## K

**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –**

**Fluidity- A) Differentiation - signifiers refer to other signifiers without having a final signified to relate to which produces a constitutive lack from the inability to reach true meaning. This instability forces us to form a world in pursuit of the lost gaps to fulfill the subject’s desires. B) Language is constantly changing- it’s contextually produced with respect to temporality and cultures because every individual indexes to language differently.**

The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the known, the material, calculable – the acquisition of knowledge is inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. In an attempt to know the world around us, we sacrifice the very nature of knowledge itself while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life. Mills, Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm.When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

**The affs attempts to improve working conditions falls short of an analysis of commodity fetishism. The affs desire to fill the lack inevitably fails.**

**Böhm and Batta 10** [Steffen; Essex Business School, University of Essex; Aanka; Essex Business School, University of Essex; “Just doing it: enjoying commodity fetishism with Lacan,” Organization; 2010; <https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1350508410363123>] // Re-Cut Justin

It is within this context that the anti-sweatshop campaign has emerged. It has brought to our attention the difficult working conditions, the exploitation and dehumanization that are part and parcel of the global economy and hence has helped to politicize consumption, to put Nike and other multinationals and their production practices on the spot. One of the aims of this campaign has been to improve the working conditions and wages of the workers in low-cost countries. However, what has also been caught up in this campaign is the call by many Western critics for this production to be brought back ‘home’. That is, multinationals like Nike are criticized—particularly by labour unions—for just running virtual operations in Western countries, concentrating on design and branding. In this way, it is argued, the West simply becomes an ‘experience economy’ (Gilmore et al., 1998)—or we could call it an ‘enjoyment economy’, a kind of big Disneyland—rather than developing its own ‘real economy’, its own industrial and manufacturing strength. Both the ‘anti-sweatshop’ and ‘bring-our-production-home’ responses are, in our view, limited, as they seem to fall short of a critique of the workings of commodity fetishism. ‘If only Nike would be more of a “real economy” company, paying its workers decent wages and pensions, then things would be better’, some of the campaigners seem to be arguing. Although this kind of argument seems to be particularly attractive in today’s deep economic crisis, we would maintain that some caution needs to be applied. In fact, as we are arguing in this article the workings of commodity fetishism, are proper to all capitalist production and consumption processes, and tie individual consumers and the mass social body as such to a continuous reproduction of capitalist commodity relations. Even if Nike produced its trainers say in the US, paying its workers a decent living wage, there would still be an alienation and perversion at the heart of its commodity relations making it fundamentally problematic. Equally, even if ‘sweatshop’ workers in the so-called ‘third world’ would be paid better wages, commodity fetishism would not disappear, tying individuals to a continuous consumption cycle, which many critics (e.g. Klein, 2000) have shown to have a range of negative effects on people, societies and the environment. What is important for us is to realize that—in the words of Guy Debord—‘it is not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to see—commodities are now all that there is to see, the world we see is the world of the commodity’ (1994: 29). That is, humankind is enmeshed in commodity relations. A study of NikeTown in Chicago, for example, argues that a visit to this consumer haven gives one the sense of a ‘festive nature of the processions through the site, with customers cast in the role of explorers and tourists in search of clothing, souvenirs and meanings’ (Peñaloza, 1998: 379). Our perceptual apparatus cannot ‘not see’ the commodity; it is everywhere. The commodity is being produced and reproduced at a variety of different levels of reality and representation, resulting in what Debord calls a ‘spectacle’: ‘The Spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (Debord, 1994: 12). These images—in the form of news, advertising and entertainment—are continuously produced and reproduced by the media and culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979), resulting in what Lacanians would call ‘Homo Symbolicus’, which implies a shift from a naturalist to a culturalist conception of need and desire (Stavrakakis, 2006: 89). The important Lacanian contribution to this debate is that the ‘enjoyment economy’ (Baudrillard, 2001; Gilmore et al., 1998) is not only a post-World War II or ‘postmodern’ invention. Instead, enjoyment must be seen at the heart not only of capitalist organization but also of how human subjectivity and hence society as such function. What is important to realize here is that, for Lacan, desire is located in the realm of the symbolic Other, the relational structure of language that makes up society. As the fetishist deals with his or her anxiety (lack) by accepting the Law of the Nameof-the-Father, the Other becomes, what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call a ‘desiring machine’ that constitutes the subject. With Lacan—as with Deleuze and Guattari—this fetishization process exits the realm of the Freudian clinic to enter the wider scene of social relations. Lacan’s formula to describe what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) later call the ‘desiring machine’ is $ ◊ a, where ‘$’ is the ‘barred’ or ‘divided’ subject (as the subject, according to Lacan, can never have a full identity) and the small ‘a’ is the object of desire that is, nevertheless, always unattainable. The Nike brand, for example, promises all sorts of amazing experiences and enjoyments when one buys a pair of one of their latest trainers. Yet, once bought, we realize that we cannot jump quite as high as ‘Air Jordan’ or play golf as skillfully as Tiger Woods. The symbolic regime of the Other is thus always lacking, which, however, does not prevent us from desiring and believing in it. This is what Lacan (2007: 108) calls fantasy. It is this fantasy that is at the heart of Lacan and Granoff’s (1956) conception of ‘fetishism’, which they describe as a process of the subject transferring his or her anxiety to a symbolic system, or what Lacan calls the Name-of-the-Father. What contemporary consumer capitalism has arguably achieved is that it has provided a symbolic system onto which the subject’s constitutive anxieties (lack) can be transferred, creating a set of fantasies for people to believe in. Nike and its global brand appeal is at the heart of this relationship.

**The affirmatives utopian reimagining of politics without explicit praxis to overcome the structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.**

**Lundberg 12** Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // ahs ss

The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ,* takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of *The Passion* and the tropological exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand, arguing that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading *The Passion,* i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest, i would like to show the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands.

#### The aff’s resentment produces a form of apathy that causes their harms.

Leslie Paul Thiele, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida, Twilight of Modernity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Politics. Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), pp. 468-490///AHS PB

**If we could** somehow **achieve** an Archimedean point allowing an **impartial judgment** of life's worth, Kateb observes, then the abundant cruelty, waste, and ugliness of life would preclude its justification: "**existence on the earth fails every test that is strenuously pressed by moral or teleological inquir- ers**."45 But such metaphysical hypothesizing is beside the point. Kateb takes seriously Nietzsche's understanding that we cannot properly evaluate life's worth. **Without a God's eye point of view, we can no more muster reasons to justify existence than we can muster reasons to condemn it. Religious or metaphysical justifications of life** (under whose rubric we may subsume all moral and teleological efforts) are ill-begotten: at best they will **fail to convince us of their impartiality and hence their prerogative to judge; at worst they will prove counterproductive, begetting a destructive resentment of all the wickedness in life, for wnich they ultimately cannot account. This resentment of life may lead to political apathy or to a hyperactive pursuit of mastery, either of which may allow or promote nuclear war making. It follows** that attachment to existence is best cultivated, and therefore **the threat of human extinction best addressed, when all religious and metaphysical at- tempts to justify existence have been thoroughly discredited.**

**The alternative is to traverse the fantasy—this requires internalizing desire in order to reject the master signifier. Only through accepting lack as a constitutive feature of the human subject can we escape this never-ending desire for wholeness.**

**McGowan ‘13** “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) AHS// EMM

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy**. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life.** It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or **simply becoming aware that one is fantasizing — is one predominant image of the psychoanalytic process.** My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy, and analysis laid this fantasy bare and thus facilitated a disinvestment in it. In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. **Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy.** For example, this dimension of psychoanalysis leads Yannis Stavrakakis, in Lacan and the Political, to **see the contemporary political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought.”**25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order.** As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”**26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and psychoanalysis for him facilitates this recognition and provides a way to dissolve fantasy’s power. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.” But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience this subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible.28 Fantasy offers the subject a transcendent experience, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure that ordinarily constrain it.** As such, this moment of fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a fundamental challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: **the illusions of fantasy keep subjects content with the ruling symbolic structure,** but they also provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure**.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the fantasy has more significance than actual memories. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a flowery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals.The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience, which is why Freud values it over memory. This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. Because it allows the subject an experience of transcendence beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable within this structure; (2) fantasy facilitates an encounter with traumatic disruption that our everyday reality guards against; and (3) **fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it.** These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

**The ROTB and standard is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically embraces lack**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**Prefer: A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place. B) Everything is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted. C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.**

## K

#### The aff’s form is a voting issue:

**1. Images of suffering fuel violence.**

**Alford 20, - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020** “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[<https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512>] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO

Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, the images of catastrophe and destruction presented by the news media are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. **Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads**. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” The Iran war effort is being pushed, as I write, by American media. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. The **New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies** about the glory of war, and how beautiful it is. Al Jazeera, the non-western source, simply reported the facts. The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that when the disaster market from around the world slows down, the west will turn inward and **produce its own spectacles of disaster**. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free television coverage in 2016 leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that the media always wanted him to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor Put children, including babies, in cages at the border Bullied a 15 year old climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and got impeached for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court Supported known child molester Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is **a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it**. Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his reelection. It is just too good for their bottom line. A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; **stop watching** disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to stop listening to the neo-liberal pundits, the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. **Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up**. When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering when we encounter it, and act to resolve it. Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.

**2. Roleplaying leads to an addiction to self-projection onto the political sphere which is violent.**

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No amount of scrutiny will reach the end of the abyss that is Donald Trump. **Looking closer at his image will not yield any more knowledge than one had about him, or his intentions, before undertaking the act of observation**. Trump is pure image insofar that he does not actually care about what he says but rather that he can be able to reproduce his image, his voice, and his name everywhere. As Hannah Arendt writes in The Human Condition, the political and the public realm signifies that everything is public. She writes: “The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear **assures us of the reality of the world** and ourselves” (Arendt, 1989:50). What is done overtime, through our gaze, is that we combine the two; **the public realm is political**. We no longer find ourselves dependent on ourselves to prove our existence. Rather, **the political realm and the spectacle becomes not even an event of enjoyment, but an event to create identity.** Everyone is now left with the question from Jean Baudrillard: “**Do we continually have to prove to ourselves that we exist**” (Baudrillard, 2010:21)? **No longer is politics something one enters into as a realm of debate and dialogue. Politics is a non-event; it never ends because we are trapped in the reality show of fake decisions. Politics is used today as an object outside of ourselves in which we formulate our identity.** In our postmodern times we are told to constantly assume new identities, to radically be authentic and actualize ourselves. Yet past the image of the political realm, **we find ourselves not really existing**. Thus the political spectacle, in its image, becomes a projection **of our want for existence**. The political rise of Donald Trump shows us that we are finally accepting the fact that we are in postmodern times and he is the first figure to successfully manipulate the postmodern political condition.

**3. Policy-making is an attempt at ethical cleansing – debaters attempt to rationalize the violence that exists outside the space and cleanse themselves of their ethical responsibility for real action action with the simulacrum of the ballot. This is why debaters fight over concept of “justice” in the space and act as though they’ve actually stopped the Saudi war when you vote aff. This distancing of ourselves from reality is what perpetuates material violence as we feel good about ourselves for doing jack shit so we can rationalize doing nothing.**

**4. Their emphasis on scenario planning and analysis is the definition of the will to transparency – they attempt to understand the world and eliminate all potentialities of difference through the necessity for that which can be predicted.**

**5. Util justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm.**

**6. Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is rape okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say yes because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure. Probability doesn’t solve because that just allows for moral error and freezes action while attempting to calculate the perfect decision.**

**The alternative is to drop the debater – 1. It disincentivizes debaters from reading violent arguments because they know they will lose for doing so which is the most motivational tool 2. The judge has an obligation to ensure debate is equally accessible and trains students to be inclusive thinkers which requires holding debaters accountable for their abhorrent arguments**

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