## Shell

**Interp – Debaters must read all arguments in the speech doc they want to apply to the round. To clarify, they may not say to check the doc for arguments they want to be evaluated.**

**Violation – You say check the doc for spec and list an entire paragraph of definitions that you didn’t read**

**Standards –**

**[1] Time skew – It means you have infinite time to make arguments because you can just say things like “check the doc for my responses to the K” which makes it impossible to win since time controls our ability to make arguments**

**[2] Strat skew – It justifies things like you hiding a prioris in a long paragraph of definitions and extending them in the next speech by saying “I told u to check the doc for spec and I spec that affirm means to express agreement”. That kills my strategy since I won’t read the arguments if I don’t read spec and you’ll extend them to win every round**

**[3] Constitutive – it violates a constitutive rule of debate by generating offense or arguments outside of speech time. Sending docs is an act of courtesy not a facet of competition but you abuse the honor system which a) forces intervention to evaluate your arguments and b) skews predictability since I have to waste prep time reading what things you specified.**

**Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity.**

**Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow 4. Drop the argument is incoherent under norm setting since you’re voting for the best rule, not a punishment of someone else’s wrong-doing 5. DTA treats all arguments in the aff as conditional which moots negative offense since I can’t turn them and read theory.**

**Competing interps – 1. Reasonability encourages a race to the margins of what counts as sufficiently fair which incentivizes as much abuse as possible 2. Norm setting – it encourages the most fair rule through debating competing models 3. Judge intervention – Reasonability begs the question of what the judge thinks is sufficient which takes the round out of the debaters hands.**

**No RVIs – 1. It deters legitimate theory vs good theory debaters because you will lose on a shell even if it’s a good norm 2. Baiting – incentivizes people to be abusive and script counter-interps to win on the RVI which increases the existence of bad norms**

**Use a norm setting model – 1. It solves long term abuse whereas IRA only matters one round at a time 2. It’s best for the activity since it encourages deep reflection and debate about what the best world of debate looks like and strives toward it.**

**1NC Theory o/w – 1. Lexicality – If the neg was abusive it was reactionary to aff abuse which means it’s justified 2. Norm setting – 1ar theory can never set norms since I only get 1 speech so we can’t fully develop the debate 3. Otherwise it would justify the aff baiting theory and uplayering and allows them to get away with infinite abuse 4. The aff spike says all theory paradigm issues are in the aff which makes any new reason 1ar theory comes first a new argument that you can’t evaluate, including IRA and spirit v text. And, reject 2ar weighing since they get the last word and will win every theory debate if they can dump a bunch of new reasons their args come first.**

## Shell

**A. Interpretation: Debaters who make presumption arguments must specify in the text of the AC [in the form of a list] the set of conditions under which presumption can become relevant in the evaluation of the round. *[i.e. if there is some kind of defense to the AC framework or NC framework which “triggers,” someone fails to extend offense, skepticism, utilitarianism, I won’t trigger presumption – it’s a preempt, drop the advocacy T + winning the framework debate etc.]***

**B. Violation: they didn’t**

**C. Standards:**

**1. Contestation – the ability for me to contest the implications of presumption and way it flows or form a strategy to engage the aff depends on my knowing what kind of arguments are enough to justify the judge voting on presumption. This is key to fairness since it skews the ability for me to contest the argument, resolve competing claims about presumption, or figure out how to respond to the aff.**

**2. Stable Implications – absent specification of these conditions you can choose whether and how to go for presumption based on my NC strat. This kills fairness since your 1ar can shift the implication depending on what’s most strategic on theory. You’re incentivized to trigger an argument since I no longer can contest it which gives them bidirectional ground and moots neg offense and strategy making each presumption trigger a no risk issue. I don't know if or when they will trigger presumption or how the judge will use presumption to evaluate certain debates, which increases intervention. My interp encourages better quality ground by forcing debaters to go for offensive arguments unless they’re held to what they say in the AC.**

#### No cx checks – a. no warrant b, judges don’t flow

**NC**

#### The standard is consistency with the skeptic’s point of view.

**Skep is true –**

**1. Culpability – Ethics must hold agents culpable as otherwise we cannot be responsible for moral wrongdoings since they occur externally to our wills and will happen regardless of whether we advise against them. However, willing fails and agents lack control. Coyne 12, Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The** [**University of Chicago**](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)**], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012** [**https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1**](https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1)

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. **Everything that you** think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

**2. External World – We internally view the world apart from the ways it externally occurs meaning our evaluations of states of affairs are skewed.**

**Frank 11,** Where is Now? The Paradox of The Present. NPR July 26 2011 <https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2011/07/26/138695074/where-is-now-the-paradox-of-the-present>

Every aspect of our personal now is a layered impression of a world already lost to the past. To understand how this works, consider the simple fact discussed in last week’s post all we know about the world comes to us via signals: light waves, sound waves, and electrical impulses running along our nerves. These signals move at a finite speed. It always takes some finite amount of time for the signal to travel from the world to your body’s sensors and on to your brain. A distant galaxy, a distant mountain peak, [and] the not very distant light fixture on the ceiling and even the intimacy of a loved one’s face all live in the past. Those overlapping pasts are times that you – in your “now” – are no longer a part of. Signal travel time constitutes a delay and all those overlapping delays constitute an essential separation. The inner world of your experience is in a temporal sense **cut off** from the outer world you inhabit. Let's take a few examples. Light travels faster than any other entity in the physical universe, propagating with the tremendous velocity of c = 300,000,000 m/s. From high school physics you know that the time it takes a light signal moving at *c* to cross some distance *D* is simply *t = D/c*. When you look at the mountain peak 30 kilometers away you see it not as it exists now but as it existed a 1/10,000 of a second ago. **The light fixture three meters above your head is seen not as it exists now but as it was a hundred millionth of a second ago**. Gazing into your partner's eyes, you see her (or him) not for who they are but for who they were 10-10 of a second in the past. Yes, **these numbers are small. Their implication, however, is vast. We live**, each of us, **trapped in our own now**.

**3. Non-arbitrariness – Ethical beliefs cannot rely on arbitrary foundations as it would justify infinite contradictions. For instance, one could easily claim the sky is green without any ability for refutation as it accords with an arbitrary mindset. However, Ethics are arbitrary because of the argument from evolution.**

**Machuca 18,** Diego E. Machuca “Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview”, 02/27/2018 [https://philarchive.org/archive/EMAMSA] Accessed 3/8/21 AHS//NPR

Drawing especially on the work of evolutionary biologists, some moral skeptics have argued that the most plausible account of the origin of morality is the one that appeals to evolution: natural selection has forged certain faculties or capacities devoted to moral judgment. In their view, the evolutionary account defeats our first-order moral beliefs because it does not require that morality be true, but only that it be evolutionarily advantageous to believe that it is true. Evolutionary debunking strategies of this sort have been deployed in a systematic way particularly by Richard Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006; 2016c) and Sharon Street (2006; 2008). Joyce first appealed to the argument from evolution in his defense of a moral error theory, but later on used it to ground a skepticism about moral justification. Street employed the argument in her attack not merely on moral realism but on value realism in general. Although in the two articles in question she does not develop or defend it, she repeatedly mentions constructivism as the anti-realist view that sidesteps her evolutionary debunking argument against value realism. The defense, interpretation, and criticism of various types of evolutionary arguments for moral skepticism have of late attracted a lot of attention, and in fact the study of ‘the evolution of morality’ constitutes a burgeoning area in metaethics. The thrust of such arguments is that biological evolution is aimed not at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, but at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive. In other words, the evolutionary function of those processes is not that of tracking the truth: their general success at matching or accurately representing alleged objective moral facts explains neither their emergence nor their persistence. Humans are therefore disposed to make moral judgments regardless of the evidence to which they are exposed, regardless of whether there are or are not objective moral facts. Someone might object that, in order to be adaptive, such processes must be reliable, i.e., the moral judgments they form are evolutionarily useful—i.e., tend to promote survival and reproduction—because they are in general true. However, given that moral beliefs may well be adaptively useful even if they are not true, if what we know is only that evolution is aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive, then we do have here a defeater: even if some moral judgments are true, there is no reason for claiming that they are. This is the way in which evolutionary skeptical arguments are in general understood in the literature. Resuming the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters discussed at the outset of the present section, the evolutionary account of the origin of our moral beliefs then provides an undercutting defeater for those beliefs: it does not show that they are false—for there might well be moral facts out there in the world—but rather that they were not formed in a reliable way because their source is not trustworthy, and hence that they are not epistemically justified. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore epistemological. However, as we will see, the evolutionary account has also been understood as providing a rebutting defeater for our moral beliefs: a reason for thinking that objective moral facts do not exist, and hence that such beliefs are false. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore ontological. When appealed to in relation to a moral error theory, evolutionary debunking considerations are normally used as a supplement to arguments that purport to establish the error-theoretic conclusion in order to account, once the conclusion is accepted, for the systematic error we commit in making moral judgments. This seems to be the case of Mackie, who briefly appealed to evolution as an alternative explanation of the origin of our moral sentiments and dispositions (1977: 113–114, 124, 192, 229, 239). Although Mackie (1985: 154) claimed that morality can be seen as an outgrowth from genetically determined retributive tendencies that were favored by evolutionary selection, 14 he did not offer an elaborate evolutionary account of morality in the way Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006) has. The latter maintains that the origin of morality is to be found in the development of human cooperation: an individual is more reproductively fit if his sympathetic desires to help his family members are supplemented by a sense of inescapable requirement to favor them that strengthens his motivation to perform helpful actions. This was accomplished by providing people with the belief that such actions have objective moral qualities. Once a cognitive capacity to believe that it is inescapably required to help family members was in place, it was exploited by natural selection to regulate also helpful behavior towards non-kin individuals. It must be remarked that Joyce’s view is not that every particular moral prescription can be evolutionarily explained, or that culture or the environment plays no role in determining moral beliefs. Rather, his view is that the tendency to use general moral categories and the belief that certain types of action bear objective moral properties are innate; that cultural influences can cause some of those actions to stop being regarded as moral or immoral, or cause other types of action to start being so regarded; and that moral dispositions require environmental cues to become manifest. For reasons that will become clear at the end of this subsection, it is important to note that Joyce is at some points cautious regarding the status of his evolutionary account of morality. He presents the hypothesis that natural selection has led us to commit the fundamental moral error as a “plausible speculation” (2001: 135). Also, although he regards the evolutionary hypothesis as plausible, coherent, and testable, and as the best story of the origin of morality we have (2006: 134, 137, 139– 140), and although he therefore answers the question “Is human morality innate?” in the affirmative, he remarks that “this is provisional and to a degree speculative, since the present evidence does not warrant answering the question in either a positive or a negative way with any confidence” (2006: 2). Finally, he observes that his evolutionary debunking argument “is conditional: It relies on an empirical premise concerning the evolution of morality which is yet to be established” (2016b: 9). In his first treatment of the evolutionary account of morality, Joyce not only remarks that it complements the arguments for moral error theory, but he makes the stronger claim that “the fact that moral thinking is a naturally evolved trait has error theoretical implications” (2001: 137) or “provides evidence in favor of the error theory” (2001: 148). In his view, the innateness of moral judgments undermines these judgments being true for the simple reason that if we have evolved to make these judgments irrespective of their being true, then one could not hold that the judgments are justified. And if they are unjustified, then although they could be true, their truth is in doubt. (2001: 159) But the fact that if we accept the evolutionary account, our moral beliefs are utterly unjustified, or we have no reason for thinking that they are true, or it is highly improbable or extremely unlikely that they are true, in no way establishes the ontological conclusion of moral error theory. Of course, the evolutionary account places the burden of proof on the non-minimal moral realist to provide us not only with a reason for believing that our moral beliefs are epistemically justified, but also with a reason for believing that there are objective moral facts or properties in the first place. Oddly enough, Joyce himself recognizes that the evolutionary account alone does not support an ontological conclusion, but rather an attitude of withholding of assent concerning the truth or falsity of moral judgments (2001: 160–168). In any case, in later works he explicitly remarks that one cannot argue for a moral error theory on the basis of evolutionary considerations, the correct skeptical conclusion being instead that all moral judgments are unjustified (Joyce 2006: ch. 6; 2016c; cf. 2016b: 8). Joyce’s later evolutionary debunking stance seems to vacillate between nihilistic and Pyrrhonian epistemological skepticism: sometimes he seems to believe that moral beliefs are intrinsically unjustified or that they have been shown to be so for good, and sometimes to believe that they can be deemed to be unjustified on the basis of the evidence available up to this point. Joyce’s epistemological version of the argument from evolution could be formulated as follows: 1. Our capacity to form first-order moral beliefs is an evolutionary adaptation produced by natural selection. 2. Biological evolution is not aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, i.e., processes whose function is to track the alleged moral truths. 3. Given 2, our having beliefs that objects possess moral properties is consistent with nothing ever possessing a moral property. Therefore: 4. Our first-order moral beliefs are epistemically unjustified. Street (2006) contends that evolutionary considerations pose a dilemma for realist theories of value (and hence for realist theories of moral value). The fact that the forces of natural selection have greatly shaped the content of our evaluative judgments raises the challenge to explain the relation between such evolutionary influences and the independent evaluative facts posited by the realist. 15 The first horn of the dilemma is the claim that there is no such relation, which results in an implausible skepticism: we would have to conclude that our evaluative judgments are contaminated by a distorting influence and hence that many or most of them are off the track. Although it is possible that “as a matter of sheer chance” our evaluative judgments accord with the allegedly independent evaluative facts, “this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely unlikely . . . but also astoundingly convenient to the realist” (2006: 122). In response, one could appeal to rational reflection as another major influence on the content of our evaluative judgments that corrects the distorting influence of evolutionary pressures on such judgments. Although Street does not discard such an influence, she claims that, since rational reflection must proceed by using evaluative judgments, one would be assessing evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments by means of other evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments (2006: 124). The other horn of the dilemma is the claim that natural selection favored those ancestors who were able to grasp the independent evaluative truths, because tracking them was advantageous for survival and reproduction. But this account that presents itself as a scientific explanation is, in Street’s view, inferior on scientific grounds to the one according to which the tendency to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ survival and reproduction because those judgments forged adaptive links between the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves and their responses to such circumstances. This account is superior in terms of the usual criteria of scientific adequacy, for it is clearer, more parsimonious, and does a better job at illuminating the tendency in question (2006: 129–134). Once again, we see that a crucial premise in an argument against value realism is a best-explanation premise. With a focus on moral realism, Street’s argument could perhaps be formulated thus: 1. The forces of natural selection have had an indirect tremendous influence on the content of our moral judgments. 2. The moral realist owes us an explanation of the relation between such an evolutionary influence and the independent moral facts he posits. 3. He can claim either that (3a) there is no relation or that (3b) there is such a relation. 4. If he claims that (3a), then he is forced either (4a) to embrace a farfetched moral skepticism or (4b) to claim that an incredible coincidence took place. 16 5. If he claims that (3b), then he must propose a tracking account, which is scientifically unacceptable (since the adaptive link account provides the best explanation of why our tendency to make certain kinds of moral judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success). Therefore: 6. Moral realism is false, i.e., there are no independent moral facts. It is surprising that Street argues for an ontological conclusion regarding independent or objective moral facts on the basis of an evolutionary debunking argument. For it seems that evolutionary debunking arguments (and genealogical debunking arguments in general) can at most undermine the epistemic credentials of our substantive moral beliefs—i.e., can at most provide us with undercutting defeaters for those beliefs. Street’s own evolutionary debunking argument establishes at most that we have no reason for affirming that our moral beliefs match alleged objective moral facts because the best explanation of our tendency to make certain moral judgments makes no appeal to them. Even though the moral realist then owes us a reason for affirming that such facts exist, the argument does not prove that they do not. Note that such epistemological moral skepticism is different from (4a), the skeptical conclusion that Street regards as implausible or far-fetched.

**Skep negates –**

**1. The skeptical conclusion being true triggers permissibility: It denies that moral obligations exist. That negates – A) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent B) Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true. Ur args – u say if I told u my name – not true, also doesn’t = presumption. The b point – a] the presumption warrants will take out b] no reason prohibition has burden of proof ca ur if I told u my name arg. The c point – a] doesn’t mean either affirm b] no – proven by majority rules votes etc.**

**2. Presumption negates – A) Probability – there are an infinite number of ways to prove something false and only one singular way to prove it true so it is more likely the aff is false B) Policy failure – if we accepted every proposal without reason it would be impossible for governments to institute every policy because all policies would be equally good which freezes action**