## TT

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who proves the truth or falsity of the resolution –

#### 1. Text – five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of[[1]](#footnote-1). Text first – Text comes first – a) Controls the internal link to fairness since it’s the basis of things like predictability and prep b) Key to jurisdiction since the judge can only endorse what is within their burden c) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to discuss it. I deny the truth of the resolution which means u can auto negate.

#### 2. Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.

#### 3. Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate. And, a priori reasoning comes first under any framework a) a priori conditions are inescapable which means ignoring them for the sake of some end is cruel optimism b) comparing worlds means if you like one world better than the next you adopt it but if my world always exists it functions as a side-constraint

#### 4. No new 1ar rob – lets the 1ac bait a rob and moot 7 mins of offense in the 1ar

## NC

#### I negate: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The resolution specifies that the right to strike must be unconditional—this means it cannot be contingent on any authority or have any exceptions.

Thomas Magnell, Philosopher, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, J Value Inquiry (2011) 45:1–12//BA PB

Unconditional rights may be either absolutely unconditional or relatively unconditional. An absolutely unconditional right is a right which every right-holder enjoys as something capable of having rights. These are the most fundamental of all rights. As rights which all right-holders have simply as right-holders, they are common to all people, institutions, corporations, societies, and at least some nonhuman animals. They do not need to be acquired. Because they are held unconditionally, they cannot be overruled. For the same reason, they are as minimal as can be. To draw anything more than the most minimal rights from right-holders as such is almost surely a mistake. The flights of fancy of natural rights theorists led Bentham to shout: ‘‘Natural Rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.’’12 Still, notwithstanding Bentham’s finest flourish of phrasing, there may be some, for example, the right of a right-holder not to be subject to a wanton disregard of its interests. This would seem to be a right that at least some animals have as well as people taken individually or in groups. It is not a particularly robust right. An awful lot of harm can be inflicted upon a right-holder without showing a wanton disregard for the right holder’s interests. Even so, as minimal as it is, it is not a right that is always respected, as National Socialists and International Socialists showed in concentration camps and the Gulag. A relatively unconditional right is a right which all right-holders of a certain kind enjoy without qualification. This gives a clear sense to the much abused term ‘‘human rights,’’ though there may be others. In the strictest sense, human rights are relatively unconditional rights. They are rights which human beings have simply as human beings, or perhaps more precisely as persons, if not all human beings are accounted persons, whatever their role or situation within or apart from a society. A better term for them would be ‘‘person rights,’’ but here the common term is unlikely to be allowed to give way. Human rights are not acquired, though if personhood is a characteristic that human beings can come to have and come to lose, human rights may be gained or lost along with it. Some other right-holders may have the same rights unconditionally, but not all. Narrower on the one hand than absolutely unconditional rights, broader on the other than conditional rights, human rights cannot be conferred by declarations or political manifestos on non-human animals or people: not on non-human animals because non-human animals cannot have them, and not on people because people already have them. In the strictest sense, many of the rights that have come to be labeled as human rights in the fairly recent past, such as the supposed rights to a certain level of income or to a certain level of education are not human rights at all, however politically popular it may be to say that they are. If they are rights in any sense, they are civil rights, acquired rights that are conferred by some civil authority. Human rights in the strictest sense have a more philosophical tone. One notable human right is that of entering into obligations, the right, odd as it sounds, to bear duties. Another is the human right to freedom, the relatively unconditional right that people who are capable of acting autonomously have as such beings. We have a right to liberty without the need for the right to be conferred, while other beings, such as non-human animals that may have the broader absolutely unconditional rights, lack this relatively unconditional right. This is why liberty is intimately tied with human dignity, even as it is demonstrably allied with human prosperity. All other rights that have correlative duties are conditional rights, rights of only some right-holders. They are acquired rights. Their acquisition is conditional on meeting certain qualifications. Someone has a right to have a promise kept only if he meets the qualifications of being the promisee. Someone has a right to receive charity only if he meets the qualification of being in need. From this it should be evident that conditional rights may be either conditioned-rights or unconditionedrights. What makes a right conditioned is a condition of the right itself, that of the correlative duty, an imperfect duty, not being conferred on other qualified rightholders. What makes a right conditional is a condition for acquiring the right in the first place.

#### The right to strike is an conditional right, so viewing it as unconditional is impossible. Fiat doesn’t solve because its intrinsic to the nature of the principle and the aff is a binding policy, not just view X as Y.

#### [1] The right to strike is conditional on the government existing and enforcing it: A] The Sqou proves that without the state, the right doesn’t exist, which means turning the NC non-uniques the aff B] State of nature would just mean people could take the action, not that they have a guaranteed right to do so.

#### [2] The right is conditional on the existence of certain social institutions: IE a workplace and employer to strike against, and a job to stop doing. This doesn’t apply to unconditional rights like freedom or life, since they are intrinsic to human nature not social constructs.



#### [3] Unconditional rights cannot conflict with each other, as otherwise neither would be absolute, but the right to strike conflicts with 1] The right to life of those deprived of stuff like medicine, which is fundamental to every human action, and 2] is intrinsically violent as when enforcing it you must know everything about a particular situation, and you must act immediately in the face of a violation, otherwise you allow injustice to occur. But these are simultaneously impossible since a) we cannot know everything about a particular situation and b) there is not infinite time to make an ethical decision. Given that there must be deliberation over any moral decision to ensure its correctness in relation to the situation, the very act of deliberation is violence, as you allow the injustice to continue, but if you were to act immediately you would act without proper knowledge to correctly address the injustice.

#### [4] Weighing: A] Even if the aff proves that an unconditional right such the right to life or right to freedom entails the right to strike, this doesn’t prove that it is unconditional since it is contingent on another right, and is therefore not sufficient to affirm B] Unconditional rights are unconditionally good and lack exceptions, so one instance where the right is wrong is sufficient to prove it is conditional too that particular circumstance.

## Shell

**Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.**

**Violation – screenshots in the doc prove they don’t**

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**1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.**

**Open source does equal the playing field**

**Overing 18** – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better preparation** – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

**2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat**

**3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.**

#### F

#### E

#### DTD Ci

#### No Rvis

## Case

### Framework

**[1] Culpability – Ethics must hold agents culpable as otherwise we cannot be responsible for moral wrongdoings since they occur externally to our wills and will happen regardless of whether we advise against them. However, willing fails and agents lack control.**

Coyne 12 **Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The** [**University of Chicago**](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)**], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012** [**https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1**](https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1)

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. **Everything that you** think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

#### [2] Argument from evolution

**Machuca 18** Diego E. Machuca “Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview”, 02/27/2018 [https://philarchive.org/archive/EMAMSA] Accessed 3/8/21 AHS//NPR

Drawing especially on the work of evolutionary biologists, some moral skeptics have argued that the most plausible account of the origin of morality is the one that appeals to evolution: natural selection has forged certain faculties or capacities devoted to moral judgment. In their view, the evolutionary account defeats our first-order moral beliefs because it does not require that morality be true, but only that it be evolutionarily advantageous to believe that it is true. Evolutionary debunking strategies of this sort have been deployed in a systematic way particularly by Richard Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006; 2016c) and Sharon Street (2006; 2008). Joyce first appealed to the argument from evolution in his defense of a moral error theory, but later on used it to ground a skepticism about moral justification. Street employed the argument in her attack not merely on moral realism but on value realism in general. Although in the two articles in question she does not develop or defend it, she repeatedly mentions constructivism as the anti-realist view that sidesteps her evolutionary debunking argument against value realism. The defense, interpretation, and criticism of various types of evolutionary arguments for moral skepticism have of late attracted a lot of attention, and in fact the study of ‘the evolution of morality’ constitutes a burgeoning area in metaethics. The thrust of such arguments is that biological evolution is aimed not at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, but at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive. In other words, the evolutionary function of those processes is not that of tracking the truth: their general success at matching or accurately representing alleged objective moral facts explains neither their emergence nor their persistence. Humans are therefore disposed to make moral judgments regardless of the evidence to which they are exposed, regardless of whether there are or are not objective moral facts. Someone might object that, in order to be adaptive, such processes must be reliable, i.e., the moral judgments they form are evolutionarily useful—i.e., tend to promote survival and reproduction—because they are in general true. However, given that moral beliefs may well be adaptively useful even if they are not true, if what we know is only that evolution is aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive, then we do have here a defeater: even if some moral judgments are true, there is no reason for claiming that they are. This is the way in which evolutionary skeptical arguments are in general understood in the literature. Resuming the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters discussed at the outset of the present section, the evolutionary account of the origin of our moral beliefs then provides an undercutting defeater for those beliefs: it does not show that they are false—for there might well be moral facts out there in the world—but rather that they were not formed in a reliable way because their source is not trustworthy, and hence that they are not epistemically justified. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore epistemological. However, as we will see, the evolutionary account has also been understood as providing a rebutting defeater for our moral beliefs: a reason for thinking that objective moral facts do not exist, and hence that such beliefs are false. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore ontological. When appealed to in relation to a moral error theory, evolutionary debunking considerations are normally used as a supplement to arguments that purport to establish the error-theoretic conclusion in order to account, once the conclusion is accepted, for the systematic error we commit in making moral judgments. This seems to be the case of Mackie, who briefly appealed to evolution as an alternative explanation of the origin of our moral sentiments and dispositions (1977: 113–114, 124, 192, 229, 239). Although Mackie (1985: 154) claimed that morality can be seen as an outgrowth from genetically determined retributive tendencies that were favored by evolutionary selection, 14 he did not offer an elaborate evolutionary account of morality in the way Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006) has. The latter maintains that the origin of morality is to be found in the development of human cooperation: an individual is more reproductively fit if his sympathetic desires to help his family members are supplemented by a sense of inescapable requirement to favor them that strengthens his motivation to perform helpful actions. This was accomplished by providing people with the belief that such actions have objective moral qualities. Once a cognitive capacity to believe that it is inescapably required to help family members was in place, it was exploited by natural selection to regulate also helpful behavior towards non-kin individuals. It must be remarked that Joyce’s view is not that every particular moral prescription can be evolutionarily explained, or that culture or the environment plays no role in determining moral beliefs. Rather, his view is that the tendency to use general moral categories and the belief that certain types of action bear objective moral properties are innate; that cultural influences can cause some of those actions to stop being regarded as moral or immoral, or cause other types of action to start being so regarded; and that moral dispositions require environmental cues to become manifest. For reasons that will become clear at the end of this subsection, it is important to note that Joyce is at some points cautious regarding the status of his evolutionary account of morality. He presents the hypothesis that natural selection has led us to commit the fundamental moral error as a “plausible speculation” (2001: 135). Also, although he regards the evolutionary hypothesis as plausible, coherent, and testable, and as the best story of the origin of morality we have (2006: 134, 137, 139– 140), and although he therefore answers the question “Is human morality innate?” in the affirmative, he remarks that “this is provisional and to a degree speculative, since the present evidence does not warrant answering the question in either a positive or a negative way with any confidence” (2006: 2). Finally, he observes that his evolutionary debunking argument “is conditional: It relies on an empirical premise concerning the evolution of morality which is yet to be established” (2016b: 9). In his first treatment of the evolutionary account of morality, Joyce not only remarks that it complements the arguments for moral error theory, but he makes the stronger claim that “the fact that moral thinking is a naturally evolved trait has error theoretical implications” (2001: 137) or “provides evidence in favor of the error theory” (2001: 148). In his view, the innateness of moral judgments undermines these judgments being true for the simple reason that if we have evolved to make these judgments irrespective of their being true, then one could not hold that the judgments are justified. And if they are unjustified, then although they could be true, their truth is in doubt. (2001: 159) But the fact that if we accept the evolutionary account, our moral beliefs are utterly unjustified, or we have no reason for thinking that they are true, or it is highly improbable or extremely unlikely that they are true, in no way establishes the ontological conclusion of moral error theory. Of course, the evolutionary account places the burden of proof on the non-minimal moral realist to provide us not only with a reason for believing that our moral beliefs are epistemically justified, but also with a reason for believing that there are objective moral facts or properties in the first place. Oddly enough, Joyce himself recognizes that the evolutionary account alone does not support an ontological conclusion, but rather an attitude of withholding of assent concerning the truth or falsity of moral judgments (2001: 160–168). In any case, in later works he explicitly remarks that one cannot argue for a moral error theory on the basis of evolutionary considerations, the correct skeptical conclusion being instead that all moral judgments are unjustified (Joyce 2006: ch. 6; 2016c; cf. 2016b: 8). Joyce’s later evolutionary debunking stance seems to vacillate between nihilistic and Pyrrhonian epistemological skepticism: sometimes he seems to believe that moral beliefs are intrinsically unjustified or that they have been shown to be so for good, and sometimes to believe that they can be deemed to be unjustified on the basis of the evidence available up to this point. Joyce’s epistemological version of the argument from evolution could be formulated as follows: 1. Our capacity to form first-order moral beliefs is an evolutionary adaptation produced by natural selection. 2. Biological evolution is not aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, i.e., processes whose function is to track the alleged moral truths. 3. Given 2, our having beliefs that objects possess moral properties is consistent with nothing ever possessing a moral property. Therefore: 4. Our first-order moral beliefs are epistemically unjustified. Street (2006) contends that evolutionary considerations pose a dilemma for realist theories of value (and hence for realist theories of moral value). The fact that the forces of natural selection have greatly shaped the content of our evaluative judgments raises the challenge to explain the relation between such evolutionary influences and the independent evaluative facts posited by the realist. 15 The first horn of the dilemma is the claim that there is no such relation, which results in an implausible skepticism: we would have to conclude that our evaluative judgments are contaminated by a distorting influence and hence that many or most of them are off the track. Although it is possible that “as a matter of sheer chance” our evaluative judgments accord with the allegedly independent evaluative facts, “this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely unlikely . . . but also astoundingly convenient to the realist” (2006: 122). In response, one could appeal to rational reflection as another major influence on the content of our evaluative judgments that corrects the distorting influence of evolutionary pressures on such judgments. Although Street does not discard such an influence, she claims that, since rational reflection must proceed by using evaluative judgments, one would be assessing evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments by means of other evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments (2006: 124). The other horn of the dilemma is the claim that natural selection favored those ancestors who were able to grasp the independent evaluative truths, because tracking them was advantageous for survival and reproduction. But this account that presents itself as a scientific explanation is, in Street’s view, inferior on scientific grounds to the one according to which the tendency to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ survival and reproduction because those judgments forged adaptive links between the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves and their responses to such circumstances. This account is superior in terms of the usual criteria of scientific adequacy, for it is clearer, more parsimonious, and does a better job at illuminating the tendency in question (2006: 129–134). Once again, we see that a crucial premise in an argument against value realism is a best-explanation premise. With a focus on moral realism, Street’s argument could perhaps be formulated thus: 1. The forces of natural selection have had an indirect tremendous influence on the content of our moral judgments. 2. The moral realist owes us an explanation of the relation between such an evolutionary influence and the independent moral facts he posits. 3. He can claim either that (3a) there is no relation or that (3b) there is such a relation. 4. If he claims that (3a), then he is forced either (4a) to embrace a farfetched moral skepticism or (4b) to claim that an incredible coincidence took place. 16 5. If he claims that (3b), then he must propose a tracking account, which is scientifically unacceptable (since the adaptive link account provides the best explanation of why our tendency to make certain kinds of moral judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success). Therefore: 6. Moral realism is false, i.e., there are no independent moral facts. It is surprising that Street argues for an ontological conclusion regarding independent or objective moral facts on the basis of an evolutionary debunking argument. For it seems that evolutionary debunking arguments (and genealogical debunking arguments in general) can at most undermine the epistemic credentials of our substantive moral beliefs—i.e., can at most provide us with undercutting defeaters for those beliefs. Street’s own evolutionary debunking argument establishes at most that we have no reason for affirming that our moral beliefs match alleged objective moral facts because the best explanation of our tendency to make certain moral judgments makes no appeal to them. Even though the moral realist then owes us a reason for affirming that such facts exist, the argument does not prove that they do not. Note that such epistemological moral skepticism is different from (4a), the skeptical conclusion that Street regards as implausible or far-fetched.

#### [3] Turn: The broad application of the term structural violence to describe every problem diverts attention away from injustice of widespread deadly physical violence and prevents an interrogation of the true causes of slow violence

**Boulding 77 - Kenneth E. Boulding, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1977** “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung” [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/423312.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5627e8cb43118ba5f8137ae330d90cf3] Accessed 9/25/21 SAO

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it **is both persuasive and wrong**. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. **Violence**, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, **is a** very **different phenomenon from poverty**. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to every- thing else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like **violence** are difficult to study because they **represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities**. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galtung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commentator as anything that Galtung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. **The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery**. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures which produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

**[4] The theory of structural violence is based in the flawed, simplistic knowledge of the evolution of power and privilege. The solution of reduce dominance and power can never solve because they rely on a misunderstanding of the causes of poverty and human suffering.**

1. [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate, http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)