
## Shell

**Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.**

**Violation – screenshots in the doc prove I do and they don’t**

****

**1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.**

**Open source does equal the playing field**

**Overing 18** – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better preparation** – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

**2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat**

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.

#### F

#### E

#### DTD

#### CI

#### No RVI

## ROB

**The Role of the ballot is to the test if the resolution is true.**

**1] Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.**

**2]. Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game.**

**3] Reject the western binary of truth and futurism in favor of a more nuanced understanding of the world.**

Graham **Priest**, Distinguished professor of philosophy at City University of New York and professor emeritus at the University of Melbourne. His latest book is One (2014), Beyond true and false, 5 May **2014**, <https://aeon.co/essays/the-logic-of-buddhist-philosophy-goes-beyond-simple-truth> ///BA PB

At the core of the explanation, one has to grasp a very basic mathematical distinction. I speak of the difference between a relation and a function. **A relation is something that relates a certain kind of object to some number of others** (zero, one, two, etc). **A function**, on the other hand, **is a special kind of relation that links each such object to exactly one thing**. Suppose we are talking about people. Mother of and father of are functions, because every person has exactly one (biological) mother and exactly one father. But son of and daughter of are relations, because parents might have any number of sons and daughters. Functions give a unique output; relations can give any number of outputs. Keep that distinction in mind; we’ll come back to it a lot. Now, in logic, one is generally interested in whether a given claim is true or false. Logicians call true and false truth values. Normally, and following Aristotle, it is assumed that ‘value of’ is a function: the value of any given assertion is exactly one of true (or T), and false (or F). In this way, the principles of excluded middle (PEM) and non-contradiction (PNC) are built into the mathematics from the start. But they needn’t be. To get back to something that the **Buddha** might recognise, all we need to do is **make value of into a relation instead of a function**. Thus T might be a value of a sentence, as can F, both, or neither. We now have four possibilities: {T}, {F}, {T,F} and { }. The curly brackets, by the way, indicate that we are dealing with sets of truth values rather than individual ones, as befits a relation rather than a function. The last pair of brackets denotes what mathematicians call the empty set: it is a collection with no members, like the set of humans with 17 legs. It would be conventional in mathematics to represent our four values using something called a Hasse diagram, like so: {T} ↗ ↖ {T, F} { } ↖ ↗ {F} Thus the four kotis (corners) of the catuskoti appear before us. In case this all sounds rather convenient for the purposes of Buddhist apologism, I should mention that the logic I have just described is called First Degree Entailment (FDE). It was originally constructed in the 1960s in an area called relevant logic. Exactly what this is need not concern us, but the US logician Nuel Belnap argued that FDE was a sensible system for databases that might have been fed inconsistent or incomplete information. All of which is to say, it had nothing to do with Buddhism whatsoever. Even so, you might be wondering how on earth something could be both true and false, or neither true nor false. In fact, the idea that some claims are neither true nor false is a very old one in Western philosophy. None other than Aristotle himself argued for one kind of example. In the somewhat infamous Chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, he claims that **contingent statements about the future**, such as ‘the first pope in the 22nd century will be African’, **are neither true nor false. The future is, as yet, indeterminate**. So much for his arguments in the Metaphysics. **The notion that some things might be both true and false is** much more unorthodox. But here, too, we can find some **plausible** examples. **Take the** notorious ‘paradoxes of self-reference’, the oldest of which, reputedly discovered by Eubulides in the fourth century BCE, is called the **Liar Paradox**. Here’s its commonest expression: **This statement is false.** Where’s the paradox? **If the statement is true, then it is indeed false. But if it is false, well, then it is true. So it seems to be both true and false.**

## Framework

**Volition, or the structure of the will, is a pre-condition for ethics and has intrinsic value – A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every agent engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good B) Foundations – the will is the basis for what constitutes an ethical subject which means its relation to the world is the primary ethical consideration C) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject D) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.**

**However, ethical theories to evaluate the will face a dilemma – they are either paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will, or they are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims.**

**Jaeggi 14,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: **theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the “sovereignty” of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in**. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s— when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations that characterize the members of affluent industrial societies: “I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence.”10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are integrated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, “a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.”11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to **a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to determine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a “purpose”—that ought to be realized. But** if the foundation of modern morality and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of society is the idea “that **it should be left to each individual how he lives his own life**” 12—that **individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to “know better.”** For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as objectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering. But can someone be alienated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alienation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the concept of **alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and preferences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions**. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case? 13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, “thin” variants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature. 14 **Even if there is**—in a banal sense—**something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if**—in a banal sense—**certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life** (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), **these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives**. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims become. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings?

**The only solution is a concept of alienation that understands the will in a functional capacity to relate to itself and the world – a criterion that is concerned with how one wills, rather than what one wills.**

**Jaeggi 2,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. A modern inquiry into the good life must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer cannot “deny the autonomy and thus the interpretive sovereignty of those concerned,” and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a “specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” **What is needed**, then, **is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination**. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. **Starting from** (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of **the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment**.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With **the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,”** which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat **has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions** of the sort he was looking for. **One could call such a position a “qualified subjectivism.”**6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. **This criterion is**, in the first place, **formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular**; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. **It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills**. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” Second**, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself**, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of **alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby**—formulated more generally—**as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world**. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that **alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom**, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, **positive freedom**. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, **freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends**. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not. 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of **alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires** (or, more generally, one’s life) **with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.”** It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, **the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.**

**That functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum.**

**This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself.**

**Jaeggi 4,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. **In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation**—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—**means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it**. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. **In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves** in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. **It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own**. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. **This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them**, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. **In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed**. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (**Thus a role**, for example, **in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch**. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.”14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creation ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a **successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them**.

**Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations. Only this coheres the nature of who you are and prevents psychological violence.**

**Impact calc: Consequences fail – A) To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will B) Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events.**

**Prefer additionally –**

**[1] Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.**

**[2] Solves oppression – A) Universality – The structure of the will is a basis for justifying why all agents are normatively equivalent which undermines the ideology underlying all forms of violence**

**[3] Ethical theories are insular – they define the good and language to describe it in their own terms. Joyce 02,** Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. //Scopa This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain **“linguistic frameworks”** (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new** terms and **ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; **accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”;** accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionally **philosophers have interest**ed themselves **in** the external **question** – the issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “**Are there numbers?**”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the** external **question,** as it has been typically construed, **does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer** to the question “Do numbers exist?” **is just** trivially **“Yes.”** From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To** step out of the thing language and **ask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake,** Carnap thinks, **because the very notion of “existence”** is a term which belongs to the thing language, and **can be understood only within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute** whether propositions exist, **whether properties exist,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus they **are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their** respective **positions.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

## Offense

**Contention – I defend a just government ought to recognize worker’s right to strike. Ill defend normal means for implementation.**

#### 1] Right to strike is necessary to not be alienated – multiple warrants

#### Brian Kohler, “The fifth day of the COP25 conference” , February 16, 2015, [http://www.industriall-union.org/5-reasons-why-we-need-the-right-to-strike] // swickle

16 February, 2015 The fundamental right to strike is under attack from employers and governments at the International Labour Organization (ILO), which sets global standards on labour rights. Eliminating this human right would have serious repercussions on us all. Here are five key reasons why we need the right to strike: Striking is a last resort but sometimes the only tool for workers to protect themselves. To avoid being at the complete mercy of employers. To give more of a balance between worker and employer power. Without it, more and more governments will ban industrial action and punish people who dare to strike. Most strikes are over pay and better working conditions. Without the threat of strike action, corporations will be able to make bigger profits, while working conditions will get worse. Making a stand On 18 February, ahead of a key ILO meeting on the right to strike from 23-25 February, unions and workers around the world will be protesting to safeguard this fundamental right. Employers’ groups and certain governments are challenging the long-accepted belief that ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which is ratified by 153 countries, up-holds the right to strike.

#### 2] The aff rectifies conditions of alienation – A) Standardization – voting neg is standardization because the aff provides the option to participate if they will to do so whereas the neg prevents individuals without access in the squo from engaging in a job B) Fixation – absent a right to strike, we can never foster the development of an agent or company in the workplace C) Over-identification – absent a right to strike we are overidentified in the workplace with no leverage to push for individualized approaches to labor subjectivity.

## Underview

#### [1] AFF theory is legit, no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, and functions under a norm setting model A) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse B) the 2n can dump on a script to a CI and go for RVI’s making it impossible to check abuse C) The 1ar is too short to win theory and substance D) The 2n can always create infinite reasonability arguments the 2ar can’t get through E) Prevents abusive strategies from proliferating which mitigates the need for 1AR restarts. If I win one layer vote aff a) Timeskew- the nc has 7min to uplayer and make the round impossible to win, I have to collapse at some point which means they can just dump on all my arguments on one layer and win every round

**[2] Reject new 2N theory arguments and paradigm issues – A) All the paradigm issues were in the aff which means any 2n argument is new and can’t be evaluated B) it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. And, neg has access to bidirectional shells which makes neg shells impossible to meet and impact turns your reading of the shells since I’ll always lose on an interpretation.**

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)