## Framework

#### I Affirm, there is no singe mind independent moral truth—instead each person creates their own conception of the good

J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB

[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

#### Instead the subject is created through an encounter with the other and determines what is by reflecting on what it is not. This mutual recognition constructs concepts of good and bad from the social and cultural standpoint the meeting occurs in.

Sevilla A.L. (2017) Relationality vs. Singularity: Between Care Ethics and Poststructuralism. In: Watsuji Tetsurô’s Global Ethics of Emptiness. Global Political Thinkers. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58353-2_2> ///AHS PB

Thinking, questioning, are often taken as a demonstration of the indubitable existence of the ego (as in Descartes’ famous methodic doubt). Sometimes this is even developed into a solipsist position (I can be sure that I exist because I am thinking, but I don’t know if anyone else exists). However, Watsuji reads these acts in the complete opposite way: questioning shows how our individuality is fundamentally connected to others through shared language and concerns.1 He writes: “No matter how much we concern ourselves with the consciousness of I, this concern itself implies our going beyond the consciousness of I and being connected with others.”2 What we see here is a completely different starting point: We take our departure not from the intentional consciousness of “I” but from “betweenness.” The essential feature of betweenness lies in this, that the intentionality of the I is from the outset prescribed by its counterpart, which is also conversely prescribed by the former.3 This betweenness as a starting point applies not only to asking ethical questions but also to all our acts as human beings. For example, right now, I am writing. But my writing is always determined by possible readers—what kind of people would read my book? What parts might they find unclear? In the same way, the reader is perhaps at this point wondering what I am thinking, and what ideas I am trying to convey. The author is always determined by readers, and a reader is always determined by authors in a reciprocal determination and mutual dependency. Therefore, Watsuji does not even start with an independent author and an independent reader, who then have a relationship. Rather, “This relationship is constructed through and through in the betweenness between an author and his readers. Neither can exist prior to and independent of the other. They exist only by depending on one another.”4

#### Thus any account of ethics presupposes a coherent relationship with the Other: A] Endpoints: The Only thing that distinguishes an immoral action like punching a person, from a morally neutral action like punching a statue is that an Other is being acted upon, since the it has the goal of effecting an agent. C] Actor Spec: States are made up of Others, which means that any theory of good that only relates to the individual cannot motivate collective action, since Others couldn’t access it.

#### All relationships require reciprocal recognition, where the I and the Other treat each other with mutual respect and both recognize each other in a non-totalizing fashion. Such reciprocity is impeded by skewed power dynamics in the encounter and is key to any conception of linguistic and moral truth.

Emmanuel Levinas, Jewish-Lithuanian Philosopher, Summarizes, "Martin Buber and the, Theory of Knowledge, 1967 ,///AHS PB

Verbundenheit characterizes the reciprocity of the I-Thou relation and of the dialogue where I commit myself to the Thou just because it is absolutely other. The essence of the 'word' does not initially consist in its objective meaning or descriptive possibilities, but in the response that it elicits. The assertion is not true because the thought that it expresses corresponds to the thing or because it is revelatory of being. It is true only when it derives from the I-Thou relation identical with the ontological process itself. The assertion is true when it realizes the reciprocity of the relation by eliciting a response and singling out an individual who alone is capable of responding. This conception of the truth has nothing in common with the static notion of truth as an expressible content. But it is not to be assumed that a Heraclitian or Bergsonian becoming, also inexpressible because the word is necessarily a changeless entity and cannot apply to what is always changing, is the sole reality that may be opposed to immutable being. For Buber describes a sphere of being which cannot be told because it is a living dialogue between individuals who are not related as objective contents to one another: one individual has nothing to say about the other. The sensitivity of the I-Thou relation lies in its completely formal nature. To apprehend the other as a content is tantamount to relating oneself to him as an object and is to enter into an I-It relation instead. The notion of truth (with respect to which Buber's language is insufficiently didactic) is determinated by the I-Thou relation construed as the fundamental relation to being. We must distinguish Truth possessed, Truth as an impersonal result, called also objective Truth (283) from the Truth as a "way of being," a manner of truly being which denotes God. But truth also signifies a "concrete attitude towards being," "Realverhältnis zum Seienden" (198-199) and the living test which verifies it (BewAhrung). "To know signifies for the creature to fulfill a relation with being, for everyone in his own particular way, sincerely (wahrhaft) and with complete responsibility, accepting it on faith in all its various manifestations and therefore open to its real possibilities, integrating these experiences according to its own nature. It is only in this way that the living truth emerges and can be preserved." (283)

#### Non-Reciprocal relationships prevent mutual ethics: A] Framing: When the I and the Other don’t view each other reciprocally, they reduce are reduced to ideas of what they are like instead of their real selves. B] Epistemology: nonreciprocal relationships always benefit one party more than the other, which means that any ethical norms agreed too will be corrupted by the influence of those with power. C] Normativity: nobody would agree to engage in an ethical relationship that arbitrarily discriminated against them, so reciprocal relations are key because both parties enter with the expectation of equal treatment.

#### Thus the standard is preserving reciprocal relationships with the other. Even if your framework is the correct moral system, we cant access it without reciprocal relations, so my offense comes first as a side constraint. Prefer:

#### [1] Ethics must motivate consensus—its impossible to disprove an others viewpoint through an external standard.

**Joyce 02**[[1]](#footnote-1)**:**

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain“linguistic frameworks” (as Carnap calls them) bringwith themnewterms andways of talking: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”;accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionallyphilosophers have interested themselves inthe external question –the issue of the adequacy of the framework itself**:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that theexternalquestion**,** as it has been typically construed,does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer to the question “Do numbers exist?” is justtrivially“Yes.”From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional)philosopher’s questions – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – are pseudo-questions**.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space.Tostep out of the thing language andask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake, Carnap thinks, because the very notion of “existence” is a term which belongs to the thing language, and can be understood only within that framework, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: persons who disputewhether propositions exist, whether properties exist**,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus theyare not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their respective positions**.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

#### [2] Judge Actions based on consistency with a procedural standard, not foreseen consequences: A] Attempting to aggregate Other’s is not reciprocal since it views the I as an superior being who can assign value to lives B] Consequences trigger more consequences so we don’t know which ones to hold people culpable for C] Induction fails since every observation is based on a previous one D] Consequentialism can never call things like murder intrinsically bad since moral value is contingent upon the individual ends

#### [3] Ideal theory is key: A] Failure to abstract away from our subject position means agents are fully aware of their self-interest and will coopt your movement. B] only ideal theory can say things like racism are always wrong because we have universal standard to hold people too, not just an individual perspective C] Ideal theory prevents epistemic bias since by abstracting away from our identities and factors that cloud or judgement we can see what is universally good for everyone not just us.

## Offense

**Contention – I defend a just government ought to recognize worker’s right to strike. Ill defend normal means for implementation.**

#### [1] The right to strike increases mutual recognition

Richard D. **Kahlenberg**, January 6, **2016**, “How Defunding Public Sector Unions Will Diminish Our Democracy” [tcf.org/content/report/how-defunding-public-sector-unions-will-diminish-our-democracy/?session=1.] // swickle

Strong unions helped build the middle class in America after the Great Depression, and continue to have a positive effect on ameliorating extreme inequalities of wealth. By bargaining for fair wages and benefits, unions in the public and private sector help foster broadly shared prosperity. Research finds, for example, that unions compress wage differences between management and labor. According to one study, “controlling for variation in human resource practices, unionized establishments have an average of 23.2 percentage point lower management-to-worker pay ratio relative to non-union workplaces.”26 By the same token, as the Center for American Progress’s David Madland has vividly illustrated, the decline in union density in the United States between 1969 and 2009 has been accompanied by a strikingly similar decline in the share of income going to the middle class (the middle three-fifths of the income distribution; see Figure 1). &nbsp;The middle class is hollowing out: in 1971, 61 percent of Americans were middle class, but a December 2015 Pew Research Center report found that a slight majority of Americans now live in low- or upper-income households.27 Although there are many reasons for middle-class wage stagnation—including globalization and the rise in technology—Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute finds that the decline in union bargaining power is “the single largest factor suppressing wage growth for middle-wage workers over the last few decades.” The International Monetary Fund, likewise, has linked decline in unions worldwide with rises in income inequality.28 Figure 1. chartDOWNLOAD International studies also connect the relatively low levels of U.S. union density (when compared with other nations) and the higher level of economic inequality found in the United States. According to a 2011 analysis by the Center for Economic and Policy Research looking at twenty-one wealthy nations, nine countries had more than 80 percent of their workers covered by collective bargaining agreements; nine had between 30 and 80 percent covered; and just three—the United States, Japan, and New Zealand—had coverage rates below 20 percent. Using data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook on levels of income inequality, my colleague Moshe Marvit and I demonstrate in Why Labor Organizing Should Be a Civil Right that the three nations with the lowest collective bargaining coverage also were among the four countries with the highest degrees of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient.29 Defunding public sector unions will only accelerate the extreme economic inequality that threatens our political democracy. Unions Are Needed to Serve as Schools for Democracy Civic organizations that are run democratically can be an important mechanism for acculturating citizens to the inner workings of democracy. Unions are among the most important of these organizations, bringing together rank and file workers from a variety of ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds, and serving as what Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam calls “schools for democracy.” Union members learn skills that are essential to a well-functioning democracy: how to run meetings, debate one another, and organize for political action.30 Labor unions can also help create a culture of participation among workers. Being involved in workplace decisions and the give and take of collective bargaining, voting on union contracts, and voting for union leadership have all been called important drivers of “democratic acculturation.”

#### [2] Absent strikes, the other can be totalized with no say against it because they cannot strike it.

#### [3] Right to strike is necessary to have equal relations with the other – multiple warrants

#### Brian Kohler, “The fifth day of the COP25 conference” , February 16, 2015, [http://www.industriall-union.org/5-reasons-why-we-need-the-right-to-strike] // swickle

16 February, 2015 The fundamental right to strike is under attack from employers and governments at the International Labour Organization (ILO), which sets global standards on labour rights. Eliminating this human right would have serious repercussions on us all. Here are five key reasons why we need the right to strike: Striking is a last resort but sometimes the only tool for workers to protect themselves. To avoid being at the complete mercy of employers. To give more of a balance between worker and employer power. Without it, more and more governments will ban industrial action and punish people who dare to strike. Most strikes are over pay and better working conditions. Without the threat of strike action, corporations will be able to make bigger profits, while working conditions will get worse. Making a stand On 18 February, ahead of a key ILO meeting on the right to strike from 23-25 February, unions and workers around the world will be protesting to safeguard this fundamental right. Employers’ groups and certain governments are challenging the long-accepted belief that ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which is ratified by 153 countries, up-holds the right to strike.

## Underview

**1. Aff gets no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, 1AR Theory a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) 1AR is insufficient to win multiple layers and competing interpretations on spikes and shells since the 2n can dump on reasonability. And, reject arguments about spikes because they mutually indict each other, but prefer mine because you had time to comply. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to win every round. Additionally, the neg may not read combination shells A) strat skew, allows you to invalidate the entire AC with one arg and infinitely add planks B) Infinite abuse- the interp says one thing but the shell does not warrant explicitly each standard which means it always results in me losing on unwarranted arguments**

**2. The neg may not read necessary but insufficient burdens a) Strat Skew- You can uplayer with 7 minutes of NIBs I have to beat back before I can access offense which is terrible for a 4 min 1ar, it is impossible for aff to overwhelm the neg because you always have longer times and reactive speeches to overcome any unfairness b) Norms- It would justify infinite neg abuse because neg would just read 7 min of auto-negate arguments which is infinite abuse.**

#### 3. AFF flex outweighs – 13-7 time skew, 6-minute collapse, and the 8% side bias gives the negative the strategic advantage and means the AFF must split 1AR time. No new 2NR I meets, allows them to spam 100 blippy I meets like debaters instead of swickle which is infinitely abusive Aff theory o/w and I get ROB choice, I have to compensate, also give me a RVI on neg theory to deter impossible and un educational 2nr collapses, And, No 2n theory arguments a) overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden b) you have 6 minutes to develop implicit responses and weighing which kills my ability to accurately check abuse. 10] The neg may not read overview answers to aff arguments – they can uplayer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all.

#### 4. Accept aff interpretations and reject neg fairness offense

#### A] 13-7 time skew and 6-minute collapse means they’ll always more time on theory so it’s epistemically skewed in their favor B] They can uplayer and restart the round to have time to generate offense that matters C] They have access to more positions due to generic backfiles and bidirectional shells which means neg theory is impossible to avoid.

**5. Negating is harder arguments are incoherent a) people flip neg during out rounds all the time b) moots the entirety of aff paradigm issues c) bidirectional neg theory means that you can always win rounds with no prep. Also, means neg theory is impossible to meet so reject it. Allow new 2ar responses to nc arguments but not new 2n responses the nc has 7 minutes of rebuttal time while I only have 4 minutes, the 2ar makes it 7-7.**

1. Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)