## NC

**The standard is consistency with the standpoint of the skeptic.**

**Prefer –**

**1. Performativity – The process of debating requires taking a skeptical approach to your opponents’ arguments and attempting to disprove their most basic principles, which means to say skepticial orientation is bad would deny your ability to respond to my arguments.**

**2. Holding ourselves to a standard of absolute truth is necessary: A) Culpability – Truth is the standard to which we hold people accountable for their actions, absent an understanding of the way the world actually is, people could make up their own understandings which makes it impossible for us to every justify why something someone did was bad, incorrect, etc and tell them to change B) Outcomes – The truth of the world is the ultimate determiner of the success of our actions, for example, if we were to act as though climate change wasn’t real because it is convenient, we would die of climate change must faster**

#### The skeptic would argue –

1] There is no basis for ethics – a priori knowledge is merely an acceptance of an individual’s conception of rationality. Macintyre 81, Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, 1981//Scopa The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view [S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which **no further reason** can be given. ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. **If [I]** the enquirer still goes on **ask** ing **‘But why should I live like that?’** then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). **The terminus of justification is** thus **always**, on this view, **a not further to be justified choice**, a choice unguided by criteria. **Each individual** implicitly or explicitly **has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and** for that will **its principles** have and **can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them**.

#### 2] Objectivity – Ethics must provide absolute accounts of goodness else agents simply act on their own passions and inferences which makes it impossible to evaluate any action as correct or incorrect. However, objectivity is impossible. Moral facts are impossible due to the is/ought gap

**Gray [Bracketed for clarity]** Grey, JW. "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" *Ethical Realism*. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/the-isought-gap-how-do-we-get-ought-from-is/

How is the is/ought gap evidence of moral anti-realism? Moral anti-realists think that there are no irreducible [moral facts](https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/2010/11/04/what-are-moral-facts/)—all moral truths can be reduced to our beliefs, desires, commitments, and so on. Anti-realists don’t think that anything is right or wrong apart from something like a social contract—it’s practical to commit ourselves to behaving ethically insofar as we will benefit when everyone else makes the same commitment as well. Three reasons that the is/ought gap is often taken to be evidence for anti-realism is because (a) the anti-realist sees no reason to think that what morally ought to be the case is a “moral fact” beyond our beliefs, desires, and commitments; (b) the anti-realist sees no reason to think that we could ever know such moral facts exist; and (c) the anti-realist solutions to the is/ought gap could be superior to the realist solutions. Is what morally ought to be the case a moral fact? Facts are states of affairs—actual things that exist and relations between things that exist. That a cat is on the mat is a fact. It’s unclear how what morally ought to be the case can be a fact. What morally ought to be is often quite different from the actual state of affairs in the world. A thief steals, a murderer kills, and so on. People aren’t actually doing what they ought to do. How can a[n] state of affairs that ought to exist be said to be a fact when what ought to be the case is often quite different from what actually [is] exists or happens in the world? Anti-realists see no good answers for these questions, but they think anti-realism can solve the problem by avoiding it. If there are no moral facts, then we no longer need to answer these questions. How can we know what morally ought to be the case? Hume was an empiricist, so he thought we could only know about reality through observation. What we observe isn’t necessarily what ought to be. The actual state of affairs in the world can be quite different that what people morally ought to do. We do know what is the case because we can observe it. Looking at what is the case—the actually obtaining nonmoral facts—doesn’t seem to tell us what ought to be the case. So, it’s not obvious how we can know what morally ought to be the case assuming that it’s a moral fact. Anti-realists think that we can avoid this problem entirely by becoming anti-realists and admitting there are no moral facts.

**Thus I contend the skeptic would negate the resolution.**

**1. The skeptical conclusion being true triggers permissibility: It denies that moral obligations exist. That negates – A) Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – 1) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and 2) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text B) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent**

**2. Skep linguistically negates because sentences derive meaning from their linguistic properties corresponding to facts about reality. For example, a claim like “my dog has four legs” requires you to have a dog and for that dog to actually have four legs. If ought means morality and that doesn’t exist, the statement is false.**

## Case

### TT negates

**1] member[[2]](#footnote-2) is “**a part or organ of the body, especially a limb**” but an organ can’t have obligations**

**2] of[[3]](#footnote-3) is to** “expressing an age” **but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time**

**3] the[[4]](#footnote-4) is “**denoting a disease or affliction**” but the WTO isn’t a disease**

**4] to[[5]](#footnote-5) is to** “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” **but the rez doesn’t have a location**

**5] reduce[[6]](#footnote-6) is to** “(of a person) lose weight, typically by dieting” **but IP doesn’t have a body to lose weight.**

**6] for[[7]](#footnote-7) is “in place of” but medicines aren’t replacing IP.**

**7] The aff assumes that multilateral state action is cooperative – but that’s impossible because of the prisoner’s dilemma.**

**Kuhn**, Steven, "Prisoner’s Dilemma", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter **2019** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>. //Massa

**There are two players, Row and Column**. Each has **two possible moves, “cooperate” (CC) or “defect”** (**D**D), corresponding, respectively, to the options of remaining silent or confessing in the illustrative anecdote above. **For each possible pair of moves, the payoffs to Row and Column (in that order) are listed in the appropriate cell.** RR is the “reward” payoff that each player receives if both cooperate. PP is the “punishment” that each receives if both defect. **TT is the “temptation” that each receives as sole defector and SS is the “sucker” payoff that each receives as sole cooperator.** We assume here that the game is symmetric, i.e., that the reward, punishment, temptation and sucker payoffs are the same for each player, and payoffs have only ordinal significance, i.e., they indicate whether one payoff is better than another, but tell us nothing about how much better. It is now easy to see that we have the structure of a dilemma like the one in the story. Suppose Column cooperates. **Then Row gets RR for cooperating and TT for defecting, and so is better off defecting. Suppose Column defects. Then Row gets SS for cooperating and PP for defecting, and so is again better off defecting.** The move **D**D for Row is said to *strictly dominate* the move **C**C: whatever Column does, Row is better off choosing **D**D than **C**C. By symmetry **D**D also strictly dominates **C**C for Column. Thus two “rational” players will defect and receive a payoff of PP, while two “irrational” players can cooperate and receive greater payoff RR. **In standard treatments, game theory assumes rationality and common knowledge.** **Each player is rational, knows the other is rational, knows that the other knows he is rational, etc. Each player also knows how the other values the outcomes.** But since **D**D strictly dominates **C**C for both players, the argument for dilemma here requires only that each player knows his own payoffs. (The argument remains valid, of course, under the stronger standard assumptions.) It is also worth noting that the outcome (**D**,**D**)(D,D) of **both players defecting is the game's only strict nash equilibrium, i.e., it is the only outcome from which each player could only do worse by unilaterally changing its move.** Flood and Dresher's interest in their dilemma seems to have stemmed from their view that it provided a counterexample to the claim that the nash equilibria of a game constitute its natural “solutions

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.google.com/search?q=member+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=member+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i60l3.1863j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=the+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64j69i61j69i60l2.1976j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. https://www.google.com/search?q=reduce+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&sxsrf=AOaemvI3lZsbmnXg5WHeL4m6rYGn8Vf6Aw%3A1630610232638&ei=OCMxYbCaJpO0tQb6wpGoCA&oq=reduce+definition&gs\_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyCQgjECcQRhD5ATIECAAQQzIECAAQQzIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQ6BwgAEEcQsAM6BwgAELADEEM6BwgjEOoCECc6BAgjECc6BQgAEJECOhEILhCABBCxAxCDARDHARDRAzoKCAAQsQMQgwEQQzoHCAAQsQMQQzoICAAQgAQQsQM6CAgAELEDEIMBOgoIABCABBCHAhAUSgQIQRgAUMLMBFjS3QRgnt8EaAJwAngDgAG2A4gB-heSAQozLjExLjEuMi4xmAEAoAEBsAEKyAEKwAEB&sclient=gws-wiz&ved=0ahUKEwiwlru9gOHyAhUTWs0KHXphBIUQ4dUDCA8&uact=5 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for#:~:text=English%20Language%20Learners%20Definition%20of,meant%20to%20be%20used%20with [↑](#footnote-ref-7)