**Shell**

**A. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all previously read positions on their LD NDCA wiki page under their own name with full citations, tags, and first three/last three words at least 30 minutes before the round.**

**B. Violation: they don’t – that’s the ss**

**Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated**

**C. Standards:**

**1. Academic Integrity – Disclosure deters mis-cutting evidence, power-tagging cards, and the abuse of brackets since it allows other debaters and your opponents the ability to recut your evidence and call you out if you are dishonest. Independent voter since a) it affects us outside of debate b) it destroys the constitutive purpose of debate as an educational activity if you can just make up or lie about evidence. Also means that you should disregard all of their evidence they read because their lack of disclosure means that I could not have checked before round to see if it was miscut,**

**2. Small Schools – non-disclosure helps big schools—-they have more coaches, debaters, and larger networks to scout and generate prep—disclosure checks back so everyone’s on the same playing field, and lets smaller schools get access to more prep.**

**3. Quality engagement – a) disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively write case negs and blocks, b) it allows for reciprocal engagement where each side has an equal opportunity to prepare as opposed to scouting capacity to determine success, and incentivizes in-depth debates which is key to clash.**

**4. Inspiration – If every minority debater decided not to disclose there would be no mechanism by which younger minority debaters without access to coaching would be able to be inspired to learn more about their position and become successful reading it – the wiki is a resource for those young debaters, which turns all your claims about inclusion and proves if you win the aff is good, it should be disclosed.**

**Fairness first – a. If fairness doesn’t matter u can just hack ag them b. even if there arguments seem like they are true, its because they already had an advantage c. concedes the authority – u think the judge will evaluate ur args fairly d. no point in reading scholarship if we cant engage in it in the first place – means u don’t spread ur literature e. reversibility – something the judge cant control ie violence outside of the space but rectifying violence in debate the judge can control so it’s a procedural claim f. anti-black violence is unfair, means that Anti-black violence is a type of unfairness so u concede the validity of it. Oppression violates a sort of freedom that hurts fairness irl**

#### Reject case cross apps and impact turns – 1. Language isn’t violent – it’s a question of models of debate that are best for the activity, not an enforcement of a norm 2. Form over content – your impact turns stem from a content level argument that you claim to be true but if the form in which you present them is wrong because you aren’t topical the judge shouldn’t evaluate them 3. Lack of engagement means all your arguments are presumptively false since we didn’t get a fair opportunity to test them

**Competing Interpretations – 1. Arbitrariness – the aff will always cherry pick a brightline that allows for as much abuse as possible while allowing them to read their aff, means checking abuse is impossible**

**No RVIs – 1. Baiting – encourages them to be as abusive as possible for the purpose of dumping on theory in the next speech 2. Forces me to argue for a bad norm if I come to the realization in the middle of the round which kills any substantive education we could’ve gotten otherwise.**

#### DTD – logic

**Use a norm setting model – it views each debater as proposing a model of debate and the better model is voted for, which encourages critical reflection about the best possible version of debate we can have. That means we don’t enforce a particular norm violently onto someone else, but have won our world of debate is better.**

## T

**Interpretation – The affirmative must defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust**

**Violation – they don’t**

**Resolved is policy. Louisiana House 05, [Louisiana State Legislature – Legislative Glossary. 3-8- 2005, https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx#Reading%20of%20a%20bill]**

**Resolution A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions** where some other form is not required. A bill includes theconstitutionally required enacting clause; **a resolution uses the term resolved**. Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor&#39;s veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 andSenate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

**Appropriation is “the action of taking something for one's own use, typically without the owner's permission”**

#### Outer space is “the physical universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere” Standards –

**[1] predictable limits and ground—allowing the aff to pick any ground for the debate makes neg engagement impossibly by skirting a predictable starting point, allowing for infinite affs and invalidating prep. Caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their** model. The affirmative gives up the skills that come from clash which are key for real world change, they would rather force a negative concession for a ballot.

**[2] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities.**

#### [3] Third, Tactics — their interpretation centers debate on telos without tactics – the left has too many ideas and not enough methods to achieve them – their failure to invest in movement-building cedes the political to a neoliberal will which cements depoliticization and racial violence. The aff is a liberal palliative that saps radical black energy and imagination.

#### [4] TVA solves: discuss how appropriation of space perpetuates antiblack violence with a method of miniziming structural violence or linguistic interps like nommo. A) forms nuanced, practical knowledge where they can contextualize liberation strategies to real world problems that turns the aff’s inclusion and is a net benefit to ur method on portability. b) better under gillespe – discussing the res is a strat of hyperconformity to disrupt the black hyperreal

## K

**The AFFS method depicts a White master, who has access to privileges that black subjects are denied. Desire organized within such frames resists a master, without resisting mastery and subscribe to a futile project of filling the lack. The link is the aff’s process of self-identification, which is always viewed in relation to a subject perceived as non-lacking, the drive to be whole in relation to whiteness.**

**Rogers 15.** Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne (Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186 //recut ahs emi

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such, **the subjects’ imaginations**, including their **imaginations of the results of revolution** – or of **a new mode of being** – are always **colonized with what is available to them**. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of **violence as a means to an end**, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, **can only be understood as the effort to capture** a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to **the Other**, expressed by Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the existence of the question. What this means is that **one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future**, as the answer. The two problematics of resistance overlap because **the answer is always imagined in the** terms/**signifiers available from the past**. **That is, the answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject**, and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are (always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition. **We are occupied as subjects through** **our own occupation with a recognizable identity before democracy**, **with** **the** qualities **(objects) that reflect** that **identity. This occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers that produce the subject** – **as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires**: as desires for **recognition of identity** **and** rights, as desires for **capital.** That is, **the subject is occupied a priori with these categories and recognizes** (and demands recognition) **via these categories**. If we accept the premises of subjection framed above then the argument follows that **the resisting subject is still a subject**, **but one who looks for recognition beyond** **the common political forms.** That is, we can say that the resisting subject is **still ‘passionately attached’** to the **ideas and objects which offer recognition**, but **these may be recognition by** an alternative political party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to **(another) Master’s discourse**. **They may resist one Master, but they chose another Master**. **They do not resist mastery**. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance. These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any **acts of resistance always become modes of**, in Lacan’s terms, **the desire for (another) Master** (2007). **Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s imagination of its goals**. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students – some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a comment on **their acting out the discourse of the Master** that they **imagine** they ca**n overcome,** through **listening (or even objecting) to** another **Master**, namely, **Lacan**. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own conditions of subjection, we can say that **the subjectivity of the resisting subject** – the student – is **preoccupied with the signifiers available to resist**, where the best **they can** hope for is to **be re-occupied by the imagination of securing (another) truth**. **This hope**, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – **is the hope for the Other’s knowledge.** A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: **resistance as a belief in an access to an answer,** or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. **Resistance, understood as a desire for a Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer**. The answer as a closed course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘**if I do this the world will be this’.** It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance – which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to. Theirs is **the desire for a discourse** **that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required** (**and can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier**, an imagination that the **subject can acquire**, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as **the ‘Other’s jouissance’**. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to resist in order to obtain the answer when it is **the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly resisting**.

**The alternative is to traverse the fantasy—this requires internalizing desire in order to reject the master signifier. Only through accepting lack as a constitutive feature of the human subject can we escape this never-ending desire for wholeness.**

**McGowan ‘13** “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) AHS// EMM

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy**. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life.** It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or **simply becoming aware that one is fantasizing — is one predominant image of the psychoanalytic process.** My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy, and analysis laid this fantasy bare and thus facilitated a disinvestment in it. In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. **Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy.** For example, this dimension of psychoanalysis leads Yannis Stavrakakis, in Lacan and the Political, to **see the contemporary political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought.”**25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order.** As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”**26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and psychoanalysis for him facilitates this recognition and provides a way to dissolve fantasy’s power. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.” But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience this subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible.28 Fantasy offers the subject a transcendent experience, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure that ordinarily constrain it.** As such, this moment of fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a fundamental challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: **the illusions of fantasy keep subjects content with the ruling symbolic structure,** but they also provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure**.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the fantasy has more significance than actual memories. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a flowery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals.The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience, which is why Freud values it over memory. This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. Because it allows the subject an experience of transcendence beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable within this structure; (2) fantasy facilitates an encounter with traumatic disruption that our everyday reality guards against; and (3) **fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it.** These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

**The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically embraces the lack**

## Case