## Theory

#### Interp – The affirmative debater must allow the negative a path to winning the debate.

#### Violation – You read aff theory first, no rvi on aff theory, rvi on nc theory, and negating affirms.

#### The standard is infinite abuse – I can’t answer aff theory which means you always win since I just don’t get to debate and it comes before substnace. Even if that’s not true, by negating u still vote aff.

#### Impacts –

#### A) Destroys clash since I literally am not allowed to make arguments, which controls the IL to education since the any form of education we can get happens through discussion.

#### B) Prevents norm creation – the aff can claim literally any norm is good and the 1N cannot respond, which justifies infinitely unfair theory norms that set the model for all future debates. Use a norm setting model and theory and frame it as an independent voter – 1. It solves long term abuse whereas IRA only matters one round at a time 2. It’s best for the activity since it encourages deep reflection and debate about what the best world of debate looks like and strives toward it. C) Constitutivism – preventing me from making any arguments is a violation of the rules of debate since it’s essentially eliminating my speech time. I

#### Only evaluate the counter-interp – Anything else allows the aff to be infinitely abusive and use the tactics that gained them the competitive advantage to ensure they win every round by uplayering a true shell with meta-theory, takeouts, and deflationary paradigm issues, justifying the original abuse on the shell.

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity. It o/w – A) Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB B) Inescapable – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Absent some judge-debater reciprocal relationship, they could just hack against or for you.

#### Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow 4. Drop the argument is incoherent under norm setting since you’re voting for the best rule, not a punishment of someone else’s wrong-doing.

#### Use spirit of the interp since text encourages spamming blippy i-meets that avoid discussion of the actual abuse story.

#### 1NC Theory o/w – 1. Lexicality – If the neg was abusive it was reactionary to aff abuse which means it’s justified 2. Norm setting – 1ar theory can never set norms since I only get 1 speech so we can’t fully develop the debate 3. Infinite abuse – Otherwise it would justify the aff baiting theory and uplayering and allows them to get away with infinite abuse just by being the better theory debater 4. Reject 2ar weighing since they get the last word and will win every theory debate if they can dump a bunch of new reasons their args come first for 3 minutes even if they are winning 10 seconds of offense.

## NC

#### Being non-alienated is a side constraint on every anticapitalist praxis: a) they presume relationality and movement building which only the nc normatively justifies and b) willing does not occur in a vaccum so we hve to look towards how agents are related to their products and others.

#### Jaeggi 2, Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 Roles on this view are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself.

#### This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself. Jaeggi 3, Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.

#### 2. Action theory – Only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes. That’s a necessary feature of ethics since we must be able to warrant a coherent conception of what motivates our actions in order to provide a method to actually implement ethical principles.

#### 3. Epistemology – Only an understanding of appropriation can unify the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical abstract concepts like 2+2=4 are true and necessary, but can only become useful once explained in context of how they actualize in the world through our intentions. That means absent an explanation of how that knowledge mixes with the world around us, it becomes useless.

#### 4. Normative frameworks come first because it comprehensively explains how all individuals should lead their lives in all situations which ow on scope and guiding action to more people. Controls Il to movement building of the aff.

### offense

#### I contend that member nations of the WTO ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicine.

#### [1] Intellectual property is a self-expression of the subject. When it’s used in a way that doesn’t reflect the framer’s intent, it is alienating.

Justin Hughes 98, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] AHS//MAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21

"On the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition." 3. Intellectual Property Under Hegel. For Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will. Hegel writes: Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold, with things recognized as things. It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are "things." We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c., "things," for while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in legal terms. . . . n205**.** Intellectual property provides a way out of this problem, by "materializing" these personal traits.Hegel goes on to say that "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody [\*338] them in something external and alienate them." n206.Hegel takes the position that one cannot alienate or surrender any universal element of one's self. Hence slavery is not permissible because by "alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, I would be making into another's property the substance of my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality." n207 Similarly, there is no right to sacrifice one's life because that is the surrender of the "comprehensive sum of external activity." n208 This doctrine supplies at least a framework to answer the question of intellectual property that most concerns Hegel. It is a question we ignore today, but one that is not easy to answer: what justifies the author in alienating copies of his work while retaining the exclusive right to reproduce further copies of that work. A sculptor or painter physically embodies his will in the medium and produces one piece of art.When another artist copies this piece Hegel thinks that the hand-made copy "is essentially a product of the copyist's own mental and technical ability" and does not infringe upon the original artist's property. n209 The **problem arises when a creator of intellectual property does not embody** his **will in an object** in **the** same **way the artist does**. The writer physically manifests his will only "in a series of abstract symbols" which can be rendered into "things" by mechanical processes not requiring any talent. n210 The dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that "the purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author should understand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory, thinking, &c." n211 This concern for the common of ideas is familiar. In resolving this dilemma, Hegel says that the alienation of a single copy of a work need not entail the right to produce facsimiles because such reproduction is one of the "universal ways and means of expression . . . which belong to [the author]." n212 Just as he does not sell himself into slavery, the author keeps the universal aspect of expression as his own. The copy sold is for the buyer's own consumption; its only purpose is to allow the buyer to incorporate these ideas into his "self." Hegel also identifies the instrumentalist-labor justification as a consideration against granting full rights of reproduction to buyers of individual copies [\*339] of a work. Hegel admits that protecting intellectual property is "[t]he purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences and arts." n213 Beyond this, Hegel says little. He declares that intellectual property is a "capital asset" and explicitly links this label to a later section in which he defines a "capital asset." n214 There is considerable literature on how Hegel did not develop the idea of "capital" to its logical conclusions, n215 but here "capital asset" can be understood as property which has a greater tendency to permanence and a greater ability than other property to give its own economic security

#### [2] IP is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. Recognition is necessary for agents to be non-alienated bc we need to establish relations with the world.

**Hughes 2 -** "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] // ahs emi

At first blush, this economic rationale seems far removed from the concerns of personality theory, [n244](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n244) yet it can be recast into the framework of the personality theory. From the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These payments acknowledge the individual's claim over the property, and it is through such acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person. [n245](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n245) "Recognition" involves more than lip service. If I say "this forest is your property" and then proceed to flagrantly trespass, cut your timber, and hunt your deer, I have not recognized your property rights. Similarly, verbal recognition of an intellectual property claim is not equal to the recognition implicit in a payment. Purchasers of a copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognizing the creator as a person. Furthermore, this generation of income complements the personality theory in as much as income facilitates further expression. When royalties from an invention allow the inventor to buy a grand piano he has always wanted, the transaction helps maximize personality. But this argument tends to be too broad. First, much income is used for basic necessities, leading to the vacuous position that life-sustenance is "personally maximizing" because it allows the personality to continue. Second, this approach could justify property rights for after-the-fact development of personality interests without requiring [\*350] such interests in the property at the time the property rights are granted. The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: respect, honor, and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards. Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the creator.VARA Hegel's prohibition of "complete" alienation of intellectual property appears to result from his recognition of the necessity for these two conditions. While he would permit alienation of copies, and even the rights to further reproduction, [n246](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n246) he disapproves alienation of "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute . . . private personality and the universal essence of . . . self-consciousness." [n247](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n247) Such alienation necessarily occurs if the recognition of the connection between a creator and his expression is destroyed or distorted. When the first condition is violated, this recognition is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted.

#### [3] Objectification - Absent intellectual property, agents feel like objects since they aren’t recognized for their exercise of agency. This procedurally prevents further appropriation bc agents lack incentive to innovate when they’re detached from their goods.

## Case

### UV

### Methods

#### The role of the ballot is to compare the desirability of the world of the affirmative and the world of the negative via fair arguments.

#### 1. Topic education – Infinite number of NIBs and permissibility arguments under truth testing allows debaters to recycle arguments which moots topic education.

#### 2. Reciprocity – Truth testing imposes unfair burdens on debaters since it requires debaters to prove statements definitively true or false, there are an infinite number of ways to prove something false and only one way to prove it true.

#### Takes out their rticks cuz they’re not offense under either of our fwks.

#### Many World Interp is scientifically unproven, nihilistic, morally repugnant, and an illogical theory.

**Ball 15** “Too many worlds “Philip Ball is a British science writer, whose work appears in Nature, New Scientist and Prospect, among others. Ball holds a degree in chemistry from Oxford and a doctorate in physics from Bristol University. His latest book is Beyond Weird: Why Everything You Thought You Knew About Quantum Physics is Different (2018). He lives in London. [https://aeon.co/essays/is-the-many-worlds-hypothesis-just-a-fantasy] // ahs em

Yet resist we should. We should resist not just because MWI is unlikely to be true, or even because, since no one knows how to test it, the idea is perhaps not truly scientific at all. Those are valid criticisms, but the main reason we should hold out is that it is incoherent, both philosophically and logically. There could be no better contender for Wolfgang Pauli’s famous put-down: it is not even wrong. And yet, it attracts both publicity and extraordinarily confident endorsement. Why? To understand that, we need to see why, more than 100 years after quantum theory was first conceived, experts are still gathering to debate what it means. Despite its shaky foundations, quantum mechanics is extraordinarily successful. In fact you’d be hard pushed to find a more successful scientific theory. It can predict all kinds of phenomena with amazing precision, from the colours of grass and sky to the transparency of glass, the way enzymes work and how the Sun shines. This is because it is largely a technique: a set of procedures for calculating what properties substances ought to have based on the positions and energies of their constituent subatomic particles. The calculations are hard. For anything more complicated than a hydrogen atom, it is necessary to make simplifications and approximations. But we can do that very reliably – and so the vast majority of physicists, chemists and engineers who use quantum theory today don’t need to go to conferences on the nature of reality. They can do their job perfectly well if, in the words of the physicist David Mermin, they just ‘shut up and calculate’. It is true, though, that the equations seem to insist on some strange things. They imply that very small entities such as atoms and subatomic particles can be in several places at the same time. A single electron can seem to pass through two holes at once, interfering with its own motion as if it was a wave. What’s more, we can’t know everything about a particle at the same time: Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle forbids such perfect knowledge. And two particles can seem to affect one another instantly across immense tracts of space, in apparent (but not actual) violation of Albert Einstein’s theory of special relativity. Before we look, there are only probabilities. When we open the box, they give way to a single actuality Quantum scientists, for the most part, just accept such things. They are no longer especially controversial. What really divides opinion is the fact that the theory seems to do away with the idea of an objective reality that we can study ‘from the outside’. Such a notion has been central to science from its beginnings – and yet quantum mechanics insists that we can’t make a measurement without influencing what we measure. This isn’t a problem of acute sensitivity. It’s more fundamental than that. I’ll explain. The most widely used form of quantum maths, devised by Erwin Schrödinger in the 1920s, involves an abstract object called a wavefunction. This wavefunction expresses all that can be known about a quantum object, such as a particle. But it doesn’t tell you what properties the object has. Instead, it enumerates all the possible properties it could have, along with their relative probabilities. Which of these possibilities is real? Is an electron here or there? We can find out by looking. But here’s the thing: quantum mechanics seems to be telling us that the very act of looking – of making a measurement – forces the universe to make that decision, at random. Before we look, there are only probabilities. When we open the box, those probabilities give way to a single, determinate actuality: something conventionally called collapse of the wavefunction. But wavefunction collapse isn’t actually part of the theory: it has to be put in by hand, as it were. That’s rightly considered to be most unsatisfactory. We are left with what’s called the Measurement Problem, which really comes down to this: between the rainbow-smear of probabilities in our equations and the matter-of-fact determinacy of everything we can actually measure, what on Earth is going on? Hence the menu of options at the Traunsee conference. The dominant view, the Copenhagen Interpretation, just shrugs and accepts wavefunction collapse as an additional ingredient of the theory, a clumsy fudge that we don’t understand but which we seem forced to make do with, at least for now. Another view is that the transition from probability to actuality isn’t just a mathematical sleight-of-hand but is in fact a concrete physical process, a little like the radioactive decay of an atom. That’s the Objective Collapse interpretation, and among its advocates is Roger Penrose, who suspects that it might involve gravity. And then there’s the Many Worlds option – though its proponents, who include heavyweights such as Stephen Hawking and the Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek, are oddly reluctant to concede that their preferred view admits of any rivals. As far as they are concerned, the MWI is the only way of taking quantum theory seriously. It ‘should be (but is not) uncontroversial’, according to Wilczek. The idea first appeared in the 1957 doctoral thesis of the US physicist Hugh Everett. He asked why, instead of fretting about the cumbersome nature of wavefunction collapse, we don’t just do away with it. What if this collapse is just an illusion, and all the possibilities announced in the wavefunction have a physical reality? Perhaps when we make a measurement we see only one of those realities, yet the others have a separate existence, too. An existence where? This is where the many worlds come in. Everett himself never used that term, but in the 1970s the physicist Bryce DeWitt started championing his proposals, and it was DeWitt who argued that the alternative outcomes of the experiment must exist in a parallel reality: another world. You measure the path of an electron, and in this world it seems to go this way, but in another world it went that way. That requires a parallel, identical apparatus for the electron to traverse. More – it requires a parallel you to measure it. Once begun, this process of fabrication has no end: you have to build an entire parallel universe around that one electron, identical in all respects except where the electron went. You avoid the complication of wavefunction collapse, but at the expense of making another universe. This picture really gets extravagant when you appreciate what a measurement is. In one view, any interaction between one quantum entity and another – a photon of light bouncing off an atom – can produce alternative outcomes, and so demands parallel universes. As DeWitt put it: ‘every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies’. Recall that this profusion is deemed necessary only because we don’t yet understand wavefunction collapse. It’s a way of avoiding the mathematical ungainliness of that lacuna. ‘If you prefer a simple and purely mathematical theory, then you – like me – are stuck with the many-worlds interpretation,’ claims one of the view’s most prominent popularisers, the MIT physicist Max Tegmark. That would be easier to swallow if the ‘mathematical simplicity’ were not so cheaply bought. The corollary of Everett’s proposal is that there is in fact just a single wavefunction for the entire universe. The ‘simple maths’ comes from representing this universal wavefunction as the symbol Ψ: allegedly a complete description of everything that is or ever was, including the stuff we don’t yet understand. And Many Worlders are oddly evasive about specifying exactly what constitutes a ‘measurement’ or ‘experiment’ that induces the splitting of Ψ into multiple worlds. You might sense some issues being swept under the carpet here. In other words, you just need to broaden your mind beyond your parochial idea of what ‘you’ means But let’s stick with it. What are these parallel worlds like? In the ‘multiverse’ of the Many Worlds view, says Tegmark, ‘all possible states exist at every instant’. That’s quite an ambiguous statement, since it might either mean all states that could evolve from some initial configuration, or all imaginable arrangements of all particles. But, either way, we face some nonsensical implications. You see, the MWI does some radical stuff to you and me. ‘The act of making a decision,’ says Tegmark – a ‘decision’ here being interchangeable with an experiment or measurement – ‘causes a person to split into multiple copies.’ Brian Greene, another prominent MWI advocate, tells us gleefully that ‘each copy is you’. In other words, you just need to broaden your mind beyond your parochial idea of what ‘you’ means. Each of these individuals has its own consciousness, and so each believes he or she is ‘you’ – but the real ‘you’ is their sum total. This means that Greene and Tegmark don’t support the MWI at all – it’s only these particular copies (and presumably some others) who do. ‘Listen to me, not them!’ Tegmark might reply. But don’t they all say that? The Russian-Israeli physicist Lev Vaidman is one of the few supporters of the MWI to have attempted to think this through more carefully. ‘“I” is defined at a particular time by a complete (classical) description of the state of my body and of my brain,’ he explains. ‘At the present moment there are many different “Levs” in different worlds, but it is meaningless to say that now there is another “I”.’ This presumably rescues moral autonomy in the face of all those other Levs doing all the wicked deeds imaginable (and probably some that are not). Yet it is also scientifically and, I think, logically meaningless to say that there is an ‘I’ at all in his definition, given that we must assume that any ‘I’ is generating copies faster than the speed of thought. In this view, a ‘complete description’ of the state of Lev’s body and brain never exists. Now it’s the ‘I’, rather than the collapse of a wavefunction, that is being put in by hand. The difficulties don’t end there. It is extraordinary how attached the MWI advocates are to themselves, as if all the Many Worlds contain Xeroxed copies leading other lives. That image isn’t, however, what the idea is really about – it’s a sci-fi scenario derived from it. As Tegmark explains, the MWI is really about all possible states existing at every instant. Some of these, it’s true, must contain essentially indistinguishable Maxes doing and seeing different things. Tegmark waxes lyrical about these: ‘I feel a strong kinship with parallel Maxes, even though I never get to meet them. They share my values, my feelings, my memories – they’re closer to me than brothers.’ Most MWI popularizers think they are blowing our minds with this stuff, whereas in fact they are flattering them. They delve into the implications for personhood just far enough to lull us with the seductive uncanniness of the centuries-old Doppelgänger trope, and then flit off again. The result sounds transgressively exciting while familiar enough to be persuasive. You see, for some reason, Tegmark doesn’t trouble his mind about the many, many more almost-Maxes, near-copies with perhaps a gene or two mutated – not to mention the not-much-like Maxes, and so on into a continuum of utterly different beings. Why not? Because you can’t make neat ontological statements about them, or embrace them as brothers. They spoil the story, the rotters. They turn it into a story that doesn’t make sense, that can’t even be told. So they become the mad relatives in the attic. The conceit of ‘multiple selves’ isn’t at all what the MWI, taken at face value, is proposing. On the contrary, it is dismantling the whole notion of selfhood – it is denying any real meaning of ‘you’ at all. In the Borgesian library of Many Worlds, it seems there can be no fact of the matter about what is or isn’t you, and what you did or didn’t do Is that really so different from what we keep hearing from neuroscientists and psychologists – that our comforting notions of selfhood are all just an illusion concocted by the brain to allow us to function? I think it is. There is a gulf between a useful but fragile cognitive construct based on measurable sensory phenomena, and a claim to dissolve all personhood and autonomy because it makes the maths neater. In the Borgesian library of Many Worlds, it seems there can be no fact of the matter about what is or isn’t you, and what you did or didn’t do. Compared with these problems, the difficulty of testing the MWI experimentally (which would seem necessary if it is to be considered truly scientific) is a small matter. ‘It’s trivial to falsify [MWI],’ boasts the Caltech cosmologist Sean Carroll, another supporter: ‘just do an experiment that violates the Schrödinger equation or the principle of superposition, which are the only things the theory assumes.’ But most other interpretations of quantum theory assume them (at least) too – so such an experiment would rule them all out, and say nothing about the special status of the MWI. No of Sliding Doors (1998) shows a puzzling lacuna in the formidable minds of its advocates. Perhaps they should stop trying to tell us that philosophy is dead.

#### On 6- squo is most simple

On 7- same logic applies to aff and also false, we prove definitive moral obligation for squo

On 10 Hyponosis is a violent precedent: the medical model has used hypnosis to gaslight patients unsafe in debate. ur not hypontizing me – its debate.

### Fwk