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#### ITS CONDO

**Link 1: The power of the image is the image of power. The semiotic battle ground in which violence is constituted gives images of ethical deviation power by affirming their reality, something debate is entirely invested in. The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize by humanizing the system**

**Johnson 17 - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017** “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO \*brackets in original

The meaning and logic of a scandal exceeds these strictly ethical and juridical frameworks. Instead, transgressions are interpreted through and implicated in the reproduction of wider frameworks of intelligibility within war. Consider, for example, the revelation of ‘prisoner abuse’ within the Abu Ghraib detention facility. While this scandal clearly invoked the idea that these violences were a departure from the rule of law and widely accepted norms regarding the humane treatment of prisoners, this is not the only way in which these events were rendered intelligible. This moment was not simply read as an instance of violence that overstepped the line in a strictly juridical sense. As Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2007: 38) has argued, these violences were also interpreted through a ‘pre-constructed, heterosexed, racialised and gendered script’. The transgressive dimensions of ‘prisoner abuse’ in Abu Ghraib were not therefore solely, or perhaps even primarily, understood in relation to a set of codified ethical principles that were violated. The signification of these violences as scandalous also drew upon and reproduced a wider set of representational logics. As such, the dominant narrative of the violences at Abu Ghraib became an individuated story of ‘womanhood or sexuality gone awry’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 70). This fetishisation and denouncement of a ‘few bad apples’ serves to obscure a more systematic insight into the widespread use of extrajuridical and extra-territorial rendition, torture and killing that has defined the ‘war on terror’.3 Unpacking the first line-drawing manoeuvre in this way allows us to understand that scandals are not detached and dispassionate arbiters of ethical conduct. As opposed to approaches that focus upon adjudicating wartime conduct in terms of its adherence or deviation from standards and thresholds defined by pre-given ethical frameworks, this approach to the ethics of war draws attention to an everyday ethical vernacular (see Bubandt, 2005; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016): a diffuse, decentred and circulating discursive economy through which particular acts of violence are rendered intelligible. It is a way of thinking about ethical arguments about war that focuses less on how particular acts of violence are problematised in relation to defined and fixed norms. The process is less clearly determined. To understand the scripting of ethical failure, of scandalous transgressions, we must therefore come to understand the complex intersections and resonances between ethical imaginaries and other representational logics. It is therefore important to understand scandals as primarily political rather than epistemological events. The exposure of a scandal is not simply a process of correctly naming an event as such. Rather, scandals are constructed sites of hyper-visibility that exceed the ethical frameworks that they invoke.4 Such an understanding of scandals leads us away from the idea that they are, by exposing and disclosing hidden transgressions, a means of speaking truth to power. Instead, understanding this first line-drawing manoeuvre begins to demonstrate to us how scandals are a manifestation of the power of truth. Such an approach to scandals draws us away from an idea that they are determined by the intrinsic qualities of the act itself and instead urges us to reflect on the socio-political function of this process of signification. Second manoeuvre: Redrawing lines The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law. (Baudrillard, 1983: 27) The first line-drawing manoeuvre of a scandal allows us to note that a line has been crossed. As has been shown, the observation of transgression therefore offers us privileged insights into the existence, prevalence and location of these lines. By tracing these crossed lines, we gain an understanding of the everyday ethical vernaculars that reflect popular understandings of the relationship between war and ethics. The danger of understanding this first manoeuvre alone is that it largely leaves intact the heroic notion of scandals as a means of revealing ethical transgressions. The observation that the signification of scandals exceeds the ethical norms that they invoke could simply be read as a suggestion that to understand the scripting of ethical failure, we must understand how these events are embedded within broader representational regimes. Understood as such, scandals simply reflect the complex and contingent resonances between ethical imaginaries and other dominant discourses and stories. In this sense, the first manoeuvre is not really involved in line-drawing at all; it is simply observing that lines have been drawn. Taken on its own, what this manoeuvre gestures towards but fails to account for is the performative force of scandal: how the invoking of particular lines ‘produces the effect that it names’ (Butler, 2011: xii). We must therefore supplement this first manoeuvre with a second in which scandals are not simply read as the crossing of a line that exists independently of this apparent observation. Instead, scandals must be understood as a process of redrawing the line that has been transgressed. In this sense, the first and second manoeuvres are not really separate manoeuvres at all. Scandals do more than simply reference norms and principles; they are productive of them. The second manoeuvre points to how norms come to be revitalised and pursued with renewed vigour; it allows us to understand the constitutive function of the first manoeuvre. To be clear, the performative force of scandal is to regenerate the very principles that are distressed by their apparent transgression. Ultimately, this is the success of ethical failure. Scandals, and ethical engagements with war more generally, must be understood in terms of their ‘socio-political effects [which] impact on our collective understanding of war itself’ (Dauphinée, 2008: 50). The second manoeuvre draws our attention to a particular dimension of this effect. Specifically, it demonstrates the way in which scandals function as what Baudrillard (1994: 18) refers to as an example of ‘operational negativity’: a **secur**ing of **a positive reality through** the **denouncement of its inversion, subversion or semblance.** To help elaborate on this function, Baudrillard considers the doctrine of iconoclasm. The iconoclastic argument forbids the worshipping of images of the divine on the basis that ‘the divinity that breathes life into nature cannot be represented’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). What underpins iconoclasm is the assumption that there is a divine presence against which particular representations can be judged; there has to be a presence that allows for the identification of its absence. For Baudrillard (1983: 11), the denouncement of various signs as false representations of the real ‘masks the absence of a basic reality’. In this sense, God is not simply dead; rather, God never existed, and there has only ever been the simulation of a divine presence. The notion of operational negativity therefore offers Baudrillard a means to develop his wider thinking about simulation and the hyper-reality of the symbolic order through which social reality is constituted. While this potentially opens up interesting avenues regarding the ontological status of the ethical architecture of war, understanding the second manoeuvre requires us to explore a different dimension of the socio-political function of this logic. As has been shown, iconoclasm performs an important pedagogic role. If God cannot be represented, then God surely exists: this is the underlying message of the iconoclasts. Operational negativity highlights an absence in order to affirm the veracity of an invoked presence. However, **this denouncement** does more than reaffirm an underlying reality principle. It also **performs a crucial regulatory function.** The force of this denunciatory logic is to police conduct in accordance with the transgressed law: you shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above. Denunciation therefore attempts to resolve transgression **by demanding conformity to a cherished principle** or commandment. **The effect of identifying deviation is to ensure a return to the** norm. The tendency of denunciation is towards a re-solution, usually understood as a securing and reproduction of the **status quo.** Denunciation therefore performs a conjoined pedagogic-regulatory function in attempting to secure both the power of truth and the truth of power (Dillon, 2015). It is in both of these senses that we must understand Baudrillard’s (1983: 27) claim that: ‘The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law.’ Scandals, as an example of operational negativity, are therefore not necessarily moments through which particular principles come to be scrutinised or disputed. Instead, the function of operational negativity is often to: regenerate a moribund principle through simulated scandal, phantasm, and murder — a sort of hormonal treatment through negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression … Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. … Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. (Baudrillard, 1994: 18–19) From this reading, scandals do not emerge as a space for contesting or rethinking the legitimacy of a particular social order. Instead**, what appears to be a moment of disruptive failure is actually crucial to the rehabilitation** and regeneration **of the very social order** that appears to have failed. What is troubling from the perspective of this second manoeuvre is how critical arguments about the ethics of war become implicated in the very practices that they appear to challenge. Understanding this complicity in the conditions of possibility of military violence requires us to understand the ways in which scandals shape the possibilities and limits of critical responses to perceived ethical failures in wartime conduct. Baudrillard’s concern with thinking within the logics of the scandal is that it reduces critical thought to a logic of recrimination. Scandals present a simple decision in the face of an event: ‘to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 15, emphasis in original). It is these grammatical terms of the scandal that are particularly problematic as, through them, critical thought becomes confined to performing a regulatory function in support of the logics of a particular morality or rationality. To denounce a particular act ‘for not following the rules of the game’ accepts and affirms that if only these rules were followed, then a particular form of behaviour would be unproblematic. This account of critique as recrimination blunts the possibilities of critical thought, largely confining it to a logic of problem-solving whereby the ethical problem of war is reduced to the identification — through transgression — and re-solution of a series of problems through a return to the norm. Problematically, this not only leaves unquestioned and untroubled the norm that it invokes, but actively serves it as, understood in this way, the possibility of transgression implies that if transgression were eliminated, war would be a wholly moral exercise. Far from undermining the possibilities for war by exposing its apparent failures, scandals are involved in the production and reproduction of the very principles upon which contemporary warfare is made possible. This is the success of ethical failure. In short, the durability of the understanding of war as a legitimate enterprise comes to rely, in part, upon the managed exposure of its fragility. Ethical failure in warfare is therefore crucial to upholding the very principles that make violence possible. Perversely, no matter how well intentioned, scandals are complicit in a virtuous cycle that reproduces the legitimacy of virtuous war. In this sense, ethical failure comes to affirm and necessitate more successful forms of violence. Recriminations against the perceived breakdown of the relationship between the martial and the ethical are in danger of confining critiques of wartime violence to the process of policing conduct in war against a series of fixed standards and thresholds. It is in this sense that we should understand scandals as a watchdog on government; not as speakers of truth to power, but rather as speakers of the power of truth. Far from challenging the construction of war as an instrument of ethical foreign policy, the terms of critical engagement are such that opposition to particular forms of wartime conduct becomes implicated in the reproduction of the very thing that it may set out to challenge or dismantle. Of course, not all responses to scandals are motivated by this desire. For example, many responses must be situated within wider pedagogic efforts designed to learn from and improve the efficacy and ethicality of wartime conduct. Viewed from the perspective of this ‘fail again, fail better’ approach, scandals are a window of opportunity to refine rather than refute the terms of ongoing violence. The danger and tragedy of scandal is that it is hard to conceive of ways of critiquing war that escape this logic. Rather than creating spaces for imagining less violent futures, scandal overwhelmingly tends towards a politics of recrimination and the resolution of largely individuated moments of ethical failure through technical fixes. The problem of scandal is therefore that it threatens to make iconoclasts of us all: urging us to denounce and combat false or aberrant forms of violence in the name of a purer and truer form of violence that we are urged to pursue with a renewed zeal and vigour.

**Johnson Continues** - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017 “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO This article has focused on the interpretation and socio-political function of wartime scandals. It has presented both an opportunity and a warning: an opportunity in terms of exploring what scandals can tell us; and a warning in terms of understanding the performative force of what scandals are already telling us. Understood as a series of linedrawing manoeuvres, this article has outlined how scandals offer us a privileged insight into the character and reproduction of the normative architecture through which contemporary war is governed. This method for critically reading wartime scandals offers a number of important insights and opportunities for engaging with the ways in which contemporary wartime violences are enabled, excused and obscured. It is important to understand that the argument presented in this article does not entail a rejection of the possibility or desirability of ethical arguments about war. This may appear to be the direction in which Baudrillard gestures. Baudrillard’s provocation that there is no scandal may seem to be a vague, inadequate and potentially conservative response to acts of violence that many feel motivated to respond to. Just as it has been argued that denunciation is in danger of being intimately involved in the reproduction of the very violences that it seeks to problematise, it could be argued that refusing to accept that particular acts are scandalous runs the risk of forming a silent complicity with them. **A commitment to normative politics does not**, however, **entail a choice between speaking out against violence or remaining silent.** Put simply, **to speak or not to speak is not the problem** we find ourselves confronted with. Such a formulation proceeds from the assumption that scandals and recrimination are the only possible ways to articulate concern with particular acts. Understood as such, this article would appear to challenge this mode of critique, thereby eradicating or seriously limiting the possibility of expressing outrage at wartime violence. Only if we accept this premise are we confronted by the decision to speak or to remain silent. This article does not aim to restrict our ability to articulate outrage about particular acts of wartime violence. Scandals are not the only ways of narrating instances of death and injury in war. **Other ways of speaking are possible and other stories can be told** (Shepherd, 2006: 401). Realising this can only serve to expand, rather than limit, the vocabulary and possibilities of critical thought beyond a restrictive politics of recrimination. The point of this article is that it is because, not in spite, of the ‘truth’ of these violences that we must interrogate the socio-political function of this way of speaking, of bearing witness, of speaking truth to power. This article does not therefore dismiss the importance of ethical arguments; instead, it attempts to demonstrate just how important they are. Taking ethical arguments seriously requires us to recognise that they are not detached from the violences that they reflect upon. **Bearing witness is not without consequences.** Troublingly, this article has demonstrated that the denunciation of moments of ethical failure may, in fact, reproduce the very practices that appear to be disturbed. **Scandals** may therefore **secure the legitimacy and necessity of more not less violence**. This spiralling and bewildering causality highlights the complexity and ambiguity of critiquing war. The challenge for critical inquiries into war is therefore how we can formulate ethical arguments about war that do not reproduce the conditions of possibility for the very practices that they seek to contest. The challenge is to imagine what outrage might look like when it is not expressed through the logic of scandal. Put simply, this article has explored and unpacked the logics and performative force of wartime scandals; the challenge now is to think about how we might speak beyond them

**Link 2: Images of suffering fuel violence**

**Alford 20 - Aaron J. Alford, Medium, January 13th, 2020** “Disaster Pornography and the American Media”[<https://medium.com/@aaronjalford1/disaster-pornography-and-the-american-media-f01ee1cb4512>] Accessed 1/30/20 SAO

Most of us are familiar with the concept of pornography, at least sexual pornography: Images or media meant to titillate your arousal. Similarly, the images of catastrophe and destruction presented by the news media are like a drug, used by first world nations to feed off the suffering of the rest of the world. Images of death and violence from non-western countries are extracted and reprocessed for consumption by you, the consumer. The production of disaster porn is, as Baudrillard proclaimed, charity cannibalism and incentives the perpetuation of oppressive conditions in order to sustain and prolong our enjoyment. “We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it. We see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.” — Baudrillard In short, disaster pornography shows us images of suffering and our efforts to stop suffering, which gives us a little dopamine hit. **Our news media is trying to get you addicted to violence, so they can sell you more ads**. Disaster pornography is the new drug. Or should I say, old drug. Producing and reproducing suffering Somehow, what Baudrillard warned of the year I was born is still going full force, unchecked, unchallenged, and no one is calling it out. Baudrillard said “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media.” Now I can already hear you scoffing at my ridiculous claims, but consider these examples. The New York Times Sells the Iran missiles as “an Action Movie” The Iran war effort is being pushed, as I write, by American media. Take for example the New York Times coverage of a missile strike compared to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the same missile strike. One is factual, the other wants you to imagine your favorite Iron Man movie. The **New York Times wants to feed your wildest fantasies** about the glory of war, and how beautiful it is. Al Jazeera, the non-western source, simply reported the facts. The big difference is the framing. NBC Worships Trump’s Missile Attacks on Syria Consider another example, NBC’s Brian Williams coverage of a missile attacks on Syrian air bases in which he described the wanton destruction as “beautiful missiles.” He said he was “tempted to quote the great Leonard Cohen” in that he is “guided by the beauty of our weapons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJz9q7pfXkY The U.S’s Cycle of support and betrayal of the Kurds To better understand this cycle, look no further than the U.S’s support and then sudden betrayal of the Kurds. During the gulf war, there was a huge push for “humanitarian protections” for the Kurds, even after Saddam Hussein had already crushed them while the west stood by drinking our tea. In 2003, we start a war against Saddam Hussein, which perpetuates the instability that feeds our love for disaster even more. Then ISIS comes out of that chaos, and we are even more fed. Then the Kurds defeat ISIS, popular opinion of the Kurds goes up in the wake of the Syrian civil war and destruction of ISIS, only to have our president abandon them to be genocided on the Syrian border by fucking Turkey. You see, we never cared about the Kurds, only the images they gave us. Only their suffering, only their death, was enough to sate the American appetite for war, violence, and suffering. The election of Donald Trump Baudrillard argued that when the disaster market from around the world slows down, the west will turn inward and **produce its own spectacles of disaster**. Brexit and the election of white nationalists in America are great examples of what Baudrillard warned of. Another example of this cycle of catastrophe is president Donald Trump’s election. Donald Trump received 2 billion dollars of free television coverage in 2016 leading up to his election. The media could not get enough of this crazy television host billionaire who thought he would be a good president. The truth is that the media always wanted him to be the president, the source of constant disasters both here and abroad. Donald Trump is a president who: Impulse killed an Iranian General without a declaration of war Cut taxes for the rich and raised taxes on the poor Put children, including babies, in cages at the border Bullied a 15 year old climate activist on Twitter Has been accused of sexual misconduct by at least 17 women Betrayed our ally the Kurds and genocidal Turkey Has actively supported a Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen Started a trade war with China for no apparent reason Attempted to bribe Ukrainian officials into meddling with our election, and got impeached for it Nominated a rapist to the Supreme Court Supported known child molester Roy Moore for congress Paid of a porn star to stay quiet about how he cheated on his wife with her Is best friends with Steve Bannon, a outspoken fascist and white nationalist Said that there were good people on both sides of a dispute between white supremacists and people protesting white supremacy Pardoned a sheriff in Arizona who advocates for concentration camps Consistently uses anti-Semitic tropes and promotes division I mean, the list goes on from here, but you get my point. Donald Trump is **a walking disaster maker, and the media worships him for it**. Hell, Republicans worship him for it. Even when the media and right wing establishment claim to disagree with him, they put him and his hateful rhetoric on the pedestal. The truth is, no matter what they tell you, the owners of American media want his reelection. It is just too good for their bottom line. A president who creates disaster’s like these is exactly what the American media needs to keep American addicted and the profits rolling in. How then shall we live? Disaster pornography relies on a cycle of production and consumption. The West is complicit in the creation of numerous disasters all around the world. When Donald Trump fucked with Iran, it provoked a response from Iran which is now played back by our media as a justification for further western intervention. This cycle didn’t just start, it’s been going on since before I was born. The west does not respond to disasters, we fucking create them. It’s a process, by which we sell our souls to the devil. Although I fear this description is unfair — to the devil. So how do we stop it? How we prevent the cycle of disaster, images, disaster? It’s simple; **stop watching** disaster porn. I don’t mean stop watching the news, but I do mean to stop listening to the neo-liberal pundits, the discourse of fear, and the spectacles of violence displayed for your pleasure. Listen to news sources who have some god damned respect for humanity. (This means not Fox News OR CNN, if that wasn’t clear). “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of poverty of the ‘other half of the world’. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty — charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.” — Baudrillard So I ask you today, to denounce with me the exploitation of disaster for our own selfish needs. **Say no to the staged spectacle and eventually the market for these simulated disasters will dry up**. When the market of staged disasters is no longer where we look, we will again be able to recognize real human suffering when we encounter it, and act to resolve it. Rather than ignoring the suffering of the underpaid, overworked, and exploited around us, we will finally be able to recognize their suffering as legitimate, rather than looking to the news for our moral compass.

**Link 3: The affirmative embraces fiction that debate should be a site for continuously bolstering the reserve labor force of corporate society through a celebration of mediated action**

**Hoofd 07 - Ingrid M. Hoofd, National University of Singapore, December 2007** “The Neoliberal Consolidation of Play and Speed: Ethical Issues in Serious Gaming” in “CRITICAL LITERACY: Theories and Practices Volume 1: 2” p. 6-14, 2007 [http://www.criticalliteracyjournal.org/cljournalissue2volume1.pdf] KZaidi Recut 9/27/21 SAO

Serious games are a fascinating next stage in the continuous exploitation of digital media technologies over the last decades for training, learning, and education. As formal education and training always involves the transmission and repetition of certain culturally and socially specific sets of skills and moral values, it would be of paramount importance to ensure that developments within the serious gaming industry are in step with the effects of the good intentions of nurturing people within a social framework that emphasises a fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society. In this light, it is interesting that from the very advent of the information society, digital technologies have been depicted as central to the development of a more just and equal society by harbouring the promise of bridging gaps between classes, races, and genders locally as well as globally. Driven by the vision of this utopian potential of new technologies, the education industry and larger policy organisations have been exploring the pedagogical possibilities of these technologies both in- and outside the traditional classroom for the last twenty-five years. Indeed, the implementation of increasingly more sophisticated and technologically mediated methods and tools for learning and education, takes as its starting point the techno-utopian assumption that (new) interactive technologies themselves are the primary harbingers of a fair and blooming society through facilitating (student) empowerment. This paper takes issue with this widespread techno-utopian perspective by seeking to shed light on the larger ethical implications of serious gaming. It will do so through foregrounding the relationship between global injustices, and the aesthetic properties and discourses of serious gaming. So while reframing serious games themselves in a new ethical perspective constitutes the main objective of this paper, it is equally important to situate serious games within a larger political discourse on the teaching of new skills. Firstly then, policy papers and academic studies on serious games all display an assumption of the inherent neutrality of gaming technologies, as if these technologies were mere tools equally suitable for all. What also becomes apparent in the language used in these studies and proposals, is how this instrumentalist vision of gaming technologies for learning goes hand in hand with a particular neo-liberal assumption of what constitutes a fit individual, and by extension of what the hallmarks of a ‘healthy’ society may be. For instance, in the European Union study “Serious Gaming – a fundamental building block to drive the knowledge work society” by Manuel Oliveira on the merits of serious games for education, justification runs along the lines of gaming ‘encouraging risk-taking and a winning attitude’ and creating a ‘performance-oriented individual.’ Similarly, Michael Guerena from the US Orange County Department of Education proposes in one of the Department’s web-casts that serious games instil “twenty-first century skills” like risk-taking, adaptability, self-direction, interactive communication, and ‘planning and managing for results’ in the students through the “channelling of fun.” Likewise, the UK-based Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association last year published their white paper Unlimited learning - Computer and video games in the learning landscape, in which they argue that serious games will “create an engaged, knowledgeable, critical and enthusiastic citizenry” whose “work practices will be geared towards networked communication and distributed collaboration” (49). Concerns around the ethical implications of serious games regarding their entanglements with larger social (gendered, classed, and raced) inequalities have until now largely been coined in terms of game content or representation. In a recent case in Singapore, the government’s proposition of using the RPG Granado Espada in secondary school history classes was followed by an outcry from various local academics condemning the stereotypical characters and simplistic representation of medieval Europe in the game. Likewise, various authors have critiqued current serious games not only because of simplistic representation of characters and surroundings, but especially because simulations generally tend to oversimplify complex social problems and situations. Gibson, Aldrich, and Prensky’s Games and Simulations in Online Learning (vi - xiv) for instance discuss these demerits of serious games. While such a critical analysis of how game content contributes to the reproduction of dominant discourses is definitely helpful, I would argue that the aesthetics of serious games involve much more than mere content. Instead, this paper will argue that the formal quest for instantaneity that research around digital media has displayed through the development of interactive technologies for education is already itself by no means a neutral affair. This is because the discourses that inform this quest and that accompany this search for instantaneity arguably enforce the hegemony of a militaristic, masculinist, humanist, and of what I will call a ‘speed-elitist’ individual. Moreover, I suggest that the propensity of current games to have sexist or racist content, is merely symptomatic of gaming technology’s larger problematic in terms of the aesthetic of instantaneity. In short, (serious) computer games have become archives of the discursive and actual violence carried out in the name of the utopia of technological progress and instantaneity under neo-liberal globalisation. This archival function is possible exactly because cybernetic technologies promise the containment and control of such supposedly accidental violence, while in fact exacerbating these forms of violence. This leads me to conclude that such violence is in fact structural to new serious gaming technologies, rather than accidental. I will elaborate this hypothesis by looking at various theorists who seek to understand this structural imperative of new technologies, and their relationship to the neo-liberalisation of learning and education. In turn, I will look at how this problematic structural logic informs the two popular serious games Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive. Secondly, the advent of serious gaming interestingly runs parallel with the contemporary dissemination and virtualisation of traditional learning institutions into cyberspace. While the existence of learning tools in other areas of society besides actual learning institutions has been a fact since the advent of schools, the shift of methods of learning into online and digital tools is symptomatic of the decentralisation of power from ‘old’ educational institutions and its usurpation into instantaneous neo-liberal modes of production. I am summarising the work of Bill Readings on the university here, because it sheds light on the shift in education tout court towards virtualisation, and its relationship to the ‘new hegemony of instantaneity.’ In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the shift from the state-run university of reason and culture to the present-day global knowledge enterprise must mean that the centre of power in effect has shifted elsewhere. More important, says Readings, is that the function of the new ‘university of excellence,’ one that successfully transforms it into yet another trans-national corporation, relies on the fantasy that the university is still that transcendental university of culture in service of the state and its citizens. So the invocation of the fantasy of an ‘originary’ university of reason and progress, that produces unbiased knowledge for the good of all, facilitates the doubling of the production of information into other spaces outside the university walls proper. While Readings surely discusses only higher education institutions in The University in Ruins, I would argue that the logic of a shifting centre of power from the state into the technocratic networks and nodes of speed operates quite similarly in the case of primary, secondary, and other types of formal education. Indeed, the current virtualisation of learning and the emphasis on lifelong learning marks a dispersal of traditional learning institutions into online spaces. This dispersal works increasingly in service of the ‘speed-elite’ rather than simply in service of the nation-state. The heralding of serious games for education can therefore be read as a symptom of the intensified reach of the imperatives of neo-liberal globalisation, in which consumption enters the lives of locally bound as well as more mobile cosmopolitan citizens of all ages through harping on the technological possibility of the confusion of production and play. Through the imperative of play then, production increasingly and diffusely colonises all niche times and -spaces of neo-liberal society. In other words, (the emphasis on) play allows not only a potential increase in production and consumption through the citizen-consumer after her or his formal education of ‘skills’, but starkly intensifies flows of production and consumption already at the very moment of learning. While such an integration of play and production is generally understood within the framework of the neo-liberal demand for the circulation of pleasure, it is useful here to widen the scope from understanding the learner as a mere consumer of pleasure into the larger set of problematic interpellations that marks subjugation in contemporary society. Intriguingly, a host of research has emerged over the past years pointing towards the intricate relationship between subjugation, military research objectives, and videogame development. Such research suggests an intimate connection between the C3I logic and humanist militaristic utopias of transcendence, which incriminates interactive technologies as inherently favouring culturally particular notions of personhood. In the case of computer- and video-games for entertainment, researchers have argued that the aesthetic properties of gaming technologies give rise to so-called ‘militarised masculinity.’ In “Designing Militarized Masculinity,” Stephen Kline, Nick DyerWitheford, and Greig de Peuter argue for instance that interactive games open up very specific subject positions that “mobilize fantasies of instrumental domination” (255). This specific mobilisation that video-games invoke, is not only due to the remediation of violent television- and film- content, but also due to the intimate connection between gaming- and military industries which grant these technologies their particular cybernetic aesthetic properties (see also Herz 1997). This element of militarisation partly informs my concept of ‘speed-elitism.’ I extrapolate the idea of ‘speed-elitism’ largely from the works of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neo-liberal capitalism. In “Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed,” Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of exchange and production, and the logic of speed. In line with Virilio’s argument in Speed and Politics, they argue that various formerly the less connected social areas of war, communication, entertainment, and trade, are now intimately though obliquely connected. This is because all these forces mutually enforce one another through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that “circulation has become an essential process of capitalism, an end in itself” (118) and therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied-up in this logic. So neo-liberal capitalism is a system within which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of communication and play – get to be formally subsumed under capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology,” Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the neutral or optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated – like in the policy papers – in favour of the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, empowerment and progress, which often go hand in hand with the celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication. Such discourses however suppress the violent colonial and patriarchal history of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness brought about by and occurring within these spaces. I would claim that Armitage’s assessment of accelerated circulation, and the way new technologies make play complicit in the techno-utopian endeavour of speed, is crucial for understanding the larger ethical issues surrounding serious games. It is helpful at this point to look at Paul Virilio’s and Jacques Derrida’s work because this helps us understand the complicity of the aesthetics of interactive and visually oriented gaming technologies in speed-elitism. In “Cyberwar, God, and Television,” Paul Virilio talks about the simulation industry’s function of “exposing [one] to the accident in order not to be exposed to it” (322). What is according to him ‘accidented’ through the virtualisation of accidents and violence, for instance in video-games, is reality itself. This ‘accident of reality’ that virtuality brings about, argues Virilio, is due to the fact that simulation technologies fragment space through their property of instantaneous connection with previously far-away places. The hallmark of this fragmentation is therefore that it brings about an intensification of forms of in- and exclusion through actual disconnection. Eventually, there will be “two realities: the actual and the virtual” (323), and I would claim that consequently the privileged speed-elite will be able to live in the illusion of engaging with social reality that the virtual grants, at the cost of the (s)lower classes who will suffer the social and ecological effects of the accidents of virtualisation. The illusion of mastery for Virilio consists in the sense of the “incorporation of the world within oneself” that “real time technologies permit” (328) due to their militaristic compulsion that seeks to “reduce the world to the point where one could possess it” (329). I maintain that these statements spell out exactly the function and logic of serious gaming.

**The alternative is to reject the imperative for productivity in the academy and instead take a detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. The upsetting force of such a fatal attitude reveals the university as the marvelously absurd outgrowth of the enlightenment that it is. The content of our strategy will never change the equation, only complete apathy towards the forms of the system can accelerate them to the point of their vacuity and collapse. Signing the ballot NEG will be the completion of this act.**

**Hoofd 17 - Ingrid Hoofd, Utrecht University, 2017** “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration” [https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7] Accessed 8/24/19 SAO

The fundamental instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’ therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change—in the paradoxical gap prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This **change** however **will** then **not be brought about by the** mere **content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the “fatal strategy” that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of a host of problematic semiotic oppositions, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of technoscientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its compulsory optimism on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or perhaps even promise through death. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current sociotechnical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest for total transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “resists the imperatives of speed,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse—whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (‘know thyself’)—or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more fragile optimism that seeks to affirm the fundamental unknowability or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the first place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1 , every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a logic of increased visibility and transparency, they also render into visible form the perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’ everything and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged visual profusion of relative otherness. Since academic productivity and activism fi nd themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘unknown quantity’ that is inherent in all meaningful learning and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine, “the presupposition of not-knowing and especially not-seeing … restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the denial and attempted erasure of the religious or spiritual aspect of the university, so that, instead of being a vision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensified itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to **welcome the upsetting force of such a fatal attitude** towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’ **as the true antidote**, or perhaps even **the quintessential shadow**, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then finally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, the future may be more radically open than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance lies the potential of that ‘more originary’ responsibility. One of the consequences of bringing back fatality and fatalism means to acknowledge that the representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of omniscience and transparent communication. As I noted in Chap. 3 , it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘reversed’ theatre in which “the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientific description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as well as an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being seduced by that object (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps the only thing one can do is to destabilize and provoke the world around us**.** We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas! (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to let the auto-immune disease run its course therefore would entail firstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the ridiculous scam that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we **follow a strategy of ‘fatal’ consciousness-raising in order to hopefully plant the seeds of future radical events regarding academia**. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable collapse of its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps we should simply let the university bleed to death for now. Only such an apparent ‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hopedfor death of the contemporary university and its revival as a radically different entity. This book must therefore finally remain speculative and opaque, and mount this final chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and true emancipation. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.

**No perms:**

**1] A radical loss for the affirmative is the only way to undermine institutional accommodation. It’s try or die for the K under their role of the ballot.**

**Genosko 16 - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16** “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may **ride failure to** an ignominious **counter-victory**. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But **radical losers stand apart from the crowd** in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as **an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory**, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

**2] Idea Testing: Perms shut down comparison of methods which is where education is generated.**

**3] New Links: Perms rely on neoclassical economic assumptions of opportunity cost that turn case**

**4] Any offense is a voter. Non-topical affs must dispute every 1n claim because they perfectly tailor the aff and have infinite prep time.**

## DA

#### Uniqueness: Actual statistics disprove a race war

#### Reilly 20 - Wilfred Reilly, political science professor at Kentucky State University, Commentary, a Magazine focused on combating anti-Semitism globally, February 2020 “No, There Is No Coming Race War” [https://www.commentary.org/articles/wilfred-reilly/no-there-is-no-coming-race-war/] Accessed 9/17/21 SAO

Aremarkable irony of the modern American conversation is that while race relations have empirically never been better, many members of different races are terrified of one another. Perceptions of crime are a primary source of this tension. The center-left mainstream media run stories almost daily about tough whites attacking blacks and other people of color for trivial reasons, while a substantial cottage industry on the far right focuses on sensational depictions of black crime. In reality, however, incidents like these, which make for almost weekly viral news stories, are quite rare; so, too, is serious interracial crime in general. According to the 2019 Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) crime report, blacks made up only 15 percent of those who criminally attacked whites in the United States in 2018. Whites attacked blacks even less often, 11 percent of the time. For good or ill, **the person most likely to kill you remains your husband or wife**, not an exotic stranger. It is well worth unpacking the actual U.S. national crime data as a means of tamping down tensions among countrymen. The **media’s sensational fixation** on interracial crime has grown steadily in recent years. A black friend has joked with me that 2018, in particular, was “the year of whites with crazy nicknames.” Major media outlets ran story after story about obnoxious Caucasians attacking blacks for the flimsiest of reasons. On June 29, 2018, “Pool Patrol Paula”—actually named Stephanie Sebby-Strempel—made headlines after allegedly shouting at and striking a pleasant young black man attempting to use a South Carolina public pool, telling him he didn’t belong in the water. When police officers attempted to arrest her for misdemeanor assault, she bit one of them. Sebby-Strempel did not police the waters alone. On July 5 of the same year, a man named Adam Bloom was dubbed “Pool Patrol PAUL” after getting into a heated argument with a black woman who was using his condo complex’s swimming facilities. When Bloom asked to see her resident ID, she replied: “This is textbook racial profiling.” Multiple officers had to be called in to resolve the situation. On Facebook, her video recording and breakdown of the incident went massively viral. On July 15, 2018—barely a week later—Chicago CVS manager Morry Matson got famous as “Coupon Carl,” following his decision to contact the police and accuse a black female customer of using a counterfeit coupon. The fact that Matson, a gay man, is not only himself a member of an “oppressed” minority group but also a leader of the moderate and all-LGBT Log Cabin Republicans did not suffice to save him from the scarlet “R” of alleged racism. He was fired days later, and the story became a cautionary tale for both blacks and whites. But the Queen of them all was BBQ Becky. On April 29, 2018, “Becky”—real name Jennifer Schulte—became internationally famous as a symbol of “the everyday racism black people face,” as USA Today put it, after she confronted a black family that was holding a cookout in a no-charcoal-grilling area of Oakland’s Lake Merritt. Schulte asked the family to leave, and they refused. The ensuing confrontation lasted several hours, during which family members accused Schulte of harassing them and several hostile park attendees followed her out of the park. Oakland Police eventually defused the situation, but a photograph of Schulte calling them on her cellphone trended online not long afterward and eventually became one of the most iconic memes of the past decade. Many laughed at the meme, but the legacy of incidents like these extends well beyond Internet in-jokes. According to Pew Social Trends’ analysis “Race in America 2019,” fully 71 percent of African Americans now see race relations as “generally bad,” and 56 percent think they have worsened under President Trump. It is impossible not to see epidemic media coverage of situations such as those mentioned above as a factor contributing to this malaise. While the mainstream media lean left and tend to focus their race-baiting on stories of white-on-black crime and harassment, a growing right-wing alternative media take the opposite tack, sensationalizing virtually every prominent story of black-on-white crime. The alt-right website American Renaissance literally maintains a “Black on White Crime Archive,” chock-full of stories such as “Anti-white Mob Cuts Off 18 Year Old’s Hand Following Road Rage” (this happened in the UK) and “The Porch Pirate of Potrero Hill: Inveterate Thief Blames Her Woes on Racism.” Similar content can be found at VDARE, World Net Daily, Info Wars, the Unz Review, the Stuff Black People Don’t Like blog, and a dozen similar outlets. Gonzo journalist Colin Flaherty runs an entire website devoted to stories about black-on-white crime. One tab on the site promises the “top 200 Black mob violence videos,” while another invites readers to “Make a Difference” by contacting Rush Limbaugh or Alex Jones and recommending Flaherty’s book on race-related crime. While content like this is generally at least somewhat less widely distributed than mainstream media stories about white rowdiness, this is not for want of trying. A quick Google search reveals that one of the most popular pieces ever to appear on Flaherty’s website is headlined: “Five Cases (of Black Crime) People Want on National TV.” Looking at today’s dueling headlines, it is tempting to ask: “So, do we have an epidemic of horrifically racist white-on-black crimes or an epidemic of brutish black-on-white crimes?” The answer is “neither.” Moreover, the statistics so thoroughly refute popular fear-mongering that Americans of all colors should take the media to task for the divisive false version of reality they so often present. In September of this year, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice released the 2019 Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report, entitled “U.S. Criminal Victimization 2018,” a comprehensive breakdown of U.S. crime data for the year in question. The reality of interracial crime revealed within the pages of this thorough report is far indeed from the “race war” fantasies of extremists on either side. According to the report, only 15.3 percent of the 3,581,360 violent crimes against whites in 2018 were committed by blacks, who make up 12 to 13 percent of the U.S. population. These **percentages are**, needless to say, **almost directly proportional**. And whites were even less likely to commit racist crimes: Only about 11 percent of the 563,940 violent crimes against blacks were committed by whites. Significantly, no third group—say, Latinos—made up for these positive findings. During the study year, persons of Hispanic or Latino descent made up only 7.9 percent of all those who attacked blacks and just 10.2 percent of all those who attacked whites. The massive majority of crime in 2018 was intra-racial, with 62.1 percent of all attacks on white people coming from other whites (non-Hispanic whites make up 61 percent of the U.S. population) and 70.3 percent of all attacks on black people coming from other blacks. For good measure, nearly 50 percent of all attackers of Hispanics were themselves Hispanic. All told, only about 2,000,000 crimes, out of 5,061,940 violent crimes and roughly 12,000,000 total crimes, involved any interracial use of force whatsoever. It is true that, as alt-righters are fond of pointing out, there are more black attacks on whites than white attacks on blacks in a typical year: Generally about 500,000 of the first and 100,000 or fewer of the latter (59,777 in 2018). However, this fact taken alone is, in debater’s parlance, “true but meaningless.” The honest math around the topic gets more complicated than this, but it’s worth noting as a starting point that there are five times as many white people as black people in the United States. Even an utterly anti-racist black criminal would thus find himself confronted with 500 to 600 percent more white targets than black ones. It is also true that, on average, whites have more money than blacks do, making the former more tempting targets for such crimes as robbery. And the black violent-crime rate overall, as per the BJS, is roughly 2.4 times the white rate, making blacks statistically more likely to be involved in crime against members of all groups. Once variables such as these are adjusted for, we see that blacks attack whites less than would be mathematically predicted, even in a default scenario where no racial hostility whatsoever existed on either side. In that scenario, we would expect blacks to make up around 30 percent of attackers of whites (12 percent multiplied by 2.4 percent), but blacks in fact make up only 15.3 percent of those who attack whites. At an even more basic level of analysis, whites make up 61 percent of the population but only 46 percent of those attacked by black criminals. Whites return the favor, attacking black citizens—again, 12 percent or more of the population—roughly 3 percent of the time. The absolute absence of an American race war is most obvious in the context of that most warlike of crimes: murder. Figures from every recent year indicate that roughly 85 percent of murders of whites and an astonishing 91 to 95 percent of murders of blacks are intra-racial. In the representative year of 2015, there were only 500 black-on-white murders and 229 white-on-black murders reported nationally, according to the International Business Times. To put these figures in context, the Homicide Data Tables of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for the same year indicate that 5,854 whites and 7,039 blacks were murdered. For good or ill, social scientists almost universally note that the person most likely to kill you is a current or former lover and not five strangers from a different ethnic group. There certainly are some interesting heterodox nuggets to be mined from the BJS and other major data sets, which might advance the agenda of one group or another. For example, it is hard not to notice that Asian Americans apparently take it on the chin from everyone else in terms of criminal victimization. While blacks committed 70 percent of all acts of violence against blacks in 2018, and whites committed well over 60 percent of violent acts against whites, Asian Americans committed only 24.1 percent of all violent acts against Asians. Whites (24.1 percent), blacks (27.5 percent), and Hispanics and “others” combined (21.4 percent) all attacked Asians roughly as often as other Asians did. The report also showed an unusually high percentage of attacks against Asians (2.9 percent) in which one Asian was assaulted by “multiple offenders of various races.” This is well ahead of the corresponding findings for blacks (1.9 percent) and whites (2.1 percent) and rivaled only by that of Hispanics. And, of course, American Jews are another small, successful group who are subjected to inter-racial attacks with disproportionate frequency. The New York City area, in particular, has witnessed an astounding wave of anti-Semitic attacks, almost all committed by people of color, during the past few months. On December 28, 2019, a bearded black man wielding a machete stabbed five Orthodox Jews inside Rabbi Chaim Rottenberg’s in-home shul in the New York suburb of Monsey. The sole suspect in the attack had previously Googled phrases like “Why did Hitler hate the Jews?” on his home computer. This incident occurred less than a month after six people were killed during a shooting at a kosher supermarket in Jersey City, New Jersey, apparently carried out by acolytes of the racialist Black Hebrew Israelite movement. These were far from the only anti-Semitic attacks in and around New York during this period. New York City police have cited “at least eight anti-Semitic incidents” between December 13 and December 31 of the past year. In one case, an African-American woman, Tiffany Harris—who was arraigned on December 28 for slapping and cursing at three ultra-Orthodox women in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Crown Heights—was charged again, on December 30, for punching a Jewish woman in the face in front of her two young children. Notably, Harris was released from custody without paying bail in either case, courtesy of “bail reform” laws championed by current New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio. New York does not appear to be an extreme outlier. It would be virtually impossible to determine how many attacks against Jews have been subsumed into the “white” category of interracial crime statistics and thus estimate the percentage of all crime directed specifically at them. It definitely can be said, however, that American Jews—who, with an estimated population of 6,829,000, represent 1.7 percent of the total U.S. population—were the targets of at least 11.7 percent of all U.S. hate crimes (835 out of 7,120) and almost 60 percent of hate crimes motivated by the victim’s religion (835 out of 1,419) in 2018. In contrast, American Muslims, with a population very similar in size to that of Jews, reported only 188 total hate crimes in 2018, while blacks experienced slightly more than twice as many hate crimes as those against Jews (1,943) despite having a population more than six times as large. As with Asian Americans, Jews are attacked by members of multiple ethnic groups. In 2018, 179 of the 835 attacks on Jews were perpetrated by whites, 41 were described as black, and there were at least 14 incidents involving multiracial groups who attacked Jews. Two hundred and fifty-eight perpetrators were not definitively identified in racial terms. Three-hundred forty-three police/FBI reports apparently did not include a racial description of the suspect. Analysis of patterns of interracial crime in general, and of the Asian and Jewish case studies in particular, lends support to a point frequently made by conservatives: The presentation of interracial crime by the center-left mainstream media dominant in the United States is more than a bit dishonest. While there is little serious interracial violence, black-on-white crimes make up about 80 percent of violent criminal incidents involving whites and blacks in a typical year. It’s fair to say, based on empirical analysis, that mainstream media coverage of interracial crime slants in almost exactly the opposite direction: Rare incidents of white-on-black violence receive far more coverage than more common black-on-white assaults. At the most basic qualitative level of review, every single one of the incidents of white-on-black harassment discussed in this piece became a national or international story, while the black-on-white cases received mostly local coverage. More broadly, entire storylines that characterize American criminal justice, such as the epidemic of diverse and minority-generated violence against Asian Americans and Jews, are frequently missing from the national headlines. In a remarkable piece headlined “Is It Safe to Be Jewish in New York ?” Ginia Bellafante of the New York Times largely admits that the legacy media underreport East Coast anti-Semitism because of the diverse racial backgrounds of those brutalizing Jews. To quote directly: “The varied backgrounds of people who commit hate crimes…make combatting and talking about anti-Semitism in New York much harder.” This blunt statement by Bellafante, who deserves credit for her honesty, caused David Marcus of the Federalist to point out the obvious: If dozens of Jewish taxpayers were being beaten bloody by white men in MAGA hats or Pepe the Frog T-shirts, this “would not be hard to talk about—it would be a clear cut case of bigotry.” Similarly slanted media coverage is not uncommon as regards other important issues involving race and violence. When, for my book Hate Crime Hoax, I conducted in-depth quantitative analysis of how police shootings are covered, I found that non-blacks make up 70 percent of police-shooting victims but receive perhaps 20 percent of national media coverage of police shootings. A Google search for the phrase “well-known police shooting” turned up four white cases, four Hispanic cases, and 32 black cases in the first 10 pages of search results, with all cookies and trackers that might affect these results having previously been deleted. But the big picture of interracial crime—and ethnic conflict more broadly—in the United States is a surprisingly positive one. There certainly are small groups that are targeted with disturbing frequency, and the mass media have certainly failed in reporting honestly on these trends. However, **there is no current or upcoming race war**, or indeed general epidemic of interracial violence. Given the actual statistical demographics of violent crime in America, the best advice for most of those who are terrified by its specter is this: Get out of the house, go to your gym or library or place of worship, and mingle with your countrymen.

**Link: The 1AC plays right into the KGBs hands. The “Race War” is empirically a propaganda ploy by Russia to promote Russian revisionism.**

**Aceves 19 - William J. Aceves, the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California Western School of Law, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 2019** “VIRTUAL HATRED: HOW RUSSIA TRIED TO START A RACE WAR in the UNITED STATES” [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=mjrl] Accessed 9/17/21 SAO

During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Russian government engaged in a sophisticated strategy to influence the U.S. political system and manipulate American democracy. While most news reports have focused on the cyber-attacks aimed at Democratic Party leaders and possible contacts between Russian officials and the Trump presidential campaign, a more pernicious intervention took place. Throughout the campaign, Russian operatives created **hundreds of fake personas on social media** platforms and then posted thousands of advertisements and messages that sought to **promote racial divisions** in the United States. This was a coordinated propaganda effort. Some Facebook and Twitter posts denounced the Black Lives Matter movement and others condemned White nationalist groups. **Some called for violence**. To be clear, these were posts by fake personas created by Russian operatives. But their effects were real. The purpose of this strategy was to manipulate public opinion on racial issues and disrupt the political process. This Article examines Russia’s actions and considers whether they violate the international prohibitions against racial discrimination and hate speech.

**He continues** - Aceves 19 - William J. Aceves, the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California Western School of Law, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 2019 “VIRTUAL HATRED: HOW RUSSIA TRIED TO START A RACE WAR in the UNITED STATES” [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=mjrl] Accessed 9/17/21 SAO This Article has focused on Russia, the United States, and race. But this story has a far broader reach. The Russian government believed race was an issue that could divide the American public. And, to a great extent, it was correct. America’s longstanding struggle with racial inequality and social injustice offered Russia a receptive audience.315 But Russia’s propaganda campaign was not limited to race—it addressed ethnicity, religion, and national origin.316 Russian messages targeted immigration, border policies, law enforcement, crime, and LGBT rights. Russia sought to inject divisions within every major inflection point in American culture and politics. Russia violated the prohibition against racial discrimination and its attendant proscription against hate speech. Other rights were also affected. By seeking to influence voter preferences and undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process, Russia violated the right to vote, which is recognized as a fundamental human right.317 **By creating false stories and disseminating them, Russia infringed on freedom of thought** as well as the right to hold opinions without interference.318 By targeting religious minorities, it violated freedom of religion.319 Although Russia directed its propaganda campaign against the United States, it also targeted other countries.320 According to a detailed study by the Rand Corporation, “Russia is engaged in an active, worldwide propaganda campaign.”321 And Russia is not the only country that uses social media to influence foreign public opinion.322 A 2017 Freedom House report found that: “[g]overnments around the world have dramatically increased their efforts to manipulate information on social media . . . .”323 In fact, “[m]anipulation and disinformation tactics played an important role in elections in at least 17 other countries over the past year, damaging citizens’ ability to choose their leaders based on factual news and authentic debate.”324 In Fall 2018, social media companies disclosed that Russia had renewed its efforts to intervene in American political life prior to the 2018 mid-term elections.325 Research conducted on several Facebook accounts revealed these accounts “included language patterns that indicate nonnative English and consistent mistranslation, as well as an overwhelming focus on polarizing issues . . . .”326 It was clear these accounts “sought to promote divisions and set Americans against one another.”327 Facebook also announced it had removed eighty-two pages, groups, and accounts which exhibited inauthentic behavior that originated in Iran and which targeted the U.S. electorate.328 Both the U.S. government and social media companies have announced they are ready to combat any new foreign intervention.329 Even members of the international community have announced their intention to address foreign interference in national elections.330 It is unclear, how ever, whether the American public is equally prepared to challenge the efforts of countries intending to incite a race war in the United States. Eventually, history will reveal whether these foreign interventions fail or whether race remains a permanent inflection point in American life.

**Internal Link: Insurrectionary politics actively divides and softens US defenses against an inevitable Russian military invasion**

**Nyquist No Date - J.R. Nyquist, Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science @ The Inter-American Institute, former analyst @ Defense Intelligence Agency, Financial Sense, No Date** “The Sequence” [https://www.financialsense.com/jr-nyquist/sequence] Accessed 9/17/21 SAO

The military power with the best tanks, aircraft and ships doesn't always win a battle. Wars may be decided by many factors, including non-military factors. For example, a military confrontation may be decided beforehand when a society gradually turns to recreational drug use; or when the work ethic collapses; or a significant segment of the society unwittingly adopts the enemy's ideology; or the political elite of the country shows itself to be corrupt and contemptuous of the public. The United States has been a great and stable power for many decades. One should never, on that account, assume the invincibility of the U.S. The American superpower has been strategically mismanaged for half a century. During the Cold War the U.S. suffered outright defeats in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. With the end of the Cold War came major Communist advances in South Africa (1994), Congo (1997), Angola (2002), Venezuela (1999), Brazil (2002), Bolivia (2006), and Nicaragua (2006). What is not understood, is that the Communist movement in general, being a fifth column instrument of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, became even more effective after the fall of the Soviet Union. As it happens, people react to words like "Communism" in a negative way. Therefore, from the point of view of strategy, it is better to dispense with the word "Communist" and use another word. The battle for what used to be called "Communism" is today a battle for so-called "social justice." The advocates in this battle are "caring individuals," who claim to represent the poor and the working class. Theirs is an ongoing struggle, and is fought on many fronts, especially inside the United States. The reason for accelerating their campaign within America is important to understand: The United States is the only military power, and the only economic power, strong enough to block the advance of Moscow and Beijing. During the Cold War, the Americans blocked these countries from advancing in many areas, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Germany, and Central America. Even the Communist victories in Southeast Asia and Africa were hardfought, and largely won through psychological warfare and propaganda. On the battlefield, America remained dominant. Given the obstacle presented, how could the Communist Bloc overcome America's military power? Very simply, when one side in a global contest appears to give up, the psychological impact is enormous. Organize the collapse of Communism from the Kremlin itself and nobody in the West will question it. If the Communists are giving up power, it is all good. But look at Russia and Eastern Europe today. By giving up untenable positions in Germany and the Baltic States, the remainder is yet dominated by agent networks and mafias aligned with Moscow. In Ukraine, for example, there is a pro-NATO president whose power has been undermined by a prime minister who works for Moscow. In Georgia, the Russian troops press in while operations continue to unseat the pro-American president. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania old Communist structures dominate business and government. Despite their entry into NATO, some of these countries may be described as nests of spies and infiltrators whose mission has been to sabotage NATO from within. **This is not simply conjecture, but the conclusion drawn by the best-informed political activists and researchers in Eastern Europe**. The supposed Cold War victory of the West opened Europe to **infection by Moscow's clandestine armies**. Already the Left formed a fifth column in Western Europe. But these political forces were to be augmented by economic interpenetration, energy dependence, and more. Because of its advanced weaponry, the United States cannot be easily defeated in a war. But **wars are won or lost before they reach the point of outright military clashes**. The order of battle in the next world war is not merely a list of divisions or nuclear rocket regiments. This order of battle chiefly consists in assets that include banks, major corporations, non-government organizations (NGOs), environmentalists, peace activists, drug cartels, organized crime syndicates, and the left wing of the Democratic Party, which the Communists targeted for infiltration more than 30 years ago. In advance of any military campaign relying on tank divisions and nuclear rocket regiments, **it is necessary to soften the United States through a series of clandestine and subversive moves:** first, there was the use of narcotics trafficking as a weapon, which began in 1960. Prior to that, there was the infiltration of organized crime, the penetration of U.S. banks, and the introduction of the Peaceful Coexistence Struggle by Nikita Khrushchev. For those interested in the details of this, please refer to a book titled Red Cocaine, by Joseph D. Douglass. (It is based on the testimony of one of the highest-level Communsit defectors of all time, Jan Sejna.) The campaign involves the use of economic weapons, as well as educational weapons. Every civilization nourishes within itself various cults opposed to its values. That is basically what "Communism" represents. The specifics of ideology are unimportant, for what is represented is essentially anti-capitalism, anti-Christianity, anti-Western civilization. It can change its name, it rhetoric, its tactics, but the movement in opposition to civilization remains essentially the same in its determination to destroy what presently exists. Taking this into account, take a good look around and re-examine the former Cold War battlefield. Note the changes around the globe, and the changes in Washington.

**Impact: Turns Case - Russia is comparatively more racist than the US**

**Arnold 15 - Richard Arnold, Associate Professor of Political Science at Muskingum University, in the journal Theoretical Criminology, 2015**“Systematic racist violence in Russia between ‘hate crime’ and ‘ethnic conflict’” [https://www.tandis.odihr.pl/bitstream/20.500.12389/22107/1/08345.pdf] Accessed 9/17/21 SAO

Scope and characteristics of systematic racist violence in Russia One of the most visible social movements in contemporary Russia, especially following the invasion of Crimea under the pretext of saving ethnic Russians from the allegedly ‘fascist’ Ukrainian government, is the extreme nationalist or ‘skinhead’ movement. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many observers worried about a so-called ‘Weimar Russia’ scenario (Brubaker, 1996; Luks, 2008; Yanov, 1995), noting the similarities between Germany after the First World War and Russia after the Cold War. Both cases featured legends about an internal enemy, a rejection of the West as a model of development, an ethnic diaspora living outside of the country, a transition from a highly regimented to a more open society, and the revenge of former elites. Although this analogy should not be overdrawn (see Luks, 2008), a further parallel between the two cases lies in the explosion of Russia’s skinhead subculture from about the year 2000. Shnirel’man (2007, 28; citing Tarasov, 2006: 19) estimates the number of skinheads in Russia in 1996 at between 7000 and 8000.5 By 2007, this number had grown to 60,000–65,000, or, as noted above, roughly half the world’s total skinhead population, with organized groups in some 85 Russian cities. Moreover, racist violence by skinhead groups now occurs in Russia on a near-daily basis. Although there are no official published statistics, annual reports from a major NGO, Moscow’s SOVA Center (Verkhovskii, 2005, 2006, 2007; Verkhovskii et al., 2010, 2012, 2013), catalogue incidents of skinhead violence. The level of racist violence was highest between 2005 and 2009, after which (as I describe below) the state belatedly stepped up its policing efforts. In 2007, SOVA recorded skinheads as killing 97 people and beating 623. In 2009, the respective numbers Impawere 94 and 443. This number may be an underestimate, as SOVA compiles its data from reports in regional newspapers and regional networks of monitoring experts (Arnold, 2010b). It is likely that many incidents of racist violence do not get included in these regional data, and thus in SOVA reports, because victims are afraid to report their attacks. To measure the scale of underreporting, Amnesty International conducted a survey of ethnic minorities in Moscow, finding that just 61 of 204 racist attacks were **reported** to the police (McClintock, 2005: 70). These data make Russia **the most violent country** in the former Soviet Union **for** ethnic and **racial minorities**, **far outstripping** the next most dangerous country, Ukraine, where, even accounting for the difference in **population size** (roughly one-third of Russia’s), the statistics are much lower. In 2006, for instance, 522 people were beaten in Russia and 66 killed in racist crimes. For comparison, in Ukraine there were 12 beaten and two killed. In 2008, in Russia 434 people were beaten and 97 killed. In the same year in Ukraine, there were 79 beaten and four killed (Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2013: 48). While there has been a decline in racist violence since its peak in 2008, skinheads still remain a potent force in Russia, with 187 deaths and 206 people wounded in 2012 (Verkhovskii et al., 2013: 130–137). **Racist groups** still **thrive in Russia** and form a substantial portion of the social support for Putin’s ‘Novorossia’ policy of reuniting ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine (see Arnold, 2014c). Comparisons with the West are more difficult. The best available resource, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on systematic racist violence for 2012, recorded nine violent hate crimes in Austria, 98 hate crimes of violence in Germany, one case in the United States, and 10 in the United Kingdom. The same report estimated violent racist crimes in Russia at over 120. The level of racist violence in contemporary Russia is thus the highest in the OSCE. These statistics are almost certainly undercounted for every country and especially so in Russia.6 In looking for historical parallels, one author reports that ‘during the 1980s … the tally of skinhead violence [in the United States] included 121 murders of blacks and gays in urban areas across the nation, 302 racial assaults, and 301 cross burnings’ (Bowling, 1998; Wooden, 1991, cf. Hamm, 1993: 3). The level of racist violence for **one year in Russia** is thus **higher than the entire decade in the U**nited **S**tates where Americans were most concerned about this violence. Thus, Russia experiences a very high level of racist violence compared to other OECD countries. Statistics on the number of racist crimes, moreover, do not capture the qualitative differences between them, which further reveal the **systematic nature of Russian racist violence**. Elsewhere (Arnold, 2009), I have disaggregated the concept ‘ethnic violence’ (of which racist violence is a part) committed by skinheads into four ideal-types: symbolic violence; lynching; pogrom; and massacre. Symbolic violence refers to non-widespread property damage such as graffiti, and pogrom to widespread property damage. Lynching refers to the murder or physical injury of persons. Finally, massacre refers to widespread physical injury and killing of persons. The type of skinhead violence varies by the ethnicity of the subject. Most symbolic violence is used against Jews, as in the spate of anti-Semitic signs erected in Russia by the side of highways from 2002 to 2005. Most lynching is used against Africans, as in the 2002 beating of an African-American US embassy guard. Most pogrom-style violence is used against migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, as in the 2002 skinhead raid on the Tsaritsino open-air market in Moscow, the 2006 pogrom in the town of Kondopoga, and the 2013 pogrom in Birulyevo, a Moscow suburb. Massacre is most commonly used against the Roma, as in a 2006 incident outside Volgograd when skinheads armed with iron bars beat eight Roma in their camp. This use of racist violence to send such inter-community messages reflects its systemic nature. Explaining the proliferation of skinheads in Russia and abroad Several aspects of post-Soviet social change contribute to racist violence and skinhead proliferation. Part of the attraction of the skinhead subculture in Russia comes from (mainly) young people’s problems of anomie and alienation. One of the most commonly cited causes of skinhead groups in the West is economic decline (Bowling, 1998: 54; Hamm, 1993: 215–216). Unemployed youths with time on their hands need outlets for their frustration. Just as the rise of the skinhead movements in Britain and the United States coincided with industrial decline, Russia experienced an even more precipitous economic decline in the 1990s. Despite economic recovery in the 2000s, unemployment, poor career prospects, and lack of entertainment options remain a problem for many Russian young people. Without the ideological glue of communism, social bonds have frayed as Russian society struggles to find new social legitimations. Elsewhere in the world, racist ideas have historically appealed to young men unhappy with their prospects, as studies of white supremacism in the United States have shown (Hamm, 1993: 211–213). In Russia, however, the 1990s economic and ideological collapse was more severe than any analogous transformation in contemporary western societies, so that organized racism truly emerged as an ‘alternative to Communism’ (Shnirel’man, 2007: 58). As with homicide (see Lysova and Shchitov, this issue), Russia’s persistently high levels of racist violence thus reflect not so much temporary economic hardship as the continuing failure to create an appealing alternative to the communist system. As in other developed countries, Russian skinhead groups violently reject immigration (and internal migration) by ethnic minorities. Extremist groups regularly refer to a ‘genocide’ of ethnic Russians,7 playing on widespread racialized fears of demographic decline. In 1993 Russia’s population stood at 148.6 million but by 2012 had declined to 143 million, the largest peacetime population decline ever recorded in any modern country (Heleniak, 2013). The decline is largely explained by low fertility rates and a low male life expectancy (which in the 2000s fell to 57.5 years). To make up for the labor shortfall, Russia has experienced increased immigration from other post-Soviet countries, most of whom are drawn from non-Russian ethnic groups, such as Armenians, Azeris, and Georgians from the Caucasus, and Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks from Central Asia. Heleniak offers the claim (which Russian officials are fond of repeating) that Russia now has the secondlargest number of immigrants in the world after the United States, including some five to six million undocumented immigrants. The official Muslim population grew from 7.9 percent of the total in the 1989 census to 10.2 percent in 2012, a likely underestimate, given heavily Muslim undocumented immigration from Central Asia. Could one, then, argue that Russia’s skinhead violence was somehow directly produced by higher levels of immigration and resulting ethnic and cultural changes? To be sure, immigration clearly figures into the rise of Russian skinheads, just as the original skinhead movement itself grew out of the ‘Teddy Boy’ subculture that emerged in post- Second World War Britain in part as a reaction to what was then a new phenomenon, large-scale non-white immigration from the Commonwealth (Hamm, 1993: 15–17). However, the ‘fact of’ immigration should be distinguished from the ‘response to’ it in seeking to explain the extreme growth of systematic racist violence in post-1991 Russia. If immigration itself, or even large-scale non-white immigration, produced such violence, then countries of immigration such as Canada and Australia would today be world leaders in such violence. Thus, as an analytical matter, Russia’s skinhead problem is puzzlingly large even for a major immigration-receiving country. In consequence, it is more promising to consider how immigration is received in a given society than to treat immigration as an objective cause of racist violence. Only a discursive and political analysis can explain why Russian society has become particularly fertile ground for such violence. Discursive and ideological factors Pseudo-scientific racism has a longer pedigree in Russia than one might suppose. Although in the USSR such racism was largely constrained by the regime’s official ‘socialist internationalism’, racist ideas entered Russian intellectual life even before the fall of communism. The ‘Soviet Theory of Ethnos’, formulated in the late 1970s, claimed that ethnic distinctions were real and immutable, and had evolved in dialogue with the local environment (Tishkov, 1997). Thus, Lev Gumilev (1990) theorized in Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere that the behavior of ancient nomadic tribes could be traced to fluctuations in solar radiation based on their geographic location. This was fertile soil for more doctrinaire racist thinking. By 1997, there were 10 neo-pagan groups in Moscow and Leningrad alone. The neo-pagans and in particular their most prominent figure, Aleksandr Dugin, preserved theories espoused by Nazi thinkers. Dugin is a former professor at Moscow State University, the chief ideologist of the ‘Eurasian’ movement in Russia, a consultant for the Kremlin, and frequent participant in televised debates.8 In this milieu**, the idea of the ‘Great White Race’** appeared with specifically Eurasian characteristics (Moroz, 2005). In the post-Soviet era, such views have become more widespread and **have won official backing**. Indeed, since the 1990s, the idea of the Aryan origin of the Russian people has discreetly entered into academic studies of history … In 1999 [several individuals] founded an organization Biblioteka rasovoi mysli (‘library of racial thinking’) which publishes nineteenth and twentieth century works on physical anthropology, some of them by Russians but primarily by Western authors. (Laruelle, 2010: 26) These Aryan ideas have evidently played out in at least some documented acts of racist violence. For example, anti-Semitic neo-pagan literature was found in the possession of a young man who walked into a synagogue in 2006, shouting ‘I will kill Jews’, and stabbed several congregants (Shnirel’man, 2007: 88–89). Such ideas may also **influence Russian government policy**, as think-tanks espousing racist ideas have emerged.9 As a related matter, officially promoted Russian chauvinism has made a substantial comeback during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Some authors describe Putin’s ideology as ‘civilizational nationalism’—the idea that Russia represents a different and better version of modernity than the West (Verkhovskii and Payin, 2012) and has its own Sonderweg, or special historical path. Such a ‘special path’ was implicit in the claim by Putin’s chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, that Russia is a ‘sovereign democracy’ that does not need to imitate the institutions of liberal democracy. This ‘civilizational nationalism’ is attractive to the Kremlin because it helps square a particular ideological circle. While the direct endorsement of ethnic Russian chauvinism (or overt racism) might be destabilizing for a multiethnic country such as Russia and would lead to condemnation from western officials, the claim that Russia is distinct from the West and does not need its institutions gives the regime an ideological basis that some people in Russia find appealing, and also deflects criticisms of Putin’s undemocratic practices. In addition to this official endorsement of exclusionary nationalism, particular official attitudes toward the management of ethnic diversity and geographic mobility may facilitate the rise of skinheads. These attitudes predate the current Russian regime. While the Soviet Union formally endorsed ethnic diversity, it adopted a primordialist view of ethnicity as unchanging and linked to specific historic ‘homelands’ in which particular ethnic groups could flourish. This ideology was reflected in the ethno-federal structure of the USSR, with 15 republics ostensibly determined by the dominant ethnic groups within them, as well as formally autonomous ethnic homelands for the non-Slavic ethnic groups within the Russian republic (Slezkine, 1994). Even in the post-Soviet period, Tishkov (1997) argues that primordial conceptions of ethnicity still dominate the Russian intellectual establishment. This can be seen in the widely popular concept of ‘ethnic distance,’ identified by Payin and Susarov (1996: 53), namely ‘the cultural differences between the representatives of different ethnic groups that limit capacities for mutual adaptation’. Such a position implicitly presents hostile interactions as an inevitable part of inter-cultural encounters. Russian officials exhibit hostility to the emergence of new cultural practices as a result of migration. The Soviet government strictly regulated emigration, immigration, and internal migration using a complex system of internal passports and ‘residence permits’ (propiska) (Light, 2012b). Soviet migration policies also entailed the mass displacement of populations for reasons of state. Hill (2003) argues that the Soviet leadership conceived of territory without a population as a security risk and so relocated vast numbers of people to Siberia, where there was neither the climate nor the economic base to support them. In addition, although Soviet migration management had a number of goals, including political surveillance and economic mobilization, it was also used to govern specific ethnic groups, such as the ‘punished peoples’ whom Stalin subjected to internal exile during the Second World War (Polian, 2004). Although the 1993 post-Soviet Russian constitution repudiated the previous draconian migration restrictions, their residue remains in much policy and practice. Thus, some regions of Russia, such as the southern province of Krasnodar, continue to limit residence rights based on ethnicity, although such restrictions are formally illegal (Kuznetsov and Popov, 2008). Moreover, much official discourse is still premised on assumptions derived from Soviet policies concerning the geographic boundaries of particular cultures. This means, in effect, that certain cultural practices, or certain people, are ‘out of place’, even when they are legally present. In consequence, although migration per se is not new in contemporary Russia (as the Soviet Union also featured extensive internal migration), neither Russian society as a whole nor political elites are well prepared to accept the consequences of post-Soviet migration, whether in the appearance of new ethnic minorities throughout Russia, or the cultural or religious practices of such new migrant communities. For example, the population of Soviet-era Moscow was overwhelmingly ethnically Russian, although Moscow was the capital of a multi-ethnic state in which Russians were barely half the national population (Colton, 1995: 407). Today, post-Soviet migration has created a truly multiethnic Moscow, with millions of residents from Central Asia and the Caucasus and the largest Muslim population of any European city. Yet the Moscow government and many residents continue to reject public expressions of non-Russian culture, often in highly 248 Theoretical Criminology 19(2) racist terms (Light, 2010; Vendina, 2013). Likewise, although post-Soviet migration has produced Muslim communities in new regions of Russia, their right to practice their religion is widely infringed, often through the official argument that Islam is not a traditional religion of the region (Light, 2012a). Thus, the effects of increased non-ethnic Russian immigration on racist violence are not direct, but rather are mediated through official ambivalence about racial and cultural equality and the rights of migrants. Primordial concepts of identity, geographically circumscribed ethnic homelands, and ‘ethnic distance’ provide tacit legitimation for racist violence, or at least limit the extent to which official condemnation of racist violence can be effective. Although the exact influence of such attitudes on systematic racist violence would be difficult to capture, they are clearly part of the milieu in which it flourishes. They are also reflected in lax enforcement policies that have facilitated the infiltration of Russia by western skinhead groups, as I chart below. Official passivity and international connections No country has a sterling record when it comes to fighting racist violence. Scholarly analysis should consider the degree of official involvement or complicity in such violence, as well as the historical trajectory of the official response. In the United Kingdom, it took a series of violent events (most notably the 1993 death of Stephen Lawrence) to make the police take the problem of violent racism seriously (Bowling, 1998). Formally non-state but effectively state-sanctioned violence—widespread lynching of African- Americans—continued in the United States from the end of the Civil War through the 1960s. And many western societies, including the United States, continue to experience racialized police violence against minorities. Even so, in post-Soviet Russia, it has proved especially challenging to build a professional police force capable and willing to investigate racist violence effectively. In part, this is because racist attitudes are widespread in the police themselves and openly displayed, as evidenced in a study of police ethnic profiling on the Moscow metro which found **‘the most extreme and egregious ethnic profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice’** (Open Society, 2006: 31). Light (2010) links such profiling to violent police extortion practices targeting minorities with the tacit approval of city officials. Other factors are also important. In part, investigation and prosecution of hate crimes may suffer from broader problems of police management and service (see Light et al., this issue). The Russian government has consciously refrained from aggressive prosecution of racist hate crimes, probably because such prosecutions would interfere with the official promotion of Russian nationalism (Schenk, 2010: 114). The government has often preferred to bring charges of ‘hooliganism’ rather than charges of racist violence, even when the latter would clearly have been appropriate, suggesting an unwillingness to acknowledge the problem or tackle it seriously. Yet it is not all bad news. Since 2009, for instance, the state has begun prosecuting racist violence with greater vigor in an attempt to defang the neo-Nazi movement, after several high-profile skinhead attacks on officials (Verkhovskii et al., 2013). Thus, in 2010, there were 91 hate crimes convictions affecting 297 people, and in 2011, 61 convictions affecting 193 people. These figures can be compared with the 23 convictions Arnold 249 affecting 65 people in 2007, when hate crimes were at their most frequent. Nonetheless, the increase in prosecution may just reflect concerns about the potential of racist organizations to challenge the state itself rather than a fundamental change in official policy, let alone a newfound desire to protect ethnic minorities against racial violence. One effect of the official unwillingness to confront racist violence has been the infiltration into Russia of international racist organizations. In the early 1990s, racist groups in the United States, Britain, and Germany began establishing branches in Russia (Belikov, 2011). Shnirel’man (2007: 23) identifies 1997 as a turning point, when Russian skinheads started to ‘get regular support from their European and American brethren’. Such support initially came from the American Ku Klux Klan and German skinhead groups such as ‘The Right Union’ and ‘Young Vikings’, who gave their Russian counterparts literature, uniforms, and audio-cassettes with recorded speeches about ‘white internationalism’. Other skinhead groups, such as the British ‘Blood and Honor/Combat 18’ and ‘The White Bulldogs’ also set up Russian ‘franchises’. A special Russian forum has existed on the international skinhead ‘Stormfront’ website since 2002. There is evidence that such transnational racism motivates systematic violent racism in Russia. Thus, in October 2013, some youths attacked the Biru-za shopping center in southern Moscow, while shouting ‘White power!’—in English. Moreover, prominent western and Russian racists have become increasingly friendly over the years, sometimes with official involvement. At an international racist convention in 2006, attended by former Louisiana state senator and leader of the Ku Klux Klan David Duke, **Russia was designated as the ‘white world’s future’** and the ‘great hope’ of the white race (Arnold and Romanova, 2013). The conference concluded with exhortations to construct a new racially homogenous home in Russia, styled the ‘white Eurasia’ or ‘white Siberia’. Other international meetings of western and Russian racists have followed, with a 2007 conference in Yalta, and presentations in Belgium by Russian racist ideologue Pavel Tulaev. Likewise, in October 2014, the ‘Eurasianist’ Aleksandr Dugin met with US and European racists in Budapest (Arnold, 2014a). Figures close to the Kremlin have also funded similar racist and homophobic conferences (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Indeed, the Kremlin has been courting the leaders of European Far Right parties, such as Marine Le Pen, leader of the French Front Nationale; Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party; leaders of the Belgian racist movement Vlaams Belang; and Gabor Vona of Hungary’s racist party, Jobbik (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Members of these parties helped monitor the ‘referendum’ in Crimea on its annexation by Russia in 2014, suggesting that the Russian government can now mobilize international right-wing support for its policies.10

## Case

**Overview – Militancy Bad**

**Reject militancy as a strategy – It is the logic of everything you criticize – militarism is the justification for an increase in anti-black violence through A) Constructing blackness as something that is militant which justifies the state cracking down on black movements with extreme force B) Increases racial division and hostility which increases the likelihood of racially motivated violence**

### Case proper

**Turn: The aff’s appeals to violent revolution requires the oppressed to position themselves in the public sphere. That’s ableist.**

**hedva 16 - johanna hedva, an anticapitalist psychonaut sorceress, Mask Magazine, January 26, 2016** “Sick Woman Theory.” [http://www.maskmagazine.com/not-again/struggle/sick-woman-theory] Accessed 2/29/20 SAO

In late 2014, I was sick with a chronic condition that, about every 12 to 18 months, gets bad enough to render me, for about five months each time, unable to walk, drive, do my job, sometimes speak or understand language, take a bath without assistance, and leave the bed. This particular flare coincided with the Black Lives Matter protests, which I would have attended unremittingly, had I been able to. I live one block away from MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, a predominantly Latino neighborhood and one colloquially understood to be the place where many immigrants begin their American lives. The park, then, is not surprisingly one of the most active places of protest in the city. I listened to the sounds of the marches as they drifted up to my window. Attached to the bed, I rose up my sick woman fist, in solidarity. I started to think about what modes of protest are afforded to sick people – it seemed to me that **many for whom Black Lives Matter is especially in service, might not be able to be present** for the marches because they were imprisoned by a job, the threat of being fired from their job if they marched, or literal incarceration, and of course the threat of violence and police brutality – but also because of illness or disability, or because they were caring for someone with an illness or disability. I thought of all the other invisible bodies, with their fists up, tucked away and out of sight. If we take Hannah Arendt’s definition of the political – which is still one of the most dominant in mainstream discourse – as being any action that is performed in public**, we must contend with the implications of what that excludes**. If being present in public is what is required to be political, then whole swathes of the population can be deemed a-political – simply because they are not physically able to get their bodies into the street. In my graduate program, Arendt was a kind of god, and so I was trained to think that her definition of the political was radically liberating. Of course, I can see that it was, in its own way, in its time (the late 1950s): in one fell swoop she got rid of the need for infrastructures of law, the democratic process of voting, the reliance on individuals who’ve accumulated the power to affect policy – she got rid of the need for policy at all. All of these had been required for an action to be considered political and visible as such. No, Arendt said, just get your body into the street, and bam: political. There are two failures here, though. The first is her **reliance on a “public” – which requires a private, a binary between visible and invisible space**. This meant that whatever takes place in private is not political. So, you can beat your wife in private and it doesn’t matter, for instance. You can send private emails containing racial slurs, but since they weren’t “meant for the public,” you are somehow not racist. Arendt was worried that if everything can be considered political, then nothing will be, which is why she divided the space into one that is political and one that is not. But for the sake of this anxiety, she chose to sacrifice whole groups of people, to continue to banish them to invisibility and political irrelevance. She chose to keep them out of the public sphere. I’m not the first to take Arendt to task for this. The failure of Arendt’s political was immediately exposed in the civil rights activism and feminism of the 1960s and 70s. “The personal is political” can also be read as saying “the private is political.” Because of course, everything you do in private is political: who you have sex with, how long your showers are, if you have access to clean water for a shower at all, and so on.