## K

**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –**

**A) Differentiation - signifiers refer to other signifiers without having a final signified to relate to which produces a constitutive lack from the inability to reach true meaning. This instability forces us to form a world in pursuit of the lost gaps to fulfill the subject’s desires. B) Language is constantly changing- it’s contextually produced with respect to temporality and cultures because every individual indexes to language differently.**

**The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects the lack.**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**Prefer: A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place. B) Everything is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted. C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.**

**The underlying desires to strike are all attempts to fill the lack**

Joel **Morris**, “The Psychoanalysis of Labor Strikes”, December **1959**, Vol. 10, No. 12, [<https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/labljo10&div=120&id=&page=>] // swickle

This is an unusual treatment of strikes. It does not deal with wages, hours or working conditions but, rather, with the psychoanalytic interpretations of strikes, based upon the theories of Freud and Adler. Mr. Morris says that a strike is analogous to Freud's description of the rebellion of a son against the father figure; and, in line with Adler's teaching, he traces the cause of strikes to an overcompensation mechanism in which labor strives for power and recognition, which in turn foment difficulties for the individual in his work situation. DO ECONOMIC FACTORS cause strikes? Some psychoanalysts believe that economics (wages and hours) may trip off a strike, but that there are other underlying psychological factors that can pre-dispose labor to strike. These factors may include latent hostility toward parents, who can be represented by management and the capitalist. The strike may also reflect a reaction against cultural coercions of natural impulses, a reduction in group tension by displacement of group aggression, or labor's economic weapon to compensate for its social and economic inferiority. The strike can also be viewed as a means by which labor strives for power and recognition, identifies with the employer's managerial powers and shares in his wealth. The popular consensus is that labor strikes are called for economic reasons—that they reflect demands for higher wages, increased job security, job safety, fringe benefits and reduced hours. These may be valid reasons, but only represent economic causes for strikes. The psychoanalyst, whether or not he believes that economics causes strikes, is predisposed to view group behavior from a different orientation. ~~He~~[they] attempts to understand the group's personality and its underlying psychological motivations. The reason for group behavior may be apparent or hidden. Realizing that what meets the eye is not always reality, the psychoanalyst can view the economics of the situation as a symptom rather than a cause of strikes. The apparent economic cause thus becomes an overt manifestation of deeper, under-lying psychological motivations.

**The affirmatives utopian reimagining of America without explicit praxis to overcome the structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.**

**Lundberg 12** Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // ahs ss

The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ,* takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of *The Passion* and the tropological exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand, arguing that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading *The Passion,* i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest, i would like to show the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands.

**The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the material and calculable, inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. We sacrifice the very nature of knowledge while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life.**

**Mills,** Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm.When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, knowledge is a dialectical enterprise that stands in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility--the possibility of the *not*: negation, conflict, and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is a fundamental one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition, hence that which is alien to the self. Paranoia is not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is a generic process of *nosis*--'I take thought, I perceive, I intellectually grasp, I apprehend'--hence have *apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. Others hurt us with their knowledge, with what they say, as do we. And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know--what we may and may not find out; and this is why our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems perhaps informing the popular adage, 'knowledge is power.' But whose? There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity? In the gathering of knowledge there is simultaneously a covering-over, a blinding to what one is exposed to; moreover, an erasure. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation/denial and repression--in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology--the question and meaning of knowledge--we are intimately confronted with paranoia. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us all to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!*When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to these questions, it is no wonder why most theists say only God is omniscient. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of God is an illusory derivative of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is *always* watching, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, I can think of no greater paranoia.

**The alternative is to traverse the fantasy—this requires internalizing desire in order to reject the master signifier. Only through accepting lack as a constitutive feature of the human subject can we escape this never-ending desire for wholeness.**

**McGowan ‘13** “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) AHS// EMM

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy**. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life.** It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or **simply becoming aware that one is fantasizing — is one predominant image of the psychoanalytic process.** My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy, and analysis laid this fantasy bare and thus facilitated a disinvestment in it. In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. **Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy.** For example, this dimension of psychoanalysis leads Yannis Stavrakakis, in Lacan and the Political, to **see the contemporary political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought.”**25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order.** As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”**26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and psychoanalysis for him facilitates this recognition and provides a way to dissolve fantasy’s power. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.” But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience this subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible.28 Fantasy offers the subject a transcendent experience, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure that ordinarily constrain it.** As such, this moment of fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a fundamental challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: **the illusions of fantasy keep subjects content with the ruling symbolic structure,** but they also provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure**.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the fantasy has more significance than actual memories. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a flowery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals.The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience, which is why Freud values it over memory. This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. Because it allows the subject an experience of transcendence beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable within this structure; (2) fantasy facilitates an encounter with traumatic disruption that our everyday reality guards against; and (3) **fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it.** These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

## Shell

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read frameworks with both normative and theoretical justifications. To clarify, theoretical justifications link back to fairness and education.

#### Violation: They read TJF’s and normative justifications – we asked in cx

#### [C] Standards:

#### [1] Philosophical education—when I read a normatively justified framework in opposition, we are able to interact and weigh between two frameworks. However, when you include normative and theoretical justifications, you moot any philosophical education by a) extending pre-fiat reasons to come before substance b) require people to justify their framework substantively less and c) hone theory skills rather than reading literature. Kills philosophical education because we don’t engage on a substantive discussion of warrants. Philosophical education outweighs other links to education because LD is uniquely a values debate. Also controls the internal link to real world education because people make a bunch of moral decisions in their everyday lives.

#### [2] Strategy Skew—by having both layers, you can just collapse to whichever one I undercover in the next speech, skewing my strategy. Even if I put defense on theoretical justifications, you still win the framework debate. Strat skew is an independent voter because we need a coherent strategy to debate in the first place, meaning it precludes things like fairness or education.

#### [D] Voters: Education, schools fund debate for its education value, and only education has out of round impacts. Drop the debater on neg theory: 1. drop the argument incentivizes abusive affs that bait theory and then collapse to substance by kicking case or extending tricks – means neg always loses. 2. 2ar collapse ensures the aff will always win if they have free range of arguments – drop the debater is key to neg layering. And, no aff rvi’s: A. incentivizes aff to read abusive interps and arguments and just focus on prepping a long counterinterp to always win, B. creates a chilling effect – aff is uniquely dangerous on theory because they get to read a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar to collapse, weigh, and contextualize: negs would always be disincentives from reading theory against good theory debaters which leads to infinite abuse. Prefer competing interps to reasonability because reasonability a. has no bright line for mitigating a shell b. invites huge judge intervention because thresholds for “unreasonable” abuse are different and c. creates a race to the bottom with both debaters being as abusive as they can conceivably justify.

## K

**Justifying util is an independent voter –**

**1. Util justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm.**

**2. Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is murder okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say no because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure. Probability doesn’t solve because that just allows for moral error and freezes action while attempting to calculate the perfect decision.**

**3. Util justifies death good – the absence of pleasure is not bad since there is no life to calculate its lossed value and experience its absence but the lack of pain is actively good even if that good cannot be enjoyed by anyone because it would still have net value. This puts them in a double bind: Either A) we intuitively know killing people is wrong in which case you reject util or B) they condone death as good in which case their advantage affirms.**

#### They read morally repugnant arguments. Thus the alternative is to drop the debater, to ensure that debate remains a space safe for all – the judge has a proximal obligation to ensure inaccessible practices don’t proliferate. Accessibility is a voting issue since all aff arguments presuppose that people feel safe in this space to respond to them.

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