## K

**Link 1: The US China space race is myth driven by racist cold war logic. The US dominates all aspects of the field and reports to the contrary are an attempt to justify increased military spending and are the root cause of escalation.**

**Greico 22 - Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, The Diplomat, January 19, 2022** “The China-US Space Race Is a Myth” [https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/] Accessed 1/29/22 SAO

The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. **The United States remains the most advanced space power** in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because **the United States has more powerful rockets**, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, **funding trended in the wrong direction**. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these **milestones should serve as a reality check**: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, **the United States won that race back in 1969.** Still, **the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington**. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But **much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources**. The United States faces real and significant security threats in space, but efforts to develop an effective space strategy must begin with a more clear-eyed net assessment. The promotion of space cooperation with China would also help to dampen hype around a space race. While the Wolf Amendment limits U.S. government agencies, such as NASA, from cooperating with Chinese space agencies, the United States and China stand to mutually gain from collaboration for civil space exploration and science. Excluded from participation in the International Space Station or NASA’s Artemis Accords, the Chinese have had little choice but to develop their own space station and lunar base. These parallel space missions create a sense of a stark competition and fuel the space race narrative. Mutually beneficial scientific cooperation between the United States and China mitigates the risks of turning all China-U.S. relations into zero-sum competition. Let the missile gap myth be a cautionary tale.

**Link 2: The 1ACs fear of Chinese nuclear weapons justifies liberal militarism and colonial humanism which are the root cause of all the affs impacts. Turns case**

**Lockwood 19 - Katie Lockwood, E-International Relations, March 3rd, 2019** “Is the International System Racist?” [https://www.e-ir.info/2019/03/03/is-the-international-system-racist/] Accessed 4/20/2019 SAO

The international system is socially constructed (Wendt, 1992: 395), meaning that how we conceptualise the social world has huge implications for reality. Consequently, if perceptions of global politics are filtered through an artificial civilised/uncivilised dichotomy, it will become real, manifesting in the foreign policy decisions of the actors who shape the system. Therefore race does not have to be a biological fact to be a social reality (Castles, 2000: 167) – the system can be ‘racist’ without ‘race’ being objectively real. While racist structures are of central importance, this essay is [does] not seeking to deny the agency of the Global South. Structure is not the all-pervading determinant of behaviour, and the Subaltern always has some agency (Giddens, 1984: 16), but their chances and choices are necessarily delimited in a racist international system. This essay shall adopt a historical perspective in order to expose the continued salience of race in international politics. The role of discourse is also given central importance due to the intimate connection between discourse, knowledge and power (Abrahamsen, 2003: 199-200). In order to demonstrate the racist nature of the international system, this essay shall first depict how racism underwrites the global economy. The influence of race shall then be examined in the context of nuclear weapons, the asylum process, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, the racial construction of terrorism will demonstrate that the international system is racist. The entrenched inequality of the global political economy is predicated upon racism. Until historical wrongs are rectified via reparations (Plessis, 2003: 645), the Global South will continue to be unable to overcome its subjugation, and the global economy’s racist past will continue to cast a shadow on the future. The continued disparity between rich and poor is no accident: the Global North actively perpetuates its advantage. Despite the myth of sovereign equality in international law, the Global South’s sovereignty is undermined by its continued economic dependence (Nkrumah, 1968: ix). Rich states are citizens of the international community whereas poor states are subjects. For example, the Global North was able to rig the system to its advantage through instituting the ‘Grand Bargain’ in 1994 (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 52). The Global South accepted the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) in 1994, crystallising their position within the international division of labour, and stifling their emergent upward mobility (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 52). Some may object that although the structure of the global economy is unfair, it is not racist, as this would further require inequality to be justified in racial terms. However, this essay holds that sensitivity to history exposes the racialised colonial foundations of the contemporary international division of labour (Jones, 2008: 924). The racialised discourses propagated by colonialism sustain the assumption that the Global South is somehow naturally destined to be a mere passive exporter of raw materials. This discourse has permeated the International Monetary Fund (IMF), manifesting in its recommendations that Ghana concentrate on the production of gold and cocoa beans as in colonial times (Kampfner, 2001). Some may object to this focus on the external causes of underdevelopment (Rawls, 1999: 108), arguing that poverty is primarily the product of poor internal choices such as Mozambique’s accumulation of vast debts (Plank, 1993: 428), or Nigeria’s corruption (Albin-Lackey, 2007). While an important point, colonialism is actually the root cause of these supposed ‘internal’ problems. Corruption and poor governance partly spring from colonial policies which undermined traditional belief systems and forms of social organisation necessary for good governance (Trebilcock and Prado, 2011: 254). Colonial ‘divide and rule’ spawned civil wars which continue to undermine development: the civil war in Burundi (1993-2005), for example, grew out of Belgium’s strategy of recruiting the Tutsi to govern the Hutus (Marshall, 2016: 128). While these underlying maladies go uncompensated, aid will continue to merely treat the symptom, not the problem. International financial institutions reflect the normative fabric of the international community (Boniface, 2002: 366), and therefore embody its racism. This is evident in the ‘structural adjustment’ programmes peddled by the World Bank and IMF during the 1980s, demanding loan recipients to liberalise and privatise their economies in accordance with strict budget discipline (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007: 3). The results were disastrous, failing to promote economic growth, and forcing developing nations to implement economic policies favourable to the hegemon underwriting the financial institutions (Plank, 1993: 417). Such neoliberal logic has since re-emerged through the new ‘Good Governance’ norm, which assumes underdevelopment to be the product of domestic political and economic environments, and so seeks to educate these states to create the preconditions for development (Gallagher, 2014: 333). Plank (1993: 428) makes a persuasive case that IMF policy is not racist, but driven by a misguided faith in economic orthodoxy. The Bretton Woods institutions were established to facilitate European post-war recovery, therefore infantilising the colonisers as much as the colonised (Schifferes, 2008). While initially persuasive, this challenge fails to appreciate the changes the global economy has experienced since the end of the Bretton Woods system which has made ‘late development’ far less obtainable (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 48) – the initial post-war manifestation of the World Bank and IMF cannot be paralleled with their contemporary manifestations. The ‘neutral’ economic language of international financial institutions harbours unacknowledged racist ideas. The ‘Good Governance’ norm promotes a paternalistic narrative reminiscent of the ‘white man’s burden’ of the colonial era (Henderson, 2013: 72), constructing a child-like Global South that needs to be educated by the firm parental hand of the West. Racism constructs an Us/Other dialectic which distances the Western donor from the non-white recipient, making the horrifying human costs of economic fundamentalism less disturbing. In practice, the policy of ‘full cost recovery’ in Ghana means forcing people to pay for the essentials of life including water – a resource widely assumed to be a right, and publicly subsidised in the developed world (Kampfner, 2001). International racism means the subaltern experience is woefully ignored. Racism makes this destitution appear natural rather than the product of international choices, legitimising the human costs of neoliberal reforms primarily designed to advance the economic interests of the dominant powers in the system. Racism is unavoidably bound up with the production of knowledge, and constructs the legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy dominating discussion of nuclear weapons. Some scholars hold that irresponsible non-Western states with nuclear weapons represent an objective threat to international order (Sagan, 1994: 68). They claim that this is not an irrational racist fear, but a recognition of the facts. However, it is the position of this essay that these ‘facts’ are socially constructed, based on a false ‘Orientalist’ (Said, 2003: 4) characterisation of the Self as rational and responsible, and the Other as irrational and irresponsible. This Orientalism is exemplified in the way North Korea is continually othered in Western media. False accounts of Kim Jong Un having his uncle fed to dogs were unquestioningly reproduced by outlets such as Fox News (DeMarche, 2015), creating a caricature of Oriental despotism. Such Orientalist narratives create fear that deterrence will not work on ‘barbaric’ non-Western regimes, when in reality the logic of nuclear weapons will compel non-Western leaders to act much like their Western counterparts, as all fundamentally wish to survive (Waltz, 2012: 4). This erroneous presentation is useful to the West, as it conditions acceptance of the existing ‘nuclear apartheid’ (Gusterson, 1999: 113) which is conducive to Western interests. Orientalism means that a single North Korean nuclear weapon is presented as an existential threat to the international community, whereas hundreds of US nuclear weapons are not (Wendt, 1992: 397). As Cox (1981: 128) rightfully asserts, ‘theory is always for someone, and for some purpose’ – racism constructs reality to the benefit of the West. The West defines its interests as synonymous with those of the international community, silencing legitimate concerns of non-Western states. For example, Kim Jong Un’s logical reasons for seeking nuclear weapons are silenced by Western media, with MSNBC propagating the false psychological narrative that he is simply a ‘madman’ (Al Jazeera, 2017). Such erroneous analysis filters into the subconscious of Western leaders, heightening distrust, undermining faith in negotiated solutions, and increasing the risk of fatal miscalculations (Al Jazeera, 2017). Historical narratives of oriental barbarism intersect with contemporary concerns surrounding nuclear weapons, thereby determining America’s overreaction to allegations that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (McQeeney, 2014: 299). Western populations willingly swallowed this justification for the use of force, suggesting that contrary to the contention of democratic peace thesis (Kant, 2017: 7), democracy is not always a constraint on belligerence as irrational, racist logic subverts people’s perceptions of their real interests. Racism produces irrational international actors, driving dangerous behaviour in the international system.

**Alternative: The Alternative is a postcolonial intervention. This is an experience in responsibility which rejects civilizational discourses. This is wholly different performance from the 1AC which cannot be permed. The Role of the ballot is to refuse cultural hierarchies in debates about nuclear escalation**

**Mathur 18 - Ritu Mathur, ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, October 15th 2018** “Postcolonial perspectives on weapons control” [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02185377.2018.1526694?needAccess=true] Accessed 4/20/19 SAO

Several months ago, I received an invitation from the editorial board of the Asian Journal of Political Science to serve as a guest editor for a special issue of this journal. This unexpected invitation came as a pleasant surprise when I was mulling over the possibilities of postcolonial interventions to decolonize practices of arms control and disarmament. The efforts to decolonize cannot be undertaken alone but need a forum and multiple voices that can collectively represent the efforts of postcolonial scholars to engage with the problem of weapons. The scholars contributing to this special issue have long struggled individually to represent the subalterns struggle for equality and justice within the field of arms control and disarmament. It is now that they come together collectively with their myriad perspectives to interrogate contemporary practices of weapons control. This undertaking is critical especially at a time when the field of International Relations is being critiqued for its Eurocentrism and there is a resurgence of populist civilizational discourses juxtaposing the West and the Rest. This appears as an opportune moment in history to accept the challenge of decolonizing practices of arms control and disarmament. It is not simply a cliché that the field of arms control and disarmament has long been defined and dominated by the West’s military superiority in arms. The struggle against this dominance has been launched by critical security studies scholars that question practices of Orientalism in warfare but refrain from probing more specifically into the problem of weapons. Postcolonial interventions are an exercise in responsibility as they engage with civilizational discourses of difference articulated in terms of race, technology, law and culture. A study of the performative power of these civilizational discourses of difference is critical to cultivate understandings of not only how differences reinforce hierarchies but also to generate reflexivity on the struggles for power, justice and emancipation waged continuously by the subaltern. This Special Issue of the Asian Journal of Political Science is an effort to make more visible the engagement of postcolonial scholars with the problem of arms control and disarmament. It is an effort to resist a resurgent tide of dominant discourses seeking to constitute and reconstitute the field of arms control and disarmament representing the interests of the West to address problems of nuclear proliferation, counterproliferation and nuclear terrorism. While these efforts have their own niche in the field of security studies they cannot be guided by assumptions representing the West as the vanguard of maintaining order and stability in the international system. These dominant representations of the West as the guardian and custodian of the field of arms control and disarmament have often blighted and marginalized contributions of the Global South to weapons control. These efforts have been further stymied and marginalized as some actors from the Global South have striven to join the nuclear club and their practices have been typologized as co-optation or imitation of the behaviour of great powers in the international system

## CP

**CP text: The USFG should overturn the Wolf Amendment and take proactive bilateral steps to increase cooperation and coordination with the PRC in space.**

**Gautel 21** — (Gidon Gautel is currently an Analyst in the space industry. He was previously the Project Coordinator of China Foresight and Project Manager of the Economic Diplomacy Commission at LSE IDEAS. Gidon holds a BSc in Government and Economics with first class honours from the London School of Economics & Political Science, and an MSc in Innovation, Entrepreneurship & Management with distinction from Imperial College Business School., [insert quals], “Coordination Failure: Risks of US-China competition in space“, Medium, 4-29-2021, Available Online at https://lseideas.medium.com/coordination-failure-risks-of-us-china-competition-in-space-7112ca4f4da1, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR)

Finally, a lack of coordination increases the risks for lunar crewmembers, once these arrive on the moon. The disruptions of the kind described above should be self-explanatory in their risk to humans attempting to establish a permanent presence. However, more insidious factors also abound. One of these is the lack of standardisation driven by a bifurcation into geopolitical blocs of lunar activity. As has been pointed out, widely adopted standards of lunar exploration promise considerable benefits[16]. A balkanisation of standards would do the opposite, limiting any attempt of future cooperation in exploration and scientific endeavour. In the most extreme cases, it endangers lives. Mutual aid is a core tenet of both the Outer Space Treaty and the Artemis Accords. Yet, a lack of universally accepted technological standards for lunar (and beyond) crewed operations potentially makes such action considerably more difficult. As the ISS has proven, any inter-operational system must be designed from the outset to be inter-operational. For future lunar activities, this presently seems impossible. Though currently remote, the possibility of the loss of life due to conflicting standards of crewed lunar technology is nevertheless a tragedy worth contemplating. Again, the described issues are most likely to occur should terrestrial geopolitical tensions between the US and China preclude proactive coordination and information sharing. While the establishment of separate lunar operations can, at this point, be taken as a given, it is far from too late to establish functionally sufficient coordination mechanisms to prevent a major international incident. While US-China coordination is limited by the Wolf Amendment, it is not wholly precluded, as indicated by NASA’s monitoring of the Chang’e 4 mission, utilising the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter[17], and, more recently, an exchange of data to mitigate the risks of an orbital collision of Mars orbiters[18]. Ideally, therefore, the United States would proactively take the necessary bilateral steps to work with China to coordinate its respective beyond-Earth surface activities and prevent harmful interference. Alongside, and regardless of, these efforts, it will be the task of members of international bodies, such as The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to facilitate coordination activities. In the midst of such efforts, ESA member states are primary actors eligible for leading such initiatives, with ESA having engaged in collaborative activities in space with both the US and China. While diplomats active within UN COPUOS will be well aware of these issues, and their role in enabling such necessary coordination, it is incumbent upon national governments allied to the US to recognise these flashpoints and spearhead broader policy responses to proactively support coordination and the activities of their diplomats at the UN. The UK government, whose diplomats already play a major role in coordinating international space activities, must lend them its full support. Beyond the moon, the issue of geographically concentrated sites of interest is only likely to prevail. While space is boundless, areas of economical or scientific value are nonetheless often concentrated. Some preliminary analysis, for example, places the number of economically viable near-Earth asteroids at around only ten[19], due to the fact that metallic, accessible, and economically viable near-Earth asteroids are comparatively rare in number. Given the considerable geographic challenges associated with on-asteroid operations, the need for multi-actor coordination will only become more pressing, especially if terrestrial US-China competition intensifies. Failures to Coordinate The risks outlined above are non-exhaustive, and do not touch upon the military dimension of space which carries equal if not greater weight. However, they demonstrate clearly the fact that US-China coordination in space will become ever more pressing as the exploration and commercialisation of space advances. Such risks will only manifest themselves if the US and China are unable to coordinate their activities sufficiently and allow geopolitical tensions to obstruct this crucial work. Looking forwards, all third-party actors in space should closely monitor terrestrial US-China relations and map these to their own activities relating to space (be this in the realm of space exploration or applications), taking mitigating measures as necessary should tensions spill over beyond Earth. In tandem, states with notable diplomatic influence should increase further efforts to enable frictionless coordination and information sharing between the two great powers. Crucially, should formal coordination mechanisms in orbit, on the moon, or beyond be in sight, imperfect coordination should be prioritised if institutional gridlock driven by the pursuit of national interest is the alternative.

**That solves the aff. We solve the root cause of why escalation happens which is a lack of clarity and trust. We also outweigh the aff, because they can only solve one potential flashpoint between the US and China but we open an avenue for cooperation that can spill over to other terrestrial conflicts.**

## Th

**A: Interp – Debaters must only read a framework that is not maximizing expected well-being.**

**B: Violation – You read util**

**C: Standards –**

**1. Inclusion – Util is bad for inclusion: A) Bad for small schools since it maximizes the benefit for large program with mass amounts of prep B) Util justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm C) Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is rape okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say yes because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure D) It’s ableist – certain individuals can’t experience pain and pleasure which justifies their inability to be agents and their manipulation.**

**2. Resolvability – Util makes debates irresolvable: A) There are infinite end states to each action that I may take meaning we can never know if it is a good or bad action as per util because it could possibly result in many ways: For example, util would tell me to save 2 babies rather than one but there’s a chance that baby turns out to be Hitler in which case util would condemn my actions**

**3. Shiftiness – There are multiple different types of maximizing well-being. Crisp, Roger, "Well-Being", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>.**

Well-being is most commonly used in philosophy to describe what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good *for* a person. **The question of what well-being consists in is of independent interest**, but it is of great importance in moral philosophy, especially **in the case of utilitarianism**, according to which the only moral requirement is that well-being be maximized. Significant challenges to the very notion have been mounted, in particular by G.E. Moore and T.M. Scanlon. **It has become standard to distinguish theories of well-being as either hedonist theories, desire theories, or objective list theories**. According to the view known as welfarism, well-being is the only value. Also important in ethics is the question of how a person’s moral character and actions relate to their well-being.

**They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of consequentialism as coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards.**

**Voters – ca there standards – yes 2nr weighing vs 1ar theory otherwise no way to beat it back cuz 2ar**