## ROB

**The Role of the ballot is to the test if the resolution is true.**

**1] Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude certain offense**

**2] Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game.**

**3] Reject the western binary of truth and futurism in favor of a more nuanced understanding of the world.**

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At the core of the explanation, one has to grasp a very basic mathematical distinction. I speak of the difference between a relation and a function. **A relation is something that relates a certain kind of object to some number of others** (zero, one, two, etc). **A function**, on the other hand, **is a special kind of relation that links each such object to exactly one thing**. Suppose we are talking about people. Mother of and father of are functions, because every person has exactly one (biological) mother and exactly one father. But son of and daughter of are relations, because parents might have any number of sons and daughters. Functions give a unique output; relations can give any number of outputs. Keep that distinction in mind; we’ll come back to it a lot. Now, in logic, one is generally interested in whether a given claim is true or false. Logicians call true and false truth values. Normally, and following Aristotle, it is assumed that ‘value of’ is a function: the value of any given assertion is exactly one of true (or T), and false (or F). In this way, the principles of excluded middle (PEM) and non-contradiction (PNC) are built into the mathematics from the start. But they needn’t be. To get back to something that the **Buddha** might recognise, all we need to do is **make value of into a relation instead of a function**. Thus T might be a value of a sentence, as can F, both, or neither. We now have four possibilities: {T}, {F}, {T,F} and { }. The curly brackets, by the way, indicate that we are dealing with sets of truth values rather than individual ones, as befits a relation rather than a function. The last pair of brackets denotes what mathematicians call the empty set: it is a collection with no members, like the set of humans with 17 legs. It would be conventional in mathematics to represent our four values using something called a Hasse diagram, like so: {T} ↗ ↖ {T, F} { } ↖ ↗ {F} Thus the four kotis (corners) of the catuskoti appear before us. In case this all sounds rather convenient for the purposes of Buddhist apologism, I should mention that the logic I have just described is called First Degree Entailment (FDE). It was originally constructed in the 1960s in an area called relevant logic. Exactly what this is need not concern us, but the US logician Nuel Belnap argued that FDE was a sensible system for databases that might have been fed inconsistent or incomplete information. All of which is to say, it had nothing to do with Buddhism whatsoever. Even so, you might be wondering how on earth something could be both true and false, or neither true nor false. In fact, the idea that some claims are neither true nor false is a very old one in Western philosophy. None other than Aristotle himself argued for one kind of example. In the somewhat infamous Chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, he claims that **contingent statements about the future**, such as ‘the first pope in the 22nd century will be African’, **are neither true nor false. The future is, as yet, indeterminate**. So much for his arguments in the Metaphysics. **The notion that some things might be both true and false is** much more unorthodox. But here, too, we can find some **plausible** examples. **Take the** notorious ‘paradoxes of self-reference’, the oldest of which, reputedly discovered by Eubulides in the fourth century BCE, is called the **Liar Paradox**. Here’s its commonest expression: **This statement is false.** Where’s the paradox? **If the statement is true, then it is indeed false. But if it is false, well, then it is true. So it seems to be both true and false.**

#### 4] Fairness: a) novices know how to debate the resolution – means its most inclusive for half the debate population b) predictability: the res is the only predictable stasis point we have going in to the round

#### 5] Topic Ed: we learn more about the topic by debating the resolution

#### 6] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

## Framing

**I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:**

**1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point.**

**2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

#### I value morality. The standard is consistency with indexed moral truths.

#### Prefer:

1] There is a distinction between factual and moral claims – the statement “This door is red,” contains no moral judgments, and the command “Close the door,” does not describe factual features of the door itself. It follows that moral judgments are not truth-apt, but instead express an agent’s attitudes towards features of an action predicated on the individual. Miller**,** Miller, Alexander. “Rejection of Non-Naturalism.” *Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.* Oxford: Polity, 2003 [https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/thought\_and\_writing/philosophy/An%20Introduction%20to%20Contemporary%20Metaethics.pdf] .explains: Ayer denies that moral judgments express beliefs: rather, **moral judgments express emotions**, or sentiments, **of approval and disapproval. Since these emotions** and sentiments are unlike beliefs in that they **do not** even purport to **represent how the world is, the judgments which express them are not truth-apt.** Compare your belief that there are children in the street, which purports to represent how the world is, with your horror at the fact that the children are torturing a cat. The belief has a representative function: it purports to represent how the world is, and it is true if and only if the world actually is as it represents it. The emotion of horror, on the other hand, has no such representative function: it is not the sort of thing that can even be assessed for truth or falsity. In short, moral judgments are neither true nor false: they do not state anything, but rather express our emotions and feelings. As Ayer puts it in a famous passage: “**If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’,** I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. **I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it.**. **It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money’, in a** peculiar **tone of horror, or** written **with** the addition of some special **exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker*.***”(Ayer [1936] 1946: 107; emphases added) It follows that: “**If I now** generalize my previous statement and **say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning** – that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false.” ([1936] 1946: 107)

2] Indexed reasons are the only way to avoid contradictions. Reichardt, Reichardt, Bastian. "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric." University Bonn (n.d.): n. pag. Print.//Scopa Second-Order Moral Relativism is a statement about the indexicality of moral truth. **A sentence like “Polygamy is morally wrong” is not true *simpliciter* but rather** **true relative to a given moral frame** of reference and false relative to another one. By **indexing moral truth** relativists **do[es] not assume that moral disagreements are contradictions.** If a moral sentence is true relative to one frame of reference and false to another one, then people from these different cultures do not contradict each other. **Just like the sentence that an object is moving might be true relative to one frame of reference and false to another one is not a contradiction but a valid consequence** from the special theory of relativity.

3] Neuroscience proves that morality is an internal emotive process. Greene**,**  Joshua Greene, [Cognitive Neuroscientist and Philosopher, Ph.D., Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Psychology and Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior at Princeton University], “From neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought:” what are the moral implications of neuaroscientific moral psychology? ” *Nature Reviews Neuroscience,* Volume 4, October, 2003 [https://sites.oxy.edu/clint/physio/article/fromneuralistomoralought.pdf].As noted above, recent evidence from **neuroscience and** neighbouring **disciplines indicate**s that **moral judgement is** often an intuitive, **emotional** matter. Although many moral judgements are difficult, much moral judgement is **accomplished in an intuitive**, effortless **way**. An interesting feature of many intuitive, effortless cognitive processes is that they are accompanied by a perceptual phenomenology. For example, humans can effortlessly determine whether a given face is male or female without any knowledge of how such judgements are made. When you look at someone, you have no experience of working out whether that person is male or female. You just see that person’s maleness or femaleness. By contrast, you do not look at a star in the sky and see that it is receding. One can imagine creatures that automatically process spectroscopic redshifts, but as humans we do not. All of this makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. **We have evolved mechanisms for making** quick, **emotion-based** social **judgements, for** ‘seeing’ **rightness and wrongness**, **because our** intensely social **lives favour such capacities**, but there was little selective pressure on our ancestors to know about the movements of distant stars. We have here the beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism: **we believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology**, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because natural selection has **outfitted** us **with mechanisms for** making intuitive, **emotion-based moral judgements**, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based judgements about who among us are the most suitable mates. Therefore, **we** can **understand our inclination towards moral realism** not as an insight into the nature of moral truth, but **as a by-product of the efficient cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions**.

#### 4] Solipsism is true—overwhelming mathematical probability proves

**Carroll 13** [Sean Carroll (Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, Moore Center for Theoretical Cosmology and Physics) “The Higgs Boson vs. Boltzmann Brains” August 22nd 2013 Preposterous Universe <http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/08/22/the-higgs-boson-vs-boltzmann-brains/> JW 1/22/15]

**A room full of monkeys, hitting keys randomly on a typewriter, will eventually bang out** a perfect copy of **Hamlet. Assuming**, of course, that their typing is perfectly random, and that **it keeps up for a long time**. An extremely long time indeed, much longer than the current age of the universe. So this is an amusing thought experiment, not a viable proposal for creating new works of literature (or old ones). There’s an interesting feature of what these thought-experiment monkeys end up producing. Let’s say you find a monkey who has just typed Act I of Hamlet with perfect fidelity. You might think “aha, here’s when it happens,” and expect Act II to come next. But by the conditions of the experiment, the next thing the monkey types should be perfectly random (by which we mean, chosen from a uniform distribution among all allowed typographical characters), and therefore independent of what has come before. The chances that you will actually get Act II next, just because you got Act I, are extraordinarily tiny. For every one time that your monkeys type Hamlet correctly, they will type it incorrectly an enormous number of times — small errors, large errors, all of the words but in random order, the entire text backwards, some scenes but not others, all of the lines but with different characters assigned to them, and so forth. Given that any one passage matches the original text, it is still overwhelmingly likely that the passages before and after are random nonsense. That’s the Boltzmann Brain problem in a nutshell. **Replace your typing monkeys with a box of atoms** at some temperature, **and let the atoms randomly bump into each other** for an indefinite period of time. **Almost all the time they will be** in a **disordered**, high-entropy, equilibrium state. **Eventually**, just by chance, **they will take the form of a smiley face**, or Michelangelo’s David, **or absolutely any configuration** that is compatible with what’s inside the box. **If you wait** long enough, and your box is sufficiently large, **you will get** a person, a planet, a galaxy, **the whole universe as we now know it.** But given that some of the atoms fall into a familiar-looking arrangement, we still expect the rest of the atoms to be completely random. Just because you find a copy of the Mona Lisa, in other words, doesn’t mean that it was actually painted by Leonardo or anyone else; **with overwhelming probability it** simply **coalesced** gradually **out of random motions**. Just because you see what looks like a photograph, there’s no reason to believe it was preceded by an actual event that the photo purports to represent. **If the random motions of the atoms create a person with firm memories of the past, all of those memories are overwhelmingly likely to be false.**

#### 5] Ethical Theories are insular

**Walker,** Walker, JC. “ EPISTEMOLOGY AND JUSTIFYING THE CURRICULUM OF EDUCATIONAL STUDIES.” British Journal of Educational Studies , The University of Sydney, [www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3121553.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aabe696486e418db1b8534ae1ee024f9d.//FSU](http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3121553.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aabe696486e418db1b8534ae1ee024f9d.//FSU) SS. The move from naive falsificationism back into the sort of holism we were considering earlier, has occurred on two fronts. First, **even on the assumption that there is nothing problematical about the notion of observation,** according to the Duhem-Quine thesis, **observations do not apply directly to particular statements**. Test situations are complex and a particular statement to be falsified will therefore be part of a fabric of statements describing not only the total test situation but also all of the assumptions built into it. **We can thus save a particular statement from falsification, come what may, by suitably altering the truth value of other statements in the fabric; and for well-integrated theories the fabric will be the whole theory. This makes the total theory, rather than the individual (observation) statement, the smallest unit of knowledge**. Nor need it be the theory that responds to every unkind observation. **If a particular observation threatens extensive revision we are at liberty to use the theory to correct the observation** (as Newton did with the Astronomer Royal's observa- tions). **The reason why this is a permissible strategy brings us to our second point: there is no sharp epistemological division between theory and observation**. This is sometimes called the theory-ladenness thesis. **Whether we talk of observing the sun rising or of seeing lines on an oscilloscope, the language we use to describe these things is language that contains certain commitments to a view of how things are. This is because expressions figuring in our descriptions are to be understood, at least partly, in terms of the role they play in some theory**. Thus the expression 'sun' and 'rising' will carry certain theoretical baggage that disposes us to understand them as referring to some objects or happen- ings rather than others. On this view, **the language we use to formulate observation statements is language that figures in some theory, even the theory or theories behind ordinary discourse. So there is no theory-free way of describing observations. This means that the observation statements used to falsify a theory are only as good as the theory in which the language of observation statements is expressed**: a form of our earlier holistic point about self-reference

## Offense

**The negative and I affirm the resolution resolved: a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike Resolved is defined as[[3]](#footnote-3) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined. Affirm means to express agreement[[4]](#footnote-4) and you already know I do.**

#### [1] I think the aff is super cool and a good idea

#### [2] Kant affirms:

#### A] Because employees are dependent upon their employer, employees are subject to a severe power imbalance that constitutes coercion.

**Budd and Scoville 05,** John W. Budd and James G. Scoville "The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations.", p.70, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES, Cornell University Press, October 15, 2005 [http://jbudd.csom.umn.edu/RESEARCH/hrirethics.htm] AHS//NPR Accessed 10/23/21

**The overwhelming number of people need to work to survive**, at least for a large portion of their live. There is a sense in which people are forced to work. **When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,**” **you technically have a choice**. However, for many **this situation is the paradigm of coercion.** How close is the analogy between the assailant and **the requirements of the employer**? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment a they get them (Manning 2003). Someone wanting employment does not negotiate about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. **If you want a job, you agree to employment** at **will and to layoffs** if management believes that they are necessary. **Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it.** As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but **most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment.** A Kantian, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, maintains that **the imbalance between employer and employee ought to be addressed.** Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation.

**B] The right to unionize and strike corrects this power imbalance by ensuring an opportunity for organization and collective bargaining.**

**Bowie 99 [**Norman E., professor emeritus at the University of Minnesota “Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective” Wiley Blackwell. https://b-ok.cc/book/2885756/a063b7] Accessed 10/24/21

Although I emphasize meaningful work as a means to gain respect and grow as a human being by exercising one’s talents, Ciulla reminds me that there is much in the work environment that undermines negative freedom (freedom from coercion), and that the decision to work itself requires a giving up of freedom in some respects. This latter point does not overly concern me because all choice forecloses other choices. Moreover, **having a job provides income, and income expands choices because it opens up possibilities**. **This is especially true when one has an adequate wage, and that is why I have emphasized the role that an adequate wage plays in meaningful work**. Of course, Ciulla is well aware of all this and in her analysis she points out that **for the unskilled their range of options is extremely limited, that the demise of unions has given much more power to manage- ment, and that there is a correlation between higher-paying jobs and the amount of freedom one has**. All these points are well taken. I especially agree with Ciulla that **unions provide a means for enhancing employee freedom**. In this case I practiced what I now preach. I am a former president of the AAUP union at the University of Delaware. I also point out that the United States is the most anti-union country in the G-20. **Unionization is considered a human right by the United Nations**. **Obviously unions provide an opportunity for participation**, and I think Ciulla and I agree that **participation schemes are one way to limit coercion**. In response to trends over the past twenty years, in this edition of Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective I pay more attention to adequate pay for the middle class, issues of inequality, and economic mobility. However, none of this requires a revision in my original account of meaningful work.

#### [3] Contracts Affirms: The National Labor Relations Act explicitly defends the right to strike

**National Labor Relations Board ND**, National Labor Relations Board is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide, [https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/nlra-and-the-right-to-strike] Accessed 10/25/21 AHS//NPR

#### The Right to Strike. Section 7 of the Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right. Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. Strikes for a lawful object. Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes: economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs. Economic strikers defined. If the object of a strike is to obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. They retain their status as employees and cannot be discharged, but they can be replaced by their employer. If the employer has hired bona fide permanent replacements who are filling the jobs of the economic strikers when the strikers apply unconditionally to go back to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement at that time. However, if the strikers do not obtain regular and substantially equivalent employment, they are entitled to be recalled to jobs for which they are qualified when openings in such jobs occur if they, or their bargaining representative, have made an unconditional request for their reinstatement. Unfair labor practice strikers defined. Employees who strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by their employer are called unfair labor practice strikers. Such strikers can be neither discharged nor permanently replaced. When the strike ends, unfair labor practice strikers, absent serious misconduct on their part, are entitled to have their jobs back even if employees hired to do their work have to be discharged. If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated.

#### [4] Negating is always contradictory – the point of being neg is to produce contradictions in the aff, which means either a) they produce contradictions or b) they don’t in which case the aff is true. And, that affirms because of the principle of explosion – the existence of one contradiction means any contradiction is justifiable since contradictions are binary rather than on a scale, which means any contradiction affirms.

### Underview

#### 1. Aff gets 1AR theory—they can be infinitely abusive in the NC because I will have no ability to call them out on it. 1AR theory is drop the debater and competing interps because the speech is too short to be able to win substance and theory. No neg RVI or new 2nr paradigm issues or theory because the 6 min 2N could go all in on theory making short 2ar impossible. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to win every round.

#### 2. The neg may not read necessary but insufficient burdens a) Strat Skew- You can uplayer with 7 minutes of NIBs I have to beat back before I can access offense which is terrible for a 4 min 1ar, it is impossible for aff to overwhelm the neg because you always have longer times and reactive speeches to overcome any unfairness b) Norms- It would justify infinite neg abuse because neg would just read 7 min of auto-negate arguments which is infinite abuse.

#### 3. No 2n theory arguments and paradigm issues – A) All the paradigm issues were in the aff which means any 2n argument is new and can’t be evaluated B) it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n C) Evaluate the theory debate after the 1AR since 1) the 6 min 2n can dump on theory making the 3 min 2AR impossible 2) we both get 1 speech on theory.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-4)