decolonial option serves to add another option to the table. It does not necessarily reject Western modernity, liberal cosmopolitanism or other positions, provided that they, too, present themselves only as an option. When understanding pluriversality in terms of its procedural aspect, this makes perfect sense. It would be wrong to set out, in advance, one option as an imperative, as one we ought to follow, albeit in different ways. The worry with this weaker version, however, is that it risks ‘losing the ability for critique’ (Alcoff 2012, 6) and becoming a relativism of anything goes. For Grosfoguel (2012, 101), **by contrast, pluriversality is not ‘a relativism of anything goes’.** Similarly, for Dussel (2012, 19), a decolonial perspective does ‘not presuppose the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between cultures’. Instead, it acknowledges that some cultures, cosmovisions and livelihoods are systematically threatened by others and cannot survive in the face of cosmovisions and lifestyles that are inextricably tied to the ceaseless extraction of resources, the dispossession of people and poor working conditions. These perspectives follow when the substantive value of pluriversality is invoked. If the practices, institutions and lifestyles that we associate with modernity continue to depend upon and be constituted by coloniality, then these are not compatible with a world in which other worlds fit. It is for this reason that Dussel suggests that decolonial liberation is ‘impossible for capitalism’ and must not accept the colonial matrix of power ‘as a whole’ (Dussel 2013, 138). Though Mignolo primarily presents decoloniality as an option, at other times he suggests that ‘pluriversal futures … are only possible if the reign of economic capitalism ends’, on the basis that economic capitalism provides space only for practices that can be turned into, or do not obstruct, profits, and hence does not allow different worlds to exist on equal terms (Mignolo 2011, 292). This article is not the place to analyse the validity of Mignolo and Dussel’s accounts of capitalism. The point is to suggest that decoloniality should be considered an **imperative**, and not just an option to be placed on the table. So understood, decolonial global ethics **goes beyond a relativism of anything goes. Any option that inevitably depends upon the systematic destruction of other words would violate the principle of a world in which many worlds fit.** Decoloniality, and its central value – pluriversality – invoke stringent demands that rule out a number of worlds, practices and lifestyles. It identifies as wrong a world of economic capitalism if and insofar as it inevitably depends on, and cannot be reformed to prevent, the destruction of other worlds. It identifies as wrong practices of resource extraction, if and insofar as they destroy the livelihoods of peasant and indigenous peoples. It identifies as wrong highly polluting lifestyles, if and insofar as they lead to the destruction of the lives and cosmovisions of those who are dispossessed and displaced as a result of environmental change. **It means, finally, that Western civilization as we know it cannot be one legitimate option among many if and insofar as it is constituted through, and cannot be separated from, coloniality**. If decolonial global ethics is to unpick the colonial matrix of power and liberate people (s) from domination, it must be an imperative. It must be understood, as it is by Mignolo (2011, 23) in one of his stronger statements, as a project ‘which all contending options would have to accept’. **This does not mean that decoloniality and pluriversality offer a singular and rigid global design**. A pluriversal world is one in which multiple options are possible – a world in which many worlds can co-exist. Whilst other options would be circumscribed insofar as they would have to accept the decolonial imperative of working towards a pluriversal world, this still leaves room for many options, many possible lives, livelihoods and cosmovisions. Only those worlds that **involve, inextricably**, the continued domination of others are judged as wrong (though it may well be the case that such views should not be excluded from dialogue, given that dialogue itself may help enrich the kind of mutual respect that would lead to the abandonment of such views). Far from invoking a relativism of anything goes, this principle is a demanding one, with radical implications for global social structures and ways of living. The building of a pluriverse is and must be an open-ended project, fed by dialogues amongst actors from across the world. Moreover, the demand of a pluriverse may be impossible to meet fully; in an interconnected world, it may be impossible to ensure that it is not the case that the actions of some constrain the worlds of others. This does not mean, however, that some worlds, practices, livelihoods, lifestyles and institutional designs are not more compatible with a pluriverse than others. Recognising interconnectedness – and the long history of interconnectedness – only increases the importance of striving for a pluriversal world in an attempt to build a world free from the domination and destruction of the colonial matrix of power. Decolonial theory makes a distinctive and valuable contribution to global ethics. It begins with an analysis of coloniality as the inextricable darker side of modernity. In reflecting on what it would mean to decolonise, decolonial theory offers a fundamentally global ethics that is distinct from individualistic and universalistic cosmopolitan theory. It begins with those perspectives threatened by a colonial matrix of power, and proposes inter-cultural dialogue across diverse cosmovisions. In so doing, it refuses to specify, in advance, what is of fundamental moral significance. Finally, it embraces pluriversality. Plurversality refers, on the one hand, to a way of constructing values. A value is pluriversal if, rather than being set up as an abstract and already-universal value, it is constructed through dialogue across multiple cosmovisions. Pluriversality also refers to a value of a world in which many words fit. Pluriversality thus offers an account of both a global process through which global values can legitimately be formed, and a value that can be used to judge particular practices, policies, processes or social structures. Pluriversality as a value is demanding and judges as morally wrong practices and social structures that inevitably dispossess others. But it is not equivalent to those universal, global designs central to the colonial matrix of power. It is not equivalent, in part, because it embraces radical difference and **seeks to multiply options,** rather than close them down. It also differs in that it has emerged from, and can only be fleshed out through, a process of pluriversal exchange. Decolonial theory has been constructed alongside and through social movement practice. The above presentation of the value of pluriversality, and of the distinctive features of decolonial theory more broadly, has only been possible in light of the work of peasant, indigenous, feminist and World Social Forum activists contesting various aspects of the colonial matrix of power. Taking decolonial global ethics seriously opens avenues for further work judging whether, how, and why given practices, policies, processes and structures are compatible with pluriversality in both senses of the term. If this article encourages global ethicists to explore further these questions, then it would have played its small part in contributing to the construction of an ethical framework that can take seriously and challenge the legacy of colonial rule.

#### Prefer my Role of the ballot

#### [1] Representations and form first a. Our approach to the world determines our material actions which means it controls the IL to policy change b. It ensures reflexivity

Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 “Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy%20Thesis.pdf] Accessed 8/13/21 SAO

Vital for the aims of this thesis is the ability to use reflexivity when discussing representation in/and research and to this end a postcolonial ecofeminist perspective is helpful as it allows for the analysis of Subject constructions, in this case those that are constructed over the lives of non-white, non-Western, colonized, or indigenous peoples. Simone de Beauvoir discusses how representations are created from partial perspectives that transcend into absolute truths when created by those with hegemonic power. “Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth” (de Beauvoir, 1972: 161). Those privileged within the hierarchy have the power to represent the Other. Representation is therefore an important focus of this thesis because we see that the power to re-present is concentrated in the hands of elites, in this case the Global North holds the power to re-present indigenous peoples. The ways in which the indigenous Other is re-presented through the Subject construction devised by the Global North creates the oppressive dualism necessary for the colonization of indigenous knowledges through acts of biopiracy. Said’s extensive exploration of the ways in which the Oriental Other is represented by the Occidental Subject in literature and academia is relevant here. In his important text, Orientalism, Said asserts that a “phenomenologically reduced status” is placed upon the Oriental that can only be accessed by a Western expert (1978: 283). Since Western re-presentations of the Orient began to arise, the Orient has been unable to represent itself as hegemonic Western representations engulf any attempt. Thus knowledge of the Orient can only be deemed credible once it had been refined by the Occidental’s work (283). This process of re-presenting through Western eyes that Said speaks of **is supported by institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery and doctrines** (Said, 1978) hence representation’s power which is performed through discursive meaning which is both constructing of and constructed within social spheres. When representing the Other, their agency to represent their own experiences becomes obscured and removed. Taking up this issue in her seminal paper, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak (2010) met her question with the answer of a resounding no: a response that exemplifies the lack of ability one has to represent oneself as a hyper-oppressed individual or collectivity. Mohanty moves beyond Spivak’s assertions and invites us to consider the possibility of a shift in the politics of representation and states, “it is time to move beyond the Marx who found it possible to say: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Mohanty, 2003A: 354). Thus, as these arguments make clear, **it is imperative that whilst** conducting research and **theorizing one is attentive to representation** - the act of speaking about and for another. The use of a postcolonial standpoint can assist me in remaining sensitive to the forms of colonialist power relations that frequently shape knowledge production. In this way, postcolonialism can help me to interrogate my partial perspective and privileged standpoint (Haraway, 1988). It offers a reflexive approach that foregrounds the way one’s positionality influences what knowledge is produced in the research process, while drawing attention to the partial perspective (Haraway, 1988) that one necessarily inhabits in this process. This reflexive approach is also relevant to the political interests of this thesis. Perpetually interrogating the claims and assumptions one makes whilst theorizing from one’s own standpoint helps to reduce the prospect of reproducing hierarchies and perpetuating colonial re-presentations. I must critique my own gaze and be careful not to encode my own representations as truth, so as not to marginalize other alternative readings. In this way I can aim to avoid conducting research through imperial eyes (Smith, 2012). Through the analysis and discussion I will attend to the Global North’s behaviour and the effects this has on the lived experiences of indigenous peoples in postcolonial India with regards to resources, knowledge and the politics of representation. In doing so I do not wish to speak for indigenous peoples or perpetuate essentialist tropes of indigenous peoples as Mother Nature’s carer. I wish to destabilize this, to untwine the tangled woman-nature-nurturer knot that has been dreamt up. I wish to de-essentialize the image of indigenous peoples through showing that the reason why the homogenized scientific and modern Global North seeks the knowledges of indigenous peoples is due to the complexity, creativity and fruitfulness of these knowledges. Again, I must be aware of not glorifying sites of indigenous knowledges as green utopian paradises capable of offsetting global environmental degradation, but instead attend to them as an alternative modernity based on differing values that demonstrate alternative knowledge production and deserved recognition, protection and selfdetermination. Furthermore, despite the urgent need to pay attention to non-Western knowledge – knowledges that sit outside of the dominant knowledge paradigm -, it remains pertinent to remind oneself of the violence and oppression within the Global South and indigenous communities with regards to gender, sexuality, religion and class (Shome, 2012: 200). The idea is not to reverse the nature/culture binary or create an indigenous-centrism as opposed to a Global North-centrism but instead move beyond these dominating dualistic ways of perceiving the world (200).

#### [2] Survival: Centering indigenous scholarship is an irreducible survival strategy

Reddy 18 - Sujani K. Reddy, Abolition: A Journal of Insurgent Politics (2018)“We Don’t Need No Education: Deschooling as an Abolitionist Practice” [ISSN 2642-9268 (Online) | ISSN 2642-925X (Print)] Accessed 8/17/19 SAO

My essay has, in some sense, now reached a point of no return. **Centering indigenous sovereignty undoes the project of capitalist imperialism** as it has taken shape through the white settler colonial nation-state. And yet it is at this very point that the project of undoing this unholy alliance begins to unravel in my mind. This unraveling has less to do with acquiescence to a system whose goal is to debt us to death, and more to do with being tired of focusing on already existing forms of dominant power in a way that reinforces them. This is again me butting my head up against a wall where critique can be a form of complicity. Lest this lead down a road of despair, I want to first recognize that for me, what we call Ethnic Studies did not actually start with the student led social movements at the dawn of what I have been calling the post–civil rights United States. To start there is to center educational institutions as the beginning and end of our horizon. Instead, I want to remember that inasmuch as Ethnic Studies bears a relationship to the long histories of our communities, our cultures, and our ways of knowing, it has its roots in practices that were and are antithetical to the institutions of capitalist imperialism. It is in the ongoing struggle to maintain indigenous epistemologies and cosmologies; it is with the enslaved who taught themselves to read against the master’s will; it is with the immigrants who were excluded and detained and who carved their voices into the walls of their holding cells; it is with the imprisoned whose quest for knowledge is self-led and oriented toward collective liberation; it is with the movements for migrant rights that work to link their struggle to ones for indigenous sovereignty. This list is obviously not exhaustive, but just a beginning**, a way to think about who we understand as having knowledge, and how we come to learn not simply skills that will lead to resources within a capitalist system but also ways of knowing that are inherently oppositional to that system.** The question of ways of knowing is critical. Following the insights of Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, while specifc to the context of Nishnaabeg intelligence, also allows me to see how the unraveling of my mind is perhaps also a way out of having been schooled in this system, and into new epistemologies.9 This, then, is an attempt to reframe what we can understand as resources, and re-vision ourselves as having access to an abundance. It is also to recognize that efforts to de-school, while not always going under this particular moniker, are and have been ongoing. But what about those of us who remain, in some way or other, working within the system as such? Here I want to turn to our capacity to practice small acts of marronage. In keeping with the proposition itself, I will proceed by being more suggestive than comprehensive or proscriptive as I refect on how the practice of Ethnic Studies evolved for me and a small group of students at my last job. These were young people whom I had worked with over multiple semesters and years, both inside the classroom and outside as an advisor and fellow activist in local struggles around migrant justice and against mass criminalization. We were in a setting where institutional resources were available for “service learning.” The college encouraged collaboration between faculty, students, and underserved communities who were not, until now, under its purview. It is important to recognize how this is a neoliberal manifestation of noblesse oblige for the ways in which it privatizes the distribution of resources and services that were once part of the purview of the state. Given this context, my student collaborators and I slowly but surely came to understand that the most meaningful forms of action for us came to be the ones that went under the radar—the ones that were sideways and slanted and drew upon the undercommons as so powerfully articulated by Harney and Moten. We found ways to be in the institution but not of it, to not subordinate ourselves to its forms of recognition but instead **to employ its resources in ways that were not legible or reducible to its designs** or demands. We were not poster children; we were poachers. Thus, I have already said too much and must leave the rest purposefully vague because publicity is precisely not the point. The question of whether or not we de-schooled Ethnic Studies is open. So too is the question of how the undercommons relates to visions of abolition. What I want to leave you with, at this juncture, is simply a practice of diversity that is not a demand for inclusion so much as it is a call to diversity our tactics—as a strategy for survival.

#### [3] Resolvability: Truth testing can’t generate normative obligations

Kienpointner 96 – M. Kienpointner in the Journal Argumentation, November 1996 “Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, world view and argumentation” [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00142980] Accessed 9/18/19 SAO

An extreme case of linguistic expressions which let premises appear as indubitable truths or norms are tautologies. In classical two-valued predicate and propositional logic, tautologies are defined as necessarily true statements which only convey redundant information (cf. e.g. 'A is A'/'As are As', 'If p, then p', 'Either p or not p' and their formal equivalents: 'Vx [P(x) -- P(x)]', 'p --> p', 'p v -,p'; note that the last tautology becomes a contingent proposition in logical systems with three or more truth values). Different from their purely formal logical counterparts, tautological utterances in natural languages do convey additional semantic information, while sharing the appearance of absolute necessity with formal tautologies. It is not surprising, then, that tautological sentences are used in everyday argumentation to convey a message like: 'My arguments are irrefutable'. In the remainder of this chapter, I will describe the function of tautologies in everyday argumentation and criticize the implicit ideological messages they often convey. But first, I will give a short review of the relevant literature. Tautologies and their communicative functions have been the subject of quite a number of contributions in recent linguistic literature (cf. Wierzbicka, 1987, 1988; Fraser, 1988; Ward/Hirschberg, 1991; Farghal, 1992; Okamoto, 1993). A main point of the controversial discussion has revolved around the question whether natural language tautologies are uninformative by themselves and only convey meanings via inferred Gricean implicatures or whether they do have language-specific meanings which are encoded by grammatical and semantic features of the linguistic system. The first alternative was favored by representatives of the 'radical pragmatics' approach. Following Grice (1975), Levinson (1983: 125) considered tautological utterances like 'Boys are boys' as meaningless if out of context. The actually existing **semantic** **information** conveyed by such utterances, which seem to violate the Quantity and Relevance maxims of Grice, is inferable only via implicatures (e.g.: 'That's the kind of unruly behavior you would expect from boys'). These implicatures depend on the particular context of the utterance. Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 511) tried to generalize this approach and to formulate explicit principles for the interpretation of tautological utterances as generalized Cricean implicatures. They see the main function of tautologies (e.g. 'War is war') in the implicit rejection of alternative utterances (e.g.: 'War is a crime', more generally: 'A is B' or 'If p, then q' etc.). The second alternative was supported by Wierzbicka (1987, 1988), who argued for a 'radical semantics' approach. According to this approach, tautologies cannot be considered as meaningless if out of context (1987: 96ff.): firstly, they **differ** considerably **across** **languages**. One and the same syntactic structure can have differing meanings in different languages and quite often, tautologies occurring in one particular language do not even exist in this form in another language (e.g. 'Boys are boys' does not exist in this form in French, German or Russian: compare \*'Les garqons sont les (des?) gargons', \*'Knaben sind Knaben', \*'Mal'iki mal'6iki'). Secondly, within one and the same language, a number of formally different types of tautological sentences can be systematically associated with different meanings. A third alternative has been suggested by Fraser (1988: 217f.) and refined by Farghal (1992) and Okamoto (1993). According to this approach, which I consider to be the most convincing one, both the 'radical pragmatics' and the 'radical semantics' approach have shortcomings: the first cannot explain that many tautological utterances do have conventional core meanings, even apart from specific contexts (and at least generalized implicatures come close to conventional meaning). Moreover, there are obvious formal and semantic differences between tautological utterance across languages. The latter cannot explain the full range of possible meanings associated with a particular tautological construction. Several counter examples have been given as to the suggested meanings of English tautologies as described by Wierzbicka (pointed out by Fraser, 1988: 218f.; Ward/ Hirschberg, 1991: 512f.) and a variety of contextual meanings of one and the same tautological construction cannot be explained without the use of pragmatic principles like the Grixean maxims (cf. Farghal, 1992: 226f.; Okamoto, 1993: 462f.). For instance, the Japanese tautology 'X wa X' (where 'wa' is a topic marker) can be assigned the core meaning of category immutability: no matter how marginal the particular instantiation of category X may be, it must be accepted as an instance of X (Okamoto, 1993: 439). But in addition, 'X wa X may plausibly be used to convey other meanings, in particular attitudinal meanings, such as resignation, tolerance, defiance, obligation, criticism, or soberness' (1993: 462). For example, the specific tautology 'Oya wa oya' ('A parent is a parent') can be used to call special attention to a parent even if he or she cannot be considered an ideal parent (obligation), to ask for understanding of the typical behavior of a parent (tolerance), to request gratitude for the efforts of a parent (appreciation) etc. Similarly, Farghal (1992: 232f.) points out that Jordanian Arabic tautologies like 'Hi:h hi:h' (lit. 'She she', that is, 'She is she' or 'She'll never change') can be used both for expressing admiration and condemnation. I will now return to the function of tautological expressions in everyday argumentation. In my opinion, the discussion of the status of tautologies and their functions in various natural languages (among them English, French, Russian, Polish, Arabic, Japanese) seems to have shown that many (if not all) varieties of tautological utterances can be used in argumentative discourse according to one and the same argument scheme. The tautologies themselves and the core meaning conventionally implied by many of them, namely, that they preclude the possibility of other alternatives and that this will remain so in the foreseeable future, belong to the premises of this argument scheme (cf. Wierzbicka, 1987: 109; Ward Hirschberg, 1991: 511): Tautological Argument (= TA): If A is A, A is not B. A is A This is the only possibility. This will not change (in the foreseeable future). Therefore: A is not B (not C, not D ... ).This scheme could easily be modified to include other types of tautological utterances (e.g.: If p, then p; or: Either p or not p etc.) and other types of conclusions (e.g.: Not q (not r, not s .. .)). Note that 'A is A' and other types of tautologies need not always express factual propositions ('Boys are boys'), but can also indirectly express **obligations and other types of** normative propositions **(**e.g.: 'A mother is a mother', meaning that one has certain obligations towards one's mother, which should be fulfilled). To illustrate this scheme and its applications in argumentative discourse, I will use some of the examples provided by Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 512ff.). They are all taken from authentic passages of spoken or written English. See for example (the abbreviations are Ward/Hirschberg's): 1. GW:Why would you want to hack in Paoli eight hours a day? DE: A job's a job. (6 March 1985) 2. Jim Gardner: The defense claimed White had asked him to kill her. The prosecution countered with the claim 'Murder is murder'. (Channel 6 Action News at 6, 8 June 1985) 3. But we do not believe there should be one set of scientific principles for the whole world, and a different set for experiments involving cigarettes. Science is science, Proof is proof. (New York Times Magazine, 14 April 1985) 4. Host: Either a ham has a bone or it doesn't have a bone. Where'd they get a name like 'semi-boneless' form? (WNSR radio, 10 December 1987) 5. MK: I really should learn how to find the other entrance [to the Holland Tunnel]. DL: What good will that do? If it's crowded, it's crowded. (2 February 1986) Example 1 to 3 illustrate the use of 'equative' tautologies ('A is A'), which are by far the most frequent type (67.5%) in a sample of 169 tautological utterances collected by Ward/Hirschberg (1991: 511). In example 1, DE reacts to the question of GW, who challenges DE's willingness to do a rather unattractive job. DE provides a tautological argument which leads to an implicit conclusion like: 'There is no alternative to the kind of job I'm doing' or 'There are no really nice jobs which would be available'. Similarly, in example 2, the prosecution counters the defense's attempt of finding mitigating circumstances with a tautology implying a conclusion like: 'There is no excusable type of murder' or 'There is no pardonable kind of intentional killing a person'. In example 3, the conclusion drawn from the two tautological arguments is spelled out explicitly ('But we do not believe . . .'): there are no alternative types of science nor are there alternative types of proof. Example 4 and 5 provide instances of 'disjunctive' and 'conditional' tautological utterances. In both cases, the conclusion is indirectly expressed with the help of incredulous (rhetorical) questions: 'Where'd they get a name like 'semi-boneless' from?' implies that there is just no possible source whatsoever from where one could get 'semi-boneless' ham because there are only two alternatives: 'either p or not p' (and no further alternatives q, r, . . .). 'What good will that do?' implies that it is useless looking for 'less crowded' or even 'uncrowded' entrances because there is no alternative q (or s, t, .. .) for p. All tautological arguments presented above invite a similar sort of criticism: despite the appearance of absolute certainty because of the alleged absolute identity between 'A' and 'A' or 'p' and 'p', in reality, no particular instances of entity A **(or state of affairs p)** are completely identical. After all, that is why people start to argue about particular instances of jobs, assassinations, scientific proofs etc.! Therefore, many tautological arguments following the TA-pattern can be criticized as instances of the fallacy called 'petitio principii' or 'begging the question' (cf. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1983: 290ff.; Walton, 1994; 1996: 54). Moreover, Okamoto (1993: 439) quite correctly observes that, by uttering 'equative' tautologies ('A is A'), 'all argument over categorization is refused, and category immutability is simply insisted on with no logical explanation'. Likewise, in the case of disjunctive tautologies ('Either p or not p') the danger of committing 'Black and White'-fallacies arises: only rarely are there only two contradictory alternatives. In most cases, at least a third **alternative q** has to be considered. Therefore, arguments according to the TA-pattern are only rationally acceptable if they are accompanied by additional evidence which justifies the assumption of only one existing possibility (cf. Mackenzie, 1994: 234f.; Colwell, 1994: 259 on similar requirements for apparently fallacious circular arguments). But in this case, the tautological utterances are merely used as stylistic strategies which support and reinforce the power of the independently formulated justification of the controversial standpoint. See the following example (Ward/ Hirschberg, 1991: 513), where a mother vehemently defends a liberal standpoint in education ('You should allow your children to go out in the evening') against possible counter arguments. Only in addition to her detailed arguments does she use a tautological utterance ('Kids are kids') to make them even stronger: 6. 'It was a normal, typical Saturday night,' said Catherine Belardo, an auburn-haired woman in a housecoat. 'They get dressed up, they go out together. I don't want people saying, 'Well where were her parents?' Her parents were here. Her mother was home her father was home. You can't keep your kids in a tube. They go out. Kids are kids. You have to show them you trust them. Then they go out the door and who knows, really, what can happen? You tell them to walk in groups. You tell them to walk where it's light. You tell them never to talk to strangers. And they did everything they were told.' (Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 February 1985) In this example, C. Belardo provides enough additional arguments to make the implicit conclusion of the tautological utterance 'Kids are kids' quite plausible, namely, that there is no possible alternative like, for instance,'Kids are adults' or 'Kids can be educated in a way that they behave like adults though still being kids'. That arguments according to the TA-scheme are far from being trivially true and convincing can also be shown ('ex contrario') with examples for self-contradictory, yet sensible utterances of the type 'A is not A'. Though apparently being necessarily false, these utterances can nevertheless be used as stylistic devices for stressing differences between seemingly identical tokens of category A. This should not be possible, if tautologies, like in formal logic, would be trivially true, and contradictions, like logical antinomies, would be trivially false by definition. However, in natural language, certain contradictory utterances, **which I prefer to call 'rhetorical paradoxes'**, are **frequently used as quite** acceptable stylistic devices of everyday argumentation. See the following three examples in German, taken from a TV talk show and advertisements (cf. Kienpointner, 1983: 95; 1992; 328): 7. Nenning: ... vielleicht ist des a Ant/ah eine Art Antwort, Herr Schroder, net, i mein, Arbeit und Arbeit is net unbedingt dasselbe. (Club II, 12 February 1980) 8. Tee ist nicht gleich Tee. Zum Beispiel Tee aus Kenia: Liebe und Sorgfalt lassen auf charaktervollem Boden unverwechselbare Qualitat gedeihen Stern, 7 April 1983) 9. Indien ist nicht gleich Indien. Und Indien-Rundreise nicht gleich IndienRundreise. Dazwischen k6nnen Welten liegen. Nicht etwa im Sinne von zurickgelegten Kilometem, was wir hier meinen, ist- Qualitat. (Profil, 21 October 1985) In all three passages, the apparently clear contradictions 'Arbeit und Arbeit is net unbedingt dasselbe' (lit.: 'Job and job isn't necessarily the same thing', that is, 'A job isn't a job'), 'Tee ist nicht gleich Tee' ('Tea is not tea'), 'Indien ist nicht gleich Indien. Und Indien-Rundreise nicht gleich Indien-Rundreise' (lit.: 'India is not the same as India. And tour of India is not the same as tour of India') make sense, given the context and the additional arguments provided in the context. In 7, the speaker defends a drug addict against the reproach that the latter does not want to work regularly. Using the paradoxical formula 'A job isn't a job', Nenning takes up previous remarks where he pointed out differences between more and less attractive opportunities for work. In 8 and 9, the respective enterprises try to point out differences in quality between their own products (tea, tours of India) via rhetorical paradoxes. All these examples show that in everyday argumentation, different from formal logic, contradictions can make sense. Generally speaking, it completely depends on the verbal context whether tautologies and contradictions are to be accepted or rejected. A final critical remark I would like to make brings us directly back to the link between language, world view, and argumentation. Tautologies often convey stereotyped assumptions about states of affairs, values, social groups etc., which belong to the stock of shared assumptions in a speech community (cf. 'Business is business', 'A job is a job', 'War is war', 'Boys will be boys', 'Girls will be girls' etc.). This is especially important if the tautologies are not newly created in a specific communicative interaction, but belong to the traditional norm of a language (in the sense of Coseriu, cf. ch. 3). Due to the apparently compelling logical form, these tautologies can effectively reinforce standard ideologies in a society because they seem to express unquestionable facts or values. The clear weaknesses of arguments according to the TA-scheme notwithstanding, powerful groups, which are often at the same time majority groups, can use them to immunize conservative or even fundamentalist standpoints (cf.: 'There will always be bad jobs, so there is no need to provide higher education for everybody'; 'There will always be natural differences between boys and girls, so there is no need for equal opportunities in the educational system').

#### [4] Subversion: We manipulate the academy into making space for minoritarian thought

Paperson 17 - la paperson, June 1, 2017 also known as K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego “A Third University is Possible” [https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/884701be-04f4-4564-939d-d9905d0e80d9#cvi] Accessed 3/8/18 SAO

It is in Ferguson’s frame of queer desiring machines that I consider the scyborg (by associating with and deviating a bit from Donna Haraway’s formulation of the cyborg) as the agentive body within the institutional machinery. If we think of the university as a machine that **is the composite of many other machines, these machines** are never perfect loyalists to colonialism —in fact, they are quite **disloyal**. They break down and produce and travel in unexpected lines of flight—flights that are at once enabled by the university yet irreverent of that mothership of a machine. This same disloyalty applies to the machined people, you. And thus there’s some hope, the hope of the scyborg. Organisms in the machinery are scyborgian: as students, staff, faculty, alumni, and college escapees, technologies of the university have been grafted onto you. Your witch’s flight pulls bits of the assemblage with you and sprays technology throughout its path. The agency of the scyborg is precisely that it is a reorganizer of institutional machinery; it subverts machinery against the master code of its makers; it rewires machinery to its own intentions. It’s that elliptical gear that makes the machine work (for freedom sometimes) by helping the machine (of unfreedom) break down. The lopsided bot, the scyborg, the queer gear with a g-limp—if there is anything to fear and to hope for in the university, it could be you, and it could be me. Scyborgs have made a third university. The scyborg is essential in producing the third world university. The scyborg is machined person, technologically enhanced by legitimated knowledge and stamped with the university’s brand. S-he is the perfect masculine expression of education: an autonomous individual who will reproduce the logics of the university without being told. The scyborg is the university’s colonial hope. Albert Memmi describes being a Tunisian Jew at the Sorbonne in the 1950s, wondering whether he would be allowed to take his exams. “It is not a right,” said the president of the exams jury. “It is a hope. . . . Let us say that it is a colonial hope.”[2] Scyborgs are creatures of colonial desire: please be successful, be pretty, be human. The scyborg’s privilege is a manifestation of the first world university’s noblesse oblige. Thus a successful scyborg proves that the university is ethical. However, on the flip side, the scyborg is a source of colonial anxiety: please do not fail us, reject us, betray us. The scyborg has hir desires too. Hirs is a decolonial hope. S-he is never a completely loyal colonialist and can often be caught in the basement library, building the third world university. To recognize the scyborg, I return to the three examples of colonial schools in Kenya, North America, and the Philippines. I do so to ask that we recognize the nineteenth- and twentieth-century scyborgs that Christian missions, the U.S. Army, and other colonial machines might have created by accident. I opened this book with Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s memoirs of Alliance High School and wartime Kenya. The importance of starting with a Black example, and an African example, is to choose a starting point that does not disaggregate Indigeneity and Blackness in the conversations about colonialism, even though the modes of operation of colonialism upon the Black and the Indigenous are very divergent. At Alliance High School, wa Thiong’o was inspired by Oliver Twist, in part out of identification with the story boy’s hunger; in part, perhaps, he aspired to be Charles Dickens. If so, I believe he accomplished it. However, what the Dickens he became is not something that missionary schools could have recognized. He published his first novel in English while at the University of Leeds in 1964. Returning to Kenya, he organized the highly successful but politically explicit theater production of his 1977 play Ngaahika Ndeenda (I will marry when I want), which was shut down by the Kenyatta regime. Wa Thiong’o was imprisoned for a year in the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison. There he wrote the first modern novel in the Gĩkũyũ language, Caitaani mũtharaba-Inĩ (Devil on the cross), on prison-issued toilet paper. Luther Standing Bear was one of the first students at Carlisle Industrial School for Indians when it opened in 1879 and, indeed, a model student who looked up to the founder, Captain “kill-the-Indian-save-the-man” Pratt. He even became a recruiter for the school. However, he went on to oppose the Dawes Act that privatized Indian land held in common; to argue for bilingual education for Native children; and to challenge the paradigms of property, Eurocentric history, and assimilation—arguments and alliances that successfully brought about the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which officially reversed the Dawes Act and assimilationist schooling and provided pathways for tribes to reestablish sovereignty and tribal government. Troy Richardson, drawing from Gerald Vizenor, writes that Standing Bear’s thoughts and deeds suggest a “shadow curriculum” of a deep sovereignty beyond their immediate referents in the (English) world. “Shadows are possibilities, neither empty nor over-determined by words or referents but instances of possibilities.”[3] For such aviators of Indigenous futurity, “consciousness is a rush of shadows in the distance.”[4] As a third example, the U.S. Army began educating Filipino schoolchildren in 1900 as a strategy of conquest in the Philippine–American War. Officers served as school superintendents, enlisted men as teachers, enrolling fifty thousand students in 1904 and more than one million in 1935. Colonial schools were considered part of military operations, serving a strategic purpose in quelling resistance. In The Miseducation of the Filipino, Renato Constantino asserts, “Education, therefore, serves as a weapon in wars of colonial conquest.”[5] But like the graduates of the boarding schools of Kenya, many of the graduates of these colonial schools **defied the schools’ intended purpose** of making colonial middle management by coming to the United States— exploiting the unintended loophole that colonized Filipinos were U.S. nationals. As Veta Schlimgen explains, the desires and ambitions cultivated in the “culture of education” created a new—and unanticipated—(im)migration dynamic when, during the 1920s, Filipino students retraced the steps of American colonizers. They migrated to the mainland states, and they sought college degrees. Filipino student migration during the 1920s increased remarkably. In 1919, about 450 Filipino students studied in the states. Five years later, nearly 2000 did and, in 1930, the number of enrolled students hovered around 3000. These numbers might seem small to us now but in the context of student migration during the interwar years, they are significant. During the 1920s, Filipino students constituted about twenty percent of non-native born students.[6] Furthermore, “during the first half of the 1920s, students (rather than laborers) made up the majority of Filipino migrants to the mainland U.S.” This unexpected product of the colonial desiring machine ultimately helped to mobilize history on the side of **brown labor unionists in West Coast farms** and canneries. Notable organizers within the Cannery Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union were first accomplished students. Victorio Velasco, after earning a degree in journalism, was shunted into cannery work and farm labor in Seattle. He went on to edit Filipino community newspapers that were critical to creating a collective Filipino workers’ political voice. Chris Mensalvas quit law school because, as a U.S. “noncitizen national” from the Philippines, he was prohibited from practicing law. “I spent three years in college and then I went to organize our people on the farms.”[7] Trinidad Rojo, who completed his PhD in sociology at Stanford University, became president of the Cannery Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union in 1939. Their work became one root of the United Farm Worker movement best associated with Dolores Huerta and Cesar Chavez. The technological fact of the matter is that Rojo, Mensalves, Standing Bear, and wa Thiong’o are scyborg, and their flights through the colonial assemblages reveal a warp in the patterning of power. Scyborgs are possible “men” fit for assimilation—the colonial hope is that the whiteness of the normative human can be extended to the very people who were premised as non-human, gender-deviant savages. Thus I have selected these male examples to bring attention to how, upon entry into schooling, they were all already premised as not men. Natives must get haircuts and Western suits; African boys need to be converted into Christian men; even with suits and Christian names, Filipino men were feared as sexual contagions in white working-class society. You can infer how these same masculinizing technologies are appended onto those of you who are not cis-men and how, despite your colonial equipment, you will never become a complete colonialist stud. The first world university wants you to become masculine in the most disciplined sense of the word and will provide you with the necessary prosthesis and will cut off your tail. But you, as scyborg, might use these technologies to bend the fabric of power to suit your decolonial desires.

#### [5] Solidarity: Our advocacy solves battle fatigue

Brady 17 - Janelle Brady, University of Toronto, Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education, May 29th, 2017 “Education for whom? Exploring systems of oppression and domination” [https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cjnse/article/view/30801] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO brackets in original text

Knowledge systems and ways of knowing are rooted in people’s social locatedness and help them to understand certain phenomena. Alcoff (2007), again drawing on Code’s work, asserted that there are epistemic advantages and disadvantages to ways of knowing and knowledge systems. In relation to the epistemology of ignorance of objectivity, those whose knowledges are validated and legitimized are part of the dominant group, whereas those whose knowledges are disenfranchised are part of the oppressed group. According to Dei (2014), knowledge is based on its historical, as well as ancestral and spiritual underpinnings, and cannot be pinpointed to one contextual moment. Epistemological advantages or disadvantages may play out in education when educators or students become ascribed knowers in particular contexts. One might be the “South Asian Food expert” or the “Indigenous history expert,” and they may experience some level of epistemological advantage in knowing; however, **their knowledge is still Othered and compartmentalized** into particular moments in time and removed from history. In an educational context, Othering people’s knowledges, histories, and identities to become stagnant points in history or single stories takes the onus away from school administrators and curriculum developers whose responsibility is to delve into South Asian history beyond samosas and Indigenous history beyond Pow wows. This is because the epistemologically advantaged become responsible for sharing their knowledge in educational contexts. However, their knowledge is not solely contextualized to that particular moment in time, but deeply entrenched in history and implicated by the history of others. Questions in the educational context can be asked about why South Asians were denied entry into Canada through racist immigration policies (Ralston, 1999; Thobani, 2007) or why and how Indigenous residential schooling, forced assimilation, the building of pipelines and the like continue to affect Indigenous communities to this very day (Coulthard, 2014). The contextual experts carry the burden for the ignorant who dominate, thus reinforcing the idea of “sharing their subjective experiences.” As Lorde (1984) stated, People [of colour] are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are expected to educate the heterosexual world. The **oppressors** maintain their position and **evade responsibility** for their own actions. (p. 115) Thus, it becomes the work of the oppressed to become educators to share their stories and their subjective histories and realities for the dominant group, when the dominant group deems it appropriate to do so. The **oppressed become the bearers of the oppressor’s ignorance** while also living through their own oppression. It is important to be critical of such dynamics so that people of colour do not bear all of the responsibility for the privileged to learn and unlearn about their privilege.

#### [6] Performativity: They presuppose that their epistemology will be valued which means contestation proves our role of the ballot is a prerequisite to all evaluation

#### -[7] Epistemology: Our role of the ballot answers a metaethical question that precedes normative framing. Refusing all epistemic hegemony is a prerequisite to cognitive deliberation and a lack of hierarchies across normative structures means I get permutations.

Poppe 16 - R.C Poppe, Utrecht University Repository, 2016 “APPLYING DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES TO CLIMATE ETHICS” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/334548] Accessed 10/9/19 SAO

Relation and contribution to climate ethics As stated in the beginning of the previous chapter, moral epistemology is a branch of metaethics that concerns itself with the justification for moral statements. Moral epistemology, however, must also be a branch of epistemology, because if justification **for moral statements** is **to be evaluated, there needs to be a justification for** the (type of) **knowledge employed to execute such evaluation.** Therefore, moral epistemology needs to account for both ethical and epistemic considerations. As Timmons argued, there is no neat separation between normative ethics and metaethics: they are intertwined. So, if one were to engage in an inquiry to normative (applied) ethics, at least some attention has be given to moral epistemology. It matters greatly, however, what epistemologies one employs as basis for that inquiry. The way decolonial thinking thus relates to climate ethics is that it can be used to address epistemological issues in the current climate ethical debate. The argument that will be explained below is going to say that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice (Santos 2008, p. 258). In a nutshell, this means that an **ethical** form of mitigation **policy cannot be achieved if the epistemology**(-ies) **employed to justify the evaluation of justification of moral statements** (moral epistemology) **is in conflict with epistemologies** and relations to nature **of the people affected** by that policy. Management approaches interfere with global cognitive justice Different relations to nature The argument regarding global cognitive justice draws upon indigenous relations to nature. According to Enrique Salmon, indigenous ways of relating to nature should be understood as a kincentric ecology (Salmon, p. 1328). This means that indigenous people regard themselves and nature as part of the same family. Salmon argues that the best way to understand such a relation to nature is through the Rarámuri (an indigenous community in eastern Mexico; the Sieraa Madres) concept of iwígara, which he explains as the following: Poppe 35 “Iwígara is the total interconnectedness and integration of all life in the Sierra Madres, physical and spiritual”…”Iwí also makes reference to the Rarámuri concept of soul. It is understood that the soul, or iwí, sustains the body with the breath of life. Everything that breaths has a soul. Plants, animals, humans, stones, the land, all share the same breath. When humans and animals die, their souls become butterflies that visit the living. The butterflies also travel to the Milky Way, where past souls of the ancestors reside. Iwí is also the word used to identify a caterpillar that weaves its cocoons on the madrone tree (Arbutus sp.). The implication is that there is a whole morphophysiological process of change, death, birth, and rebirth associated with the concept of iwí. Iwí is the soul or essence of life everywhere. Iwígara then channels the idea that all life, spiritual and physical, is interconnected in a continual cycle. Iwí is the prefix to iwígara. Iwígara expresses the belief that all life shares the same breath. We are all related to, and play a role in, the complexity of life. Iwígara most closely resembles the concept of kincentric ecology.” (Salmon, p. 1328) The concept of kincentric ecology, iwígara, is at the heart of the Rarámuri land management philosophy (Salmon, p. 1329). It is a reciprocal relationship in which the Rarámuri are one of the relatives of the family of the land, of which they regard themselves as guardians (Salmon, p. 1329). The Rarámuri conception of nature and their relation to it is quite different from Western conceptions. Singer, for example, argues that the atmosphere (which is a part of nature) is to be perceived as a resource and that for the sake of justice in mitigation policy, the entitlements to this resource need to be allocated fairly. Similarly, Escobar argues that the conception of capital in political economy is undergoing a significant change with regards to nature. He calls this the ecological phase. Nature, he says, is no longer exploitable and external to capital, but rather it has become internal to capital (Escobar 1996, p. 326). “No longer does nature denote an entity with its own agency, a source of life and discourse, as was the case in many traditional societies, with European Romantic literature and art of the 19th century. For those committed to the world as resource, the ‘environment’ becomes an indispensable construct. As the term is used today, environment includes a view of nature according to the urban-industrial system.” Poppe 36 (Escobar 1996, p. 331) As mentioned in Singer’s section, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) recognizes a right to sustainable development, because of the assumption that economic progress is essential for combatting climate change. According to Escobar, however, this is counterintuitive, because economic growth and capital accumulation are largely the source of environmental degradation (Escobar 1996, p. 329). Therefore, the ability of sustainable development to preserve nature is questionable and the question should be asked whether this is even the main aim of the project. Referring back to the reflection on Singer, the preservation of nature seems to be subject to the preservation of political and economic systems. “The sustainable development strategy, after all, focuses not so much on the negative consequences of economic growth on the environment, as on the effects of environmental degradation on growth and potential for growth. It is growth (ie capitalist market expansion), and not the environment, that has to be sustained. Since poverty is believed to be a cause, as well as an effect, of environmental problems, growth is needed with the purpose of eliminating poverty and with the purpose, in turn, of protecting the environment.” (Escobar 1996, p. 330) Escobar says this is perhaps most visible in discussions regarding the biodiversity in rainforests. Their preservation through sustainable development is not to save the rainforest for the sake of saving the rainforest. Rather it is to save the rainforest as a resource; the resource being the genes of the species living in this environment that can be used for bioengineering (Escobar 1996, p. 334-335). “Nature and local people themselves are seen as the source and creators of value-not merely as labour or raw material. The discourse of biodiversity in particular achieves this effect. Species of microorganisms, flora and fauna are valuable not so much as ‘resources’, but as reservoirs of value-this value residing in their very genes-that scientific research, along with biotechnology, can release for capital and communities. This is one of the reasons why communities-particularly ethnic and peasant communities in the tropical rainforest areas of the world-are finally recognized as the owners of their territories (or what is left of them), but only to the extent that they Poppe 37 accept viewing and treating territory and themselves as reservoirs of capital. Communities in various parts of the world are then enticed by biodiversity projects to become ‘stewards of the social and natural “capitals” whose sustainable management is, henceforth, both their responsibility and the business of the world economy’.” (Escobar 1996, p. 334-335) These ethnic and peasant communities are the indigenous peoples that inhabit these territories (Escobar 1996, p. 334). Key to the argument of global cognitive and social justice here is that, as Escobar says above, these peoples are expected to view and treat these territories and themselves as reservoirs of capital. According to Lohmann, however, “a resource is something whose value lies in being a ‘source’ of something else”…”a commodity is something whose value lies in what it can be swapped for or what price it can fetch” (Lohmann et al, p. 55). Therefore, it seems that Escobar’s use of the term resource can perhaps better be swapped for commodity. Although this makes little difference for the argument to come, it means that what Escobar calls reservoirs of value can be interpreted as resources. What this means for indigenous peoples, on the one hand, is that they have to abide the ideology of efficiency that is central to modern economics (Lohmann et al, p. 54). For example, as Lohmann says, this means that indigenous peoples might be forced to divide their land into permanent forest areas and permanent agricultural areas, even though many indigenous communities use areas periodically (they use a piece of rainforest as agricultural land for some time, then move on to another area to let nature run its course on the previously used area) (Lohmann et al, p. 54). On the other, it means that they consequently have to redefine themselves, their relation to nature, and their everyday practices. No global social justice without global cognitive justice Before it is possible to construct a sound argument, it is important to define social justice and cognitive justice. Michael Novak claims social justice is social in two ways: 1) it is social in the sense that it requires cooperation to attain justice; and 2) it is social in the sense that it aims at all members of a community (whether it be local or global), not at a single individual only (Novak, p. 12). The second claim can be understood as an entitlement to an equal notion of justice: justice applies to everyone equally. Cognitive justice, as Santos argues, should be understood as a “just relationship among different kinds of knowledge” (Santos 2008, p. 258). This means that **no a priori supremacy should be granted to any** kind of **knowledge** (Santos 2008, p. 258). Poppe 38 Justice is in itself a challenging philosophical concept. Referring back to Timmons, normative questions about how to attain justice are inevitably subject to metaethical questions of what justice is and how a concept of justice can be justified. Even though decolonial thinking regards universalist tendencies as problematic, there is need for a common ground in the understanding of the concept in order to have a normative discussion about global justice. Therefore, perhaps the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the best model to work with, since it expresses that the “…recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UDHR, preamble). In the making of the social and cognitive justice argument, I will draw upon Article 18 of the Declaration: Article 18: “**Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,** conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” (UDHR, 1948) Santos’ argument, as previously mentioned, is that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice. So what exactly in climate ethics interferes with global cognitive justice? As mentioned in the previous chapter, Singer’s principles of fairness are aimed at allocating the burden of mitigation fairly. This burden, however, is expressed in economic terms: the monetary cost of reducing emissions. For indigenous peoples such as the Rarámuri, however, it is not so much a material problem as it is an epistemic one. As illustrated above, their knowledge and beliefs do not fit in the epistemic framework of rationality and scientific thought; they employ a spiritual epistemology. Their philosophy of land management is directly related to their spirituality. Their use of land, such as a periodical use, is not arbitrary or random, but it is a manifestation of their spiritual beliefs. The Rarámuri, for example, only harvest plans in areas where their Iwígara (their life breath) is strong, so that the plants with a weak Iwígara may strengthen (Salmon, p. 1330). This way they believe to maintain a balance in the interconnectedness of life (Salmon, p. 1330). By demanding that indigenous peoples view and treat nature and themselves as resources (reservoirs of value) to preserve biodiversity, they need to adjust their practices in Poppe 39 order to secure such preservation (like setting permanent forest and permanent agricultural areas). The problem, therefore, is that mitigation policy through management approaches interferes with the manifestation of indigenous beliefs in practice, which is a violation of Article 18 of the UDHR. Assuming that the UDHR is indeed an adequate standard for what is just, this means that management approaches (and therefore climate ethics operating under a management framework) fail to bring about social justice. Having established this, why is there need to discuss cognitive justice as a prerequisite for social justice? Is it not possible to simple adjust policy in such a way that it does not interfere with social justice? As mentioned in the introduction, policy-decisions regarding climate change come predominantly from Western countries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Office in 1988 (Singer, p. 184), includes no representatives of indigenous peoples (Lohmann et al, p. 38). Yet, as discussed above, the policies constructed affect and disrupt these peoples way of living. It seems, then, that the construction of policy is paternalist in nature; indigenous peoples have no say in the construction of policy, even though they are affected by it. This implies that the policy-makers know better what is best for indigenous peoples than themselves. Consequently, this can be interpreted as a rearticulation of coloniality through the rhetoric of development: the Western policy-makers being the developed and the indigenous peoples the undeveloped. According to Giovanna Di Chiro, this is exactly the claim of the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. They claim that conventional environmental organizations and policy-makers employ a managerial top-down approach with a technocratic rationality that is “disempowering, paternalistic, and exclusive” (Di Chiro, p. 306). As Escobar argued, however, people living in what are now labeled as developing countries did not use to define themselves in terms of development, even though billions of these people now do. Indigenous peoples, however, even though they often live in these developing countries, still do not define themselves in terms of development. Mark Plotkin, an Amazonian ethnobotanist, argues that the reason why indigenous peoples often live isolated should be regarded as a form of resistance, precisely because they do not want to comply with Western thinking and way of life (Plotkin, 2014). This resistance can thus be understood as the previously mentioned epistemic disobedience; indigenous peoples **reject the epistemic hegemony** of rational and scientific thought. Consequently, following decolonial Poppe 40 reasoning, qualitative statements regarding indigenous ways of life in terms of development or rationalism are inappropriate, because indigenous peoples do not employ a rationalist epistemology nor regard development as the meaning and direction of history (see Santos’ monoculture of time). As mentioned in the introduction, policy-decisions regarding mitigation policy come from the global actors empowered to make such decisions and conventional policy takes a management approach towards mitigation policy. These are the developed (Western) countries, because they have a stronger economic and political position than developing countries. Important to keep in mind is that mitigation policy is an international endeavor; the developed countries do not construct policy on their own and enforce them nationally, but this is managed globally by intergovernmental organizations such as the IPCC. Since the Western epistemic framework assumes an epistemic supremacy of rationality and scientific knowledge, according to decolonial thinking, policy-decisions reflect this assumption. Therefore, the construction of mitigation policy reflects the rhetoric of development, because policy-makers would consider Western knowledge to be more sophisticated and thus believe the employment of such knowledge to be capable of benefitting everyone, including indigenous peoples, more than other knowledges. Management approaches in policy show the same paternalistic tendency, because they globally impose the assumption that nature is a resource to be managed and preserved as to sustain capital (Escobar, p. 328). As has been illustrated above, however, such reasoning leads to the interference with indigenous ways of life and even their fundamental human rights. Therefore, from a decolonial perspective, there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice in the construction of mitigation policy. Consequently, climate ethical theory or principles that operate in a management framework cannot achieve social justice, because the employment of a management framework in international policy-making implies the epistemic hegemony of one knowledge over others (a lack of cognitive justice). Therefore, cognitive justice is a prerequisite of social justice.

#### [8] Magnitude: Extractive colonial relations cause extinction

Helland and Lindgren 16 - Leonardo E. Figueroa Helland and Tim Lindgren Westminster College in the JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 2016 “What Goes Around Comes Around: From The Coloniality of Power to the Crisis of Civilization” [http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/631/831] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO

Today we face a **planetary crisis**. Environmental, energy, food, financial, and social reproduction crises are disrupting the world-system (Ahmed 2010; McMichael 2011; Chase-Dunn 2013; Houtart 2010; Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2015; Peterson 2010; Rockstrom et.al. 2009, 2009b; Salleh 2012; Smith 2014; Steffen et.al. 2007). This planetary crisis, we argue, has been triggered by a globalizing mode of civilization that has become hegemonic.2 This mode of civilization is constituted and underpinned by anthropocentric, androcentric, hetero-patriarchal, Euro/Western-centric, modern/colonial and capitalist systems of power. Building on world-systems, decolonial, eco-feminist and posthuman theories, we contend that the “coloniality of power” (Quijano 1991; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008; Lugones 2007; Maese-Cohen 2010; Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013) has worked to globalize a civilization that **exhausts the planet** and exploits most of its people, thus unleashing a socioecological blowback that is turning this civilization into its own worst enemy. By “coloniality” we refer to the complex and multidimensional legacy of divisive, exploitative, stratifying and hierarchical forms of power (e.g., Eurocentric/Western-centric hegemony), forms of knowledge (e.g., technoscientific instrumental rationality), forms of (inter)subjectivity (e.g., possessive individualism), forms of human interrelations (e.g., racism, classism, heteropatriarchalism, etc.), and forms of human dominion over land and mastery of “nature” (e.g., anthropocentric property/dominion/sovereignty) that have become entrenched and continue to be reproduced throughout the world as an ongoing consequence of colonization. Coloniality thus entails that the hegemony of colonial forms persists to this day as a legacy that structurally constitutes modernity, even into supposedly “postcolonial” times. Coloniality is the underside of modernity: the historical and structural foundation that has enabled—e.g., through conquest, imperialism, **slavery, resource extraction and Western dominance**—the rise, hegemony, and globalization of a world-system dominated by modern civilization. This civilization has sought to globalize a political-economic model bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet (Ahmed 2010; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2013; McMichael 2011; Steffen et.al. 2007; WPCCC 2010). Now in its “neoliberal” stage, this model reinforces a historically-ongoing coloniality of power premised on linear discourses of “progress,” “modernization,” “development,” and “evolution,” altogether constituting a hegemonic “standard of civilization.” Globalized through (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism, this “standard of civilization” has subjugated the global South under the North, and the rural under the urban, thereby stratifying the world into multiple overlapping hierarchies structured along core-periphery asymmetries. The globalization of this mode of civilization wouldn’t be possible without the coloniality of power which has assimilated semi-peripheral and peripheral elites into a Western-centric civilizational obsession with endless accumulation based on the “mastery of nature” (Plumwood 2002; Adelman 2015) and geared towards the aggressive pursuit of “high modernism” 3 (Scott 1998)—and its “late modern(ist)” continuation. While settler-colonial elites have been instrumental to the expansion of hegemonic civilization, the colonial deindigenization and cultural assimilation of Southern elites through centuries of Western domination has increasingly entrenched dominant worldviews and practices throughout the globe. Gonzalez notes; “[i]n the post-colonial period, Southern elites, deeply influenced by Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their own indigenous and minority populations in order to “modernize” and “develop” them” (2015: 13). Most “postcolonial” elites haven’t broken with this coloniality of power (Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013); instead, they often reproduce governmentalities aimed at “catching-up” with, emulating, imitating, “cloning” or conforming to hegemonic models enacted in the North’s metropolitan cores (Sheppard et.al. 2009; McMichael 2011; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008). In seeking to emulate the North’s unsustainable “imperial mode of living” (Brand and Wissen 2012), many Southern elites have replicated the North’s “ecodestructive, consumerist-centric, over-financialized, [and] climate-frying maldevelopment model” (Bond 2012). This coloniality of power has often consumed the creativity, energy, and “resources” of (semi)peripheries in aspirational attempts to emulate and/or conform to hegemonic models by, for example, aggressively pursuing accelerated modernization, developmentalism, urbanization, industrialization, and massified commodity/consumerist cultures at almost any cost, human or ecological. Playing catch-up with the North inevitably requires the present-day rehearsal, in accelerated, compressed manner, of structurally violent practices that have underpinned the North’s “rise” to planetary dominance—like the transformation of nature (including humans) into exploitable “resources” (Apffel-Marglin 2011) and the systematic reliance on coercive statecraft, ecological imperialism, and (neo)colonialism. Comparable practices, now rehearsed in “updated” forms by elites/regimes of semi-peripheral “emerging economies,” seek to replicate expansive core-like metropolitan centers of accumulation, consumption, and growth, like the grossly unequal BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) megalopolises. To achieve this, emerging economies must resort to internal colonialism and “subimperialism” or “second degree imperialism” (Bond 2014) so as to compel into subservience their “own” peripheries as sources of exploitable natural and human “resources.” Yet in striving to emulate a patently unsustainable Northern “way of life” built on centuries of dispossession, emerging economies face two obstacles: First, the hegemonic barriers imposed by the dominant regime of accumulation controlled by the North which resists any challenges to its hegemony. Second, the planetary boundaries (Rockström et.al. 2009) imposed by the Earth’s finite carrying capacity which is already responding to breaches with destabilizing consequences (Foster, Clark, York 2010). Seduced by the coloniality of power, large “emerging economies”—like BRICS—are on a crash course against entrenched “old” Northern cores—as the latter try to preserve their unsustainable privileges at any cost. Brand and Wissen (2012) note: [G]eopolitical and geo-economic shifts will…increasingly be…ecological conflicts…[Facing] increasing competition for the earth’s resources and sinks, national and supranational state apparatuses seem…willing to support ‘their’ respective capitals…to strengthen their competitive position and…secure the resource base of their…economies…Thus, the hegemony of the imperial mode of living…, [spreading from]…the global North…to the South…explains…an imperialist rearticulation…in the context of multiple crises (555). Increasingly volatile tensions are resulting from the clash between the hegemonic system of accumulation and the planetary boundaries. Geopolitical/geoeconomic conflicts, and grabs and scrambles over “resources” strategic for “development(alism),” are proliferating globally. Such complications can often be traced to the hegemonization of an ecologically unsustainable, socially stratifying and politically volatile model of civilization bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet. Ironically, the very success in globalizing this civilizational model through the coloniality of power may lead to its autophagous self-destruction through a planetary crisis. Overcoming this crisis requires not only a critique of modernity in its neoliberal capitalist guise, but a transformation beyond the systems of power underpinning the hegemonic civilization. In solidarity with movements for systemic change and drawing on decolonial dialogues we conclude with a blueprint for a just and sustainable transition inspired on indigenous, eco-feminist, and posthuman alternatives.

#### And: Theory is violent and should be rejected.

#### [1] Appeals to a neutral educational meritocracy buy into a universalist fiction that sanctions racialized violence

Brady 2 - Janelle Brady, University of Toronto, Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education, May 29th, 2017 “Education for whom? Exploring systems of oppression and domination” [https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cjnse/article/view/30801] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO

On the matter of objectivity, Code (as cited in Alcoff, 2007) stated, “objectivity requires taking subjectivity into account” (p. 41), and within a guise of objectivity, ignorance prevails and is produced and reproduced. An implication of objectivity within education is that it is presented as the ideal-truth and something one ought to strive for, thus subjectively located realities are assumed to be weak in nature and not scientific in assumptions and arguments. For example, the reproduction of objectivity is presented in educational curricula as students strive to follow **a scientific model in order to seek a supposed truth**, but this misses the significant situatedness of knowers, group identities, and an analysis of systemic foundations of oppression (Alcoff, 2007, p. 40). As such, students who are the knowers of their own realities become silenced and disenfranchised from the dominant perspectives presented in Canadian curricula. Students’ experiences and knowledge should be centered in the classroom to create multicentric ways of knowing (Dei, 1996), which involves multiple epistemologies and debunks universality, as opposed to unicentric ways of knowing. The epistemological ignorance of objectivity is rarely raised in education, thus reproducing systems of oppression which become ontological reality. Dei (2016) posited that “objectivity is the dominant’s subjectivity” (G. J. S. Dei, personal communication). Without this epistemological bias being called into question**, objectivity is presented as the ultimate truth**. King (2015) highlighted the need for liberation from “ideological myths, masquerading as objective scientific or academic knowledge, that rationalize and obscure dominating power relations” (p. 180). In Kindergarten to grade 12, students are rarely encouraged to question the philosophical canons and all-knowing mathematicians and scientists (Abawi, 2016-2017)—the keepers of knowledge—who are white men. Thus, non-white students are unlikely to find people who represent their lived experiences or look like them as part of their normal encounters with subject material (Smith, 2010). Furthermore, according to Smith, educators have a difficult time in providing multiple sites of teaching and learning within the classroom, because identities, which do not fall under a white, patriarchal supremacist ordering, are deemed as Others and are only provided in juxtaposition to or as additives on the normative base. In an effort to achieve objectivity in education, the focus on **essentializing difference** through liberal democratic **discursive practices of** tolerance, respect, and **fairness depicts racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples through a deficit perspective** (Abawi & Brady, 2017; Dei, 1996). Therefore, Alcoff’s (2007) epistemology of ignorance of objectivity demonstrated how the subjugated are questioned: their values, experiences, and lived realities are labelled as subjective and henceforth weak, non-encompassing ways of knowing. This leads to Alcoff’s discussion of the third epistemology of ignorance, which highlights the epistemic advantages and disadvantages to knowledge and ways of knowing. Knowledge systems and ways of knowing are rooted in people’s social locatedness and help them to understand certain phenomena. Alcoff (2007), again drawing on Code’s work, asserted that there are epistemic advantages and disadvantages to ways of knowing and knowledge systems. In relation to the epistemology of ignorance of objectivity, those whose knowledges are validated and legitimized are part of the dominant group, whereas those whose knowledges are disenfranchised are part of the oppressed group. According to Dei (2014), knowledge is based on its historical, as well as ancestral and spiritual underpinnings, and cannot be pinpointed to one contextual moment. Epistemological advantages or disadvantages may play out in education when educators or students become ascribed knowers in particular contexts. One might be the “South Asian Food expert” or the “Indigenous history expert,” and they may experience some level of epistemological advantage in knowing; however, their knowledge is still Othered and compartmentalized into particular moments in time and removed from history. In an educational context, Othering people’s knowledges, histories, and identities to become stagnant points in history or single stories takes the onus away from school administrators and curriculum developers whose responsibility is to delve into South Asian history beyond samosas and Indigenous history beyond Pow wows. This is because the epistemologically advantaged become responsible for sharing their knowledge in educational contexts. However, their knowledge is not solely contextualized to that particular moment in time, but deeply entrenched in history and implicated by the history of others. Questions in the educational context can be asked about why South Asians were denied entry into Canada through racist immigration policies (Ralston, 1999; Thobani, 2007) or why and how Indigenous residential schooling, forced assimilation, the building of pipelines and the like continue to affect Indigenous communities to this very day (Coulthard, 2014). The contextual experts carry the burden for the ignorant who dominate, thus reinforcing the idea of “sharing their subjective experiences.” As Lorde (1984) stated, People [of colour] are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are expected to educate the heterosexual world. The oppressors maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions. (p. 115) Thus, it becomes the work of the oppressed to become educators to share their stories and their subjective histories and realities for the dominant group, when the dominant group deems it appropriate to do so. The oppressed become the bearers of the oppressor’s ignorance while also living through their own oppression. It is important to be critical of such dynamics so that people of colour do not bear all of the responsibility for the privileged to learn and unlearn about their privilege. The idea of knowing and the relentless pursuit of knowledge is another issue that comes into play when addressing the ignorance of objective epistemologies and ontologies. Objectivity, falling under a moderncolonial logic, is presented as all-knowing and truth-seeking. However, this is counter to Indigenous knowledges—which anticolonial scholars (e.g., Dei, 2008; Simpson, 2004) believe should be centered in curricula—with one of the major tenets of Indigenous knowledges being the humility of knowing (Shields, 2005). The humility of knowing—where the learner does not seek mastery of knowledge, but instead knowledge is gained through sharing, learning, and unlearning—is in contrast to what becomes sought after in colonial education, which is rooted in individualism and the ultimate quest for **knowledge, meritocracy, and excellence.** Students who are from non-dominant groups are **forced to attempt scholarly excellence** in institutions **based on individualism** while their very ancestral, family, and community settings are contradictorily based in holistic and community-based ways of knowing and organizing. Therefore, the consumption of knowledge does not become a sharing process, but a process based on individual ownership of knowledge, and **those with access to such value systems succeed** while those who come with humility are pushed out of schools (Dei et al., 1997). This focus on individualism is further exacerbated through neo-liberalist education. In this context, while education promotes group work, academic success advantages individuals (Giroux, 2003). The danger here is that **students begin to believe their academic success is based on their own merit** rather than the systems which afford them privilege. This results in mantras of equality falling under the veil of liberalism, sameness, and meritocracy. This individualism also creates chants like “All lives matter,” which is critical of the Black Lives Matter movement and supports the belief, **built on an epistemology of ignorance, that all lives are subjected to the same trials**. This perpetuates ignorance and objective knowledge systems, while negating and furthering the expendable nature of Blackness, Indigenousness, and Black and Brown bodies. Hence, scholars have explored the dangerous nature of claiming that “All lives matter” (Adjei, 2016; Carney, 2016; Orbe, 2015; Yancy & Butler, 2015), believing it upholds white supremacy and denies the police brutality of Black people, the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, and Islamophobic attacks. Such a claim to innocence becomes key to upholding systems of oppression, which are often silenced and denied by the dominant group. Therefore, **educators**, students, community members, and parents/families **need to trouble the ideal of** equality and **claims to fairness for all** in reimagining new possibilities for hope and change.

#### [2] Notions of fairness in agonistic games are hopelessly vague and ideologically reinforce conquest

Lee 17 - Jonathan Rey Lee, Analog Game Studies, March 20th, 2017 “CAPITALISM AND UNFAIRNESS IN CATAN: OIL SPRINGS” [http://analoggamestudies.org/2017/03/capitalism-and-unfairness-in-catan-oil-springs/] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Before the first turn was over, I knew I had won—a circumstance typically only achievable through overwhelming skill, prognostication, or cheating. In this case, however, the game itself gave me an insurmountable advantage via my starting position. It’s tempting to label this as poor game design1 since it certainly violates the principle of fairness almost universally assumed in competitive gaming. Yet in a world where the myth of a ‘level playing field’ obscures and authorizes ongoing social inequalities, problematizing the notion of ‘fairness’ in gameplay may provide unique insight into the ‘fairness’ of capitalist culture. This insight is possible because contemporary games are cultural phenomena that have also become media phenomena. Games, that is, need not merely reflect culture, but have critical potential for reflecting on culture. The following reflections work toward developing such a critical paradigm by showing how the Oil Springs scenario for The Settlers of Catan plays out ethical dilemmas raised by the emergent and systemic inequalities generated by capitalist systems. In order to analyze these inequalities, this paper first explores game balance as the interplay between emergent inequality (how games determine winners and losers through the inputs of skill and chance) and systemic inequality (how an asymmetrical game state may privilege certain players).2 This paper then analyzes how the Oil Springs scenario for Catan links resource generation to land ownership, the runaway leader problem to the tendency of capital to accrue capital, and industrialization to market destabilization and ecological catastrophe. Finally, I reflect on the experience of enacting inequality within an unbalanced game system. Throughout, I suggest that while competitive games are typically designed to produce emergent inequality from within a level playing field (systemic equality), the rules that govern such emergent inequality are systemic in ways that allow for critically engaging systemic inequality. Fair and Balanced While not all games are competitive,3 the history of games is thoroughly intertwined with agon (or ‘**contestation’) as an organizing principle of Western culture**. According to French sociologist Roger Caillois, agonistic games play out agonistic culture “like a combat in which equality of chances is artificially created, in order that adversaries should confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible of giving precise and incontestable value to the winner’s triumph.”4 With mathematical precision, agonistic games create balanced contests that reflect the ideal of agonistic culture: a perfectly level playing field that produces a genuine meritocracy. Yet, even while reflecting this agonistic ideal, the complicated balancing act performed by actual games demonstrates the limits of this ideal. Recognizing that fairness is problematic even within the carefully-controlled medium of games should also call into question the very possibility of a level playing field in arenas as complex as global capitalism. Fairness, like beauty, is left to the eye of the beholder. What standards determine which is most fair: that everyone gets the same amount of pie (equality), that everyone gets pie according to their need for pie (equity),5 or that everyone gets pie in proportion to how much money or labor they invested in the pie (meritocracy)? There are similarly divergent ways of considering fairness in games. Caillois is adamant about the fundamentality of fairness, arguing that games of both skill and chance (agon and alea) “require absolute equity, an equality of mathematical chances of most absolute precision. Admirably precise rules, meticulous measures, and scientific calculations are evident.”6 Taken together, however, skill and chance presuppose contradictory paradigms of equality, making it difficult to determine what counts as fair for games that incorporate both (as most contemporary tabletop games do). Similarly, although Caillois argues that “The search for equality is so obviously essential to the rivalry that it is re-established by a handicap for players of different classes,”7 notion of fairness behind the handicap does not reinforce but rather undermines the agonistic ideal. Such contradictory messages suggest that fairness is a highly subjective notion. That is: standards of fairness vary not only according to individual preferences, but also by context (casual gaming vs. tournaments), game genre (wargames vs. party games), and even circumstance (games are generally only ‘unfair’ when one is losing). Unsurprisingly, this variability amongst subjective standards yields a spectrum of paradigms for promoting balance, a somewhat vague negative term that presents fairness as ‘not unbalanced.’ Most commonly, games that tend towards symmetry tolerate emergent inequality but very little systemic inequality: symmetrical games allow skill and chance to separate players as the game progresses, but provide roughly parallel pathways to victory. In such games, the inevitable asymmetries are typically either minimized (playing first often confers an advantage, but usually a minimal one) or counterbalanced by other asymmetries of relatively equal value (the komi in Go compensates black’s advantage in going first with a point bonus given to the white player). Asymmetrical games extend this latter technique by counterbalancing different ways of playing (via differing pieces, abilities, rules, goals, etc.) to create a more or less equal game balance. Thus, asymmetrical game design provides two possibilities for exploring systemic inequalities. Balanced asymmetrical games can explore themes of inequity while maintaining an environment of fair play that adopts a perspective of critical distance—the player observes the interplay of differences that contribute to inequity without being immersed in the experience of inequity itself. By contrast, deliberately unbalanced asymmetrical games can explore inequity both thematically and procedurally, immersing players in a fundamentally inequitable world. To advocate critical play with and against capitalist systems, there are good reasons to challenge any standard of competitive balance that supports the myth of capitalism as a level playing field. **Insisting on perfectly balanced games is not just an impossible ideal; it** is a problematic one. Balanced games imagine idealized worlds that **may reinforce the deep cultural assumption that contestation is a** practical and **ethical way of organizing society**. Yet, there is a substantial disconnect between the fair and balanced worlds of gameplay and the many systemic inequalities that emerge in everyday societies. In practice, major genres of competitive game design—such as wargames, race games, betting games, and economic strategy games—often uncritically invoke and thereby reinforce broader forms of cultural contestation. Strategic wargames, for example, may intellectualize war tactics while glossing over the cost of violence. Similarly, economic strategy games may glamorize profiteering while failing to represent exploitation. For instance, Monopoly depicts rents as an arena for capitalist competition but ignores the consequences for tenants, worker placement games often reinforce the dehumanizing representation of laborers as human resources,8 and Catan fails to represent the violence of settler colonialism.9 And even as these games ignore disenfranchised populations, they ask players to become complicit in the systems that produce such disenfranchisement: the participatory medium of games often entangles player agency with the logic of capitalism by promoting a particularly capitalist model of agency—a self-interested agonistic impulse that plays out within a quantifiable, rule-governed system of exchange. Monopoly board There is perhaps no clearer example of the intersection of games and capitalism than Monopoly, of which Caillois writes, “The game of Monopoly does not follow but rather reproduces the function of Capitalism.”[ref]Caillois, p. 61.[/ref] Ironically, the game industry appropriated Monopoly from a game explicitly designed to demonstrate social inequality—The Landlord’s Game (patented 1904; this image from 1906) by Elizabeth Magie. Originally designed to demonstrate Henry George’s notion that the infrastructure of renting properties consolidated wealth in the hands of landowners at the expense of their tenants, The Landlord’s Game has resonances with the issue of land ownership discussed in the next section. (CC Wikimedia Commons) Although the way that games are more generally implicated in capitalism10 (and vice versa)11 deserves more critique, this parallelism may also provide games like Catan with a special critical potential to expose systemic inequality. For instance, in The First Nations of Catan, game designer and scholar Greg Loring-Albright describes how he developed “a balanced, asymmetrical strategy game” that “creates a narrative for Catan wherein indigenous peoples exist, interact with settlers, and have a fair chance of surviving the encounter by winning the game.”12 As discussed above, this type of game represents a critical intervention into historical inequalities while minimizing systemic gameplay inequalities, such as ones that might give the indigenous peoples a less than “fair chance.” By contrast, Catan and its Oil Springs scenario are mostly symmetrical and, if not actually unbalanced, certainly balanced unstably. With respect to Catan, Oil Springs makes more explicit the thematic connection to capitalism and, in a related move, makes the game balance even less stable “to draw attention to important challenges humanity faces, in relation to the resources that modern society depends on.”13 It accomplishes this by adding to the five original pastoral resources in Catan the modern resource of Oil, which is simultaneously more powerful (it counts as two standard resources), more flexible (it can be used as two of any resource), and more dangerous (its use triggers ecological catastrophes). By raising the stakes in these ways, Oil Springs further unbalances Catan to make a point about emergent social inequality tied to the unequal distribution of resources. Playing Capitalism Capitalism is far too multifaceted for any game—even one with as many variants and expansions as Catan—to model fully. Yet, games can indeed critically play with capitalism by condensing capitalist principles into their game systems through the systemic constraints and affordances that structure game interactions. Rather than describing capitalism, many agonistic games are themselves simple capitalist systems in which self-interested players engage in more or less free market competition with each other. Certain game designs, therefore, are not only tied to the agonistic logic behind capitalism, but are unique microcosmic economies that can represent specific facets of capitalism. The abstraction of Catan, for instance, obscures the history of settler colonialism and the exploitation of labor to focus instead on portraying land ownership as a lynchpin of modern capitalism, both in relation to resource generation and the tendency of capital to accrue capital. Similarly, the mechanics in Oil Springs focus on the role of the natural resource of oil as fuel for industrial capitalism by showing how industrialization accelerates resource production and exploits the environment. For Karl Marx, ownership of private property14 precludes fair compensation of workers by granting the capitalist (the holder of capital[refMarx defines capital thusly: “Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labor and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilized in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labor and new means of subsistence. All these component parts of capital are creation of labor, products of labor, accumulated labor. Accumulated labor which serves as a means of new production is capital.” See Robert C. Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, p. 207.[/ref]]) legal ‘rights’ the value generated by production without requiring that they contribute any labor towards generating that value. Land in Catan reflects this model by automatically generating resources which are given directly to the player/landowner, completely bypassing the question of labor. Instead, the emergent inequality is between rival capitalists played by the game participants. Although class differences are not represented, these emergent inequalities are structurally linked with class differentiation. Indeed, private property is problematic for Marx primarily because it forms the conditions for emergent inequalities to become systemic inequalities through wealth consolidation. Thus, private property parallels an emergent asymmetry known in game design as the runaway leader problem, in which it becomes increasingly difficult to catch the lead player as the game progresses. This occurs in any game design—such as Catan—that links point accumulation and resource generation, creating a feedback loop such that the further one is towards achieving victory the more resources one gains to reinvest in that progress. In contrast to a game like Dominion, in which accumulating victory points can actually reduce the effectiveness of one’s resource-generating engine, in Catan the closer one is to victory the faster one should move toward victory.15 The idiom it takes money to make money captures this fact about capitalism, which Marx describes as “the necessary result of competition” being “the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form” (70). In fact, emergent and systemic inequalities often do synergize in this way as the material consequences of emergent inequalities become concretized as systemic as they are passed down from generation to generation, maintaining fairly resilient wealth disparities between different social and ethnic groups. Catan For Marx, these problems with land ownership are only intensified in industrial capitalism, in which ownership over the machinery of production further disenfranchises the industrial worker. This is precisely the shift in emphasis behind Oil Springs, which introduces Oil not just as one more roughly equivalent commodity, but one which radically unbalances Catan’s market economy. Representing the increasing pace of production from pre-industrial to industrial societies, one unit of Oil is worth two resources. In fact, it is worth two of any resource, which means that the strategic value of a single Oil resource ranges from two to eight resources (since it can take up to 4 resources to trade for a resource of one’s choice), making Oil so much more valuable than other resources that it seriously unbalances the game. In addition, Oil is required for building a Metropolis, the most powerful building in the game. Depicting how new industrial processes destabilize existing economic relationships, Oil Springs shows how the problems of capitalist land ownership are compounded when such land contains scarce resource reserves that are essential to industry. Such resources encourage relationships of dependence not only over renters and laborers (who are nowhere represented in Catan), but also over other industrialists who require these resources. Thus, the game makes the inequality between different starting positions more dramatic to depict a shift in modern geopolitics away from territory being valued primarily for it land, population, and location to being valued primarily for its strategic resources. While Oil Springs does have mechanisms that restore some balance, such as keeping Oil off the highest-probability hexes and capping the amount of Oil a player may hold at one time,16 its primary mechanisms for balancing Oil ironically further unbalance the game. By making Oil use precipitate ecological disasters, Oil Springs highlights the costs of industrial capitalism and makes an implicit ecocritical statement about how environmental consequences affect us all. They affect us, that is, randomly but not equally. Demonstrating that even negative consequences can be exploited by the industrial capitalist, the game’s two forms of environmental disaster turned out to be less damaging to me than to other players. The first environmental disaster, in which rising water levels destroy coastal settlements, played in my favor because I planned to exploit Oil and therefore avoided building coastal settlements.17 The second disaster, representing ‘industrial pollution,’ randomly strikes individual hexes, causing them to permanently cease to produce resources. More precisely, it does this to the ‘natural’ resources—affecting all hexes except for Oil Springs, which continue to produce after a reduction in the shared Oil reserves. Thus, because I was disproportionally less accountable for the consequences of my actions, I was able to safely initiate risky behavior that the risk-averse players suffered from. As risk and accountability can become unhinged in a free-market society that pushes for deregulation, Oil Springs speaks to the fact that those most responsible for climate change—be they individuals, corporations, or nations—do not generally bear the brunt of the consequences.18 Oil Springs The Disaster Track from the Oil Springs Scenario. Every time an Oil resources is used, it moves a marker along this track, triggering an ecological disaster if it reaches the final space (this takes 5 Oil in the 3-4 player game and 8 Oil in the 5-6 player game). If this occurs 5 times in total, the game immediately ends and no one wins. Image used for purposes of critique. In all the aforementioned ways, the game systems of Catan and Oil Springs use emergent inequalities to reflect on various systemic inequalities. This conflation, however, raises another question of fairness, namely how systemic inequalities emerge. In the case of Catan, this question becomes how to distribute land that has such intrinsically unequal value that it is sometimes possible to accurately predict the winner based on the starting positions (as in my case). The game attempts to solve this by using a snake draft to organize how players select their starting positions. Fairness is achieved not by creating equal spaces, but by assigning fundamentally unequal spaces using the mechanisms of emergent inequality: skill and chance (agon and alea). There is a fundamental difference, however, in the role these two forms of emergent inequality play in the deep interpenetration of games and culture. For Caillois, whereas agonistic games reflect the meritocratic ideal of cultural contestation, aleatory games play with the fundamental uncertainty of life—they are ludic, even carnivalesque experiments in fatalism. Unlike the triumphalism of agon, therefore, the aleatory elements of games explore consequentiality beyond the limits of human agency. This explains, for Caillois, how aleatory social institutions such as gambling and lotteries counterbalance the fundamentally agonistic structure of society by providing a faint hope that any individual may leap out of a condition of systemic inequality through an emergent (but rare) inequality. This demonstrates how capitalism balances itself by using the possibility of upward mobility to obscure its systemic conditions for economic immobility. This also reveals a way in which game design struggles to represent systemic social inequality: games often achieve balance by using aleatory elements to subsume systemic inequality within emergent inequality, sacrificing the critical experience of systemic inequality in order to maintain the ideal of balance. Thus, the emergent inequalities in Catan fail to represent how historical inequalities are invariably systemic as race, gender, class, and nationality play prominent roles—how in America, for example, the original occupants were dispossessed by force of arms and land was redistributed according to explicitly discriminatory laws.19 It also fails to represent how even after more recent legislation has eroded many of these practices, their legacy20 necessarily lingers within a capitalist system where ownership is passed down from generation to generation. There are limitations, therefore, to representing social inequality exclusively through emergent mechanisms—when games create a genuinely level playing field, they become incompatible with capitalism, which perpetuates the myth of a level playing field while in fact perpetuating systemic inequalities. Playing with Privilege It was only upon further reflection that I began to tie my play experiences to the preceding forms of social inequality. In the moment, however, my focus was more narrowly focused on executing my strategy—or, to put it bluntly, on winning. At the same time, this was tinged with a growing sense of discomfort that can only be described by an even more uncomfortable word: privilege. Certainly, my ability to win the way I did was due to a privileged starting position, which tilted the balance of power in my favor. Yet, privilege is an attitude as well as a condition: **being able to focus exclusively on strategy and winning is itself** a form of **privilege**. Games (even so-called serious games) are not theories of social inequality—as embodied, performative spaces, games express a procedural rhetoric21 in which players develop perspectives by exploring the consequences of their decisions and actions as they play out within the game system. To play certain games in certain ways, therefore, is to play as capitalists and play out capitalism. Games like Acquire encourage us to play as capitalists. As mentioned above, the procedural rhetoric of Oil Springs is paradoxically predicated on privileging the very strategies of industrial capitalism that this ecocritical game otherwise censures. This presents players with a dilemma, in which **playing to win may require performing actions that are** thematically represented as **ethically problematic**. Thus, the primary reason I received such advantageous placement in my case study is that I ruthlessly pursued Oil from the start, whereas several of my opponents hesitated to do so (possibly due to their ecological consciousness). Sometimes gamers attempt to justify a win-at-all-costs mentality by claiming they are merely following the dictates of the game (indirectly valorizing the cultural ideology of agon), or that they are merely solving an abstract puzzle without regard to thematic considerations. While these are valid ways to play a game, **they** nonetheless **represent an active choice** on the part of the player **rather than some** ‘objective’ or **‘default’ position.** Indeed, the phrase “win at all costs” itself admits that such play necessitates a cost. While I can understand why some players would choose to play in this way, **this position is not viable for game scholarship**. To properly study a game, one must account for the interplay of its many facets. Theme, which can evoke representational content and complex psychological and affective22 responses, is an essential facet of a game as text. When players respond to a game’s theme, they are performing a genuine textual engagement worthy of analysis. Thus, this section draws on my own play experience to reflect on possible consequences of systemically privileging certain positions. If I had to sum up my experience, I would say that playing and subsequently winning this particular game was no fun at all. And, although I cannot speak for the other players, I imagine it was not much fun them either. Working from an advantaged position altered the game experience in ways that counteracted much of the enjoyment I typically derive from gameplay. I say ‘working from’ rather than ‘playing from’ because rather than playfully exploring new strategies, I found myself merely implementing the most obviously advantageous strategy. My narrow focus on winning imposed an inappropriately results-driven framework on play, something I typically value more for the experience than the results. This focus was driven, moreover, less by the rewards of victory than by the fear of failure23—even while my privileged position robbed winning of much of its merit, losing would have been still worse. Although the game was unbalanced in my favor, an increased probability of winning did not, in my case, lead to an enriched game experience. This is because **the value of a game experience cannot be reduced to winning,** which is why games—even agonistic ones—are distinct from non-playful tests or contests. This is surprisingly analogous to Marx’s argument that capitalism not only inequitably distributes resources, but also reduces human experience to something instrumental and transactional. Indeed, Marx suggests that even while the capitalist is materially advantaged over the laborer, both are equally alienated by being reduced to their respective roles within the capitalist system. Systemic inequality, that is, is dehumanizing for all its participants—whether privileged or marginalized. Systemic inequality in games is, of course, less consequential and more voluntary than social inequalities,24 but it can alienate players in similar ways. In fact, most games eschew systemic inequality because it tends to be unpleasant for everyone involved. Players in privileged positions may find their roles overdetermined by the game structure, resulting in a narrowing of strategic, exploratory, or playful possibilities (for example, I had no reason to trade with other players when I could acquire all the resources I needed on my own). Similarly, players in less privileged positions may find their choices narrowed by their limited resources as the runaway leader problem renders their choices increasingly inconsequential. Systemically unequal game design, that is, looks like a lose-lose situation. Yet, it is not that inequality deprives play of choice, but rather that it overdetermines the consequences or relative viability of various choices. In the right conditions, therefore, such unbalanced play may add a unique dimension to the play experience. Rather than playing as an industrial capitalist, for instance, I could have chosen to play as an environmentalist. Instead of using Oil, I could have chosen to ‘Sequester’ Oil by permanently removing one of my Oil resources from the game each turn, gaining 1 Victory Point (VP) for every three Sequestered Oil, and an additional VP for sequestering the most Oil. Simple mathematics suggests that this is a terrible strategy: 1 VP is a paltry reward for the relative value of three Oil.25 This discrepancy underlies a model in which industrial capitalism is systematically more viable than environmentalism. Yet, what counts ‘viable’ can be called into question. Precisely because sequestering is ‘bad’ strategy, it offers an interesting thematic possibility: role-playing as an environmentalist knowing that one is not likely to win. From a thematic perspective, this strategy could be quite rewarding. Whereas my privileged play would lead either to failure or a victory deprived of merit, pursuing sequestering could offer either an impressive victory or a loss offset by the satisfaction of maintaining a moral position. These benefits, however, are psychological rather than ethical. While environmentalism is certainly much needed, playing environmentalism in a game is no more intrinsically beneficial than playing industrial capitalism. Critical gameplay requires more than importing real-world values into games; it requires interrogating the assumptions players bring to the game and the positions they adopt within the game. To sequester Oil solely for the sake of feeling morally superior is not a critical position (although it could certainly be an attractive one). Precisely because environmentalism matters, it deserves critical attention and critical gameplay. After all, activism can be problematic in, for example, replicating colonial attitudes towards the developing world or performing a kind of ‘conscience laundering.’26 Critical play,27 that is, is not an outcome but a method. Or, as Marx puts it, “I am therefore not in favor of setting up any dogmatic flag. On the contrary, we must try to help the dogmatics to clarify themselves the meaning of their own positions” (13). The potential consequences of such reflection are not just two, but many. Beyond simply stating that one way of playing (environmentalism) is superior to another (industrial capitalism), critical play provides an opportunity for players to self-reflectively engage the decisions and feelings of occupying different subject positions within inequitable systems. Critical play encourages reflection. Coda Games have not historically been on the forefront of discussions on social inequality.28 This is partially because the fundamentality of agon in games reinforces certain cultural logics, partially because the carnivalesque nature of play tends not to revolutionize prevailing systems,29 and partially because social inequality presents a special challenge for game design. To reverse this trend will require a critical perspective that pushes the limits of the game medium, such as the imperative toward balance at the heart of competitive game design—especially in a world where ‘fairness’ alternatively means ‘light-skinned,’ and the myth of a level playing field is used to justify a clearly uneven one. As Oil Springs demonstrates, experimenting with the interplay between emergent and systemic inequality is one way games can explore capitalism as similarly rule-governed, self-interested systems. In deconstructing the myth of the level playing field, it becomes clear that emergent inequalities in capitalism are develop systemic qualities. As a rule-governed agonistic system, capitalism legally positions the capitalist to leverage the rights of ownership to exploit the worker’s labor. Similarly, capitalism promotes the runaway leader problem by passing down capital via inheritance rather than need or merit. Furthermore, despite all claims to neutrality, economic hierarchies in capitalism are historically intertwined with other social hierarchies, such as race and gender. The problems of social inequality, therefore, are necessarily multiple and intersectional. Games have historically also lacked nuance with respect to intersectional analysis.30 If they represent categories like race and gender at all, most games do so either via problematic stereotypes or via visual and narrative means that bypass the procedural rhetoric that makes games so distinctive. I suspect that most game design avoids systemic unfairness at the level of identity politics to avoid alienating players who identify in diverse ways. At least on the surface, class—an extrinsic marker of social identity—seems easier to dissociate from sensitive identity politics and, thereby, more implementable in games like Catan.31 However, critical play must resist the ways that games by their nature simplify and abstract what they represent. Instead, critical play draws upon but moves beyond such simplification and abstraction to respond to complex social realities. And the reality of capitalism, as discussed above, is that class is intertwined with race and gender. Indeed, an intersectional perspective on critical play may provide a way of exploring the paradoxical unity and disunity of player and role that complicates the gameplay experience. After all, despite the common association between criticism and distance, critical play is still an experience—an embodied calling into question of certain social systems. –

#### [3] We can cross apply the aff to theory. Solves ideological dogmatism and content exploration and turns every standard

Koh 13 - Ben Koh, NSD Update, October 1st, 2013 “Breaking Down Borders: Rethinking the Interaction Between Theory and Ethics” [http://nsdupdate.com/2013/breaking-down-borders-rethinking-the-interaction-between-theory-and-ethics/] Accessed 8/14/20 SAO

First: **Fairness is** at its basis is **an ethical concept**. For instance at its basis, fairness as Rawls explains is, “a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission.” That is to say, the basis of fairness rises from benefiting from cooperation. In the debate context, the “benefit” as Rawls refers to could be the actual ability to debate, or speaking without interference etc. In the same way that it’s considered immoral under most ethical systems to take without recompense, fairness is relevant due to it being the “recompense.” Additionally, equality’s importance is as a moral concept. The utterance that we ought to both start with the same amount of speaking time is morally relevant for it guides or at least constrains our actions, or the rightness and wrongness thereof (i.e. if I go a minute longer in the NR, I would usually be dropped or at least penalized due to its wrongness). Second, Fairness is normative: A) The idea that there is a consequence to a certain unfair act implies its relevance to our action. Debaters generally don’t read theory just because they wanted to point out something interesting or amusing, they do so to win or to rid the round of the problematic argument. B) The voluntary concession of the basic rules for the round renders fairness as being “obligatory.” Loland explains, “the obligation of fairness does not arise unconditionally. One basic premise is that the parties are voluntarily engaged. They have chosen participation in favor of nonparticipation and have thus more or less tacitly agreed to follow the commonly accepted rules and norms of the practice play the game. Loland further explains that “in sporting games, the predominant distributive norm is meritocratic. The norm on equal tratemnt, then, becomes a necessary condition for a game to take place. To be able to evaluate the relevant inequalities satisfactorily, participants have to compete on the same terms. All competitors ought to be given equal opportunity to perform.” The implication is that an argument that questions ethical assumptions (or even more basically assumptions at all) needs to be open to criticism. In the same way debaters now take into account the theoretical implications of their frameworks (i.e. the line of arguments centered around whether or not “ought is defined as maximizing well-being” is a fair interpretation), **debaters should take into account the ethical implications of their theory arguments**. Analyzing the way we debate theory further exposes these assumptions. Theory is debated typically in a very **utilitarian** **fashion**. Debaters tend to weigh between theory standards under assumed criterions of “what would a policy maker do,” how easy the calculation is, etc. They answer the question of drop the debater vs. drop the argument commonly in terms of solvency, whether or not there is a deterrent effect, etc. It’s no surprise in my mind that most “LARPers” are generally as proficient on the LARP as they are on the theory debate due to the reproduction of skill. To keep theory argumentation at a standstill in its variation is to deny the basic value in LD in the first place. There’s no reason why we should not question the assumption of how we debate or think about theory in the same way we question the assumptions of right and wrong in LD. A question that follows then is what occurs if we debate theory in a more Kantian sense? Or a more Nietzschean one? Etc. I’m not persuaded by the idea that ethical arguments cannot apply to the context of theory debate. Examples: 1) If the argument against consequentalism is true that there are infinite consequences, is norm setting ever possible? 2) If an intention based framework is true, and the violation was not made intentionally, should the one violating still be held culpable for the violation 3) A polls framework would outline why community consensus is most ethically relevant. If a certain practice is common, would that implicate its moral permission? Beyond the voter, concepts like competing interpretations, which in some variations claims that only one interpretation is objectively/ absolutely true, could easily be criticized with postmodern arguments. Massumi (a Deleuzian contemporary) would probably argue that the attempt to instill a certain worldview of the round is indicative of state philosophy, where “The end product would be ‘a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society’ – each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.” Security K type arguments that criticize the idea of deterrence claiming that mindset is the root cause of the threats it attempts to be prevented can easily apply to drop the debater justifications about norm setting. Apprehension to introduce this type of argumentation into the debate sphere can be tracked most likely to the tendency of judges to either a) paradigmatically assume fairness is important to avoid annoying and assumptive debates about whether or not fairness is a voter or b) judges not voting on these arguments frequently in the past. However, this line of thought I present does not attempt to claim that fairness is absolutely not a voter. This type of argument generally does not contest if theory itself is unfair or resolvable in a theoretical way, i.e. in the fashion most “fairness not a voter” arguments are made. The goal rather is to reframe the lens of which we analyze theory debates, or analyze “fairness not a voter arguments.” The application fosters discussion about what fairness ethically should imply, not in attempt to create more “frivolous theory debates” or figure out ways to make theory irresolvable. In fact, this mindset would produce **better philosophical discussion**. By examining the full implication of an ethical argument, debaters could more fully understand what it means to argue X or Y is the correct moral framework beyond just the resolution at hand. Whereas debate about animal rights or compulsory voting does allow for that form of philosophical analysis, this viewpoint allows for full education of ethics to even more frequent, real world concerns of fairness and education. Additionally, most of the historical unwillingness is probably rooted in tendency for debaters to use this avenue of argumentation in a **blippy fashion**. However in the same way that arguments that are more fleshed out or have definitive warrants are given priority over others, debaters ought to argue this similarly. Rather than treating ethical arguments against theory as a “back up strategy,” this should become a more full, centralized approach. The purpose of this article is that fairness as an ethical idea, with the same ethical discussion, etc., should not be absent from questioning. The implementation, function, correctness of a conception of fairness, etc., should all be open for debate in the same way that we try to figure out if death is really morally bad after all. The even broader implication is that LD debate should continue to foster questioning**. To take a firm stance on basic assumptions is to deny the role of philosophical questioning in the first place**. To quote Rebar Niemi, “the notion that any one of us could set some determinate standard for what debate should be is preposterous, uneducational, sanctimonious, and arrogant. I think that the notion that we should teach the already privileged population of debate to be inflexible, dogmatic, and exclusive in their belief sets **creates** worse citizens, **worse people,** and ultimately a worse world.”

### Offense

#### Advocacy text: Ill defend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. I am not role playing the state, just stating the current state of affairs is unethical.

#### That affirms

#### [1] Patents on medicine create a hierarchy of cultural practices

Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 “Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy%20Thesis.pdf] Accessed 8/13/21 SAO

The production of scientific and technological knowledge has a history of hierarchical oppression. From the inception of scientific experimentation those deemed suitable to produce knowledge and in which way was clearly defined. And so the modest witness (Haraway, 1997: 24) was born. For Donna Haraway, this Subject was able to sediment its position as the only self-invisible, objective knower by normalizing the idea that “his subjectivity is his objectivity” (24). Through performing an air of legitimate agency and distancing himself from any form of knowledge viewed as ‘feminine’ (anything subjective, embodied or alchemical, but not necessarily originating in a or from a female biological body) and excluding women, people of lower class and people of different ethnicities from the space of knowledge production, therefore making their voices dissident and eventually invisible, the modest witness claims the space of knowledge production (27-32). Haraway sees this evolution of the experimental life as responsible for marginalizing various groups from the scientific world and also permeating these oppressive views out into society. She states, “racial formation, gender-in-the-making, the forging of class, and the discursive production of sexuality [are created] through the constitutive practices of [knowledge production] themselves” (35). Discursive practice of knowledge production forge these same marginalized Subjectivites through constructing, re-presenting and positioning as less capable due to these categorizations. An intersectional (Crenshaw, 1989) indigenous identity, whereby an indigenous person suffers oppression along multiple lines; gender, race, ethnicity and class, leads to the entire marginalization and trivialization of knowledges produced by the indigenous Subject. Knowledges produced outside of the dominant paradigm becomes subjugated as they are: “either hidden behind more dominant knowledges but can be revealed by critique or have been explicitly disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (Foucault, 1980: 82). Positivist accounts of Eurocentric masculinist knowledges are often in direct opposition to knowledges produced by subordinate groups, such as indigenous peoples, who have developed alternative standpoints and validation processes (Collins, 1991: 202). The former account is dominant and therefore subordinate knowledge is rarely recognized and those producing it even more rarely acknowledged (Smith, 2012: 121). This self-stated omnipotent embodied Subject defines its own reality as concrete experience (Spivak, 2010: 27) prioritizing its own in relation to all other experience. Knowledge and power intertwine to become a nexus of considerable force, continually constructing one another, capable of defining discourse. Foucault argues that knowledge and power cannot stand-alone, they are in a perpetual reliant construction of one another, “knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true.' Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations” (Foucault, 1977: 27). This formidable force of power/knowledge constructs a referent figure for itself whilst simultaneously constructing the Other in opposition. The dominating power/knowledge nexus generates inequalities in the way knowledge is structured by legitimizing itself and delegitimizing alternatives (Shiva, 1993: 9). This is what leads Shiva to argue that modern knowledge systems, emerging from a colonizing culture, are themselves colonizing (9). As discussed previously, the concept of biopiracy has its epistemological roots in the colonial period. Otherwise framed as bioprospecting but termed biopiracy in this thesis due to its politically loaded associations with theft (Bender, 2003), biopiracy is “the practice of commercially exploiting naturally occurring biochemical or genetic material, especially by obtaining patents that restrict its future use, while failing to pay fair compensation to the community from which it originates” (Taylor, 2014). Ethnopharmacological studies have enticed many researchers and anthropologists to biodiverse areas of the Global South in search of ancient wisdom for contemporary healing (Lee and Balik, 2001).15 This type of ecoethno research is highly problematic for various reasons as has been discussed previously. When multinational pharmaceutical and agrichemical companies fund research with invested interests in exploiting indigenous knowledges for the exclusive economic enrichment of the Global North (Tamale, 2001: 28) the central knowledge producing role of the indigenous Other is obscured in Western discourse and the economic relation between indigenous peoples, resources and the Global North is denied or presented in a paternalistic frame (Plumwood, 1993: 49). Through the framing of indigenous peoples as devoid of scientific knowledge the role of indigenous peoples is constructed as being unrelated to the knowledge production process. Beyond these problematic issues also lies environmental degradation, habitat destruction and resource exploitation. Thus, in cases of biopiracy the appropriation of knowledge can be witnessed, and this denies the indigenous Subject the right to present and preserve one’s own scientific creativity, and the right to expression and self-determination. This theft can be viewed as double layered; first, it is the theft of intellectual and creative property nurtured by indigenous communities for generations, and second, the theft of potentially economically viable and life sustaining resources (Shiva cited in Shah, 2002). Shiva further comments on the central role racism has in the hierarchy of knowledge production and how this applies to biopiracy, “The knowledge of our ancestors […] is being claimed as an invention of US corporations and US scientists and being patented by them. The only reason something like that can work is because underlying it all is a racist framework that says the knowledge of the Third World and the knowledge of people of colour is not knowledge. When that knowledge is taken by white men who have capital, suddenly creativity begins… **Patents are a replay of colonialism**, which is now called globalization and free trade” (Shiva, cited in Mohanty, 2003: 232- 233, emphasis added). Indigenous knowledges are discounted when they emanate from a racialized indigenous Subject, yet that same knowledge is venerated when it emanates from a Global North Subject. Biopiracy operates as another mechanism of silencing the indigenous Subject, Those who do not fit within the neo-liberal capitalist regime and Global North’s narrow concept of modernity are disqualified, therefore reifying the Global North’s supremacy. **This act is authorized by** the subtle nuances of **international legislation** on the rights of indigenous peoples and trade and patent related laws that circumvent obstacles to the misappropriation of indigenous knowledges. Subject construction of the natural, inferior indigenous Other is created and sustained through these documents, as will be analysed in chapter four, enabling this discourse of exploitation. In the following chapter the postcolonial ecofeminist perspective used to frame this exploration will be detailed, accompanied by the critical discourse methodology that will be used to analyse the international legislation.

# 1AR File

## 1AR OV

#### The Role of the ballot is the highest layer in this round. It shapes what you as a judge are doing when you sign the ballot and what argument function as offense. The role of the ballot is to use the flow to identify and vote for the debater who performativity decolonizes debates about medicinal patents. That means the only impacts that matter are ones which prove that the way you are debating challenges institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery and doctrines that uphold colonialism. That’s Dunford and Curbishley.

#### Prefer my role of the ballot. Extend <*insert ROB warrant Extension*> this argument is conceded.

## Extensions

### Curbishley – Form First

Extend Curbishley 15 – 1. Speech acts are inseparable from content as they determine their truth and 2. pre-fiat offense comes first because our form level interrogations of assumptions allow us to deconstruct cognitive hierarchies.

### Reddy - Marronage

Centering minoritarian epistemologies within debate ruptures the project of cognitive colonialism as it functions as a marronage strategy where we infiltrate colonial systems to bring them down similar to the undercommons. Additionally, we gain and practice skills of survival inside that we can take to the real world. That’s conceded Reddy. This means that our reading of the 1AC fwk spills over and we are winning that on a pre-fiat layer, eliminate the colonial mindset.

### Kienpointer – Tricks bad

#### Extend Kienpointner 96: An A priori can’t prove the resolution true or false – sentences cannot be determined to be true or false without substantive argumentative context: 3 conceded arguments

#### [1] Syntactic structures vary considerable across languages – a statement that may appear tautologically true in one language may not even structurally exist in another – for example the phrase boys will be boys looks necessarily true in English but in French it would be 'Les garqons sont les (des?) gargons' which doesn’t semantically mean anything.

#### [2] despite the appearance of absolute certainty because of the alleged absolute identity between 'A' and 'A' or 'p' and 'p', in reality, no particular instances of entity A are completely identical – the assumption that they can exist in the material world begs the question and over categorizes ideas without logical explanation. It is an assumption that there is a 1 to 1 relationship between ideas in the material and formal world.

#### [3] Contradictions can be true and persuasive in natural language – they can’t be in formal logic – this means you can’t map formal logic rules onto natural language to determine truth. For example: 'A job isn't a job' can point out differences between more or less attractive options for work. It completely depends on the verbal context whether tautologies and contradictions are to be accepted or rejected

### Sunderland – Policymaking

Extend sunderland – Our scholarship is the first step towards deconstruction. Changing the language of biotech debates in educational spaces. Centering this anti-hegemonic scholarship forces a mindset shift which is k2 decol because the mindset that decolonization is impossible is what stops people from engaging in it.

### Paperson – State good

Extend Subversion - we have to use these white colonial technologies to fulfill our decolonial desires by interacting with the structures you criticize in order to make meaningful reform. Filipinos used the US colonial education system and exploited it so that 20% of all nonnatives in the US in the 1900s were Filipino children studying after graduating education systems. They then went on to become legislatures helping minoritarian policies. You can use the state against itself to create progressive change – that’s paperson

### Brady – Battle Fatigue

Extend conceded Brady – 3 conceded turns

[a] Battle fatigue – you place the burden on marginalized people to educate white people but they are tired of fighting.

[b] Allows the oppressor to evade responsibility since they don’t have to confront the discussion.

[c] Reduces marginalized folk to only being useful to explain their oppression leading to psychological violence.

### Performativity

#### Extend Performativity – Their contestation proves they care about the freedom of thought. They presuppose that their epistemology will be valued but only our framework allows that.

### Poppe – Phil bad

Epistemic investigations come first, for a statement to have truth value, the assumptions that underly that truth must also be true. This means understanding the effect of decolonial thinkingand establishing that everyone has a right to freedom of thought come first. That’s Poppe.

## Offense

### Curbishley

Patents commodify knowledge. They say that something is only innovative or original if a western system of ownership is applied to them. That excludes ways of knowing that operate outside of western commodity driven knowledge production. Original ideas existed before the first patent given at the end of the 1700’s was given, but the system of knowledge of patents excludes all those ideas.

Empirically western companies steal indigenous knowledge and put it behind a pay wall which is also colonial.

# A2 Theory

## A2 Fairness

#### Overview on the shells. Theory is a method of the conquistador’s concealment of the violence of conquest which perpetuates things like missing murder of indigenous women. Endorsing pedagogy against violence OW marginal fairness skews to your strategy on portability- Our form of education is more employable to weighing between standards for 4 minutes.

#### Extend Brady 17

#### [1] Privilege DA: The fantasy of fairness is a move to innocence that allows privileged individuals to believe they achieved accomplishments based on their own merit instead of civil society that marks certain bodies for success based on historically racialized lines. This space was never objective and your interp certainly won’t help. The impact is upholding systems of oppression – this outweighs theory – creating good norms presuppose the space is worth protecting

#### [2] Deficit DA: Appeals to neutral fair rules ignore how whole groups are set up to fail and then blames them for their failure. Notions of equality of opportunity allow billionaires to rig outcomes while blaming social divisions on character flaws – Appeals to fairness always ignore excluded forms of knowledge and label anyone who doesn’t view the world the same keep up as weak.

#### Extend Lee 17

#### [1] Agonism DA: Games cannot be separated from their cultural baggage. The idea that contestation improves education isn’t natural, but is particular expression of western capitalists

#### [2] Vagueness DA: There are at least three different understandings of fairness. Equality where everyone gets the same, equity where everyone gets according to need, and meritocracy where everyone gets according to inputs. Without a stasis point evaluating the flow is impossible.

#### [3] Bootstrap DA: Insisting on perfectly balanced games is impossible and reinforces the cultural notion that markets are perfect and failure is your fault.

#### [4] Monopoly DA: Role playing with a sole focus on strategy and winning is not a default position, but a choice. This turns debate into an instrumental and transactional enterprise that creates colonial subjects.

## A2 Clash = Education

#### [1] Ask you self would they actually prep – it’s been on our wikis for years –they would find a quick backfile

#### [2] Only values one type of knowledge production – one through clash and contestation – our whole fwk is an argument about why alternative forms of knowledge production are good- we have read lots of evidence about why regurgitating knowledge you don’t understand or aren’t intimately connected to is bad – impacted turn the wargaming mindset of debate

#### [3] We control biggest i/l – if they lose they will def go prep it because theory will realize they can’t win on theory

#### [4] I don’t need to sharpen my skills – I’ve researched the opposition already

## A2 Hack Against You

#### [1] How you and I interact doesn’t govern the judge’s relationship to us. We obviously have different roles.

#### [2] Judges are constitutively impartial evaluators. They definitionally can’t bring in any bias, they don’t need an external justification like fairness

## A2 Testing DA

#### [1] You could answer our fairness preempts even if we don’t defend the topic, so I can cross apply theory cards

#### [2] My arguments impact turns contestation as the best method of arriving at truth. That Lee 17

## A2 Can’t Weigh the Aff

#### [1] Aff is the interp – neg is the counter interp – the cross app has already happened

#### [2] Different flows are arbitrary, the 1thoery shell is indicating the whole 1ac, so we can apply

#### [3] Fairness is normative, that’s Koh

#### [4] Aff is an epistemic indict to debate practices – this causes a chicken or the egg controversy that can only be resolved by weighing the aff and comparing the layers equally

## Must Spec Plan

#### [1] A2 Education - Policy relevance K – self censorship and transformative ideas

#### [2] Impact Turn: Top down management systems bad K

## Generic Spec

Reject spec shells-

1) Infinite regress- there are an infinite number of things I can specify in the aff and you will always come up with a new one

2) Predictability- it is impossible for me to know what you want me to spec in the aff which means I’ll always violate

3) Neg shells are impossible to meet since you have access to bidirectional shells

4) There’s no brightline for what counts as something to spec, for instance you can always choose something from out of the blue and find a random justification for it

5) Justifies infinite neg abuse since I will always violate the shell which justifies reading theory every round, justifying the practice of spec as a norm endorses the model of debate in which neg always wins on theory

6) Definitionally uneducational since it justifies reading spec every single round which means it always collapses to theory

CX Checks

[1] Checks friv theory—willing to comply with theory debate. Theory trades off with substance, so CX checks are key to topic ed.

[2] Prevent neg uplayering—bidirectional shells mean

[3] Better in speccing in the AC proper because the neg can chose the level of specification they want in order to properly engage with the AC.

[4] Clear conversation about it in CX.

[5] Prevents you from wasting speech time—5 seconds in cross-ex is worth 2 mins on a shell I don’t violate

[6] Good for norm setting—everyone’s on board with the violation so we can just focus on the standards debate.

[7] Doesn’t actually waste CX time—checking the violation also clarifies how the case functions.

[8] Not checking in CX is ex post facto because I didn’t know the interp before the round which means only giving me a chance to comply with the rule after I know it is fair.

Reject multi plank shells-

1) Your norm isn’t universalizable enough to set a norm- nobody will ready this exact same line of abuse which means it only functions under and in round abuse model which means you also always prefer the counter interp under norms creation

2) No brightline- when you read multiple planks to the same shell there is no way to determine how much abuse crosses the line, for instance if you remove each plank independently how much unfairness would be solved

3) Infinite regress- there are always more planks you can add to the shell and find a random justification for it

4) Infinite abuse- the interp says one thing but the shell does not warrant explicitly each standard which means it always results in me losing on unwarranted arguments

## Enforcement Spec

## Implementation Spec

## New Affs Bad

## ROB Spec

## AT T FWK

#### Overview

Counterinterp – Their interp plus our aff – k2 generating the skills and combating the conquistadors, other debates solve their education offense so its only a question of whether including THIS aff generates a more ethical relation to the space. Two additional Net Benefits

[1] unequal division of ground and no TVA – that’s the guven and indigenous perspective evidence. It’s impossible to affirm the resolution through your forms of debate. Puts them in a double bind on fwk and theory – there’s no aff ground under their model of debate

[2] (something about how refusal in THIS round since they read fwk is k2 tuck and yang refusal and refusing a conformity to social norms)

#### AT Predictability

[1] hundreds of years of limit means its predictable

[2] colonialism affs are stock k affs

[3] CA Guven – transparency bad.

[4] (if disclosed] Disclosure solves

#### AT clash

[1] The affirmative point of contestation is necessary – we create the only contestation via the far left, modern politics is too far right, we need the affirmatives challenge.

[2] Presupposes the clash that you advocate for is valuable but we are winning that discussion is bad.

[3] You can clash via proposing other methods of resistance and combatting oppressive structures

#### AT Clash IL to education

[1] Turn - Voting aff creates trends. Voting against it on theory cannot result in more education because people don’t model losing arguments. Outrounds are a megaphone for my aff. If they can’t win on theory they will have to go home and read. Predictability is determined by ballots. Vote aff to make my lit predictable.

[2] Deterrence DA: Your deterrence claims prove that your theory stops my education from happening .

[3] Critical Thinking DA: Hard debate is good debate- thinking on your feet is a portable skill you can model in activism to be flexible in the face of tyrannical systems.

[4] This justifies torturing someone to make them stronger. If we prove theory is bad, reject the debater

[5] We control biggest i/l – if they lose they will def go prep it because they will realize they can’t win on theory

[6] I don’t need to sharpen my skills – I’ve researched the opposition already

[7] No Refinement:  I've already researched the neg so no impact

#### AT Small Schools

[1] Non-T debate is better for schools – you can focus on fine tuning your prep instead of broadly jumping all over, that’s the only way to beat schools like Harvard Westlake who have infinite prep to every topical position

[2] Argument style is k2 access – particular groups of people have certain views, assuming they want to debate the topic is eurocentric

[3] Biggest IL to access is anyone accessing debate in the first place making our aff a prereq.

#### AT Constitutive of debate

[1] Debate is a revolutionary game – content of debate changes debate, its not top down. The theory debate and their voters prove that we can shape what the activities looks like, There are no constitutive features. With a Good argument and a good impact you can shape the space and we have the best impacts.

[2] Is-Ought fallacy – just because it is, doesn’t mean it should be, we’ve warranted why it shouldn’t be

#### AT Argument Refinement

[1] Academic respectability DA – My arguments have already been tested by our authors, no reason we need this capitalist space to make them better.

[2] Happens in method v method debates – if someone read a lacan k I would refine my ability to win my theory of power

[3] NU - It’s happening right now, T-FWK is a counter-method, I’m just going to win because my arguments are already more refined.

#### AT Cede the Political

[1] Recognition of law DA – Deems that ideas should only be viewed as valid if the government says they’re valid

[2] Ralley around the flag DA – If we are forced to defend that the USFG taking some action is good it creates a push for patriotism leading to catastrophic governmental consequences. After 9/11, it was easier for bush to push us into war BECAUSE of the patriotism.

[3] The political in the context of this topic is bad, that’s the first standard on the counterinterp.

#### AT TVA

[1] Assimilation DA – you call for only including radical scholarship if they conform to what you think scholarship should look like

[2] Footnoting DA – our literature will always end up taking a backseat, extinction outweighs arguments would also crowd out our discussion.

[3] You can’t refuse and not refuse the topic at the same time meaning it doesn’t solve the aff.

### Overview

[1] TT impossible – Universal truths are impossible because they are subjective and are based on our own experiences – Taylor

[2] Even if truth is possible, your forms of truth mattering require the 1AC – That’s the Poppe argument extended on case.

[3] Ignores in round violence.

[4] Cross apply offense – your discussions are violent

### AT Logic

### AT Inclusion

[1] Our ROB is definitionally inclusion, minoritarian thought and discourse is excluded under TT, that’s our offense.

[2]

### AT Isomorphism

[1] You aren’t a binary – truth is subjective meaning there is no yes/no it is still a slider of more or less truth.

[2] We destroy preconceived notions and knowledge hierarchies that exist within judges minds meaning we REALLY stop judge intervention.

### AT Constitutivism/Textuality

### AT Echo-Chamber

### AT Rickert

[1] Non-unique, the judge is by definition in a position of power because they control who wins the round

[2] Rickert is an example of a normative power structure that is attempting to shut down epistemic disobedience, so you should question the epistemology behind Rickert’s understanding and conclusion about the role of judges

[3] You link, you haven’t justified why you read a role of the ballot which tells the judge to endorse a certain norm

[4] This argument assumes truth testing is a rule, but it’s a norm – the judge voting on it IS enforcing one model of debate over another

### AT A prioris/tricks

[1] The assumption that a structure determines truth indirectly smuggles in ideological baggage that requires additional argumentation to make true. For example, the argument “science is science, proof is proof” can only be said to be true if we have already normatively justified why the scientific method is a good epistemological model.

[2] Contradictions can be true and persuasive in natural language – they can’t be in formal logic – this means you can’t map formal logic rules onto natural language to determine truth. For example: 'A job isn't a job' can point out differences between more or less attractive options for work. It completely depends on the verbal context whether tautologies and contradictions are to be accepted or rejected

### AT Structural Fairness

## Colt Peacemaker

#### Imeet

1. We speced through all the texts of the cards and tags, we can’t change what the aff says and we take a stance on everything. They all say what offense would look like in the context of the literature and how to engage. 2. We literally do what they want. Look at the top we say its evaluated through the flow, and that methods matters if its consistent with Cross cultural cosmovisions and evaluated by comparing solvency on the level of the form, and on the theory section we explicitly say theory should be rejected and doesn’t matter under our ROB. Not only was it in the doc but we read it OUT LOUD. Since there was no further explanation on the violation DON’T allow them to extrapolate how we don’t violate

#### You violate

You don’t clarify whether or not the shell is evaluated through flow or another method of engagement, what counts as offense under your interp or how to weigh between shells. This outweighs

#### Counterinterp

Counterinterpretation: The affirmative doesn’t have to specify a comprehensive role of the ballot.

[1] Spec is infinitely regressive – there are infinite number of things that can be specified and it would be impossible to do so in the 6 min 1ac

[2] CX Checks a. asking in cx is better because you can choose what you want specification for and a more indepth spec could be provided b. checks friv theory which allows for engagement in our valuable discussion c. ensures that you fully understand the position. D. solves all their offense they could’ve asked but they didn’t

[3] Void for vagueness – you don’t specify what a theoretical objection is or what prefiat and post fiat offense means. Invites judge intervention because judge has to determine what is sufficient to meet. Independent voter because it takes the round out of debaters hands.

#### On engagement = education:

[1] This is an empirical claim without an empirical warrant. We told them the aff 30 mins before and the aff has been on my wiki since last year and they still don’t know anything about it.

[2] Only values one type of knowledge production – one through clash and contestation – we are winning that different forms of knowledge production are good with framing proper

[3] We control biggest i/l – if they lose they will def go prep it because they will realize they can’t win on theory

# DAs

## Super Bugs DA

#### Turn: The 1ACs use of extinction rhetoric as a justification for combating diseases legitimizes repression and genocide.

Savage 7 - Rowan Savage, Journal of Historical Sociology, September 25th 2007 ““Disease Incarnate”: Biopolitical Discourse and Genocidal Dehumanisation in the Age of Modernity” [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2007.00315.x] Accessed 9/14/21 SAO

How does particular language function to legitimise and justify the “unthinkable”? **The language that we use to describe action shapes our understanding of the meaning of that action**. There is a world of difference between the murder of a human being and the excision of a cancerous growth, between “massacre” and “cleansing”. Language which names people as a disease not only justifies their destruction, but the perpetrator may even feel self-righteous.155 In the context of the “therapeutic” aspect of genocide, Lifton described this as principled mass killing. 156 What such discourse does is to recreate understanding of the meaning of action. Metaphor, according to Murray Edelman, “defines the pattern of perception to which people respond”.157 Metaphorical language prevents its users from equating their own actions “with their old, ‘normal’ knowledge of murder and lies.”158 Metaphorical language thus renders murder non-murderous.159 Lifton, for example, wrote of the way in which, through the medicalised rhetoric which concealed killing, Nazi doctors created an “Auschwitz self” in which the doctor knew he selected, but did not interpret selections as murder, in which the meaning of action was completely disavowed.160 While doctors did not believe euphemisms such as Rampendienst (“ramp duty”) or Selektion (“selection”), “the language used gave Nazi doctors a discourse in which killing was no longer killing; and need not be experienced, or even perceived, as killing. As they lived increasingly within that language – and they used it with each other – Nazi doctors became imaginatively bound to a psychic realm of derealization, disavowal, and nonfeeling”.161 As one former Nazi doctor said to Lifton in reference to “euthanasia”, “there was a certain . . . sensibility that this couldn’t be, . . . [that] one cannot simply murder a mentally ill or . . . old person or an imbecile.”162 Metaphor, however, also performs another function intimately connected with maltreatment and murder: metaphors which name victim peoples as cancers, tumours, viruses and bacilli construct them as a threat, and at the same time refer, implicitly or explicitly, to the standard solution to that threat – their destruction. **In cases of disease epidemics “[t]he survival of the** nation, of civilized society, of **the world** itself **is said to be at stake – claims that are a familiar part of building a case for repression** (an emergency requires “drastic measures,” et cetera.)”.163 These “drastic measures” trump the moral codes which apply outside o1f an “emergency” situation. Herbert Hirsch and Roger W. Smith demonstrated the way in which fear-inspiring images are used to justify killing and call for action. **Out-groups will be called** vermin, infidels, traitors, heretics, **enemies of the people** . . . [T]he use of such terms by those with political authority is a clear sign that the society is moving in a genocidal direction. **Language becomes an indicator of a shift in the normative order** and serves notice that inhibitions against mass killing have begun to erode . . . [s]uch terms prepare the victims for destruction by dehumanizing members of the group and providing a warrant for genocide.164 Dehumanising and demonising metaphorical language is both “a legitimating mechanism and a call for action”.165

## Climate Tech DA

#### Turn: Green energy fuels colonialism, extraction, and sustainable warfighting

Dunlap 18 - Alexander Dunlap, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Centre for Development and Environment @ UiO, in Versobooks, in 2018 ["End the “Green” Delusions: Industrial-scale Renewable Energy is Fossil Fuel+", https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3797-end-the-green-delusions-industrial-scale-renewable-energy-is-fossil-fuel?fbclid=IwAR2XA2wDoZVbnjup4LREwyQrcKJEuOMqdrZ8Oj9mPRSXWhUZ6Ii15xpkqAo, 8-28-2019] AR

Renewable energy is **not the solution** we think it is. We have inherited the bad/good energy dichotomy of fossil fuels versus renewable energy, a holdover from the environmental movement of the 1970’s that is misleading, if not false. Fossil fuels are correctly understood to be at the heart of capitalism, industrialism, and state formation, the results of which have been ecologically catastrophic. 1 Meanwhile, industrial-scale renewable energy has emerged as the protagonist of our times, positioned as a solution to our ever-increasing energy consumption. Along with market-based conservation and “natural capital” policy making, it is taken to be among the central mitigating forces against climate change and ecological degradation. 2 With the rise of the green economy and climate change legislation, renewable energy includes the harnessing of wind, solar, and other apparently infinite “natural resources” to meet energy consumption on an unprecedented, ever expanding scale. However, contrary to the claims of its proponents, it by no means adequately addresses the real problem posed by current levels of energy consumption, which are driven by capitalist growth imperatives that ultimately **cause the ecological degradation and climate change** we see today. A focus on the technocratic issue of energy consumption often leaves **unchallenged** the political-**economic violence** of intrinsic to the social system that such energy powers. Industrial-scale renewable energy does nothing to remake the exploitative relationships with the earth and ecosystems created and reproduced by “industrialized humans” — people acclimated to and dependent upon an industrial capitalist way of life. The excessive concern with possible energy solutions within capitalism as opposed to more **fundamental social transformations** expresses our inability to **imagine any other way of living**, blinding us to the deeper socio-ecological insurrection that climate change has made necessary. Industrial-scale renewable energyand the grid-centric systems it powers represent the renewal and expansion of the present political and capitalist order**.** Not only are existing social discontents like inequality, discrimination, and exploitation reinforced by renewable energy, but the amount of infrastructure it presently requires clearly indicates the ecological costs involved in its full implementation. The wind and solar parks that span across fields and hillsides as far as the eye can see are harbingers of what this new energy system would look like. Where does all this metal come from, how much energy can it produce, and what kind of society do these systems propel and enable? In 1980, American Indian Movement activist Russell Means explained the uncomfortable reality of extractivism in Native territory. Confronting a room of revolutionary Communists about their desire for industrialism, Means said: Right now, today, we who live on the Pine Ridge Reservation are living in what Euro society has designated a "national sacrifice area." What this means is that we have a lot of uranium deposits here and Euro culture (not us) needs this uranium as energy production material. The cheapest, most efficient way for industry to extract and deal with the processing of this uranium is to dump the waste byproducts right here at the digging sites. Right here where we live. This waste is radioactive and will make the entire region uninhabitable forever. This is considered by industry, and the white society which created this industry, to be an ‘acceptable’ price to pay for energy resource development. Along the way they also plan to drain the water-table under this area of South Dakota as part of the industrial process, so the region becomes doubly uninhabitable. The same sort of thing is happening down in the land of the Navajo and Hopi, up in the land of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow, and elsewhere. Over 60 percent of all U.S. energy resources have been found to lie under reservation land, so there's no way this can be called a minor issue. For American Indians it's a question of survival in the purest sense of the term. For white society and its industry it's a question of being able to continue to exist in their present form. We are resisting being turned into a national sacrifice area. We're resisting being turned into a national sacrifice people. The costs of this industrial process are not acceptable to us. It is genocide to dig the uranium here and to drain the water-table, no more, no less. So the reasons for our resistance are obvious enough and shouldn't have to be explained further. To anyone. 3 Like the mining of fossil fuels, the siting and implementation of renewable energy systems entails the creation of such sacrifice zones, often on Indigenous land. These projects have thus confronted considerable pushback from rural and Indigenous populations, and the struggles around extraction outlined by Means have only continued to intensify. 4 By clinging to ideas like “sustainable development” and the “green economy,” progressives and other conscientious citizens are **staking the future of the planet on dubious mechanisms of oversight**, rife with conflicts of interest. The proliferation of voluntary UN standards, corporate social responsibility initiatives, private auditing firms, 5 and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) are but “band aids of good intentions.” 6 They ultimately cover over the true costs of extractivism, especially for the Indigenous people most affected by it. The distinctions drawn between fossil fuels and renewable energy involve a **sleight of hand** that masks the continued ecological degradations necessary for the continuation of **consumer society** and its ecological modernization. 7 Renewable energy requires immense amounts of mineral and fossil fuel resources, both in the construction of machinery necessary for extraction and for the manufacturing, transportation, construction and operation of wind turbines and other industrial-scale renewable energy systems. For all these reasons, instead of conceiving renewable energy as a “green” environmental solution, industrial or utility-scale renewable energy is more accurately referred to as “**Fossil Fuel+.”** Let us focus the discussion on a single renewable form: wind. Wind energy is something of a poster child for renewable energy in general, and it is increasingly becoming a preeminent approach to climate change mitigation. Through my fieldwork in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec region of Oaxaca, Mexico, where I was embedded for six months in a polícia comunitaria, I have been able to witness firsthand the struggles and negative outcomes involved in the implementation of this form of renewable energy, even as it continues to be encouraged and incentivized by national and international climate change mitigation programs. Consider, for example, the resources required to construct a single two-megawatt wind turbine. One of these turbines uses roughly 150 metric tons of steel for reinforced concrete foundations, 250 metric tons for the rotor hubs and nacelles, and 500 metric tons for the tower. 8 This also includes 3.6 tons of copper per megawatt. 9 Furthermore, industrial steel production is impossible without burning coal, as metallurgical coal — or coking coal — is a vital ingredient in the process. 10 Now, imagine regions like the Isthmus of Tehuantpec, where roughly 1,700 wind turbines operate to provide energy to Walmart, Grupo Bimbo, industrial construction, mining, and other companies and industries. 11 These turbines require significant amounts of mining. But every stage of the mining process, from extraction, processing, manufacturing, transport, construction and, to some degree, operation, requires a large expenditure of fossil fuels, a fact that is often neglected in the ecological accounting of wind energy. According to Guezuraga et al., the main consumers of energy and producers of CO2 for the turbines are “the production of stainless steel, followed by concrete and cast iron,” while “plastic production represents the most energy intensive process of all materials.” 12 While from the perspective of carbon accounting, steel, concrete, and cast iron production are the main consumers of energy, the ecological cost of mining and processing the rare earth minerals required to create permanent magnet generators in wind turbines remains publically neglected. The costs? A BBC report from 2015 called the Baotou mining and processing area “hell on Earth,” a terrifying, dystopian industrial environment filled with pollution and cluttered with factories, pipelines, high-tension wires, and artificial lakes oozing “black, barely-liquid, toxic sludge” that “tested at around three times background radiation.” 14 Rare earth mining is also disastrously inefficient. Mined with open pit, underground, or leached in-situ methods, rare earth ore deposits contain “low concentrations [of desired minerals] ranging from 10 to a few hundred parts per million by weight.” 15 Most concerning, however, is that “[t]he mining and processing steps for refining of rare earths tend to be energy, water and chemical intensive with significant environment risks affecting water discharges (radionuclides, mainly thorium and uranium; heavy metals; acid; fluorides), tailing management and air emissions.” 16 Wind energy thus involves socially and ecologically destructive mining processes that produce large amounts of mining tailings (or waste) containing heavy metals, thorium, and radioactive materials that goes into the air, water, soil, animals and people — the quantity and intensity of which is difficult to measure, not only for political but also epistemic reasons, making accounting for all ecosystem impacts not only costly but impossible. Amory Lovins points out that, while in theory wind turbines could be built without rare earth minerals (geared turbines), this is not currently the case for the majority of utility-scale wind parks — especially wind turbines located offshore or in areas with extremely strong winds. 17 Like other industrial enchantments (such as computers or smart technologies), wind farms continue to require levels of extraction that generate toxic and radioactive waste excluded from carbon accounting and often exempt from outdated life cycle assessments. 18 While further research on the exact levels of ecocide and political violence is necessary, the fact remains that the green economy is expanding demand for destructive mining of iron ore, copper, oil, and rare earth minerals. This in turn is part and parcel of the creation and expansion of sacrifice areas engulfing entire regions of China and the mountains, rivers, and forests across the world. The political and environmental costs of implementing these renewable wind energy systems are also high. Scale, placement, mitigation practices, and energy-use are foundational for assessing the viability and long-term socio-ecological sustainability of wind turbines. This means taking cognizance of the quantity and location of large-scale turbines, as well as the various political and socio-geographical factors involved in their construction. For example, while it is ill advised to place them on lands used by semi-subsistence Indigenous groups, within 1.5 kilometers of people’s homes, or in areas with fresh ground water, farming, and fishing areas, this is precisely what has happened on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. 19 The construction and placement of wind turbines requires the creation of roads that clear trees and animal habitats and compact soil. They also require the creation of wind turbine foundations that range, depending on the site, between 7-14 meters (32-45 ft.) deep and about 16-21 meters (52-68 ft.) in diameter. The foundations require the filling of ground water with solidifying chemicals before filling them with steel reinforced concrete. Then, during operation, leaking oil seeps into the ground where animals graze and into water wells where people drink. 20 And this leaves aside the effects of concrete production, as well as the violence involved in building wind or other renewable energy systems on Indigenous territory. 21 On top of all this, each wind turbine only has roughly a 30-40 year lifespan before it needs to be decommissioned and, hopefully, recycled, which is currently done at an unsatisfactory rate over all. 22 These unpleasant facts are why renewable energy should really be called fossil fuel+. The + indicates the added benefit of the renewable component or multiplier present in renewable energy systems while simultaneously acknowledging their dependence on fossil fuel based-technologies and extractivism. Because the +, or renewable component, is dependent on fossil fuels, it is not entirely positive. A focus on the benefits of renewable energy systems overlooks the simple but paramount question: what is all this energy used for? Renewable energy is opening and widening new wind, solar, and other natural resource frontiers, and in doing so it is renewing capitalism as well. In addition to private industry, militaries are beginning to take an increased interest in renewable energy systems. The same techniques and technologies that are helping corporations expand in ostensibly “green” directions will be applied to power military infrastructures and equipment. Whether the question is of solar in the Middle East, wind power in Mexico, or aircraft carriers that run on biofuels, these relations support the expansion of capitalism while obscuring its wrenching crises — thereby obstructing effective people-led or, if we are to be generous, government-led action. 23 Industry and security forces are beginning to acknowledge their ecologically destructive operations, and repressive forces are looking for ways to become ecologically “sustainable.” Such **“**sustainable violence**”** is not just the result of “bad governance.” 24 It is inextricably bound up in industrial extraction and efforts of economizing on the destructive and repressive actions of governments, industry and security forces involved in the expansion of industrial-scale renewable energy systems. Finally, fossil fuel industries — whether coal, natural gas, or oil — are beginning to invest and use renewable industry to legitimize their resource extraction operations and diversify their energy related holdings. Examples range from Gas Natural Fenosa, which is investing in wind parks in Mexico, 25 to RWE in Germany, operator of the largest coal mine in the country, which is setting up their own green daughter company — “Innogy” — to invest in wind energy and other “renewables” after spending years subverting and lobbying against them. 26 Grupo Mexico is also buying wind in Mexico and solar parks in the US to cloak their company in a “green” image. **Meanwhile,** they are powering the extraction **of raw materials** with renewable sources**.** 27 With Andrea Brock, I have called this the “renewable energy-extraction nexus,” which demonstrates **the intimate relationship between forms of extraction** — whether wind, natural gas, coal, or copper — necessary for **renewable energy development and** the continued subsumption of the earth and its inhabitants to industrial society. 28 The renewable energy-extraction nexus embodies the network of extractive industries and utility providers that form the skeleton of the state. This includes the intricate web of subsidies, collaboration and, at times, competition that renews the techno-industrial capitalist machine, spreading its infrastructure and values across the planet. This expansion happens at a great disregard for the costs involved, whether for people (particularly Indigenous or rural communities in both the Global North and South), animals, plants or geophysical nature. The preceding considerations allow us to recognize renewable energy as renewing destruction. It entails revived and intensified relations of domination that have much in common with colonial and center-periphery dynamics. When people embrace renewable energy systems, many do not realize that they require various forms of violence against people, environments, and animals, which must remain hidden for obvious reasons. These systems, which require concrete, steel, copper, rare earth minerals and, by extension, fossil fuel and mineral extraction, are made acceptable by being placed out of sight and out of mind, in the materially poor, rural, and Indigenous territories of the Global South and North. When liberals, progressives, “the Left,” and even environmental justice activists applaud the large-scale transition to renewable energy, they ignore the many hazards that would otherwise be unacceptable to them. Displacing fossil fuel industries to the Global South, where there are fewer environmental regulations and political rights, makes possible the use of excessive forms of state-private security violence against anyone who might protest them. Furthermore, the material necessary for renewable energy can only result in an increase in extractivism in the Global South and all the negative consequences this entails for people on the ground. If we do not confront these facts, then the solution of today — like previous energy systems and regime changes — will likely result in the complicated tyrannies of tomorrow. Recognizing renewable energy as Fossil Fuel+ is a first step to combat the fairytale of renewable energy. By highlighting the myths surrounding renewable energy, we also create the groundwork for greater environmental considerations and the enactment of radical ecological alternatives that address the roots of consumer society and its marketed solutions.

## Health Diplomacy DA

#### Turn: Appeals to health diplomacy reinforce extractive colonial hierarchies

Irfan et al 21 - Ans Irfan, Christopher Jackson, Ankita Arora, Scientific America, April 5, 2021 “We Must Enhance—but Also Decolonize—America’s Global Health Diplomacy” [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-must-enhance-mdash-but-also-decolonize-mdash-americas-global-health-diplomacy/] Accessed 9/13/21 SAO

Global health is the newest depoliticized and dehistoricized iteration of colonial medicine. **Colonial medicine,** which **was started to protect white people from diseases** present among colonized Black and brown people, has also been known over the years as international health, imperial medicine and tropical health. As part of the colonial agenda of “civilizing” the colonized populations, one of the historical aims of global health was to **dismantle local** systems of knowledge, including **health and medicine, and impose Western biomedical models** instead. These colonial foundations of global health continue to persist in the United States, a settler-colonial nation. Nevertheless, global health is often taught uncritically, without a deeper reflection on Western scientists' social position as part of the Global North’s scientific enterprise and related positionality; power dynamics; historical context; and contemporary colonial approaches such as top-down global health governance and programming. **Global health diplomacy,** a critical tool in the U.S. foreign policy tool kit, **is** perhaps **one of the key mechanisms that perpetuate contemporary colonialism**. Rooted in white male saviorism, global health diplomacy often maintains imbalanced power dynamics. Further, it approaches formerly colonized, brutalized and looted nations—colloquially known as “developing countries”—with a deficit model that positions Western society as an omniscient benefactor for the rest of the world. This attitude is reflected in the top-down global health models imposed on countries in the Global South. From the Trump administration's global gag rule to the Obama administration's promotion of LGBTQ rights, U.S. global health assistance too often comes with demands in sociocultural infrastructure changes that reflect the desires of the political party controlling the White House. To be abundantly clear, women's health; access to sexual and reproductive services; and LGBTQ+ rights are fundamental values that should be a part of the U.S.’s global agenda. However, it is critical to note that the Western morals imposed on the global population during colonization have caused many of the regressive, inhumane policies such as anti-LGBTQ+ laws to begin with. To that end, we must more consciously distinguish between health diplomacy that actually meets the needs of historically disenfranchised global populations and policies that merely advance an imperialist U.S. political agenda.

## Treaties DA

#### Turn: International Treaties do not represent indigenous people and reify oppression and dominance.

Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 “Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy%20Thesis.pdf] Accessed 8/13/21 SAO

At the discursive level, all three documents are produced from a Global North-centric perspective. The politics of representation, who speaks and where knowledge production occurs are important factors in the analysis of the discursive practice. This uniformed bias towards the Global North contributes to the hegemonic power structures embedded within the texts. Declarations of rights have often been cited for being Western-centric, individualist and not aligned with collective ideas of rights (Panikkar and Sharma, 2007) that reflect the values and ideologies of some indigenous communities (Hsieh, 2006). Both the US Patent Law and TRIPS have also been criticized for internationalizing a Global North perspective on trade, intellectual property and knowledge production (Yamane, 2011). Whether any of these documents adequately represent and reflect the ideas, beliefs and values of the people they aim to speak for is up for contestation, with the consensus being that these documents do harm to the Global South and vulnerable communities and individuals (Joseph, 2011). These documents are produced by international organizations, a key feature of neo-liberalism whereby soft power can be exercised internationally by politically invested interests, which are politically patriarchal spaces (Chaulia, 2011). International organizations lie across the intersection of power and ideas that are derived from the patriarchal capitalist world system (10). Furthermore, the intertextual nature of these pieces of international legislation aids their discursive power. The UNDRIP builds on recommendations from the Human Rights Council Resolution 1/2 and TRIPS is largely regarded as a piece of legislation built upon US and European patent and trade laws. The strategic goals of these documents and the discourse they create serves to reify the dominance of the Global North and maintain the oppression of the Other, specifically the indigenous Other and natural resources.

# Ks

## Ableism

#### [1] Turn: The negative research practices erases indigeneity and perpetuate global alienation and colonialism

Velarde 18 - Minerva Rivas Velarde, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Disabilities Studies Quarterly, 2018 “Indigenous Perspectives of Disability” [https://dsq-sds.org/article/view/6114/5134] Accessed 9/23/20 SAO

This article contributes to the discourse on disability from an indigenous perspective, an area about which there is very little known (Grech, 2015; Hickey, 2008; Meekosha, 2008, 2011). It supports the concerns raised by Meekosha that writings on disability have mainly come from 'northern' countries, asking the question: do disabled people in 'southern' countries share the same issues and ideas? When attempting to answer this question it is necessary to acknowledge the impact of the power structure between the global north and south. Disability scholars from the global south and from indigenous populations within Western colonial settler societies, such as Australia and New Zealand, are putting themselves forward, writing about the impact that their identities and cultural roots have on their reflections and their struggles regarding decolonising their thinking (Barker & Murray, 2010; Hickey, 2008). Rivas Velarde (2015), when reflecting on immersing herself in indigenous issues and colonisation, wrote: "I was not fully aware of the impact of the processes of colonisation, colonialism, and neo-colonial power on the lives of disadvantaged people in the global South. I was not prepared either to reflect deeply about my indigenous roots and how through my so called formal education such values have been silenced" (p.35). The author's notion of oppression and view of decolonisation as a confronting act led her to undertake a process of rescuing her roots and identity, thereby adding to the claim of Grech (2015), who suggested that decolonisation is not simply a metaphor, rather it requires taking on a political process, owned by the global south, to confront colonial lineages, as well as embracing collaboration with the north. Whilst empowering the voice of the global south and working towards reconciliation, this paper reflects the efforts of disability scholars collaborating to decolonise disability. Current dominant disability discourses do not sufficiently reflect the cultural assimilation or indigenous rights to self-determination from a native rights point of view (Grech, 2015; Meekosha, 2011). Moreover, colonial practices have been linked to high rates of preventable disabilities in the global south (Meekosha, 2008, 2011). However, rates of social deprivation associated with the causation of disability are only part of the issue, and it is equally important to understand how disability is perceived in the global south, particularly by indigenous people. The concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991) can help in understanding the complexities of how indigeneity and disability identity are compounded and how inequities have been triggered by this intersection. Hickey and Wilson (2017) claim that "being indigenous, having experiences of colonisation and institutionalisation, experiences of racism and discrimination, and living with disabilities gives rise to multiple identities that go unseen by people with or without experiences of disability" (P. 89). They state that this is critical to understanding these identities, as indigenous peoples have to struggle with issues related to race, colonisation, and the marginalisation of disability in their community and society in general. Failing to do so will not only perpetrate segregation, but will also allow disability scholarship to continue theorising about indigenous people without acknowledging their viewpoints, lived experiences and needs. Indigenous Voices in Disability Studies Contemporary literature indicates that indigenous communities find the term 'disability' to be alien and somewhat contradictory to their traditional beliefs concerning impairments (Connell, 2011; Hickey, 2008; King, 2010). Nearly two decades ago, Ariotti (1999) conducted a study in Western Australia which revealed that the Anangu people, rather than seeing impairments, celebrated uniqueness and accepted the diversity and difference present within humanity. Subsequently, Meekosha (2011) has urged researchers and policy-makers in Australia to listen to indigenous peoples' concepts of disability, as these are absent from current policy and legislation. In keeping with the outcomes of the study of the Anangu people, the Māori community in New Zealand has also reported a need for disability to be constructed in a more positive and integrated fashion than is the case in Western scholarship (Fitzgerald, 1997). Māori people see the nature of humanness as a unique and interrelated phenomenon, which connects the past, present, and future through land attachment and spiritual well-being, with interrelations at its core (Hickey, 2008). As such, inter-dependency between heritages, time and space cannot be easily transferred to the Western conceptualisation of humanity. This ancestral Māori conceptualisation embraces differences and uniqueness, and so impairment is a natural part of being. This approach opens up a major divide between the indigenous concept of uniqueness with the non-indigenous concept of impairment and ultimately disability, with indigenous enquiry incorporating non-empirical and non-generalisable dimensions. Gotto (2009) explored the ways in which people with intellectual impairments were integrated into indigenous communities in Mexico, and reported that such individuals were valued and respected members who were recognised for their contributions, rather than for their impairments. In line with the findings from Mexico and examples from Australia and New Zealand, indigenous traditional beliefs work to welcome individuals as people first, with a reluctance to identify them as different, impaired, 'deficient' or disabled. Shakespeare (1996) cautiously stated that having an impairment may be a common experience, and being disabled is the specific social identity of a minority, yet being disabled as a social identity is not accepted by indigenous people. Watson (2002) also argued that this discrepancy is not exclusive to indigenous peoples and that the use of the term 'disability' has not always been welcomed by non-indigenous groups who are disabled. In his paper entitled 'Well, I know this is going to sound very strange to you, but I don't see myself as a disabled person: identity and disability', Watson (2002) challenged the concept of identity in disability scholarship and argued that 'disabled' persons share one important attribute, which is that they are all subject to oppression regardless of how they identify themselves. Watson (2014) has added strength to Shakespeare's arguments by claiming that culture is both a source of oppression and liberation for disabled individuals. In this sense it is easy to see that what has emerged as a political strategy for the liberation of disabled persons in the global north has arguably widened the divide between the north and the south, thereby reinforcing oppressive ideologies. Further insight into indigenous identity comes from Barker and Murray (2010), who explained that for some indigenous people the determination of normalcy in wellness and health is dependent upon whether an individual is in balance with his/her spirituality, family, social connections and ancestral attachment to the land. This acknowledgement of indigenous needs is inter-connected with a responsiveness to cultural needs, which is related to cultural competency. However, meeting the needs of indigenous people has been limited to looking at outcomes, as opposed to building theories or discourses that are relevant to disability based upon the experiences of indigenous people (Bickenbach, 1999). In view of the emphasis placed on culture in indigenous groups, the development of a constructivist approach to disability is relevant, as it incorporates both culture and life experiences of indigenous people in the postcolonial era (Snyder and Mitchell, 2007). With such an approach, indigenous identity, self-determination and culture become the driving force for the liberation of indigenous people in the global south through addressing the diversity, uniqueness and history of each indigenous region, tribe and community from around the globe (Bhopal, 2008; Durie, 1998). When focusing on the importance of indigenous identity, Hickey (2008) used the concept of 'othering' (Foucault, 1972) to describe how disabled indigenous identities have been negatively perceived by non-indigenous people. Foucault (1972) first introduced this concept after working with vulnerable people who were seen as 'other', rather than as having any value. The lack of knowledge production on how disability is perceived in indigenous communities is another aspect of 'othering' and indigenous discrimination (Creamer, 2009). In support of this position, Lavallee and Poole (2010) have argued that knowledge of indigenous peoples' systems and beliefs has been disregarded, whereas this should be incorporated into augmenting, extending and contributing to contemporary disability enquiry. Furthermore, from an epistemological viewpoint the construction of a discourse on indigenous disability needs to challenge the traditional Western construction of disability knowledge (Meekosha, 2008). Smith (1999) similarly has discussed the 'regimes of truth' which are situated within a particular cultural social system and need to be 'decolonised'. In this context an indigenous approach to disability must confront the epistemology of the Western approach to research, which has concentrated on positivism rather than on research of a participatory nature (Gilroy, 2016; Grech, 2016; Smith, 20007).

#### [2] Turn: Identifying as disabled undermines decolonization

Soldatic ’15 (Karen– PhD, an Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow (2016-2019) who prior to joining the Institute, worked at UNSW. "Postcolonial reproductions: disability, indigeneity and the formation of the white masculine settler state of Australia." Social Identities, 2015 Vol. 21, No. 1, 53–68, TandFOnline.) NPR

Further, emerging work in the area has identified the ways in which the category of disability for indigenous people within the white-settler colonial state resonates strongly with ongoing violence, oppression and stigmatization. So much so that, in fact, many indigenous people with disability do not want to claim disability, impairment or ill health as another marginalizing identity (Gilroy, 2009). Disability, with its parallel discourses of biological inferiority, can be a dangerous identifier for indigenous people struggling against white-settler colonial power (King, 2010). Many indigenous people seek to make invisible any additional bodily and mind differences that may amplify their ongoing experiences of violence and dispossession (Hollinsworth, 2013). Further, indigenous knowledges map the body and mind differently from those of western disability epistemologies and, therefore, what stands as disability for the settler is not positioned in this way for indigenous people (King, 2010). In many Aboriginal nations, disability, as Social Identities 57 Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:59 31 May 2015 constructed within the western frame, is an unknown (Ariotti, 1999). While disabled scholarship may wish to centre disability to enrich intersectional, complex, hybrid identities, the converging of other identities can undermine indigenous repertoires of decolonization. This is most clear when we consider the ways in which indigenous activism for indigenous nation-state formations radically de-centres one of the central tenets of postcolonial methodological assumptions – methodological nationalism. Critics have argued that the emphasis on nation, nation-state and nationalism inadvertently places boundaries around the possibilities of developing a cosmopolitanism/transnationalism with the emergence of globalization and is not reflective of the intensified integration of neoliberal nation-state economies (see Chernilo, 2006, for a full discussion). Leading postcolonial theorist Ato Quayson (2013) has acknowledged this claim, suggesting that the substantive methodological framework of the nation-state has not, as yet, adequately addressed its methodological critics – now a more urgent task with the onset of neoliberal global (often forced) mobilities.

### 2ar Ableism EXT

#### Intersectionality DA: Err Aff – they have no specific ev on how disability and indigeneity interact –This is a strategic omission that means the neg theory of power can’t be liberatory. Voting neg ensures the discussion continues to be segregated and dooms decolonization. 2NR discussions are insufficient, the focus of the 1NC betrays the negs motives.

#### Footnoting DA: Northern narratives surrounding disability will always take center stage unless you vote neg to force the discussion towards indigeneity. The 2NR proves natives were always an afterthought

#### Negativity DA: For many indigenous groups’ disability is an alien phrase that betrays the failure of western epistemology. The negative forces the western frame of negativity upon groups which would never self-identify as such. This means if you believe the negs impacts are true, voting neg just makes more people experience them.

#### Universalism DA – The negative advocacy assumes universalism and employs non-participatory research which erases indigenous ways of knowing. Means the neg cant describe the affs violence

#### Accountability DA: Through affirmation of disability, settlers never have to be accountable for the way they perpetuate colonialism – treats as naturally occurring phenomenon. For example, diabetes was nonexistent in indigenous populations before colonization but the introduction of sugar flour by colonizers has led to many indigenous peoples losing limbs to the disease.

#### Identification DA: Identifying as disabled marks indigenous bodies as open for colonialization. Even if the neg views disability as a positive identifier, larger structures frame it through a deficit perspective and mobilize reactionaries – For example alcoholism on reservations has been used to justify more federal intervention into the lives of people whose land has been stolen.

## Afro-Nihilism

#### [1] Perm do both: The aff is the K: Epistemologies of objectivity cause antiblack violence

Warren 19 - Calvin Warren, assistant professor of African American studies at Emory University, in the Journal Qui Parle, December 1st, 2019 “The Catastrophe Black Feminist Poethics, (Anti)form, and Mathematical Nihilism” [https://read.dukeupress.edu/qui-parle/article-abstract/28/2/353/151702] Accessed 2/10/20 SAO

Black feminist poethics, however, presents the secret of mathematics as an unspoken contamination of purity, a noetic sequela—as opposed to the purity of Badiou’s null set. The history of antiblack violence is precisely the imbrication of phenomenology and ontology, and it is difficult to disentangle pure form from a violent situation. In “Mathematics Black Life,” Katherine McKittrick identifies one location of this mathematical drama—the archive. The archive of slavery produces “the mathematics of unliving,” by reifying and objectifying captives within an arithmetic logic of commerce and finance. Employing and manipulating **numbers produces fractioned black being**; the archive overrepresents black death as the limit of blackness within this situation, if we read her though Badiou. Mathematical thinking always carries a certain phenomenological violence with regard to blackness. McKittrick understands the entanglement of ontology and phenomenology as the epidermalization of math. Furthermore, “the seeming neutrality of **mathematics . . . is trusted as** innocuously **objective**, thus providing an alibi for racism.”14 **This neutrality**—contamination masquerading as pure form—**is complicit in reproducing antiblack violence.** To “do the math” within McKittrick’s theory acknowledges that epidermalization contaminates every “pure form” and thinking mathematically requires protocols for addressing this contamination. This protocol, unlike Badiou’s, approaches mathematics through skepticism—“believing the lie,” as she would state.

#### [2] No offense to the perm: Warren calls for a rejection of the dualism of matter and form and its attendant universal knowledge scheme.

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Da Silva imagines the complete destruction of form as a possibility for blackness. We might call her destructive approach an “immanent critique” of sorts in which mathematical reasoning is turned against this very reasoning to obliterate form. But is such a complete separation possible? Perhaps it is impossible to disentangle matter from form, especially since modern violence binds these together in devastating ways. That is, ∞ - ∞ (or infinity minus infinity) is the formalization of mathematical nonsense or the form destruction assumes in calculative thinking. Thus the presentation of pure matter (plenum) can be thinkable only through form itself. Thinking pure matter still requires pure form—form as oxymoron, nonsense, impasse, or impossibility (or form as Badiou’s empty set). If we cannot completely wrest form from matter, if we cannot sanitize formal violence yet simultaneously maintain the “purity” of matter, we are caught in a mathematical fantasy of reproduction and redeployment. I would propose that we destroy both matter and form—a mathematical nihilism. This represents another mathematical fantasy, one that **resists the discourse of purity and separation**, one that desires the destruction of modernity’s dualism (form/matter). If, as I suggest, form and matter are inseparable and purity is but a fantasy of separation, I would like to envision destroying both—since we will never achieve pure matter apart from form. Such nihilism would employ the destructive approach to mathematics da Silva brilliantly introduces, by turning mathematical reasoning against itself, but would not aim to preserve matter (or form). It would require (un)thinking existence. If we destroy both matter and form, what is left? The aftermath, or remnants of destruction, is not something I can present with apodictic certainty. But this is the risk of destruction: a risk into an abyss of the unknown, contravening mathematical compulsions of certainty, calculation, and predictability. Such nihilism presents destruction as the only hope for blacks contending with regenerative and inexhaustible antiblackness through form and matter. Mathematical nihilism requires the “end of the world,” since the form/matter dualism sustains the world, its knowledge, and possibilities. This fantasy of total destruction promises neither an Event, a Numerical Burst, nor purity, since such promises just reproduce and codify antiblack violence. A catastrophe is necessary not only to disabuse us of purity myths and numerical transformation but also to open a space for imagining a different existence.

#### [3] Perm double bind: Either the inclusion of the alternative with the affirmative resolves any residual links or the alternative can’t solve the SQ which is inundated with violence, optimism, and liberalism. The Net benefit to the perm is the affs antihumanist method. Any risk my method resolves some material violence is offense for the aff.

#### [4] Extend Mathur 18, that’s the pluralism card from the 1AC that says the resurgence of nationalist western reactionaries means we need as many methods as possible in our debates about weapons policy. That’s offense

#### [5] The aff method is better: extend King 16 – Locating humanism as the root of violence is the best method for simultaneously resolving issues of colonialism, anti-black, and inter-species violence.

#### [6] Warren would reject dualisms – means mutual exclusivity is impossible to generate in the world of the neg alternative. We also reject the notion of mutual exclusivity in the 1AC – all knowledge systems have value so long as they don’t infringe on the practicing of another, that’s Poppe 16.

#### [7] Middle Passage focus erases black identity and replicates eurocentrism. The affs civilizational focus solves for more people

Wright 04 - Michelle M. Wright 2004 - Michelle M. Wright is an Associate Professor in the Department of African American Studies at Northwestern University, where she teaches courses in theories of the African diaspora and comparative studies of Black European and African American discourses of ‘‘blackness.’’ "Chapter 12: Middle Passage Blackness and its Diasporic Discontents: The Case for a Post-War Epistemology" In Africa in Europe: Studies in Transnational Practice in the Long Twentieth Century (pp. 217-233). Liverpool University Press. NPR/SAO

Just a quick glance at the table of contents of this volume, Africa in Europe, points to a significant and welcome difference from most of the other volumes on the Black/African diaspora that have preceded it: it is not framed by what I term the ‘Middle Passage epistemology’, or MPE.1 While academe is often derided as the ‘Ivory Tower’, cut off from the exigencies of the ‘real world’, academic production in fact reflects the cold economic realities of the postwar era so that **those who make up the majority of the African diaspora** in fact **are not represented**. Simply put, this is because the United States, even in what many including myself would consider its last gasps of empire, still dominates the world in terms of well-paid scholars, relatively wealthy universities and colleges, not to mention academic presses and academic publications. As a result, the majority of publications on the Black/African diaspora tend to reflect the ancestral experience of many African Americans despite the fact that African Americans, numerically speaking, comprise **only 30 million of the some one billion Africans** and peoples of African descent that are the African diaspora. This is the result, I would argue, of implicitly interpellating ‘blackness’ as a collective group identity through the MPE. The MPE is a necessary epistemology, not the least because it lastingly marks a horrific journey and equally horrific enslaved survival that at least gives pause to those steeped in the rather insistent myth that the Enlightenment was only an age in which reason dominated and human suffrage was wholly embraced by our most eminent thinkers. Yet more often than not the MPE does not do all it claims to do, and in mapping or narrating the African diaspora many are left behind and this most likely begins with its central myth of a homogenous Black identity that in turn produces a very fixed notion of time. Although the MPE supposedly operates as an epistemology for all blacks in the West who arrived through European and American slave ships, its focus tends to be on American blacks. Even in his celebrated analysis of the ‘routes and roots’ of Black diasporic identity that forms the ‘single complex unit’ of The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy largely ignores Black Caribbean and UK literary, intellectual and philosophical contributions. Although the Atlantic Ocean of course borders the east coast of the South American continent and the West coast of the Eurasian continent, The Black Atlantic ignores those Atlantic populations to focus on the elite majority within that minority: heterosexual bourgeois American black men.

## Afro-Pess

#### Perm Do Both: The Aff is the K. We read a 6 min K of civil society and Humanism. And advocate ending the world as we know it

Winters 17 - Joseph Winters, Black Perspectives, professor of African American Studies at Duke University September 5th, 2017 “Blackness, Pessimism, and the Human” [https://www.aaihs.org/blackness-pessimism-and-the-human/] Accessed 2/13/20 SAO

What exactly is Afro-pessimism? Who are its proponents? While several authors currently identify with the Afro-pessimist position (Jared Sexton and Calvin Warren, for instance), Frank Wilderson has provided the most acute and well-recognized definition of the term. In his incisive text Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, Wilderson writes, “The Afro-pessimists are theorists of Black positionality who share Fanon’s insistence, that though Blacks are sentient, the structure of the entire world’s semantic field…is sutured by anti-black solidarity” (58). According to this description, the domains of meaning, grammar, and law are defined over and against the black body, which came into being through the gratuitous violence of kidnapping, the Middle Passage, and slavery. The Afro-pessimist contends that humanism incorrectly assumes that all forms of suffering can ultimately be redressed and overcome through the grammar of rights, respect, and compassion. To the contrary, Wilderson contends that humanism cannot acknowledge “an object who has been positioned by gratuitous violence—a sentient being for whom recognition and incorporation are impossible” (55). In other words, humanism is ~~blind~~ to its own condition of possibility because **the coherence of the Human relies on the exclusion of blackness.** There is no grammar for black suffering within humanism because humanism treats suffering as contingent and resolvable through the process of assimilation. This familiar stance cannot register the constitutive quality of anti-black violence, which is a condition that can only be eliminated, according to Wilderson, by bringing about the end of civil society **as we know it**. Perhaps what is so powerful—attractive to some, repulsive to others—about Wilderson’s formulation is how it compels us to re-examine pervasive assumptions about race, black struggles for freedom, history, and human recognition. For clarity, I break these assumptions into three parts: the politics and grammar of recognition, the Human as a site of racial transcendence, and the relationship between structure and agency. It is very difficult to talk about the strivings of excluded groups apart from the politics of recognition. Persecuted communities are required to articulate their grievances and aspirations through the language of recognition, a predicament outlined by the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. In his oft-cited description of the Master/Slave relationship, Hegel suggests that antagonistic, hierarchical relationships can be overcome through struggles for mutual recognition. Mutual recognition is the capacity of two or more people to see themselves as participants in a shared ethical and political life. Instead of seeing each other in a hostile, contentious manner, mutual recognition occurs when individuals see themselves in others and vice versa. This mutual acknowledgement is possible because of collective norms and practices, and the general realization that individual lives depend on the broader social world for survival, affirmation, and ethical formation. While this sounds encouraging, Wilderson maintains that this domain of mutual recognition depends on a fundamental barring of black bodies. He claims that “Whereas Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially present through some struggle for, of, or through recognition, Blacks cannot reach this plane” (38). This plane of recognition is anti-black. Eric Garner experienced this throughout his life and in his last breath. His chokehold killing at the hands of police officers was deemed legal and appropriate, indicating a long-lasting antagonism between the law and blackness (the law reproduces itself through the surveillance and containment of blacks). Some even refused to blame Garner’s death on the violent actions of the police officers and instead blamed his obesity, demonstrating how the “excessive” black body eludes everyday practices of recognition and compassion. The assumption about the viability of mutual recognition, which is contested by the pessimist, dovetails with enduring desires for racial transcendence. Whether one believes that we live in a post-racial world or not, the transcendence of racial difference supposedly occurs when we embrace our common humanity. According to this view, race is merely an illusory social construct that hampers people’s ability to acknowledge similarities across racial lines. When someone claims, “I am part of the human race” or “All lives matter,” the assumption is that the Human is a universal, all-accessible category. In other words, the Human is an inclusive category while the invocation of blackness is divisive. Following Fanon, the pessimist reminds us that the Human is also a divisive modern construct that emerges alongside racial formations. More specifically, the qualities of the ideal Human—reason, freedom, property, accumulation—are defined in opposition to certain kinds of undesirable characteristics and positions—wildness, excess, slavery, and the vagabond. Consequently, the Human that imagines itself settled and standing his/her ground (George Zimmerman) is justified in attacking a black body that seems out of place (Trayvon Martin), that is wandering aimlessly and “up to no good.” While Wilderson can concede that the Human, as the domain of recognition, has assimilated formerly unrecognized groups and communities, he suggests that the very process of becoming Human requires an acceptance of anti-blackness. Therefore, there are structural limitations to the inclusivity of the Human. The very language of structures rubs many people the wrong way. In addition to diminishing the significance of history and context, the notion that the social order is organized by constitutive constraints denies agency. We live in a world that celebrates the self-willing individual wherein the self is depicted as the ultimate source of its own success or failure. Whether we read self-help books or listen to prosperity gospel sermons, the message is that life is filled with infinite opportunities and a person’s ability to realize these abundant possibilities depends on that person’s attitude, courage, work ethic, and so forth. More sobering views of agency suggest that while our actions are constrained by norms, these norms undergo transformation through subversive performances of the norm.1 For the pessimist, the potential for subversion and transformation runs up against inveterate limitations. This constrained agency happens within a social order made possible by anti-black violence. When Wilderson uses terms like “Black” and “Human” in capital letters, he registers a social world that positions, marks, and manages bodies in a relatively reliable, systemic manner. While difference and variation exist within the category “Black,” Wilderson contends that these differences do not diminish the incompatible non-relationship between Blackness as a position and the sphere of the Human. This antagonism, while it emerged historically, has become part of the fabric of the world. One might wonder why we should even write, contemplate, and diagnose these matters if there is no possibility for altering this predicament. In light of **Wilderson’s lifelong activism**, the Afro-pessimist stance does not necessarily lead to resignation but can prompt radical theoretical, aesthetic, and political efforts to end the world **as we know it.**

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## Anthro

#### Perm Do Both: Ethical reciprocity refuses abstraction and requires particularized analysis of relations beyond humanism that are consistent with antrho scholarship

Rosiek et al 20 - Jerry Lee Rosiek, Jimmy Snyder, and Scott L. Pratt, in the Journal Qualitative Inquiry, 2020 “The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement” [https://coe.uoregon.edu/rosiek/files/2020/01/Indigenous-Theories-and-the-New-Materialisms-hard-published-edition.pdf] Accessed 4/21/21 SAO

**Agent ontologies** in Indigenous studies literature are well developed in many of the places where the new materialist agential realism literature is not. The current literature on agential realism in the Eurocentric canon is most frequently focused on justifying the idea of non-human agency against the grain of presumptions that the objects of our studies passively await our discovery and description. The language and assumptions underlying contemporary Indigenous philosophy, by way of contrast, often presume the existence of pervasive non-human agency. There is, therefore, less need to argue for agent ontologies against more mechanistic ontologies that have characterized Western thought for centuries. A greater portion of Indigenous scholarship focuses on working out specific performative and ethical implications of agent ontologies on their own terms. This difference makes the Indigenous studies literature on agent ontologies illegible to some scholars of Western philosophy or it makes it seem less rigorous or less genuinely theoretical. This can be the response, even though the role of “theory” is supposedly put under reconsideration by Barad’s agential realism. Conversely, to someone already convinced of the ubiquity of non-human agency, the prevalent interest among Eurocentric scholars with justifying a departure from their inherited humanist ontologies seems like a highly provincial obsession, one that distracts from the more substantive work of shaping productive ontological relations with a world full of human and non-human agents. Laguna Pueblo scholar Paula Gunn Allen (1986) writes about this preference for the doing of an agent ontology rather than simply talking about it. American Indian People do not content themselves with simple preachments of this truth, but through the sacred power of utterance they seek to shape and mold, to direct and determine, the forces that surround and govern human life and the life of all related things. . . .This is in essence the great principle on which all productive living must rest, for relationships among all the beings of the universe must be fulfilled; in this way all individual lives may also be fulfilled. (pp. 55-56) We can see this more performative aspect of an agent ontology—what Allen refers to as a preference for utterance over preachment of truth—in several themes that appear regularly in Indigenous studies literature. Among these are a focus on the particularity of relations with nonhuman agents and on the performance of ethical reciprocity with non-human agents. Engaging the Particularity of Non-Human Agency In Indigenous studies scholarship, non-human agency is taken as a given and so is less frequently introduced as a general concept. Instead, there is more emphasis on the formation of relations with particular other-than-human agents. This is a reflection, in part, of the fact that there is no one “Indigenous” cosmology or metaphysics. Within this diversity, however, there arerepeated and **consistent references to an understanding of the character of agency as something that emerges out of particular circumstances in such a way that its most salient features are missed if it is dealt with primarily as a general abstraction**. In Spirit and Reason, Standing Rock Sioux scholar Vine Deloria (1999b) writes, Indians do not talk about nature as some kind of concept or something “out there.” They talk about the immediate environment in which they live. They do not embrace all trees or love all rivers and mountains. What is important is the relationship you have with a particular tree or a particular mountain. (p. 223) **This emphasis on particularity of relations is tied**, in Deloria’s writings,3 **to an understanding that these are relations with other agents** (Deloria usually uses the term “persons”). Our relations are therefore not only epistemic, or even utilitarian. They are also personal and ethical.4 **This gives rise to an empiricism with a character that is different than that of settler colonial empiricism.** “American Indians,” Deloria observes, “understanding that the universe consisted of living entities, were interested in learning how other forms of life behaved, for they saw that every entity had a personality and could exercise a measure of free will and choice” (pp. 52-53). This implies we live in a moral universe in which everything is an agent or part of an agent and every action carries a moral dimension. As a result, . . .there is a proper way to live in the universe: There is a content to every action, behavior, and belief. . . . There is a direction to the universe, empirically exemplified in the physical growth cycles of childhood, youth, and old age, with the corresponding responsibility of every entity to enjoy life, fulfill itself, and increase in wisdom and the spiritual development of personality. Nothing has incidental meaning and there are no coincidences. . . . In the moral universe all activities, events, and entities are related, and consequently it does not matter what kind of existence an entity enjoys, for the responsibility is always there for it to participate in the continuing creation of reality. (Deloria, 1999b, p. 47) The relational character of agency has an impact on all activities including those of inquiry. “The key to understanding Indian knowledge of the world,” Deloria and Wildcat (2001) conclude, “is to remember that the emphasis was on the particular, not on general laws and explanations of how things worked” (p. 22). **The key to knowing is not to determine universals and derive particulars, but to know the particulars.** Detailed explications of the relation between particularity, non-human agency, knowledge, thought, place, and being are ubiquitous in contemporary Indigenous studies literature. Michael Marker, an Arapaho education scholar living and working in British Columbia Canada, provides a compelling illustration of the tie between agent ontology and particularized forms of knowing. In a reflection on place-based conceptions of knowledge in coastal Salish cultures, he cites conversations with Salish elders recorded in the early 20th century. In these recordings, they attempted to explain to an obtuse interviewer that it was not supernatural beings residing at sacred places that transferred power to someone who visited those locales. Instead, it was the act of being in the place that made certain kinds of understanding possible. Marker (2018) explains, Not only are spirit powers known to reside in certain specific places on the landscape, but the methodology for learning about powerful forms of consciousness and visions cannot be extracted from the “being in places” where the powers exist. The place itself is saturated with energy forms that exist only in the dimension of that landscape. This is an Indigenous interface with two sentiences: the mind of the place, and the human mind that is convening and opening to it. (p. 4) Sounding themes similar to Karen Barad’s assertion that **agency is constituted through particular intra-actions**, Marker remarks on how in this interface, sometimes the land enables the agency of the human and sometimes the human becomes the extension of the agency of the land. Referring to the idea that the land often “names itself,” Marker (2018) observes, In Indigenous cosmologies, the actual landscape does often have the capacity to name itself and uses the human beings to enact the self-naming. In this way of understanding reality, the human mind is a conduit for the consciousness of the land to be expressed in language. Yup’ik scholar A. Oscar Kawagley (2003) explained how the Yup’ik language clearly shows “the elements of nature naming and defining themselves” (p. vii). (p. 2) Janelle Baker, a Métis scholar, similarly talks about the sentience of places. Writing about ecological restoration projects on Indigenous lands, she talks about the need for respectful relations not just with the humans living in a place but also with non-humans and the land that are also a part of the local community and kinship relations. This necessity has implications for the practice of research; she asserts, “[A] researcher needs to be sensitive to, and participate in, systems of respect and reciprocity belonging to the people, ancestors, and sentient landscape of the place in which they are doing research” (p. 110). Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee scholar Vanessa Watts takes this reflection on the relationship between the agency of land and humans a step further. In her 2013 essay “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency Among Humans and Non-Humans,” she provides an account of the Anishinaabe understanding of human agency as emanating from a relation to the personhood of the land. “Place-Thought,” she writes, “is based upon the premise that land is alive and thinking and that humans and nonhumans derive agency through the extensions of these thoughts” (p. 21). She also offers a diagnosis of why this mode of relation seems difficult for members of Westerner settler colonial cultures to understand, respect, or engage, and why assimilation into settler culture can cause Indigenous persons to lose this relational capacity. She locates the difficulty in the Western philosophical practice of thinking in terms of an epistemological/ontological or knowing/being binary. Within the frame of such binaries, the “material (body/land) becomes abstracted into epistemological spaces” (Watts, 2013, p. 31). This abstraction enables the naturalization of the treatment of land and other non-human beings as resources, to be mapped, known, and cataloged as objects, and owned by human knowing subjects. In this frame, place-based Indigenous ways of knowing-as-being appear flawed in their failure to prioritize objectification that enables commodification. Watts observes, “It is not that Indigenous peoples do not theorize, but that these complex theories are not distinct from place” (p. 22). Watts finds this limitation of Euro-Western thought not only in classic positivist traditions of inquiry but also in the writings of new materialist science studies’ authors such as Bruno Latour (1987), Vicky Kirby (2008), Stacey Alaimo (2008), and others. Although these authors allow for the existence of non-human agency, by her interpretation, they take pains to redefine agency in a manner that dissociates it from mind, will, and purpose. These sorts of things are reserved for humans and this leads to a hierarchy of agencies, in which some beings have agency, but “humans possess something more special” (Watts, 2013, p. 30). Anishinaabe cosmology, she explains, does not posit such hierarchies of agency. Relations with non-human agents are approached with no sense of superiority and with a focus on establishing ethical commitments to particular agents and communities of agents. Watts (2013) speculates further on the reason for this difference. She points out how contemporary science studies’ authors are concerned to avoid a materialism that risks any biological essentialism that might underwrite racist or patriarchal discourses. Acknowledging the particular character of non-human agents and committing to specific relations with non-human agents seem to risk something similar to essentialism. In Anishinaabe cosmology, for example, the relation to land is both spiritual and gendered. The land is a female person with a long, complicated history. The gender specificity and details of this history, according to Watts, have implications for practices of relating to the land and, for the practice of relations between other agents, human and nonhuman who owe their existence to the land. Considered without her specific qualities, the land ends up regarded as a generalized object emptied of character. Watts considers the aversion to any form of essentialism to be part of what keeps Euro-Western theories of non-human agency focused primarily on the abstract idea of agency. She notes that . . .some Indigenous female writers have been accused of being reactionary or gynocentric, implying they edge on a dangerous essentialism. However, essentializing categories of Indigenous cosmologies should not be measured against the products of Euro-Western mistakes. Nor should Indigenous peoples be the inheritors of these mistakes. (Watts, 2013, p. 32) Another related factor that might contribute to the persistent failure of Western settler colonial social theorists to connect with Indigenous agent ontologies is the way privileging relational entanglement with particular non-human agents may be experienced as a loss of autonomy. Notice that for many of the aforementioned authors, the contribution of place, land, and country to the constitution of non-human agency implies that humans need to be comfortable with, perhaps even seek out, a condition of being an instrument of another agency. Deloria (1999a) states directly that in the revelatory experience of sacred land, we “find that we are objects within a place and no longer acting subjects capable of directing events” (p. 254). This stands in contrast to liberal individualism and its epistemic correlates in Western thought, where sublimation of human agency into other processes is almost always framed as negative, as a restriction or subversion of human freedom. This anxiety about loss of freedom may be contributing to the current trend of treating non-human agency as either a new way of describing objects of inquiry (no transformation or restriction of the spectator subject) or as a pretext for claiming that agential realism requires the complete dissolution of the individual humanist subject.5 Whatever the cause, the divergence of emphasis on the particular and general features of experience is a persistent site of misunderstanding and disconnection between settler colonial culture and Indigenous thought. A practical example of this kind of misunderstanding can be found in various reports about the protests against the building of an oil pipeline near the Standing Rock Indian reservation in North and South Dakota, USA, from 2016 to 2017. These protests were initiated by members of the Standing Rock Sioux when they established the Sacred Stone Camp at the confluence of two tributaries of the Missouri river. According to the Standing Rock community Historic Preservation Officer, LaDonna Brave Bull Allard (2016), 380 recognized archeological sites were put at risk by the entire pipeline, 26 of which were at the site of the protest. The basis for the Standing Rock Sioux objection to the pipeline was the disruption of the relation between the Sioux people and these particular sites found at the confluence of rivers in question. The U.S. government is wiping out our most important cultural and spiritual areas. And as it erases our footprint from the world, it erases us as a people. These sites must be protected, or our world will end, it is that simple. Our young people have a right to know who they are. They have a right to language, to culture, to tradition. The way they learn these things is through connection to our lands and our history. . . .If we allow an oil company to dig through and destroy our histories, our ancestors, our hearts and souls as a people, is that not genocide? (Allard, 2016) This concern about the possible disruption of the community relationship with these water sources was at times expressed using the Lakota phrase Mni Wiconi which has been most frequently translated as Water Is Life. This phrase simultaneously referred to the importance of the relationship between the Standing Rock Sioux community and the specific rivers in question as well as to the more general relationship between humans, water, and the earth. However, it was most often the general meaning of the phrase “Water Is Life” that was heard and commented upon when it was picked up by non-Indigenous reporters and environmental activists. The phrase was appropriated as an environmentalist slogan and became a hashtag that was circulated through social media and news outlets. Water in general was referred to as a form of “life” in the broadest sense—a part of human life, a resource material on which our lives depend. The understanding of the river or a particular confluence of rivers as the only place where particular insights become possible, as the only place where certain words and concepts can be understood, or as a relative that teaches future generations essential lessons about life was filtered out by the extractive epistemic habits of public media discourse.6 Similar filtering frequently occurs in academic discourse. More could be said here about the work of the cited Indigenous authors and activists as well as many others. The point, however, is not to persuade readers of the exclusive merits of any specific Indigenous community’s cosmology or ontology. Our purpose, instead, is to illustrate the scope, depth, and distinctiveness of theorizing about nonhuman agency found in Indigenous studies literature for readers who may be unaware of it. In this section, we have argued that one of the most distinctive features of this theorizing is prioritizing the performative establishment of particular relational entanglements with non-human agents over seeking generalizable understanding of that agency. We believe this is one of the most promising points of possible connection between the writings on agent ontologies in contemporary science studies literature and Indigenous studies literature. Ethical Relations With Non-Human Agents as Performative Reciprocity If Indigenous studies scholarship of the sort cited above draws our attention to the challenge of moving beyond general “preachments” about the agency of non-human things and into particular practices of relational entanglement with non-human agents, then the question arises: What might those practices look like, especially in the context of scholarship and social inquiry? Of course, there can be no single answer to this question. That being said, **a theme that recurs in the Indigenous studies literature is the foundational importance of ethical reciprocity in all relations** including processes of research (Cajete, 2016; Simpson, 2017; Wilson, 2008). For example, Margaret Kovach (2009) has written about the application of the Cree concept of “miýo-wîcêhtowin (good relations)” (p. 63) to the process of seeking knowledge. Citing Irene Calliou, a Metis elder, she talks about the importance of . . .showing respect for the earth, of reciprocity, and of the importance of observation and attentiveness in learning as knowledge is transmitted through kinship relationships. . .A prevailing teaching is that and Indigenous research framework must not solely be an intellectual construct, for it cannot be understood in the absence of its practical manifestations, which involves living life in a way that reflects goodness, that reflects miýo. (p. 63) An ethic of reciprocity is a practice of attending to the way our existence is interdependent with networks of relations of other humans and non-humans. It is a practice of considering the consequences of our actions—including our research—for all the communities with which we are in relation and on which our being depends. In reaching beyond the scale of the personal, **an ethic of reciprocity becomes more than an individual morality**. It is also a politics, as Leanne Simpson (2017) explains, Extraction and assimilation go together. Colonialism and capitalism are based on extracting and assimilating. My land is seen as a resource. My relatives in the plant and animal worlds are seen as resources. My culture and knowledge is a resource. . . **The alternative to extractivism is deep reciprocity. It’s respect, it’s relationship, it’s responsibility, and it’s local**. (p.75) In the research methodology literature, the application of an ethic of reciprocity is most often cited in relation to the impact of research on Indigenous people and communities and the need to respect Indigenous community’s right to selfdetermination (e.g., Baker, 2016; Battiste, 2011; Begaye, 2008; Bishop, 2005; Ellis & Earley, 2006; Jones & Jenkins, 2008; Kovach, 2005, 2009; Tolich & Smith, 2014). Research, considered in this way, must give back to the Indigenous communities in which it is conducted. More than this, it needs to respect and help sustain the conditions that enable Indigenous communities to live and thrive (Smith, 2000, 2007). These principles are often reflected in formal agreements between Indigenous nations and government agencies, universities, and research centers (e.g., Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2014; National Health and Medical Research Council, 2003; National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2012). The establishment of such agreements is absolutely vital work. The principle of ethical reciprocity found in the Indigenous studies literature, however, is not limited to reciprocal relations between human communities. These human-to-human imperatives are almost always grounded in principles that are thought to apply to relations with nonhuman agents as well (e.g., Deloria, 1999b; Garroutte & Westcott, 2013; Jones & Hoskins, 2013, 2016; Simpson, 2017). Glen Coulthard (2014), a member of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation, calls this a “grounded normativity” that entails “certain obligations to the land, animals, plants, and lakes, in much the same way that we hold obligations to other people” (p. 60). In the case of social inquiry, an ethic of reciprocity with non-human agents would imply that, when seeking insight into some part of the world, an inquirer would not be entitled to that knowledge. Instead, they would need to consider what they are giving back to the agents co-constituted with them in the inquiry and the broader network of relations in which the encounter is nested. What is reciprocally given in acts of inquiry might include substantive service to purposes other than one’s own, or symbolic gestures that acknowledge interdependence. Within many North American Indigenous communities, for example, reciprocity is at times marked through an offering of tobacco (Kovach, 2009). Sometimes the gesture is more dramatic, as in practices of fasting, dancing to the limits of endurance, and other physical and mental exertions. These gestures perform—no, not perform—they embody an understanding that in seeking knowledge, a person becomes involved in a co-constituting relation with another agent or group of agents. These actions alter the ontology of the subject engaged in inquiry in so far as that subject is no longer constituted as a spectator or critical observer, but as a participant in ethical relationship with other agents. Such enactments of reciprocity can seem wholly out of place in inquiry governed by settler colonial conceptions of knowledge in which inquirers can engage passive objects of knowledge without affecting them. When the world is presumed to be inert and awaiting representation by scholars, things like offerings of tobacco appear to be category mistakes—erroneous projections of agency and ethical significance onto inanimate phenomena. Combined with pervasive racism and settler colonial forms of bigotry, such practices are easily caricatured, and their distinctive subject producing effects can be overlooked. However, when we consider disciplined inquiry to be a process that generates, not just representations, but also configurations of onto-ethical relations with both human and non-human phenomena, the valence of the comparison inverts. The options of becoming individual authoritative spectator subjects or critical ironic subjects in settler colonial traditions of inquiry appear narrow when compared with the range of ethical subject formation that can be established between human and non-human agents in some Indigenous philosophical frameworks. Viewed in this way, Indigenous practices of inquiry appear to instantiate a broader conception of inquiry than Western humanist inquiry, which seems rather provincial and limited in comparison. In advocating that attention be paid to the Indigenous studies literature on practices of ethical reciprocity with non-human agents, we are not moving toward a suggestion that contemporary non-Indigenous social scientists adopt Indigenous ceremonial or community practices wholesale and try to enact them in the context of academic processes. This would be crass appropriation and violate the express admonitions of many Indigenous communities.7 It would also constitute an avoidance of the work of reimagining the substance of contemporary academic inquiry practices by simply trying to tape a signifier of Indigenous authenticity on otherwise untransformed scholarship. Instead, we are suggesting that these practices be taken seriously by nonIndigenous scholars as intellectual and cultural achievements that establish and renew particular agent-producing relational entanglements. In this way, Eurocentric social sciences can learn from the Indigenous literature in a manner that simultaneously addresses some of the challenges facing new materialist social science and that substantively contributes to the decolonization of the academy generally. We find a compelling example of what such learning might look like in Eva Garroutte and Kathleen Wescott’s (2013) essay “The Story Is a Living Being: Companionship With Stories in Anishinaabeg Studies.” In this essay, Garroutte and Westcott write about the agency of stories. They are concerned that new developments in narratological research, although offering improvements on past social scientific analysis of Indigenous knowledges, fall short of respecting the Anishinaabeg understanding of the ontology of stories. They observe that Scholars have contributed a considerable body of research on Native American stories. Yet such research has often yielded results that those stories’ caretakers find unsatisfying. (p. 61) The problem, they offer, is that contemporary Western narratology treats narratives as objects to be analyzed and dissected. The new, more respectful, narratology takes a dialogic approach to studying the narratives that shape community life, where the dialogue is with community members and serves the purpose of triangulation and member-checking. The reciprocity achieved through such dialogue, however, is reciprocity with other humans, and the story remains an object of study passively awaiting representation. According to Anishinaabeg traditions, stories are living agents that merit an ethical response themselves. The ontological view here is nuanced and resonant, though not isomorphic, with the themes of new materialist philosophy of science. Quoting an interview with Westcott, an Anishinaabeg/Cree storyteller, the chapter explains, The vital qualities of stories enable them to work “co-creatively” with hearers, Westcott continues, helping to mold the shape of the world. And they imply that stories do not reduce to their constituent parts. “I was taught . . . that the story is a living being. It’s not an entity in the way that, say, a bear is, because it is carried on the word. The story is able to procreate through the telling, but it is not identical with the words that people use to tell it.” The living nature of stories even enables modes of interaction beyond narration: “Even at times when my purpose is not to tell the story, I may enter the story; I watch it and listen to it.” (Garroutte & Westcott, 2013, p. 68) To some extent, humans and stories as agents exist prior to their coming together by this account. However, note there is also an interdependent emergence of agency between stories and humans. This is both similar to, but different from, Barad’s account of agency emerging exclusively in intra-action. Also note the additional ontological claim made: that the story exists even when it is not being told. Westcott goes on to say the stories exist even if there are not humans who know how to tell them. It exists not only as discursive performance, but as a possible performative relation. This agential ontology of stories has implications for the conduct of inquiry according to the authors. A practice of inquiry focused on representation, categorization, and parsing of Anishinaabe stories not only risks missing part of the phenomenon in that representation but also does something to the stories—inhibits their agency. . . .to the extent that it moves only within the confines of representational assumptions, the Anishinaabe myth loses the capacity to evoke a mythic reality. It loses the ability to testify to possibilities for being in the world as a relative within an infinitely extended web of human and other-than-human relationships. It does not lead its hearers to conclude that they can move beyond empathic awareness to become of one mind with other beings. It fails to teach an audience that they can be fully transformed by such relationships. . . .In so doing, these conventional narratives for guiding scholarly engagement with stories disenable “possible lives.” (pp. 75-76) Encapsulating traditional Anishinaabe stories within a broader Western narrative of discovery and representation makes parts of these stories available to wider audiences and yet disables other possible meanings the stories carry. Westcott and Garroutte question the merits of this trade-off. The question they suggest researchers need to be asking themselves is not are we representing the elements of the stories accurately?—but are we good companions to the stories? The authors conclude, As researchers in the new field select different analytic tools, our remarks suggest that they should not make choices without realizing that these will affect what their stories can do: those stories’ ability to evoke realities and to illuminate possible lives. (Garroutte & Westcott, 2013, p. 76) Garroutte and Westcott provide here a glimpse of some possible points of connection between new materialist and Indigenous studies’ conceptions of non-human agency. Although they are concerned about the impoverished representation of traditional Anishinaabe stories, they also provide an illustration of the distinctive way agent ontologies in Indigenous studies scholarship might transform the practices and purposes of social analysis. According to their commentary, inquiry generates not only forms of utility for human inquirers but also enables and constrains the agency of the stories we purport to study. Understood in this way, we can begin to see the contours, a performative ethical reciprocity with non-human agents—a sense of responsibility to something more than human that does not devolve into a prescriptive material determinism. According to Garroutte and Westcott, responsibility involves considering not just representational accuracy, but the relational futurities we participate in creating with other non-human agents. It is the protean agency of nonhuman agents that both requires an ethical response and that prevents such ethics from becoming rigid calculus or set of imperatives.

## Baudrillard

#### [1] Perm Do Both: Postcolonial post-humanist interventions are an implosive strategy.

Guignion 18 - David Guignion, The University of Western Ontario, 10,4,18 “The Mirror of Humanism; or, Towards a Baudrillardian Posthuman Theory” [https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7739&context=etd] Accessed 2/13/20 SAO

In Carnival and Cannibal, Baudrillard argues that “hegemony […] is accompanied by an extraordinary process of reversion, in which power is slowly undermined, devoured or ‘cannibalized’” (4). This subversion of institutional power does not necessarily derive from a willing and overt challenge to it. Rather, Baudrillard suggests that if we consider what is really happening in this planetary confrontation, we see that the subjugated peoples, from the depths of their slavery, far from resembling their masters less and less and taking their liberatory revenge, have begun to resemble them more and more, have begun to mimic their model grotesquely, piling on thick the marks of their servitude –which is the other way of taking one’s revenge –a fatal strategy which we cannot term ‘victorious’ since it is lethal for both. (10-11) Baudrillard states that we should resist adopting a challenge to power in the form of a radical subjectivity by which to challenge power, lest we risk being absorbed back into power’s ethos. A similar proposition is advanced by Homi Bhabha in The Location of Culture, when he suggests that “[r]esistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention” (157), but that it can manifest itself in the form of “hybridity” which is the “revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects” (159). It does this by turning the “gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power” (160) that “terrorizes authority with **the ruse of recognition**” (165). The subaltern persona in Bhabha’s discourse occupies then a “liminal moment of identification” that “produces a subversive strategy” through “movement and manoeuvre” without “teleology and holism” (265**). Postcolonial subjectivities and posthuman subjectivities share a subversive resistance to the cultural domination of the code that Baudrillard conceptualizes as a broad cultural logic of oppression**. It may even be said that Bhabha’s conception of hybridity proposes and informs a posthuman postcolonial subjectivity that neither holds a singular cultural identity, nor a clearly defined physical territory. The points of contact between Jean Baudrillard and Homi Bhabha are sparse. However, both point to an interesting conceptualization of resistance that refuses to adopt a steady subject position from which to construct a counter-discourse. Counter-intuitively they propose that resistance may actually be effective when it assumes the literal form of the ‘eye of power.’ Effectively, the hegemonic locus of power is overturned by having its characteristics (re)presented and (re)displayed by those who have been denied agency in the eye of that very power. We are confronted here, however, with a problem: how can we reconcile a posthuman strategy of resistance that does not simply deploy the same discourse of becoming that Braidotti cherishes? To this question, I believe that the response lies in the concluding remarks in Callus and Herbechter’s article when they suggest that subjectivity can not necessarily be grasped and deployed at will, but that it is continually in flux, and is ultimately historically contingent. If we keep this proposition in mind, we may observe in Baudrillard a radical subversion to the privileging of the subject position. In other words, Baudrillard presents a theory in “which the 100 object is always presumed more cunning than the subject, and in which the object always ironically takes the detour of the subject. Faced with this potentialisation and redoubling of things, the subject must learn how to disappear in order to reappear as object” (Revenge of the Crystal 17).

#### [2] Aff outweighs: Baudrillard’s theory can’t account for conquest. This means the aff solves the k but the k can’t solve the aff

Guignion 18 - David Guignion, The University of Western Ontario, 10,4,18 “The Mirror of Humanism; or, Towards a Baudrillardian Posthuman Theory” [https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7739&context=etd] Accessed 2/13/20 SAO

Still, **Baudrillard’s remarks overlook the enormous casualties** suffered by the losing side. In this case, the term “war” does not capture the essence of these military movements as well as the term “invasion**,” indicative of a form of neo-colonialism**. The transformation of these wars from the domain of reality to that of the virtual performs a dual function for the neo-colonial efforts of the West. First, there is a virtual violence, a violence of the image. In this operation the real events of these wars are substituted for the image of these wars: “The image consumes the event, in the sense that it absorbs it and offers it for consumption” (Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism 27). This process not only replaces the real with the virtual, but filters which images and messages are distributed. The images distributed operate to convince the viewer of the reality of these wars, or, more precisely, their virtual reality. Second, these wars function to destroy the other, virtually and symbolically. The West’s drive toward global hegemony “is a giant project meant to symbolically liquidate all values through consensus or force” (Baudrillard, The Agony of Power 67). Global power, for Baudrillard, “is the power of the simulacrum” (66). Under the code of the simulacrum, where people are reduced to the status of cybernetician, the other poses an avid challenge to global hegemony. Global hegemony responds to this roadblock by declaring war on “the alterity of the other” by either converting or annihilating it (Baudrillard, Gulf War 37). The simulating machine dabbles in the affairs of reality when zones of resistance that do not subscribe to its oppressive logic emerge. In many ways, Baudrillard’s theorization of war bridges the gap between simulation and reality, pointing to a milieu—the war machine—that simulation mobilizes in the service of eradicating difference.

#### [3] Perm Do Both: Either the inclusion of the alternative with the affirmative resolves any residual links or the alternative can’t solve the SQ which is inundated with semiotic violence. The Net benefit to the perm is the affs antihumanist method. Any risk my method resolves some material violence is offense for the aff.

#### [4] Baudrillard is the hyperreal - They haven’t read the text back at us, they cut it into vacuous cards and regurgitated it back-They made their philosophy a simulacrum because Baudrillard’s text no longer exists. They aren’t radicals-They are Michigan KM model 15, means they can’t access form arguments

#### [5] If they win their thesis vote for me in contempt of victory. This is a turn at the level of form.

Genosko 16 - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf] Accessed 1/24/19 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may **ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory**. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But **radical losers stand apart from the crowd** in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

#### A2 Semiotics mean no material impacts:

#### A2 Info Dissuasive:

#### A2 Charity Cannibalism:

#### A2 Life Death Binary:

#### AT Hyperreality

[1] Non-falsifiable – they say everything is influenced by cap and the hyperreal but there is no way to check if that’s true because our evaluation would also be skewed.

[2] They have only given examples of the hyperreality not a tangible warrant for why or how it exists. I can also provide examples of things not affected by the hyperreal like eating ice cream or indigenous groups that don’t interact with western society proving that not EVERYTHING is affected by the hyperreal.

[3] Ivory tower DA - you discount material resistant strategies and force everyone who is harmed by capitalism to suck it up and hyper-conform, justifying infinite violence. Vote neg on pascals wager - the world is already so consumed by the hyperreal that voting neg doesn't make the world significantly worse but if they are wrong, they never materially resist capitalism, amplifying all of their impacts

#### AT Debate Bad

[1] Debate good

[a] Turn: you won’t create critical coalition. Your model will force more debates on why debate is good or bad defeating the original purpose

[b] center discussion on debate bad in debate forces a closure on more perspectives and people that could be included in the space, this is offense to the NC because you prevent a creation of a different debate space and limit expression

[c] Debate solves the hyperreal – we learn to parse through information beating back fake news, you collapse it meaning this is a DA to the aff.

[2] You participate in debate allowing it to thrive off your success and you encourage the competitive speed elitist mindset by asking for the ballot for debating well. This turns the aff and makes you antiethical to the thesis.

#### AT Charity Cannibalism

[1] We aren’t the media; we are in an academic space. That’s not what their authors criticize.

[2] No gratuitous images, we aren’t describing wars like they criticize.

[3] If mentioning violence is enough to link, you link because you talk about the consequences of charity cannibalism and the hyperreal.

[4] Turn – images of suffering motivate people to take action.

#### AT Information is Dissuasive

[1] If it’s true, you can’t vote aff because you don’t understand what the aff is, and it turns the aff because they are anti-ethical to their thesis by promoting more info.

[2] Information overload is inevitable but debate solves – we learn to filter through information

[3] Fake news has existed before the simulacra ie fake medicine meaning that information will always be dissuasive and the aff doesn’t solve.

#### AT Form over Content

[1] content determines form - if I talk about how a dog is terrible and a bad boy, but use that cute voice that dogs love, even though my form of talking and presenting is good, the content makes what I’m doing bad.

[2] If form matters, all our arguments indict the form of the affirmative because they indict the structure of the AC and the way it’s read.

## Cap

## Deleuze

#### Link: Their utilization and reliance on DNG’s concept of [becoming, rhizomatic politics and subject formation] is grounded in white nonrepresentational theory which enacts real violence upon indigenous and black populations

King 17 - Tiffany Lethabo King, Critical Ethnic Studies, Spring 2017 “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight” [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?seq=1/analyze] Accessed 10/23/18 SAO

Taking a cue from Simpson and Tuck and Yang, I turn to Tuck’s 2010 critique of Deleuze’s notion of “desire” as an example of the theoretical practice of refusal, which Simpson wonders about and which Tuck and Yang elaborated on in 2014. Eve Tuck’s 2010 article “Breaking Up with Deleuze” refuses Deleuze’s understanding and imposition of his definition of desire for Native studies and Native resurgence in particular. Tuck refuses the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic due to its totalizing moves and specifically its evasion and refusal of Native and alternative notions of refusal that emerge from Native struggles for survival.24 For Tuck, paying attention to “the continuity of ancestors,” or genealogies, in Native and in all modes of knowledge production is imperative. For Indigenous and Native studies, it reverses the erasure enacted by continental European and settler- colonial theory, which uses a tradition of ongoing genocide to annihilate Native thinkers and subsequently their epistemologies and theories. Prior to Byrd’s indictment of Deleuzoguattarian laudatory accounts of America’s terrain of “Indians without Ancestry,” Tuck reroutes us back to ancestral and genealogical thinking as a way of asserting Indigenous presence and its epistemological systems and traditions, devoid of Cartesian boundary- making impulses and desires. Tuck’s work also prepares us in 2010 for the critique that Byrd levies in 2011, which exposes the traditions, roots, and genealogies of Western poststructuralist theory. Such theory created the conditions of possibility and emergence for Deleuzoguattarian genocidal forms of rhizomatic and nonrepresentational thought. Black Caribbean feminist Michelle V. Rowley argues we need to especially attend to a theory’s “politics and conditions of emergence.”25 In other words, we need to consider on whose backs or through whose blood a theory developed and then circulated while hiding its own violence. Jodi Byrd in particular attends to the colonialist, genocidal, and therefore humanist impulses of the rhizome in her book Transit of Empire.26 What is particularly instructive is the way that Byrd operationalizes her critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s first chapter, “Rhizome,” in their tome A Thousand Plateaus.27 Byrd’s deconstruction, or picking apart, of the poststructuralist and nonsubject- and nonobject- related Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatics are a masterful (and frankly thuggish and rude) demonstration of refusing to adapt or “repair” colonial epistemologies and geographies. Byrd’s refusal is a moment that further helps one distinguish between the works of postcolonial and decolonial studies. Byrd performs an outright refusal that short circuits the colonial and postcolonial comportments of politesse, which allow genocidal Western thought to continue uninterrupted. Byrd’s interrogation of the “colonial nostalgia” latent in poststructural and nonrepresentational forms of thought like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is an explicit example of how the violence of white nonrepresentational theory creates an immediate space of impasse for Indigenous, decolonial, Black, and abolitionist intellectual traditions. As Byrd argues, the Deleuzian and Guattarian rhizome assumes its errant, untraceable, and de/reterritorializing path through Native genocide. The rhizome obtains its metaphorical and theoretical elasticity from the discursive genocide of Indigenous peoples. The territory of maneuver or ground that the rhizome gains its bearing on is unwittingly or perhaps indifferently anchored in the disavowal of the Indigenous ancestral claims, history, presence, and ongoing relationship with the land in North America. Deleuze and Guattari covet the free- range and bloody movements in the West, described as a land of “Indians without Ancestry” primarily because they do not have to contend with the presence of Indigenous peoples and their prior relationships (ancestors) to the land and space through which they move and clear as nomads. There are no existing people to which Deleuze and Guattari have to be accountable. Therefore, their own and others’ self- actualizing, free- form whiteness can proceed unimpeded. The rhizomatic West— terra nullius— is without a people, history, or a cosmology to navigate. Byrd’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s reproduction or transit of the “Indian” in their book A Thousand Plateaus limns some of the methods in which colonialism and modes of conquest are enacted on behalf of the selfactualization of white subjects who produce nonrepresentational theory. In fact, Byrd argues that the “Indian is the ontological prior through which poststructuralism functions.”28 Byrd traces the appearance or deployment of the Indian as a simulation or “present absent” in Jacques Derrida’s and then Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which creates space for the white subject and the unending frontier. Byrd also argues that nonrepresentational theory heralded as a liberatory path beyond the subject is colonialist. Byrd indicts Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Leslie Fiedler’s work in order to invoke the American West and the Indian as exceptional cases that inspire rhizomatic movement through the notion of an ever- receding frontier.29 It is colonialist on (at least) two accounts: in its need to render the Indian already and inevitably (ontologically) dead as “it” has no ancestors or living community to whom one needs to be accountable; and in its invocation of the vanishing “Indian,” which opens up the possibility of an “ever- receding frontier” and inspiration for the metaphor of the rhizome. This logic and mode of conquistador thought undergirds the Deleuzian and Guattarian ethos of experimental and rhizomatic lines of flight. Their nonrepresentational theory of lines of flight are only possible as a form of white selfactualizing posthumanism due to the death of Indigenous peoples and their excision from the Earth/land. White posthumanism and its flows and lines of flight are made possible through Native death.

### 2AR EXT

#### Their utilization and reliance on DNG’s concept of [becoming, rhizomatic politics and subject formation] is grounded in white nonrepresentational theory which enacts real violence upon indigenous and black populations as they approach solutions with no regard to territory and assumes and the white conception of free-range and maneuverability which is the mindset that justifies and paves the way for things like Native genocide and the ever receding frontier. Their knowledge production is fundamentally colonialist which is a prior impact under our ROB.

## Fem IR

## Fem Killjoy

## Generic Academy Bad

#### Genocide scholarship is the first step toward decolonization

Nunpa 14 - CHRIS MATO NUNPA, Ph.D is a retired Associate Professor of Indigenous Nations & Dakota Studies, 2014 “Ch 5. Historical Amnesia: The “Hidden Genocide” and Destruction of the Indigenous Peoples of the United States” [Hidden Genocides: ISBN 978– 0– 8135– 6162– 2] Accessed 11/5/18 SAO Bracketed for clarity\*

Because of the genocidal policy of “forcibly and systematically transferring the care of Native children to non- Indians through maintenance of a compulsory boarding school system and wholesale adoptions,”40 the U.S. Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978. Of course, there was no mention of the term “genocide” in the legislation. Thinking of Native Peoples and Jews as lice or vermin and conceiving of concentration camps were not the only things that Hitler and the Nazis had in common with the United States and its policy and programs regarding the Indigenous Peoples. They also shared the expression “final solution.” Note the following passage: “It is readily acknowledged that Indian children lose their natural resistance to illness by habitating so closely in these schools (residential board schools), and that they die at a much higher rate than in their villages. But this alone does not justify a change in the policy of this Department, which is geared toward the final solution to our Indian Problem” (emphasis added).41 As one can readily see, the U.S. government, Department of the Interior, and BIA were [was] years ahead of Hitler and the Nazis in coining this phrase. I encourage readers when they hear the phrase “final solution” to think of the genocide of the Indigenous Peoples, including the Dakota People of Minnesota, perpetrated by the United States and the state of Minnesota as well as that of the Jews committed by Hitler and the Nazis. Destruction and Social Impact of Genocide Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes in her Decolonizing Methodologies about the social and political conditions that result from the genocide and destruction inflicted upon Indigenous Peoples, whenever and wherever they may be found, by the various colonizing powers— England, France, Spain, United States, et cetera. Smith describes the oppressive conditions that “perpetuate extreme levels of poverty, chronic ill health, and poor educational opportunities.” She continues, “Their children may be removed forcibly from their care, ‘adopted’ or institutionalized. The adults may be as addicted to alcohol as their children are to glue and other drugs, they may live in destructive relationships which are formed and shaped by their impoverished material conditions and structured by politically oppressive regimes.”42 As the Indigenous Peoples continue to live in these conditions, the white- supremacist general society continues to feed them messages that they are worthless, lazy, dependent, and dumb, that is, they lack higher order human qualities.43 These preceding statements by Linda Tuhiwai Smith certainly apply to the Indigenous Peoples within the United States of America. Most of our reservations, especially those who do not have casinos, are like third world countries. By almost any kind of social and economic indicators, our Indigenous Peoples are at the lowest and worst levels of conditions. From The State of Native America, edited by M. Annette Jaimes, I will list some of these effects and conditions under which our Indigenous Peoples of the United States of America live: In addition to our original land base being seized (approximately 98 percent), Indigenous Peoples have experienced a complete loss of control over the resources within and upon our residual territory. Indigenous Peoples experience as a group the most extreme poverty of any sector in the present North American population. Indigenous Peoples experience the greatest rates of malnutrition, death by exposure, infant mortality, and teen suicide of any group on the continent. The average life span is approximately thirty years shorter than that of a U.S. Euro- American of either gender. Our traditional forms of government have been supplanted by a form of governance imposed on us by the United States. Our languages have been suppressed, especially, at the boarding schools operated by both the state and the church. Our spirituality and religious ceremonies have been suppressed. At one point, the U.S. Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 1978. Why should this have been necessary in a country that says it was founded in religious freedom? Our identity, our numbers, and our cultural heritage continue to be under attack and manipulated. Our self- determination has been suppressed, and our efforts to gain selfdetermination are viciously repressed. Our youth continue to be systematically miseducated that everything that has happened to us was right and inevitable.44 Also in Jaimes’s The State of Native America, Churchill and LaDuke, in their “The Political Economy of Radioactive Colonialism,” discuss other social impacts of historical formations such as genocide, massive land theft, and broken treaties: We experience the highest rate of infant mortality on the continent. We have the highest unemployment rate. We have the lowest per capita income. We have the highest rate of communicable or plague diseases. We have the lowest levels of formal educational attainment.45 As one can see by this listing, the Indigenous Peoples of the United States “suffer virtually the full range of conditions observable in the most depressed of Third World areas.”46 The destructive social impact of genocide on the Indigenous Peoples has been traumatic and devastating. Conclusion: Hidden Genocides The United States was very efficient in the destruction of its Indigenous Peoples. In fact, according to Stannard, in his book American Holocaust, “the Fuhrer from time to time expressed admiration for the ‘efficiency’ of the American genocide campaign against the Indians, viewing it as a forerunner for his own plans and programs.”47 Stannard further writes, “The destruction of the Indians of the Americas was, far and away, the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world.”48 M. Annette Jaimes writes, “Not only does the rate of extermination suffered by the Indigenous Peoples of North America vastly exceed that experienced by the Jews of Europe under the Nazis, it represents a scale and scope of genocide without parallel in recorded human history.”49 Another devastating social effect of our history and of our genocide has been this society’s continuing attitude of viewing the Indigenous Peoples as less than human, as animals, and as objects. Therefore, in the U.S. media— for example, movies, television shows, and comic books— Native Peoples are still being stereotyped, caricatured, disparaged, demeaned, and generally dehumanized. We are still the object of fun and games in the United States when we are used as sports mascots and sports teams’ names: Washington Redskins, Cleveland Indians, Atlanta Braves, Kansas City Chiefs, and University of North Dakota’s Fighting Sioux, for example. In his textbook, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Adam Jones writes about how the words Apache, Tomahawk, Cherokee, and Winnebago bring to mind U.S. military weaponry and gas- guzzling vehicles advertised for rugged excursions across the open roads of the North American continent, away from “civilization.”50 Such cultural symbols create denigrating representations of Indigenous Peoples as violent and wild people who deserved their fate. Benjamin Madley called these “post- facto justifications” of the genocide committed against Indigenous Peoples.51 These stereotyped and caricatured images help historians and the U.S. public to justify genocide. They also help to hide the genocide. As Donna- Lee Frieze and Elisa von Joeden- Forgey argue in their chapters of this book, genocides become hidden genocides when people believe they are forms of benevolent progress. The public intellectual Christopher Hitchens, for example, deemed a protest staged by Native Peoples and Americans against Christopher Columbus to be nothing more than “an ignorant celebration of stasis and backwardness, with an unpleasant tinge of selfhatred.” The “politico- military victories” of Europeans in the Americas, he wrote, left “humanity on a slightly higher plane than it knew before” and “deserves to be celebrated with great vim and gusto” because it “inaugurated a nearly boundless epoch of opportunity and innovation.”52 Things need to change. The great mass of U.S. Euro- Americans needs to know the facts, needs to know what happened in American history. Genocide scholars of the world need to write about the “holocaust” of the Indigenous Peoples of the United States because the multitudes do not listen to Indigenous academics as they most certainly would to their fellow white man. As Jaimes writes, “Alternatively, we are mutually confronted with the specter not of simply a present determined by the unrelenting horrors of the U.S. past, but a future dictated by the never- quite- acknowledged ugliness of a U.S. present. In a word, we face the consummation of U.S. American Nazism, with all that implies in terms of racism, sexism, militarism, environmental devastation through rampant industrialism, and the final consolidation of the U.S. police state.”53 Genocide is a painful and unpleasant topic to face and discuss. No country, including the United States, wishes to confront the genocide in its history. The United States is in denial, is suffering from historical amnesia, and the U.S. Indigenous Holocaust continues to remain hidden. However, we must open our eyes to the lessons of the past if we do not wish to see history continue to be repeated. In the year 2012, the Sesquicentennial of the Dakota– U.S. War of 1862, we find the state of Minnesota, its colonial institutions (for example, the Minnesota Historical Society), and its Euro- Minnesotan citizenry reluctant to acknowledge the “hidden genocide” of the Dakota People of Minnesota. Waziyatawin states that the state of Minnesota and its colonial institutions do not acknowledge the broad context “in which whites invaded Dakota homeland, frequently before any legal land cessions, with the expectation that they would dispossess Dakota people of our lands.”54 The state does not wish to recognize what happened between the state of Minnesota and the Dakota People. The state does not wish to admit to the bounties, the forced marches, the mass executions, the concentration camps, the forced removal of the Dakota from their ancient homelands (“ethnic cleansing”), the suppression of Indigenous spirituality and ceremonies, the suppression of Native languages, the boarding schools, and on and on. It is time not only for the state of Minnesota and its Euro- Minnesotan citizenry but also for the United States and its Euro- American citizenry to acknowledge their respective “hidden genocides.” It is time for Minnesota and the United States to begin telling the truth!

## Generic Anti-Blackness

## Lacan

## Pain Narratives Bad

## Queer Pess

## Settler Colonialism

#### A focus on the discursive grammar of conquest is the only way to combat genocide, slavery, and violence. (black female)

King 16 - Tiffany Lethabo King, Theory & Event, Volume 19, Issue 4, 2016 “New World Grammars: The ‘Unthought’ Black Discourses of Conquest” [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633275] Accessed 10/15/19 SAO

As the unique (and productive) social and theoretical concerns of Oceanic settler-indigenous relations travelled transnationally and landed in North America, some of the particular historical legacies and contemporary machinations of relations of conquest in the Americas and the Atlantic were effaced and disappeared. Writing this critique of settler colonial studies in the wake of Patrick Wolfe’s death makes me reflect on the possibilities and limits of his work in a new way, one less motivated by a form of “gotcha criticism” than one urged by ethics. An ethical engagement and critique of Wolfe’s and other white settlers work forces us to grapple with white human(ist) and earnest intentions and attempts to enact decolonization in everyday thought and practice. However, the intended and unintended consequences of white annunciations of decolonial theory and praxis still require rigorous engagement and scrutiny. Wolfe’s work provides the substance from which to do this ethical work. Wolfe’s work as well as the work of white male Oceanic scholars caused a marked shift in the way North American discourses of genocide, coloniality, and settlement resonated in the academy. There was an excitement, particularly among white male scholars who were not engaged in or connected to the kind of scholarship and activism that Women of Color, specifically the formation INCITE, introduced in the early 2000s.12 The overwhelming (and at times) uncritical adoption of settler colonial discourses from an Oceanic context enacted a discursive shift that fields like Ethnic Studies, American Studies, Native Studies and Black Studies is still contending with. The discursive shift privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement and settler colonial relations that displaces conversations of genocide, slavery and the violent project of making the human (humanism). In 2007, Carole Pateman examines the ascendancy of the discursive regime of settlement and the settler contract within British legal discourse. Pateman argues that **the discourse of settlement has been a way of concealing the violence of Conquest for centuries**.13 I am curious about the redeployment of the discourse of settler colonialism in the emerging field of North American settler colonial studies. I wonder if it is functioning as a ruse and way of distracting critical theory from grappling with the relations of conquest as well as urgent political and theoretical concerns of Native Studies and Black Studies and movements concerned with Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Black Lives Matter. On one level, as the fervor over white settler colonial studies grows, a form of discursive genocide is performed as Native scholars, texts and analytics disappear from the conversation. Further an actual discussion of Native genocide is displaced by a focus on the white settler’s relationship to land rather than their parasitic and genocidal relationship to Indigenous peoples. Settler colonialism also suffers from an acute form of aphasia in relation to Blackness and slavery. Land, space and (white settler) subjectivity become rubrics of analysis that are elaborated upon and theorized through a resuscitation of humanist continental theory.14 Humanist modes of legibility reassert themselves through Marx’s worker, capitalist, property and Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power at the level of the individual and governmentality and biopolitics at the scale of population. Settler colonialism forces its interlocutors into conversations rife with humanist analogies and discussion of resolutions that Native Studies and Black Studies (specifically Afropessimists)15 with a steadfast commitment to abolishing genocide and humanist forms of sovereignty would resist. These analytic and political imperatives within strains of Native and Black Studies are important to preserve within discussions of coloniality in the Americas. While white settler colonial studies interventions are important—and should not be dismissed—it is also important to notice the ways that settler colonial studies’ primary preoccupation is with the settler’s relationship to land (or terra nullius). This **focus on terra nullius and land disappears the settler’s relationship to violence** and the intricate and violent processes of the human’s self-making. A focus on the settler and their relationship to land displaces the way the settler also becomes the conquistador/a (human) through Native genocide and Black dehumanization. Further, genocide or Wolfe’s “structural genocide” often becomes a secondary and provisional concern of the field. In Wolfe’s own synopsis of settler colonial power the relationship to land is the privileged site of analysis. 4 In sum, then, settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan center to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies. Its operations are not dependent on the presence or absence of formal state institutions or functionaries.16 Further, drawing on Cole Harris’ work, Wolfe deploys a Marxian analysis in order to draw attention to settler colonialism’s “principal momentum.”17 “Combine capital’s interest in uncluttered access to land and settlers’ interest in land as livelihood, and the principal momentum of settler colonialism comes into focus.”18 Wolfe effectively categories and names settler colonialism a land-centered project as opposed to a genocide-centered project. In the well-rehearsed passage from the germinal 2006 essay, setter colonialism’s land-centered and oriented project is placed in the active, animating and independent clause of the sentence. Genocide becomes a byproduct and subordinate clause, “with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies”19 that merely functions as a modifier. If we also think with the figure of the conquistador Columbus tagged with “Black Lives Matters,” we can maintain a focus on the ways that Native genocide and Black enslavement as a dehumanizing and property-making venture ensured the historical and current conditions of possibility (on the land-made property) for conquistador subjectivity. The conquistador and conquistador relations and modes of life (which can become subjectless discourses) are the historic and ongoing daily processes of white human self-actualization that require the making of the Indian as non human well as the making of Black Slave as forms of property. The making of the Conquistador—as the human— can be tracked methodologically as bloody, bodily, discursive, sensual (and affective) enactments of perverse and gratuitous violence as well as theoretically approached and narrated as a way of deftly and surgically reading the minutia of its quotidian discursive moves and affectations. Further **a focus on conquest can reroute attention to** a Black Studies’ **critiques of** the human and **humanism**. I argue that it is in this discourse of conquest that we find Black Studies lingua franca for staging a discussion with Native Studies as an interlocutor. Further, Black discourses of conquest fill in the conceptual gaps of Blackness that currently vex and confound white settler colonial studies. Bringing Black Lives into the Frame through Conquest and the Human Conquest can be traced as a mode of speech and thinking within the work of a number of Black scholars. Understanding the mechanizations of conquest from within Black Studies requires placing an emphasis on the sociogenic making and remaking of the human (Christian, European Man, economic man, etc.) as an object of study. According to Alexander Wehelyie, Black Studies has “taken as its task the definition of the human itself.”20 Given the histories of slavery, colonialism, segregation, lynching and so on, humanity has always been a principal question within black life and thought in the west; or rather, in the moment in which blackness becomes apposite to humanity, Man’s conditions of possibility lose their ontological thrust, because their limitations are rendered abundantly clear. Thus, the functioning of blackness as both inside and outside modernity sets the stage for a general theory of the human, and not its particular exception.21 Like Weheliye’s project in Habeus Viscus, I use the works of Hortense Spillers and Sylvia Wynter as models for the ways that Black intellectual traditions stalk the making of the human through the relations of conquest. Spillers’ and Wynter’s urgent questions about how the human is made requires an interrogation of how conquest shapes processes of self-actualization in relation to Black and Indigenous peoples and our Cartesian concept of land as other than human. I also bring Frank Wilderson’s discussion of the everyday and banal yet gratuitous violence of the making of Settler/Master/Human subjectivity into conversation with Spillers in order to think about conquest as an ongoing set of relations. Further thinking about conquest as a set of relations, mode of life, set of relations and forms of thought/knowing deserves a more robust elaboration and theorization. Examining Spillers and Wynter’s work, the discourse of conquest functions as a grammar that endows the scholars with multi-forked tongues. This toungue’s polyvocality **enables a simultaneous** utterance and **consideration of slavery and genocide**. More importantly, Spillers and Wynter think about the emergence of the hierarchy of the human species as a epistemological order that is only able to appear in contradistinction to “human Others” and the human’s Other. The European-Christian can only rise to the apex of the summit of humanity through the invention and subjugation of the Native and Black as the heathen and then eventually the irrational, sensual abject muck in which the last link of the great chain of being hangs. A part of Wehelyie’s exploration of Wynter’s and Spillers’ bodies of work entail an in depth exploration of the ways they expound upon the bloody and always ongoing process of crafting and recrafting Man.

[1] Perm do both: the aff is a cognitive rejection of colonialism so its not competitive but if it is, Turn: Land restoration proposals cause reactionary violence and offer no mechanism for combating future rollback.

WILLIAM BRADFORD, Chiricahua Apache and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL, 2005 “Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice” VOLUME 66, NUMBER 1 [http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/03/66.1.bradford.pdf] SAO

Existing theories of justice for Indians either whitewash the historical conquest and forced cession of Indian lands in order to preserve the contemporary entitlements of non-Indians (JAS), mistakenly commodify former Indian lands, despite the inconsistency of this position with Indian cosmology, and treat them as already converted to cash paid through remedial trust-based programs (JAC); or offer land restoration proposals that would inflict grievous injustice upon blameless (if historically ignorant) non-Indians and catalyze reactionary anti-Indian politics across a much broader legislative spectrum (JAR). Worse, because these theories have no strategy to dislodge the impedimenta of federal Indian law and tame the plenary power of Congress, JAS, JAC (essentially an applied model of reparations), and JAR offer no proposals to assist tribes in reclaiming their inherent rights of sovereignty and self-governance and no visions for the restoration of harmony and peace between peoples.

[2] Aff is a pre-req because we decolonize mindsets creating a space where people are open to full decolonization.

[3] CA King – land centered pedagogies erase the settler relation to violence and shift the focus away from things like the missing and murdering of indigenous womxn and children.

#### [1] Perm do both: Mathur 18

#### [2] Double Bind

#### [3] King 16 – K of Set Col – humanism better starting point

#### The assumption that climate ethics are best described thru the euphemism of “settlement” parasitically displaces the incoherence of native genocide and black slavery thru a coherent humanist register – prioritize a discourse of conquest that challenges the over-representation of Western Man thru the fraught terrain black/red theorizing

## A2 Answering Aff like Set Col

The misrecognition of genocide as “settlement” and native thought as “land-centered pedagogy” is mimicked by non-native usurpation of natives in debate as “give back the land” which pushes native debaters to identify themselves at the site of coherent intra-human conflict – you have a categorical imperative to refuse discursive genocide.  
Brough 17 (Taylor, BA from University of Vermont and 2016 CEDA Nationals Champion, Open letter to non-Black Native people in debate, https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/ shree) AHS EM

I am here preoccupied with our enunciative capacities in debate—with what I perceive “Native debate,” and specifically non-Black Native debaters, to be doing in service of Settler/Master (mis)recognition, what the consequences of such doing might be, and what it might mean to push against the disciplining force of recognition in debate. **The ontological fact of genocide/sovereignty as a dual positioning for Native people, coupled with academia’s push to identify ourselves at the site of** (coherent and recognizable) **trauma** (what Wilderson terms “intra-human conflicts”), **has led Native thought in debate, broadly, to do three related things: 1) prioritize the coherent discussion of sovereign loss over one of genocide and its incoherence, 2) articulate ourselves as always** in conversation with(read: **traumatized by**) **the Settler, 3) distance ourselves from a Black/Red conversation or from Black/Red theorizing.** These three moves are all antiblack in addition to being an insidious manifestation of the genocide that structures half of our (non?)being. Depressingly, if we were to historicize “Native debate,” **we would have to begin with a litany of non-Native debaters reading “Give Back the Land,” offering sovereignty as a solution to a tragic history of genocide that relegates Native people to phobic/phillic objects of the past whose futures are in the hands of those Settlers who bravely dare to talk about them.** The terrain in which everyone can become Native—or at least become an advocate for Natives—is a cleared landscape produced by genocide but also, significantly, produced by antiblack slavery.[[2]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn2) This history of non-Native debaters’ representations of sovereignty, land repatriation, and treaty rights as the only solution to genocide also reaches into the present. What is most disturbing to me about this ongoing history is that we have yet to tie virtually any debate round to actual, material land repatriation, sovereign gains, or the upholding of treaty rights. These material gains involve labor from Native people organizing at the grassroots level, not an academic labor from Settlers. Debate arguments do not facilitate sovereign benefits for Native peoples. Further, the struggle for sovereignty itself does not overcome or solve genocide. The removal of the Hunkpapa Lakota Oyate and their relatives at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock should be proof enough of this—sovereignty as a politic is often met with, rather than resolving, genocidal violence. Non-Black Native people in debate have performed a similar land-based politic. **Native debate has become so associated with words like “land,” “sovereignty,” “space,” “place,” “treaty rights,” and others, that it is almost impossible to theorize Native debate absent sovereignty as a grammar that marks our existence**. So both non-Native debaters (who claim to advocate for Native peoples’ sovereignty) and Native debaters (who claim to advocate for something that usually falls into the grammar of sovereignty) are talking in essentially the same register, with incredibly limited slippage towards genocide as a vector of violence. And, for Native people, like non-Natives, debate arguments do not and cannot facilitate the material elements of decolonization that these land-based arguments frequently rely upon.[[3]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn3) Sovereign gains don’t happen in debate rounds, but for some reason **the (mis)recognition of Native enunciation as sovereignty persists, in that the word “land” harkens to Native debate in almost every instance, that almost every debate involving Native people reading perceptibly “Native” arguments includes a discussion of “treaties” or “sovereignty” or “land-based pedagogy” or “spatiality.” What other reason could this be than a structure of desire around recognition from the Settler/Master?** If we really follow the history of how “Nativeness” has been misrepresented in debate by Settlers, it becomes clear that much of contemporary Native debate, strangely (or as I argue, not so strangely), mimics these misrepresentations. Of course, debate is an economy of (mis)recognition. **That “Native” becomes coextensive with “land” in debate is no accident. It is an enunciation that has been evoked prior to the involvement of any Native debaters or coaches. And it is reiterated by non-Black Native debaters with increasing certainty about the truthiness of Native relationships to the land.** Systematically absent from this conversation, of course, is a discussion of genocide. I have gestured above towards the ways that the **desire for recognition from the Settler/Master motivates this conceptual move towards the register of sovereignty.** As Wilderson writes, “The crowding out, or disavowal, of the genocide modality [by the sovereign modality] allows the Settler/’Savage’ struggle to appear as a conflict rather than as an antagonism. This has therapeutic value for both the ‘Savage’ and the Settler: the mind can grasp the fight, conceptually put it into words. To say, ‘You stole my land and pilfered and appropriated my culture’ and then produce books, articles, and films that travel back and forth along the vectors of those conceptually coherent accusations is less threatening to the integrity of the ego, than to say, ‘You culled me down from 19 million to 250,000.’”

## Speaking for Others

If they can win on this argument, if we turn it and win that them imposing it is violent, we should win

[1] Extend conceded Brady – 3 conceded turns

[a] Battle fatigue – you place the burden on marginalized people to educate white people but they are tired of fighting.

[b] Allows the oppressor to evade responsibility since they don’t have to confront the discussion.

[c] Reduces marginalized folk to only being useful to explain their oppression leading to psychological violence.

[2] Cross apply the Tuck and Yang evidence – you have conceded reasons why everyone’s refusal is important.

[3] Turn - They create the necessity for racist blood quantuming to see whether someone is fit to read the argument.

[…]

[4] No link - We talk about the structures of colonialism as a whole and don’t isolate a specific group. Most people, [especially POCs], would be affected by the broader structures of colonialism.

[5] Turn – the negative is also an image of suffering you use to gain the ballot, there is no reason why that violence is any different.

[6] It’s impossible to verify the intention of an action.

## HWL Metageographics

#### Need to be able to identify the enemies

#### Modernity comes before geography

Sakai 06 - Naoki Sakai, Japanese Historian, in the Journal Theory, Culture & Society, March-May 2006 “Translation” [https://monoskop.org/images/7/77/Theory\_Culture\_and\_Society\_23\_2-3\_Problematizing\_Global\_Knowledge\_2006.pdf] Accessed 2/12/20 SAO

Modernity and the West In talking about ‘modern’ as it is apprehended in many parts of the world today, first it is historically necessary to anchor it in the original uses of this notion in the history of Western Europe. This is neither because the most authentic forms of modernity can be found in Western Europe, nor because modernity emanated from the center somewhat associated with Western Europe to the periphery of the Rest. Rather this is because the notion of ‘modern’ has been accepted and used primarily as a translation from its European originals for more than a century in many places, including those outside the geographic terrain of Europe and North America. One can talk about ‘modern’ as if there were a globally common apprehension of it precisely because, all over the world, people assume it is impossible to apprehend it without referring it back to its European equivalents, from which their local translations are believed to have derived. In the globally-accepted conception of modernity the schema of cofiguration between the West and the Rest is already at work powerfully. Despite linguistic and social diversities among the different sites of the world, therefore, the notion of ‘modern’ is supposedly retraceable to the singular history of Western Europe, thanks to the Eurocentric structure incorporated in the very notion itself. In this respect, the schema of co-figuration is the form which is most appropriate to the representation of the Eurocentric world, and it is also a form in which the legacy of European colonialisms is preserved. As far as the local terms used for modernity are concerned, however, the situation was drastically different in ‘pre-modern’ times preceding the translation of ‘modern’ into local equivalents. The introduction of ‘modern’ qualitatively changed the manner in which people customarily organized their historical experience. With the arrival of ‘modern’, people in many places in the world began to map geopolitical directives, centered on colonial powers in Western Europe, onto their pasts and futures, and to order their destinies and desires in terms of cartographic relativity. ‘Modern’ now implied much more than a chronological closeness to the present moment in which periods are classified. Consequently they sought coherence in the transition from the experience of their past to the anxiety or hope for their future by projecting a trajectory from a locus outside the modern onto a locus within. The progression of time from the past to the future was thus associated with a movement, on the cartographically imagined surface of the globe, from a geographic location outside the ‘modern’ civilization to another within it. The dynamic ecstatic or ex-static process from the past to the future was deprived of its temporality, and represented spatially as a vector from a geopolitical location in the periphery to another in the center. Thereby the temporal movement could be appropriated by the schema of co-figuration, and consequently the two pairing figures of the West and the Rest were imagined as if each were somewhat homogeneous within, despite the fact that neither the West nor the Rest could be an entity or a unity of language anyway. As a matter of fact, this explains how the mythic construct called the West was constituted, and why the West had been perceived as structurally indissociable from the modern until recently

# Philosophy NCs

## General Normative Theories

[1] Have to justify epistemology first

[2] Can’t prove one better than another

## Utilitarianism

You can look at consequences – the critique of util is about how aggregation calculations are skewed and assume a level of hubristic knowability, what knowledge systems future predictions are made based on, and how the system treats the partial universal

Priori question on level of meta ethics

NU – Extinction Now

Studies Bunk

Consequences impossible to calc

Solving RC O.W

Ext Indicts

Excludes animals and different ppl

Lesser evil turn

Carded indicts

#### Minimizing violence under util paradoxically causes the greatest evil. Reject trade-off arguments

Weizman 11 - Eyal Weizman, director of the research agency Forensic Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London, in the book “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza” published in 2011 [https://www.amazon.com/dp/B007HXFCWY/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?\_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1] Accessed 2/5/20 SAO

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the term ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror’, the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajuridical violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. 11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. **State violence** in this model **takes part in a necro-economy** in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace. 13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. 14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture, 15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatiotechnological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, **with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively**. Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay The Order of Evils. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but rather in minimizing the harms that he refers to as ‘evils’. Ophir unpacks the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that **questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them**. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demands of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility. 17

## Kant

#### Priori question on level of metaethics

#### Only partial fulfilment – ppl not labelled humans

#### Rationality not universal

#### Anthro

#### Sythetic Apriori impossible

#### Kant Affirms

#### Turn: Humanist ethics are the root of violence against the world

Taylor 18 - Carol A. Taylor, University of Bath, in the book socially Just Pedagogies, January 2018 “Each Intra-Action Matters: Towards a Posthuman Ethics for Enlarging Response-ability in Higher Education Pedagogic Practice-ings: Posthumanist, Feminist and Materialist Perspectives in Higher Education” [DOI: 10.5040/9781350032910.ch-005] Accessed 2/5/20 SAO

Why we need to exit the cul-de-sac of humanism I have been pondering the need to get out of the ethical cul-de-sac that humanism has led ‘us’ into for some years now (Taylor, 2016). This need revolves around a number of key problems. The first problem is the relation humanism sets up between the individual and the universal. Humanist ethics locates moral conceptions in individual human bodies while, at the same time, positioning ethics within abstract, universalising and human rights-based discourses. In sliding between these two poles of the individual and the universal, philosophical discussions distinguish between morality – which is said to be about personal character and the moral principles of an individual, group or tradition – and ethics – which is used to refer to the study of morality in social systems and how moral principles are put into action (Taylor and Robinson, 2014). However, from a posthuman stance, the individualuniversal dichotomy actually serves to **obfuscate ethical issues of responsibility** and acts as a sleight of hand to (arguably quite complacently) cover up the astonishingly lamentable state of worldly affairs that humans fail to/ have to take responsibility for. To add a little background: the individual-universal duality which both shapes humanist ethical thinking and enables ‘us’ to evade ethical actions is an outcome of the European Enlightenment’s philosophical allegiance to the traditions of deontological and consequentialist ethics. Deontological ethics, also known as the ‘ethics of principles’, 4 originated with Immanuel Kant, who proposed that humans are rational, autonomous beings whose existence is shaped by moral laws which are universal, general and unconditional. Kant proposed that such laws are equitable, have universal applicability, and can be articulated in frameworks, codes and procedures to regulate ethical conduct. This way of thinking will be familiar to many who have submitted research proposals to Institutional Ethics Review Boards and research councils, or whose profession is regulated by codes of conduct. In contrast to this, consequentialist ethics originate with Jeremy Bentham, whose ‘utilitarian ethics of consequences’ maintains that taking consequences into account is the best route to ensuring the greatest well-being for the greatest number. The central argument here is that focusing on the effects of actions impels us to consider their beneficence and impact on others. As an ethics of particular situations, consequentialist ethics might seem ostensibly more helpful to a posthumanist ethics in that they can put deontological ethics to the test by asking difficult questions about how universal principles apply in specific situations for particular people (Taylor, 2015). However, like deontological ethics, consequentialist ethics are oriented to the regulation of human affairs; ethics is circumscribed to the human realm because it is grounded in a philosophical view that humans, as sovereign subjects in possession of reason, will use their reason – the highest and god-given faculty man (sic) has – to arrange the world in a reasonable manner. In humanism, then, man figures as an ethical, political person from whose ego, rational certitude and boundaried body ethical action emanates. Ethics is directed ‘at’ others with whom man interacts or perhaps more precisely, on whom he acts; ethics grounds a disposition in which man can (quite literally) dispose of the world, nature and all the creatures who inhabit it from his indisputable location as centre, source and authority of ethical reasoning. Ethics formulated in this humanist vein gives rise to a second problem: that the supposedly **5 ‘universalistic’ values** presumed to be a ‘god-given birthright’ **turn out to be quite partial** in the end, deriving as they do from particular, historical and questionable Western epistemologies. As feminist, post-colonial, Black, queer, intersectional and indigenous scholars have amply shown, these epistemologies are normatively-based on the outlooks and viewpoints of the ‘standard’ political citizen – that is, one who is male, White, Western, ablebodied and heterosexual. **The Enlightenment ideals they encode – rationality, objectivity and scientific progress – have acted as a powerful impetus for Western** individual-universalist ethical frameworks, but the unmasking of this epistemology as a founding fantasy of powerover is both welcome and overdue. And this is the second reason why I think humanism has led us into an ethical cul-de-sac: it fundamentally functions through practices of **othering**. It positions every being not made in the image of ‘Mr Normal’ as aberrant, unequal and, therefore, able to be dis-counted. Ethics and morality, then, as functions and outcomes of liberal humanism, work as white, male, colonialist exclusionary practices aimed at securing hegemony for some and delivering partial benefits for only some ‘others’. Indeed, it is the case that when particular groups of people (and never nonhumans) have progressively, often via emancipatory narratives or violent political struggle, or the latter mingling with the former, been accorded some share in the Enlightenment narrative of ‘progress’, then this has been specifically because they have been deemed by those White, male power-brokers as having demonstrated sufficiently developed rational human qualities to have ‘graduated into humanhood’ (Spivak, cited in Wolfe, 1998: 43–4) from their formerly ‘uncivilized’ and ‘natural’ state. There is an additional, third reason why we need to exit the humanist ethical cul-de-sac: the principle and practice of human exceptionalism which presumes that humans are the most important beings in the world is based in the presumption that the world, its natural resources 6 and all other creatures which inhabit it, are available for use by humans for their particular ends. This humanist disposition puts the world is at his – man’s – disposal. Human exceptionalism is, therefore, another othering, via the institution of a binary – human as ‘culture’, nonhumans and the inorganic world as ‘natural other’ which justifies varying modes of species-specific violence, from zoos and the misery of captivity, to approximately 1.5 million animals euthanized in animal shelters in the USA each year, to intensive dairy farming, to destruction of land and marine habitats. The logic of humanist exceptionalist ethics makes these violences not only possible but necessary for securing ‘our’ ‘natural’ place as insurmountably superior and different, and for enabling us to obtain the resources ‘we’ need to inhabit the planet at the level of ‘comfort’ and ‘ease’ we require. Human exceptionalism, in unholy alliance with technocracy, capitalist expansion, and necro-politics, has, therefore, enabled ‘us’ humans to arrogate to ourselves the ethical right to dispose of nonhuman bodies in any way we wish – a train of ethical thinking that has undoubtedly led to the suffering and extinction of nonhuman animals on a vast scale. The three reasons outlined above are underpinned and cross-cut by a fourth reason why it is necessary to exit the humanist ethical cul-de-sac: the presumption that objectivity is obtainable, desirable and required to guarantee Truth and therefore ensure human progress. Daston and Galison (2007: 371) have shown, however, that ‘the emergence of [objectivity] is recent and contingent’, and that the ‘stranglehold’ of objectivity on the epistemological imagination is a recent ‘rupture’ occasioned by modernity and its humanist centerings. Interestingly, they argue that the elevation of objectivity as the one and only epistemic virtue is grounded in fear – a fear that knowledge based in subjectivity may give rise to errors, errors borne of passion, sensuousness, imagination. For the scientific imagination to succeed objectivity has to be pitted against the ‘weakness’ of subjectivity and subjectivity has to be 7 controlled and corrected by efforts of will, sacrifice and renunciation. As feminist scholars of science (Fox Keller, 1985; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1993) have long known and admirably demonstrated, and as Daston and Galison (2007: 374) underline, ‘the demands [objectivity] makes on the knower outstrip even the most strenuous forms of self-cultivation, to the brink of self-destruction’. Adherence to objectivity both shapes the image of the idealized knower as he who has overcome all his sensuous frailties in pursuit of Truth (most emphatically with a capital ‘T’) and has divorced knowledge irrevocably from the body. Subjectivity is a cardinal sin in Enlightenment, humanist epistemology. From a posthuman, new materialist perspective, enthroning objectivity and reason as epistemic virtues par excellence does some neat ethical work to bifurcate the world into a series of binaries (male/ female, reason/emotion, mind/body, self/other), accord privilege to the former term in the couplet, and denigrate the second term. But, as these binaries and the discussion above show, an epistemology is not separate from an ethics, an aesthetics and an ontology. Haraway (1988) was right to argue that humanist universalism, individualist egocentrism, and scientific objectivity, grounded in and emanating from an epistemology which separates the knower (man) from the known (the world and all its ‘others’) is a ‘god trick’, a showy bit of plate spinning, a means to separate the ‘clean’ body of the mountebank on stage from the unwashed, smelly bodies of his audience. Posthumanist, new materialist ethics bring this (rather extended) bout of shadow-boxing with reality to an end: there is no impersonal place of knowing ‘outside’ the messiness that emanates from embodied and sensory forms of knowing, and distance is neither desirable nor possible in mutually entangled futures on a shared planet. Instead of a dis-engaged ethic of use it proposes an entangled ethics of relation, the features of which I now outline.

## Plato/ Virtue Ethics

#### [1] Turn: Aristotelian Ethics rely on an arc of redemption that reinforces colonialism

Dahl 14 - Adam J. Dahl, University of Minnesota, July 2014 “Empire of the People: The Ideology of Democratic Empire in the Antebellum United States” [https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/167047/Dahl\_umn\_0130E\_15307.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y] Accessed 10/24/18 SAO

Yet the gap between their two conceptions of settler democracy is much narrower than we might think. In his account of the relationship between settler expansion and liberal-republican democracy, Rana argues that although the latter politically entailed the former as a means of realizing dominant racial visions and exclusive projects of political peoplehood, the relationship between the two is by no means conceptual. He explicitly rejects the idea that the link between settler colonialism and democratic republicanism is philosophically or conceptually essential because such a view “too quickly rejects the emancipatory features of the republican tradition.”16 Similar to Smith, he seeks the redemption of settler conceptions of democracy by delivering on the true promise of American liberty. In this regard, he refuses to shed the assumptions of American exceptionalism, and he admits as much: “the real exceptionalism of the American project” lies in the efforts of some American settlers to “strip republican ideals of their oppressive roots to make free citizenship broadly accessible to all.”17 Rana, like Smith, rejects that the link between settler colonialism and democracy exists at a conceptual level by failing to understand that historical context is constitutive of conceptual logic. This presents methodological problems at two levels. First, the narrative structure of Rana’s account is at odds with his assertion that settler colonialism is constitutive of American democracy. To set up his historical narrative, he contends that settler democracy “entailed imperial frameworks, which over time undermined the very promise of this ideal.”18 If settler forms of expansion and hierarchy do not logically flow from settler ideals at a conceptual-historical level, then the problem seems to be in their fortuitous and contingent association in the process of historical development. In this regard, Rana relies on an Aristotelian framework in which settler democracy has a pure form at the conceptual level but then becomes perverted, acquiring expansionist and exclusionary tendencies in its historical development. The argument that exclusion and settler ideals are linked solely at the historical rather than conceptual level relies on the assumption that such ideals are somehow pure in their conceptual origins but become perverted in the historical process. But if American democracy’s settler-colonial entailments come only from its contingent association in historical development, then Rana offers an argument that is little different from Smith’s. Both follow a narrative structure of redemption in which the emancipatory promise of settler democracy can be disconnected from its expansionist and exclusionary connotations. Second, Rana’s own normative commitments are also at odds with his constitutive view. When he comes to the normative component of his argument, he is ultimately left arguing, quite simply, that settler conceptions of democracy need not be rejected but rather affixed to more inclusive and universal legal frameworks. Rana’s primary normative question is, “What constitutional structures should govern a postsettler society and what account of freedom could justify these structures and ground a new ethical basis for citizenship?”19 But the question of course arises, from what wellspring should we draw up these conceptual, political, and theoretical resources to challenge the exclusive and hierarchical tendencies of settler colonialism? Turning to the writings of Thomas Paine, Orestes Brownson, and Randolph Bourne, Rana calls on the settler tradition of democracy itself to challenge settler colonial hierarchies. But in exclusively drawing on settler traditions of thought and culture to reconfigure colonial hierarchies, he normalizes the power, presence, and subjectivity of settler colonials. Part of the problem here stems from Rana’s exclusive attention to the constitutional development of settler democracy. Amending a socio-cultural perspective to the constitutional entwinement of democracy and empire reveals the project of conjoining frameworks of inclusion and universalism with settler principles to be extremely limited as an effort to overcome U.S. Empire. Rana ignores how settlerness inheres in the norms, habits, and customs of American citizenship, which were not only cultivated on top of an expropriated land base but were also shaped and given political and cultural meaning through settler expansion. It is precisely by ignoring these dynamics and then calling on settler-democratic norms to combat the very colonial hierarchies it has produced that Rana (and Smith) norm-alize settler experiences. The consequence of settler normalization is the disavowal of how subjects and victims of American colonialism have articulated their own modes of democratic self-rule that, while vitally draw on American democratic ideals, appropriate and revise the terms of modern democratic theory in a way that extends beyond their original meaning.

#### [2] IP rights structurally prevent all people from accessing the same intellectual virtues and violates the virtue of empathy by not giving life-saving medication to poorer nations.

**Morabito 15** - “Essay: Pharmaceuticals and Global Justice: Balancing Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights” by Marisa Morabito [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1808&context=student\_scholarship] //ahs emi

The approach to IP rights and global pharmaceutical industry thus requires a different philosophical, ethical framework. I would like to suggest a virtue and human flourishing approach which is based on human good and well-being and helping others to also be able to flourish by living ethical lives which parallels Nussbaum's capabilities approach, a virtue ethics view.la Virtue ethics is an ethical system based upon adherence to a principle. Virtue ethicists believe that there are "certain ideals toward which we should strive...[to allow] for the full development of our humanity" by looking at what humans can become.ls The virtue ethicist focuses on humans achieving their maximum potential while having virtues of compassion, generosity and courage.l6 For instance, "a person who has developed virtues will be naturally disposed to act in ways consistent with moral principles.lT Virtue ethics emphasizes character formation and habits to foster positive improvements in the world.18 A virtuous person wants to behave well and looks at a circumstance and decides what is right and wishes to behave according to what is right.le This view aligns with Nussbaum who takes a capabilities view which is based on the idea that well-being is "of vital moral importance [and]... individuals must have real opportunities to live well and to flourish as human beings.20 Nussbaum's capabilities view looks at the important functions of a human being and looks at what institutions are doing for those capabilities.2r For example, functions and capabilities are set and then we observe whether intuitions are promoting human flourishing based on these principles.22 If the standards are not being met, we must try to change the institution's policies to allow for human flourishing.23 Nussbaum's capabilities approach explains what flourishing is and tries to achieve this flourishing worldwide.2a Based on this theory, IP rights "generate a material circumstance for a majority of the world in which we can't maximally exercise our intellectual capacities, and thus we fail as a species to maximally flourish."25 Therefore any further discussion of IP rights and the global pharmaceutical industry must proceed clearly focused on adherence to a moral principle; maximizing human flourishing. Successful efforts in South Africa were only achieved when the policy became virtue/principle based. In the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, the court ruled that the government breached the people's right to have access to health care services when it prevented drug availability to pregnant women in order to stop mother-to-child HIV transmission.26 2.4 million people have received free anti-retroviral treatment in 2013 which was a 1.4 million increase from 2009 while over 20 million people have been tested for HIV since the government created counseling and testing programs in2010.27 South Africa's goal is to have an extra 4.6 million people receiving anti-retroviral treatment within the next five years.28 Furthermore, South Africa has reduced the prices of anti-retrovirals and there was a tender to make one ARV pill which can be used once instead of having to take three pills two times per day which means there will be fewer pills used and consumed.2e Although there have been successes, the South African population continues to have the highest number of HIV/AIDS infected people globally as millions still lack access to ARVs.30 The ongoing tension between the fight against poverty and IP rights continues to persist at the mercy of humans in poorer nations who are unable to afford medications to cure their illnesses and diseases which hinders maximum human flourishing and does not express good character. In her article "Common Ground: The Case for Collaboration Between Anti-Poverty Advocates and Public Interest Intellectual Property Advocates" Cantrell states that with intellectual property advocates, their focus is on the individuals rights to create, appropriate, and recreate.3l However, the tension between the fight against poverty and the protection of intellectual property rights is evident as the IP movement's success is frequently at the expense of the poor.32 Cantrell continues to state that Martha Nussbaum's virtue theory of human capabilities suggests that every person should have the ability to live a flourishing life yet the IP movement has placed limitations on what a person can do and be as a result of continued poverty.33

#### [3] Property rights are incoherent under virtue. According to their metaphysics everything material intrinsically has a form that’s universally accessible to all people. That means individuals can’t claim ownership to something everyone has access to.

#### 2AR on Dahl 14

#### [1] Abstraction DA – Virtue ethics assumes a pure form of the civilizational model that ignores the constitutive expansionist and exclusionary tendencies that have resulted in global genocidal violence. Your obsession with an abstract world of forms is what allows us to pretend like we have somehow been led astray and all colonialism is an unintended byproduct of failure to conform to a virtuous standard.

#### [2] Bootlicking DA - You live in the heart of a settler colonial empire – being a virtuous citizen means conforming to standards of settler futurity that is mutual exclusive with notions of self-rule that have been erased by American imperialism. Remember, under virtue ideal characteristics of moral agents are based on one’s role in society. That’s a bad ethical standard because it means everyone in this room is constitutively obligated to maintain the occupation on stolen land because we are citizens of the empire. The 1ac framework guarantees moves to innocence that we say cause ongoing material and ontological genocide.

## Deleuze – See Ks

## Skep

#### [1] We agree objective morality doesn’t exist, that’s the aff: Means you can perm the NC

#### [2] Aff answers the question of what’s next after concluding skep is true. The aff says because skep is true you shouldn’t impose one culturally relativist set of moral practices over another. Patents are an expression of that imposition, so even if you agree with the whole neg there’s offense for the aff.

#### [3] Skep being true doesn’t mean morality isn’t valuable. We have won that our normative justification for decolonization prevents dehumanization, exploitation, and ultimately planetary ecological annihilation. That means any impact to following a normative theory that isn’t necessarily true or verifiable is outweighed by the harms of disregarding it.

#### [4] They justify atrocities which is an independent voter under our ROB. Colonizers have always used elaborate logic tricks to justify conquest which is a link at the level of subject formation.

## Determinism

#### Reject Determinism:

#### [1] Determinism says slavery was okay or that it was permissible. That makes debate unsafe—reject them on face. At worst, just reject the framework—our intuitions are too strong to accept determinism.

#### [2] Self Defeating: If free will doesn’t exist, the judge can’t accept your conception as true. Also mean you didn’t read a 1nc which proves the judge can auto-affirm

#### [3] Determinism is non-verifiable since all decisions you could make to prove determinism false would just be said to have been caused by something else

#### [4] My fwk solves. Dunford says that ethical reciprocity is the purpose of humanity so fulfilling that predetermined destiny means u should vote aff!

#### [5] Neuroscientific ev disproves- this ow free will in the context of pre-determined choices is prove true.

Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS NPR

The stochastic models and the models of evidence accumulation consider decision as the crossing of a threshold of activity in specific brain regions. They do not restore the idea of conscious control but turn away from the previous paradigm. These studies cannot yet fully explain how the intention to perform an action arises in the brain, but they better account for the complexity of the process. In particular, they recognize the role of the spontaneous activity of the brain, of external cues and other factors—including those that might be called ‘‘will’’ and ‘‘reasons’’ (which, however, do not currently have precisely identified neural correlates)—in reaching the critical threshold. Studies that show how we can consciously block movements whose preparation has already begun unconsciously, then, indicate how the subject is able to exercise a form of control, whose genesis however is still unclear. One could state that free ‘‘decision-making draws upon a rich history of accumulated information, manifested in preferences, attitudes and motivations, and is related to the current internal and external environment in which we act. Complete absence of context is impossible’’ (Bode et al., 2014). In this framework, I have here proposed to integrate neuroscientific research on free will by connecting higher-level concepts with their neural correlates through a psychological operationalization in terms of skills and cognitive functions that do not necessarily imply a continuous conscious control over the decision-making and action process. This may also allow one to create a quantitative index, albeit still quite rudimentary, of the degree of freedom of each subject. This freedom would be specifically defined and therefore may not perfectly coincide with the intuitive concept of free will. Starting from these functional indicators, which psychology has well clarified, one could then move on to investigate the precise neural correlates for a different and (possibly) more fundamental level of explanation in terms of brain processes that enable the executive functions. According to Craver (2007), a mechanistic explanation is able to lead to an inter-field integration. There are two relevant aspects to this approach. The functional knowledge that can be drawn from psychological research is a tool to identify neural mechanisms; the knowledge of the brain structure can guide the construction of far more sophisticated psychological models (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). The index of free will that I am proposing (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015)—despite surely needing further refinement—might be useful to explore the brain mechanisms that underlie what appears in behavior as ‘‘free will’’, which no longer seems to be an illusion, not even for neuroscientific research.

#### [6] Robust science disproves sensationalist views on determinism, but even if they are right, believing in agency is essential for human progress

Osman 21 - Magda Osman, Queen Mary University of London, The Conversation, May 26th, 2021 “To what extent are we ruled by unconscious forces?” [https://theconversation.com/amp/to-what-extent-are-we-ruled-by-unconscious-forces-161216] Accessed 9/7/21 SAO

Recent research shows that nudge techniques often dramatically fail. They also backfire, leading to worse outcomes than if they weren’t used at all. There are several reasons for this, such as applying the wrong nudge or misunderstanding the context. It seems that more is needed to change behaviour than nudging. That said, nudgers lead us to believe that we are more easily influenced than we think, and than we are. A fundamental aspect of our psychological experiences is the belief that we are the agents of change, be it personal circumstances (such as having a family) or external ones (such as anthropogenic climate change). On the whole, we would rather accept that we have free choice in all manner of contexts, even when we perceive it is under threat from mechanisms unconsciously manipulating us. However, we still strategically believe we have less agency, control and responsibility in certain areas, based on how consequential they are. For example, we would rather claim conscious control and agency over our political voting than over what breakfast cereal we are purchasing. So we may argue that our poor breakfast choice was down to subliminal advertising. However, we are less inclined to accept being duped into voting a certain way by big tech social media forces. Headline-grabbing scientific findings in psychology often don’t help because they add to some of the extreme intuitions that we are fundamentally ruled by our unconscious. But the more robust scientific evidence indicates that we are more likely governed by conscious thinking than by unconscious thinking. We might get the sense that we aren’t always fully aware of why we do what we do. This might be because we aren’t always paying attention to our internal thoughts and motivations. But this isn’t equivalent to our unconscious ruling our every decision. While I don’t think so, let’s say that we are actually ruled by the unconscious. In this case, there is an advantage to entertaining the belief that we have more conscious control than not. In cases where things go wrong, believing that we can learn and change things for the better depends on us accepting a level of control and responsibility. In cases where things go well, believing that we can repeat, or further improve on our successes, depends on accepting that we had a role to play in them. The alternative is to submit to the idea that either random, or unconscious forces dictate everything we do and in the long run that can be devastating mentally. So why did you fall in love with your partner? Maybe they made you feel strong or secure, challenged you in some way, or smelt nice. Just like any other matter of importance, it is multifaceted, and there is no single answer. What I would argue is that it’s unlikely that your conscious self had nothing at all to do with it.

#### [7] Causality- there must be nothing which something comes from which means that generation of ideas can be spontaneous.

## Hegel

#### Turn: Hegel’s thought cannot be separated from its colonial and racist origins

Stone 17 - Alison Stone, Lancaster University, Hegel Bulletin, Published Online June 27 2017 “Hegel and Colonialism” [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin/article/hegel-and-colonialism/61B53799DD191018664EE38446E0915D] Accessed 10/28/20 SAO

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism, but what he does say is approving. Finishing his account of the European middle ages, he praises the revival of learning, the flourishing of fine art, and the arrival of the ‘hero’ Columbus in the new world (S 411; Hei 204). Columbus, he says, was motivated by the ‘outward’ urging of spirit to know its own earth and convert non-European natives to Christianity. The reasons why Hegel regards this positively emerge in the passages on the ‘geographical conditions of history’ that address the ‘new world’. It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed have significant civilisations, since they were of a feebler stock and are long gone. The new world has shown itself to be much feebler than the old world. … Some of the tribes of North America have disappeared and some have retreated and generally declined … (HG 192–93) In 1830/31 Hegel expanded on the new world, adding that African Negroes had to be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives were incapable (Hei 59). For ‘the Negroes are far more receptive to European culture than the Indians … [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeed in producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefühl]’ in indigenous Americans (S 81). Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instil discipline in the natives; through these and other colonial efforts, the ‘authentic Americans are … now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] in European culture’ (N 165). Incidentally, Hegel’s points about indigenous Americans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians, since he includes ‘New Holland’—i.e., Australia—in the new world. As for the old world, Hegel begins with Africa—the ‘authentic’ sub-Saharan Africa of the Negroes. He contends that the Negroes know no morality and practice slavery along with polygamy, cannibalism, and other customs that embody total ignorance about freedom. Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes is Slavery. Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and sold to America. Despite this, their lot is even worse in their own country, where an equally absolute slavery is present; for the overall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousness of his freedom yet, and so sinks down to a mere thing, a worthless object. …. Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht], for the essence of humanity is freedom; but for this man must first become mature [reif]. This is why the gradual abolition of slavery is therefore more appropriate and more right [Richtigeres] than its sudden removal. (S 96–99) So: European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofar as Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom. Yet before enslavement, Africans did not know themselves to have that capacity; accordingly they enslaved and mistreated one another, and acted merely on their natural desires. The latter does not constitute freedom, Hegel insists; if I act from naturally given desires, I am still not determining for myself how to act. So **slavery was, relatively, an improvement**, because it ‘matured’ the Negroes to become aware of their freedom. ‘One must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming their naturalness’ (Hei 70). We can infer from Hegel’s comments that slavery educates in several ways. (i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (from, e.g., N 165). (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (e.g., Hei 59). In working, one learns to hold one’s natural desires in check and thereby see oneself as capable of deliberating about or even rejecting them. (iii) Work also instils an awareness of one’s capacity to mould natural objects—a sense of ‘achieving independence through one’s own activity’ (61). (iv) Ironically, those enslaved thus acquire a sense of private property (61)—partly by learning of European institutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects, thereby forming a sense of ‘possessing’ them which fosters an appreciation of property.9 In sum: ‘Slavery … is necessary at those stages where the state [and its people] has not yet arrived at rationality. It is an element in the transition to a higher stage’ (HG 197). Because slavery still has elements of wrong, though, the final step must be for slavery to end. However, Hegel cautions, slavery should not be suddenly abolished because it must end after, not before, the Negroes have been educated through it: ‘If slavery was altogether wrong, then the Europeans should give the slaves their freedom immediately; but in that way the most frightening consequences arise, as in the French colonies’ (Hei 70). Hegel’s line of thought, then, takes in slavery and colonization at once (understandably, since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonial America). Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because it violates the rights, equality and freedom of the slaves. But through being enslaved, slaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could not otherwise make, for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree, so that freedom can come to Africans only from without. Analogously, one might think that colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights, equality and freedom of indigenous peoples—but no, for before colonization those people had no awareness of their freedom. They ‘ha[d] no sense of private property, of achieving independence through one’s own activity, or of securing one’s property through right’ (61). By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually by agencies such as the Christian church, these people will eventually learn about their freedom. Until then, their subjection, while partially wrong insofar as it is subjection, is also partially right: it is, at least, an improvement on the natives remaining in their natural, wholly unfree, pre-colonial condition. Colonialism is justified, on this view, because it spreads freedom to peoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring it. Moreover, the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of native peoples—hence Hegel’s endorsement of the Christian clergy and missionaries ‘setting out to accustom the Indians to European culture and ethics [Sitten]’ (N 164)—since those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom. We might wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter that occurred during the colonization of America as justified. He does acknowledge European, especially Spanish, violence towards indigenous Americans, but he is only overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had, he says, degenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204). Moreover, he disguises the extent of European violence by running together indigenous Americans having been ‘destroyed and slaughtered’ (untergegangen, verdrängt), having disappeared (verschwunden), and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zurückgezogen; N 163; see also Parekh 2009). **Hegel** does not wholly denounce colonial violence because he **thinks that Europe’s conquest of America was based on a sound goal— spreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all people—and that the violence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified**. But Hegel does disapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goal—robbery. This is congruent with Hegel’s overall approach to violence in history, which he memorably calls a ‘slaughterbench’ (Schlachtbank). On his view, the consciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishing its pre-eminence by prevailing, culturally and militarily, over its predecessor. To the extent that war and violence are necessary for progress, they are justified (although ‘justified’ does not mean ‘to be celebrated’). Even in these terms, though, much of the violence carried out by European colonizers—the decimation of many native American tribes, the Middle Passage—went beyond the minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along the way to their ultimate freedom. But likewise, in history generally, violence has regularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress. Such excesses are inevitable, an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs. These excesses of violence are not justified; yet we can be reconciled to them as an inevitable, albeit non-ideal, concomitant of progress (H 90–91). Presumably, Hegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence. Hegel’s overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified but also necessary, as part of Europe’s centuries-long process of realizing freedom. A logical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples: after all, the European principle is that all are free. This extension can only occur, though, by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples, since they have no native means of acquiring freedom: ‘The [Negroes’] condition is incapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung], and their condition as we see it today is as it has always been’ (N 190). And ‘the Negroes ... cannot move [bewegen] to any culture’ (Hei 67). Likewise with indigenous Americans: America is new and young because it had no history until the Europeans arrived. These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenous Americans cannot be educated; they can. But given their native ignorance of freedom, they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeans, which requires that they first be subjected to European control. Hegel’s case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals. He admits that unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have an idea of freedom—that ‘one is free’—but this idea remains so inadequate as to count as unfreedom. Hence, lacking belief in their own freedom, Oriental people cannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and, without such pursuits to drive historical change, their societies remain ahistorical. Colonization of these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified. As long as a people is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical, that people can advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it, for being pre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom. And indeed Hegel does say of India that: ‘The English, or rather the East India Company, are the lords [Herren] of the land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected [unterworfen] to Europeans; and China will also, some day, have to submit to this fate’ (S 142–43). We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in the Philosophy of Right: ‘The liberation of colonies … [is] of the greatest advantage to the mother state, just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage to the master’ (PR §248A, 269). Hegel’s paradigm here is American independence: i.e., the independence of what, he is explicit and adamant, is colonial European America, not Native America (N 165–66). That is, America merits independence once its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelage. This coheres with Hegel’s approving reference to independent Haiti in the Philosophy of Mind (EM §393A, 40): he says that this is a Christian state that the Negroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude. Once a people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture, as in Haiti, then and only then does that people merit freedom. Hegel’s argument for colonialism is of the ‘civilizing mission’ family. Effectively, his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worst under it—colonized peoples—by civilizing and bringing them freedom that they cannot access without passing through colonial subjection. For Hegel, colonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand. III. Saving Hegel from himself Hegel’s PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization of universal freedom. Does this show that Hegel’s conception of freedom is necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism? If so, then—taking it that colonialism was in fact morally wrong—presumably his conception of freedom and its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedom as such, of course). But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegel’s thought too summarily, and thereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial and decolonizing thought and activism, which, after all, has regularly drawn on Hegel, both directly—e.g., when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiong’o (2012) use Hegel to critique colonialism—and indirectly, through Hegel’s influence on Marxism and critical theory. Moreover, Hegel’s thought may still offer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined. We might therefore reasonably seek to separate Hegel’s basic conception of freedom and its historicity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that, when so separated, that basic conception tells against colonialism. Such a view—one that rescues Hegel from himself—is often adopted, more or less explicitly, by his interpreters.10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of view, although I will go on to complicate it in Section IV. The view is this. We can separate the essentials of Hegel’s account of freedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of history. Hegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans, indigenous Americans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on their own. Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is, including its necessary historical development, remains insightful. A better informed judgment of non-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative. But that does not undermine Hegel’s basic points that freedom develops historically in tandem with the consciousness of it, as embodied in different cultures and social institutions. When we separate these basic points from his actual narrative, we find that these points serve a progressive purpose, yielding grounds to reject colonialism. This view dovetails with Hegel’s claim that the human capacity for selfdetermination is universal, not confined to Europeans (see, e.g., H 88). Admittedly, though, this starting-point is only an abstract universal. Self-determination can be actualized only when one is conscious of one’s capacity for it, and that requires social and cultural institutions, a whole way of life, which foster that consciousness. Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greece, for Hegel, so that actualized freedom does not obtain universally. Arguably, though, given his basic view of freedom and its historicity, Hegel could and should have interpreted all the world’s regions as taking part in the gradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom. Hegel does not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious of freedom at all. Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were, the former had no basis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partly realized freedom. Thus, what underpins Hegel’s denial of historicity to non-European peoples is his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom. That in turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisive break from unfreedom into freedom. The Greeks, Hegel says, became the distinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneous Oriental peoples and their cultures, but the Greeks surmounted or overcame (überwinden) this background (HG 214). By doing so, the Greeks created their ‘free, beautiful’ spirit (374). The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions to ‘make themselves’ (372; see also 393–94). However, this view that the Greeks ‘overcame’ the Oriental world of unfreedom seems overstated by Hegel’s own lights. For Hegel himself, the Greeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedom running from China through India to Persia and culminating in Egypt, Persia’s most advanced province. Egypt is the hinge between Orient and Occident, in which the human soul’s intrinsic capacity for freedom was almost grasped. But it was not quite grasped, for the soul was still not distinguished from animal nature, a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334, 368). That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their gods and goddesses on animal species, often with animal heads. Yet, for Hegel, the Greeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacity for freedom. They admitted freedom only to male, native-born slave-owners. In that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance of natural contingency, i.e., accidents of birth, sex and geographical location (H 88). So the difference between the Egyptian view—human freedom is incompletely distinguished from (animal) nature—and the Greek view—human freedom is again incompletely distinguished from nature—appears to be a difference of degree, not kind.11 Hegel’s ‘overcoming’ idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduated portrayal of history’s stages. That portrayal could be taken to show that belief in freedom is not exclusively European, since the Persians and Egyptians already had versions of that belief. To be sure, they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)—but then so was the Greeks’. And by extension, the Indians and Chinese likewise had versions of the belief in freedom—even more inadequate ones, since they attributed freedom only to ‘one’, not ‘some’—but where that inadequacy still differentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more so in the Indian case since the ‘one’ is a whole caste). If the Oriental peoples did have versions, however unsatisfactory, of the belief in freedom, then Hegel should not have denied that these peoples are historical. For if it is believed that someone is free, be it only ‘one’ ruler or caste, then others may claim and demand that same freedom for themselves, powering historical change. Now, Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lacking freedom more radically than the Orientals, yet contrary evidence was available to him. He might, for instance, have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (later six) Native American tribes, founded c.1600 and dissolved c.1800: a system of intra- and inter-tribal governance which ‘maximized individual freedom while seeking to minimize excess governmental interference in people’s lives’ (Johansen 1982: 9), influencing the American Constitution. And **Hegel embellished, exaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa** so as to portray a people without any respect for human life, freedom, or rights—more so than the sources suggested, and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998).12 The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans as having views of freedom, even if he classed them as even less adequate than Oriental ones. With that those peoples would, like the Orientals, have had an entry to history. Nonetheless, Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from nonEuropean unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedom, down to its lowest level, and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedom, right up to where unfreedom is almost freedom, but not quite. But the placement of this dividing line appears arbitrary. Consider, for example, Hegel’s view that Hindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguish themselves, as human agents from nature (HG 256, 273–81). On Hegel’s account, as we’ve just seen, there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fully extricate human agency from nature either, so—on his own terms—it is not clear that the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history, freedom versus unfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom, more or less far along the historical path towards full freedom). Hegel could and, it seems, should have interpreted much of his material as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practised freedom, albeit imperfectly. We might still find this revised Hegelian narrative objectionable, assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions of freedom as less advanced than European ones. Yet once it is admitted that non-European peoples are historical in principle, Hegel would also have to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies, so reinterpreting his material once again. Each continent would have its own history of progression in consciousness of freedom, rather than non-European continents merely paving the way for Europe. The several continents would have histories of freedom that run in parallel, rather than corresponding to more or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modern Europe. Neither of these revised Hegelian narratives—the single line or parallel lines versions—supports colonialism, not even the single line model on which non-European peoples’ native levels of freedom are, although real, yet deficient compared to European ones. By recognizing freedom, however unsatisfactorily, non-European cultures would still have the internal potential and motor to advance to greater freedom. In that case colonization would not be necessary for non-European peoples’ achieving freedom, and would not be justified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom. Another plank in Hegel’s justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed no freedom pre-colonization—so that, despite its abrogation of their freedom, colonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it). But if these peoples did have a grasp of freedom, however imperfect, then colonization stood to worsen their position. That risk is especially pronounced given Hegel’s own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonization and, given the role of contingency in human affairs, that that violence may well mushroom beyond the necessary minimum. Further, for Hegel colonization requires the extirpation of native cultures; but if these are not cultures of unfreedom, then that extirpation is not justified. Apparently, then, Hegel should by his own lights have opposed colonialism, for his own philosophy generates a case against it. IV. The Greeks, history and self-liberation from nature The view just canvassed is that, despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism of Hegel’s substantial narrative in the PWH, his distinctive account of freedom, as developing historically through successive civilizations, does not in itself necessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and, when extricated from the latter, yields a case against colonialism. However, we can distinguish weaker and stronger versions of this view. More weakly: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism, and so does not necessarily imply pro-colonialism, but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as the pro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it. More strongly: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and, when so separated, this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherently anti-colonial direction. I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim, and the weaker one only subject to a significant qualification: Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism, but not as easily as Section III suggested. This is because Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism In Section III I suggested that Hegel’s divisions Greeks/non-Greeks, free/ unfree look arbitrary. But actually they are not. For Hegel: Its [Greece’s] principle is that self-conscious freedom steps forth. … [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature … the specificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be grasped. One unity is the Oriental, … consciousness immersed in nature; a [new kind of] harmony is now to be brought forth [by the Greeks] in which … spirit dominates. Spirit now determines nature, and this is a spiritual unity … (Hei 117; my emphases) [The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that the freedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation to some natural stimulus. Greek freedom is stimulated by something other and is free because it changes and produces the stimulus from out of itself (aus sich). (S 238; my emphasis) Thus, the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in the other, i.e., nature. But this does not mean that the content of their practices and way of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeks’ given impulses. Rather, they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves in them. In the Greek case, then, spirit ‘determined’ nature, whereas previously spirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature. This Greek determination of nature by spirit—spirit’s investment of nature with meaning of its own—was made possible by a prior moment, first carried out by the Greeks, through which ‘spirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature, … [but] releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]’ (HG 395–96). This moment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from nature corresponds to the overcoming (überwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnic heritage, a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remake that heritage for themselves, to make themselves. Hegel is explicit that none of the world’s other peoples to that point had achieved this. Even so, for Hegel, the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect to nature and existing givens in the world—re-shaping what they found already there, rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves. Hence the Greeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicating independently on the given natural and social world through their own reason, or of generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritual freedom. Or, as Hegel also puts it elsewhere, individual subjectivity was not differentiated from social substance, but the individual identified fully and unquestioningly with his or her social role, and there was no ground for Hegel and Colonialism 16 independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993). Connected with all this, the Greeks restricted freedom to some people only, effectively stipulating that only those with certain kinds of nature—male, free-born—or natural location—native Greek—had the power of self-determination. In these ways spirit’s freedom remained ‘conditioned’, or limited (bedingt), by—although not immersed in— nature (and see HG 390). However, these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination as the Greeks understood it, as including a moment of overcoming or settingoneself-free from nature, such that the power to overcome nature cannot possibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature at all). Thus, ‘in the principle of Greek freedom, inasmuch as it is freedom, it is implied that thought must be free for itself’ (HG 268)—although the Greeks for a long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implication. Nonetheless, in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for the Greeks’ exclusion of some people from freedom, and their other ways of restricting freedom’s scope, to come in for criticism. The criticism came with Socrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on what is and generate norms by itself (417). In that freedom of thought was thereby grasped as fully independent of nature, it was also grasped as universal, at least in principle. In these two ways, ‘Thought … introduces an opposition [Gegensatz] [to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity of essentially rational principles’ (S 267). For Hegel, then, Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what is, including of limited freedom, as no pre-Greek cultures did, just because the Greeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature, whereas ‘in the Oriental states, in which a lack of opposition is present, no moral freedom can come about’ (267). Although the advent of rational critique brought on the demise of Greek culture, Europe was thereby also set on the path of transformative historical change. We see, then, why in his own terms Hegel says that non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedom’s extension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulers—patriarchal authority in China, caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals in India, and state power in Persia. Non-Europeans could not question such authorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given. Because freedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation from nature and the given, no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited by nature, e.g., confined to people of certain castes, or by given states of affairs, e.g., customary authority and ritual. Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drive social change, hence lacked history proper—or indeed freedom as properly distinguished from unfreedom. So, for Hegel, there is a genuine difference in kind, not merely degree, between the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and the non-European world on the other; the Europe/non-Europe divide is not arbitrary but has a philosophical rationale. For while the Greek view of freedom was, like non-European views, limited and inadequate, the former was more advanced in one key respect—the inclusion in freedom of a primary moment of ‘overcoming’ nature—which enabled the Greek and post-Greek European world to become self-critical, self-revising, and so historical. This is what motivates Hegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedom, however limited, whereas non-European views that might prima facie look like views of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom. Once again, we might object that non-Europeans have at times construed freedom as including this moment of overcoming nature. Even on Hegel’s account, Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world in thought. He maintains, though, that this is merely an intellectual withdrawal and that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersed in, not including any moment of self-freeing-from, nature (see, e.g., S 157–58). In response we could, with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016), agree that in classical Indian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within nature but argue, against Hegel, that this does not constitute a real absence of freedom but rather a different conception of freedom. We might then say that because these—and other—non-European views were still views of freedom, those views were still sufficient to motivate social criticism, and hence place nonEuropean peoples in history, even without the element of overcoming nature. However, such a position would take us further away from Hegel’s own account of the historicity of freedom, according which, as we have seen, that moment of overcoming nature, uniquely new in ancient Greece, is crucial in powering historical progression. Hegel’s basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensive and significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested in Section III. In particular, that account connects with Hegel’s denial that nonEuropean peoples are historical—i.e., can come to freedom on their own—and hence with his case for colonialism, as the only route along which those peoples can reach freedom. These connections suggest that, after all, we cannot straightforwardly take up Hegel’s account of freedom and its historicity while sloughing off his pro-colonialism. This is not to say that we cannot separate out these parts of his thought at all. But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be a complicated process, not quick or straightforward. To the extent that such a rescue is possible, Hegel’s pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessary to his thought or system. Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive and deep-seated connections with his other views—enough to show that it is not the case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standards. Rather, he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms, although other, anti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which he could have developed. So the claim that Hegel’s account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial is unduly strong. **Through his understanding of freedom as involving spirit extricating itself from nature,** that account has **sustained links with his Eurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism**. We can nonetheless envisage various manoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all the world’s peoples, for example by saying that they have several conceptions of freedom where freedom can, but does not have to, include self-liberation from nature. Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedom, but not the only one. Even so, Hegel’s own account of freedom and its historicity does not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres, but only permits them. In sum, if Hegel’s view of freedom does not necessarily imply pro-colonialism, neither is it inherently anti-colonial. We can make distinctions and qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions, but this is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thought admits, another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonial system that Hegel in fact forged. There is a broader moral. We—i.e., the heirs of the European heritage that runs through philosophy into modern political thought—should not let this heritage off the hook too easily. This heritage, including Hegel’s thought, has been implicated in colonialism in various ways. To be sure, because it extols and articulates the values of freedom and equality, this heritage also furnishes conceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anticolonial struggles, and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modern European ideas for this purpose. For example, the Haitian revolutionaries declared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of the French Revolution. This might lead us to suppose that the European political legacy is intrinsically liberatory, and that theorists in the European tradition— Hegel included—have only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunate prejudices that led them to go back on their own principles. I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quickly, and leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from these predecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections with Eurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes. This is not to say that we should or could repudiate these ideas outright. Rather, in view of their connections with colonialism, we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take these inherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently. My aim has been to help us cultivate this caution in Hegel’s case by acknowledging that, while his thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities, it also has real and tenacious links with colonialism of which we should remind mindful.13

## Alienation

## Contracts

# CPs

## Generic CP

#### [1] Perm do both: We reject the notion of mutual exclusivity – all knowledge systems have value so long as they don’t infringe on the practicing of another, That’s Poppe 16

#### [2] CPs only function as offense if they justify opportunity costs. The 1n doesn’t do this but the 1AC answers it. Opportunity costs rely on notions intrinsic to western neo-classical economics – counter plans aren’t offense under my framework because the epistemology that they are ground in is violent

[3] Mgmt strategies fail

## Generic PICs

[1] Willis – steal culture

[2] Side step aff discussion

[3] Pics don’t disprove the resolution – no justification in the 1n

[1] Doesn’t solve aff impact – existence of nukes is what drives warming

#### Decolonization is unequivocal

Tuck and Yang 12 - Eve Tuck, State University of New York at New Paltz and K. Wayne Yang, University of California, San Diego in the journal Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 2012 “Decolonization is not a metaphor” [https://www.latrobe.edu.au/staff-profiles/data/docs/fjcollins.pdf] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

#### Modern Society is built on stolen culture

Willis 11 - Paul Willis, OpenDemocracy, August 15th, 2011 “The west’s ongoing theft of indigenous knowledge” [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/wests-ongoing-theft-of-indigenous-knowledge/] Accessed 8/28/19 SAO

But a short slide back in history reveals how the ingenuity of native peoples has both shaped our world in ways few of us are conscious of and how the originators of this knowledge have most often been sidelined in the name of profit. Canadians, for example, might have guessed that canoes and toboggans come from their natives but how many knew that they had the first people to thank for the game of Lacrosse and for maple syrup? Ever since first contact westerners have stolen from the designs, intellectual property and traditional knowledge of indigenous communities, sometimes reaping vast wealth for themselves into the bargain. Early explorers learned about tobacco, for example, through the shamanic rituals of American native tribes, later developing milder strains and turning it into a hugely profitable cash crop. In recent times the phenomenon has continued thanks in large part to international patent laws that have allowed western companies, particularly American, to steal indigenous plant knowledge and pass it off as their own – a practice that critics have labelled biopiracy. In 1999, for example, American authorities granted a patent to Cromak Research Inc., based in New Jersey, to exploit the anti-diabetic properties of three Indian plants even though their use in the control of diabetes was already common practice in India. In Brazil too large multinational corporations have already patented more than half the known plant species (Brazil is estimated to have around 55,000 species of flora, a fifth of the world's total). Chris Bose, Native American artist, at Montreal's Place des Arts The plunder of native art has been equally rapacious. Even a giant of 20th century art like Pablo Picasso is not above the fray. The great modernist has been accused of appropriating African tribal art in his work without giving full credit to where it came from. These days native art appears on everything from tattoos to surfboards, most often divorced from its historical meaning. Suzan Shown Harjo, an expert in American Indian federal laws, has spent forty years helping protect native sovereignty in the arts, culture and human rights: “They’ve been raided and pillaged in the same way by invaders of our lands,” Harjo, who has helped develop at least three pieces of pro-Native American legislation that have since become law, told the Indian Country Today newspaper. “We are fighting the same kind of mentality and people when we try to protect our traditions, culture, knowledge and cultural patrimony.” Chris Bose, a filmmaker from British Columbia appearing at the First Peoples Festival, has found his own way of fighting back against the cultural theft, in turn stealing icons from the west and fusing them with his native art. The central image of his latest film Jesus Coyote, a rough-edged short that mixes 1930s footage of the reservations with a Nine Inch Nails soundtrack, is a Christ with a coyote’s head. (Coyote’s are significant in the mythology of Bose’s Secwepemc tribe as the creators of land and sky). “Don’t get me wrong Jesus seemed like a cool guy,” says Bose. “But we’ve had so much stolen from us over the years it makes your head spin thinking about it. And the fact is being born native means being born an activist.”

## Word PICs

# A2 Tricks

#### Extend Kienpointner 96: An A priori can’t prove the resolution true or false – sentences cannot be determined to be true or false without substantive argumentative context: 3 conceded arguments

#### [1] Syntactic structures vary considerable across languages – a statement that may appear tautologically true in one language may not even structurally exist in another – for example the phrase boys will be boys looks necessarily true in English but in French it would be 'Les garqons sont les (des?) gargons' which doesn’t semantically mean anything.

#### [2] despite the appearance of absolute certainty because of the alleged absolute identity between 'A' and 'A' or 'p' and 'p', in reality, no particular instances of entity A are completely identical – the assumption that they can exist in the material world begs the question and over categorizes ideas without logical explanation. It is an assumption that there is a 1 to 1 relationship between ideas in the material and formal world.

#### [3] Contradictions can be true and persuasive in natural language – they can’t be in formal logic – this means you can’t map formal logic rules onto natural language to determine truth. For example: 'A job isn't a job' can point out differences between more or less attractive options for work. It completely depends on the verbal context whether tautologies and contradictions are to be accepted or rejected

# A2 K Tricks

## A2 Surrender/ Vote Black on Presumption

#### [1] Blood Quantum testing

#### [2] Punishment replicates the global north mindset – helland and lingren

#### [3] Delegitimizes Success

#### [4] Race to the bottom – no way to weigh

#### [5] Normatively justifies surrender to whiteness

#### [6] No impact to ballots on resume – participation is enough

#### [7] Perm: The aff is a K of the root cause of this position – means surrender to \_\_\_\_\_ by using the affs method to conclude that nukes are racist

#### [1] Blood Quantum testing - That forces genetic testing to get a blood quantum. This is exactly what racists use to justify exclusionary policies during the Jim-Crow Era

#### [2] Delegitimizes success of black debaters

#### [3] Race to the bottom – no way to weigh

#### [4] Perm: The aff is a K of the root cause of this position – means surrender to \_\_\_\_\_ by using the affs method to conclude that the topic is exclusionary.

[5] Surrender to blackness recreates a form of cruel optimism where your identity is only validated if the judge decides they want to vote on that, which causes blackness to appeal to external factors for legitimacy.

AT Brady

#### On Brady –

#### 1. Testing da – we dont know who is black or black enough- as a general principle, that means the cp forces authenticity testing that leads to white debaters targeting mixed people and opens the floodgates for antiblackness

#### 2. The ev says there has to be hope for resolution- its inconsistent with pessimism and bites back into all the link args that a white judge voting neg on the cp will magically resolve antiblackness- thats the THESIS of the other link arguments

#### 3. you dont need the ballot- putting white folxs in the hands of the decision calc of poc LITERALLY “puts whitey between us”- you bite into the cp and reproduce the impacts

#### 4. You’re playing oppression Olympics- bruh, meting white judges weigh against if you shoudl surrender to blackness or brownness is just oppression olympics

#### 5. You fetishize blackness as well- using it and forefronting it as the space for discussion makes white judges “feel woke” and increases complacency

## A2 Consult Black PPL

#### [1] I/Meet - Tokenization Turn

#### [2] Authors are consultation

#### [3] Race to the bottom

#### [1] I/Meet - I consulted but I am not going to tokenize them by naming them. Them trying to force non black people to consult black people in order to meet their off tokenizes black people.

#### [2] Our authors are a consultation - king agrees with the aff by saying that our critique of humanism is good

#### [3] Delegitimizes win - They don’t get credit for their wins.

#### [4] The logic justifies consulting everyone of every race which is impossible to meet

## A2 Black Female Author

#### [1] I/M: Brady

#### [2] Punishment replicates the global north mindset – helland and lingren

#### [3] Race to the bottom

#### [4] Tokenization

#### [5] Blood quantum

#### [1] I/M: We read King and Brady

#### [2] Race to the bottom - encourages debaters to just read arguments about inclusion

#### [3] Tokenization -

#### [4] Blood quantum – That forces genetic testing to get a blood quantum. This is exactly what racists use to justify exclusionary policies during the Jim-Crow Era

#### [5] There are an almost infinite amount of standpoint epistemologies we could include in the 1AC, so its impossible to meet the spirit of the shelL

## A2 Gillespie

Debate bad – hyperreality as an ontology warrant – fuck the flow

# General Case Turns

## A2 You value one Epistemology over another

#### It’s about not taking a subjective standard and making it universal – we are only saying you should protect the right to have subjective world views.

#### If native epistemology was infringing on western it would be bad – the only good or bad quality isn’t subjective – its just not mutually exclusive

## A2 Justifies Bad Subjective Norms

#### i.e violence is a good way of doing debate – obvi that’s infringing on someone freedoms – but we are then establishing a universal norm – why is colonialism slavery and genocide bad?

## A2 Framework is Impact Justified

## A2- Ecofem Is Essentialist

#### The approach averts the essentialist critique of ecofeminism.

Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 [“Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy”.Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Humanities in Gender Studies at Utrecht University]cdm/msa

Using eco-feminism in a non-essentialist re-vitalized way in this thesis can help to destabilize the engrained nature/culture binary, dualistic thinking that causes harm to the indigenous Other and the environment, as will be demonstrated and as is argued by many critical ecofeminists who place the accountability of ecological failures with it (Warren, 2000). Ecofeminism has suffered a long era of critique, being charged with reproducing an essentialist understanding of nature, and therefore woman, on the basis of its approach to embodiment and its foregrounding of certain material connections with the environment (Gaard, 2011: 42). Indeed, the perceived anti-feminist and essentialist assertions that are said to mark this perspective have led to a shying away from the theory in women’s studies, gender studies and queer studies (33). However, its intellectual origins, foundational inquiries and dedication to an inclusive feminism set on alleviating oppression for and beyond anthropocentric lines makes eco-feminism a credible and contemporarily relevant analytical lens to work with in conjunction with the attentions that a postcolonial perspective delivers. Ecofeminism offers a critique of economic imperialism, colonialism – both cultural and ecological –, and gender oppression (44). As hooks points out, feminism, as a struggle for liberation for all, must participate in other movements that share the struggle against the ideological foundation of patriarchal oppression, racism, and environmental degradation in order to achieve emancipation from these systems (1989: 22). Based on this assertion feminist and ecological movements can work harmoniously to attend to working against these systems. Creating alliances in theory and practice is vital for cross-cultural understanding and interdisciplinary work that will benefit the movement towards liberation of the Other and the environment. Thus, although there are criticisms of essentialism in ecofeminist work, alliances between environmentalists, feminists and indigenous peoples should not be denigrated due to the potentially problematic relations these alliances create (Jacobs, 2003: 667). Similarly, although essentializing indigenous peoples and their perceived connection with nature is highly problematic, as much of the literature argues, focusing solely on this issue denies any positive and progressive engagements that are happening as is correspondingly argued by Spivak’s notion of strategic essentialism. The risk of essentialism should not preclude us from working with these categories in order to make visible and address conditions that impact certain lives.

## A2 Benefit Sharing

#### [1] No one owns indigenous knowledge; multiple communities claim

Heald 3 - Paul Heald Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia 2003 [“THE RHETORIC OF BIOPIRACY” available online at: <http://cro.ots.ac.cr/rdmcnfs/datasets/biblioteca/pdfs/nbina-1806.pdf>] cdm

If a biopirate wants to establish a long-term working relationship in a biologically rich area, with whom should he establish it? **It is** often **unclear who, if anyone, within a long-term occupant community is authorized to sell knowledge**. In addition, frequently **more than one group possesses the same knowledge**. Pharmaceutical companies trying to act in good faith and provide compensation have run into difficulty in identifying precisely who deserves to be compensated. 5 7 One solution may be to contract with a national organization instead, as Merck did in its agreement with INBIO in Costa Rica. In the developing world, however, where most plant genetic resources are found, national governments often do not speak for long-term occupant communities.5 8 In fact, the two are often antagonists.5 9 The sheer cost of transacting over plant genetic resources stands in the way of a functioning market. The problem with creating markets for knowledge of plant genetic resources is especially acute when **corrupt local and national governments are unwilling to facilitate transactions** with their least powerful constituents. In the developing world, we see a pattern of dislocation, destruction of homeland, and a preference for logging and commercial farming interests that threaten both biodiversity and the very existence of long-term occupant communities. Governmental antagonism to these communities complicates transactions with them. Even where official policy is benign, institutionalized bribery and the lack of a reliable judiciary make establishing a flourishing market difficult. Bureaucratic impediments to bio-prospecting may make it entirely unprofitable.

#### [2] Turn: Patents force cultural communities to transform Indigenous knowledge into western commodities, that’s offense under our ROB

Hamilton 6 - CHRIS HAMILTON, London School of Economics and Political Science 2006 [“BIODIVERSITY, BIOPIRACY AND BENEFITS: WHAT ALLEGATIONS OF BIOPIRACY TELL US ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY” ]cdm

If we assume biopiracy to be an issue of a misallocation of IPR, a lack of prior informed consent in initially accessing biodiversity, or as a glitch in the system for redistributing the benefits of genetic resources, then the solution that suggests itself is one of ‘benefit sharing’. Indeed, this is something that has been present since the inception of ‘bioprospecting’ and is enshrined in the CBD. From a ‘biopiracy’ perspective, benefit sharing responds to biopiracy understood as an issue of the misallocation of benefits derived from genetic resources but does not substantially shift the debate away from the dominant paradigm which suggests that the benefits from genetic resources will be derived via the IPR system. The benefit sharing issue has also been the subject of a number of discussions and responses from international organizations dealing with IPR. Recent discussions at the WTO, for instance, have taken up the benefit sharing debate in earnest. Submissions from Peru and others have advocated that the solution to biopiracy lies in requiring those applying for a patent involving genetic resources (either the resource itself or the knowledge of its use) to disclose the origin of the knowledge and/or the material involved in the patented subject, as well as to be able to demonstrate that they have obtained the prior informed consent of any traditional knowledge holders who might be affected and have negotiated appropriate benefit sharing agreements with those same traditional knowledge holders. Most of these proposals at the WTO have come about as part of discussions on the review of the TRIPS Agreement and, thus, propose that these commitments (disclosure of origin and evidence of benefit sharing) be included within the mechanisms of the TRIPS Agreement itself. For their part, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been dealing with the notion of benefit sharing in discussions about the relationship between traditional knowledge and intellectual property. In general, they recognize the importance of traditional knowledge related IP provisions to complement the CBD’s benefit sharing initiatives as well as ‘important policy issues beyond the domain of IP.’65 Criticisms of the benefit sharing approach have focused on several points, often moving fluidly between material and ethical critiques. The first and most obvious of these are the material challenges associated with defining what the benefits are, who should distribute them, how these should be distributed, and who precisely should be the recipients. If we look to the neem case again, if it is indeed the case that it is widely used in India and elsewhere as a fungicide, the issue of benefit sharing would take on unmanageable proportions. In particular, how would one begin to establish who should be the recipient of the benefits in a case where the knowledge that is being exploited could legitimately be said to derive from the practice of millions of people in India and elsewhere? In many situations this is made more complex when the element of expectations are brought in, especially in cases of pharmaceutical bioprospecting in remote areas, despite the fact that it is quite widely acknowledged that lucrative, blockbuster drugs very rarely result from bioprospecting-type programs.66 This is also often related to concerns about the fact that benefit sharing agreements may be pegged to the commercial success of a given plant patent and, thus, there is no guarantee that benefits will be forthcoming. 66 A complete discussion of this particular concern is beyond the scope of this particular study. For discussions of these matters see, for example, C. Hayden. From Market to Market: Bioprospecting’s Idioms of Exclusion. American Ethnologist 2003; 30: 359–371; S. Greene. Indigenous People Incorporated? Culture as Politics, Culture as Property in Pharmaceutical Bioprospecting. Curr Anthropol 2004; 45: 211–237. Another of the points that is often raised relates to the substance of the material remunerations included in benefit sharing agreements. This has prompted some to claim that these involve sharing only the ‘crumbs’ of the benefits.67 On the surface, a concern with the material remunerations might also be seen as invoking the dominant IPR paradigm: essentially saying that the problem is not the patent itself but the equitable disbursements of the benefits that will come from it. Though this is in many ways true, these concerns are often unproblematically advocated alongside broader ethical concerns with whether or not IPR is an appropriate forum to use to deal with these kinds of knowledges and the benefits that they might generate. For example, the collection of essays in the recent Edmonds Institute book, called The Catch: Perspectives in Benefit Sharing68 presents some very forceful critiques of the notion of benefit sharing as a possible inoculation against, or remedy for, biopiracy. Many of the essays seem to focus on what they see as this same contradiction in the notion of benefit sharing in the CBD, between the ascription of value to these resources (a value which can be shared with the appropriate people via benefit sharing) and the use of the IPR system to recognize this value. They advocate two positions which overlap: that the benefits of these genetic resources are so great as to be incalculable and that they have always been seen as a collective and a public wealth, thus fundamentally incompatible with the individual rights associated with IPRs. As Ribiero puts it in her essay: The immense wealth of knowledge of plants, animals, insects and other elements of nature – knowledge on which the world has come to depend for food, health, clothing, and many other aspects of human life – originated in indigenous communities and rural communities across the planet. That knowledge is and has always been a collective and public wealth, managed by local communities for the benefit of humanity.69 It would appear that those who criticise benefit sharing are able to do so relatively unproblematically from two seemingly contradictory positions: that IPR (or benefits derived from exploiting IPR) is not the best way to arbiter these agreements but also, simultaneously, that it is not going to properly identify the scale of the benefits or grant all parties equal access to the economic benefits generated via the commodification of the biological resource in question. If we take that into account, it seems clear that benefit sharing, if invoked as a ‘solution’ to biopiracy, is unlikely to address all of the relevant ethical concerns raised. Or, put another way, for many campaigning against biopiracy, **it is not who owns it but that it is owned at all that matters.**

#### [In 1AC fast version] [3] Turn: Prior, Informed Consent initiatives are failing now

McCulloch 21 - Emily. M McCulloch, Public Land and Resources Law Review, Volume 44 Article 5, June 2021, “Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: A Struggling International Principle” [https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=plrlr] Accessed 08/18/21 AHS PG

Despite the FPIC going into effect over ten years ago, companies and **nations still commit atrocities against indigenous populations**.59 **In 2018, there were 164 documented killings** of individuals trying to protect their land.60 Latin America has the highest rate of violence against activists, with little government protection, as well as suffering from international companies extracting resources on indigenous land.61 This data leads to some key concerns about the FPIC among the international community, including implementation and lack of enforcement. A. Lack of Clarity in Implementation Fundamental issues remain with implementing the FPIC including isolation, internal participation, and overlap.62 Isolation is detrimental to the FPIC’s goals because some indigenous populations desire to live secluded.63 Because of their isolation, public participation and consultation are difficult.64 Scholars argue the “desire to be left alone” shows they do not give consent to projects because of their intention to secure their land from the outside communities.65 This reluctance and mistrust lend itself to difficulties when implementing the FPIC. Another issue with the FPIC implementation is internal participation.66 Some **indigenous groups** contain marginalized populations like women and children, but **do not allow all community members to participate**—a concept the FPIC requires.67 For example, in some indigenous groups, women and children are not consulted on issues that affect the internal community.68 Because overall participation by affected indigenous groups is a key part of the FPIC implementation, participation from “illiberal” communities is challenging.69 A third major issue with implementation is overlap between other indigenous communities or entities.70 A “dichotomized” view of indigenous groups leads to “arbitrarily fixating indigenous peoples’ consensus, while disregarding the multiple and fragmented nature of the member subject positions.”71 By recognizing the cultural overlaps and differing interests among groups, developers face challenges to achieve one common plan and gain all groups’ consent.72 Another key issue involves private actors like the World Bank and extractive resource industries’ interpretation of the FPIC.73 Because UNDRIP applies to governments and not private companies, 74 the World Bank has implemented less stringent guidelines called Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation, except for in special circumstances where it advises use of the FPIC.75 As noted, the ICMM has an even lesser standard, which directs that development programs should engage and consult with indigenous peoples in a “fair, timely and culturally appropriate way throughout the project cycle.”76 This standard could “lead to breaches of international human rights standards, as companies might only do the minimum necessary to meet the requirements of local legislation, potentially failing to recognize the right to the FPIC, and thus infringing [on] the Indigenous right to self-determination.”77 While the ICMM is taking steps to follow the FPIC, ultimately, it can still decide to move forward with projects, even if there is opposition or a lack of consensus. 78 Finally, **it remains unclear if the “consent” part of the FPIC includes veto power**.79 Without veto power, the FPIC loses strength because projects can continue to move forward. As of now, the international community recognizes tribal consultation as the customary norm.80 For instance, the United States has a “long-standing executive branch policy to incorporate special [tribal] status into regulatory processes,” but it does not include tribal veto power on projects.81 Similarly, Canada has a duty to consult with indigenous communities during the Environmental Impact Assessment phase which includes “good-faith consultation” and willingness to make changes based on information obtained during assessments.82 Canada’s policy, however, does not include tribal consultation as determinative of whether the project moves forward, even if indigenous communities are opposed. 83 Unfortunately, as shown in Canada’s and the United States’ policies, the question of whether nation states need to obtain consent from indigenous communities is usually answered in the negative because governments can weigh economic benefit to regulate resources for all citizens, not just its indigenous groups. Along with implementation issues, the **FPIC faces a lack of enforcement in countries that have adopted it**, which non-compliant countries would have to resolve if the FPIC was considered hard law. Some of the biggest breaches of the FPIC stem primarily from Latin American countries, 85 even though Latin American countries comprise the majority of countries that signed ILO 169.86 This issue is referred to as the “governance gap,” which means a nation state fails to protect populations because of lack of mechanisms to ensure compliance.87 Additionally, there is no legal entity or instrument to enforce compliance because UNDRIP is nonbinding unless it is carried out in domestic law.88 Further, a government’s right to develop and the FPIC often conflict, particularly in developing countries.89 State versus tribal sovereignty and ownership of national resources are often still debated.90 Because nation states argue these resources “are the benefit for all,” courts often side with nations on ownership issues.91 Issues over rights to develop and resource ownership are further conflated due to large inconsistencies between an international, national, and domestic regulation, known as the “implementation gap.”92 The Philippines exemplifies the implementation gap in a conflict with Dole Asia, one of the largest producers of bananas, which is backed by companies like JP Morgan Chase.93 The Philippines is a signatory to UNDRIP, 94 and it also holds its own national policies surrounding indigenous rights such as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.95 Despite the international and national policies, the Philippines has inconsistently implemented indigenous protection policies. For example, in the Bukidon region, the indigenous KADIMADC community stated a wealthy landowner, who owns the largest gun-making factory in the country, was illegally sub-leasing indigenous land for a Dole plantation without their consent.96 Dole failed to take steps in reviewing this land lease to determine if the land was disputed and if the FPIC was granted.97 Because of Dole’s lack of due diligence, the community’s indigenous peoples turned to local government to investigate allegations.98 Reportedly, instead of investigating, government officials tried to bribe indigenous members to sign consent forms.99 The KADIMADC people remained on their land, but the wealthy landowner’s security personnel in the area have threatened the community with loss of homes and life. 100 The Philippines government is failing to implement the FPIC on a national and local level, and it has failed to implement the UNDRIP policies it agreed to at an international level.

#### [4] ABS agreements reinforces hierarchies within indigenous communities

Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 “Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy” [https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy%20Thesis.pdf] Accessed 8/13/21 SAO

The textual analysis of the UNDRIP produced interesting findings with regard to subject construction and issues of gender. Most prominently, the language used in the UNDRIP is mostly gender neutral, with a distinct lack of gender focus. The UNDRIP discusses women in three articles out of a total of 46.18 These articles state that vulnerable indigenous peoples ought to be provided greater protection. However, there is a lack of intersectional discussion, meaning specific, multiple identities which overlap in complex ways are not considered, and therefore a homogenization of the different categories of vulnerable Subjects that the declaration lays out. Although the declaration does cite that women, children, the elderly, the young and those with disabilities have special needs and require further attention to be paid to their rights, it does not further explain what these needs and rights are, nor how they can be protected. Furthermore, the declaration states that these groups require this undefined particular attention only when the State deems it to be appropriate (see article 21.2). Thus we find embedded within the language of this declaration a notion of agency that is attached to the State as that which makes decisions regarding what measures to protect certain indigenous Subjects can be taken and when. In the absence of intersectional and specific discussion of the needs of different groups of people, and through the framework of this critical discourse analysis from an ecofeminist postcolonial perspective, my conclusion drawn is that the declaration exemplifies the naturalized and feminized status of indigenous peoples from the perspective of the United Nations (UN) and the international community through marginalization and homogenization. **This interactional control,** who sets the agenda and how different actors are positioned in relation to each other **through the discourse on the rights of indigenous peoples, displays** the **hegemonic positioning** this intergovernmental organization has. The UN has set the agenda on the rights of indigenous peoples through this declaration in accordance with recommendations from the Human Rights Council. However, without a detailed and specific gender and ethnicity focus, indigenous subjectivities cannot be adequately explored and protected.19 Through the language of universal equality certain groups of people with specific Subject positions are left vulnerable as their specific needs are not taken into account due to universality being based upon an ‘average’ Subject. This homogenization of indigenous peoples into one collectivity, as represented in the discourse of the declaration, applies directly to Plumwood’s master model whereby oppressive dualisms can be created. This dualism, individual privileged Subjects as opposed to an anonymous mass of unnamed Subjects, creates the homogenization of indigenous peoples and serves to disqualify the diverse lived experiences of indigenous groups globally and within indigenous communities themselves. In this way, the oppression of the collectivized, natural and inferior Other is effected and maintained. This is instrumental in the cases of biopiracy discussed later as indigenous peoples knowledges of biodiversity are appropriated due to its inferior positioning.