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#### Link 1: The aff replicates anthropocentrism by discounting the onto-epistemological power of outer space

Ferrando 16 - Francesca Ferrando, Liberal Studies Program, New York University, in the Book “The Ethics of Space Exploration” pgs 147-149, edited by Schwartz and Milligan, published 2016 “Chapter 10: Why Space Migration Must Be Posthuman” [Space and Society, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39827-3\_10] Accessed 12/1/21 SAO

It is now time to consider the impact of space encountering on human identity and existential insights, by delving into the specific change of perspective brought along by space traveling. This radical shift, known as the overview effect, consists of a series of epiphanies experienced by astronauts looking at the Earth from outer space. In his book The Overview Effect: Space exploration and human evolution (1998), Frank White relates such a shift in consciousness to that specific geographical perspective, stating: “Mental processes and views of life cannot be separated from physical location” (3). Humans are embodied beings; their materiality is a process supported and deeply affected by their surroundings. White further asserts this point by emphasizing the fact that the astronauts in Earth orbits and the lunar astronauts have different types of epiphanies: “The orbital astronaut sees the Earth as huge and himself or herself as less significant. The lunar astronaut sees the Earth as small and feels the awesome grandeur of the entire universe…Both programs change the astronaut’s perception of the Earth and of his or her own identity, but in quite different ways” (ibid., 36). To White, the overview effect is so significant, that he affirms: “It is possible to grasp the true implications of this evolutionary process only by seeing it from the viewpoint of the universe as a whole, and from that perspective, the Overview Effect may point to humankind’s purpose as a species” (ibid., 5). **The overview effect is of key importance to space ethics, allowing us to approach the topic of space migration not** only **from the** usual **utilitarian perspective, but** also **from an onto-epistemological standpoint:** resonating with Heidegger, **space physically becomes “a way of revealing**”. 10.5 Conclusions The affects and effects of space travel are life-changing, as Valentina Tereshkova remarks: “As soon as I begin staring into the starry ways in the sky, I physically realize how close they are. Those who have already been in space, yearn with all their hearts and souls to haste there again and again” (2015, 10). Tereshkova recently volunteered for a one-way trip to Mars, believing in a project which, even though not accomplished yet, may soon enough become actual. This chapter responds to the urgency for reflecting on the large-scale ethical implications, socio-political challenges and technological preconditions of space migration. In the first section of this chapter we have demonstrated that in the ancient world astronomical insights had a direct impact on social events, architectonical structures and religious beliefs: knowledge of space was crucial to the understanding of the Earth and to the development of human civilizations. In the second section we have underlined how, in the space race, humans lost their ontological primacy. While humanistic categories such as gender, race, nationality, among others, are still affecting the practices of going to space, the anthropocentric ontological primacy of the human has been challenged. On one side, non humans animals were launched first and have preceded humans in space. On the other side, robots are better suited to survive to outer space conditions.28 Thirdly, space migration brings to the bioethical debate on human enhancement new terrain of discussion by addressing, among other controversial issues, the search for alien life and the possibility of creating hybrids and chimeras between human animals and non-human animals, who may be better fitted to live on planets other than Earth, with all the bioethical concerns that crossing such species boundaries may raise. In the third section we have highlighted how outer space cannot be thought separate from Earth: space technology is already causing space debris, an environmental hazard both for spacecrafts as well as for life on Earth. Space pragmatics should be revised by developing sustainable space technology in order to comply with the theoretical premises based on the “Outer Space Treaty” (1967), expanding the beneficial vision of space exploration and space migration, from humans and Earth, to non-human beings and non-human agents, including other planets, stars, natural satellites and asteroids, approaching outer space under specific environmental regulations. Space exploration and interstellar traveling are setting the conditions for a socio-cultural, bio-technological and geo-political evolution, which is radically challenging the notion of the human, of the cosmos and of life itself. From an onto-epistemological perspective, the narratives of outer space are **feeding a posthuman paradigm shift** by decentering the Earth from the center of the known universe, and placing hypothetical human and non-human beings on other celestial bodies; furthermore, space migration and the adaptation to extraterrestrial conditions may eventually bring along the evolution of posthumanities. Outer space represents a literal and physical place beyond anthropocentrism, Earth-centrism, biocentrism and life-centrism, although these discriminatory categories are reappearing in human activities and pragmatics in space: this is why space is crucial to Posthumanism as much as Posthumanism is necessary to space. Outer space can finally be seen as the becoming29 of the human, not only linguistically (as a “posthumus”, the etymological root of the term “human”), but also ontologically. Outer space has historically performed and continues to manifest as a way of revealing in the processual constitution of human and posthuman identities. Through a comprehensive analysis of past, present and future legacies, this chapter stresses the importance of adopting a posthumanist approach in space migration, in order to manifest, instead of old habits and new wars, desirable futures for humans and non-humans alike.

#### Link 2: Foreclosing the failure of radical ecological and social arrangements in space cements the normative architecture of capital

Valentine 12 - David Valentine, Anthropological Quarterly, Fall 2012“Exit Strategy: Profit, Cosmology, and the Future of Humans in Space” [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/488890] Accessed 1/13/22 SAO

Should we take these cosmological accounts seriously? Recently, as I explained my attempt to do so to a colleague, he became very angry with me. He argued that the cosmological mission of NewSpace entrepreneurs can only be fantasy, and to treat it as anything else was intellectually and politically dangerous because it obscured the extractive and exploitative ideologies that are fundamentally at the heart of any capitalist endeavor. Giving a counter example, I noted that several of my interlocutors are concerned about potentially civilization-killing asteroids hitting Earth and that their plans are practical and non-fantastic in the sense that species have been eradicated by asteroids before, a possibility that exceeds the demands, fantasies, or time frame of capitalism. I mentioned the famous Tunguska event of 1908 where a comet or asteroid hit a remote area of Siberia with a force roughly equivalent to 1,000 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. My colleague himself exploded at this point: “capitalism does more damage on the face of the Earth every day than that asteroid did at that moment!” While I’m not sure whether he was accurate or how one might assess the material impact of capitalist endeavors in a single day vis-á-vis a large asteroid strike, his point is not to be ignored. Yet what struck me most about this argument is, again, the implication that Earth and its recent human history brackets the totality of human experience and of its future, and that the evidence of capitalism’s effects on the Earth relegates potential asteroid strikes or human settlement in space necessarily to the realm of fantasy. On the other hand, my NewSpace interlocutors see the assumption— on the part of most of the public, governments, and social critics—that the human future is constrained by the upper limits of the Earth’s atmosphere and by the time-span of modernity as itself a dangerous fantasy. In the words of one presenter at the 2011 ISDC: “Something is going to hit us, we need to survive. We have to convince people of that.” In this view, the Earth-bound gaze ignores Earth’s context in a broader environment of the solar system and assumes an historical context which spans merely hundreds rather than **billions of years**. They see history in terms of a species imperative to expand in order to protect life and intelligence by distributing humans across the solar system and even the galaxy (as shown by Olson and Farman in this issue). But they too assume that Earth-originating, historically-recent free market principles will underpin such expansion, even as some might imagine or hint at other social and exchange forms arising in the encounter with space. What I seek here is another kind of exit strategy: an escape from the assumption (whether rightist or leftist) that the encounter with space will simply produce a repetition, extension, or logical conclusion of history, human sociality, exchange relations or any other human phenomena that have emerged on the surface of our planet. From libertarian supporters of NewSpace endeavors, this requires following through on the radical promises they see offered by a future in space with an acknowledgment that **the context of space may produce radically-different kinds of social and exchange relations**. From those who see human settlement of outer space as a fantasy or a dangerous distraction from the realities of environmental collapse and capitalist excesses, this requires a willingness to engage seriously with the possibilities of space as a context for human futures. From both, it requires an engagement with contemporary human activity that is not already explained by the brief span of modern human history. Again, it is important to reiterate I am not proposing a contradiction between cosmology and capital. NewSpacers are excellent capitalists; they certainly want to make money, and they see market forces as key to the settlement of space. Concomitantly, other entrepreneurs have visions of the social good that their enterprises will bring about, and may find finance capitalism’s short-termism equally vexing and necessary to navigate. Yet, NewSpace is unique not only in that it encompasses diverse industry sectors, but more importantly because it envisions itself as shaping the total future of the human species and of life on Earth itself; in this way, it is cosmological. And again, these are not exclusive goals. Several of my interviewees have contested my characterization of a necessary tension between NewSpace entrepreneurs’ and investors’ goals. In interviews, people like Kollipara, whom I cited above, see a distinction between these goals but not a tension. For Kollipara, profit is both the proximal engine and purpose of NewSpace enterprises, and he sees the investment problems of NewSpace industries as natural problems of any nascent industry. But going is still the end goal: like most other interviewees, Kollipara was willing to accept my ticket to Mars, to abandon his Earthly wealth to be part of the vanguard of the human future. While the market is seen by Kollipara and others as the natural engine for this radical evolution of the human future, the two are not smoothly aligned, and one cannot fully explain the other. I conclude with another return: to the future. The very idea of “the future” provokes suspicion in anthropologists because of its suturing to the teleologies of modernity and capitalism. And “space” is the iconic site of modernity’s future. Yet, again, as Collins (2008) notes, **if we accept that “the future” is necessarily the steady path of neoliberalism (or, alternatively, its overturning by a socialist revolution), aren’t we just buying into those very teleologies?** In turn, if we don’t pay attention to the explicit utopian human futures of people who are powerful enough to at least set them in motion, are we not preventing ourselves from becoming involved in one of the emerging debates about what a human future should look like? To be sure, the future that NewSpacers envision is already known to them; like the anthropologies that Collins critiques, it is a future past, though in this case built on the premise of free markets, American exceptionalism, science fiction precedents, a valorization of colonialism, and libertarian principles and ethics. But if NewSpace is in a position to enact at least some of its cosmological visions, I am arguing we should engage with those visions in their own terms, and not foreclose them within the unfolding of a story that we already know (the eternal success of neoliberalism or the inevitability of an environmental and socialist revolution) so that we may engage with this future and the surprising sociality and exchange relations that may emerge from it. This requires taking these future visions of humans in space—no matter how apparently extreme— seriously, as a cosmology with teeth.

#### Alternative: Reject colonial determinism. Instead of embracing failure we must be attentive to the difference introduced by space as a critical philosophical project.

Valentine 15 - David Valentine is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Platypus, May 5, 2015 “Failure and the Future” [https://blog.castac.org/2015/05/failure-future/] Accessed 1/14/22 SAO

There’s nothing quite as satisfying for the modern as an historical prediction about the future, or about a large transformational project, that has—inevitably—failed. Whether as specific as predictions of particular technologies (where’s my flying car?), or as general as claims that market solutions will erase social inequalities (capitalism will eventually end poverty!), critical scholars have demonstrated that faith in a progressive future is fundamentally a political and ideological project of the modern era. But this satisfaction with modernity’s failures alerts us to the fact that we never-moderns still have faith in one kind of prediction, which is precisely the prediction of inevitability of failure of such transformational projects and their promised positive futures. Indeed, one could say that what we call the end of the modern or of history was inducted in this affective mode: an ironic stance toward now-faded modernist futures, their hubris and hopefulness simultaneously exposed as illusions of a progressive but failed modernity. This is nowhere more apparent than in critical approaches to the human conquest of space beyond Earth. The recent negative publicity about Mars One is a case in point. Announced in 2012, Mars One’s founder, Bas Lansdorp, proposed sending privately-funded, one-way human missions to the Red Planet with volunteer crews, enabling the establishment of a Mars colony by 2029. Lansdorp has argued that such a remarkable goal could be achieved using existing technologies and could be funded by media rights to what, he argued, would be the solar system’s most-watched reality television program. Mars One and its volunteer crew selection process garnered enormous interest in the press, on television, and online, but its previous media-darling status is now on rocky ground due to the revelations of a mission finalist. As such, it now appears as yet another fantasy of universalizing capitalist relations, dashed on the shores of technological impossibility and capital’s internal contradictions, leaving capitalism (and the human species) to face its consequences firmly on Earth and begin its atonement at the dawn of the Anthropocene, that is, the current, human-impacted geological epoch of Earth. In my six-year ethnographic project, currently in its final stages, on outer space settlement advocates and their visions of the future, study participants have also been privately predicting Mars One’s failure for years, though for different reasons than those of media and scholarly observers. Despite Mars One’s claims, the engineers, rocket scientists, and entrepreneurs who have been involved in the space settlement movement for decades saw the practical holes in this future plot line all too quickly. But the synchrony between these analyses of Mars One’s failure is not my point; rather, it is the differences between their opening premises and the consequences of those differences. What intrigues me is how the cracks in Mars One’s plans reveal differences in how to span the gap between past, present, and future for which, as Hannah Arendt notes, we are poorly prepared. Since her 1963 essay, The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, outer space has been, for scholars on the left, the site both of an ultimate dehumanization and of fantastical modern, technologized statecraft, distracting us from our imminent collision course with auto-extinction. Mars One stands as the latest example of such fantasy. For outer space settlement advocates, the multiple possible locations for humans and their ecologies in space—including on Mars—are the very promise of human futurity. Mars One, for them, is just poorly planned and resourced. The challenge I face in my current research and writing is how not to write off the futurity of my informants’ visions with a check issued by the urgency of the contemporary, for despite the long list of gaps in Mars One’s plans, there is a huge amount of labor and capital involved in better-planned visions for space settlement—so large that it would be dangerous to write off its effects, whatever they may be, as mere fantasy. Without discarding the important insights of Arendt and her intellectual descendants, my work is to take seriously both the engineering and scientific labor of my informants and the visions of the future that drive them. What is profoundly anthropological about their work is the requirement to take space not as an empty signifier guaranteeing the modern, capitalism, or the future, but as the location of real places (as Lisa Messeri has shown), as multiple kinds of nature to which humans may adapt themselves through technological interventions. That is, they take the difference of space not necessarily as a contrast to Earth or as a site of escape from Earth, but as multiple places that are also different from each other and that thus that require different kinds of thinking about what a future world might be. That **attention to “world” and future must incorporate everything from gravity**, air, light, and food to **labor, race, gender,** and exchange, to haircuts, proprioception, **sunlight, and privacy**. My query is this: What difference (to world, to future, to imagination, to science) is introduced by outer space that makes our critical tools inadequate for thinking about difference, relations, and humans beyond Earth? And might this difference, then, introduce

#### k solves the aff - analyzing how place shapes humanity challenges anthro which is the root cause of bordered thinking

**Crist 14 - Eileen Crist & Helen Kopnina, in the Journal of Dialectical Anthropology, November 21st 2014** “Unsettling anthropocentrism” [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10624-014-9362-1] Accessed 10/2/20 SAO

Matthew Calarco’s deconstruction of anthropocentrism begins with a typology of its key characteristics. Anthropocentrism is characterized firstly by a credo of exceptionalism that exalts the human in a standalone category among all life forms. In Western discourses, Calarco emphasizes, recurrent efforts have been directed to theorize ‘‘the special place that humans occupy and their exceptional status in various domains.’’ Anthropocentrism is also distinguished by its binary logic. **While binary distinctions are intrinsic to language** and perhaps defining of thought**, the exceptionalist logic of anthropocentrism hijacks this feature to spawn hierarchies out of dualisms**, within which humans are ‘‘discovered’’ to have a ‘‘series of traits that belong solely to humans,’’ while nonhumans are found to be bereft of these traits and thus of inferior stature. **Sharp distinctions between humans and nonhumans are commonplace both in the realm of ontology** (ideas about being) **and** in the realm of **ethics** (ideas about moral consideration). According to Calarco, a strong moral hierarchy deserves special attention because it is essential in defining action orientations: only by giving relative, and often absolute, value to the human over the nonhuman, and by withdrawing moral consideration for the other-thanhuman realm, can a reign of displacement, exploitation, killing, and relentless use of the natural world (and its multitude of beings) become status quo. Elaborating his typology further, Calarco offers another significant insight: Historically, anthropocentrism has never placed all humans on a par, but ‘‘typically it functions to include only a select subset of human beings in the sphere of humanity proper.’’ Calarco thus calls attention to the fact that the privileging of ‘‘the human’’ has not tracked along species-inclusive lines. **Conquests and displacements of human others—indigenous and less powerful peoples deemed beneath ‘‘humanity proper’’—are a straightforward extension of anthropocentric logic** (Categories of ‘‘subhuman’’ and ‘‘savage’’ have precisely functioned to excise certain groups from humanity and lump them into the sphere of otherness toward which violence and domination can be exercised.). The last category of Calarco’s typology involves institutional effects—the ‘‘discursive and material practices’’ of anthropocentrism. He highlights the ‘‘animal-industrial complex’’ in which the killing and exploitation of animals constitutes a pervasive and morally invisible aspect of daily life in late modernity.

## Shell

**A. Interpretation: The aff must explicitly specify a comprehensive role of the ballot and clarify how the round will play out under that role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC. To clarify, the aff must:**

**1. Clarify how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense matters and which comes first.**

**2. Clarify what theoretical objections do and do not link to the aff, such as whether or not the aff comes before theory.**

**3. Clarify how to weigh and compare between competing advocacies i.e. whether the role of the ballot is solely determined by the flow or another method of engagement.**

**B. Violation:**

**Multiple ways the AC violates:**

**1. You never explicitly specify what counts as offense on the ROB.**

**2. You never clarify any interactions with theory.**

**3. You never specify how we weigh in the AC.**

**C. Standards:**

**1. Engagement – If I don’t know how the role of the ballot functions, its impossible for me to engage the aff, since knowing what counts as offense for me is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful arguments that clash with yours. Knowing what a legitimate advocacy is ensures that I read something that is relevant to your method, and knowing how to weigh gives us an explicit standard for what is relevant, preventing superficial clash where we each make vacuous preclusion claims. This is uniquely true of role of the ballots since there is no communal norm on what “preformative engagement” is in the same way there is for what counts as util offense. Few impacts:**

**a) Education – when two ships pass in the night we don’t learn anything, education is derived from analyzing and comparing each other’s arguments, so this theory argument is specifically legitimate.**

**b) Resolvability – if there is no engagement determining which arguments come first it is impossible so the judge can’t resolve the round. This comes first- judge needs to be able to resolve who is winning under your role of the ballot, so even if that precludes theory in general, resolving the round is a gateway issue.**

**c) Link turns your role of the ballot – your impacts are premised on actually having a debate and engaging with issues of oppression. A one-way street doesn’t give us any benefits you didn’t get form writing your case at home. Further, difficult to engage roles of the ballot are uniquely bad since no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with, so you harm any progress your position can create.**

## Case

### Shell

### Case proper

**Borders solve pandemics**

**Rich Lowry, researcher & author, The National Interest, April 2020** [“We Are All Restrictionists Now” accessed 08-17-2020 <https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-nations-realize-importance-borders/>] mre

We are all restrictionists now. In the coronavirus crisis, everyone realizes **the importance of borders**, even the people who not long ago were ideologically hostile toward them. Borders **mark off the sovereign territory** of one people from another. **They are a means** — if they can be enforced and defended — for a sovereign state to protect its people from invaders and unwelcome immigrants and goods. They are a tool almost every nation has used to try to keep the coronavirus from gaining a foothold in its population and to try to keep it from spreading further. The lyrics of the treacly John Lennon classic “Imagine” — recently performed by celebrities organized by actress Gal Gadot as a balm in this time of distress — have never been so absurdly inapt. If there were really no countries and the world were as one, we’d be even more vulnerable to whatever threat arises in a city in central China, or anywhere else on the globe. Of course, travel restrictions haven’t prevented the spread of the disease — there’s no such thing as an airtight seal. But restrictions at least bought governments some additional time, and openness to foreign travel from China had been an accelerant on its spread. The EU travel restriction was an attempt to hold off the hardening of borders between EU nations themselves. Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland tightened their borders without coordinating with other EU countries. Even Angela Merkel’s Germany, which provided the kindling for populist movements across the continent with its open-borders approach to the 2015 migrant crisis, restricted travel without coordinating with its neighbors. Such restrictions are the least of it. Italy has had trouble importing masks because European countries have been working to hold on to medical supplies, indeed to hold on to food. According to the Wall Street Journal, “German officials said their restrictions were partly designed to safeguard supplies at German supermarkets from French shoppers.” So much for a new era of European solidarity dissolving historic, centuries-old political and cultural divisions among continental nations. In a crisis, no one says, “Please, ship overseas medical gear we might need here at home — we are citizens of the world too broad-minded to care about the interests of our own people over the interests of anyone else.” And no government has acted this way, whether right, left, or center; whether led by cosmopolitans or nationalists; whether in Asia, Europe, or North America. Everyone realizes their foremost obligation is to their own. Of course, Trump is naturally inclined to this view. He imposed travel restrictions even before he was truly seized with the seriousness of this crisis. The pandemic gives new credibility to his dim view of our commercial entanglement with China, and before this is all over, there will probably be bipartisan legislation to minimize our dependence on Chinese-manufactured pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. 15 None of this means that we shouldn’t wish other countries well, help them if we can, and share research and technologies. **But borders exist for a reason**. All peoples have their own governments that, if they are doing their jobs, put the health, safety, and welfare of their own people first. The coronavirus has acted as a solvent on a decade or more of clichés about the arrival of a globalized world where old lines drawn on a map no longer matter. **In a crisis, everyone turns to borders as a first line of defense**.

**Pandemics cause extinction**

**Anders Sandberg, PhD of Computational Neuroscience & James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, in Oxfordre, in 2018** ["Human Extinction from Natural Hazard Events", http://oxfordre.com/naturalhazardscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.001.0001/acrefore-9780199389407-e-293, 4-18-2019] AR

Biological Risks Human populations are subject to **natural pandemics** where “new” pathogens spread across large areas. These can often be **lethal**: the Black Death killed 72–200 million people in Eurasia (18%–50% of the world’s population), with a mortality rate ranging from 20%–60% in different locations (Benedictow, 2004; Ziegler, 2013). The Columbian exchange of diseases between the New and Old world led to a catastrophic population decline in the Americas (Alfani & Murphy, 2017). The 1918 flu pandemic resulted in 50–100 million deaths (Johnson & Mueller, 2002) (2.7%–5% of the world’s population). Emerging diseases are likely to cause pandemics in the future, and this may contribute to extinction. It may **appear** unlikely that a pathogen could cause extinction of its host, since **lack of hosts** would naturally limit the pathogen population. However, this does not apply if the pathogen has a **reservoir in another host species**. A pathogen with a reservoir species that acts as a **stable carrier state** for the pathogen, a high potential for **infecting susceptible species** (especially critical age groups), and **hyperlethality** (mortality in the range of 50%–75%) may cause **repeated outbreaks** that **gradually reduces the fitness of the species until eventually it succumbs to other random environmental events** (MacPhee & Greenwood, 2013). Amphibian chytridiomycosis may be a good example, where the pathogen has a large host range but is **lethal to particular species** (Berger et al., 2016). On the other hand, Tasmanian devil facial tumor disease may cause an extinction in an already threatened species because both a **low density threshold** and **low genetic diversity** among the hosts makes **all** individuals susceptible (McCallum, 2012). As an example, avian influenza H5N1 represents a recognized potential pandemic that could cause massive damage if a mutation would add the **ability of easy transmissibility** between humans (at present human infections are not transmissible). It also exists within a large pool of **bird hosts**. Given that past influenza pandemics have infected between 24%–38% of the population, H5N1 has a case fatality rate ranging from 1% to 60%, a rough estimate suggest that a pandemic could kill between 16.8 million and 1.7 billion people (Cotton-Barratt et al., 2016). A pandemic flu model estimated 21–33 million deaths globally for a modern re-run of the 1918 flu but noted that it did not represent a worst case scenario (Madhav, 2013). While unlikely to be an extinction threat on its own, it could clearly weaken a vulnerable population. Viruses with longer incubation times, higher infectiousness, and case fatality rates are known: while a super-pandemic combining all these properties may be unlikely, it does not seem biologically **impossible**. In addition, **deliberate** alterations of different viruses have successfully increased transmissibility and lethality, or reduced treatability: the **major biological extinction risk** may be **deliberately engineered pathogens** rather than natural.