## T

**Interpretation- Debaters must defend a reduction in intellectual property protection on medicines.**

**Violation-**

**Reduce is not eliminate**

**Words and Phrases 1914**, [<http://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&id=IJMNAAAAYAAJ#v=onepage&q&f=false>] // Swickle

REDUCE Rev. Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable In any of the cases. The word "reduce," In its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state. Green v. Sklar, 74 N. E. 595, 596, 188 Mass. 303.

#### Reduce is not eliminate

#### Michigan District court, (“SAGINAW OFFICE SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant. Civil Action No. 09-CV-13889 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION,” Lexis) [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mied-4\_09-cv-13889/pdf/USCOURTS-mied-4\_09-cv-13889-2.pdf] // Swickle

In determining whether the words "reduce" and "adjust" are ambiguous, the Court is directed to consider the ordinary meanings of the words, Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 28, and to harmonize [\*11] the disputed terms with other parts of the contract, Royal, 706 N.W.2d at 432 ("construction should be avoided that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory"). "When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate." Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 466 Mich. 611, 647 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 2002). The Court finds that the plain meanings of these terms do not unambiguously support the Bank's position. The dictionary definition of "adjust" is to "adapt" or "to bring to a more satisfactory state." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 27 (2002) ("Webster's"). This is a fairly broad definition, which may be subject to, alternatively, narrower or more expansive scope. To say that the complete eliminationof a schedule brings it to a more satisfactory state is undoubtedly an expansive viewof adjustment. It is the Court's duty to determine the intent of the contracting parties from the language of the contract itself, Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 30 ("the intent of the contracting parties is best discerned by the language actually used in the contract"), and in this case, it cannot unambiguously be said that the sense in which the parties used these [\*12] terms embraces the Bank's more expansive definition. Likewise, "reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number,"Webster's, at 1905, but the term does not, in the context of the TSA, unambiguously embody an expansive scope that views complete deletion as a subset of diminution.

**Standards**

**[1] Semantics are a constraint on voting aff:**

**[A] Jurisdiction: They’re aff but not affirming the res. That’s an indepdent voter since the ballot asks who does the better debating in the context of the res.**

**[B] The topic is the only shared basis we have for preround prep and inround clash on a stable advocacy. Pragmatics only matter if we have a topic to debate.**

**[2] Limits: Being able to defend something not topical allows you to choose any scenario in the world with no limits. Kills fairness since I have to prep for every aff while they have to prep for one. Even if there are some responses, the NC will always get destroyed by 1AR frontlines to generics. Also kills education because it forces a lack of engagement, resulting in up layering and shallow debates – outweighs – even if your interp is best for education we don’t access it since I can’t engage.**

**[3] Topic lit: the literature talking about intellectual property rights is about reductions of intellectual property rights ie the TRIPS waiver. Topic lit is key to a. predictability- what we prep is based on the literature that we read and find on the internet and b. real world education- everyone in the real world is advocating for a reduction of ip rights so we should to. Real world education ows other types of education since the only reason we learn stuff is so we can apply it to the real world.**

**[4] Ground: full elimination takes away neg K and CP ground and makes it aff arguments - on a topic that is already super aff skewed in terms of persuasive literature, the neg has to be able to argue the aff doesn't go far enough. It also moots DAs- DAs are written in the context of a reform not an elimination. Even if our links would hypothetically be stronger, we havent prepped those links because they were unpredictable.**

## FW

#### Revisionary intuitionism is reliable and leads to util.

ELIEZER YUDKOWSKY 8, "The "Intuitions" Behind "Utilitarianism"", 1-28-2008, http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the\_intuitions\_behind\_utilitarianism/

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning **had been valuable and** my **meta-level moral reasoning had been** **worse than** **useless**. And **this appears to be a general syndrome - people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad".** Thus, **I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can**. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn't exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that "exist" is not the right term to use here, I generally say, "But what do you do anyway?" and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that **"intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but** is, rather, **the cognitive building block out of which** both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual **arguments are constructed**. **I see the project of morality as a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable**, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all the intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your specific intuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a grunting caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - **there is** nothing else to argue from**. Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - it's just that **modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out** to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and** other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong:** the brain can't successfully multiply **by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with**. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. **Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist**, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. **Three lives are one and one and one**. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. **It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them**. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And **that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer it:

#### [1] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C] No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be *no* action.

#### [2] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought – thus framework is functionally a topicality argument about how to define the terms of the resolution. Prefer my definition:

#### [A] Textuality:

#### [1] Oxford dictionary defines ought as “Used to indicate a desirable or expected state.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought>

#### [2] Ought entails an ends-based calculus of maximizing expected well-being.

Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010). //AHS AD

But this notion of“ought” is an artificial and needlessly confusing way to think about moral choice. In fact, it seems to be another dismal product of Abrahamic religion—which, strangely enough, now constrains the thinking of even atheists. If this notion of **“ought”** means anything we can possibly care about, it **must translate into a concern about the actual** or potential **experience of conscious beings** (either in this life or in some other). For instance, **to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will** tend to **be better off if we do.** The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e., he doesn’t know what he’s missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense. The person who insists that he is committed to treating children with kindness for [the] reasons that have nothing to do with anyone’s well-being is also not making sense. It is worth noting in this context that the God of Abraham never told us to treat children with kindness, but He did tell us to kill them for talking back to us (Exodus 21:15, Leviticus 20:9, Deuteronomy 21:18–21, Mark 7:9–13, and Matthew 15:4–7). And yet everyone finds this “moral” imperative perfectly insane. Which is to say that no one—not even fundamentalist[s] Christians and orthodox Jews—can so fully ignore the link between morality and human well-being.

#### [3] Moral hedging—we ought to maximize the probability of being morally correct instead of choosing just one theory

Boey 13 Grace Boey “Is applied ethics applicable enough? Acting and hedging under moral uncertainty” 3 Quarks Daily December 16th 2013 <http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2013/12/is-applied-ethics-applicable-enough-acting-under-moral-uncertainty.html> JW

A runaway train trolley is racing towards five men who are tied to the track. By pulling a lever, you could divert the train's path to an alternative track, which has only one man on it … If you're gearing up to respond with what you'd do and why, don't bother. It doesn't matter whether you'd pull the lever: it's too late. The five were run over almost fifty years ago, because philosophers couldn't decide what to do. They have been – pun most certainly intended – debated to death. Formulated by the late Philippa Foot in 1967, the famous "trolley problem" has since been endlessly picked apart and argued over by moral philosophers. It's even been reformulated – apart from "classic", the trolley problem also comes in "fat man", "loop", "transplant" and "hammock" varieties. Yet, in spite of all the fascinating analysis, there still isn't any good consensus on what the right thing is to do. And, not only do philosophers disagree over what to do, a significant number of them just aren't sure. In a 2009 survey of mostly professional philosophers, 34.8% of the respondents indicated some degree of uncertainty over the right answer [1]. Philosopher or not, if you're in the habit of being intellectually honest, then there's a good chance you aren't completely certain about all your moral beliefs. Looking to the ethics textbooks doesn't help – you'd be lucky not to come away from that with more doubts than before. If the philosophical field of ethics is supposed to resolve our moral dilemmas, then on some level it has obviously failed. Debates over moral issues like abortion, animal rights and euthanasia rage on, between opposing parties and also within the minds of individuals. These uncertainties won't go away any time soon. Once we recognize this, then the following question naturally arises: what's the best way to act under moral uncertainty? Ethicists, strangely, have mostly overlooked this question. But in relatively recent years, a small roup of philosophers have begun rigorous attempts at addressing the problem. In particular, attempts are being made to adapt probability and expected utility theory to decision-making under moral uncertainty. The nature of moral uncertainty Before diving into such theories, it's useful to distinguish moral uncertainty from non-moral uncertainty. Non-philosophers often get impatient with philosophical thought experiments, because they depict hypothetical situations that don't do justice to the complexities of everyday life. One real-life feature that thought experiments often omit is uncertainty over facts about the situation. The trolley problem, for example, stipulates that five people on the original track will definitely die if you don't pull the lever, and that one person on the alternative track will definitely die if you do. It also stipulates that all the six lives at stake are equally valuable. But how often are we so certain about the outcomes of our actions? Perhaps there's a chance that the five people might escape, or that the one person might do the same. And are all six individuals equally virtuous? Are any of them terminally ill? Naturally, such possibilities would impact our attitude towards pulling the lever or not. Such concerns are often brought up by first-time respondents to the problem, and must be clarified before the question gets answered proper. Lots has been written about moral decision-making under factual uncertainty. Michael Zimmerman, for example, has written an excellent book on how such ignorance impacts morality. The point of most ethical thought experiments, though, is to eliminate precisely this sort of uncertainty. Ethicists are interested in finding out things like whether, once we know all the facts of the situation, and all other things being equal, it's okay to engage in certain actions. If we're still not sure of the rightness or wrongness of such actions, or of underlying moral theories themselves, then we experience moral uncertainty. As the 2009 survey indicates, many professional philosophers still face such fundamental indecision. The trolley problem – especially the fat man variant – is used to test our fundamental moral commitment to deontology or consequentialism. I'm pretty sure I'd never push a fat bystander off a bridge onto a train track in order to save five people, but what if a million people and my mother were at stake? Should I torture an innocent person for one hour if I knew it would save the population of China? Even though I'd like to think of myself as pretty committed to human rights, the truth is that I simply don't know. Moral hedging and its problems So, what's the best thing to do when we're faced with moral uncertainty? Unless one thinks that anything goes once uncertainty enters the picture, then doing nothing by default is not a good strategy. As the trolley case demonstrates, inaction often has major consequences. Failure to act also comes with moral ramifications: Peter Singer famously argued that inaction is clearly immoral in many circumstances, such as refusing to save a child drowning in a shallow pond. It's also not plausible to deliberate until we are completely morally certain – by the time we're done deliberating, it's often too late. Suppose I'm faced with the choice of saving one baby on a quickly-sinking raft, and saving an elderly couple on a quickly-sinking canoe. If I take too long to convince myself of the right decision, all three will drown. In relatively recent years, some philosophers have proposed a ‘moral hedging' strategy that borrows from expected utility theory. Ted Lockhart, professor of philosophy at Michigan Technological University, arguably kicked off the conversation in 2000 with his book Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences. Lockhart considers the following scenario: Gary must choose between two alternatives, x and y. If Gary were certain that T1 is the true moral theory, then he would be 70% sure that x would be morally right in that situation and y would be morally wrong and 30% that the opposite is true. If Gary were sure that T2 is the true theory, then he would be 100% certain that y would be morally right for him to do and that x would be morally wrong. However, Gary believes there is a .6 probability that T1 is the true theory and a .4 probability that T2 is the true theory. (p.42) There are at least two ways that Gary could make his decision. First, Gary might pick the theory he has the most credence in. Following such an approach, Gary should stick to T1, and choose to do x. But Lockhart thinks that this 'my-favourite-theory' approach is mistaken. Instead, Lockhart argues that it is more rational to maximize the probability of being morally right. Following this, the probability that x would be morally right is .42 and the probability that y would be morally right is .58. Under this approach, Gary should choose y. This seems reasonable so far, but it isn't the end of the story. Consider the following scenario described by Andrew Sepielli (professor of philosophy at University of Toronto, who has written extensively about moral uncertainty and hedging over the past few years): Suppose my credence is .51 that, once we tote up all the moral, prudential, and other reasons, it is better to kill animals for food than not, and .49 that it is better not to kill animals for food. But suppose I believe that, if killing animals is better, it is only slightly better; I also believe that, if killing animals is worse, it is substantially worse – tantamount to murder, even. Then it seems … that I have most subjective reason not to kill animals for food. The small gains to be realized if the first hypothesis is right do not compensate for the significant chance that, if you kill animals for food, you are doing something normatively equivalent to murder. Both Lockhart and Sepielli agree that it isn't enough for us to maximize the probability of being morally right. The value of outcomes under each theory should be factored into our decision-making process as well. We should aim to maximize some kind of ‘expected value', where the expected value of an outcome is the probability of its being right, multiplied by the value of its being right if it is indeed right. Lockhart's specific strategy is to maximize the ‘expected degree of moral rightness', but the broad umbrella of strategies that follows the approach can be called ‘moral hedging'. Moral hedging seems like a promising strategy, but it's plagued by some substantial problems. The biggest issue is what Sepielli calls the ‘Problem of Intertheoretic Comparisons' (PIC). How are we supposed to compare values across moral theories that disagree with each other? What perspective should we adopt while viewing these ‘moral scales' side by side? The idea of intertheoretic comparison is at least intuitively intelligible, but on closer inspection, values from different moral theories seem fundamentally incommensurable. Given that different theories with different values are involved, how could it be otherwise? Lockhart proposes what he calls the ‘Principle of Equity among Moral Theories' (PEMT), which states that maximum and minimum degrees of rightness should be fixed at the same level across theories, at least for decision-making purposes. But Sepielli points out that PEMT seems, amongst other things, arbitrary and ad hoc. Instead, he proposes that we use existing beliefs about 'cardinal ranking' of values to make the comparison. However, this method is open to its own objections, and also depends heavily on facts about practical psychology, which are themselves messy and have yet to be worked out. Whatever the case, there isn't any consensus on how to solve the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. PIC has serious consequences – if the problem turns out to be insurmountable, moral hedging will be impossible. This lack of consensus relates to another problem for moral hedging, and indeed for moral uncertainty in general. In addition to being uncertain about morality, we can also be uncertain about the best way to resolve moral uncertainty. Following that, we can be uncertain about the best way to resolve being uncertain about the best way to resolve moral uncertainty … and so on. How should we resolve this seemingly infinite regress of moral uncertainty? One last and related question is whether, practically speaking, calculated moral hedging is a plausible strategy for the average person. Human beings, or at least most of them, aren't able to pinpoint the precise degree to which they believe that things are true. Perhaps they are uncertain about their own probabilistic beliefs (or perhaps it doesn't even makse sense to say something like "I have a .51 credence that killing animals for food is wrong"). Additionally, surely the average person can't be expected to perform complex mathematical calculations every time she's faced with uncertainty. If moral hedging is too onerous, it loses it edge over simply deliberating over the moral theories themselves. Moral hedging must accomodate human limits if it is to be applicable. Moving ahead with moral uncertainty It's clear that there's much more work to be done on theories of moral hedging, but the idea seems promising. Hopefully, a good method for inter-theoretic value comparison will be developed in time. It's also good that these philosophers have brought the worthwhile question of moral uncertainty to life, and perhaps strong alternatives to moral hedging will subsequently emerge. Maybe philosophers will never agree, and textbooks on moral uncertainty will join the inconclusive ranks of textbooks on normative ethics. But we can hardly call such textbooks useless: they show us the basis (or non-basis) of our initial intuitions, and at least give us the resources to make more considered judgments about our moral decisions. Over the years, humanity has benefitted enormously from the rigorous thinking done by ethicists. In the same way, we stand to benefit from thinking about what to do under moral certainty. It's also clear that theories have to accommodate, and be realistic about, human psychology and our mental capacities to apply such strategies. Any theory that doesn't do this would be missing the point. If these theories aren't practically applicable, then we may as well not have formulated them. The practical circumstances under which we encounter moral uncertainty also differ – in some situations, we're under more psychological stress and time constraints than others. This raises the interesting question of whether optimal strategies might differ for agents under different conditions. Something else to consider is this: in what way, if any, are we required to cope with moral uncertainty in ways such as moral hedging? Theorists like Lockhart and Sepielli argue for the most ‘rational' thing to do under uncertain circumstances, but what if one doesn't care for being rational? Might we still be somehow morally obliged to adopt some strategy? Perhaps there is some kind of moral duty to act rationally, or 'responsibly', under moral uncertainty. It does seem, in a somewhat tautological sense, that we're morally required to be moral. Perhaps this involves being morally required to ‘try our best' to be moral, and not to engage in overly 'morally risky' behaviour. Other than Lockhart and Sepielli, others who have engaged the issue of moral uncertainty – at least tangentially – include James Hudson (who rejected moral hedging), Graham Oddie, Jacob Ross, Alexander Guerrero, Toby Ord and Nick Bostrom. Hopefully, in time, more philosophers (and non-philosophers too) will join in this fledgling debate. The discussion and its findings will be a tribute to all the victims of ethical thought experiments everywhere – may we someday stop killing hypothetical people with analysis paralysis.

## DA

#### China’s generic drug economy is growing but needs to secure leadership in innovative pharmaceutics.

**Atkinson 20 -** “The Impact of China’s Policies on Global Biopharmaceutical Industry Innovation” by Robert D. Atkinson on September 8, 2020 [https://itif.org/publications/2020/09/08/impact-chinas-policies-global-biopharmaceutical-industry-innovation] // ahs emi

Unlike some more-traditional manufacturing or electronics industries wherein China has dominated global production, China’s biopharmaceutical industry is an emerging industry that is still relatively small, but targeted by the Chinese government. One reason the industry is relatively nascent is that as a still emerging economy, China’s health care expenditures, including on drugs, are significantly lower than in higher-income nations. Nonetheless, Chinese biopharma industry output has grown rapidly over the past decade as Chinese incomes have grown and as China has dramatically expanded the share of its citizens that are eligible for health insurance.14 Chinese sales increased from $26.2 billion in 2007 to $122.6 billion in 2017 (U.S. sales were $466.6 billion).15 This is a key reason why China’s share of global industry value added rose from 7.2 percent in 2001 to 22.1 percent in 2016, with over two-thirds of that growth happening after 2010. (See [figure 2](https://itif.org/publications/2020/09/08/impact-chinas-policies-global-biopharmaceutical-industry-innovation#_Ref49794754).) Some of this is due to China being the leading producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in drugs—accounting for between 20 and 40 percent of global output—and is the world’s largest API exporter, as well as a key generics producer.16 APIs and generics are less innovation based, with simpler production processes and less need for original innovation. China more than doubled its biopharmaceutical production capacity, including APIs, from 2010 to 2014.17 Per a KPMG report on China’s biopharmaceutical industry, “Thanks to substantial state support, the biopharmaceutical industry has enjoyed concentrated, high-speed growth over the past several years.”18 However, China is moving toward becoming a developser and producer of innovative new drugs. As the McKinsey Global Institute wrote, “[S]ome leading Chinese pharma companies that historically focused on generics have started building capabilities and making investments in innovative drugs.”20 It added, “[T]he number of applications of local innovative drugs entering clinical trials in China has grown from 21 in 2011 to 88 in 2016.”21 In 2017, 800 innovative molecules were under development in China, ranging from preclinical to phase III stages in the pipeline, of which 10 percent were at clinical stage III (the stage at which medicines are definitively tested for effectiveness or cure).22 A number of Chinese biopharma companies are establishing multiregional clinical trials designed to serve global markets. For example, in 2018, Chinese biologics and biosimilars maker Bio-Thera Solutions Ltd. started a phase III trial of its HER2 antibody conjugate drug targeting HER2-positive metastatic cancer.23 As of mid-2018, 25 Chinese companies had applied for approvals for advanced anticancer drugs based on biotechnology (PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors).24 Moreover, in 2017, China had 139 clinical trials with chimeric antigen receptor treatment (CAR-T) cell therapy, compared with around 118 in the United States.25 Of just over 400 CAR-T clinical trials conducted in March of 2019, 166 were in China, and 165 in the United States.26 Chinese biopharma start-ups are also broader in terms of the number of drugs they make or license to make, with the average number of drugs when filing for an initial public offering (IPO) in China being 10, versus 4 in the United States.27 And in 2016, China had filed 410 clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR gene-editing) patents, with the United States filing 447.28 In 2015, there were 173 publicly traded pharmaceutical companies in China.29 Much of this has been based on the practice of simply copying from the leading Western companies.30 In 2015, Chinese companies still produced less than 1 percent of new molecular entities (e.g., drugs) globally.31 However, many global biopharmaceutical firms have expanded their investments in China. For example, the Japanese biopharma firm Takeda relocated its Asia Development Center from Singapore to Shanghai. Likewise, Sanofi is building an emerging market business unit in China. In fact, virtually all of the world’s leading 20 pharmaceutical companies have manufacturing facilities in China—and many have also established R&D centers there.32 China is an important market for foreign life-sciences companies, with the top-10 mature drugs from foreign companies adding $2.8 billion additional revenue to China from 2014 to 2018.33 From 2010 to 2014, annualized growth in Chinese sales revenue among biopharma manufacturers was 23 percent.34 Chinese firms are also expanding internationally, especially in world-class biopharma innovation hubs. For example, numerous Chinese biotechnology companies have started new R&D facilities in the United States, generally focused in such major biotech hubs as Boston, San Francisco, and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. Chinese companies use this strategy to gain access to new technologies they can then bring back to the mainland—more so than firms from most other nations that have shown considerable willingness to invest in U.S. R&D and production facilities.35Notwithstanding this progress, China still faces a number of challenges. Perhaps the core challenge is, as a science-based industry, it is hard to close the gap with biopharma leaders simply by copying them. In other industries, such as solar panels, high-speed rail, and robotics, China caught up to leaders by copying their technology—often through theft and forced technology transfer—and then using a variety of means, including predatory pricing supported by government subsidies, to weaken foreign competitors. Copying can certainly work if China wants to develop a globally competitive generics and biosimilar industry (biosimilars are follow-on drugs to original biotech drugs), but it will not be enough to achieve significant market share in innovative drugs. To do that, China needs to develop indigenous capabilities that allow it to develop and bring to market first-to-the-world drugs. As a KPMG report notes, “The industry also faces practical constraints, including a shortage of core technology, a subpar industrial structure, weak R&D capacity, low resource efficiency, and disorderly markets.”36 Copying can certainly work if China wants to develop a globally competitive generics and biosimilar industry, but it will not be enough to achieve significant market share in innovative drugs. Moreover, many of China’s biopharmaceutical firms are quite small and do not have the scale to become true innovators. More than 70 percent of China’s pharmaceutical manufacturers have fewer than 300 employees and revenue of less than $3 million.37 And the vast majority produce either APIs or generic drugs. For example, in 2012, there were 1,272 applications for approval for generic drugs, with over 60 percent of them being submitted by different companies more than 20 times each.38 This is why China lacks world-leading major biopharmaceutical firms with the scale and technical sophistication of EU, Japanese, and U.S. firms. In branded pharmaceuticals and biotechnology drugs, Chinese companies had less than 3 percent of global market sales in 2015.39 China’s relatively low per capita income is also a factor because it makes it harder for China to pay for innovative new drugs, thus limiting the development of Chinese firms. This is why just 8 percent of new drugs approved globally between 2011 and 2017 are available in China.40 CHINESE BIOPHARMA INDUSTRY GOALS For over a decade, the Chinese government has targeted biopharma as a key industry for development. Its 2006 Report, “The Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Medium- and Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020),” called on China to master “core technologies” including “major new drugs.” China’s 11th Five-Year Plan listed 16 “megaprojects,” including pharmaceutical innovation and development, and control and treatment of AIDS, hepatitis, and other major diseases.41 As part of that plan, China’s State Council directed provinces and municipalities to target the industry for development, which, given the ability of local Chinese Communist Party officials to move up the ranks by following the guidance of Beijing, was quite effective in driving local policy. The plan called on China to, “Form an advanced industrial technology system supporting the development of biotechnology drugs, establish a batch of multi-functional, bio-technical drug production bases in line with international standards, and cultivate a group of enterprises with international competitiveness.”42 The plan went on to call for: Key technology development: build large-scale and high-throughput genome sequencing technology and equipment, massive biological information processing and analysis technology. Construction of public technology service platform: build a large-scale biological resource pool and the core platform of the biological information center, build a networked national biological resources and biological information service facilities, strengthen the deep exploration of genetic information, and promote the development of new sequencers. Provide bioinformatics services for individualized diagnosis and treatment, biological resource discovery, animal and plant molecular breeding, and industrial microbial strain modification.43 China’s 12th Five-Year Plan identified 7 priority strategic emerging industries, including biotechnology, aimed at increasing their contribution to China’s gross domestic product (GDP) from their then-current 2 percent level (2008) to 8 percent by 2015 (which it failed to meet), and 15 percent by 2020.44 Despite its aspirations, the plan’s implementation was poor, with few important reforms actually being implemented. For example, until 2017, the Chinese Food and Drug Administration—now the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA)—had a multiyear backlog of new drugs awaiting approval. The State Council has called on all levels of government to target the industry for support. However, China appears to have gotten more serious about implementation since then. Its most recent 13th Five-Year Plan (2015–2020) maintained focus on the industry and called for biotech industry output to exceed 4 percent of GDP by 2020, up from less than 2.5 percent a few years prior.4546 Moreover, the State Council has called on all levels of government to target the industry for support, writing, “The people’s governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, ministries and commissions under the State Council, and their respective agencies: The Bio-Industry Development Plan is hereby printed and distributed to you, please implement it carefully.”47 The Bio-industry Development Plan component set a target for biopharmaceutical sales to grow to $1.02 trillion by 2020 at an annual growth rate of 20 percent.48 According to a set of guiding opinions from the State Council, “Innovation will be strengthened through collaboration on key R&D projects, the commercialization of pharmaceuticals, advances in medical devices, and the modernization of TCM (traditional Chinese medicine). Industry and organizational structure will be optimized through cross-sectoral mergers and restructuring, trans-regional shifts, and the development of concentrated industry clusters.”49 The plan went on to note—in turgid bureaucratic language—that the Chinese government would: Establish a demand-side incentive mechanism for new biotechnology products. Break regional monopoly and support bio-innovation enterprises to open up markets. We will fully implement the price formation mechanism of biological products based on the principle of high quality and good price, same quality and competitive price, and promote the promotion and application of new products and new technologies to support the development of high-tech service industry and related industries. Expand medical insurance coverage, standardize drug procurement behavior, develop commercial health insurance, and support innovative drugs with clinical necessity, exact curative effect, high safety and reasonable price to enter the medical insurance catalog. Improve the biological breeding subsidy policy. We will steadily promote the pilot application of non-grain fuel ethanol, carry out industrialized demonstration of biodiesel in an orderly manner, and start the commercial application of aviation biofuels in a timely manner on the basis of completing aviation biofuel verification flights. Intensify efforts to promote resource tax and fee reform, speed up the elimination of outdated products, technologies and processes, and promote the promotion and application of emerging green technologies and products.50Most recently, China’s Made in China 2025 identified ten key industries to target, including biomedicine. It set out the following goals: i) Goals for 2020: Promote a large number of enterprises to achieve drug quality standards and systems that are in line with international standards, among which at least 100 pharmaceutical enterprises obtain U.S., EU, Japanese, and World Health Organization (WHO) authentication and achieve product export; according to international drug standards, develop and promote 10–20 chemical and high-end drugs, 3–5 new traditional Chinese medicines, and 3–5 new biotech drugs; complete drug registration in Europe, the United States, and other developed nations; speed up the development of internationalization of domestically produced drugs; before 2020, when international patents for blockbuster drugs expire, achieve over 90 percent generics production; achieve breakthroughs for 10–15 important core and critical technologies; and begin to establish national drug innovation system and innovation team. ii) Goals for 2025: By 2025, basically achieve drug quality standards and systems that are in line with international standards; develop chemical drugs, traditional Chinese medicine, and biotech drugs focused on 10 major diseases; achieve industrialization of 20–30 innovative new drugs; 5-10 drugs with indigenous property rights receive U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or EU authentication and enter the international market; construct, improve, and support the national drug innovation system for external services; form a high-level innovation team with an international perspective; and promote China’s drug internationalization development strategy.51 In addition to the national Made in China 2025 plan, at least 19 of China’s 23 provinces have their own plans.52 This should not be surprising because provincial communist-party leaders are quick to support central government strategic priorities, aware that this is key to professional advancement. Likewise, the 2016 State Council plan states: All regions and relevant departments must fully understand the importance of promoting the healthy development of the pharmaceutical industry, strengthen organizational leadership, improve the working mechanism, and form a joint effort. All regions should formulate specific implementation plans based on actual conditions, carefully organize and implement them to ensure that all tasks are implemented. All relevant departments should promptly formulate supporting policies in accordance with the division of responsibilities and create a good environment.53

#### IP protection is key to strengthening Chinese economy by switching to innovative drug production.

**Chen and Li 20 -** “A Study of the Influence of Intellectual Property on China–U.S. Trade Relations” by Wei Li (Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, China) and Yichao Chen (Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, China) [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899] // ahs emi

Numerous related studies exist on the relationship between intellectual property protection and foreign trade. In the field of exports, [Liang Hongying and Yu Jinsong (2010)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899) explored the influence of intellectual property protection on China’s exports. Relevant findings indicate that intensifying intellectual property protection exerts a significantly positive effect on the gross volume and structure of exports. [Guo and Wu (2014)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899) theoretically analyzed the influence of intellectual property protection on exports of creative products and empirically analyzed using 2006–2010 panel data on creative product exports of America. Intellectual property protection enhancement in an importing country was proven to be conducive to creative product exports, and such a positive effect is still rather significant in the context of imitating threatening situations. Regarding [Yu Daoxian and Liu Haiyun (2008)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899), statistical data from 1993–2006 are utilized to empirically verify that the number of domestic and foreign patents granted can affect China’s export trade in different ways. This result also indicates that the technological innovation of a foreign country strongly promotes the export trade progress of China. In the field of imports, [Awokuse and Yin (2010)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899) probed how stricter intellectual property laws in China affect bilateral trade flows. According to their findings, enhancing intellectual property protection drives China’s imports, especially the import of knowledge-intensive products. Based on the overall and the subdivided Chinese import data from 1991 to 2005, Yu [Changlin (2011)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899) deemed that, on one hand, intensifying intellectual property protection can affect import trade in a country depending on two reverse effects of market expansion and market power. On the other hand, the net effect of intellectual property protection enhancement depends on the tradeoff between market expansion and market power. The investigations previously discussed indicate that intellectual property protection enhancement is capable of facilitating a country’s import and export trade growth through diverse mechanisms. As described by [Brander (2007)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899), intellectual property protection can be regarded as a “strategic trade policy”; that is, intellectual property may affect international trade flows once protected commodities cross national borders. Increasingly greater importance has been attached to intellectual property, given that the proportion occupied by knowledge-intensive or high-tech products in international trade has doubled (increasing from 12% in 1980 to 24% in 1994). [Gould and Gruben (1996)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899) proposed through their studies on transnational data associated with patent protection, trade system, and national characteristics that intellectual property protection functions as a decisive factor for economic growth. According to a similar conclusion drawn through empirical research by [Thompson and Rushing (1999)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244020915899), if a country’s per capita GDP reaches US$3,400 (in 1980) and higher, intensive intellectual property protection plays a role in accelerating its economic growth.

They Continue…

The China–U.S. trade structure may result in the fact that the strength of Chinese intellectual property protection is the Granger cause of the China–U.S. trade balance. On one hand, Chinese enterprises lack core competitiveness. Enhancing Chinese intellectual property protection is beneficial to China’s improvement in enterprise innovation ability to increase corporate exports. By probing the enterprise data released by the World Bank, Yin Zhifeng et al. (2013) concluded that enhancing intellectual property protection strength can elevate the enterprise innovation output of the host country by increasing enterprise R&D investments. In addition, Li Chuntao et al. (2015) conducted a survey of the micro-data of transnational companies. Based on his findings, favorable intellectual property protection can accelerate corporate investments in innovation. In contrast, America is unwilling to expand China-oriented high-tech products because of trade control and a blockade on techniques. Intellectual property is viewed as the strategic resource and core competitiveness in the ascendant of America, a great power in the areas of the economy, science, and technology. Therefore, effective intellectual property protection becomes the key to guaranteeing economic and technological progress. For this reason, China maintains its technology trade deficit with America and such a deficit shows an annually progressive increasing tendency during the past 10 years. In December 2010, American exports to China reached US$10.12 billion, with technology imports of US$5.75 billion, representing only 56.8% of this total. As a leading technology country, America exports new and hi-tech products to China; however, the proportion of such products was only 22.4% of the 2010 global total. Apparently, the United States does not have the most technology exports to China, which contradicts its leading position in technology. To break through American technical restrictions, China needs to improve its self-innovation capability, which depends on the steady strengthening of Chinese intellectual property protection. The China–U.S. balance of trade is the Granger cause of the Section 337 Investigation count involving Chinese intellectual property. Such a fact signifies that the former may exert influence on the intellectual property trade barrier built by America, which is also closely associated with the present China–U.S. trade structure. From the viewpoint of Yu Lefen (2011), the reasons that China runs into the intellectual property trade barrier include trade protectionism, trade friction intensification, and novel advantages of the intellectual property barrier. According to Zheng Minghui et al. (2013), China encounters the intellectual property barrier primarily because trade protectionism caused by an economic recession in America is on the rise. Furthermore, the research findings of Ferrantino (1993) provided that if the country’s intellectual property protection is strong enough, a number of intellectual property treaty members may promote venue-expenditure flows in international fields. Without a doubt, the Section 337 Investigation is one of the major approaches to building intellectual property trade barriers, which reflects America’s attitude and policy on China–U.S. trade to a great extent. The VAR model in its entirety shows that, when America as the largest developed country throughout the world strengthens its intellectual property trade barrier, China—the world’s largest developing country representing the interests of another group—should enhance its intellectual property protection, persistently make progress in its intellectual property undertakings, and improve its comprehensive intellectual property strength to catch up with America in the area of intellectual property power. The model also shows that the China–U.S. trade balance may suffer relevant impacts and again achieve balance through long-term adjustments. In such an imbalance, immeasurable economic losses together with a series of unnecessary troubles and conflicts may be incurred on both China and America. One country is in a critical period of reform and opening and the other is in a leading global position. Brander et al. (2017) presented that China should establish legality by fulfilling its current commitment to international intellectual property to play a leading role in its reform. For China, the core competitiveness of Chinese products should be improved by enhancing the country’s product innovation capability, developing core technologies, and forging products “Made in China” into those “Created in China.” In addition, legislative protection and law enforcement for intellectual property should be perfected to address and safeguard against trade attacks, such as the Section 337 Investigation of America. Regarding America, building an intellectual property trade barrier is indeed a territory-protecting approach from commanding heights of the world. The presently leading global position of America determines that it should impose certain suppressions over other countries in certain sectors while seeking development. In addition, both countries’ intellectual property relationship and its negative influence on China–U.S. trade should be taken into reasonable consideration at the time that the intellectual property trade barrier is built to pursue joint development for mutual benefit in a win–win situation.

#### Chinese economic decline sparks war—it becomes china’s only way to galvanize support

**Carpenter ’15:** Ted Galen Carpenter senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, National Interest, 9-6-2015 ["Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?", "https://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784"

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.

#### Chinese-US war goes nuclear.

Littlefield and Lowther 15 - Dr. Adam Lowther is Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command. Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University. (Alex Littlefield and Adam Lowther, “Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America”, The Diplomat, 8/11/2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)

As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

#### Extinction – nuke war fallout creates Ice Age and mass starvation

Steven Starr 15. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.