### Framework

**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –**

**[1] Alienation – our introduction into the world and the field of knowledge requires mediation through language. The submission to language pushes us into an indirect relationship. It deprives the subject of immediate contact with the object world, which creates a constitutive distinction between non-alienated and post-linguistic experience.**

**[2] The recognition of the knowledge gap is not active but rather unconscious – knowledge is infinite which means it can’t be acquired or processed by the subject which creates a fundamental lack between the real and the symbolic. And a search for knowledge is damaging to the self because the subject has a fetishization of the external paranoia- a simultaneous desire for it and rejection.**

**[3] Fluidity- A) Differentiation - signifiers refer to other signifiers without having a final signified to relate to which produces a constitutive lack from the inability to reach true meaning. This instability forces us to form a world in pursuit of the lost gaps to fulfill the subject’s desires. B) Language is constantly changing- it’s contextually prduced with respect to temporality and cultures because every individual indexes to language differently.**

**[4] Desires come first- A) Only my framework answers the question “why act”, since agents have a reason to due to their own motivations rather than some non-existent transcendental principle. B) Identity –the creation of the subject determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade. C) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, the standard and rotb is to embrace the lack. This is key to preventing psychological violence and coheres the nature of who you are.**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] //ahs em

It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**Orefer the framework –**

**[1] Solves oppression- [a] Empowerment – overcoming the lack ensures agents view themselves as active which motivates agents to combat systems of oppression rather than viewing themselves as passive objects. [b] Explanatory power –oppression operates through the categorization and otherization from the lack.**

**[2] Debate is a fundamentally a game. We desire wins and avoid losses – only psychoanalysis explains the constitutive drives of the activity which proves it outweighs.**

**[3] Bindingness – the lack is constitutive to the structure of language and the nature of the subject. Any action a subject take is inevitably mediated through signification. We cannot escape our mediation through language which means an understanding of it comes first.**

**[4] All communication is constrained by the lack, even the flow because of its linguistic content, which means the standard is a side constraint on the judge evaluating the round. Use Evaluative modesty – whoever wins the strongest strength of link to their offense times the probability that each portion of the flow is the highest layer: A) Key to determining the better debater since some debaters are really skilled in one area, but the best debater is flexible and can do well on multiple layers B) Probability – we’re never 100% certain that one thing comes before another since there are arguments for each C) Clash – Incentivizes debaters to engage with arguments rather than going all in on one position.**

**[6] Denying the AC is impossible since any argument starts from the premise that language captures reality, but denying the AC denies any ability for language to have meaning in the first place.**

**[7] Prefer the role of the ballot—critical pedagogy demands that students question their surroundings. Only the AC resolves the problem of ensuring challenges within the confines of recognizing social inequality.**

**Roseboro ‘08**, Donyell L. *Jaques Lacan and Education: a Critical Introduction*. Sense, 2008. // AHS RG

I have often said that the way we do public education needs radical transformation. McLaren (2003) offers a critique of public education and an explanation of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy, in a very broad sense, encompasses the various theories I have briefly described above; it allows us to understand how spirituality and education is important, how caring is necessary, and how culturally relevant pedagogy improves student learning. **Critical pedagogy is a theoretical way of thinking and doing education that focuses on teaching students to question and to challenge social and political power structures.** It, however, is not just about teaching students to question. In critical pedagogy, **we hope to teach students to question processes which maintain racist, sexist, heterosexist, and classist institutions and to analyze how and why such attitudes/behaviors continue to shape the way we** do public education, particularly the way we **construct curricula.** So while critical pedagogy is a way of teaching and learning that embraces student input, creates democratic classroom spaces, and encourages student questioning, it comes wrought with some obvious tensions. Specifically, McLaren says, Critical pedagogy directs educators toward a teaching process that . . . often enmeshes us in an ethical and pedagogical dilemma. Critical pedagogy is about power and empowerment. Although this assertion may seem straightforward, in the classroom, it often plays itself out in contradictory ways. On the one hand, the critical educator invites students to construct their own analysis of social phenomena and to appropriate for themselves the process of theory-building. But, on the other hand, the critical educator wants students to situate social phenomena in broader structural relationships and to ask questions, such as who benefits from these relationships, how are unequal relationships being reproduced, and how do individuals interpret their situatedness in a system of unequal economic, racial, and gendered relations? For some students, these kinds of questions support their own analysis of social phenomena; for others, they do not. In the latter case, **the critical educator often finds himself or herself caught in a dilemma: how to support students' questioning and meaning-making while at the same time teaching students to critique power relations that contextualize schools and place limits on lives** (p. xxiii). So, while I teach my students to question and I embrace such questioning, I face one potential problem - what if my students, in coming to their own conclusions based on their questions, come away with the belief that social inequality does not exist, that all students are capable of achieving anything if they work hard enough, and that teachers' only responsibility is to set high standards and teach the content? And here is the problem. As a secondary social studies methods and foundations of education instructor, I do have an agenda. I am not just here to teach the "content" (however we might define that). I am here to also teach my students how to actively participate in social and political processes because they are connected to multiple communities **and affected by the political systems in place**; as future educators, I want them to be able to teach students how to engage in/with their communities and more formal political and social systems. **To do so thus requires that we analyze those communities and social and political systems; we have to know what it is we are either enmeshed in or that we might encounter. A Lacanian, post-formal curriculum**, at its core, **requires that we seek and identify truths, we work to become integrated beings by hearing the unconscious** (that which we do not want to or cannot face), **and that we understand the limitations on our constructions of self/identity.** If we apply these personal requirements to an analysis of the larger socio-political world, then we can translate their applicability to our collective identity building processes. As a collective, or a conglomeration of multiple collectives, what is it that we do not wish to face? How have we constructed a community identity that avoids particular truths? And how has this representation and avoidance marginalized some and made them believe that their truths do not matter? Ultimately, Lacan's work/theories and post-formalism share several key components-listening, hearing, and interpreting. Applied to public education this means that we should have, in addition to the seven expectations I listed at the beginning of the chapter: 1. Processes in place which allows the space for students and teachers to speak and listen, to build relationships, to discuss the organization of the school, to question the curriculum. 2. Heterarchic rather than hierarchic accountability (dare I say it?). Policy makers, politicians, administrators (all those who structure public education), must create such processes to allow students and teachers to speak and listen and they must be held accountable for doing so. Otherwise, we would have nicely worded democratic mission or vision statements and little to no real involvement of teachers and students in the construction of curriculum or organization of schools.

### Offense

**[1] Space exploration is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new “frontiers” and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.**

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. **Privatized space research mobilizes fears of ecological, political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for new utopian futures,** or the search for Earth 2.0. **These imaginaries reflect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier.** In contrast, eco-centric visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroyers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a multispecies process—off the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. This article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and political earthly life. **Outer space imaginaries are booming**. Reborn from Cold War projects into the post-9/11 **securitized era**, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are **proliferating, creating new material impacts and new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion.** Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many **extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of technoscientific progress and human mastery over nature.** Space programs are increasingly **privatized**, with tech entrepreneurs leading the way to **extraterrestrial futures**. I refer to these projects, oft en framed as a necessary step in human social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on Earth. Th ese share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defi ned by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question. Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, **innovation, or human exceptionalism**, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace intention from life’s expansion. Earth 2.0 and Home and Away 159 eco-centric imaginaries off er diff erent understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories. Th is article traces these two imaginaries for the future of life aft er Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. Th e word “imaginaries” builds on the definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of effects and entanglements between language, cultural production, scientifi c research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial expansionary megaprojects. Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research programs, policy proposals, social movements, and **private investments, they bring displacements of ontological, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present—with** both **oppressive** and liberatory **possibilities** (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconfi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements work through analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar 2017). These two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve seeing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter 1997). Th ese visions range from the widespread use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s uniqueness in the universe, to the politically unifying “overview eff ect” proposed by Frank White (1987). Early space programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientifi c understandings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). **Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-fi rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present”** (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication fi gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. 160 Micha Rahder Leaving Earth—Fact or Fiction? Th ere is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. Th e boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Th ese projects and imaginaries share signifi cant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, known as SETI (Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spacefl ight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. Th is article has a bias toward US-based projects, both public and private, as these are most prolifi c and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private companies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. Th e charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republican Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a scientifi c institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imaginaries are on the rise as the international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself. Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fi ction and fantasy long relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). Th is division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical, and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). Th e Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fi ction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fi elds are drawing attention to how science fi ction has long infl uenced technological and scientifi c developments, particularly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfi eld notes, “fi ctions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. Th ese dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams fi nding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fi ctional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the Home and Away 161 scientifi c gaze (Redfi eld 2002). Language can shape the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might participate in them. Refl ecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and diff erence as opposed to a unifi ed singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While biological and philosophical debates over the defi nition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that defi ne life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief history of human projects oriented toward life’s expansion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. Th is focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). Th is choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward, examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfi guring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to Anthropocene “ Th ings that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting **human expansion into space** have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy 2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientifi c progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close relation with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capacity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth” environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, **reinforcing ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management of more-than-human worlds** (DeLoughrey 2014). Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the United States and Europe have oft en been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that **resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather than imagining others we might one day escape to** (Cockell 2006). Narratives of **new capitalist frontiers** led many environmentalists to view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle**,” fearing it will lead to ideologies of a disposable planet** (Hartmann 1986). Yet expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extraterrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, **entrepreneurial capitalists**—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fi ll this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most oft en articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond Earth is no longer defi ned by competing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shift ed from sudden nuclear annihilation to the slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Th ough understood as new or diff erent, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastructures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). **These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa.** As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way. **These sometimes amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth, and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control.** This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries Earth 2.0 Dominating current eff orts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partnerships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range from imperialist nationalisms to profi ts to new utopian Home and Away 163 social orders, oft en mixed together in unexpected confi gurations. Yet these **Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures**

**[2] Extraterrestrial imaginaries scapegoat culpability of environmental destruction and are unobtainable utopias.**

**Rahder 2** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

These utopian visions are still grounded by earthly concerns. Jacob Haqq-Misra argues for “liberating Mars,” basing future settlement not on an extension of earthly sociopolitics (whether organized in terms of nation-states or corporations) but instead by establishing a new Martian planetary citizenship to create a “test bed for new ideas that could lead to unforeseen epistemic transformations of our values and preferences” (2016: 66). Yet his argument compares this “transformative experience” to a “trust fund child” gaining new values from a wilderness trip (65). “Nature”—whether earthly wilderness or Martian extremity—is called upon as a resource for human cultural transformation, reimagining a modernist dichotomy as the basis for a planetary move beyond modernism. Th ese narratives frame the search for a new Earth 2.0 as a necessary project for collective human and environmental survival. Defl ecting critiques that space programs divert too many resources from earthly problems, Cameron Smith and Evan Davies (2012) claim that “all worthwhile things” (among which they list boats and wedding rings) are worth large expense. **Space expansion, framed as a form of long-term insurance for the human species, is moved from the question “Can we aff ord to go?” to “Can we aff ord not to?” (Hartmann 1986). This powerful mixture of apocalyptic narratives, new resource frontiers, and utopian schemes combine to create a sense of space expansion as not just inevitable, but a present in which we are behind rather than working toward something yet to come.** As Musk argued in a speech at the International Astronautical Congress: “It’s 2017 . . . We should have a lunar base by now.” Th is present, beholden to the future, makes strange work of history. **Earth 2.0 imaginaries offer the opportunity to start anew; these narratives erase collective responsibility for harms done by colonial projects and seem to “cleanse” history** (Redfi eld 2002: 797). Alternately, **history is turned into an “objective” knowledge resource for avoiding repeated mistakes (**e.g., HaqqMisra 2016). Most striking is the frequent collapse of timescales, with recent historical and deep evolutionary time brought into new resonances (Codignola et al. 2009). Space expansion is commonly fi gured as an inevitable step in a conjoined evolutionary-colonial history: “We wriggled onto dry land, ventured out of the African savannah as apes, set sail for new worlds—how Home and Away 165 could we not expect, someday, to live in colonies on Titan or starships cruising through deep space?” (Austen 2011). Th is vision places white, Western, masculine techno-capitalist humanity at the pinnacle of evolutionary scales. Th e future Earth left behind in Earth 2.0 imaginaries tends to fall into two categories. By far, the most common are **visions of an Earth destroyed, uninhabitable to humans if not to all carbon-based life**. Other narratives project that we might get off Earth in time to “save” it from ourselves, leaving behind a global park of purifi ed nature (Austen 2011). Both versions resonate with environmentalisms that take an anti-humanist turn, as in visions of humanity as a global pollution or disease, out of balance, or otherwise in need of reduction or eradication (Anker 2005; Dumit 2005). Projections of natural purity resonate in multiple directions, into pasts and futures, and both on and away from Earth. Lisa Messeri (2017a), working with scientists **searching for potentially habitable exoplanets, notes that “earthlike” planets are imagined as a kind of new Eden, representing a purification of human industrial histories by way of long-term futures. These futures of Earth 2.0 proliferate both at home and away—a rebooted humanity off ered a chance to “do nature better,” to recapture Eden.**

**Envisioning utopias will always fail and causes psychic violence.**

**Stavrakakis, 99** Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government @ University of Essex; *Lacan and the Political*, pg. 99-100 // ahs emi

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that **the need for utopia**n meaning **arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality.** Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). **Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience.** Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? **Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them** (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, **utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium** (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 **Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination.** Put another way, **the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat.** **The** naivety—and also the **danger**—of utopian **structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy** is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: **stigmatisation is followed by extermination.** This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. **If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if** utopia **is based on the expulsion and repression of violence** (this is its beatific side) **this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side).** This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, **Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area** (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, **this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history.** A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, **this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema.** It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, **the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such.** What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory—they can be infinitely abusive in the NC because I will have no ability to call them out on it. 1AR theory is drop the debater and competing interps because the speech is too short to be able to win substance and theory. No neg RVI or new 2nr paradigm issues or theory because the a) 6 min 2N could go all in on theory making short 2ar impossible b) all paradigm issues were in the aff so 1n should hve it.

#### [2]

#### [a] Permissibility is sufficient to prove an “ought” statement. If there are no moral reasons not to act, then there’s nothing prohibiting an agent from taking an action so all actions permissible means the aff is to.

#### [b] Negation by contradiction – Both P and not P cannot be true simultaneously, which means proving not P is false proves P true, meaning lack of sufficient reason for not P justifies P.

#### [3] Reject Utilitarianism –

**[a] Util creates a moral obligation to oppress people, when their suffering would cause a greater amount of happiness for the majority.**

Jeffrey **Gold**, Utilitarian and Deontological Approaches to Criminal Justice Ethics

According to utilitarianism, an action is moral when it produces the great-est amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. A problem arises, however, when the greatest happiness is achieved at the expense of a few. For example, **if a large group were to enslave a very small group, the large group would gain certain comforts and luxuries (and the pleasure that accompanies those comforts) as a result of the servitude of the few**. **If we were to follow the utilitarian calculus** strictly, **the suffering of a few (even intense suffering) would be outweighed by the pleasure of a large enough majority**. A thousand people’s modest pleasure would outweigh the suffer-ing of 10 others. Hence, utilitarianism would seem to endorse slavery when it produces the greatest total amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. This is obviously a problem for utilitarianism. **Slavery and oppression are wrong regardless of the amount of pleasure accumulated by the oppressing class. In fact, when one person’s pleasure results from the suf-fering of another, the pleasure seems all the more abhorrent.** The preceding case points to a weakness in utilitarianism, namely, the weak-ness in dealing with certain cases of injustice. Sometimes it is simply unjust to treat people in a certain way regardless of the pleasurable consequences for others. A gang rape is wrong even if 50 people enjoy it and only one suffers. It is wrong because it is unjust. To use Kant’s formulation, it is always wrong to treat anyone as a mere means to one’s own ends. When we enslave, rape, and oppress, we are always treating the victim as a means to our own ends.

**[b] Because only consequences determine if specific actions are good or bad, utilitarianism justifies horrific conclusions since no state of affairs could ever be intrinsically bad in and of itself.**

**Vallentyne**, Peter. *Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism*. **2006**, mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10174/AgainstMaximizingActConsequentialism.pdf?sequence=1.

**If** core **consequentialism is true, then any action with maximally good consequences** (in a given choice situation) **is permissible**. The main argument in favor of this claim is the following: **P1: An action is morally permissible if it is best supported by insistent moral reasons for action. P2: The value of consequences is always an insistent moral reason for action. P3: The value of consequences is the only insistent moral reason for action. C: Thus, an action is morally permissible if it maximizes the value of consequences.** This is the same argument given in the previous section for the impermissibility of actions that do not have maximally good consequences, except that (1) the appeal to insistent reasons has been made explicit, (2) the necessary conditions of the original P1 and C have been converted to sufficient conditions, and (3) the qualification in P3 that allowed the possibility of some prior constraints has been dropped. P1 is highly plausible. An action that is best supported by insistent moral reasons is surely permissible. P2 can be challenged, as I did earlier, on the ground that beyond some point the value of consequences ceases to be an insistent moral reason (once consequences are good enough, their value may only be a non-insistent reason). For the present purposes, however, we can grant this claim. The crucial claim is P3. It is implausible, because there are insistent moral reasons other than the value of consequences. There are also deontological insistent reasons, and these, or at least some of these, are lexical prior to the value of consequences. In particular**, individuals have certain rights that may not be infringed simply because the consequences are better.** Unlike prudential rationality, morality involves many distinct centers of will (choice) or 15 **interests, and these cannot simply be lumped together and traded off against each other.**16 **The basic problem with standard versions of core consequentialism is that they fail to recognize adequately the normative separateness of persons.** Psychological **autonomous beings** (as well, perhaps, as other beings with moral standing) are not merely means for the promotion of value. They **must be respected and honored**, and this means that at least sometimes certain things may not be done to them, even though this promotes value overall. An innocent person may not be killed against her will, for example, in order to make a million happy people slightly happier. This would be sacrificing her for the benefit of others.

**[c] Utilitarianism would justify that death is good.**

David **Benatar summarizes in**, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: **2006**, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB As a matter of fact, **bad things happen to all of us. No life is without hardship**. It is easy to think of the millions who live a life of poverty or of those who live much of their lives with some disability. Some of us are lucky enough to be spared these fates, but most of us who are, nonetheless suffer ill-health at some stage during our lives. Often the suffering is excruciating, even if it is in our final days. Some are condemned by nature to years of frailty. We all face death.²⁰ We infrequently contemplate the harms that await any new-born child—pain, disappointment, anxiety, grief, and death. **For any given child we cannot predict what form these harms will take or how severe they will be, but we can be sure that at least some of them will occur.²¹ None of this befalls the nonexistent. Only existers suffer harm. Optimists will be quick to note that** I have not told the whole story. **Not only bad things but also good things happen only to those who exist. Pleasure, joy, and satisfaction can only be had by existers. Thus, the cheerful will say, we must weigh up the pleasures of life against the evils. As long as the former outweigh the latter, the life is worth living**. Coming into being with such a life is, on this view, a benefit. The asymmetry of pleasure and pain **However, this conclusion does not follow. This is because there is a crucial difference between harms (such as pains) and benefits (such as pleasures) which entails that existence has no advantage over, but does have disadvantages relative to, non-existence.²²** Consider pains and pleasures as exemplars of harms and benefits. It is uncontroversial to say that () **the presence of pain is bad, and that () the presence of pleasure is good. However, such a symmetrical evaluation does not seem to apply to the absence of pain and pleasure, for it strikes me as true that () the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas () the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.**