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#### The 1AC framework has no account of axiology. They argue that pain is irreducible, but they don’t explain why human pain is the only important value. Their syllogism skips a step

Watson 16 - Paul Watson, environmental activist and founder of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, The Outdoor Journal, June 8th, 2016 “Human Lives Are Not More Important Than Animal Lives” [https://www.outdoorjournal.com/blog/human-lives-are-not-more-important-than-animal-lives/] Accessed 9/10/18 SAO

Is a human life worth more than a gorilla, a whale or any other species? I’m going to tread on some very sensitive toes with this commentary but I think it needs to be said. My perspective is biocentric, whereas most of humanity looks on reality from an anthropocentric point of view. I do not expect the anthropocentric mind to understand my position. My position is that a human life is not more important than the life of a gorilla or a whale. This is is going to make some people angry as hell, but that does not concern me. What concerns me is the reality of our relationship with the natural world. Columnist Dave Bry recently wrote in The Guardian: As much as I love animals – and I love them very much – the idea that the life of a cat or a dog or a lion or a gorilla is as important as the life of a human is a terrible one, a wrong one, an insulting one. [There] are powerful, important things about being a human being … Yes, I would save the life of Ted Kaczynski, Idi Amin or Donald Trump over any animal you could name. (Yes, even my beloved childhood pets: the cats Love and Honey, the dog, Yvette. Sorry, guys, RIP.) Personally I think this statement by Bry is asinine, insensitive and absurd. Idi Amin was a mass murderer. His life was not worth the life of a mosquito and if someone had shot the bastard, thousands of people’s lives would have been spared not to mention the slaughter of African wildlife under his authority. Would Bry say the same about Hitler, and if not, why not, how is he any different than a mass murdering dictator like Idi Amin? So I think Brys’ position has not been thought out, and if it has, it is he who holds a terrible idea with a wrong position and insulting to every person who was slaughtered in WWII or in Africa under Amin. Bry is saying his cats and his dog are expendable but a vicious dictator is not, simply on the basis of being a member of the human species. The reality is that some human lives are simply not worth more than other humans and also not more important than many animals. A few years ago when I was teaching at UCLA I asked my students this question: If you had to choose between a human life and the survival of an unknown species, what choice would you make? And to make the question a little easier for them, I said the human life is a cute little baby and the species is a type of bacteria. “So,” I said, “Does the baby live in exchange for the eradication of the species or do we save the species and allow the baby to die?” They answered without hesitation and chose the life of the baby. “What if I ask you to save 200 species of unknown bacteria in exchange for the baby?” Again they chose the baby. “Can anyone tell me why you made that choice?” I inquired. “Because human lives are more important.” One student answered. Another said, “The life of a baby is more important than some germs, how could you even ask such a thing?” she said with a look of disgust. “Congratulations everyone,” I said. “Your choice just caused the extinction of the human race.” This is because there are anywhere from 700 to 1,000 different species of bacteria residing in the human gut and without them we could not digest our food or manufacture vitamins for our bodies. This was part of a lesson I was trying to teach on the law of interdependence, that all species need each other and without some species we cannot survive. Are phytoplankton and zooplankton less important than human lives? If it was a choice between diminishing human numbers and diminishing worldwide populations of phytoplankton what choice would we make? Again I put the question forth, this time to some die-hard anti-abortionists. If the choice is between forcefully preventing abortions and allowing the births of millions of unwanted babies or watching the disappearance of phytoplankton, what choice would you make? They said that the lives of the babies were more important even if it meant the babies would not be properly cared for, nurtured, educated and loved. One person asked me what a phytoplankton was? “It’s a tiny marine plant,” I answered. “You mean like seaweed?” “Yes but much smaller.” “So you’re saying that seaweed is more important than babies?” The man asked with a look of disgust on his face. “Yes, that’s what I am saying.” I answered. “You’re a sick man,” he literally shouted at me. And of course he was not interested in my explanation. And the truth is that we have already made that choice to eradicate phytoplankton in exchange for increasing human populations. Since 1950, the Ocean has suffered a 40% decline in phytoplankton populations and phytoplankton produces over 50% of the oxygen for the planet. This is a serious problem but one which most people remain blissfully ignorant of. Phytoplankton has been diminished because of pollution, climate change, acidification and the slaughter of the whales. Why the whales? Because whales provide the nutrients essential for the growth of phytoplankton, especially iron and nitrogen. These nutrients are spread to the phytoplankton in the form of whale feces similar to a farmer spreading manure on his crops. A single Blue whale defecates three tons a day of nutrient rich fecal material which makes the whales the farmers of the sea and a key species for the survival of phytoplankton. Diminishment of whales means diminishment of phytoplankton means diminishment of oxygen. **There are many species** much **more important than we are.** Bees and worms, trees and plankton, fish, ants and spiders, bacteria, whales and elephants amongst many others. They are more important for a very simple reason**. Most** of them **can live** quite happily **without humans but humans cannot live without them.** A world without bees and worms would be a world where we could not feed ourselves. A world without phytoplankton and trees would be a world where we could not breathe. A world without yeast (an animal) would be a world without beer and wine which I mention only because this is a loss that may get some people’s attention. Nature has three very basic ecological laws. 1. Diversity, meaning that the strength of an eco-system is determined by the diversity within it. 2. Interdependence, meaning that the species within an eco-system are dependent upon each other and 3. Finite resources, meaning that there is a limit to growth, a limit to carrying capacity. As human populations grow larger they literally steal carrying capacity from other species, leading to diminishment of other species which leads to diminishment of diversity and diminishment of interdependence. In other words, no species is an island entire unto itself and that includes our own human species. Humans have created a fantasy world called anthropocentrism, the idea that all of reality, all of nature exists only for humanity, that we are the only species that matters and human rights take priority over the rights of all other species. In other words we look upon ourselves as divinely created superior beings when in reality we are simply overly conceited arrogant, ecologically ignorant, naked apes who have become divine legends in our own limited minds. This anthropocentric view of the world has made us selfish, self-centred and extremely destructive to all other forms of life on the planet including our own. Our fantasies have allowed us to destroy the very life support systems that sustain us, to poison the waters we drink and the food we eat, to amuse ourselves with blood sports and to eradicate anything and everything we do not like, be it animal, plant or other human beings. We demonize each other and we demonize the entire living world. This fantasy world we have invented has witnessed our creation of Gods out of whose mouths we can give voice to our fantasies with the moral authority to justify our destructive behaviour. Over the years I have risked my life and my crews have risked their lives to protect whales and seals, sharks and fish. I am often asked how can I ask people to risk their lives for a whale? Very easy, is my answer because fighting for the survival of whales or fish means fighting for our own future. The mystery however to me is how people can question risking our lives for a whale yet accept that young people are routinely asked to risk their lives for real estate, oil wells, religion and for a coloured piece a cloth they call a flag. Apparently risking their lives to protect property is acceptable whereas taking risks to defend non-human lives is not. This was very neatly summed up once by a ranger in Zimbabwe who was attacked by human rights groups after killing a poacher who was about to kill an endangered Black rhino. The accusation was, how could you take the life of a human being to protect an animal? His answer revealed the hypocrisy of human values. He said, “If I was a policeman in Harare and a man ran out of a bank with a bag of money and I shot him dead on the street, I would be called a hero and given a medal. My job is to protect the future heritage of Zimbabwe and how is it that an endangered species has less value than a bag of paper?” Humanity slaughters some 65 billion animals every year for meat and takes even greater numbers of lives from the sea, much of which is discarded callously as by-catch. We kill animals for fun or because we consider them to be pests. There has never been a species as mercilessly destructive as the human primate. We kill wilfully, viciously and relentlessly and we do so because we feel entitled to do so. Anthropocentrism is an incredibly delusional conceit by a single species to lift ourselves above in value and importance over all other living things. Humanity is so entrenched in this view of the world that we have stifled all empathy to the feelings and interests of all other species. We view them as expendable, as property, as nuisances, as sources of amusement, as slaves. In an anthropocentric world only humans matter and this has absurdly led to beliefs that this entire planet was created just for us, that we are the pinnacle of evolution and the masters of the universe. Every single anthropocentric religion places human beings at the centre of everything and above all other species. We have fashioned God in our image in order to justify our superiority and woe be it to any one of that questions this fantasy. Anthropocentrism is a form of ecological insanity and is leading us towards self destruction, because only so many species can be removed before the laws of diversity, interdependence and finite growth lead to our own extinction. Are humans the most intelligent species on the planet? Yes. because we define what intelligence is and therefore declare ourselves to be the most intelligent species. **We define ourselves as mora**l, ethical, benevolent and wise **despite the fact that our actions reveal that we are anything but** moral, ethical, benevolent and wise. I would define intelligence as the ability to live in harmony with nature and within the boundaries of ecological laws. We willfully ignore that dolphins and whales have larger more complex brains and we dismiss any speculation that animals think, make choices, dream and have emotions. We also dismiss the reality that trees communicate through chemicals and fungal networks. We pride ourselves on our art, our science, our religions, our politics, our cultures and totally reject that other species have their own cultures, their own realities completely independent of our hominid vanities. Recently a 17-year old gorilla named Harambe was shot dead because zoo-keepers determined that he was a threat to the life of a four year old child despite the indications that the gorilla was actually attempting to protect the child. The primary justification was that the life of a gorilla is of less value than the life of a human child and thus expendable without hesitation. Never mind that in two previous incidents, one in Chicago and another on the island of Jersey a child’s life was saved by a captive gorilla. The Cincinnati zoo was most likely motivated by the threat of a lawsuit unless they shot Harambe and ended the drama with a bullet to the head of a sentient being that although confused and disoriented was displaying real concern for the child that fell into his prison cell. Very few thought of the trauma this would cause to the other gorillas or the fact that the killing was a horrific betrayal to the good intentions of Harambe. After all he was just an animal and no animal is worth the life of a single human. Instead of acknowledging that her child was not hurt by Harambe, the mother of the child thanked God for the child not being hurt with the assumption being that her God could not have cared less about a gorilla. Harambe and the child were together for ten minutes before Harambe was murdered. There are 7.5 billion of us and every year there are fewer and fewer of everything else except for the slaves we breed for food and amusement. Gorillas do not contribute to climate change, to pollution of the ocean to deforestation, to war and habitat destruction. They are gentle, vegetarian, shy, and intelligent self-aware sentient beings whose existence benefits the planet and gives hope for the future. What human being can equal a gorilla for the virtues of harmlessness, sustainable living, peacefulness and ecological intelligence? Not one of us. So in my opinion the life of a gorilla is not only of more value than the life of a human being, it is a hundred times more valuable, as are whales, and snails, bees and trees. Why? Because we cannot live on this planet without them.

#### Human life is categorically violent to animal life which outweighs under util

Best 7 - Dr. Steven Best, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Texas, El Paso in the Animals Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, 2007 “Book review of Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust” [http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/JCAS-Vol-5-Issue-2-2007.pdf] Accessed 1/10/22 SAO

This said, it is nonetheless crucial to understand the concerns of oppressed human groups when being compared to animals, not only because they often feel their experience is being exploited for the purposes of another group, however sincere or valid (and most critics did not feel the intentions of PETA were honorable or respectful), but also because **a key cause of** their **oppression was being likened to animals** in the first place. But the comparisons done by PETA, Patterson, and a host of Jewish writers and activists are hardly the same as those made by racists, anti-Semites, and Nazis, as PETA (as true of animal rights people in general) is not ideologically reactionary but rather wants to overcome all forms of hierarchy, domination, exploitation, bias, prejudice, and violence to develop a more, not less, comprehensive ethic and principle of equality (as based on sentience, **not arbitrary, circular, and self-serving human appeals to human reason**). Moreover, the point of the exhibit – as true of Patterson’s book – is not to reduce humans to animals, but rather to raise animals up into humans in the sense that they are accorded respect, granted their proper intrinsic value, and endowed with the rights relevant for them to lead lives based on freedom from pain and suffering and freedom to happiness and pleasure. Finally, whether critics acknowledge it or not, there simply are commonalities among modes of oppression, they do co-constitute and reinforce one another, and these need to be analyzed as one holistic complex of hierarchy, domination, and oppression, one that, as argued all along, has important roots in the domination of animals. As Matt Prescott eloquently explains: "The very same mindset that made the Holocaust possible - that we can do anything we want to those we decide are 'different or inferior' - is what allows us to commit atrocities against animals every single day. ... The fact is, all animals feel pain, fear and loneliness. We're asking people to recognize that what Jews and others went through in the Holocaust is what animals go through every day in factory farms." 36 To give Dr. Martin Luther King a significantly broader reading that extends beyond the narrow limits of the human community to include all sentience life: “No one can be free until all are free.” There is a moral hypocrisy and speciesist double-standard informing heated attacks on PETA’s attempts to draw parallels between animal and human suffering, one that desperately needs to be transcended in favor of a broader ethic. For while groups such as the NAACP and the Anti-Defamation League ask PETA to be sensitive to human oppression, understanding that Blacks and Jews often accused PETA of barging into communities with their display and not appreciating how oppressed peoples might feel used or exploited to make moral arguments on behalf of animals. While these criticisms no doubt were valid in many cases, it must also be said that there were few attempts by oppressed people to make the effort from their side to try to sympathize with and understand animal oppression. While PETA may use images of Jewish and Black exploitation in ways they object to, it is more to the point to note that they eat animals in their private lives and groups functions, a considerable more grievous offense than a well-intended, possible misappropriation of images of suffering to expand the moral community. Indeed, the NAACP’s shameless public defense of serial dog torturer and killer Michael Vick was despicable and displayed a grotesque lack of moral sympathy to non-human animals, not fundamentally different from the detachment (if not pleasure) white racists showed toward those Blacks victimized by their violence Too many people with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finest resist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The moral myopia of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that **animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (****the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and** die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that **ours is an enterprise without end,** self-regenerating,**bringing** rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” 37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly **eight times the present human population.** In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US). 39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet

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**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**The affirmatives utopian reimagining of without explicit praxis to overcome the structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.**

**Lundberg 12** Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // recut ahs ss

The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ,* takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of *The Passion* and the tropological exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand, arguing that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading *The Passion,* i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest, i would like to show the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands.

**The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the material and calculable, inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. We sacrifice the very nature of knowledge while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life.**

**Mills,** Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm.When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

**The alternative is to embrace the death drive. Utopian ideals seek to achieve that which is impossible—our striving to reach enjoyment replicates the very thing we are trying to eliminate. Only by founding our politics upon recognition that our limitations provide the perfect source for endless enjoyment can we prevent the endless repetition of suffering.**

**McGowan ‘13** “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) Accessed on 7/25/19 AHS// emi

In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet **the traditional conception of progress always runs aground.** Th is paradox must become the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and the source of our enjoyment.32 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various eff orts to reach it. **The limit separating us from the good society is the very thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it.** In place of this pursuit, a **psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us from the good rather than toward the good itself. Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is what undermines all perfection.** But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. **By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social order changes its very nature.** Instead of being the burden that one seeks to escape, **repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode through which one att ains satisfaction. Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence.** Th is idea of politics lacks the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political energy.33 **What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way** 21 **that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of** global capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion and development. **The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that psychoanalysis makes to political thought.** But since it is a concept relatively foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like. Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political problems: **the ineffi cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift repression.** The two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained for the subject or for society but instead to **recognize the structures that already exist and silently inform both.** Th e **wager of what follows is that the revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom.** The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem of subjectivity. **The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a barrier to it.** A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 22 on society itself. **Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not.** **This theory would inaugurate political change by insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature of loss.** Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. **It is through the death drive that the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition of the initial loss sustains this freedom.** By embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. **Rather than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.**

## NC

**Framework**

**I value morality. The Meta-Ethic is constructivism – ethics do not exist transcendentally but are created by agents.**

**1. Constructivism can bridge the epistemic gap between our inability to perceive moral facts and our creation of moral rules through a normative procedure that makes our judgements legitimate. Enoch 15,** Enoch, David. "Can There Be A Global, Interesting, Coherent, Constructivism About Practical Reason?". *Papers.Ssrn.Com*, 2015, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2607072>. //Scopa **Suppose** you believe that **there are no (procedure-independent) facts about who should serve first in our friendly tennis match. You may think** – to paraphrase Mackie (1977, Chap. 1) – that **such facts** are metaphysically queer, that they **cannot be part of the furniture of the universe, that positing them is incompatible with a** naturalistic, **scientific world view. Still, this is perfectly consistent with your believing that you should serve first**. This is so, **because you think of this fact** – that you should serve first – not as part of the fabric of the universe independently of us and our relevant procedures, but **rather as constructed by the facts about the coin toss**. After all, there is nothing metaphysically queer about those! If the apparently mysterious fact that you should serve first is best understood as constructed by the non-mysterious facts about the coin toss, progress seems to have been made. One major philosophical motivation for constructivism is naturally seen, I believe, as a generalization of this last point9 . Many people are suspicious about more robust, non-procedural forms of metanormative realism. They think that **there are serious metaphysical and epistemological worries (and perhaps others as well) that make such realism highly implausible**. **Nevertheless,** going shamelessly antirealist also has problems. We seem to be rather strongly committed, for instance, to there being correct and incorrect ways of answering moral (and more generally normative) questions, and moreover **our moral** (and more generally normative) **discourse purports to be** rather strongly **objective. Constructivism may be thought of as a way of securing the goods realism (purportedly) delivers, for a more attractive price**. In the coin toss example, for instance, there is an objectively correct answer to the relevant normative question: It is you who should serve first. Nevertheless, there is nothing mysterious about this objectively correct answer, for this answer (or its correctness) is constructed by the relevant unproblematic procedure. So even if the naturalist world does not have room for (ultimate, procedure-independent) facts regarding who should serve first, still correctness and objectivity need not be discarded – understood along constructivist lines, objectivity and correctness can be secured without the need to pay the hefty metaphysical and epistemological price purportedly associated with more robust forms of realism 10 . Indeed, constructivism may be thought to ground another kind of objectivity (Nagel 1986; and see Svavarsdóttir 2001): Perhaps the ontological understanding of objectivity – something about what is and what is not a part of the fabric of the universe – is just unsuited for the normative. Perhaps what we should be after here – and **what constructivists can give us – is a methodological kind of objectivity**, the kind of objectivity that can be secured by the fact that **following the relevant constructivist procedure secures the status of its result**. For a more interesting example, think of Korsggard's constructivism. One may have metaphysical and epistemological (and maybe other) doubts about normative reasons or statements about them: Such statements do not seem easily reducible to other, not-obviously-normative ones, and yet the idea of irreducibly normative facts seems to be in tension with the metaphysical doctrine of naturalism; It may seem mysterious how we could know anything about such facts, even if they did exist; It may seem mysterious how we could refer to them, even if they did exist; and so on. Nevertheless, it seems like some normative statements are true and others false, or perhaps some are correct (even if not strictly speaking true) and some incorrect (even if not strictly speaking false). Korsgaard's constructivism seems to give us all we want here. Of course some normative statements are true and some false, but their truth is constructed by the relevant procedure, that of logically constrained reflective scrutiny. There seems to be nothing mysterious in this procedure – indeed, deliberating, reflective agents are very much a part of nature, a phenomenon that surely must find place even in the naturalist's picture of the world (a point Korsgaard (1996, 166) emphasizes). **If normative facts are constructed by such a procedure, then they are very much facts, but they are no longer mysterious in the ways they purportedly are on a more robustly realist view**. 3.2

**2. Motivation – Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. That requires constructivism since even if there is an external good, agents will only follow it if they create it themselves.**

**3. Regress – Attempting to compare between universal truths is infinitely regressive since we continuously need a higher moral truth to justify the previous one – only constructivism solves because it creates insular theories based on procedure that require nothing more than deliberation about the truth rather than a truth itself.**

**However, constructivism concludes in a source of authority to enforce ethical rules: 1) Culpability – Absent an agreed upon ethical principle enforced by an external agent with normative authority, individuals would never be able to be held accountable for unjust actions. 2) Motivation – Absent a moral authority that guides the construction of ethics, every agent would act in accordance with their own internal motivations, but those are merely subjective preferences that fail to consider what we’ve constructed as the good. A normative authority allows the placement of restraints on action that aligns the collective motivation towards the common good. Motivation is a side-constraint since ethics are only valuable insofar as agents follow through on them 3) Arbitrariness – Absent an authority, ethical principles can be applied unequally, contingently, and absent justification since either a non-normative authority enforces rules absent the knowledge of agents governed or agents apply their own rules to each other. 4**

**Contention**

**I contend it is not unjust for private entities to appropriate space.**

**1. In order to claim that an action is unjust, there must be a legitimate normative authority that can articulate and enforce that claim. That’s not the case in space since A) Consent – Any authority over space isn’t normative since the collective that is governed by it doesn’t consent to it, since governments exist independently of one another, the citizens or corporations based in the US don’t consent to the rules of China and vice versa B) Unification – International law doesn’t apply to every private entity since not every country has committed to international law, which arbitrarily applies the rules of an authority that may exist for several countries to ones that haven’t committed to its rules C) Authority – No governing body in space has the international authority to enforce moral rules upon corporations – even international law can only enforce its rules on the governments bound by it, not the corporations that operate within that country, which subverts the collective authority in favor of individual countries with different ethical rules. Stockwell 20,** Stockwell, Samuel. "Legal ‘Black Holes’ In Outer Space: The Regulation Of Private Space Companies". E-International Relations, 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/>. Envisaging appropriation concerns that might arise from the future extraction of space assets by spacefaring nations, **Article II of the UN OST declared that: “Outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” (UN, 1967). The emphasis on claims of *national* sovereignty were intimately tied to the Cold War context** at the time, where space activities were under the exclusive monopoly of governmental agencies and initiated for goals of military dominance or national prestige (Sachdeva, 2017: 210). However, **the privatisation of the space industry that has occurred since the 1980s has meant that the legislation leaves an enormous amount of legal ambiguity and interpretation** regarding the regulation of private resource mining in space. As Shaer (2016) demonstrates, **the Article II provision fails to address either the exploitation of space for financial gain or the property claims of *commercial* enterprises** (Shaer, 2016: 47).

**2. Absent a legitimate authority, the creation of ethical rules falls to those participating within a particular activity at a given time. For example, there’s no governing body that presides over a backyard game of baseball, which means the players establish and enforce their own rules. This means the only alternative to a normative authority would negate since corporations have a vested interest in the appropriation of space, and they would each make the judgement that it is legitimate insofar as they are already engaging in the action.**

**3. Contradiction in conception – Constructivism implies a contradiction in preventing appropriation since it’s through the act of appropriation itself that agents can construct ethical principles – only by establishing a society in space can we begin to establish the normative requirements to condemn our presence there.**