# K

#### The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects the lack. links much better into meta-ethic of desire which ow on link specificity.

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-widening spiral of existential deadends. How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

#### Prefer:

#### A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place.

#### B) **Everything** is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted.

#### C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.

#### The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the material and calculable, inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. We sacrifice the very nature of knowledge while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life.

**Mills,** Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm.When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

#### The aff’s nuclear deterrence focus recreate violence while envisioning a satisfaction of fiat. They craft infinite repetition and obsession with unifying the Real.

**Matheson 15** – Dr. Matheson is a former debate coach at Harvard University and a current candidate at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Center, His research focuses on intersections of rhetoric, media, and theories of psychoanalysis and deconstruction.“Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive” [https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537] // ahs em \*bracketed for grammar

It is worth noting that the Symbolic need not have a permanent structure either. Constellations of tropes are made durable, but not permanent, by what Lundberg calls “affective labor” and I have generally referred to as cathexis. That the belief in determinism persists in some quarters should not discredit the Real or the drive for unmediated experience (i.e., the death drive). Instead, it should highlight our tendency to mistake the durable but artificial structures of the Symbolic for some metaphysical truth of the Real, just as the Bomb is conflated with God. This is also why Lacanian psychoanalysis is consistent with the emerging set of ideas grouped together as speculative realism. Humanity mistakes its reality for the Real, and is only shocked into perspective when the latter is revealed by the inadequacy of the former. As Lacan wrote, To be a psychoanalyst is simply to open your eyes to the evident fact that nothing malfunctions more than human reality…nothing is more stupid than human destiny, that is, that one is always being fooled. Even when one does do something successfully, it is precisely not what one wanted to do. (Psychoses 82) The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is [has] “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened. The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7 The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration. But it is only one part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes. Instead, the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction. Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real. CHAPTER 2: PLAYING WARGAMES [W]ar and business are conflicts resembling games, and as such, they may be formalized as to constitute games with definite rules. Indeed, I have no reason to suppose that such formalized versions of them are not already being established as models to determine the policies for pressing the Great Push Button and burning the earth clean for a new and less humanly undependable order of things. --Norbert Weiner, God & Golem, Inc. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate…everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using 74 counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us… First, the tuché, which we have borrowed…from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton…it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly 76 attempts to reach the chaos of contingency. They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real. In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition. When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of 77 chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules. Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

#### Fantasy productions are not neutral models of risk but collusions between capital and state that prevent the change they’ll talk about. The neg rejects this model of beautifying space policy.

**Ormrod 11 -** “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space” by James S Ormrod School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, Falmer BN1 9PH, Sussex, England; e-mail: j.s.ormrod@brighton.ac.uk Received 17 August 2011; in revised form 19 September 2012 [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/d16511] // ahs emi

I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: **the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe.** The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how **fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension).** This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of **NASA’s** Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). Beyond world risk society? 741 **The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy,** as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. **These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power.** Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. **Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities.** Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. **Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd.** Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. **Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space.** Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999).

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive. Utopian ideals seek to achieve that which is impossible—our striving to reach enjoyment replicates the very thing we are trying to eliminate. Only by founding our politics upon recognition that our limitations provide the perfect source for endless enjoyment can we prevent the endless repetition of suffering.

McGowan ‘13 “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) Accessed on 7/25/19 AHS// emi

In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional conception of progress always runs aground. Th is paradox must become the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and the source of our enjoyment.32 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various eff orts to reach it. The limit separating us from the good society is the very thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it. In place of this pursuit, a psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us from the good rather than toward the good itself. Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is what undermines all perfection. But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social order changes its very nature. Instead of being the burden that one seeks to escape, repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode through which one att ains satisfaction. Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence. Th is idea of politics lacks the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political energy.33 What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way 21 that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of global capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion and development. The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that psychoanalysis makes to political thought. But since it is a concept relatively foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like. Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political problems: the ineffi cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift repression. The two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that already exist and silently inform both. Th e wager of what follows is that the revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom. The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem of subjectivity. The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a barrier to it. A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 22 on society itself. Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not. This theory would inaugurate political change by insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature of loss. Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. It is through the death drive that the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition of the initial loss sustains this freedom. By embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. Rather than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.

# AC

## util

#### 3- Jouissance is the greatest pleasure.

McAleer 17 - Graham McAleer, The Ethics of Fashion, December 9th, 2017 “Lacan’s critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism” [http://www.ethicsoffashion.com/lacans-critique-benthams-utilitarianism/] Accessed 11/24/19 SAO

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was involved in the founding of my undergraduate institution, the “Godless College,” University College London. Nonetheless, I have never been taken with his ethical thought. Benthamism or utilitarianism is, with Kantianism, one of the two most dominant ethical theories taught at colleges in the Anglosphere. I’m not sure it has the same hold in European universities; possibly because central Europe has an indigenous ethical theory, value ethics. I am far more persuaded by value ethics. The central dispute between Bentham and value ethics (Scheler, Kolnai, Wojtyla) is the original moral character of the world. Bentham thinks objects ethically neutral: only once an object/act/event is lifted into the moral calculus of the greatest happiness of the greatest number does it come to have moral bearing. By contrast, value ethics argues that what populates our world intrinsically bears value tones, discrete value textures that shape our ethical assessments. This position is also shared by Shaftesbury, Smith, and in my opinion, Hume. To this dispute, Lacan adds that the use of the greatest happiness principle is not the generous and altruistic act that Bentham, and his follower, J. S. Mill, believes. Pleasure scrambles any clean distinction between egoism and altruism. The utilitarian principle gains its user a secret satisfaction: “It is a fact of [psycho-analytic] experience that what I want is the good of others in the image of my own” (Seminar 7, Chapter 14). The core of my psyche is The Thing, the unconscious, a place of “unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee.” How to escape? Things are not so simple: I don’t altogether want to flee. This place is also the origin of my jouissance, the confused pleasure offered by a bewildering aggressivity. Bentham’s mistake is to think we have clarity about pleasure: that we can index our pleasure so as to understand the application of the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Seminar 2, Chapter 1). However, jouissance confuses me: I both want it, and not. Pleasure is deceiving and I am no good guide to my own pleasure. This is no mere pragmatic or epistemological problem: applying the principle well is not possible; pleasure is necessarily bewildering. What is The Thing we want, and flee? It is a place of vulnerability, where longing and violence entwine. Is escape possible? Sort of. In affirming what countermands aggression — the moral law — I do right by others, and therewith myself: I remove myself from the place of violence as I affirm the good of others. This is only ever a partial affirmation of the other. Altruism is also always egoism. And yet even my egoism is deceived: I do also want to affirm The Thing, the place of jouissance. Egoism would be to pursue my pleasure to the utmost but I recoil from my gravest identity: to make my pleasure gravid would also be to dig my own grave. Thus, affirming the other I surreptitiously affirm myself (egoism) and simultaneously deny myself (not egoism): I am neither true friend to others or myself. Benthamism is built on the least trusty worthy of foundations: pleasure.

#### Utilitarianism is a bad rule to use.

Card and Smith 20 - Dallas Card & Noah A. Smith, Stanford University & the University of Washington, January 2020“On Consequentialism and Fairness” [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.00329.pdf] Accessed 2/5/20 SAO \*We don’t endorse the authors conclusions or rhetoric

Although utilitarianism is highly influential, there are fundamental problems with it. First, aggregating well-being requires measuring individual welfare, but it is unclear that it can be measured in a way that allows for fair comparisons. Even if we restrict the set of morally relevant entities to humans, issues of subjectivity, disposition, and self-reporting make it difficult if not impossible to meaningfully comparison across individuals (Binmore, 2009). Second, even if there were a satisfactory way of measuring individual well-being, there are computational difficulties involved in estimating these values for hypothetical worlds. Given that well-being could depend on fine-grained details of the state of the world, it wis unclear what level of precision would be required of a model in order to evaluate well-being for each entity. Thus, even estimating the overall value of a single state of the world might be infeasible, let alone a progression of them over time. Third, any one-number summary of the distribution of preferences will fail to distinguish between dramatically different distributions. Using the sum, for example, will treat as equivalent two states with the same total value, but with different levels of inequality. While this failing is not necessarily insurmountable, most solutions seem to undermine the inherent simplicity of the utilitarian ideal.9 Fourth, others have challenged the premise of impartiality on the grounds that it is subtly paternalist or patriarchal, emphasizes individual autonomy over relationships and care, and ignores existing relations of power (Friedman, 1991; Driver, 2005; Kittay, 2009). Undoubtedly, there is a long and troubling history of otherwise enlightened philosophers presuming to know what is best for others, and being ~~blind~~ to the harms of institutions such as colonialism, while believing that certain classes of people either don’t count or are incapable of full rationality (Mills, 1987). Ultimately, it seems inescapable to conclude that there is no universally acceptable evaluation function for consequentialism. Rather, we must acknowledge that every action will entail an uneven distribution of costs and benefits. Even in the case where an action literally makes everyone better off, it will almost certainly benefit some more than others. As such, the most credible position is to view the idea of valuation (utilitarian or otherwise) as inherently contested and political. While we might insist that an admissible evaluation function conform to certain criteria, such as disinterestedness, or not being self-defeating (Parfit, 1984), we must also acknowledge that advocating for a particular notion of value as correct is fundamentally a political act.

#### Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### on stevens –

#### [1] no this is a new link. Envisioning utopias will always fail and causes psychic violence.

Stavrakakis, 99 Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government @ University of Essex; *Lacan and the Political*, pg. 99-100 // ahs emi

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that **the need for utopian** meaning **arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict,** when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, **the** beatific side of **fantasy is coupled** in utopian constructions **with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The** naivety—and also the **danger**—of utopian **structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy** is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia **is based on** the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to **violence**; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, **this** **representation is** usually articulated as a total and universal representation**, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real**, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

#### Reject the duty to extend human life. We cannot fulfill this project. One day the sun will explode and humanity will die. But the futile attempt to save humans encourages us to destroy all that we consider to be sub-human. We can be a good community instead of a timeless one.

Milligan 15 - Tony Milligan, PH.D. lecturer in philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire and specializes in ethics, in his 2015 book. [Nobody Owns the Moon: The Ethics of Space Exploitation]eec

And so, what I am suggesting here is that recognition of a duty to extend human life is above all a way of responding to a special bond to other members of our moral community and not primarily responding to them merely as members of the same biological species. A commitment of this sort, to a sense of moral community, seems to be in play when we criticize the special failures which are often involved in racism, anti-Semitism and similar forms of prejudice. Suppose, for example, I assert that the most extreme forms of the latter involve both false beliefs (about culture or biology) and a betrayal of humanity. By doing so I would not be suggesting that they involve a betrayal of our genetic similarity. Rather, I would be suggesting that they involve the betrayal of a deep bond which is made possible by various aspects of our shared biological nature but which might equally be made possible by the possession of some other biological nature and which is, in any case, an achievement of social history rather than a mere biological given. Should we then extend our conception of moral community beyond the human, so that it comes to include non-humans, that too might be a very good thing. Indeed, at any given time, we are already members of several communities and a community of fellow creatures may be entirely within our reach. However, communities of the relevant sort result from a shared history rather than from a community-forming decision. The strength and ethical significance of any particular bond is something which cannot be wished into existence or, indeed, wished away. (And it is precisely the latter which is the special mistake from which familiar prejudices evolve.) Two Objections In spite of all that has been said above, two important objections to the idea of a duty to extend human life may be difficult to ignore. One centers upon practicality and other upon over-estimation. On the side of practicality it may be held that, in this context, ought implies can. If we cannot actually do anything to significantly extend the survival of humanity then we cannot reasonably be held to have any such duty. And here, the difficulties of extending human life are both familiar and formidable. Yes, we could (and probably will) go to Mars and (barring extreme misfortune) we will establish a stable presence off-world and nearby on the Moon. Perhaps we will also establish a presence somewhat further away from the Sun, in the asteroid belt, among the moons of the gas giants. But this will still leave humanity doomed to extinction during the latter stages of our Sun's life-cycle. Reaching anywhere else and surviving will be difficult and perhaps to all intents and purposes impossible, because of the sheer immensity of space. Matters may simply not be within our control. The odds against our survival beyond the lifetime of our sun may not be good. In which case it may be seriously misguided to think and act as if we will have more time at our disposal than the limited time that we do in fact have. The difficulties of inter-stellar travel, the problems facing any attempt to construct an Ark to preserve human life elsewhere, may simply turn out to be too great. Indeed, at present, I am reluctantly inclined to suspect that this may turn out to be the case. However, this may simply be my own short-sightedness. I rather hope that it is and the hope may not be misplaced and it need not collapse into some manner of faith in the future. After all, prediction about the remote future generally fails. Based upon our limited human capacity to envisage the future in realistic ways (a human limitation in support of which we may appeal to two millennia of seriously misleading Utopian and dystopian literature written by some of the most intelligent humans ever to have lived) it seems reasonable to say that we are, again, in a poor epistemic position to know whether or not the spreading of humanity beyond the solar system will ultimately be possible. And if we do not know then, as a precautionary matter, it may be best to allow that survival and spread, on a cosmic scale, may be a possible outcome. And in this case we may indeed have a duty to fry and make it happen. Uncertainty about the long-range future of humanity may well favor acceptance that the claimed duty is a genuine duty. The second objection concerns over-estimation and more specifically, the way in which the endorsement of a duty to extend human life may promote an already damaging over-estimation of our human importance (damaging to the environment, to other creatures, to all that is not human). Carl Sagan once remarked that we are the universe's way of being conscious of itself.- Although we may understand what was meant, even here a form of species prejudice may be evident or at least risked. Unless we are to discount the awareness of other (already-existing) terrestrial creatures, the point is rather that we are the universe's way of being conscious of, or theorizing, itself as a universe or, as a cosmos (an orderly law-governed system). And this is slightly more accurate if rather less elegant. But perhaps we are no such thing. Perhaps there are many beings with similar or even greater capacities. What then would make us so special? To affirm the importance of humanity we might be thrown back solely upon humanity as a community of beings to which we happen to belong and to whom we owe special loyalties that we do not owe to others (although, no doubt we owe them something). But if we do so it may be better to focus upon our community being a good one rather than an indefinitely prolonged one. This same dilemma (familiar from Homer and Aristotle) may be present in the life of the individual: is it better to live longer or to live well? (Both, incidentally, opted for the latter.) If we are not unique, or at least if we are not an extremely rare sort of thing, it may seem better to accept that ultimately our community of beings will play out its limited run of time. Indeed, an acceptance of this might improve the quality of our ethical flunking just as acceptance of mortality by the individual human ma}' make their life less wasteful and misdirected. This too is a concern of a deep sort and one which is not easily disposed of. Yet, although deliberation of this kind may be deep, so too is our connection to humanity and the idea of a duty to humanity. Depth confronts depth and we are left with no guarantees about getting matters right. Yet in this instance the countervailing consideration draws upon the possible existence of other beings about whose nature we have no current knowledge and whose actual existence we cannot obviously presuppose.

## adv

### debris

#### Private companies are key to cleanup

Moore and Burken 21’ – Adrian Moore and Rebecca van Burken, Adrian Moore is vice president and Rebecca van Burken is a senior policy fellow at Reason Foundation, where they are authors of the report, “U.S. Space Traffic Management And Orbital Debris Policy.”, “It's time for US to get serious about cleaning up space junk”, The Hill, July 27th, 2021, [https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/564945-its-time-for-us-to-get-serious-about-cleaning-up-space-junk] Accessed 12/14/21 AHS//AP

Urgency means committing to better space traffic management, and tracking and removing orbital debris. Orbital debris management is not well organized within the government. Right now, the Department of Defense (DOD) does most tracking of space debris for the U.S. out of the need to protect military satellites and national security interests. NASA has its own less advanced systems for tracking debris. However, orbital debris management is not just about tracking debris anymore. It is also about forming collision warning systems and safely managing traffic in space. To do this efficiently, we need a civil repository for all orbital debris components, [something that many commercial space companies have already created on their own](https://www.axios.com/space-junk-tracking-business-a365462b-a82e-4926-849b-5f292dd1b164.html) to stay aware of orbital debris and help protect their satellites in space. Tracking debris may be a national security priority, but providing space traffic control is not really in the Defense Department’s mission. We should be utilizing the private sector’s expertise and advancements in this area. For example, Astroscale has contracts with both the Japanese and European space agencies to develop orbital debris removal capability. And responsibility for developing collision warnings and space traffic management [would be best suited for the Office of Space Commerce](https://reason.org/policy-brief/u-s-space-traffic-management-and-orbital-debris-policy/), an office with existing connections to the commercial space industry, NASA and DOD. Partnering with the debris tracking and removal systems private companies are developing while freeing up DOD to focus on military awareness and NASA to focus on research and development would be the most efficient way forward. If government works with private industry through strategic public-private partnerships, the U.S. can best address the threats posed by orbital debris and create sustainable policies for safe space exploration.

**New satellites launched into space have been redesigned to lessen space debris.**

**Sebastian Anthony, ExtremeTech, 1-22-2014** ["Japan is preparing to launch a giant magnetic net that will trawl space for junk," http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/175230-japan-is-preparing-to-launch-a-giant-magnetic-net-that-will-trawl-space-for-junk] nnd

Proactive measures are being taken, too: satellite makers are increasingly required to include functionality that allows the craft to maneuver into a graveyard orbit (an orbit specifically for debris, so it can’t interfere with operational satellites), or to de-orbit and burn up in the Earth’s atmosphere. (Read: The hunt for alien, star-encompassing Dyson Spheres begins.)

#### Only commercial development of the moon can make debris clean up economically viable. Governments can’t and won’t solve.

Ray Villard, Discovery news, July 13th 2011 “Strip Mine the Moon to Fuel Space Exploration” < http://news.discovery.com/space/moon-mining-needed-to-fuel-space-exploration-110713.htm> SAO

“Discovering rich concentrations of hydrogen on the moon would open up a universe of possibilities — literally,” wrote William Stone, an aerospace engineer who is chairman of Shackleton Energy Co. in Del Valle, Texas, in the June 2009 IEEE Spectrum magazine. “For the first time, access to space would be truly economical. At last, people would be able to begin new ventures, including space tourism, space-debris cleanup, satellite refueling, and interplanetary voyages.” Rocket fuels and consumables now cost an average of $20,000 per pound to lift off Earth; we are prisoners at the bottom of this very deep gravitational well. Stone and other experts have realized that resources could instead be carried off the moon much more cheaply. Transporting material from the moon requires just 1/14th to 1/20th of the fuel needed to loft material up from Earth’s surface. Assuming there are significant reserves of ice at the perpetually dark lunar poles, Stone envisions investing $20 billion over a decade to establish a network of “refueling service stations” in LEO and on the moon to process and provide fuel and other consumables to space-bound missions. The consequences, says Stone, is that we could build entirely new classes of space vehicles. They would be designed operate only at and beyond LEO. The large expense of NASA’s space shuttle was in designing a super-vehicle that withstood the effects of high-speed atmospheric drag, pressure, and intense vibration on payloads, and thermal heating to back and forth into space. This was not accomplished without catastrophic failures and loss of crew. But a vehicle that is designed to operate only in space can be much simpler. This vision is reminiscent of the space transportation infrastructure envisioned in the 1968 sci-fi classic “2001 A Space Odyssey,” where lunar shuttles ferry passengers between Earth orbit and lunar bases… “It is time for the private sector to take the lead in creating new markets and expanding humanity’s presence in space. Governments cannot and will not do it by themselves anytime soon,” writes Stone.

**NASA and the DOD track space debris now so nuq.**

**NASA, 9-27-2013** ["Space Debris and Human Spacecraft," http://www.nasa.gov/mission\_pages/station/news/orbital\_debris.html] nnd

The Department of Defense maintains a highly accurate satellite catalog on objects in Earth orbit that are larger than a softball. NASA and the DoD cooperate and share responsibilities for characterizing the satellite (including orbital debris) environment. DoD’s Space Surveillance Network tracks discrete objects as small as 2 inches (5 centimeters) in diameter in low Earth orbit and about 1 yard (1 meter) in geosynchronous orbit. Currently, about 15,000 officially cataloged objects are still in orbit. The total number of tracked objects exceeds 21,000. Using special ground-based sensors and inspections of returned satellite surfaces, NASA statistically determines the extent of the population for objects less than 4 inches (10 centimeters) in diameter. Collision risks are divided into three categories depending upon size of threat. For objects 4 inches (10 centimeters) and larger, conjunction assessments and collision avoidance maneuvers are effective in countering objects which can be tracked by the Space Surveillance Network. Objects smaller than this usually are too small to track and too large to shield against. Debris shields can be effective in withstanding impacts of particles smaller than half an inch (1 centimeter).

**The risk of damage from collision in space is relatively low. All satellites are moving at the same speed effectively staving off conflict**

**Jeffrey Kluger, TIME, 7-11-14** ["Look Out! Satellite Debris is Coming Home," <http://time.com/2976883/space-debris-falling/>] nnd

All of them, eventually, will have to come home, and that gets people spooked, but it shouldn’t—at least not most of the time. First of all, most satellites will incinerate on their way down, though the bigger a piece of junk is and the denser the materials that make it up, the greater the chance it has of striking the surface. Still, fully 70% of that surface is water and most of the land that’s left is entirely uninhabited or only sparsely so. Yes, a burnt-out satellite falling earthward with central Shanghai in its crosshairs would create a deadly mess, but any one individual’s odds of getting hit (which, like it or not, is how most of us reckon these things) are very low. NASA’s and NORAD’s continuous surveillance lowers that risk even further by modeling orbits and predicting just which pieces are coming in next, and some websites make it easy for the public to stay up-to-date too. The much greater risk from out of control satellites is not to people on Earth, but to other objects still in orbit. Even then though, collisions are less common than they’d seem. The biggest of the relatively small handful of errors in the blockbuster Gravity was (unfortunately) its central premise, which was that a collision between two satellites had created a high speed storm of debris that was racing around Earth in the same orbit as the shuttle and space station and pummeling both structures on each pass. But orbital physics make that impossible. All objects in the same orbit move at the same speed, so a collision between them is no more