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**Agonism forces natives to compete against majoritarian systems in a competition they are set up to lose. Your deliberation is death sentence**

**An Indigenous Perspective, February 5th, 2020** “Voting is Not Harm Reduction” [https://www.indigenousaction.org/voting-is-not-harm-reduction-an-indigenous-perspective/] Accessed 9/3/20 SAO

Since the idea of U.S. “democracy” is majority rule, barring an extreme population surge, Indigenous voters will always be at the mercy “of good intentioned” political allies. Consolidating the Native vote into a voting bloc that aligns with whatever settler party, politician, or law that appears to do less harm isn’t a strategy to exercise political power, it’s Stockholm syndrome. The Native vote also seeks to produce Native politicians. And what better way to assimilate rule then with a familiar face? The strategy of voting Indigenous Peoples into a colonial power structure is not an act of decolonization, it’s a fulfillment of it. We have a history of our people being used against us by colonial forces, particularly with assimilated Indigenous Peoples acting as “Indian Scouts” to aid the enemy’s military. In only one recorded instance, Ndee (Cibicue Apache) Army Scouts mutinied against the U.S. when they were asked to fight their own people. Three of the Ndee scouts were executed as a result. No matter what you are led to believe by any politician seeking office, at the end of the day they are sworn to uphold an oath to the very system that was designed to destroy us and our ways of life. The oath for members of Congress states, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.” Even if we assume that their cultural values and intentions are in line with those of the people, it is rare that politicians are not tied to a string of funders. As soon as they get elected they are also faced with unrelenting special interest lobbying groups that have millions and millions of dollars behind them and, even if they have stated the best intentions, are inevitably outnumbered by their political peers. Today we have candidates that were elected making promises to stop the mass scale kidnapping and murdering of Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit people and what do they propose? They don’t indict the resource colonizers destroying our lands whose very industry is precipitating this crisis of human trafficking and extreme gender violence. They don’t propose ending capitalism and resource colonialism. They propose laws and more copswith more power to enforce those laws in our communities, so although we have an epidemic of police violence and murders against our peoples, Indigenous politicians address one violent crisis by making another one worse for our people. It’s the fulfillment of the assimilationist cultural genocide of “killing the Indian to save the man.” With that vote, the willful participation and sanctioning of the violence of this system, you kill the Indian and become “the man.” Tribal, local, and regional politics are situated in the same colonial arrangement that benefits the ruling class: politicians are concerned with rules and ruling, police and military enforce, judges imprison. Regardless of who and on what scale, no politician can ever represent Indigenous lifeways within the context of a political system established by colonialism. A less harmful form of colonial occupation is fantasy. The process of colonial undoing will not occur by voting. You cannot decolonize the ballot.

**Strikes are premised on native exploitation and dispossession. That negates under your ROB. The idea that the government has to maintain control of people is exactly what is violent. The AC rhetoric is damning – they say “Recognizing the right to strike allows worker to engage in violence that remains in control of the state” That’s colonial.**

**Englert 20 - Sai Englert, Antipode, Volume 52, Issue 6, p1647-1666, July 20th, 2020** “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession” [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659?\_\_cf\_chl\_jschl\_tk\_\_=pmd\_IN42Cf1NcyqQml9Xop.a5CEPpzoVSn9haIrOBgQWgfc-1635251839-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQuR] Accessed 10/26/21 SAO//AP

The question of labour (and therefore exploitation) is then a crucial aspect in the organisation of settler colonialism. This is true both in terms of the relationship between the settler colonial power and the native populations, but also in terms of social relations within the settler colonial polity. In fact, the labour movement within settler colonies has often been at the forefront of the imposition of racial segregation through colour bars, limits on racialised migration, and “whites-only” policies. The reasons behind this tendency will be discussed in greater detail below, but for now it will suffice to point out that from the late-19th century onwards, white working class movements across the settler colonial world organised over the question of limiting, excluding, or containing the use of indigenous and/or racialised workers. They furthermore rebelled against the settler states, or united with indigenous workers for collective improvement to their labour rights. In the United States, white workers organised against the competition of African American workers in the aftermath of emancipation, as well as the barring of Chinese migration to California, which successfully passed into law in the late 19th century (see Day 2016; Karuka 2019). Similar campaigns where waged in both South Africa and Australia against the immigration of Asian workers in the early 20th century. In fact, the formation of the Australian Labour Party took place on the basis of taking the “white Australia” campaign into parliament (Hyslop 1999; Shafir 1996). Perhaps the most emblematic example of these labour campaigns for the exclusion of racialised workers is that for the colour bar in South Africa (and later for the imposition of Apartheid) by the white workers' movement. In a strange mixture of internationalist rhetoric and settler colonial racism the white miners in 1922 raised the slogan: “Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a White South Africa” (Reddy 2016:101). In the case of the Zionist colonisation of Palestine, the labour movement even became the social actor behind which the entire settler polity united. As Shafir (1996) has shown, Zionist colonial strategy in Palestine transformed, under the leadership of the Labour Zionist movement in the early decades of the 20th century, from a settler colonial project based primarily on exploited Palestinian labour to one which emphasised their exclusion and reliance on “Hebrew labour” instead. The change was brought about by the campaigns led by the settler labour movement, colonial responses to Palestinian resistance, and the material problems faced by the Zionist movement in attempting to attract new settlers to Palestine. More will be said about this in the fifth section of this paper. For now it will suffice to point out that the Labour Zionist movement fought for this form of settler organisation against Palestinian workers as well as against settler bosses and their project for a settler economy based on the exploitation—not the elimination—of the natives. The guiding principle of this movement was that to make settlement effective Jewish workers needed to be granted higher wages and living standards, while **indigenous workers needed to be excluded from the labour market all together**. It is this logic of full separation, that Sayegh (2012:214), described as lying at the root of the Zionist project in Palestine: “[R]acial self-segregation, racial exclusiveness and racial supremacy”. A series of important points emerge from this alternative view of settler colonialism. Firstly, the exclusive Wolfe-an focus on elimination of the native as opposed to exploitation, although of central importance within some periods and locales of settler colonialism, does not allow one to develop an effective general axiomatic analysis of the settler colonial form and its social relations. Secondly, the racial organisation of labour—whether settler, enslaved, or indigenous—and the struggle over its organisation between settlers and indigenous populations, as well as between settlers themselves, are a crucial aspect of settler colonialism, both in its eliminatory and/or exploitative forms (on which more below). Thirdly, the participation of settler labour movements in the colonial project, particularly in the process of control and/or expulsion of racialised, enslaved, and/or indigenous population appears as a key characteristic across the settler colonial world. The task, then, is to account for the specificities of colonial projects that developed around the creation of settler societies without falling into the twin trap of privileging a specific settler colonial strategy, nor building arbitrary analytical walls between different colonial projects. Moreover, if different strategies of control and accumulation are available to settler colonial regimes, a further question arises over the way in which the decision is made to pursue one over the other. In order to address these issues, this paper turns to the concept of accumulation by dispossession. It argues that the specificities of settler colonial social relations emerge from the dispossession of indigenous populations by settlers and the struggle between settler classes over its distribution amongst themselves. Accumulation by Dispossession, Settler Colonialism, and the Capitalist Transition In the first volume of Capital, Marx (1887) discusses the centrality of colonialism, slavery, and violence (at home and abroad) to the birth of capitalism. He famously wrote: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. What Marx was stressing was that the emergence of the rule of capital was a violent and international affair in which new areas, peoples, and resources were forcefully brought under its control or eliminated. Marx highlighted the connection between colonial expansion, racial violence, and capitalist development. A similar observation is made by Byrd (2011:xxiii) more recently when she writes that “[r]acialisation and colonisation have worked simultaneously to other and abject entire peoples so they can be enslaved, excluded, removed, and killed in the name of progress and capitalism”. Central to this process was the simultaneous establishment of private property and the separation of workers from their own means of production and reproduction the world over. This process, Marx discusses as “so-called primitive accumulation”—a concept he borrowed from the classical political economists. The example Marx uses to illustrate this process is the clearing of the commons in England, whereby land, forests, and natural resources, which were previously held to be the common property of all, were privatised. The inhabitants were forced off the land and into the growing urban workshops to sell their labour power (this same process later pushed them towards the settler colonies). Marx showed that far from relying on “silent compulsion”, capitalist production needs violent coercion to function, by making any alternative form of subsistence outside of the market unavailable to the working classes. Building on these insights, David Harvey has pointed out that this process takes place continuously under capitalism, preferring therefore to describe it as “accumulation by dispossession” in order to undermine the idea that it was temporally limited to the origins of capitalism. Harvey (2007:34–35) identifies a series of processes through which this takes place today. These include: (1) the commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations (as in Mexico and India in recent times); (2) conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusively private property rights; (3) suppression of rights to the commons; (4) commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; (5) colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); (6) monetisation of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; (7) the slave trade (which continues, particularly in the sex industry); and (8) usury, the national debt, and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation. This is not to equate the privatisation of the NHS in the UK and the imposition of a pipeline through indigenous land at Standing Rock as identical. Neither should this lead to the conclusion that neoliberalism “indigenises us all” (Veracini 2015:93). It is however developing an analytical framework through which both processes can be understood as taking place within the logics of capital. A growing number of authors have made the link between settler colonialism and primitive accumulation (for example, Coulthard 2014; Harris 2004; Nichols 2017; Simpson 2014). Most important here is Coulthard, already discussed above, who, in his Red Skins, White Masks, has emphasised the centrality of primitive accumulation to the settler colonial world and its specific expression in that context. He showed convincingly that in North America primitive accumulation had taken place by eliminating the indigenous population and replacing it with a new—settler—population, which would in turn be submitted to the tyranny of the market in its stead. It was this attention to settler accumulation that led Coulthard (2014:125) to identify settler colonialism as “territorially acquisitive in perpetuity”, thereby complicating, as already pointed out in the first section, the concept of elimination as an outcome rather than a strategy. He further writes: In the specific context of Canadian settler-colonialism, although the means by which the colonial state has sought to eliminate Indigenous peoples in order to gain access to our lands and resources have modified over the last two centuries … the ends have always remained the same: to shore up continued access to Indigenous peoples’ territories for the purposes of state formation, settlement, and capitalist development. (Coulthard 2014:125) This approach, by focusing on the aims of settler colonial regimes rather than fetishising its methods, further leaves open an analysis, developed in this paper, of the multiplicity of settler strategies within an overall strategy of accumulation. This can include, as Harris (2004:172) shows within the late 19th century Canadian context, incorporation of indigenous populations into the workforce. If Canadian settler colonialism has pursued “state formation, settlement, and capitalist development” primarily through elimination, other settler states in different contexts could pursue similar goals by different means. It is this point that Kelley (2017) made in relation to South Africa (see above), where settler colonial dispossession removed indigenous populations from the land and forced them into the colonial labour market. More recently, Nichols (2015, 2017), echoing Harvey and Coulthard, has discussed the importance of considering the relationship between primitive accumulation in the original formation of capitalism and in its later reproduction and spread across the globe, with a specific focus on settler colonial contexts. He argues that the incorporation of indigenous people into the workforce is not a necessity for settler regimes because the colonial process is incorporating their land into an existing global capitalist system, which has already generated surplus labour in other places. As such labour could be extracted from indigenous people or from settler populations proletarianised in different locales. This approach then also underlines the diversity of strategies available to settler regimes, including exploitation and/or elimination of the natives. This analysis of accumulation by dispossession, lays the theoretical foundations to approaching contemporary settler colonialism as a process within a broader framework of capitalist accumulation. This can both open up reflections about its specific characteristics as well as its continuities with broader logics of exploitation and/or dispossession. Settler Accumulation and Settler Quietism In order to reflect on the particular nature of accumulation by dispossession within a settler colonial context, another issue should be raised: that of the internal social relations within settler colonial societies. Indeed, the most striking aspect of settler colonial societies is the development of a colonial polity in which settlers live, produce, and reproduce themselves socially. They do so on the back of the dispossession of indigenous populations through which they acquire land, resources, and, depending on the context, labour. This—perhaps obvious—characteristic leads to the development of internal class relations and conflicts, alongside confrontations between settlers and indigenous peoples. The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society … In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. Case Studies Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. Case Studies The specificity of Zionism in the history of settler colonialism, its lack of a colonial metropolis, had real consequences for the Zionists in Palestine. Firstly, it could not impose—at first—its control over the land through military force. Secondly it could not organise the transfer of populations to the colony in the same way a state could. In the words of Shafir (1996:155): “Zionism, then, was a colonisation movement which simultaneously had to secure land for its settlers and settlers for its land”. The dual need for land and labour was at the heart of many political developments in the Yishuv. If the question of land was resolved first through acquisition from largely absentee land owners and then (and most extensively) through military violence, the question of immigration came close several times to bringing the whole colonial project to its knees, as the European Jewish population tended to reject Zionism as a political response to the poverty and discrimination they faced. Two distinct political responses emerged within the early settler population. On the one hand, the Jewish farmers and their sponsors hoped to develop a cash crop producing agricultural sector focused on export to Europe and the exploitation of cheap Palestinian workers. This vision was based, as demonstrated by Shafir (1996), on the model of other European projects—especially the French settler colonies of North Africa. On the other hand, the nascent Labour Zionist movement demanded better wages and working conditions for Jewish workers in Palestine, which they argued would be the only way to attract and retain new settlers. This, they claimed, necessitated full separation between the Jewish and Palestinian sectors, removing thereby the “unfair competition” of the cheaper indigenous labour force. This led to the development of a series of new Labour Zionist institutions to organise this “Conquest of Hebrew Labour”, by organising strikes, pickets, and boycotts of Jewish owned businesses that employed Palestinian workers or sold products made by them. The Kibbutzim, the Histadrut,6 and the early Zionist militias were all born out of the process of organising this campaign (Lockman 1996). For example, the Histadrut’s constitution, passed at its founding congress, made clear that it was a Zionist body committed to the project of settlement through the development of an exclusively Jewish society. It stated that the Histadrut’s goal was to: … unite all the workers and labourers in the country who live by their own labour without exploiting the labour of others, in order to arrange for all settlement, economic and also cultural affairs of all the workers in the country, so as to build a society of Jewish labour in Eretz Yisra’el. (quoted in Lockman 1996:68) The similarity between the logic of this statement and that of the white South African strikers mentioned above is remarkable. This struggle—waged against Palestinian workers and Jewish farmers—led to a partial victory for the Labour Zionist movement (Lockman 2012). Key industries, such as construction and agriculture, were taken over by Labour Zionist institutions such as Solal Boneh and the Kibbutzim. At the same time, Jewish representation in colonial institutions was increased through collaboration with the British Mandate authorities especially in the context of crushing the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The Labour Zionists took over the Yishuv’s political leadership and created a dominant Jewish sector, without however being able to establish a fully segregated one. It did set in motion the logic of separation as well as laying the infrastructure for a Jewish state, which would be made a reality by its militias’ military violence and mass expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba. This case study shows that the Labour Zionist movement developed on the basis of opposing Jewish farmers as well as Palestinian workers, a political focus that also shaped its key institutions. The campaign for Hebrew Labour also demonstrates that the “elimination of the native” in the settler colonial context is not a given, as in the Wolfe-an framework, but the outcome of a specific set of struggles that pit both the indigenous population against the settlers, as well as different settler classes against one another. This approach is not only applicable to historical processes but also contemporary ones. In 2011, an Israeli social movement emerged from a small activist encampment protesting the cost of housing in Tel Aviv into a two and a half month long protest in which hundreds of thousands of people joined demonstrations and square occupations all over the country. The movement was supported by a large majority of Israelis, regardless of political persuasion or ethnic background (Perugorria et al. 2016), as well as by key institutions of the historic Labour Zionist movement, including the Histadrut and the national students’ union. It was an expression of class struggle within the settler population, where the victims of neoliberal economic reforms fought for greater redistribution of wealth. This process was self-consciously an internal one: the movement actively presented itself as made up of loyal, serving, citizens—an impression that was reinforced by the organisations that supported it—while keeping Palestinians and their demands at arm’s length. The Palestinian question remained taboo (Honig-Parnass 2011). The Netanyahu government’s response to the movement’s demands was to deepen settler dispossession. The question of unaffordable housing could be resolved easily, so the argument went, by expanding settlements. MK Arye Eldad argued that “[t]ens of thousands of Israelis can live in Judea, Samaria [the West Bank] and Jerusalem” (quoted in Harkov 2011). Similar proposals were a significant current among Israeli politicians. In August 2011, a group of 41 MKs (out of 120), including representatives from the Labour Zionist camp, called on Netanyahu to expand settlement construction in response to the demonstrators’ demands. Indeed, governmental initiatives have since focused on developing housing in East Jerusalem on the one hand, and in the Israeli periphery—more specifically within areas with high Palestinian populations, such as the Naqab in the south—on the other. An interesting episode in the summer of 2015 highlighted this approach. The government was in the process of negotiating a new agreement with the Chinese state over permits for up to 20,000 Chinese construction workers to come to Israel. When criticised, Netanyahu defended the deal on the basis that “the ability to build many apartments, thereby increasing supply, will, in the end, allow us to change price trends” (quoted in Reed 2015). Moshe Kahlon, the then finance minister, also explained that “the plan to bring thousands of Chinese workers into the country is intended to speed up construction work to solve the housing problem and bring down prices” (MEMO 2015). The government’s response to the demonstrations has been to provide affordable housing to the settler working class while simultaneously increasing its control over Palestinian land. A “settler colonial fix” is available to the Israeli elites, through which they can soften the blow of internal inequality through colonial expansion. The state’s response to the 2011 social movement’s demand for affordable housing through the intensification of indigenous dispossession, and the silent acceptance of this solution by a movement that had gathered such considerable public support, further underscores the claims made by this paper. Settler class struggle is waged over both the distribution of wealth within the settler population, but also over the distribution of the settler colonial loot. The participation of the settler workers’ movement in the process of accumulation by dispossession, through capturing land, resources, and labour, or through the expulsion of the indigenous population is a specific characteristic of settler colonial regimes. Indeed, whereas the theoreticians of accumulation by dispossession, discussed above, understood it as a process directed against workers and peasants, we see here settler workers actively participating in the process and enjoying its spoils. Furthermore, the discussion of this process within the framework of Zionism in Palestine, shows that this struggle takes place both within exploitative (first case study) and eliminatory (second case study) contexts. It is in part through this internal struggle over the distribution of the settler colonial loot, alongside the struggle against the indigenous population, that the nature of the settler colonial regime is determined, as discussed in the first case study, which described the shift in the process of settler accumulation from exploiting the indigenous population to attempting to eliminate it. Conclusion Two observations emerge from this paper. Firstly, a number of different strategies of control and wealth extraction are available for settler colonial regimes. These cannot be accurately or helpfully described as being based on the elimination of the natives alone, as done by Wolfe and those ascribing to his paradigm. Indeed, this paper has built on existing literature that shows how many settler colonies—notably in Africa and Latin America—were built on the exploitation of indigenous populations. It is also important to note, as a number of authors have done, and the first case studies above have illustrated, that the particular regime adopted by a settler colony is neither static nor predetermined. Instead, it is the outcome of struggle and can, therefore, change over time. Secondly, this paper focused both on thinking through what links settler colonial regimes to broader political and economic structures as well as what separates them as distinct social formations. In this light, it highlighted the processes of accumulation by dispossession, which occurs across capitalist economies, while also taking on a specific character in the settler colonial context. The paper has argued that accumulation by dispossession in a settler context is specific because it is carried out by all classes of settlers, including by workers who are traditionally understood as its victims. It further points out that this also leads to specific social relations in settler colonial contexts, in which settler labour movements fight simultaneously over the distribution of wealth generated through their labour and the distribution of the colonial loot accumulated through the dispossession of the indigenous population. This leads to a greater identification of settler labour with the settler colonial project and state, as it is dependent on the latter for its participation in the redistributive process. Both points were then demonstrated through two case studies taken from the history of Zionism in Palestine. This paper has built on existing literature that shows that although the elimination of the native is key to some settler colonial regimes, in certain periods, it does not accurately define the overall logic of settler colonialism, as claimed by Wolfe. In fact settler colonial states and movements have and continue to mobilise a wide variety of policies towards indigenous peoples, including exploitation, which the Wolfe-an model positions outside of the realm of settler colonial relations. This paper instead proposes another analytic approach, which highlights the specificity of social relations within settler colonial contexts in which settler workers participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession. This in turn, the paper has shown, shapes both the internal class struggle within settler societies, as well as the collective assault by the settler polity against the indigenous populations it colonises and dispossesses.

**Impact: Agonistic democracy identifies power in a deliberative forum as personhood. Natives are always blocked out and thus can’t count as subjects under the aff fwk. Settler colonialism makes life worlds fungible. This culminates in a complete project of genocide which outweighs case.**

**Paperson 17 - la paperson, June 1, 2017** also known as K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego “A Third University is Possible”[https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/884701be-04f4-4564-939d-d9905d0e80d9#cvi] Accessed 3/8/18 SAO

Land Is the Biopolitical Target Biopolitics is normally conceptualized in terms of how “life” for the modern human subject is increasingly controlled by liberal disciplinary apparatuses. Yet the exercises of supremacist sovereign power over life and death are most chillingly undisguised when we consider the ways thelife worlds of land, air, water, plants and animals, and Indigenous peoples are reconfigured into natural resources, chattel, and waste: statuses whose capitalist “value does not depend on whether they are living or dead but only on their fungibility and disposability. For example, in modern animal industrial processes, the carcass is valued just as much as, if not more than, the breathing animal. The business of chicken “farming” involves the separation of birds into parts with exchangeable value, extractable value, or disposable value: skinless, boneless white meat offers premium profit per ounce; parts not fitting an American appetite are frozen and dumped with undercutting prices in poorer countries; viscera go to rendering plants to become pet food or fertilizer; feathers return as animal feed or plastic fortifiers; beaks are routinely pared off of live birds to prevent damage before slaughter. Fungibility is exchangeability. Fungibility also means getting anatomized into exchangeable parts to be stored, shipped, sold, combined with other parts for a new product, or decomposed entirely for elimination. When parts are worth more than the whole, the living being ceases to exist as a meaningful unit. Fungibility means that“life” is reduced to just another state of matter, to plug and play into machines of re/production.Chickens grow like vines into cages; cattle are planted in boxes of mud where they are watered, fertilized, and fed growth serum. In modern animal industrial processes, the “livestock” are already in a state of living death.In discussing the state of ambiguous life/death, I am directly drawing upon Black studies scholarship in the vein of Wynter and Weheliye, who describe how antiblackness situates the Black body outside of any meaningful speciation with the human.[21] Hortense Spillers describes how slave transactions were recorded with a meticulous disregard for gender and name—just like counting livestock: “nothing breaks the uniformity of this guise,” this “sameness of anonymous portrayal,” despite the otherwise “detail and precision that characterize these accounts.”[22] In contrast to the rubric of Marxist politics that focuses on the labor exploitation faced by human slaughterhouse workers, Afropessimist scholar Frank Wilderson compares the accumulation of Black bodies with the cows in the slaughterhouse. “But still we must ask, what about the cows? The cows are not being exploited, they are being accumulated and, if need be, killed.”[23] Writing on neoslavery and the modern prison’s genealogy in the techniques of the transatlantic slave trade, Dennis Childs describes the literal and figurative caging of Black ontology into a state of “living death.”[24] Antiblack is not a subject position. It is a chattel position— like being a sardine in a can—a Schrödinger’s box where life and death are only two different states of a commodity. Tiffany Lethabo King takes this analysis a step further by considering how the body of the Black woman is treated much as land is treated under slavery and settler colonialism. That is, the settler colonial machinery that marks up land for clearing, for production, for settlement, for industry, for waste—for infinite malleability in the service of settler futures—similarly marks the Black woman as infinitely malleable in the service of a racial economy. “Blackfemaleness becomes this open sign within the symbolic economy of slavery. It can be turned into virtually anything”: productive labor, reproductive labor, tissue for medical science, object of social policy, and “anything else imaginable.” Anything, that is, except human. For King, Black women’s bodies function as metaphors for and units of settler space: It is within Black feminist scholarship that we see this robust theorization of Black fungibility or the unending exchangeability. . . . To gender Blackness as “female” is to make Blackness more malleable and flexible as opposed to making it, as Sylvia Wynter says, “another genre of” the liberal stable human (i.e., white womanhood). What this means, is that gender as a discourse when applied to Black bodies is about making these bodies ever malleable. It is not about imposing coherent humanizing gender upon Black Bodies.[25] King’s analysis thus extends our understanding of Black fungibility beyond the animal and into land, into the nonhuman beyond biological. In this way, King’s insights have provocations for the very relationship between the fields of Indigenous studies and Black studies. Whereas Blackness is obscured in ethnic studies as another “race,” it has greater capaciousness when thought about as a piece of the more-than-human world—the living world—as analyzed more deeply in Indigenous studies. When foundational Native studies scholar Jack Forbes asks, “where do our bodies end?” he draws attention to life as being far more than the unit of the living organism: I can lose my hands, and still live. I can lose my legs and still live. I can lose my eyes and still live. I can lose my hair, eyebrows, nose, arms, and many other things and still live. But if I lose the air I die. If I lose the sun I die. If I lose the earth I die. If I lose the water I die. If I lose the plants and animals I die. All of these things are more a part of me, more essential to my every breath, than is my so-called body. What is my real body? We are not autonomous, self-sufficient beings as European mythology teaches. . . . We are rooted just like the trees. But our roots come out of our nose and mouth, like an umbilical cord, forever connected to the rest of the world. . . . Nothing that we do, do we do by ourselves. We do not see by ourselves. We do not hear by ourselves. . . . That which the tree exhales, I inhale. That which I exhale, the trees inhale. Together we form a circle. [26] When we consider the transport of fracked oil via railways and pipelines, and the bulldozing of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe’s burial sites by the forces of Dakota Access Pipeline, we see the application of death to land itself. Destroying burial sites to lay pipeline is no different from the mass extermination of buffalo to lay rail. Both target the land (the nonhuman) to (1) eliminate Indigenous presence and (2) make the land alienable. Making death lands is an operation of making terra nullius. Deathandextraction and fungibility ride together. Alienating the life out of Black life is required to subject black bodies to industrial technologies of mass killing and caging. Alienating the Indigenous spirit life out of the land is required to subject land/animals/people to mass reapings. Removing land from people **also** means making war ontologically inherent on certain peoples**.** War-able peoples in turn lead to bombable lands, extinctionable animals, and genocide. The “human” is about all the idealizations above the flesh and above the land, what Sylvia Wynter describes as the elevation of an “ethnoclass” of the Western bourgeois conception of Man, “which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself.”[27] Blackness is about the flesh, and the flesh is land—both are biomatter. Thus, by seeing land as biopolitical, I am seeing how the nonhuman critique in Black studies aligns with the more-than-human critique in Indigenous studies. Settler time has transfigured North American land into a simultaneity of Black violation and Indigenous disappearance, into a schism of property– people. Therefore, for King, the entanglements of settler colonialism and gendered/sexualized antiblackness must inform solidarity in Native and Black feminist organizing. Land must be decolonized into a simultaneity of Black life as being, which requires Black places to be, and to be joyful, without the eminent threat of violation and of Indigenous life as being-and-place, which requires places/peoples to be regenerated. This is a decolonizing land biopolitics, so to speak.

**The role of the ballot and alternative is to refuse colonialism, prefer**

**[1] Frameworks of refusal expose the complicity of debate in colonial knowledge production**

**Tuck & Yang 13 – Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang, Dec 19, 2013** “R-WORDS: REFUSING RESEARCH” [http://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords\_refusingresearch.pdf] Accessed 10/19/18 SAO

Considering Erased Lynchings dialogically with On Ethnographic Refusal, we can see how refusal is not a prohibition but a generative form. First, refusal turns the gaze back upon power, specifically the colonial modalities of knowing persons as bodies to be differentially counted, violated, saved, and put to work. It makes transparent the metanarrative of knowledge production—its spectatorship for pain and its preoccupation for documenting and ruling over racial difference. Thus, refusal to be made meaningful first and foremost is grounded in a critique of settler colonialism, its construction of Whiteness, and its regimes of representation. Second, refusal generates, expands, champions representational territories that colonial knowledge endeavors to settle, enclose, domesticate. Simpson complicates the portrayals of Iroquois, without resorting to reportrayals of anthropological Indians. Gonzales-Day portrays the violations without reportraying the victimizations. Third, refusal is a critical intervention into research and its circular self-defining ethics. The ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling—its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know, and to defend its violations in the name of “good science.” Refusal challenges the individualizing discourse of IRB consent and “good science” by highlighting the problems of collective harm, of representational harm, and of knowledge colonization. Fourth, refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory. Simpson presents refusal on the part of the researcher as a type of calculus ethnography. Gonzales-Day deploys refusal as a mode of representation. Simpson theorizes refusal by the Kahnawake Nation as anticolonial, and rooted in the desire for possibilities outside of colonial logics, not as a reactive stance. This final point about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler colonial knowledge. Desire is compellingly depicted in Simpson’s description of a moment in an interview, in which the alternative logics about a “feeling citizenship” are referenced. The interviewee states, Citizenship is, as I said, you live there, you grew up there, that is the life that you know—that is who you are. Membership is more of a legislative enactment designed to keep people from obtaining the various benefits that Aboriginals can receive. (p. 76) Simpson describes this counterlogic as “the logic of the present,” one that is witnessed, lived, suffered through, and enjoyed (p. 76). Out of the predicaments, it innovates “tolerance and exceptions and affections” (p. 76). Simpson writes (regarding the Indian Act, or blood quantum), “‘Feeling citizenships’ . . . are structured in the present space of intra-community recognition, affection and care, outside of the logics of colonial and imperial rule” (p. 76). Simpson’s logic of the present dovetails with our discussion on the logics of desire. Collectively, Kahnawake refusals decenter damage narratives; they unsettle the settler colonial logics of blood and rights; they center desire. By theorizing through desire, Simpson thus theorizes with and as Kahnawake Mohawk. It is important to point out that Simpson does not deploy her tribal identity as a badge of authentic voice, but rather highlights the ethical predicaments that result from speaking as oneself, as simultaneously part of a collective with internal disputes, vis-à-vis negotiations of various settler colonial logics. Simpson thoughtfully differentiates between the Native researcher philosophically as a kind of privileged position of authenticity, and the Native researcher realistically as one who is beholden to multiple ethical considerations. What is tricky about this position is not only theorizing with, rather than theorizing about, but also theorizing as. To theorize with and as at the same time is a difficult yet fecund positionality—one that rubs against the ethnographic limit at the outset. Theorizing with (and in some of our cases, as) repositions Indigenous people and otherwise researched Others as intellectual subjects rather than anthropological subjects. Thus desire is an “epistemological shift,” not just a methodological shift (Tuck, 2009, p. 419).At this juncture, we don’t intend to offer a general framework for refusal, because all refusal is particular, meaning refusal is always grounded in historical analysis and present conditions. Any discussion of Simpson’s article would need to attend to the significance of real and representational sovereignty in her analysis and theorizing of refusal. The particularities of Kahnawake sovereignty throb at the center of each of the three dimensions of refusal described above. We caution readers against expropriating Indigenous notions of sovereignty into other contexts, or metaphorizing sovereignty in a way that permits one to forget that struggles to have sovereignty recognized are very real and very lived. Yet from Simpson’s example, we are able to see ways in which a researcher might make transparent the coloniality of academic knowledge in order to find its ethical limits, expand the limits of sovereign knowledge, and expand decolonial representational territories. This is in addition to questions her work helpfully raises about who the researcher is, who the researched are, and how the historical/ representational context for research matters. One way to think about refusal is how desire can be a framework, mode, and space for refusal. As a framework, desire is a counterlogic to the logics of settler colonialism. Rooted in possibilities gone but not foreclosed, “the not yet, and at times, the not anymore” (Tuck, 2010, p. 417), desire refuses the master narrative that colonization was inevitable and has a monopoly on the future. By refusing the teleos of colonial future, desire expands possible futures. As a mode of refusal, desire is a “no” and a “yes.” Another way to think about refusal is to consider using strategies of social science research to further expose the complicity of social science disciplines and research in the project of settler colonialism. There is much need to employ social science to turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon. This form of refusal might include bringing attention to the mechanisms of knowledge legitimation, like the Good Labkeeping Seal of Approval (discussed under Axiom III); contesting appropriation, like the collection of pain narratives; and publicly renouncing the diminishing of Indigenous or local narratives with blood narratives in the name of science, such as in the Havasupai case discussed under Axiom II. As long as the objects of research are presumably damaged communities in need of intervention, the metanarrative of social science research remains unchallenged: which is that research at worst is simply an expansion of common knowledge (and therefore harmless), and that research at best is problem solving (and therefore beneficial). This metanarrative justifies a host of interventions into communities, and treats communities as frontiers to civilize, regardless of the specific conclusions of individual research projects. Consider, for example, wellintended research on achievement gaps that fuels NCLB and testing; the documentation of youth violence that provides the rationales for gang injunctions and the expansion of the prison industrial complex; the documentation of diabetes as justification for unauthorized genomic studies and the expansion of antiIndigenous theories. Instead, by making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of social science research, researchers may bring to a halt or at least slow down the machinery that allows knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life. Thus, this form of refusal might also involve tracking the relationships between social science research and expansions of state and corporate violence against communities. Social science researchers might design their work to call attention to or interrogate power, rather than allowing their work to serve as yet another advertisement for power. Further, this form of refusal might aim to leverage the resources of the academy to expand the representational territories fought for by communities working to thwart settler colonialism.

**[2] Safety – you should punish them for being genocidal before you should worry about punishing me for skewing their time**

**[3] Policymaking Skills: Policy making knowledge doesn’t change policy**

**Gilens and Page 14 - Martin Gilens, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin Page, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, Perspectives on Politics, Volume 12, Issue 3 , pp. 564 – 581, September 2014** “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/testing-theories-of-american-politics-elites-interest-groups-and-average-citizens/62327F513959D0A304D4893B382B992B] Accessed 9/30/21 SAO

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, **the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.** The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences. 49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, **because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it**. A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly-informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support. But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that—collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect. 50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, **we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one's own interests** or a determination to work for the common good. All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative. Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies. Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other non-economic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues. Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.

**And - No perms**

**[1] All of the links to the affirmative are reasons to reject the perm**

**[2] Refusal is productive. Any perm is a move to innocence and a new link. The aff cant function as offense under my ROB**

**[3] Attempts to bridge our theoretical approaches sanitize epistemological difference – Their analysis of imperialism purposely obscures social formations that allow oppression**

## Case (Was all extempt)