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**Link 1: The power of the image is the image of power. The semiotic battle ground in which violence is constituted gives images of ethical deviation power by affirming their reality, something debate is entirely invested in. The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize by humanizing the system**

**Johnson 17 - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017** “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO \*brackets in original

The meaning and logic of a scandal exceeds these strictly ethical and juridical frameworks. Instead, transgressions are interpreted through and implicated in the reproduction of wider frameworks of intelligibility within war. Consider, for example, the revelation of ‘prisoner abuse’ within the Abu Ghraib detention facility. While this scandal clearly invoked the idea that these violences were a departure from the rule of law and widely accepted norms regarding the humane treatment of prisoners, this is not the only way in which these events were rendered intelligible. This moment was not simply read as an instance of violence that overstepped the line in a strictly juridical sense. As Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2007: 38) has argued, these violences were also interpreted through a ‘pre-constructed, heterosexed, racialised and gendered script’. The transgressive dimensions of ‘prisoner abuse’ in Abu Ghraib were not therefore solely, or perhaps even primarily, understood in relation to a set of codified ethical principles that were violated. The signification of these violences as scandalous also drew upon and reproduced a wider set of representational logics. As such, the dominant narrative of the violences at Abu Ghraib became an individuated story of ‘womanhood or sexuality gone awry’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 70). This fetishisation and denouncement of a ‘few bad apples’ serves to obscure a more systematic insight into the widespread use of extrajuridical and extra-territorial rendition, torture and killing that has defined the ‘war on terror’.3 Unpacking the first line-drawing manoeuvre in this way allows us to understand that scandals are not detached and dispassionate arbiters of ethical conduct. As opposed to approaches that focus upon adjudicating wartime conduct in terms of its adherence or deviation from standards and thresholds defined by pre-given ethical frameworks, this approach to the ethics of war draws attention to an everyday ethical vernacular (see Bubandt, 2005; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016): a diffuse, decentred and circulating discursive economy through which particular acts of violence are rendered intelligible. It is a way of thinking about ethical arguments about war that focuses less on how particular acts of violence are problematised in relation to defined and fixed norms. The process is less clearly determined. To understand the scripting of ethical failure, of scandalous transgressions, we must therefore come to understand the complex intersections and resonances between ethical imaginaries and other representational logics. It is therefore important to understand scandals as primarily political rather than epistemological events. The exposure of a scandal is not simply a process of correctly naming an event as such. Rather, scandals are constructed sites of hyper-visibility that exceed the ethical frameworks that they invoke.4 Such an understanding of scandals leads us away from the idea that they are, by exposing and disclosing hidden transgressions, a means of speaking truth to power. Instead, understanding this first line-drawing manoeuvre begins to demonstrate to us how scandals are a manifestation of the power of truth. Such an approach to scandals draws us away from an idea that they are determined by the intrinsic qualities of the act itself and instead urges us to reflect on the socio-political function of this process of signification. Second manoeuvre: Redrawing lines The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law. (Baudrillard, 1983: 27) The first line-drawing manoeuvre of a scandal allows us to note that a line has been crossed. As has been shown, the observation of transgression therefore offers us privileged insights into the existence, prevalence and location of these lines. By tracing these crossed lines, we gain an understanding of the everyday ethical vernaculars that reflect popular understandings of the relationship between war and ethics. The danger of understanding this first manoeuvre alone is that it largely leaves intact the heroic notion of scandals as a means of revealing ethical transgressions. The observation that the signification of scandals exceeds the ethical norms that they invoke could simply be read as a suggestion that to understand the scripting of ethical failure, we must understand how these events are embedded within broader representational regimes. Understood as such, scandals simply reflect the complex and contingent resonances between ethical imaginaries and other dominant discourses and stories. In this sense, the first manoeuvre is not really involved in line-drawing at all; it is simply observing that lines have been drawn. Taken on its own, what this manoeuvre gestures towards but fails to account for is the performative force of scandal: how the invoking of particular lines ‘produces the effect that it names’ (Butler, 2011: xii). We must therefore supplement this first manoeuvre with a second in which scandals are not simply read as the crossing of a line that exists independently of this apparent observation. Instead, scandals must be understood as a process of redrawing the line that has been transgressed. In this sense, the first and second manoeuvres are not really separate manoeuvres at all. Scandals do more than simply reference norms and principles; they are productive of them. The second manoeuvre points to how norms come to be revitalised and pursued with renewed vigour; it allows us to understand the constitutive function of the first manoeuvre. To be clear, the performative force of scandal is to regenerate the very principles that are distressed by their apparent transgression. Ultimately, this is the success of ethical failure. Scandals, and ethical engagements with war more generally, must be understood in terms of their ‘socio-political effects [which] impact on our collective understanding of war itself’ (Dauphinée, 2008: 50). The second manoeuvre draws our attention to a particular dimension of this effect. Specifically, it demonstrates the way in which scandals function as what Baudrillard (1994: 18) refers to as an example of ‘operational negativity’: a **secur**ing of **a positive reality through** the **denouncement of its inversion, subversion or semblance.** To help elaborate on this function, Baudrillard considers the doctrine of iconoclasm. The iconoclastic argument forbids the worshipping of images of the divine on the basis that ‘the divinity that breathes life into nature cannot be represented’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). What underpins iconoclasm is the assumption that there is a divine presence against which particular representations can be judged; there has to be a presence that allows for the identification of its absence. For Baudrillard (1983: 11), the denouncement of various signs as false representations of the real ‘masks the absence of a basic reality’. In this sense, God is not simply dead; rather, God never existed, and there has only ever been the simulation of a divine presence. The notion of operational negativity therefore offers Baudrillard a means to develop his wider thinking about simulation and the hyper-reality of the symbolic order through which social reality is constituted. While this potentially opens up interesting avenues regarding the ontological status of the ethical architecture of war, understanding the second manoeuvre requires us to explore a different dimension of the socio-political function of this logic. As has been shown, iconoclasm performs an important pedagogic role. If God cannot be represented, then God surely exists: this is the underlying message of the iconoclasts. Operational negativity highlights an absence in order to affirm the veracity of an invoked presence. However, **this denouncement** does more than reaffirm an underlying reality principle. It also **performs a crucial regulatory function.** The force of this denunciatory logic is to police conduct in accordance with the transgressed law: you shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above. Denunciation therefore attempts to resolve transgression **by demanding conformity to a cherished principle** or commandment. **The effect of identifying deviation is to ensure a return to the** norm. The tendency of denunciation is towards a re-solution, usually understood as a securing and reproduction of the **status quo.** Denunciation therefore performs a conjoined pedagogic-regulatory function in attempting to secure both the power of truth and the truth of power (Dillon, 2015). It is in both of these senses that we must understand Baudrillard’s (1983: 27) claim that: ‘The denunciation of scandal always pays homage to the law.’ Scandals, as an example of operational negativity, are therefore not necessarily moments through which particular principles come to be scrutinised or disputed. Instead, the function of operational negativity is often to: regenerate a moribund principle through simulated scandal, phantasm, and murder — a sort of hormonal treatment through negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression … Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. … Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. (Baudrillard, 1994: 18–19) From this reading, scandals do not emerge as a space for contesting or rethinking the legitimacy of a particular social order. Instead**, what appears to be a moment of disruptive failure is actually crucial to the rehabilitation** and regeneration **of the very social order** that appears to have failed. What is troubling from the perspective of this second manoeuvre is how critical arguments about the ethics of war become implicated in the very practices that they appear to challenge. Understanding this complicity in the conditions of possibility of military violence requires us to understand the ways in which scandals shape the possibilities and limits of critical responses to perceived ethical failures in wartime conduct. Baudrillard’s concern with thinking within the logics of the scandal is that it reduces critical thought to a logic of recrimination. Scandals present a simple decision in the face of an event: ‘to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 15, emphasis in original). It is these grammatical terms of the scandal that are particularly problematic as, through them, critical thought becomes confined to performing a regulatory function in support of the logics of a particular morality or rationality. To denounce a particular act ‘for not following the rules of the game’ accepts and affirms that if only these rules were followed, then a particular form of behaviour would be unproblematic. This account of critique as recrimination blunts the possibilities of critical thought, largely confining it to a logic of problem-solving whereby the ethical problem of war is reduced to the identification — through transgression — and re-solution of a series of problems through a return to the norm. Problematically, this not only leaves unquestioned and untroubled the norm that it invokes, but actively serves it as, understood in this way, the possibility of transgression implies that if transgression were eliminated, war would be a wholly moral exercise. Far from undermining the possibilities for war by exposing its apparent failures, scandals are involved in the production and reproduction of the very principles upon which contemporary warfare is made possible. This is the success of ethical failure. In short, the durability of the understanding of war as a legitimate enterprise comes to rely, in part, upon the managed exposure of its fragility. Ethical failure in warfare is therefore crucial to upholding the very principles that make violence possible. Perversely, no matter how well intentioned, scandals are complicit in a virtuous cycle that reproduces the legitimacy of virtuous war. In this sense, ethical failure comes to affirm and necessitate more successful forms of violence. Recriminations against the perceived breakdown of the relationship between the martial and the ethical are in danger of confining critiques of wartime violence to the process of policing conduct in war against a series of fixed standards and thresholds. It is in this sense that we should understand scandals as a watchdog on government; not as speakers of truth to power, but rather as speakers of the power of truth. Far from challenging the construction of war as an instrument of ethical foreign policy, the terms of critical engagement are such that opposition to particular forms of wartime conduct becomes implicated in the reproduction of the very thing that it may set out to challenge or dismantle. Of course, not all responses to scandals are motivated by this desire. For example, many responses must be situated within wider pedagogic efforts designed to learn from and improve the efficacy and ethicality of wartime conduct. Viewed from the perspective of this ‘fail again, fail better’ approach, scandals are a window of opportunity to refine rather than refute the terms of ongoing violence. The danger and tragedy of scandal is that it is hard to conceive of ways of critiquing war that escape this logic. Rather than creating spaces for imagining less violent futures, scandal overwhelmingly tends towards a politics of recrimination and the resolution of largely individuated moments of ethical failure through technical fixes. The problem of scandal is therefore that it threatens to make iconoclasts of us all: urging us to denounce and combat false or aberrant forms of violence in the name of a purer and truer form of violence that we are urged to pursue with a renewed zeal and vigour.

**Johnson Continues** - Jamie M. Johnson University of Sheffield, European Journal of International Relations 2017 “Beyond a politics of recrimination: Scandal, ethics and the rehabilitation of violence” [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5732620/pdf/10.1177\_1354066116669569.pdf] Accessed 8/10/18 SAO This article has focused on the interpretation and socio-political function of wartime scandals. It has presented both an opportunity and a warning: an opportunity in terms of exploring what scandals can tell us; and a warning in terms of understanding the performative force of what scandals are already telling us. Understood as a series of linedrawing manoeuvres, this article has outlined how scandals offer us a privileged insight into the character and reproduction of the normative architecture through which contemporary war is governed. This method for critically reading wartime scandals offers a number of important insights and opportunities for engaging with the ways in which contemporary wartime violences are enabled, excused and obscured. It is important to understand that the argument presented in this article does not entail a rejection of the possibility or desirability of ethical arguments about war. This may appear to be the direction in which Baudrillard gestures. Baudrillard’s provocation that there is no scandal may seem to be a vague, inadequate and potentially conservative response to acts of violence that many feel motivated to respond to. Just as it has been argued that denunciation is in danger of being intimately involved in the reproduction of the very violences that it seeks to problematise, it could be argued that refusing to accept that particular acts are scandalous runs the risk of forming a silent complicity with them. **A commitment to normative politics does not**, however, **entail a choice between speaking out against violence or remaining silent.** Put simply, **to speak or not to speak is not the problem** we find ourselves confronted with. Such a formulation proceeds from the assumption that scandals and recrimination are the only possible ways to articulate concern with particular acts. Understood as such, this article would appear to challenge this mode of critique, thereby eradicating or seriously limiting the possibility of expressing outrage at wartime violence. Only if we accept this premise are we confronted by the decision to speak or to remain silent. This article does not aim to restrict our ability to articulate outrage about particular acts of wartime violence. Scandals are not the only ways of narrating instances of death and injury in war. **Other ways of speaking are possible and other stories can be told** (Shepherd, 2006: 401). Realising this can only serve to expand, rather than limit, the vocabulary and possibilities of critical thought beyond a restrictive politics of recrimination. The point of this article is that it is because, not in spite, of the ‘truth’ of these violences that we must interrogate the socio-political function of this way of speaking, of bearing witness, of speaking truth to power. This article does not therefore dismiss the importance of ethical arguments; instead, it attempts to demonstrate just how important they are. Taking ethical arguments seriously requires us to recognise that they are not detached from the violences that they reflect upon. **Bearing witness is not without consequences.** Troublingly, this article has demonstrated that the denunciation of moments of ethical failure may, in fact, reproduce the very practices that appear to be disturbed. **Scandals** may therefore **secure the legitimacy and necessity of more not less violence**. This spiralling and bewildering causality highlights the complexity and ambiguity of critiquing war. The challenge for critical inquiries into war is therefore how we can formulate ethical arguments about war that do not reproduce the conditions of possibility for the very practices that they seek to contest. The challenge is to imagine what outrage might look like when it is not expressed through the logic of scandal. Put simply, this article has explored and unpacked the logics and performative force of wartime scandals; the challenge now is to think about how we might speak beyond them

**Link 3: The affirmative embraces fiction that debate should be a site for continuously bolstering the reserve labor force of corporate society through a celebration of mediated action**

**Hoofd 07 - Ingrid M. Hoofd, National University of Singapore, December 2007** “The Neoliberal Consolidation of Play and Speed: Ethical Issues in Serious Gaming” in “CRITICAL LITERACY: Theories and Practices Volume 1: 2” p. 6-14, 2007 [http://www.criticalliteracyjournal.org/cljournalissue2volume1.pdf] KZaidi Recut 9/27/21 SAO

Serious games are a fascinating next stage in the continuous exploitation of digital media technologies over the last decades for training, learning, and education. As formal education and training always involves the transmission and repetition of certain culturally and socially specific sets of skills and moral values, it would be of paramount importance to ensure that developments within the serious gaming industry are in step with the effects of the good intentions of nurturing people within a social framework that emphasises a fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society. In this light, it is interesting that from the very advent of the information society, digital technologies have been depicted as central to the development of a more just and equal society by harbouring the promise of bridging gaps between classes, races, and genders locally as well as globally. Driven by the vision of this utopian potential of new technologies, the education industry and larger policy organisations have been exploring the pedagogical possibilities of these technologies both in- and outside the traditional classroom for the last twenty-five years. Indeed, the implementation of increasingly more sophisticated and technologically mediated methods and tools for learning and education, takes as its starting point the techno-utopian assumption that (new) interactive technologies themselves are the primary harbingers of a fair and blooming society through facilitating (student) empowerment. This paper takes issue with this widespread techno-utopian perspective by seeking to shed light on the larger ethical implications of serious gaming. It will do so through foregrounding the relationship between global injustices, and the aesthetic properties and discourses of serious gaming. So while reframing serious games themselves in a new ethical perspective constitutes the main objective of this paper, it is equally important to situate serious games within a larger political discourse on the teaching of new skills. Firstly then, policy papers and academic studies on serious games all display an assumption of the inherent neutrality of gaming technologies, as if these technologies were mere tools equally suitable for all. What also becomes apparent in the language used in these studies and proposals, is how this instrumentalist vision of gaming technologies for learning goes hand in hand with a particular neo-liberal assumption of what constitutes a fit individual, and by extension of what the hallmarks of a ‘healthy’ society may be. For instance, in the European Union study “Serious Gaming – a fundamental building block to drive the knowledge work society” by Manuel Oliveira on the merits of serious games for education, justification runs along the lines of gaming ‘encouraging risk-taking and a winning attitude’ and creating a ‘performance-oriented individual.’ Similarly, Michael Guerena from the US Orange County Department of Education proposes in one of the Department’s web-casts that serious games instil “twenty-first century skills” like risk-taking, adaptability, self-direction, interactive communication, and ‘planning and managing for results’ in the students through the “channelling of fun.” Likewise, the UK-based Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association last year published their white paper Unlimited learning - Computer and video games in the learning landscape, in which they argue that serious games will “create an engaged, knowledgeable, critical and enthusiastic citizenry” whose “work practices will be geared towards networked communication and distributed collaboration” (49). Concerns around the ethical implications of serious games regarding their entanglements with larger social (gendered, classed, and raced) inequalities have until now largely been coined in terms of game content or representation. In a recent case in Singapore, the government’s proposition of using the RPG Granado Espada in secondary school history classes was followed by an outcry from various local academics condemning the stereotypical characters and simplistic representation of medieval Europe in the game. Likewise, various authors have critiqued current serious games not only because of simplistic representation of characters and surroundings, but especially because simulations generally tend to oversimplify complex social problems and situations. Gibson, Aldrich, and Prensky’s Games and Simulations in Online Learning (vi - xiv) for instance discuss these demerits of serious games. While such a critical analysis of how game content contributes to the reproduction of dominant discourses is definitely helpful, I would argue that the aesthetics of serious games involve much more than mere content. Instead, this paper will argue that the formal quest for instantaneity that research around digital media has displayed through the development of interactive technologies for education is already itself by no means a neutral affair. This is because the discourses that inform this quest and that accompany this search for instantaneity arguably enforce the hegemony of a militaristic, masculinist, humanist, and of what I will call a ‘speed-elitist’ individual. Moreover, I suggest that the propensity of current games to have sexist or racist content, is merely symptomatic of gaming technology’s larger problematic in terms of the aesthetic of instantaneity. In short, (serious) computer games have become archives of the discursive and actual violence carried out in the name of the utopia of technological progress and instantaneity under neo-liberal globalisation. This archival function is possible exactly because cybernetic technologies promise the containment and control of such supposedly accidental violence, while in fact exacerbating these forms of violence. This leads me to conclude that such violence is in fact structural to new serious gaming technologies, rather than accidental. I will elaborate this hypothesis by looking at various theorists who seek to understand this structural imperative of new technologies, and their relationship to the neo-liberalisation of learning and education. In turn, I will look at how this problematic structural logic informs the two popular serious games Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive. Secondly, the advent of serious gaming interestingly runs parallel with the contemporary dissemination and virtualisation of traditional learning institutions into cyberspace. While the existence of learning tools in other areas of society besides actual learning institutions has been a fact since the advent of schools, the shift of methods of learning into online and digital tools is symptomatic of the decentralisation of power from ‘old’ educational institutions and its usurpation into instantaneous neo-liberal modes of production. I am summarising the work of Bill Readings on the university here, because it sheds light on the shift in education tout court towards virtualisation, and its relationship to the ‘new hegemony of instantaneity.’ In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the shift from the state-run university of reason and culture to the present-day global knowledge enterprise must mean that the centre of power in effect has shifted elsewhere. More important, says Readings, is that the function of the new ‘university of excellence,’ one that successfully transforms it into yet another trans-national corporation, relies on the fantasy that the university is still that transcendental university of culture in service of the state and its citizens. So the invocation of the fantasy of an ‘originary’ university of reason and progress, that produces unbiased knowledge for the good of all, facilitates the doubling of the production of information into other spaces outside the university walls proper. While Readings surely discusses only higher education institutions in The University in Ruins, I would argue that the logic of a shifting centre of power from the state into the technocratic networks and nodes of speed operates quite similarly in the case of primary, secondary, and other types of formal education. Indeed, the current virtualisation of learning and the emphasis on lifelong learning marks a dispersal of traditional learning institutions into online spaces. This dispersal works increasingly in service of the ‘speed-elite’ rather than simply in service of the nation-state. The heralding of serious games for education can therefore be read as a symptom of the intensified reach of the imperatives of neo-liberal globalisation, in which consumption enters the lives of locally bound as well as more mobile cosmopolitan citizens of all ages through harping on the technological possibility of the confusion of production and play. Through the imperative of play then, production increasingly and diffusely colonises all niche times and -spaces of neo-liberal society. In other words, (the emphasis on) play allows not only a potential increase in production and consumption through the citizen-consumer after her or his formal education of ‘skills’, but starkly intensifies flows of production and consumption already at the very moment of learning. While such an integration of play and production is generally understood within the framework of the neo-liberal demand for the circulation of pleasure, it is useful here to widen the scope from understanding the learner as a mere consumer of pleasure into the larger set of problematic interpellations that marks subjugation in contemporary society. Intriguingly, a host of research has emerged over the past years pointing towards the intricate relationship between subjugation, military research objectives, and videogame development. Such research suggests an intimate connection between the C3I logic and humanist militaristic utopias of transcendence, which incriminates interactive technologies as inherently favouring culturally particular notions of personhood. In the case of computer- and video-games for entertainment, researchers have argued that the aesthetic properties of gaming technologies give rise to so-called ‘militarised masculinity.’ In “Designing Militarized Masculinity,” Stephen Kline, Nick DyerWitheford, and Greig de Peuter argue for instance that interactive games open up very specific subject positions that “mobilize fantasies of instrumental domination” (255). This specific mobilisation that video-games invoke, is not only due to the remediation of violent television- and film- content, but also due to the intimate connection between gaming- and military industries which grant these technologies their particular cybernetic aesthetic properties (see also Herz 1997). This element of militarisation partly informs my concept of ‘speed-elitism.’ I extrapolate the idea of ‘speed-elitism’ largely from the works of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neo-liberal capitalism. In “Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed,” Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of exchange and production, and the logic of speed. In line with Virilio’s argument in Speed and Politics, they argue that various formerly the less connected social areas of war, communication, entertainment, and trade, are now intimately though obliquely connected. This is because all these forces mutually enforce one another through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that “circulation has become an essential process of capitalism, an end in itself” (118) and therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied-up in this logic. So neo-liberal capitalism is a system within which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of communication and play – get to be formally subsumed under capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology,” Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the neutral or optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated – like in the policy papers – in favour of the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, empowerment and progress, which often go hand in hand with the celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication. Such discourses however suppress the violent colonial and patriarchal history of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness brought about by and occurring within these spaces. I would claim that Armitage’s assessment of accelerated circulation, and the way new technologies make play complicit in the techno-utopian endeavour of speed, is crucial for understanding the larger ethical issues surrounding serious games. It is helpful at this point to look at Paul Virilio’s and Jacques Derrida’s work because this helps us understand the complicity of the aesthetics of interactive and visually oriented gaming technologies in speed-elitism. In “Cyberwar, God, and Television,” Paul Virilio talks about the simulation industry’s function of “exposing [one] to the accident in order not to be exposed to it” (322). What is according to him ‘accidented’ through the virtualisation of accidents and violence, for instance in video-games, is reality itself. This ‘accident of reality’ that virtuality brings about, argues Virilio, is due to the fact that simulation technologies fragment space through their property of instantaneous connection with previously far-away places. The hallmark of this fragmentation is therefore that it brings about an intensification of forms of in- and exclusion through actual disconnection. Eventually, there will be “two realities: the actual and the virtual” (323), and I would claim that consequently the privileged speed-elite will be able to live in the illusion of engaging with social reality that the virtual grants, at the cost of the (s)lower classes who will suffer the social and ecological effects of the accidents of virtualisation. The illusion of mastery for Virilio consists in the sense of the “incorporation of the world within oneself” that “real time technologies permit” (328) due to their militaristic compulsion that seeks to “reduce the world to the point where one could possess it” (329). I maintain that these statements spell out exactly the function and logic of serious gaming.

**The alternative is to reject the imperative for productivity in the academy and instead take a detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. The upsetting force of such a fatal attitude reveals the university as the marvelously absurd outgrowth of the enlightenment that it is. The content of our strategy will never change the equation, only complete apathy towards the forms of the system can accelerate them to the point of their vacuity and collapse. Signing the ballot NEG will be the completion of this act.**

**Hoofd 17 - Ingrid Hoofd, Utrecht University, 2017** “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration” [https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7] Accessed 8/24/19 SAO

The fundamental instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’ therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change—in the paradoxical gap prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This **change** however **will** then **not be brought about by the** mere **content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the “fatal strategy” that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of a host of problematic semiotic oppositions, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of technoscientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its compulsory optimism on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or perhaps even promise through death. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current sociotechnical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest for total transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “resists the imperatives of speed,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse—whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (‘know thyself’)—or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more fragile optimism that seeks to affirm the fundamental unknowability or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the first place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1 , every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a logic of increased visibility and transparency, they also render into visible form the perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’ everything and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged visual profusion of relative otherness. Since academic productivity and activism fi nd themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘unknown quantity’ that is inherent in all meaningful learning and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine, “the presupposition of not-knowing and especially not-seeing … restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the denial and attempted erasure of the religious or spiritual aspect of the university, so that, instead of being a vision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensified itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to **welcome the upsetting force of such a fatal attitude** towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’ **as the true antidote**, or perhaps even **the quintessential shadow**, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then finally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, the future may be more radically open than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance lies the potential of that ‘more originary’ responsibility. One of the consequences of bringing back fatality and fatalism means to acknowledge that the representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of omniscience and transparent communication. As I noted in Chap. 3 , it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘reversed’ theatre in which “the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientific description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as well as an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being seduced by that object (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps the only thing one can do is to destabilize and provoke the world around us**.** We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas! (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to let the auto-immune disease run its course therefore would entail firstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the ridiculous scam that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we **follow a strategy of ‘fatal’ consciousness-raising in order to hopefully plant the seeds of future radical events regarding academia**. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable collapse of its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps we should simply let the university bleed to death for now. Only such an apparent ‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hopedfor death of the contemporary university and its revival as a radically different entity. This book must therefore finally remain speculative and opaque, and mount this final chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and true emancipation. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.

**No perms: A radical loss for the affirmative is the only way to undermine institutional accommodation. It’s try or die for the K under their role of the ballot.**

**Genosko 16 - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16** “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may **ride failure to** an ignominious **counter-victory**. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But **radical losers stand apart from the crowd** in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as **an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory**, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater with the best strategy to interrogate and rupture the intellectual property simulation – all the k cards say its true.

## CP

**CP Text: The USFG ought to create a single payer purchasing pool for insulin and distribute it free of charge to all Americans. Its bipartisan, economically feasible, and empirically increases accessibility.**

**Goozner 20 - MERRILL GOOZNER FROM, a long-time business and economics journalist, is editor emeritus and columnist for Modern Healthcare, a trade journal that he edited from 2012 to 2017, WINTER, NO. 55, Winter 2020** “Insulin Should Be Free. Yes, Free.” [https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/55/insulin-should-be-free-yes-free/] Accessed 9/26/21 SAO

Predatory pricing by the insulin cartel has triggered a public health crisis. Diabetics are dying after self-rationing their overpriced insulin. The past decade’s exorbitant price hikes have left patients stranded like oxygen-starved hikers on Mount Everest. The insulin debacle has become the public face of a much broader crisis. Sharp increases in out-of-pocket costs have left millions of patients unable to afford their medications. A large majority of Americans now rank the high cost of drugs as their top health-care concern, according to a recent Kaiser Family Foundation poll. And of all the prescription-drug horror stories out there, insulin is the worst. The insulin story illustrates everything that is wrong with the contemporary drug marketplace. Insulin, which is usually produced naturally by the pancreas to process sugar in the blood, was first isolated and used to prevent death from diabetes in the 1920s. Biosynthetic versions of human insulin were invented more than three decades ago and are no longer patented. Yet, the three-firm cartel that controls the insulin market—Eli Lilly, Sanofi, and Novo Nordisk—still does not face competition from low-cost generics, which typically come to market at a small markup above their manufacturing cost (not the 500 percent markups typical of still-patented branded drugs). Why? Those firms have been primary beneficiaries of a well-funded biotechnology industry campaign that convinced the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require long and expensive clinical trials for any biosimilars (the industry name for biosynthetic generics), which makes their cost much closer to the brand-name originals. About a quarter of the nation’s 30 million diabetics require insulin, without which they either die or suffer debilitating health consequences. Democratic Senator Amy Klobuchar highlighted the crisis by bringing a Minnesota constituent, Nicole Smith-Holt, to the 2019 State of the Union address. Smith-Holt’s 26-year-old son Alec, a Type 1 diabetic, died in 2017 from an acute case of ketoacidosis, the acid buildup in the blood that results from inadequate insulin, after being forced off his mother’s insurance plan when he turned 26. The $1,300-a-month he had to pay out-of-pocket for insulin was $200 more than his biweekly paycheck. Klobuchar and her Iowa Republican colleague Charles Grassley have included an accelerated pathway for biosimilars in their proposed legislation that would end the patent games drug companies use to delay generics entering the market. Later in the year, on the eve of the second Democratic Party debate, Senator Bernie Sanders, who has made Medicare-for-All his signature policy proposal, took a busload of diabetics to Canada to purchase insulin that is one-tenth the United States price. Sanders’s single-payer system would go beyond negotiating lower prices as is done in Canada and other industrialized nations. It would completely eliminate the copays and deductibles that stand in the way of many patients—including some who are well-insured—getting the medications they need. That our health-care system fails to provide essential medicines to people who face immediate death or injury without them is morally outrageous. The pricing and access policies of profit-seeking drug companies also make that failure quite literally a human rights violation. Those companies—and the government that fails to control them—are flagrantly ignoring the World Health Organization’s constitution, which calls “the highest attainable standard of health a fundamental right of every human being.” The document, which the United States signed in 1946, also says that “understanding health as a human right creates a legal obligation on states to ensure access to timely, acceptable, and affordable health care of appropriate quality.” But flagrant violations of international norms have not convinced Congress to put an end to this human rights abuse. The drug industry’s protectors include virtually every member of the Republican Party, which marches in lockstep with the army of lobbyists deployed by Big Pharma. Last year, the drug industry spent $169.8 million on lobbying, more than any other industry. It’s on track to spend even more this year, having poured $129.4 million into its Washington influence machine through September, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Despite their numerous protests, many Democratic Party leaders remain conflicted about how to solve the problem. Too many legislators buy into the industry’s assertions that high prices are necessary to incentivize innovation. Most Democrats also accept drug and insurance industry campaign contributions, making them reluctant to pursue dramatic changes in the status quo. And conflicted members are in key positions for making policy. Since the beginning of 2019, New Jersey Democratic Representative Frank Pallone, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, raised $130,700 from medical professionals and $66,500 from drug companies, which together represented nearly 13 percent of his total campaign contributions. Democrat Anna Eshoo, who chairs that committee’s health subcommittee and is a vocal defender of her Silicon Valley district’s biotech companies, raised $115,700 from Big Pharma and $106,350 from medical professionals. That is fully 26 percent of her campaign contributions so far this year. Drug and biotechnology companies are concentrated in areas (eastern Pennsylvania/New Jersey, Boston, and San Francisco/Silicon Valley) that are heavily Democratic. Ending the political paralysis engineered by the drug industry and **putting the interests of patients first is long overdue. Insulin is the perfect place to start. And the way to do it is** not **to make insulin** merely affordable. No—the way forward begins by making insulin **free to every patient**. That’s right, free. To all who need it without copays or deductibles, and without having to wait for the passage of a single-payer health-care system, which will be a very heavy lift under even the most favorable conditions. Making insulin free will force Medicare, Medicaid, private insurers, and pharmacy benefit managers to directly confront the insulin drug cartel over their outrageous prices. If the three drug companies refuse to negotiate, there are practical policies for responding to their intransigence that are applicable to every high-priced drug category. There are plenty of good ideas out there for how to make drugs affordable to taxpayers and private insurers should policymakers force them to assume the full cost of drugs. It can be done without jeopardizing innovation. All policymakers need to remember when designing a new system is that short-term medical necessity, long-term public health, and basic human decency should take precedence over the excessive profits being extracted from the current system by the pharmaceutical cartel. They must never forget that the greatest medical invention in the world is of no use to a patient who can’t afford to pay for it. Why start with insulin? Because diabetes has reached epidemic proportions in the United States. Its incidence is expanding at the same rate as our collective waistlines. Nearly 10 percent of Americans today are diabetic, more than double the rate of 1990. Another 12 percent are pre-diabetic and at high risk of developing the disease because they are overweight or obese, which is the number one risk factor for Type 2 diabetes. (Type 1 diabetes, an autoimmune disorder, usually manifests itself in childhood or early adulthood and accounts for just 4 percent of diabetics.) Because our society has failed miserably in its half-hearted efforts to address the obesity epidemic, the United States now ranks third out of 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries for diabetes prevalence. Blacks, Hispanics, and the poor suffer disproportionately from the disease. The epidemic is imposing a staggering cost on the nation’s health-care system: an estimated $237 billion in 2017 for direct care alone. Poorly treated or untreated diabetes also leads to maiming and life-threatening conditions like kidney and heart disease, blindness, nerve pain, and amputations. Collectively, these complications of diabetes account for an estimated one in every $4 spent on health care, according to the American Diabetes Association. Diabetes mellitus, derived from the Greek words for siphon and sweetness, occurs when the pancreas fails to produce sufficient insulin to process blood sugar after eating. Diabetes is hard to manage under the best of circumstances. It requires constant pinpricks to test blood, complicated drug regimens to control fasting glucose levels, close attention to diet, and, for about one in three diagnosed diabetics, regular injections of short- and long-acting insulins to keep blood sugar levels from spiking up or down, either of which can cause acute reactions like ketoacidosis and death. One-quarter of diabetics in the United States do not even know they have the disease and find out only when they wind up in the emergency room from some diabetes-related complication. But individual health crises increasingly are triggered by “noncompliance,” the failure to take medicines as prescribed. Noncompliance used to be ascribed to patient apathy or an unwillingness to accept unwanted side effects. Today, physicians are just as likely to attribute diabetic noncompliance to the financial toxicity caused by the high price of insulin and other drugs for managing blood sugar. Across all classes of drugs, an estimated 20 percent of prescriptions are never filled, with copay affordability increasingly cited as a major reason for noncompliance. The average diabetic now spends nearly $5,000 a year on drugs, with insulin of course being the most expensive. The price of long-acting insulin has shot up eightfold since 2000. Eli Lilly’s Humalog, for instance, retailed at $234 per vial in 2015, up from just $35 in 2001. Moreover, prices are far above those paid abroad. Sanofi’s Lantus retailed at $372 a vial in the United States in 2015, more than six times higher than what the same brand costs in Canada ($67), France ($47), or Germany ($61), according to a 2016 survey published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Patients need anywhere from two to six vials a month. As noted earlier, many patients deal with financial toxicity by skimping on their meds. A recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) analysis showed 13.2 percent of diabetics did not take their medications as prescribed, with nearly one in four asking their doctors for lower priced medicine. The uninsured were nearly three times more likely to skip or skimp on treatment. A 2018 survey by T1International, a patient advocacy group based in London, found that fully 26 percent of American patients rationed their insulin in the previous year compared to just 6.5 percent of patients in other high-income countries. The result? The hospitalization rate for diabetes complications was 38 percent higher in the United States compared to other industrialized nations. The ancillary costs caused by skimping on drugs will only grow in the years ahead unless something is done to make diabetes drugs like insulin universally available at no cost to patients. More diabetics like Smith-Holt’s son will die unnecessarily. The pipeline of people heading for costly dialysis because of inadequate diabetes treatment will widen. The nation’s hospital beds will fill with people suffering diabetes-related heart attacks, strokes, blindness, and amputations. Health insurance premiums and taxpayer obligations will rise to pay for it all. Dealing with high drug prices is only the start in addressing this mushrooming public health disaster. Americans not only pay higher prices for drugs. They require more drugs because, compared to other advanced industrial nations, Americans suffer from a far greater incidence of chronic diseases like diabetes, heart disease, cancer, and arthritis—a shift that in recent years has been directly tied to rising obesity. Americans and Europeans consumed about the same amount of calories per day in 1989, but by 2013, American consumption had jumped nearly 10 percent while European food intake declined slightly. America today has twice Europe’s obesity rate. Moreover, declining health status in the United States is disproportionately concentrated among poor, minority, and working-class Americans. Epidemiologists have known for decades that there is a direct correlation between a person’s health and their social conditions. The United States is markedly worse than peer nations on what experts call the social determinants of health. We have the most unequal distribution of wealth and income; the least fair tax system; more inadequate housing, especially for the poor; and our food production and food marketing system, especially for low- and moderate-income people, is a hothouse for incubating obesity-related ill health, especially diabetes. All are major contributors to the sharply deteriorating health status of working-class Americans. To its great shame, the United States has experienced declining longevity for three years running, according to the CDC, a phenomenon not seen in the industrialized world since Russia in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It’s important to recognize that the debilitating social conditions that are causing declining longevity are not universal. They do not afflict America’s prosperous suburbs and gentrified urban cores. Indeed, life expectancy in those well-to-do enclaves continues to grow and is equal to the healthiest countries in Western Europe. Inequality, including in access to essential medicines, is driving the growing longevity gap between these prosperous areas and the communities inhabited by America’s working class and poor, where the modern-day epidemics of obesity, opioids, and gun violence are causing significant declines in life expectancy. The relatively well-off middle class needs to recognize that dealing with these socially borne health disparities is in its self-interest. Only by tackling the causes and consequences of chronic disease epidemics like diabetes can we bring our health-care costs within international norms, and lower insurance premiums for everyone. That work begins by making essential drugs like insulin free for patients and low-cost to the system’s public and private payers. Insulin, a naturally occurring protein, hasn’t always been expensive. Dr. Frederick Banting, the Canadian awarded the 1923 Nobel Prize for Medicine for its discovery, reportedly said “insulin belongs to the world, not to me.” He gave half his cash award to one of the co-inventors responsible for its purification, who had been denied recognition by the Nobel Assembly. His co-inventors were similarly imbued with the scientific spirit: They turned the patent over to the University of Toronto for the grand sum of one dollar. The university, in turn, decided to license it for free to any company willing to produce the drug at the exacting purity standards required by diabetics—not an easy task given the volumes needed for treatment. The first insulin used by Banting and colleagues had come from the minced pancreases of hogs and cattle, which they obtained from local slaughterhouses. Animal insulin is essentially the same as human insulin and works as well once impurities are removed. Drug firms getting into the business would follow the same procedure. They built a supply chain for harvested animal pancreases that ran from major slaughterhouses to their purification factories. While the original patent was free to anyone who wanted to use it, the university added a fateful codicil to the contracts: Private companies could keep any subsequent patents awarded for improvements to the drug. Eli Lilly of Indianapolis quickly accepted the offer and began producing insulin for the American market. The company patented the technologies for processing out the impurities that could lead to severe side effects, from allergic reactions at the injection sites to anaphylactic shock. Just a few other companies followed suit, thus giving birth to the original diabetes cartel. In 1941, a federal grand jury indicted three firms—Lilly, Sharp & Dohme (later part of Merck), and E.J. Squibb (later merged with Bristol Myers)—for insulin price fixing. They pleaded no contest and settled by paying a $5,000 corporate fine and a $1,500 fine for each of their top corporate officers. While the penalty was relatively minor, it had a sobering effect on the industry that emerged after World War II price controls were lifted. The price of insulin remained relatively low and wasn’t a major concern for diabetics (unless they were uninsured) for over half a century. But the 1980s biotech revolution enabled researchers to begin making synthetic human insulin. They also developed short- and long-acting versions that dramatically improved diabetes care. The days of diabetic dependence on animal insulin were over. But these new biotech drugs were protected by a new set of patents, and their prices began edging up. In this century, they were affected by broader changes in drug industry pricing strategies. For most of their postwar history, drug manufacturers depended on selling patented medicines to large patient populations. The prices of antibiotics, anti-inflammatories, broad spectrum anti-cancer drugs, and meds to lower blood pressure, cholesterol, and stomach acid all followed similar patterns. Their prices, when introduced, may have seemed high, especially compared to the generics that came to market after the original drugs went off patent. But they usually sold for less than $1,000 a year. Generating sales in the billions of dollars for most drugs depended on reaching tens of millions of patients. With less than 3 percent of the population suffering from diabetes through the end of the 1980s (it’s now three times that level), insulin was never a major revenue generator for an industry whose profits depended on mass-market blockbusters. As innovation in these mass-market drugs waned—scientists like to say that by the end of the twentieth century, all the low-hanging fruit of the then-80-year-old drug revolution had been picked—academic and industry labs began focusing on rarer and more difficult diseases that affected smaller patient populations. Advances in molecular biology allowed scientists to identify the specific genetic malfunctions that triggered these diseases and to begin developing drugs that targeted those malfunctions. Government-funded advances in molecular biology also enabled the treatment revolution popularly known as “personalized” medicine. Scientists began dividing broad disease categories into various sub-types. Breast cancer tumors, for instance, became identifiable as ER-positive, PR-positive, HER2-positive, all of the above, or none of the above. Treatment varied accordingly. It was elegant science, but it also meant the patient population for any given drug shrank. That’s why most of the targeted medicines developed over the past two decades have come from small, venture capital-funded biotech firms started by scientists whose original research was funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), charitable foundations, patient groups, or some combination of those resources. Their successes created a new playbook for the big drug companies, which were scrambling for a revenue replacement strategy as their mass-market drugs came off patent. They began buying up successful biotech firms at inflated prices, often just on the cusp of their new drugs gaining FDA approval. To pay for these costly acquisitions from the venture capitalists, as well as maintain their own revenue streams and profit margins, the big firms began charging higher and higher prices to these smaller and smaller patient populations. Today, some of the latest drugs sport million-dollar price tags for the few thousand patients who benefit from their use. This pricing strategy has nothing to do with the cost of developing those drugs. **The premium paid by American consumers generates revenue far beyond what “the companies spend globally on their research and development**,” a recent study in the journal Health Affairs found. Dr. Aaron Kesselheim, writing in the Journal of the American Medical Association, attributed the drug industry’s untrammeled pricing power to two market realities: One, they are protected from competition through patenting; and two, unlike in Europe, their prices are not subject to government controls. As prices soared on new drugs coming to market, a curious thing happened. The prices of existing-but-still-patented drugs began rising right along with them. Unscrupulous operators like former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli, now in federal prison for security fraud, even began imposing huge price increases on some generic medicines. After acquiring Turing Pharmaceuticals, the sole manufacturer of Daraprim, which is used to treat a rare parasite infection, Shkreli raised its price from $13.50 to $750 a tablet, a 5,000 percent increase. The three firms that make up the insulin cartel took advantage of this new pricing climate after switching to biotechnology-derived insulin. The FDA approved Eli Lilly’s first synthetic insulin in 1982. Short- and long-acting versions were approved in 1996 and 2000, respectively. Their prices quickly began rising at double-digit annual rates. When new and allegedly improved versions came along, price spikes would follow despite the absence of evidence that they led to better outcomes for diabetics. European and other advanced industrial countries kept insulin price increases in check through government price-setting and more careful assessment of the newer insulins’ actual medical value. Patient and consumer advocates had hoped that the earliest biotech drugs, synthetic insulin among them, would by now have given way to much cheaper generics, known as biogenerics or biosimilars in the biotech space. After all, when Congress enabled generic competition through the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (popularly known at Hatch-Waxman after its two primary sponsors), the price of drugs coming off patent dropped markedly, sometimes by 80 percent or more. But due to intense industry opposition, Congress did not pass the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act until 2009, three years after the European Union approved its first “biosimilar.” It took another decade before the FDA approved rules enabling biosimilar interchangeability at the pharmacy, which is key to substituting generics for brand-name products. Why did it take so long? Industry and industry-funded scientists argued that biosimilars—a term they created to distinguish them from bio-generics—needed to show they were equally effective and didn’t have greater side effects than their branded predecessors. Traditional generics only had to show they were chemically the same. Under both presidents Obama and Trump, the FDA has supported the industry position. As a result, biosimilar manufacturers have to conduct long and expensive clinical trials before gaining FDA approval. The handful of biosimilars that have entered the United States market are priced near their brand-name rivals, not like true generics that come to market at 20 percent or less of the brand-name price. The latest two insulins to enter the market are a case study for this regulatory and market failure. Each is considered a “follow on” drug, not a biosimilar. Each was developed, tested, and put on the market by a member of the insulin cartel. Neither is automatically interchangeable at the pharmacy. Each is priced at 50 percent or more of the branded predecessor. None has achieved significant uptake since many doctors and patients are either unaware of their existence or are unwilling to risk the hyped-up possibility of side effects for the scant savings from switching drugs. American patients and their insurers spent $126 billion on biologic drugs in 2018. Just 2 percent went for biosimilars. For insulin, as well as other pricey biotechnology drugs, the hope that biosimilars would provide low-cost competition has been a total bust. Now we get to the heart of the matter: how to make insulin free. Let’s start that discussion by asking: What is the impediment to making insulin free? Answer: Our fragmented insurance system, which has neither the monopsonist buying power to challenge the patent-holding drug cartel nor the ability to negotiate prices. As a result, individual insurers create roadblocks to making insulin and other essential medicines and supplies affordable to patients. Nearly all private insurers impose copays on insulin that can reach hundreds of dollars a month. Even recent caps—Colorado imposed a $100 monthly maximum on out-of-pocket expenses; Express Scripts, a leading pharmacy benefit manager, limited its copay to $25 a month for some customers—will still force some low-income, price-sensitive patients to skimp on their drugs. Medicare, the biggest government health-care program, falls into the same trap. Congress has been gradually shrinking the coverage gap in the Medicare drug benefit, but under new rules enacted for 2019, beneficiaries must still pay 25 percent of the cost of all brand-name medicines, including insulin, until they reach $5,100 in out-of-pocket expenses, when the copay drops to 5 percent. Total out-of-pocket spending by diabetic Medicare beneficiaries quadrupled between 2007 and 2016 to nearly $1 billion. The path to ending all copays and deductibles, i.e., making insulin free to patients, is bypassing our fragmented insurance system with a common purchasing program that unites all consumers. It’s not even especially complicated. All it would take is for Congress to create and authorize a drug-purchasing pool, similar to a statewide program being implemented in California, that ideally would include everyone: all Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries; users of other government programs like the Veterans Administration, the Indian Health Service, and subsidized plans on the exchanges; and the majority of Americans—currently somewhere around 175 million people—who have private insurance for health-care coverage. The pool, which would be run by the federal government, would jointly purchase all forms of insulin from their manufacturers. It would then turn them over to pharmacies and other distributors free of charge. It would also have to add a small payment to cover distribution costs. **Physicians would then be free to prescribe the best insulin for their patients**, who would pick up their prescriptions at the pharmacy counter for free. Over time, this unified group purchasing system could be expanded to include other high-cost medicines, including the high-priced cancer chemotherapy and other specialty drugs that are prescribed and administered in physician offices and clinics. The pool authority would still have to buy the insulin, of course. Nothing is free. But **by eliminating markups in the distribution chain and lowering the price it paid for insulin**, the pool authority would be able to substantially lower the total payments patients and payers shell out, which the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated at $13.3 billion in 2017 for Medicare alone. To lower its acquisition costs, the pool authority would be empowered to engage in any of a number of tactics to bring down the price that it pays for insulin. They include: Direct negotiations with manufacturers; Setting benchmark prices based on an index of prices paid by other industrialized nations (the Trump Administration floated this idea last December and House Democrats included it in their bill; the drug industry has been running an expensive advertising and lobbying campaign to bury the idea); Setting reference prices based on the lowest-cost alternatives already in the market; and Importing the drugs from lower-cost countries. Having done this, the pool would next need to finance its acquisition costs in order to make the drug free to patients. The pool authority could raise money in one of two ways, or a combination of both: from general tax revenue

**The CP is competitive: Patents are key to adequate regulation and testing of drugs - AFF leads unsafe medication, which threatens public health, kills most vulnerable patients, and causes narcotic/human trafficking to surge. Especially true in the context of 1AC solvency claims on biohacking which happen outside of the traditional manufacturing process.**

**No Perms**

**[1] Real world – the government wouldn’t create two plans to solve the same problem. Finite political capital, legislative momentum and financial resources**

**[2] Idea Testing – We don’t get education about which policy is better if we moot the whole debate by just combing them**

## Shell

**Interp: The affirmative debater must articulate a distinct ROB in the form of a delineated text in the first affirmative speech.**

**Violation:**

**Standards:**

1. **Strat Skew – Absent a text in the 1AC, they can read multiple pieces of offense under different ROBs and then read a new one in the 1AR so they never substantively lose debates under the ROB, it just always becomes a 2nr debate about whether the ROB is good or not comparatively to the 1n’s which moots engagement. They can warrant things like condo logic, consequentialist policy-making offense for their aff, or kritikal impacts that deviate from their plan and then read an incredibly nuanced ROB in the 1ar that makes it so only the conceded or under-covered offense matters. Stable advocacies are key to fairness since otherwise you aren’t bound by anything you say. Impact:**
2. **Infinite abuse – Reading a new ROB in the 1AR makes it so all you have to do is dump on the 1N ROB and marginally extend your warrants in the 2ar and the neg can’t do anything about it since there is no 3NR to answer the 2ar weighing or extrapolations, you already have conceded offense, all you need is the ROB.**

#### F

#### E

#### NO RVIS

#### CI

#### DTD

## Shell

**A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than “The member nations of the WTO ought to reduce ip protections for medicine” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff)  
B. Violation: they dont  
C. Standards:**

**Fairness – This is a litmus test to determining whether your aff is fair –  
a) Ground – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. Nobody knows your aff better than you, so if you can’t find an answer I can’t be expected to**

## Case

**The affirmatives utopian reimagining of America without explicit praxis to overcome the structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.**

**Lundberg 12** Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // recut ahs ss

The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ,* takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of *The Passion* and the tropological exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand, arguing that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading *The Passion,* i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest, i would like to show the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands.