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**Link 1: The power of the image is the image of power. The semiotic battle ground in which violence is constituted gives images of ethical deviation power by affirming their reality, something debate is entirely invested in. The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize by humanizing the system**

**Johnson 17 - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017** “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO \*brackets in original

The meaning and logic of a scandal exceeds these strictly ethical and juridical frameworks. Instead, transgressions are interpreted through and implicated in the reproduction of wider frameworks of intelligibility within war. Consider, for example, the revelation of ‘prisoner abuse’ within the Abu Ghraib detention facility. While this scandal clearly invoked the idea that these violences were a departure from the rule of law and widely accepted norms regarding the humane treatment of prisoners, this is not the only way in which these events were rendered intelligible. This moment was not simply read as an instance of violence that overstepped the line in a strictly juridical sense. As Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2007: 38) has argued, these violences were also interpreted through a ‘pre-constructed, heterosexed, racialised and gendered script’. The transgressive dimensions of ‘prisoner abuse’ in Abu Ghraib were not therefore solely, or perhaps even primarily, understood in relation to a set of codified ethical principles that were violated. The signification of these violences as scandalous also drew upon and reproduced a wider set of representational logics. As such, the dominant narrative of the violences at Abu Ghraib became an individuated story of ‘womanhood or sexuality gone awry’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 70). This fetishisation and denouncement of a ‘few bad apples’ serves to obscure a more systematic insight into the widespread use of extrajuridical and extra-territorial rendition, torture and killing that has defined the ‘war on terror’.3 Unpacking the first line-drawing manoeuvre in this way allows us to understand that scandals are not detached and dispassionate arbiters of ethical conduct. As opposed to approaches that focus upon adjudicating wartime conduct in terms of its adherence or deviation from standards and thresholds defined by pre-given ethical frameworks, this approach to the ethics of war draws attention to an everyday ethical vernacular (see Bubandt, 2005; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016): a diffuse, decentred and circulating discursive economy through which particular acts of violence are rendered intelligible. It is a way of thinking about ethical arguments about war that focuses less on how particular acts of violence are problematised in relation to defined and fixed norms. The process is less clearly determined. To understand the scripting of ethical failure, of scandalous transgressions, we must therefore come to understand the complex intersections and resonances between ethical imaginaries and other representational logics. It is therefore important to understand scandals as primarily political rather than epistemological events. The exposure of a scandal is not simply a process of correctly naming an event as such. Rather, scandals are constructed sites of hyper-visibility that exceed the ethical frameworks that they invoke.4 Such an understanding of scandals leads us away from the idea that they are, by exposing and disclosing hidden transgressions, a means of speaking truth to power. Instead, understanding this first line-drawing manoeuvre begins to demonstrate to us how scandals are a manifestation of the power of truth. Such an approach to scandals draws us away from an idea that they are determined by the intrinsic qualities of the act itself and instead urges us to reflect on the socio-political function of this process of signification. Second manoeuvre: Redrawing lines The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law. (Baudrillard, 1983: 27) The first line-drawing manoeuvre of a scandal allows us to note that a line has been crossed. As has been shown, the observation of transgression therefore offers us privileged insights into the existence, prevalence and location of these lines. By tracing these crossed lines, we gain an understanding of the everyday ethical vernaculars that reflect popular understandings of the relationship between war and ethics. The danger of understanding this first manoeuvre alone is that it largely leaves intact the heroic notion of scandals as a means of revealing ethical transgressions. The observation that the signification of scandals exceeds the ethical norms that they invoke could simply be read as a suggestion that to understand the scripting of ethical failure, we must understand how these events are embedded within broader representational regimes. Understood as such, scandals simply reflect the complex and contingent resonances between ethical imaginaries and other dominant discourses and stories. In this sense, the first manoeuvre is not really involved in line-drawing at all; it is simply observing that lines have been drawn. Taken on its own, what this manoeuvre gestures towards but fails to account for is the performative force of scandal: how the invoking of particular lines ‘produces the effect that it names’ (Butler, 2011: xii). We must therefore supplement this first manoeuvre with a second in which scandals are not simply read as the crossing of a line that exists independently of this apparent observation. Instead, scandals must be understood as a process of redrawing the line that has been transgressed. In this sense, the first and second manoeuvres are not really separate manoeuvres at all. Scandals do more than simply reference norms and principles; they are productive of them. The second manoeuvre points to how norms come to be revitalised and pursued with renewed vigour; it allows us to understand the constitutive function of the first manoeuvre. To be clear, the performative force of scandal is to regenerate the very principles that are distressed by their apparent transgression. Ultimately, this is the success of ethical failure. Scandals, and ethical engagements with war more generally, must be understood in terms of their ‘socio-political effects [which] impact on our collective understanding of war itself’ (Dauphinée, 2008: 50). The second manoeuvre draws our attention to a particular dimension of this effect. Specifically, it demonstrates the way in which scandals function as what Baudrillard (1994: 18) refers to as an example of ‘operational negativity’: a **secur**ing of **a positive reality through** the **denouncement of its inversion, subversion or semblance.** To help elaborate on this function, Baudrillard considers the doctrine of iconoclasm. The iconoclastic argument forbids the worshipping of images of the divine on the basis that ‘the divinity that breathes life into nature cannot be represented’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). What underpins iconoclasm is the assumption that there is a divine presence against which particular representations can be judged; there has to be a presence that allows for the identification of its absence. For Baudrillard (1983: 11), the denouncement of various signs as false representations of the real ‘masks the absence of a basic reality’. In this sense, God is not simply dead; rather, God never existed, and there has only ever been the simulation of a divine presence. The notion of operational negativity therefore offers Baudrillard a means to develop his wider thinking about simulation and the hyper-reality of the symbolic order through which social reality is constituted. While this potentially opens up interesting avenues regarding the ontological status of the ethical architecture of war, understanding the second manoeuvre requires us to explore a different dimension of the socio-political function of this logic. As has been shown, iconoclasm performs an important pedagogic role. If God cannot be represented, then God surely exists: this is the underlying message of the iconoclasts. Operational negativity highlights an absence in order to affirm the veracity of an invoked presence. However, **this denouncement** does more than reaffirm an underlying reality principle. It also **performs a crucial regulatory function.** The force of this denunciatory logic is to police conduct in accordance with the transgressed law: you shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above. Denunciation therefore attempts to resolve transgression **by demanding conformity to a cherished principle** or commandment. **The effect of identifying deviation is to ensure a return to the** norm. The tendency of denunciation is towards a re-solution, usually understood as a securing and reproduction of the **status quo.** Denunciation therefore performs a conjoined pedagogic-regulatory function in attempting to secure both the power of truth and the truth of power (Dillon, 2015). It is in both of these senses that we must understand Baudrillard’s (1983: 27) claim that: ‘The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law.’ Scandals, as an example of operational negativity, are therefore not necessarily moments through which particular principles come to be scrutinised or disputed. Instead, the function of operational negativity is often to: regenerate a moribund principle through simulated scandal, phantasm, and murder — a sort of hormonal treatment through negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression … Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. … Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. (Baudrillard, 1994: 18–19) From this reading, scandals do not emerge as a space for contesting or rethinking the legitimacy of a particular social order. Instead**, what appears to be a moment of disruptive failure is actually crucial to the rehabilitation** and regeneration **of the very social order** that appears to have failed. What is troubling from the perspective of this second manoeuvre is how critical arguments about the ethics of war become implicated in the very practices that they appear to challenge. Understanding this complicity in the conditions of possibility of military violence requires us to understand the ways in which scandals shape the possibilities and limits of critical responses to perceived ethical failures in wartime conduct. Baudrillard’s concern with thinking within the logics of the scandal is that it reduces critical thought to a logic of recrimination. Scandals present a simple decision in the face of an event: ‘to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 15, emphasis in original). It is these grammatical terms of the scandal that are particularly problematic as, through them, critical thought becomes confined to performing a regulatory function in support of the logics of a particular morality or rationality. To denounce a particular act ‘for not following the rules of the game’ accepts and affirms that if only these rules were followed, then a particular form of behaviour would be unproblematic. This account of critique as recrimination blunts the possibilities of critical thought, largely confining it to a logic of problem-solving whereby the ethical problem of war is reduced to the identification — through transgression — and re-solution of a series of problems through a return to the norm. Problematically, this not only leaves unquestioned and untroubled the norm that it invokes, but actively serves it as, understood in this way, the possibility of transgression implies that if transgression were eliminated, war would be a wholly moral exercise. Far from undermining the possibilities for war by exposing its apparent failures, scandals are involved in the production and reproduction of the very principles upon which contemporary warfare is made possible. This is the success of ethical failure. In short, the durability of the understanding of war as a legitimate enterprise comes to rely, in part, upon the managed exposure of its fragility. Ethical failure in warfare is therefore crucial to upholding the very principles that make violence possible. Perversely, no matter how well intentioned, scandals are complicit in a virtuous cycle that reproduces the legitimacy of virtuous war. In this sense, ethical failure comes to affirm and necessitate more successful forms of violence. Recriminations against the perceived breakdown of the relationship between the martial and the ethical are in danger of confining critiques of wartime violence to the process of policing conduct in war against a series of fixed standards and thresholds. It is in this sense that we should understand scandals as a watchdog on government; not as speakers of truth to power, but rather as speakers of the power of truth. Far from challenging the construction of war as an instrument of ethical foreign policy, the terms of critical engagement are such that opposition to particular forms of wartime conduct becomes implicated in the reproduction of the very thing that it may set out to challenge or dismantle. Of course, not all responses to scandals are motivated by this desire. For example, many responses must be situated within wider pedagogic efforts designed to learn from and improve the efficacy and ethicality of wartime conduct. Viewed from the perspective of this ‘fail again, fail better’ approach, scandals are a window of opportunity to refine rather than refute the terms of ongoing violence. The danger and tragedy of scandal is that it is hard to conceive of ways of critiquing war that escape this logic. Rather than creating spaces for imagining less violent futures, scandal overwhelmingly tends towards a politics of recrimination and the resolution of largely individuated moments of ethical failure through technical fixes. The problem of scandal is therefore that it threatens to make iconoclasts of us all: urging us to denounce and combat false or aberrant forms of violence in the name of a purer and truer form of violence that we are urged to pursue with a renewed zeal and vigour.

**Johnson Continues** - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017 “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO This article has focused on the interpretation and socio-political function of wartime scandals. It has presented both an opportunity and a warning: an opportunity in terms of exploring what scandals can tell us; and a warning in terms of understanding the performative force of what scandals are already telling us. Understood as a series of linedrawing manoeuvres, this article has outlined how scandals offer us a privileged insight into the character and reproduction of the normative architecture through which contemporary war is governed. This method for critically reading wartime scandals offers a number of important insights and opportunities for engaging with the ways in which contemporary wartime violences are enabled, excused and obscured. It is important to understand that the argument presented in this article does not entail a rejection of the possibility or desirability of ethical arguments about war. This may appear to be the direction in which Baudrillard gestures. Baudrillard’s provocation that there is no scandal may seem to be a vague, inadequate and potentially conservative response to acts of violence that many feel motivated to respond to. Just as it has been argued that denunciation is in danger of being intimately involved in the reproduction of the very violences that it seeks to problematise, it could be argued that refusing to accept that particular acts are scandalous runs the risk of forming a silent complicity with them. **A commitment to normative politics does not**, however, **entail a choice between speaking out against violence or remaining silent.** Put simply, **to speak or not to speak is not the problem** we find ourselves confronted with. Such a formulation proceeds from the assumption that scandals and recrimination are the only possible ways to articulate concern with particular acts. Understood as such, this article would appear to challenge this mode of critique, thereby eradicating or seriously limiting the possibility of expressing outrage at wartime violence. Only if we accept this premise are we confronted by the decision to speak or to remain silent. This article does not aim to restrict our ability to articulate outrage about particular acts of wartime violence. Scandals are not the only ways of narrating instances of death and injury in war. **Other ways of speaking are possible and other stories can be told** (Shepherd, 2006: 401). Realising this can only serve to expand, rather than limit, the vocabulary and possibilities of critical thought beyond a restrictive politics of recrimination. The point of this article is that it is because, not in spite, of the ‘truth’ of these violences that we must interrogate the socio-political function of this way of speaking, of bearing witness, of speaking truth to power. This article does not therefore dismiss the importance of ethical arguments; instead, it attempts to demonstrate just how important they are. Taking ethical arguments seriously requires us to recognise that they are not detached from the violences that they reflect upon. **Bearing witness is not without consequences.** Troublingly, this article has demonstrated that the denunciation of moments of ethical failure may, in fact, reproduce the very practices that appear to be disturbed. **Scandals** may therefore **secure the legitimacy and necessity of more not less violence**. This spiralling and bewildering causality highlights the complexity and ambiguity of critiquing war. The challenge for critical inquiries into war is therefore how we can formulate ethical arguments about war that do not reproduce the conditions of possibility for the very practices that they seek to contest. The challenge is to imagine what outrage might look like when it is not expressed through the logic of scandal. Put simply, this article has explored and unpacked the logics and performative force of wartime scandals; the challenge now is to think about how we might speak beyond them

**Link 2: Images of suffering fuel violence**

**Alford 20 - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020** “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[<https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512>] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO

Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, the images of catastrophe and destruction presented by the news media are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. **Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads**. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” The Iran war effort is being pushed, as I write, by American media. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. The **New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies** about the glory of war, and how beautiful it is. Al Jazeera, the non-western source, simply reported the facts. The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that when the disaster market from around the world slows down, the west will turn inward and **produce its own spectacles of disaster**. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free television coverage in 2016 leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that the media always wanted him to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor Put children, including babies, in cages at the border Bullied a 15 year old climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and got impeached for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court Supported known child molester Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is **a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it**. Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his reelection. It is just too good for their bottom line. A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; **stop watching** disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to stop listening to the neo-liberal pundits, the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. **Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up**. When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering when we encounter it, and act to resolve it. Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.

**Link 3: The affirmative embraces fiction that debate should be a site for continuously bolstering the reserve labor force of corporate society through a celebration of mediated action**

**Hoofd 07 - Ingrid M. Hoofd, National University of Singapore, December 2007** “The Neoliberal Consolidation of Play and Speed: Ethical Issues in Serious Gaming” in “CRITICAL LITERACY: Theories and Practices Volume 1: 2” p. 6-14, 2007 [http://www.criticalliteracyjournal.org/cljournalissue2volume1.pdf] KZaidi Recut 9/27/21 SAO

Serious games are a fascinating next stage in the continuous exploitation of digital media technologies over the last decades for training, learning, and education. As formal education and training always involves the transmission and repetition of certain culturally and socially specific sets of skills and moral values, it would be of paramount importance to ensure that developments within the serious gaming industry are in step with the effects of the good intentions of nurturing people within a social framework that emphasises a fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society. In this light, it is interesting that from the very advent of the information society, digital technologies have been depicted as central to the development of a more just and equal society by harbouring the promise of bridging gaps between classes, races, and genders locally as well as globally. Driven by the vision of this utopian potential of new technologies, the education industry and larger policy organisations have been exploring the pedagogical possibilities of these technologies both in- and outside the traditional classroom for the last twenty-five years. Indeed, the implementation of increasingly more sophisticated and technologically mediated methods and tools for learning and education, takes as its starting point the techno-utopian assumption that (new) interactive technologies themselves are the primary harbingers of a fair and blooming society through facilitating (student) empowerment. This paper takes issue with this widespread techno-utopian perspective by seeking to shed light on the larger ethical implications of serious gaming. It will do so through foregrounding the relationship between global injustices, and the aesthetic properties and discourses of serious gaming. So while reframing serious games themselves in a new ethical perspective constitutes the main objective of this paper, it is equally important to situate serious games within a larger political discourse on the teaching of new skills. Firstly then, policy papers and academic studies on serious games all display an assumption of the inherent neutrality of gaming technologies, as if these technologies were mere tools equally suitable for all. What also becomes apparent in the language used in these studies and proposals, is how this instrumentalist vision of gaming technologies for learning goes hand in hand with a particular neo-liberal assumption of what constitutes a fit individual, and by extension of what the hallmarks of a ‘healthy’ society may be. For instance, in the European Union study “Serious Gaming – a fundamental building block to drive the knowledge work society” by Manuel Oliveira on the merits of serious games for education, justification runs along the lines of gaming ‘encouraging risk-taking and a winning attitude’ and creating a ‘performance-oriented individual.’ Similarly, Michael Guerena from the US Orange County Department of Education proposes in one of the Department’s web-casts that serious games instil “twenty-first century skills” like risk-taking, adaptability, self-direction, interactive communication, and ‘planning and managing for results’ in the students through the “channelling of fun.” Likewise, the UK-based Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association last year published their white paper Unlimited learning - Computer and video games in the learning landscape, in which they argue that serious games will “create an engaged, knowledgeable, critical and enthusiastic citizenry” whose “work practices will be geared towards networked communication and distributed collaboration” (49). Concerns around the ethical implications of serious games regarding their entanglements with larger social (gendered, classed, and raced) inequalities have until now largely been coined in terms of game content or representation. In a recent case in Singapore, the government’s proposition of using the RPG Granado Espada in secondary school history classes was followed by an outcry from various local academics condemning the stereotypical characters and simplistic representation of medieval Europe in the game. Likewise, various authors have critiqued current serious games not only because of simplistic representation of characters and surroundings, but especially because simulations generally tend to oversimplify complex social problems and situations. Gibson, Aldrich, and Prensky’s Games and Simulations in Online Learning (vi - xiv) for instance discuss these demerits of serious games. While such a critical analysis of how game content contributes to the reproduction of dominant discourses is definitely helpful, I would argue that the aesthetics of serious games involve much more than mere content. Instead, this paper will argue that the formal quest for instantaneity that research around digital media has displayed through the development of interactive technologies for education is already itself by no means a neutral affair. This is because the discourses that inform this quest and that accompany this search for instantaneity arguably enforce the hegemony of a militaristic, masculinist, humanist, and of what I will call a ‘speed-elitist’ individual. Moreover, I suggest that the propensity of current games to have sexist or racist content, is merely symptomatic of gaming technology’s larger problematic in terms of the aesthetic of instantaneity. In short, (serious) computer games have become archives of the discursive and actual violence carried out in the name of the utopia of technological progress and instantaneity under neo-liberal globalisation. This archival function is possible exactly because cybernetic technologies promise the containment and control of such supposedly accidental violence, while in fact exacerbating these forms of violence. This leads me to conclude that such violence is in fact structural to new serious gaming technologies, rather than accidental. I will elaborate this hypothesis by looking at various theorists who seek to understand this structural imperative of new technologies, and their relationship to the neo-liberalisation of learning and education. In turn, I will look at how this problematic structural logic informs the two popular serious games Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive. Secondly, the advent of serious gaming interestingly runs parallel with the contemporary dissemination and virtualisation of traditional learning institutions into cyberspace. While the existence of learning tools in other areas of society besides actual learning institutions has been a fact since the advent of schools, the shift of methods of learning into online and digital tools is symptomatic of the decentralisation of power from ‘old’ educational institutions and its usurpation into instantaneous neo-liberal modes of production. I am summarising the work of Bill Readings on the university here, because it sheds light on the shift in education tout court towards virtualisation, and its relationship to the ‘new hegemony of instantaneity.’ In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the shift from the state-run university of reason and culture to the present-day global knowledge enterprise must mean that the centre of power in effect has shifted elsewhere. More important, says Readings, is that the function of the new ‘university of excellence,’ one that successfully transforms it into yet another trans-national corporation, relies on the fantasy that the university is still that transcendental university of culture in service of the state and its citizens. So the invocation of the fantasy of an ‘originary’ university of reason and progress, that produces unbiased knowledge for the good of all, facilitates the doubling of the production of information into other spaces outside the university walls proper. While Readings surely discusses only higher education institutions in The University in Ruins, I would argue that the logic of a shifting centre of power from the state into the technocratic networks and nodes of speed operates quite similarly in the case of primary, secondary, and other types of formal education. Indeed, the current virtualisation of learning and the emphasis on lifelong learning marks a dispersal of traditional learning institutions into online spaces. This dispersal works increasingly in service of the ‘speed-elite’ rather than simply in service of the nation-state. The heralding of serious games for education can therefore be read as a symptom of the intensified reach of the imperatives of neo-liberal globalisation, in which consumption enters the lives of locally bound as well as more mobile cosmopolitan citizens of all ages through harping on the technological possibility of the confusion of production and play. Through the imperative of play then, production increasingly and diffusely colonises all niche times and -spaces of neo-liberal society. In other words, (the emphasis on) play allows not only a potential increase in production and consumption through the citizen-consumer after her or his formal education of ‘skills’, but starkly intensifies flows of production and consumption already at the very moment of learning. While such an integration of play and production is generally understood within the framework of the neo-liberal demand for the circulation of pleasure, it is useful here to widen the scope from understanding the learner as a mere consumer of pleasure into the larger set of problematic interpellations that marks subjugation in contemporary society. Intriguingly, a host of research has emerged over the past years pointing towards the intricate relationship between subjugation, military research objectives, and videogame development. Such research suggests an intimate connection between the C3I logic and humanist militaristic utopias of transcendence, which incriminates interactive technologies as inherently favouring culturally particular notions of personhood. In the case of computer- and video-games for entertainment, researchers have argued that the aesthetic properties of gaming technologies give rise to so-called ‘militarised masculinity.’ In “Designing Militarized Masculinity,” Stephen Kline, Nick DyerWitheford, and Greig de Peuter argue for instance that interactive games open up very specific subject positions that “mobilize fantasies of instrumental domination” (255). This specific mobilisation that video-games invoke, is not only due to the remediation of violent television- and film- content, but also due to the intimate connection between gaming- and military industries which grant these technologies their particular cybernetic aesthetic properties (see also Herz 1997). This element of militarisation partly informs my concept of ‘speed-elitism.’ I extrapolate the idea of ‘speed-elitism’ largely from the works of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neo-liberal capitalism. In “Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed,” Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of exchange and production, and the logic of speed. In line with Virilio’s argument in Speed and Politics, they argue that various formerly the less connected social areas of war, communication, entertainment, and trade, are now intimately though obliquely connected. This is because all these forces mutually enforce one another through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that “circulation has become an essential process of capitalism, an end in itself” (118) and therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied-up in this logic. So neo-liberal capitalism is a system within which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of communication and play – get to be formally subsumed under capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology,” Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the neutral or optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated – like in the policy papers – in favour of the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, empowerment and progress, which often go hand in hand with the celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication. Such discourses however suppress the violent colonial and patriarchal history of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness brought about by and occurring within these spaces. I would claim that Armitage’s assessment of accelerated circulation, and the way new technologies make play complicit in the techno-utopian endeavour of speed, is crucial for understanding the larger ethical issues surrounding serious games. It is helpful at this point to look at Paul Virilio’s and Jacques Derrida’s work because this helps us understand the complicity of the aesthetics of interactive and visually oriented gaming technologies in speed-elitism. In “Cyberwar, God, and Television,” Paul Virilio talks about the simulation industry’s function of “exposing [one] to the accident in order not to be exposed to it” (322). What is according to him ‘accidented’ through the virtualisation of accidents and violence, for instance in video-games, is reality itself. This ‘accident of reality’ that virtuality brings about, argues Virilio, is due to the fact that simulation technologies fragment space through their property of instantaneous connection with previously far-away places. The hallmark of this fragmentation is therefore that it brings about an intensification of forms of in- and exclusion through actual disconnection. Eventually, there will be “two realities: the actual and the virtual” (323), and I would claim that consequently the privileged speed-elite will be able to live in the illusion of engaging with social reality that the virtual grants, at the cost of the (s)lower classes who will suffer the social and ecological effects of the accidents of virtualisation. The illusion of mastery for Virilio consists in the sense of the “incorporation of the world within oneself” that “real time technologies permit” (328) due to their militaristic compulsion that seeks to “reduce the world to the point where one could possess it” (329). I maintain that these statements spell out exactly the function and logic of serious gaming.

**The alternative is to reject the imperative for productivity in the academy and instead take a detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. The upsetting force of such a fatal attitude reveals the university as the marvelously absurd outgrowth of the enlightenment that it is. The content of our strategy will never change the equation, only complete apathy towards the forms of the system can accelerate them to the point of their vacuity and collapse. Signing the ballot NEG will be the completion of this act.**

**Hoofd 17 - Ingrid Hoofd, Utrecht University, 2017** “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration” [https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7] Accessed 8/24/19 SAO

The fundamental instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’ therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change—in the paradoxical gap prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This **change** however **will** then **not be brought about by the** mere **content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the “fatal strategy” that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of a host of problematic semiotic oppositions, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of technoscientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its compulsory optimism on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or perhaps even promise through death. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current sociotechnical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest for total transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “resists the imperatives of speed,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse—whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (‘know thyself’)—or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more fragile optimism that seeks to affirm the fundamental unknowability or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the first place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1 , every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a logic of increased visibility and transparency, they also render into visible form the perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’ everything and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged visual profusion of relative otherness. Since academic productivity and activism fi nd themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘unknown quantity’ that is inherent in all meaningful learning and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine, “the presupposition of not-knowing and especially not-seeing … restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the denial and attempted erasure of the religious or spiritual aspect of the university, so that, instead of being a vision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensified itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to **welcome the upsetting force of such a fatal attitude** towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’ **as the true antidote**, or perhaps even **the quintessential shadow**, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then finally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, the future may be more radically open than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance lies the potential of that ‘more originary’ responsibility. One of the consequences of bringing back fatality and fatalism means to acknowledge that the representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of omniscience and transparent communication. As I noted in Chap. 3 , it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘reversed’ theatre in which “the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientific description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as well as an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being seduced by that object (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps the only thing one can do is to destabilize and provoke the world around us**.** We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas! (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to let the auto-immune disease run its course therefore would entail firstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the ridiculous scam that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we **follow a strategy of ‘fatal’ consciousness-raising in order to hopefully plant the seeds of future radical events regarding academia**. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable collapse of its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps we should simply let the university bleed to death for now. Only such an apparent ‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hopedfor death of the contemporary university and its revival as a radically different entity. This book must therefore finally remain speculative and opaque, and mount this final chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and true emancipation. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.

**The Aff’s productivism model has hidden colonialist imperatives, only the alts strategy of reversibility ensures the destruction of the root cause of the Affs harms.**

**Holliday-Karre 15 - Dr. Erin Amann Holliday-Karre, Assistant Professor of Literature at Qatar University, in the Journal Feminist Theory, March 24th, 2015** “The seduction of feminist Theory” [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1464700114562530] Accessed 1/29/20 SAO

Jean Baudrillard has long been dismissed by feminists, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, not only as anti-feminist but also, by implication as sexist, racist, and misogynist. Many feminists accuse Baudrillard of denying women access to the masculine realm of production by arguing that the feminine power of seduction can trump masculine ideology. Rebecca Schneider, for example argues that the timing of Baudrillard’s theory of seduction is significant because it occurred just as women and people of colour were beginning to gain access to the spheres of production: ‘Baudrillard might be read as representative of an anxiety born of women’s entry into the realms of production’ (1997: 191). This suspicion might be turned around to ask why feminists reject new theories that challenge them to rethink assumptions about ‘the realms of production’. The production model as the sole means of empowerment is at the heart of Baudrillard’s critique, not women per se.1 And while the twenty-first century ushered in a feminist revaluation of Baudrillard’s work, many still argue that the work of feminism and Baudrillard’s theory of seduction are incompatible. The claim of incongruity between feminist theory and a theory of seduction stems from a belief that feminists must rely on productive strategies, using terms such as equality and difference, to empower women. To conceptualise all feminist theory in this way misses the fact that many canonical feminist texts challenge the use of productive terminologies in discussions of their work. In her analysis of contemporary feminist theory and Baudrillard, Baudrillard’s Challenge: A Feminist Reading (2000), Victoria Grace challenges the feminist use of terms such as desire, power, identity, equality, and difference arguing that these terms perpetuate structures used to oppress and exclude women. For Grace, as for Baudrillard, **feminists should not jockey for inclusion in an inherently unjust system**, but rather challenge and work to subvert its foundations. Both Grace and Baudrillard maintain that arguing for a feminine difference, as Luce Irigaray does, perpetuates a notion calculated to keep women in a subservient position. Grace claims that: These concerns and foci of analysis and deconstruction are undeniably driven by an assumption of the inevitability of the economic (needs, production, value), the inevitability of the law (the bar that structures identity/difference, subject/object), even taking into account the attempts at deconstruction and re-writing from a position of a different ‘difference,’ and of the inevitability of power. There is no seduction here. (2000: 188) According to Grace, many feminists, including Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Judith Butler, do not theorise the political foundations for productive ideologies thereby perpetuating their inherent binaries. For Grace, Baudrillard becomes critical for feminism to the extent that his theory of seduction provides tools to challenge and overturn the logic and supremacy of productive ideology. While **feminists** see a positive focus for their work in the logic of the **production model,** in Baudrillard’s estimation all ideology **is Eurocentric and** thus **contains hidden colonialist imperatives**.2 Grace agrees with Baudrillard that unless feminists challenge productive ideology, we risk preserving its hierarchical foundations. While Grace presents an important and timely analysis of Baudrillard and contemporary feminism, I challenge her claim that ‘there is no seduction here’. I agree that Baudrillard’s theory of seduction is crucial for feminism in that it presents a challenge to the value-laden productivist discourse that Grace finds perpetuated in contemporary feminist theory. However, I argue that the next step in assessing the possibilities of Baudrillard’s work for feminist theory is to recognise those feminists who do employ a strategy of seduction in Baudrillard’s sense of the term. Where Grace (2000: 5) finds no feminist whose standpoint comes close to that of Baudrillard, I highlight several feminists who can be read as taking precisely the position called for by both Grace and Baudrillard. By limiting her analysis to contemporary feminists, Grace obscures Baudrillard’s mention of British feminist Joan Rivie`re’s essay, ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’ (1929). Taking Baudrillard’s reference to Rivie`re into account allows for the elucidation of an historical strain of seduction in feminism that I argue can be traced from early feminists, such as Virginia Woolf, to more contemporary feminists, such as He´le`ne Cixous. Explicit references to Baudrillard’s theory are unnecessary to the recognition of seduction in feminist writing – what is required is a close attention to language. Naming Baudrillard’s theory of seduction as a new concept for feminism allows us to see its contours in feminist writing, and to reveal it as a strategy used to overturn the logic of production. Grace suggests that most feminists reject Baudrillard’s theory on the basis of the traditional definition of seduction: ‘The word ‘‘seduction’’ in the Anglo-American context, is resolutely associated with a kind of predatory male behavior bent on conquest [...] or alternatively a female sexual behavior designed to turn the male on his path toward evil and his downfall’ (2000: 140).3 However, it seems precipitous to assume with Grace that Baudrillard’s use of the term is ‘precisely in opposition to, and a process of critique of, these accepted readings’ (2000: 142). Although I agree that Baudrillard critiques its traditional literary definition, the fact that he chooses to use the term seduction situates him in the context of both literary and psychoanalytic discourses on ‘seduction’. Placing Baudrillard in conversation with Shoshana Felman can show that contemporary feminist readings of, for example, Don Juan are not so different from Baudrillard’s theory. Felman divorces seduction from terms like ‘sexual manipulation’ and ‘predatory male behavior’, situating it within a performative theory of language. For Felman, ‘Don Juan is a myth of scandal precisely to the extent that it is the myth of violation; the violation not of women but of promises to them’ (1983: 11). Locating Don Juan’s transgression not in his behaviour but in the structure of language, Felman argues that the words ‘I promise’ serve to violate the meaning attached to language. Baudrillard and Felman both argue that a cognitive (Baudrillard uses ‘productive’) view defines language as ‘an instrument of knowledge, a means of knowing reality’ (Felman, 1983: 27). But Don Juan’s seduction, says Felman, depends on the point that ‘saying for him, is in no case tantamount to knowing, but rather doing’ (1983: 27). That is, the words ‘I promise’ constitute a certain truth for the person who hears them, and also function as a performative act. When women seduced by Don Juan attribute meaning to his performative act, they err. By dismissing Baudrillard as merely critical of literary notions of seduction, Grace misses the opportunity to read Baudrillard’s definition of seduction in relation to contemporaneous feminists like Felman. Baudrillard writes, ‘To be seduced is to be turned from one’s truth. To seduce is to lead the other from his/her truth’ (1990: 81), precisely what Don Juan does. Significantly for my argument, Grace concedes that literary engagement is in some ways necessary for understanding seduction, but acknowledges that, as a sociologist, she is limited in that regard. In her notes from the chapter subheading ‘The Enjoyment of Poetics’, she writes, ‘I do not claim expertise in analyzing poetry [...] My intention is to present Baudrillard’s reflections [...] to show how language might be traversed by seduction, by the symbolic’ (2000: 200). This is a significant concession given that seduction travels over and through language. She can, however, easily identify a productive reading: A psychoanalytic ‘reading’ will lend itself [ ... ] to the articulation or manifestation of the hidden meaning, silenced through each utterance. The assertion of meaning also has the function of silencing, within this framework, of repressing the unsaid, establishing a disjuncture through what is said and what is meant. (Grace, 2000: 179) Grace’s assertion that ‘there is no seduction here’ is, I argue, the result of a productive, analytic, and interpretive reading for meaning that functions (unintentionally) to repress feminism’s seductive potential. Thus both Grace and Baudrillard employ the same practice of productive reading, with regard to feminist writing, that they accuse feminism of perpetuating. Reading feminist writing as literary writing, and thereby paying close attention to language, enables us to better understand the seductive potential of feminism. In order to recognise feminist writing as seductive, we must emphasise where and when seduction occurs in feminist discourse. I do not aspire to set up a hierarchy in which seductive discourse is good and productive discourse bad; rather, I want to show the ways in which seduction appears in and through productive discourse so that feminists can understand seduction as a tool used to challenge the truth claims of productive discourse. While we cannot codify seduction as a practice – to do so would be to relegate it to the productive realm – we can expose the ways in which systems of production contain their own foil in and through seduction. Awareness of how productive ideologies structure social systems and recycle oppressive value systems can decrease blind advocacy of productive language. Although Baudrillard does not describe what a seductive reading practice would look like, in his analysis language is seductive (and revolutionary) to the extent that it employs ‘reversible speech’ (speech without the proclamation of truth), is not annexed by linguistic structures (language distributed as value through meaning and signification), and cannot be reduced to a unified argument. Seductive discourse is aware of the ideological laws regarding the signification of language, how words come to have meaning, and works to expose the artifice behind such signification, by using non-sense signifiers – words, images, and concepts emptied of significance and value. When describing the ways in which seduction functions in culture, Baudrillard turns to literary texts: in one example, he provides a reading of a fairy tale in which a boy finds a fairy and asks her to grant him wishes. The fairy agrees on the condition that the boy ‘must never think of the color red in the fox’s tail’ (Baudrillard, 1990: 74). The boy replies, ‘is that all?’ (Baudrillard, 1990: 74). What happens next is what is, perhaps, most expected. The boy begins to see the colour red in the fox’s tail everywhere he goes. Baudrillard writes that ‘[h]e becomes obsessed with this absurd, insignificant, but tenacious image, augmented by the spite that comes from not being able to rid himself of it. Not only do the fairy’s promises not come true, but he loses his taste for life’ (1990: 74). For Baudrillard, this story demonstrates the power of any signifier that is insignificant. The fairy is aware of the fact that the boy’s mind will be attracted to a place devoid of significant meaning. But, being unaware of the insignificance of the colour red in the fox’s tail, the child is not on his guard. Had the fairy asked the boy not to engage in something serious or of significance, the boy would be more likely to succeed. According to the theory of seduction, it is meaningless signs that consume us much like the door marked ‘this door leads to nowhere’ (Baudrillard, 1990: 74). You feel compelled to open it just to see. What is crucial here is Baudrillard’s analysis. For one could argue that the colour red in the fox’s tail does have meaning in that the colour red contains both a signifier, red, and a signified, the colour that comes to mind. The colour red becomes emptied of meaning only in relation to the way Baudrillard reads the story. He urges the reader to recognise that absurd and artificial signs rule the world to a greater degree than logical ones because of social and political imperatives to create significant meaning. To understand feminist writing as seductive would involve a reading strategy in which feminist theory is recognised as breaking down the coded system of production through the dissemination of meaning and value. A seductive reading practice highlights the presence of signs without referents, eclipsed signs, absurd and nonsensical signs in feminist writing, not to provide meaning for these signs but to explore the ways in which empty signs function in the text to reverse ‘irreversible’, or fixed, ideologies. I argue that where feminism empties words and gestures of meaning, as I show Woolf does with the mulberry tree in Three Guineas (1938), the reader is seduced. I further argue that when feminism employs neither productive value nor opposition to that value, as Rivie`re does with the masquerade, seduction comes into play. Seduction is not an either/or proposition but spaces in-between. For Baudrillard, seduction ‘takes from discourse its sense and turns it from its truth’ (1990: 55). I would argue that much **feminist thought is dedicated to this very task** and here I expose the textual politics whereby feminism works as seduction, what Grace defines as ‘that movement that removes from the realm of the visible, that vaporizes identity, and is marked by ambivalence’ (2000: 141). I believe that feminists have posed a radical challenge to productive ideology. Baudrillard provides a discourse that helps recognise seduction in feminist writing. I argue that, in order to discover similarities between Baudrillard’s theory of seduction and the work of feminism, productive reading practices must be abandoned.

**No perms: A radical loss for the affirmative is the only way to undermine institutional accommodation. It’s try or die for the K under their role of the ballot.**

**Genosko 16 - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16** “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may **ride failure to** an ignominious **counter-victory**. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But **radical losers stand apart from the crowd** in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as **an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory**, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the best strategy to combat oppression. This provides both sides reciprocal access to generating liberation strategies and outweighs the aff ROB on scope. Prefer additionally.**

**[1] Normativity DA: Pure cultural relativism fails to provide the conceptual tools to normatively condone racism**

**Thompson 5 - JOSEPH THOMPSON, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS, Comparative Civilizations Review, Fall 2005** “CULTURAL RELATIVISM OR COVERT UNIVERSALISM? THE METAETHICS OF MULTICULTURALISM” [https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1640&context=ccr] Accessed 9/29/20 SAO

Claims to moral universality are basic to conceptions of human rights, the concept of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and our understanding of international law and justice. Moral universals are taken to be a consequence of our common "power of thought," as illustrated in the above passage from Marcus Aurelius. The implications of universal rationality are at once moral and political, extending immediately to the entire world. We get much the same idea in Kant some sixteen centuries later, and this idea is not much different from certain human rights theories today. Moral universalism aims at global politics: the world is a single city.2 Moral universalism is also, as I argue, the tacitly assumed standpoint of multiculturalism, but the implied universality of its moral commitments goes largely unrecognized. On the contrary, academic discourse about multiculturalism, pluralism, and diversity usually professes some variety of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism, as I use the term, is a theory about how and to what extent ethical judgments can be sustained or justified—what moral philosophers call a metaethics. And while I generally support this agenda, I take multiculturalism to be advancing—more inclusion of and regard for other cultures, races, and religions in the curriculum—I seriously question its metaethics, both its presuppositions and conclusions. Cultural relativism generally maintains that we should not criticize or pass judgment on the values, beliefs, and practices of other cultures, since we would be judging according to our own culturally bound customs and norms. Different cultures can be evaluated, it is said, only by their own standards; if they think something is right, then for them it is right. It is supposed to be sheer ethnocentric bias to suppose our culture's standards to be the standards. The cultural relativist's basic question is, who are we to judge?3 But such claims about the cultural limits of moral judgment are inconsistent with other values most multiculturalists would affirm as priorities: gender equality and religious tolerance, ethnic diversity and acceptance of other cultures, freedom from persecution or oppression and respect for basic human rights, and care and concern for the environment and other forms of life on earth. Surely these are not just good "in our culture," whatever that means. If you oppose apartheid and genocide, you are heading in the direction of moral universalism. Closer analysis of this tension between professed cultural relativism and implicit or covert universalism reveals some basic inconsistencies. Multiculturalists want to have it both ways: they are often highly critical, for example of imperialism or racism or sexism, in different times and at other places in the world (as well as "right here at home")—which implies that they think their view is objectively right, better, and not just their interpretation. But moral relativists are not entitled to such indignation and outrage. They are not supposed to be able to judge. If they maintain such a position only as a matter of preference—versus claiming to be objectively right—then they may be able to reasonably act for themselves according to such preferences. But they will have no basis to criticize others who may be said to prefer (e.g.) racism or sexism. However initially plausible and appealing, the claims of cultural relativism need to be sorted out and separated from the primary values of multiculturalism. The underlying tensions between competing moral intuitions need to be brought forward if they are to be reconciled. Relativism does not work with multiculturalism, either in support of it or as a consequence of it. Multiculturalists should abandon the relativist position, to be honest and consistent about what they are advocating. In the end, I would argue, they cannot be relativists if they want to criticize others—which, by all appearances, they do. Schools of Thought Multiculturalism is a prevalent movement in the academy, and particularly in the liberal arts its priorities set the tone for educational policy, curriculum requirements, new classes and programs, hiring and promotion, research and publication agendas, textbook development and sales, and a major amount of campus resources. It has become both an ideology and big business. But of course, multiculturalism does not present one monolithic view, any more than cultural relativism does, so we should not expect a very precise definition. What I am referring to is not a particular set of doctrines so much as a school of thought—a phrase which is meant to capture not only the idea of a unifying tradition of belief, but also the possibility of contention and debate within that tradition. It further suggests the academic origins of such theoretical discourse. Universalism, relativism, and postmodernism, these are all schools of thought in this sense. None of these requires complete unanimity, with all subscribers affirming identical propositions. There is no definitive set of necessary and sufficient conditions to determine e.g. who is and who isn't a multiculturalist. But there is a framework of belief within which a school of thought functions. On any number of particular judgments there may not be complete, nor perhaps even widespread, agreement, but consensus on the basic framework is general and sufficient to warrant the use of one label or name for the school of thought (what we could call an '-ism'). There are -isms within -isms. Multiculturalism is a subset of postmodernism, which tends in general toward relativism (especially with respect to theories of normativity). One sees it particularly in that related subset of postcolonialism: the old myths of European superiority need to be repudiated again and again, the old propaganda deconstructed across the curriculum, wherever culture and value are concerned: in history, literature, anthropology, sociology, critical theory, cultural studies, the arts and humanities generally. Though I will be using the term throughout this discussion, even the idea of "culture" itself is problematic, particularly as the unit of analysis for cultural relativism. Is there really such a thing as culture? As somebody in the social sciences coolly corrected me recently: "Oh, we don't say culture any more." (This made me wonder about the adjectival form—are we not to say cultural either?) I think most of us can and do use the term appropriately enough, but I am sure that it can also be misapplied. This is not to say that determining what is and is not a culture, or where a culture begins and ends, will be easy or unproblematic in every case—but that is exactly the point. Culture could mean "more than just nature," or "whatever goes on beyond biology." It can be local, regional, or national culture; it could include subculture. But it is one thing to try to define the idea of culture in a philosophical sense, and quite another to pick out a culture as a discrete entity in the social-scientific sense. Perhaps culture, too, may be considered as a "school of thought" because **cultures are not univocal or unanimous**. The multivalence within a putatively single culture poses a problem for the cultural relativist, for it complicates the neat distinctions between (all of) them and (all of) us upon which the theory depends. It is not as though an entire culture (if there is such a thing) is in complete accord as to what is "our view" versus "their view." There may be general agreement, but empirically difference and diversity are also part of any "real culture," as Martha Nussbaum puts it: "Real cultures are plural, not single;" "Real cultures contain argument, resistance, and contestation of norms;" "Real cultures have a present as well as a past."" The boundaries between cultures, if they exist, are not clearly demarcated. Cultures as single entities, if they exist, do not speak with one voice. But the claim that we cannot judge other cultures presupposes that there are really such fundamental entities as separate cultures, whose identities and values are distinct and determinable, whose differences are ultimately insuperable. This assumption is problematic, to say the least; we might add to Nussbaum's list that Real cultures are situated and connected; Real cultures overlap and intersect. Cultural groups bear family resemblances to each other; but relativism seems to imply that they are totally incommensurate, with no common basis for mutual understanding or compromise. Cultural Relativism Just as the term culture proves hard to define, but not impossible to use meaningfully, so too the term cultural relativism. There are no exact specifications for this metaethic, but some general features may be identified. Relativism as such can refer to a broad variety of views about truth, knowledge, and morality. Epistemological relativism basically denies that objective or certain or absolute truth is possible and can be known. Most commonly encountered in practice and for the purposes of this discussion is the relativism with respect to morality and values, which may be relative either to the individual or to the culture. Cultural relativism denies the possibility of objective or universal standards by which cross-cultural ethical and normative conclusions could be drawn. It is more than just an emphasis on empirical differences between cultures and evident lack of universal or cross-cultural standards. It is the view that cultural groups determine these things in their own ways, so what may be right for one culture may be wrong for another. It entails the further claim that beyond these differences between cultures there is nothing more to ethics, that moral argumentation has nothing more to say. Cultural relativism, crudely put, says that no one culture can claim its values or views are better than that of another culture. Rather, they are just different ways of doing things. Who can say which is right or wrong, better or worse? The comparison seems highly subjective, as one says, and open to interpretation. Whose standards are we judging by? Neither side is right or wrong. There is no objective right or wrong. This kind of judgment is at the core of cultural relativism, something to the effect that every culture has a right to its own standards, beliefs and traditions, so we should not (as one says) force our views on others.5 But notice that this claim **purports to hold for all cultures**. This all is important, for logically it determines a universal affirmative proposition. **That is not relativism**—it is a right being asserted (already a heavily loaded term), and a moral imperative (viz., not to force one's views on others). Both of these are evidently intended to hold objectively across cultures, though how that is supposed to happen is never made clear. Most propositions of cultural relativism are logical universals in the negative form. No one cultural group is entitled to judge another according to its own set of standards. No culture ought to assert its own viewpoint and values to the exclusion or marginalization of others. There are no trans-cultural universal norms, values, or standards, any more than there is any one universal worldview. Indeed, it is this very lack of consensus that is supposed to prove cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is like individual relativism writ large. It depends upon the same central (and, I think, deeply incoherent) intuition—that no view or value or interpretation can be shown to be better than any other, since there are supposed to be no criteria by which to judge. It implies, although fewer relativists would directly affirm it, that in the absence of any objective (non-relative) standard, anybody's view or value or interpretation is just as good (or right or true) as any other. These things are relative to the individual, and everyone has an opinion. The same kinds of claims are made when comparing cultures. No culture is supposed to be able to make objective claims over another, since there are no trans-cultural standards or principles by which to adjudicate among competing claims. Whatever standards we might appeal to would themselves be culturally relative. Purported universals or absolutes posture as "meta-narratives" governing all history or all human beings, but these have been deconstructed. There are not supposed to be any meta-narratives. The appeal of cultural relativism is understandable in the light of 20,h-century history, in reaction to the horrors we have seen on behalf of the supposed absolutes people have set up for themselves: racism, imperialism, fascism, totalitarianism, religious extremism. Myths of superiority need to be repudiated again and again. This kind of relativism developed, according to Abdullahi An-Na'im: "as a reaction against cultural evolutionism," the idea that cultures progress "from primitive or savage to modern ... Cultural relativism was introduced to combat these Eurocentric and racist notions of progress."6 An-Na'im, who has written extensively on human rights, is certainly no cultural relativist himself: "the basic premise of international efforts to protect and promote human rights is the belief that there are limits on cultural relativism." Yet he recognizes the practical value of a limited version of this view: "as a manifestation of the right to selfdetermination and as a safeguard against the dangers of ethnocentrism, the theory of cultural relativism provides a good approach to cross-cultural evaluations without necessarily undermining our ability to criticize and condemn repressive or morally abhorrent practices." (How this limited relativism is still able to maintain moral judgment and criticism is a problem An-Na'im devotes a good deal of effort to working out.) Kwasi Wiredu also sees a reactive movement in relativism and its reluctance to universalize: By a kind of (not necessarily explicit) self-critical recoiling from the earlier intellectual self-aggrandizement of the West, some very articulate movements of thought therein— notably, but not only, postmodernism—are displaying extreme abstemiousness with respect to claims of universality.8 This is the irony of it: cultural relativists try to avoid making universal ethical and metaethical claims—on the basis of other universal ethical and metaethical claims. Part of the problem is the paradox raised by self-referential propositions that seem to undo themselves, like "the only absolute is that there are no absolutes." But it is more than a linguistic loop we get tied up in. These are often outright errors in metaethical reasoning. Since all values are obviously not universal, relativists mistakenly infer that no values are universal—so all values must be relative and subjective. This totalizing, all-or-nothing theory does not square well with practice and experience, and it does not follow logically. It is not necessarily the case that either no values are trans-cultural, or all of them must be. And universality, whether in the form of a priori categorical propositions or strong inductive generalizations, does not have to mean literally every single case with no possible exceptions whatsoever. By using more specific language and adding or implying certain clauses and disclaimers, we can affirm some well-established paradigms of (let us say) very nearly universal human values. Exceptions must always be considered, but this will be another case of judgment according to universal principles, seeking an overriding good reason that could serve others as well in relevantly similar circumstances. Even relativists, then, end up making claims that are supposed to be objective and hold universally. The supposed postmodern ethical condition of radical relativism involves claims which themselves purport to be objective statements of what is the case where truth and value are concerned, e.g. that no one view or value can claim superiority. And this metaethical judgment is taken to entail the concomitant ethical judgment that one culture should not force its views on others. But then these are claims to normative objectivity, attempts at prescription, not just description. These judgments propose to speak for both sides. If this metaethical view is objective, and if there really is an ethical imperative to regard and treat other cultures in a certain way—then neither ethics nor metaethics is entirely culturally relative, since at least these determinations are evidently taken to be justifiable across cultures. If we are able to make at least these judgments, then any number of claims to normative objectivity may be determined along similar lines. The possibility of any trans-cultural, global or universal value is enough to open the way for any number of others. If we are committed to these claims— that no one cultural worldview can claim privilege or priority, that no culture should force its views on others, and so on—then we must be committed to their logical implications as universal propositions.