**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –**

**1] The world is structured by language—signifiers mediate reality by defining concepts through differentiation, or by classifying them by what they are not. However, the nature of that opposition is unstable because signifiers’ meaning is constantly in flux.**

* **Van Haute 3 – Van Haute in Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Fall 2003** (Philippe. *Against Adaptation Lacan's "Subversion" of the Subject*. Other Press, 2003) [<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/46467/pdf>] Accessed 1/14/19 AHS//EMM

Thus it also becomes clear why we said, in our exposition of Freud above, that the expression “reality outside of us” re- quires further consideration, and cannot simply be accepted as it stands. The world in which we carry on our everyday ex-istence is always already structured by the signifiers of language. The world in which we shape our lives receives its form from our expectations, intentions, representations, and so on, and these are themselves structured in turn by the symbolic systems that determine us (for example, in articulating the difference between man and woman). At the very least, then, the opposition between language and the thing about which it speaks is more complex than we suggested above, and than Freud sometimes seems to think. The world about which we speak and in which we live is no “brute” reality; it is itself al-ready mediated and structured by the signiﬁers of language, which allow it to appear as a meaningful and differentiated environment (Umwelt). The signiﬁer actively institutes meaning. Language does not simply reflect reality; it is not the expression of a previ-ously given order. The reality in which we carry on our existence must, on the contrary, be understood in a pregnant sense as the effect of the order of signiﬁers. In this context, Lacan points out that signifiers are essentially determined diacritically or differentially. In other words, they signify primarily on the basis of their difference from other signiﬁers and not, for ex-ample, by referring to a non-linguistic reality. Let us return to our example of the difference between “man” and “woman.” It is clear that the signiﬁer “man” only has meaning as opposed to the signiﬁer “wom[x]n”—for what could “man” mean with-out “wom[x]n”? The signifiers “man” and “woman” receive fur-ther meaning from a complex network of references in which signifiers such as “human,” “animal.” and “plant,” for example, hold a central place. The meaning of a signifier is in the first place dependent upon the linguistic context of which it is a part. Moreover, the fact that a signiﬁer only receives meaning from a complex network of signitive references immediately implies, for Lacan, that the meaning of a signiﬁer changes ac-cording to the context in which it is taken up. When an analysand says in an analytical session, Je vais a la mer (“I am going to the sea”). the analyst might hear, le vais a la mere (“I am going to the mother”), basing her interpretation on other associations that the analysand has formulated in the course of this or other sessions. A second example can perhaps make the point somewhat clearer. Some years ago, for professional reasons, I opened a bank account in Holland, and the bank clerk asked if I had any “titles.” 1 replied that I did, but immediately added that I wanted to keep them in Belgium, where l was liv-ing at the time. The man looked at me strangely, and asked me if the “titles” were not valid in Holland. After a bit of talking back and forth, it turned out that he had meant academic titles, while I, because of my Belgian background, had understood “titles” in the sense of the French titles (“financial securities").9 Just as the associative context determined the meaning of the signifier mer/mere (“sea”/“mother") in the first example, so here the meaning of the signiﬁer “title” changes depending on whether it is to be understood in an academic context or an economic one. The production of meaning is thus in principle a process that cannot be closed off. There is no ultimate con- text that could, as it were, embrace all contexts and so bring the production of meaning to completion.

**2] Ethics – individuals create ethics internally- a) Externalist ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. B) Even the most objective description of another individuals’ experience cannot bridge the epistemic gap between my experience and others because of the lack, which means a universal understanding of experience is impossible. And under this, the impact to the aff comes first because it hurts the individual subject which makes it a procedural question.**

**3] Desires come first – A) Only my framework answers the question “why act”, since agents have a reason to due to their own motivations rather than some non-existent transcendental principle. B) Identity –the creation of the subject determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade. C) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, the standard is to embrace the lack. This is key to preventing psychological violence and coheres the nature of who you are.**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] //ahs em

It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**Impact calculus –**

**Reject the duty to extend human life. We cannot fulfill this project. One day the sun will explode - the futile attempt to save humans encourages us to destroy all that we consider to be sub-human.**

**Milligan 15 - Tony Milligan, PH.D.** lecturer in philosophy at the **University of Hertfordshire** and specializes in ethics, **in his 2015 book**. [Nobody Owns the Moon: The Ethics of Space Exploitation]eec

And so, what I am suggesting here is that recognition of a duty to extend human life is above all a way of responding to a special bond to other members of our moral community and not primarily responding to them merely as members of the same biological species. A commitment of this sort, to a sense of moral community, seems to be in play when we criticize the special failures which are often involved in racism, anti-Semitism and similar forms of prejudice. Suppose, for example, I assert that the most extreme forms of the latter involve both false beliefs (about culture or biology) and a betrayal of humanity. By doing so I would not be suggesting that they involve a betrayal of our genetic similarity. Rather, I would be suggesting that they involve the betrayal of a deep bond which is made possible by various aspects of our shared biological nature but which might equally be made possible by the possession of some other biological nature and which is, in any case, an achievement of social history rather than a mere biological given. Should we then extend our conception of moral community beyond the human, so that it comes to include non-humans, that too might be a very good thing. Indeed, at any given time, we are already members of several communities and a community of fellow creatures may be entirely within our reach. However, communities of the relevant sort result from a shared history rather than from a community-forming decision. The strength and ethical significance of any particular bond is something which cannot be wished into existence or, indeed, wished away. (And it is precisely the latter which is the special mistake from which familiar prejudices evolve.) Two Objections In spite of all that has been said above, two important objections to the idea of a duty to extend human life may be difficult to ignore. One centers upon practicality and other upon over-estimation. On the side of practicality it may be held that, in this context, ought implies can. If we cannot actually do anything to significantly extend the survival of humanity then we cannot reasonably be held to have any such duty. And here, the difficulties of extending human life are both familiar and formidable. Yes, we could (and probably will) go to Mars and (barring extreme misfortune) we will establish a stable presence off-world and nearby on the Moon. Perhaps we will also establish a presence somewhat further away from the Sun, in the asteroid belt, among the moons of the gas giants. But this will still leave humanity doomed to extinction during the latter stages of our Sun's life-cycle. Reaching anywhere else and surviving will be difficult and perhaps to all intents and purposes impossible, because of the sheer immensity of space. Matters may simply not be within our control. The odds against our survival beyond the lifetime of our sun may not be good. In which case it may be seriously misguided to think and act as if we will have more time at our disposal than the limited time that we do in fact have. The difficulties of inter-stellar travel, the problems facing any attempt to construct an Ark to preserve human life elsewhere, may simply turn out to be too great. Indeed, at present, I am reluctantly inclined to suspect that this may turn out to be the case. However, this may simply be my own short-sightedness. I rather hope that it is and the hope may not be misplaced and it need not collapse into some manner of faith in the future. After all, prediction about the remote future generally fails. Based upon our limited human capacity to envisage the future in realistic ways (a human limitation in support of which we may appeal to two millennia of seriously misleading Utopian and dystopian literature written by some of the most intelligent humans ever to have lived) it seems reasonable to say that we are, again, in a poor epistemic position to know whether or not the spreading of humanity beyond the solar system will ultimately be possible. And if we do not know then, as a precautionary matter, it may be best to allow that survival and spread, on a cosmic scale, may be a possible outcome. And in this case we may indeed have a duty to fry and make it happen. Uncertainty about the long-range future of humanity may well favor acceptance that the claimed duty is a genuine duty. The second objection concerns over-estimation and more specifically, the way in which the endorsement of a duty to extend human life may promote an already damaging over-estimation of our human importance (damaging to the environment, to other creatures, to all that is not human). Carl Sagan once remarked that we are the universe's way of being conscious of itself.- Although we may understand what was meant, even here a form of species prejudice may be evident or at least risked. Unless we are to discount the awareness of other (already-existing) terrestrial creatures, the point is rather that we are the universe's way of being conscious of, or theorizing, itself as a universe or, as a cosmos (an orderly law-governed system). And this is slightly more accurate if rather less elegant. But perhaps we are no such thing. Perhaps there are many beings with similar or even greater capacities. What then would make us so special? To affirm the importance of humanity we might be thrown back solely upon humanity as a community of beings to which we happen to belong and to whom we owe special loyalties that we do not owe to others (although, no doubt we owe them something). But if we do so it may be better to focus upon our community being a good one rather than an indefinitely prolonged one. This same dilemma (familiar from Homer and Aristotle) may be present in the life of the individual: is it better to live longer or to live well? (Both, incidentally, opted for the latter.) If we are not unique, or at least if we are not an extremely rare sort of thing, it may seem better to accept that ultimately our community of beings will play out its limited run of time. Indeed, an acceptance of this might improve the quality of our ethical flunking just as acceptance of mortality by the individual human ma}' make their life less wasteful and misdirected. This too is a concern of a deep sort and one which is not easily disposed of. Yet, although deliberation of this kind may be deep, so too is our connection to humanity and the idea of a duty to humanity. Depth confronts depth and we are left with no guarantees about getting matters right. Yet in this instance the countervailing consideration draws upon the possible existence of other beings about whose nature we have no current knowledge and whose actual existence we cannot obviously presuppose.

**Prefer the framework –**

**[1] Performativity – debate is a fundamentally a game. We desire wins and avoid losses – only psychoanalysis explains the constitutive drives of the activity which proves it outweighs.**

**[2] Bindingness – the lack is constitutive to the structure of language and the nature of the subject. Any action a subject take is inevitably mediated through signification. We cannot escape our mediation through language which means an understanding of it comes first.**

**[3] Lexicality – [A] Answering the AC proves it true since you had to first embrace to lack to access rational argumentation. [B] Answering the framework is self-defeating because you use language to answer arguments about language, which is tautological and proves everything devolves to signification since your arguments are inseparable from how you communicate them.**

**[4] Denying the AC is impossible since any argument starts from the premise that language captures reality, but denying the AC denies any ability for language to have meaning in the first place.**

**[5] All communication is constrained by the lack, even the flow because of its linguistic content, which means the standard is a side constraint on the judge evaluating the round. Use Evaluative modesty – whoever wins the strongest strength of link to their offense times the probability that each portion of the flow is the highest layer: A) Key to determining the better debater since some debaters are really skilled in one area, but the best debater is flexible and can do well on multiple layers B) Probability – we’re never 100% certain that one thing comes before another since there are arguments for each**

**Offense**

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle: Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

**[1] Space exploration is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new “frontiers” and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.**

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. **Privatized space research mobilizes fears of ecological, political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for new utopian futures,** or the search for Earth 2.0. **These imaginaries reflect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier.** In contrast, eco-centric visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroyers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a multispecies process—off the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. This article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and political earthly life. **Outer space imaginaries are booming**. Reborn from Cold War projects into the post-9/11 **securitized era**, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are **proliferating, creating new material impacts and new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion.** Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many **extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of technoscientific progress and human mastery over nature.** Space programs are increasingly **privatized**, with tech entrepreneurs leading the way to **extraterrestrial futures**. I refer to these projects, oft en framed as a necessary step in human social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on Earth. Th ese share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defi ned by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question. Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, **innovation, or human exceptionalism**, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace intention from life’s expansion. Earth 2.0 and Home and Away 159 eco-centric imaginaries off er diff erent understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories. Th is article traces these two imaginaries for the future of life aft er Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. Th e word “imaginaries” builds on the definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of effects and entanglements between language, cultural production, scientifi c research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial expansionary megaprojects. Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research programs, policy proposals, social movements, and **private investments, they bring displacements of ontological, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present—with** both **oppressive** and liberatory **possibilities** (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconfi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements work through analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar 2017). These two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve seeing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter 1997). Th ese visions range from the widespread use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s uniqueness in the universe, to the politically unifying “overview eff ect” proposed by Frank White (1987). Early space programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientifi c understandings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). **Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-fi rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present”** (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication fi gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. 160 Micha Rahder Leaving Earth—Fact or Fiction? Th ere is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. Th e boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Th ese projects and imaginaries share signifi cant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, known as SETI (Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spacefl ight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. Th is article has a bias toward US-based projects, both public and private, as these are most prolifi c and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private companies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. Th e charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republican Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a scientifi c institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imaginaries are on the rise as the international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself. Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fi ction and fantasy long relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). Th is division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical, and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). Th e Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fi ction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fi elds are drawing attention to how science fi ction has long infl uenced technological and scientifi c developments, particularly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfi eld notes, “fi ctions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. Th ese dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams fi nding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fi ctional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the Home and Away 161 scientifi c gaze (Redfi eld 2002). Language can shape the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might participate in them. Refl ecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and diff erence as opposed to a unifi ed singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While biological and philosophical debates over the defi nition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that defi ne life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief history of human projects oriented toward life’s expansion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. Th is focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). Th is choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward, examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfi guring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to Anthropocene “ Th ings that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting **human expansion into space** have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy 2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientifi c progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close relation with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capacity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth” environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, **reinforcing ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management of more-than-human worlds** (DeLoughrey 2014). Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the United States and Europe have oft en been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that **resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather than imagining others we might one day escape to** (Cockell 2006). Narratives of **new capitalist frontiers** led many environmentalists to view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle**,” fearing it will lead to ideologies of a disposable planet** (Hartmann 1986). Yet expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extraterrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, **entrepreneurial capitalists**—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fi ll this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most oft en articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond Earth is no longer defi ned by competing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shift ed from sudden nuclear annihilation to the slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Th ough understood as new or diff erent, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastructures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). **These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa.** As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way. **These sometimes amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth, and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control.** This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries Earth 2.0 Dominating current eff orts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partnerships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range from imperialist nationalisms to profi ts to new utopian Home and Away 163 social orders, oft en mixed together in unexpected confi gurations. Yet these **Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures.**

**[2] Extraterrestrial imaginaries scapegoat culpability of environmental destruction and are unobtainable utopias.**

**Rahder 2** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

These utopian visions are still grounded by earthly concerns. Jacob Haqq-Misra argues for “liberating Mars,” basing future settlement not on an extension of earthly sociopolitics (whether organized in terms of nation-states or corporations) but instead by establishing a new Martian planetary citizenship to create a “test bed for new ideas that could lead to unforeseen epistemic transformations of our values and preferences” (2016: 66). Yet his argument compares this “transformative experience” to a “trust fund child” gaining new values from a wilderness trip (65). “Nature”—whether earthly wilderness or Martian extremity—is called upon as a resource for human cultural transformation, reimagining a modernist dichotomy as the basis for a planetary move beyond modernism. Th ese narratives frame the search for a new Earth 2.0 as a necessary project for collective human and environmental survival. Defl ecting critiques that space programs divert too many resources from earthly problems, Cameron Smith and Evan Davies (2012) claim that “all worthwhile things” (among which they list boats and wedding rings) are worth large expense. **Space expansion, framed as a form of long-term insurance for the human species, is moved from the question “Can we aff ord to go?” to “Can we aff ord not to?” (Hartmann 1986). This powerful mixture of apocalyptic narratives, new resource frontiers, and utopian schemes combine to create a sense of space expansion as not just inevitable, but a present in which we are behind rather than working toward something yet to come.** As Musk argued in a speech at the International Astronautical Congress: “It’s 2017 . . . We should have a lunar base by now.” Th is present, beholden to the future, makes strange work of history. **Earth 2.0 imaginaries offer the opportunity to start anew; these narratives erase collective responsibility for harms done by colonial projects and seem to “cleanse” history** (Redfi eld 2002: 797). Alternately, **history is turned into an “objective” knowledge resource for avoiding repeated mistakes (**e.g., HaqqMisra 2016). Most striking is the frequent collapse of timescales, with recent historical and deep evolutionary time brought into new resonances (Codignola et al. 2009). Space expansion is commonly fi gured as an inevitable step in a conjoined evolutionary-colonial history: “We wriggled onto dry land, ventured out of the African savannah as apes, set sail for new worlds—how Home and Away 165 could we not expect, someday, to live in colonies on Titan or starships cruising through deep space?” (Austen 2011). Th is vision places white, Western, masculine techno-capitalist humanity at the pinnacle of evolutionary scales. Th e future Earth left behind in Earth 2.0 imaginaries tends to fall into two categories. By far, the most common are **visions of an Earth destroyed, uninhabitable to humans if not to all carbon-based life**. Other narratives project that we might get off Earth in time to “save” it from ourselves, leaving behind a global park of purifi ed nature (Austen 2011). Both versions resonate with environmentalisms that take an anti-humanist turn, as in visions of humanity as a global pollution or disease, out of balance, or otherwise in need of reduction or eradication (Anker 2005; Dumit 2005). Projections of natural purity resonate in multiple directions, into pasts and futures, and both on and away from Earth. Lisa Messeri (2017a), working with scientists **searching for potentially habitable exoplanets, notes that “earthlike” planets are imagined as a kind of new Eden, representing a purification of human industrial histories by way of long-term futures. These futures of Earth 2.0 proliferate both at home and away—a rebooted humanity off ered a chance to “do nature better,” to recapture Eden.**

**Envisioning utopias will always fail and causes psychic violence.**

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Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that **the need for utopia**n meaning **arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality.** Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). **Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience.** Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? **Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them** (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, **utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium** (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 **Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination.** Put another way, **the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat.** **The** naivety—and also the **danger**—of utopian **structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy** is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: **stigmatisation is followed by extermination.** This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. **If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if** utopia **is based on the expulsion and repression of violence** (this is its beatific side) **this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side).** This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, **Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area** (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, **this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history.** A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, **this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema.** It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, **the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such.** What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

**[3] privitzated appropriation of space is a narcissistic search for fulfillment and wholeness, which is structurally impossible because of alienation from the real.**

**Kilbryde 15** - “Space Travel as a Means for Re-Enchantment, Unification, and Spiritual Fulfillment” by Ana Kilbryde\* The University of Brighton, East Sussex, United Kingdom [http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/Journal/JOA-Final/JournalOfAstrosociology-Vol1.pdf#page=89] // ahs emi

One may describe this sense of **unification with the universe as something incomprehensible and sublime.** It certainly cannot fit into any existing framework, as nondualism is a primordial, organic consciousness without subject or object (Katz, 2007, p. 3-14). Moreover, attempting to categorize a sense of unity into a theoretical framework requires recognition of an object, which implies a duality between the object and the subject. After all, the argument here is that **the search for unification results from a sense of separation brought about by dualist ideologies** and binary modes of thinking. This “ecstasy of unity” runs parallel to what Abraham Maslow (1976, p. 6-16) deemed ‘peak experiences’. These are mystical experiences of egoless amalgamation with the world. **They are experiences of wholeness and integration in which the individual existed effortlessly in the here and now.** Both these peak experiences and experiences of unity are comparable to ideas inherent in East Asian religions such as Confucianism and ideas such as Zen. These experiences of unity hold no definitions of the world or distinctions between us and the cosmos, and assumedly neither do feelings of enchantment, as its adversary, i.e., **disenchantment, is a consequence of rationalization.** In Ideas and Opinions, Einstein wrote that “The true value of a human being is determined by the measure and the sense in which he has attained liberation from the self” (Einstein, 1954, p. 12). **Therefore, one may view enchantment through unification as an abandonment of one’s identity, self, and ego, and as an appreciation of a unified existence.** A notion incredibly similar to the ‘ecstasy of unity’ is the concept of the ‘Overview Effect’, which is a term formulated by Frank White (1987) in his book The Overview Effect – **Space Exploration** and Human Evolution. White’s interest lies with the experiences astronauts encounter when looking upon the Earth from space, which **has been described as a cognitive shift in one’s awareness** (White, 1987). Astronauts have claimed that during this time, the conflicts that divide our society vanish, boundaries disappear, and **there is an inherent urge to create a unified planetary existence.** They also claim to possess a new appreciation for the preciousness and size of our planet and a will to protect this ‘pale blue dot’ (Sagan, 1994) becomes clear and critical. Flight experience has spiritually transformed an increasing number of astronauts, and reports indicate that this change in attitude often remains long after they return to Earth. Rusty Schweickart, Chris Hadfield, Mike Massimino, and Tom Jones are among the astronauts said to have experienced the effect (Sato, 2008). In recent years, space psychologists commenced research upon the salutogenic aspects of space flight (Suedfeld, 2005), that is, focusing on the benefits that arise from stressful or somewhat negative experiences during space programs. Suedfeld et al. (2010) investigated the memoirs of 125 space travelers and found that from stressful and somewhat negative experiences in space, these individuals developed greater levels of appreciation for others and nature, enhanced spirituality and power over that spirituality, and enhanced personal strength. This finding indicates that space travel has the potential to foster enlightenment and unification. **Scientific discoveries have painted a picture of an infinite universe with the potential for endless discoveries and countless possibilities, and this potentially arouses enchantment and awe.** However, does this re-enchantment serve as a prelude to, or even a manifestation of, narcissism? It is not dismissible, as Christopher Lasch (1991, p. 13-15) recognizes a rising level of selfawareness, self-identity, self-reflexivity, and celebrity status and acclamation in today’s society. The concept of narcissism that Lasch is referring to is not the same as the definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), although they do share characteristics. Instead, the focus here is upon Lasch’s idea of the narcissist in an ever-growing capitalist society. **Among incessant self-awareness, reflexivity and self-affirmation, the narcissist tends to seek meaning in every aspect of their lives, their cravings have no limits and they never seem to be satisfied. This implies that the search for unification may well be the narcissist seeking self-fulfillment, that it is superficial rather than spiritual and may just be another thing they want to attain.** Similarly, Dickens and Ormrod “have argued that members of the **pro-space movement** exhibit a form of adult narcissism” (Ormrod, 2007; Dickens & Ormrod, 2007, p. 137). Space travel, capital, and industry could be viewed **as an attempt to regain feelings of omnipotence similar to that felt at the stage of primary narcissism** whereby the mother and the rest of the world is seen as an extension of the infant’s self, so he therefore mistakes this dependence on his mother as his own supremacy (Freud, 1973). Dickens and Ormrod (2007, p. 138) make comparable links between experiencing space and primary narcissism, e.g., the feeling of weightlessness in space is similar to the feeling experienced in the womb and argues the journey to space is a representation of a universal urge to detach themselves from the mother.

**Method**

#### [1] Beginning with a Lacanian ontology of the subject explains their impacts, whereas their accounts of colonial violence are exclusively rooted in the Symbolic

**Lane 97** (Christopher Lane, "Savage Ecstasy": Colonialism and the Death Drive, Discourse Vol. 19, No. 2, The Psychoanalysis of Race (Winter 1997), pp. 125-130) // ahs em

The point is not that Fanon chose not to follow Lacan à la lettre. As Fanon avowed in Black Skin, White Masks , "Earlier I referred to Jacques Lacan; it was not by accident. In his thesis, presented in 1932, he violently attacked the idea of the constitutional. Apparently, I am departing from his conclusions" (80). Certainly, Lacan did attack "the idea of the constitutional" with a 'Violen [ce]" that many recent critics accusing him of bogus universality appear not to realize (see McClintock 196; Butler 56-57). The point is that Fanon 's partial fidelity to Lacan restores to the latter a Hegelian interest in sublation that Lacan also "violently" rejected. The very notion of a lack - or want - in being (" manque-à-être ") {Four 29) renders Fanon 's dream of a monument on which he "can already see a white man and a black man hand in hand " (222; original emphasis) unlikely to succeed on a basis of a mutual recognition. Denis Hollier therefore remarks of Lacan's mirror stage: "In this mirrored labyrinth, equivocation is law: the difference between ego and the other, between the victim and the aggressor, ceaselessly disappears" (9). For this reason, Lacan's conception of "L'Autre" or Other, has no obvious relation to color.2 This does not mean that Lacanian psychoanalysis is unable to address racism and prejudice, or that it is uninterested in either phenomenon. To the contrary, **Lacan's refusal to portray racial difference as pure alterity fosters a more precise and historically subtle account of group identification and racial fantasy than we find in Hegelian accounts of whites and blacks, where both racial groups are locked in immutable conflict.** For important reasons, then, Lacan does not simply or timelessly represent the black man as the Other; ironically, it is postcolonial theory, taking its notion of alterity from Hegel, Sartre, and Fanon, that produces this ahistorical account of racial difference. The repercussions of Fanon 's Hegelianism are nonetheless acute. While Fanon complains of being "sealed into thingness" (218) by white racism, he also aims toward "mastery of language" because it "affords remarkable power" (18). On one level, we can appreciate why **linguistic mastery is threatening to white racism**. However, Fanon also avows, at the beginning of Black Skin , White Masks , that "to speak is to exist absolutely for the other" (17). Ironically, Fanon is at his most "Lacanian" here, for he clarifies that we cannot delimit the tyranny of prejudice to intentional racism; nor can we simply defeat it by "mastery of language": **The signifier raises a further, generic dimension of alienation that implicates men and women of all races while exceeding their capacity for symbolic control. This is surely why Fanon claims "The Other will become the mainstay of [the white man's] preoccupations and his desires"** (170) , and why he states of the black man, "The goal of his behavior will be The Other (in the guise of the white man)" (154). Considering this radical asymmetry, we can appreciate why Lacan characterized **desire as "a relation of being to lack. ... It isn't the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists"** {Seminar II, 223). With this clarification, we can also understand Gide's preoccupation with African jouissance. Alongside the passage in Travels Icited earlier, in which Gide exclaims "This is how they express their emotion - manifest their joy! ... I stayed gazing at [this infernal mystery] for a long time, fascinated by it as by an abyss ..." (123), we can place Lacan 's question Che vuoi?, What does the Other want of me? ("Subversion" 312). Elsewhere, Lacan elaborates on this question: "What is my desire? What is my position in the imaginary structuration? This position is only conceivable in so far as one finds a guide beyond the imaginary, on the level of the symbolic plane, of the legal exchange which can only be embodied in the verbal exchange between human beings" ( Seminari , 141; see also Boothby 110-14). This passage is replete with questions that recur throughout Gide's Travels and all colonial discourse. Yet the "guide" that Gide finds "beyond the imaginary" surpasses all "legal exchange," as Lacan willingly concedes. It does so because Gide's desire is not redudble to symbolic exchange, even though he (and we) might wish to account for it in these terms. Jouissance is the cause of this self-surpassing, for it "guides" the subject to the "abyss" of its being. For this reason, the question "What does the Other want of me?," which recurs throughout Gide' s Travels as a demand for purpose and orientation, conflates the Other's jouissance with the menacing specter of African joy and revenge. Slavoj Zižek put this well when he argued that "Fantasy appears ... as an answer to 4 Che vuoi?,' to the unbearable enigma of the desire of the Other, of the lack in the Other, but it is at the same time fantasy itself which, so to speak, provides the coordinates of our desire - which constructs the frame enabling us to desire something. The usual definition of fantasy ('an imagined scenario representing the realization of desire') is therefore somewhat misleading, or at least ambiguous: in the fantasy-scene the desire is not fulfilled, 'satisfied,' but constituted (given its objects, and so on) - through fantasy , we learn ' how to desire "' (118; original emphasis). Nonetheless, it must be asked: How can we tolerate a scenario in which the colonizer's fantasy clearly has such additional repercussions? Gide's naïveté is so distressing because it reminds us all of fantasy's egregious narcissism. **His identification balances precariously on these hostile fantasies, for the aggression and violence accompanying identification hinge necessarily on the enigma of the Other's jouissance** (for a related argument, see Anna Freud, "Identification with the Aggressor," Ego 118-22, 125-31). **Colonialism obviously compounds this antagonism, but it does not explain or delimit the difficulty of all structures of identification**; this is a specific and generic argument. **To put this another way, if we relied solely on material "guides" at this point, and not the egoideal, as Lacan advised {Seminar I, 141), we would find ourselves surprised by the surplus violence that constantly escapes colonial law (**Copjec 215-16). Let us clarify this point by reiterating Gide's dilemma about literal guides and transport in Travels. When he returned to France, Gide justified his having paid porters to carry him and Marc in a tipoye ,3 though he complained at the time of discomfort and the difficulty he experienced in reading. At the time of his travels, too, Gide remarked: "A difficulty has arisen with our porters. They all want to leave. ... [I] t is extremely difficult to get men to replace them; on the other hand, it seems inhuman of us to take these people much further away from their villages" (83; my emphasis) . To push Marty's and Lucey's analyses further than they seem willing to go, let us note that Gide offered the following passage toward the end of his journey: A few smiles, a few kind words, have got the better of the porters' remissness. Yesterday evening they refused to go any farther. And now, in their enthusiasm, they declare they are willing to go as far as Douala. One old man, who was carrying the heavy cinema packing-case, was seized with a fit of excitement [ aise de lyrisme ' . He began rushing wildly about in every direction, laughing and shouting; off into the bush and then back again; spinning round on his own axis; darting up to a tree he caught sight of and striking it three times with ajavelin he had in his hand. Had he gone mad? Not at all; it was merelyrical excitement [ C'est du lyrisme, simplement ]. What we used to call "savage ecstasy" [le transport sauvage ] when we were children. And at the time the tipoye-hearers - to get a matabiche [tip], no doubt - began thanking me, either separately or in chorus. They are no longer satisfied with calling me "Governor." They shout: 'Thank you, Government, thank you!" (301-2; Retour 118) According to Lucey, Gide's phrase " crise de lyrisme" "hints at a tentative, even fearful identification with this older porter, who somehow ironically fulfills Gide's desire both to be the spectacle and to see/film it" (179; see also Allégret, "Voyage" 37-38; Durosay, "Les Images" 63) . This reading clearly obtains because the porter carries Allégret's camera, but it takes us only so far in understanding the condensed implications of "savage ecstasy." Let us ask, first, why is Gide so keen to downplay the possibility of this man's madness: "C'est du lyrisme , simplement "? Why also does Gide's certainty at witnessing "merely lyrical excitement" implicate him in knowledge but lead him affectively toward dissociation?: The man's "excitement" - indeed, the porters' "enthusiasm" - never connects with Gide's perception of sublimity. I think this asymmetry between Gide and the porters clarifies a dimension of colonial enjoyment that exceeds the tips, coercions, and material explanations we might otherwise invoke to comprehend this scene. If jouissance seems to manifest itself in the porter's "savage ecstasy," consider Gide's pride in being read synecdochically as colonial government - as the figure of France. **Let me clarify that while the psychic motivations of every party might appear enigmatic in this and other scenes, they have powerful material effects.** **The point is less to add these volatile structures of fantasy and identification to colonial critique than to rethink how a careful understanding of the drives might alter our conception of colonialism - perhaps even imperial history.** Let us consider, for instance, why Gide concludes his Travels by reporting the following dialogue between a young French boy and girl as they all return to France on board the Asie. The girl remarks: "We French detest other nations - all of us French . . . don't we, George? . . . Yes, it's a peculiar thing about the French that they can't endure other nations. ..." The boy responds obliquely, but with conviction: "I call a musician ... a person who understands what he plays. I don't call a person a musician who bangs on the piano just like people kicking niggers" (375). Gide remarks: "And, as he added, with an air of authority, that they should "be put an end to" - not the niggers, perhaps, and certainly not the people who kick them, but the bad musicians - the girl exclaimed indignantly: 'But then who will play for us to dance?' " (375). Recalling the Compagnie Forestière's "ball" that so appalled and fascinated Gide, this exchange promotes a bleak conclusion, while allowing us to grasp the astonishing turbulence and psychic complexity of racial identification. Thus we can use Gide' s text to open the terms of identification and racial fantasy and display their volatile determinants. In this respect, without leaving Gide behind us, we appreciate the genuine risk and radicalism of Bound to Violence (1968), Yambo Ouologuem's extraordinary novel, which ends more diplomatically with a game of interracial chess, but which also stubbornly reiterates these inter- and ¿níraracial antagonisms. As a fictional account of Mali's colonial and even "precolonial" history, Ouologuem's novel, like Gide's Travels , sustains an astonishing inquiry into Le devoir de violence : the Malians' debt to violence as well as their urge to reproduce it in other forms. The narrator concludes: "One cannot help recalling that Saif, mourned three million times, is forever reborn to history beneath the hot ashes of more than thirty African republics" (181-82). These fragments characterize the novel's final section, "Dawn": **The crux of the matter is that violence, vibrant in its unconditional submission to the will to power, becomes a prophetic illumination, a manner of questioning and answering, a dialogue, a tension, and oscillation . . . No solidarity is possible.** Nor purity. .... The law of justice and love is the only bond that is capable of uniting our irreducible diversities - from above. Down below, amid the strange fauna of the human passions, the lust for power and glory is at work. .. The impossible part of forgiveness is that one must keep it up. (173, 175, 177, 181) I do not wish to transmute Gide's problem into Ouologuem's text to foster aspurious universality. To follow Ouologuem in tracing African colonialism from the twelfth century (the time of Arab mercantilism, with all of its racism and exploitation of Africans) to contemporary France does not mean that we must naturalize violence or exonerate Europe from its specific relation to imperialism. Like Ouologuem, however, and even the white South African journalist Rian Malan, I want to complicate the widespread assumption in postcolonial theory that denouncing Western violence gives us historical clarity or political power. It is Malan, for instance, who documents how South African whites and blacks "spiraled on down toward mutual annihilation. We always seemed to miss each other in the murk of our mutually baffling cultures and our mutually blinding fears" (276). Following this painful insight, and Fanon's and Ouologuem's comparable arguments, I contend that psychoanalysis does not impede our search for political answers, but it does implicate us all in "the racial distribution of guilt" (Fanon 103).