# K

#### The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects the lack.

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

#### Prefer: A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place. B) **Everything** is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted. C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.

#### The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the material and calculable, inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. We sacrifice the very nature of knowledge while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life.

**Mills,** Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, [www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm](http://www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm).

It is not necessary to adopt Lacan’s entire system, which is neither essential nor desirable, in order to appreciate what he has to offer to our topic at hand. In fact, many of Lacan’s positions—such as the decentering of subjectivity for the reification of lanLACAN ON PARANOIAC KNOWLEDGE 31 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. guage—radically oppose contemporary psychoanalytic thought to the degree that Lacan becomes essentially incompatible. Notwithstanding, with the ever-increasing linguistic turn in psychoanalysis, Lacan becomes an important figure to engage. Because language is a necessary condition (albeit not a sufficient one) for conceptual thought, comprehension, and meaning to manifest (see Frie, 1997; Mills, 1999), human knowledge is linguistically mediated. But the epistemological question—that is, the origin of knowledge— requires us to consider prelinguistic development, intrapsychic and interpersonal experience, and the extra- or nonlinguistic processes that permeate psychic reality, such as the constitutional pressures of the drives (Triebe) and affective states (from the monstrous to the sublime) that remain linguistically foreclosed as unformulated unconscious experience. When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

#### their idea that “Deep space exploration is a shared goal” is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new “frontiers” and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. Privatized space research mobilizes fears of ecological, political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for new utopian futures, or the search for Earth 2.0. These imaginaries reflect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier. In contrast, eco-centric visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroyers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a multispecies process—off the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. This article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and political earthly life. Outer space imaginaries are booming. Reborn from Cold War projects into the post-9/11 securitized era, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are proliferating, creating new material impacts and new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion. Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of technoscientific progress and human mastery over nature. Space programs are increasingly privatized, with tech entrepreneurs leading the way to extraterrestrial futures. I refer to these projects, oft en framed as a necessary step in human social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on Earth. Th ese share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defi ned by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question. Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, innovation, or human exceptionalism, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace intention from life’s expansion. Earth 2.0 and Home and Away 159 eco-centric imaginaries off er diff erent understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories. Th is article traces these two imaginaries for the future of life aft er Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. Th e word “imaginaries” builds on the definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of effects and entanglements between language, cultural production, scientifi c research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial expansionary megaprojects. Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research programs, policy proposals, social movements, and private investments, they bring displacements of ontological, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present—with both oppressive and liberatory possibilities (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconfi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements work through analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar 2017). These two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve seeing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter 1997). Th ese visions range from the widespread use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s uniqueness in the universe, to the politically unifying “overview eff ect” proposed by Frank White (1987). Early space programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientifi c understandings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-fi rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present” (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication fi gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. 160 Micha Rahder Leaving Earth—Fact or Fiction? Th ere is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. Th e boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Th ese projects and imaginaries share signifi cant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, known as SETI (Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spacefl ight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. Th is article has a bias toward US-based projects, both public and private, as these are most prolifi c and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private companies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. Th e charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republican Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a scientifi c institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imaginaries are on the rise as the international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself. Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fi ction and fantasy long relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). Th is division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical, and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). Th e Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fi ction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fi elds are drawing attention to how science fi ction has long infl uenced technological and scientifi c developments, particularly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfi eld notes, “fi ctions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. Th ese dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams fi nding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fi ctional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the Home and Away 161 scientifi c gaze (Redfi eld 2002). Language can shape the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might participate in them. Refl ecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and diff erence as opposed to a unifi ed singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While biological and philosophical debates over the defi nition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that defi ne life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief history of human projects oriented toward life’s expansion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. Th is focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). Th is choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward, examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfi guring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to Anthropocene “ Th ings that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting human expansion into space have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy 2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientifi c progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close relation with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capacity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth” environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, reinforcing ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management of more-than-human worlds (DeLoughrey 2014). Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the United States and Europe have oft en been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather than imagining others we might one day escape to (Cockell 2006). Narratives of new capitalist frontiers led many environmentalists to view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle**,”** fearing it will lead to ideologies of a disposable planet (Hartmann 1986). Yet expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extraterrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, entrepreneurial capitalists—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fi ll this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most oft en articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond Earth is no longer defi ned by competing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shift ed from sudden nuclear annihilation to the slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Th ough understood as new or diff erent, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastructures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa. As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way. These sometimes amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth, and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control. This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries Earth 2.0 Dominating current eff orts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partnerships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range from imperialist nationalisms to profi ts to new utopian Home and Away 163 social orders, oft en mixed together in unexpected confi gurations. Yet these Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures.

#### The aff’s nuclear deterrence focus recreate violence while envisioning a satisfaction of fiat. They craft infinite repetition and obsession with unifying the Real.

**Matheson 15** – Dr. Matheson is a former debate coach at Harvard University and a current candidate at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Center, His research focuses on intersections of rhetoric, media, and theories of psychoanalysis and deconstruction.“Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive” [https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537] // ahs em \*bracketed for grammar

It is worth noting that the Symbolic need not have a permanent structure either. Constellations of tropes are made durable, but not permanent, by what Lundberg calls “affective labor” and I have generally referred to as cathexis. That the belief in determinism persists in some quarters should not discredit the Real or the drive for unmediated experience (i.e., the death drive). Instead, it should highlight our tendency to mistake the durable but artificial structures of the Symbolic for some metaphysical truth of the Real, just as the Bomb is conflated with God. This is also why Lacanian psychoanalysis is consistent with the emerging set of ideas grouped together as speculative realism. Humanity mistakes its reality for the Real, and is only shocked into perspective when the latter is revealed by the inadequacy of the former. As Lacan wrote, To be a psychoanalyst is simply to open your eyes to the evident fact that nothing malfunctions more than human reality…nothing is more stupid than human destiny, that is, that one is always being fooled. Even when one does do something successfully, it is precisely not what one wanted to do. (Psychoses 82) The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. **Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is [has] “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality** (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. **We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened.** The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because **the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7** **The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration.** But it is only one part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. **We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes.** Instead, **the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction.** Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. **War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing** left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” **As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real.** CHAPTER 2: PLAYING WARGAMES [W]ar and business are conflicts resembling games, and as such, they may be formalized as to constitute games with definite rules. Indeed, I have no reason to suppose that such formalized versions of them are not already being established as models to determine the policies for pressing the Great Push Button and burning the earth clean for a new and less humanly undependable order of things. --Norbert Weiner, God & Golem, Inc. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate…everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using 74 counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. **Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice** (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us… First, the tuché, which we have borrowed…from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton…it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion**. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly 76 attempts to reach the chaos of contingency.** They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). **Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is** the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But **the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real.** In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). **Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition.** When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. **Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence**—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of 77 chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: **we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules.** Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

#### technological management is what leads to all their impacts. here’s a clear link – “Earth observation satellites key to warming adaptation”

**Dodds 12** - Joseph Dodds, MPhil, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK, MA, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK BSc, Psychology and Neuroscience, Manchester University, UK, Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol) of the British Psychological Society (BPS), and a member of several other professional organizations such as the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, 2012 [“Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos” p 70 \*gender mod] cdm // recut emi

Here there are echoes of Freud's (1916) idea of 'anticipatory mourning' and the associated attacks and spoiling that we will study below (see p. 72). However, for Searles the natural world is not just a space for externalizing our conflicts. Rather, a healthy relationship to the non-human environment is essential for human psychological well-being. Furthermore, one consequence of our alienation from nature is an omnipotent longing for fusion with our technology, and a powerful anxiety should this fully occur. Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology which is wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead ... [T]his technology-dominated world [is] so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience ... to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it ... [T]his 'outer' reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous waste products are part of our physical selves (Searles 1972: 368) The further we are alienated from nature, the more we are driven into primitive regressive identification and omnipotent fascination with our technology, a powerful positive feedback loop. The inner conflict between our human and non-human selves, and our animal and technological natures, is projected onto the environment, further rupturing the relationship and leading to a spiral of destructiveness as we 'project this conflict upon, and thus unconsciously foster, the war in external reality between the beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and \*(hu)man's technology which is ravaging them' (ibid.). Here we are in Klein's paranoid-schizoid world, with a primitive ego unable to differentiate between good and bad mother. While ecologists portray a good eco-mummy doing battle with bad techno-mummy, things are not so simple. As we have seen, civilization (and its technology) is a defence, a 'good mother' to protect us from capricious and uncaring mother nature (Freud 1930), but, as Searles suggests, we are supposed to accept that 'our good mother is poisoning us' (Searles 1972: 369). For Searles (1972), behind both nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe lies the raw destructiveness Kleinians link to Thanatos, or what Erich Fromm (1992) understands in terms of necrophilia. Searles (1972: 370) argues that at this level of functioning we project 'our own pervasive, poorly differentiated and poorly integrated murderousness, bora of our terror and deprivation and frustration, upon the hydrogen bomb, the military-industrial complex, technology.' We may find the slow, more controllable death from pollution preferable to 'sudden death from nuclear warfare' or we might yearn for the quick relief of a nuclear blast to the 'slow strangulation' of environmental devastation (Searles 1972: 370). Living with such apocalyptic threats leads to a kind of ultimate version of the defence Anna Freud (1936) described as identification with the aggressor. At an unconscious level we powerfully identify with what we perceive as omnipotent and immortal technology, as a defense against intolerable feelings of insignificance, of deprivation, of guilt, of fear of death ... Since the constructive goal of saving the world can be achieved only by one's working, as but one largely anonymous individual among uncounted millions ... it is more alluring to give oneself over to secret fantasies of omnipotent destructiveness, in identification with the forces that threaten to destroy the world. This serves to shield one from the recognition of one's own guilt-laden murderous urges, experienced as being within oneself, to destroy one's own intrapersonal and interpersonal world. (Searles 1972: 370) In this view, we are seeing a kind of repetition on a planetary level of an early intrapsychic anxiety situation. In childhood 'a fantasied omnipotence protected us against the fUll intensity of our feelings of deprivation, and now it is dangerously easy to identify with seemingly limitless technology and to fail to cope with the life-threatening scarcity of usable air, food, and water on our planet' (ibid.). Unfortunately our technological powers have outstripped our emotional maturity, and the omnipotent phantasies of infancy now have a frightening objectivity. In place of a religion we no longer believe in, or hopes for future generations we no longer have meaningful contact with, we identify with our immortal, inanimate technology. In this realm of omnipotent fantasy ... mother earth is equivalent to all of reality ... a drag ... to our yearnings for unfettered omnipotence ... It may be not at all coincidental that our world today is threatened with extinction through environmental pollution, to which we are so strikingly apathetic, just when we seem on the threshold of technologically breaking the chains that have always bound our race to this planet of our origin. I suspect that we collectively quake lest our infantile omnipotent fantasies become fully actualized through man's becoming interplanetary and ceasing thereby to be man ... [W]e are powerfully drawn to suicidally polluting our planet so as to ensure our dying upon it as men, rather than existing elsewhere as ... gods or robots ... [T]he greatest danger lies neither in the hydrogen bomb ... nor in the more slowly lethal effect of pollution ... [but] in the fact that the world is in such a state as to evoke our very earliest anxieties and at the same time to offer the delusional 'promise' ... of assuaging these anxieties, effacing them, by fully externalizing and reifying our most primitive conflicts ... In the pull upon us to become omnipotently free of human conflict, we are in danger of bringing about our extinction. (Searles 1972: 371-372)

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive. Utopian ideals seek to achieve that which is impossible—our striving to reach enjoyment replicates the very thing we are trying to eliminate. Only by founding our politics upon recognition that our limitations provide the perfect source for endless enjoyment can we prevent the endless repetition of suffering.

McGowan ‘13 “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) Accessed on 7/25/19 AHS// emi

In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional conception of progress always runs aground. Th is paradox must become the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and the source of our enjoyment.32 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various eff orts to reach it. The limit separating us from the good society is the very thing that constitutes the good society as such. **Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it.** In place of this pursuit, a **psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us from the good rather than toward the good itself. Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is what undermines all perfection.** But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. **By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social order changes its very nature.** Instead of being the burden that one seeks to escape, **repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode through which one att ains satisfaction. Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence.** Th is idea of politics lacks the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political energy.33 **What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way** 21 **that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of** global capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion and development. **The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that psychoanalysis makes to political thought.** But since it is a concept relatively foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like. Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political problems: the ineffi cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift repression. The two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that already exist and silently inform both. Th e wager of what follows is that the revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom. The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem of subjectivity. **The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a barrier to it.** A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 22 on society itself. **Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not.** **This theory would inaugurate political change by insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature of loss.** Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. **It is through the death drive that the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition of the initial loss sustains this freedom.** By embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. **Rather than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.**

# NC

Moral theories must judge action as a unified whole.  If they did not, the separate steps in the chain of action would not be justified.  In the process of doing a whole action, the steps are not disconnected, but rather so connected that one interruption would disrupt the entire action. **Rodl 2K,** Rodl I (Rödl, Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000) **Suppose** I walked from a to c, via b.  It may be that **I decided to walk from a to b, and, having got there, [then] decided to walk from b to c.  Or I decided to walk from a to c, and did**.  In the former case, I was walking from a to b, and then I was walking from b to c.  But **only in the latter case**, not in the former, **was I walking from a to c.  As a movement, an action is not an aggregate, but a unity of phases.**

**And, that requires atemporal judgements – anything else can be disregarded at any moment which destroys motivation and culpability. Rodl 2,** Rodl I (Rödl, Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000)**[Because] judgments that represent changeable states cannot be the ground of an intention**, which is the principle of a movement. So the necessarily represented **[a] unity of ends must bear a different kind of temporality.** We shall now suggest that the relevant unity is a unity not of desire, but of what we shall call infinite ends. Just as the concept of desire, so is our concept of an infinite end defined by the form of a thought that constitutes adherence to it. As a man may desire noble things, so may his infinite ends be base, if base things figure in his thoughts of the relevant form. All-things-considered **[while desire] judgments join subject and action**-form **at a time.** An intention joins them progressively, guiding the progress of the action. If the representation of **an infinite end** is to **provide[s] the principle of temporal synthesis of an action [and]**, it **must [not] join subject and action**-form neither **at a time** nor progressively, but in a way that, metaphorically speaking, always already contains the whole of a temporally extended action. We shall see that **this means that its predication is time-general.** “I am getting my tools because I want to repair my bicycle”, I say. “Why do you want to repair your bicycle?,” you ask. “ I want to go cycling.” But why go cycling? It is healthy. Is this an instrumental syllogism? It appears so. Does not it represent health as an end and cycling as a means? It is true, we call **[for example if] health [is] an infinite end.** But it is an end in a different sense from repairing a bicycle; the end and what is done in its service relate differently in these cases. Infinite ends are time-general; this distinguishes them from desires. I may one moment feel like going to the movies, the next moment feel like staying home, and a minute later again think that going to the movies would be nice. But it makes no sense to say that, one moment, I cared about my health, was completely indifferent to it the next moment, and a bit later again cared greatly about it. If I want health, **then [health] manifests itself in actions at various times; wanting health is time-general and not tied to a moment.**

#### Action theory comes first –

#### 1. States of affairs only care about ethical decision making insofar as there is an entity and an action that is coherent enough to achieve that normative end. Every decision made is an action, even inaction which means the NC is inescapable.

#### 2. Culpability – To conceive yourself as the cause of your actions, an analysis of how one acts is a priori – otherwise we would never hold agents accountable since they would claim they were not an agent capable of generating an action with normative force.


#### I contend the aff violates the principles of action theory.


#### 1.The resolution is a passive statement – it doesn’t prescribe action but rather makes a value statement about justice so there’s no action to judge the morality of the aff by and u negate.

#### 2. The aff can’t generate an atemporal obligation because it is contingent on empirical circumstances that the aff is currently taking place in (ie uniqueness)

# Case

## UV





## framing

**O/V:**

**[1] Jouissance is the greatest pleasure.**

**McAleer 17 - Graham McAleer, The Ethics of Fashion, December 9th, 2017** “Lacan’s critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism” [http://www.ethicsoffashion.com/lacans-critique-benthams-utilitarianism/] Accessed 11/24/19 SAO

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was involved in the founding of my undergraduate institution, the “Godless College,” University College London. Nonetheless, I have never been taken with his ethical thought. Benthamism or utilitarianism is, with Kantianism, one of the two most dominant ethical theories taught at colleges in the Anglosphere. I’m not sure it has the same hold in European universities; possibly because central Europe has an indigenous ethical theory, value ethics. I am far more persuaded by value ethics. The central dispute between Bentham and value ethics (Scheler, Kolnai, Wojtyla) is the original moral character of the world. Bentham thinks objects ethically neutral: only once an object/act/event is lifted into the moral calculus of the greatest happiness of the greatest number does it come to have moral bearing. By contrast, value ethics argues that what populates our world intrinsically bears value tones, discrete value textures that shape our ethical assessments. This position is also shared by Shaftesbury, Smith, and in my opinion, Hume. To this dispute, Lacan adds that the use of the greatest happiness principle is not the generous and altruistic act that Bentham, and his follower, J. S. Mill, believes. Pleasure scrambles any clean distinction between egoism and altruism. The utilitarian principle gains its user a secret satisfaction: “It is a fact of [psycho-analytic] experience that what I want is the good of others in the image of my own” (Seminar 7, Chapter 14). The core of my psyche is The Thing, the unconscious, a place of “unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee.” How to escape? Things are not so simple: I don’t altogether want to flee. This place is also the origin of my jouissance, the confused pleasure offered by a bewildering aggressivity. Bentham’s mistake is to think we have clarity about pleasure: that we can index our pleasure so as to understand the application of the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Seminar 2, Chapter 1). However, jouissance confuses me: I both want it, and not. Pleasure is deceiving and I am no good guide to my own pleasure. This is no mere pragmatic or epistemological problem: applying the principle well is not possible; pleasure is necessarily bewildering. What is The Thing we want, and flee? It is a place of vulnerability, where longing and violence entwine. Is escape possible? Sort of. In affirming what countermands aggression — the moral law — I do right by others, and therewith myself: I remove myself from the place of violence as I affirm the good of others. This is only ever a partial affirmation of the other. Altruism is also always egoism. And yet even my egoism is deceived: I do also want to affirm The Thing, the place of jouissance. Egoism would be to pursue my pleasure to the utmost but I recoil from my gravest identity: to make my pleasure gravid would also be to dig my own grave. Thus, affirming the other I surreptitiously affirm myself (egoism) and simultaneously deny myself (not egoism): I am neither true friend to others or myself. Benthamism is built on the least trusty worthy of foundations: pleasure.

#### [2] Reject the duty to extend human life. We cannot fulfill this project. One day the sun will explode - the futile attempt to save humans encourages us to destroy all that we consider to be sub-human.

Milligan 15 - Tony Milligan, PH.D. lecturer in philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire and specializes in ethics, in his 2015 book. [Nobody Owns the Moon: The Ethics of Space Exploitation]eec

And so, what I am suggesting here is that recognition of a duty to extend human life is above all a way of responding to a special bond to other members of our moral community and not primarily responding to them merely as members of the same biological species. A commitment of this sort, to a sense of moral community, seems to be in play when we criticize the special failures which are often involved in racism, anti-Semitism and similar forms of prejudice. Suppose, for example, I assert that the most extreme forms of the latter involve both false beliefs (about culture or biology) and a betrayal of humanity. By doing so I would not be suggesting that they involve a betrayal of our genetic similarity. Rather, I would be suggesting that they involve the betrayal of a deep bond which is made possible by various aspects of our shared biological nature but which might equally be made possible by the possession of some other biological nature and which is, in any case, an achievement of social history rather than a mere biological given. Should we then extend our conception of moral community beyond the human, so that it comes to include non-humans, that too might be a very good thing. Indeed, at any given time, we are already members of several communities and a community of fellow creatures may be entirely within our reach. However, communities of the relevant sort result from a shared history rather than from a community-forming decision. The strength and ethical significance of any particular bond is something which cannot be wished into existence or, indeed, wished away. (And it is precisely the latter which is the special mistake from which familiar prejudices evolve.) Two Objections In spite of all that has been said above, two important objections to the idea of a duty to extend human life may be difficult to ignore. One centers upon practicality and other upon over-estimation. On the side of practicality it may be held that, in this context, ought implies can. If we cannot actually do anything to significantly extend the survival of humanity then we cannot reasonably be held to have any such duty. And here, the difficulties of extending human life are both familiar and formidable. Yes, we could (and probably will) go to Mars and (barring extreme misfortune) we will establish a stable presence off-world and nearby on the Moon. Perhaps we will also establish a presence somewhat further away from the Sun, in the asteroid belt, among the moons of the gas giants. But this will still leave humanity doomed to extinction during the latter stages of our Sun's life-cycle. Reaching anywhere else and surviving will be difficult and perhaps to all intents and purposes impossible, because of the sheer immensity of space. Matters may simply not be within our control. The odds against our survival beyond the lifetime of our sun may not be good. In which case it may be seriously misguided to think and act as if we will have more time at our disposal than the limited time that we do in fact have. The difficulties of inter-stellar travel, the problems facing any attempt to construct an Ark to preserve human life elsewhere, may simply turn out to be too great. Indeed, at present, I am reluctantly inclined to suspect that this may turn out to be the case. However, this may simply be my own short-sightedness. I rather hope that it is and the hope may not be misplaced and it need not collapse into some manner of faith in the future. After all, prediction about the remote future generally fails. Based upon our limited human capacity to envisage the future in realistic ways (a human limitation in support of which we may appeal to two millennia of seriously misleading Utopian and dystopian literature written by some of the most intelligent humans ever to have lived) it seems reasonable to say that we are, again, in a poor epistemic position to know whether or not the spreading of humanity beyond the solar system will ultimately be possible. And if we do not know then, as a precautionary matter, it may be best to allow that survival and spread, on a cosmic scale, may be a possible outcome. And in this case we may indeed have a duty to fry and make it happen. Uncertainty about the long-range future of humanity may well favor acceptance that the claimed duty is a genuine duty. The second objection concerns over-estimation and more specifically, the way in which the endorsement of a duty to extend human life may promote an already damaging over-estimation of our human importance (damaging to the environment, to other creatures, to all that is not human). Carl Sagan once remarked that we are the universe's way of being conscious of itself.- Although we may understand what was meant, even here a form of species prejudice may be evident or at least risked. Unless we are to discount the awareness of other (already-existing) terrestrial creatures, the point is rather that we are the universe's way of being conscious of, or theorizing, itself as a universe or, as a cosmos (an orderly law-governed system). And this is slightly more accurate if rather less elegant. But perhaps we are no such thing. Perhaps there are many beings with similar or even greater capacities. What then would make us so special? To affirm the importance of humanity we might be thrown back solely upon humanity as a community of beings to which we happen to belong and to whom we owe special loyalties that we do not owe to others (although, no doubt we owe them something). But if we do so it may be better to focus upon our community being a good one rather than an indefinitely prolonged one. This same dilemma (familiar from Homer and Aristotle) may be present in the life of the individual: is it better to live longer or to live well? (Both, incidentally, opted for the latter.) If we are not unique, or at least if we are not an extremely rare sort of thing, it may seem better to accept that ultimately our community of beings will play out its limited run of time. Indeed, an acceptance of this might improve the quality of our ethical flunking just as acceptance of mortality by the individual human ma}' make their life less wasteful and misdirected. This too is a concern of a deep sort and one which is not easily disposed of. Yet, although deliberation of this kind may be deep, so too is our connection to humanity and the idea of a duty to humanity. Depth confronts depth and we are left with no guarantees about getting matters right. Yet in this instance the countervailing consideration draws upon the possible existence of other beings about whose nature we have no current knowledge and whose actual existence we cannot obviously presuppose.

## inherency

#### Asteroid mining is a fantasy. The moon is easier, tech lags behind, and a profit paradox makes it untenable

Dorminey 21 - Bruce Dorminey, Science journalist and host of Cosmic Controversy, Forbes, August 31st, 2021 “Does Commercial Asteroid Mining Still Have A Future?” [https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2021/08/31/does-commercial-asteroid-mining-still-have-a-future/?sh=16a48b071a93] Accessed 1/8/22 SAO

What happened to the space-mining industry? A decade ago, the mainstream media was full of articles about how mining asteroids for precious metals, metal composites and even rare earth metals would revolutionize the commercial space economy. There were grandiose plans to reap untold fortunes from near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), either robotically or even by sending private commercial astronauts to act as space miners. But there has been little action since. It’s precisely this kind of space hype that makes the mainstream public so cynical and weary of the best laid plans. How many times will we hear the mantra ‘it’s back to the Moon and then on to Mars,’ before anyone ever sets foot on the red planet? Much less thinks about mining Mars? Or reaping the riches from an accessible mineral-rich asteroid? “I think we all overestimated what could be done,” Jeff Kargel, a former U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) geologist who is now a senior scientist at The Planetary Science Institute in Tucson, Arizona, told me. There has yet to be any commercial mining reconnaissance and the idea of sending astronauts to reconnoiter near-Earth asteroids now seems antiquated. “I don’t think sending astronauts to an asteroid makes a whole lot of economic sense,” said Kargel, an expert on asteroid compositions. He argues that there’s not much that can’t be managed via robotics when it comes to mining water, iron and nickel, as well as platinum group metals (PGM)s from asteroids. The advent of small and very inexpensive cubesats are a potential major boon for the space mining industry, says Kargel. Most of these new-type spacecraft are spin-stabilized and don’t last long, he notes. But the basic idea of having very inexpensive spacecraft which can be mass produced are fortuitous for future asteroid mining efforts, he says. Can we do that in situ or do they need to be lassoed and towed back into some sort of cis-lunar orbit? Kargel has soured on the idea of moving asteroids for mining into low earth orbit or cis-lunar space simply because it would be extremely dangerous to tamper with such an object’s orbit. As for mining KREEPs (rocks containing potassium, rare-earth elements, and phosphorus) from the Moon? Kargel says the KREEP soils from the Moon would seem to be the better source because it’s extremely enriched in Rare Earth Elements (REEs). As for mining Helium-3 from the Moon? There’s been talk about mining Helium-3 on the Moon for the past thirty years at least and it still hasn’t happened. A decade ago, I was distinctly unimpressed about Helium-3 because it is tied to controlled nuclear fusion, says Kargel. But Helium-3's practicality is tied to national and international physics making big further progress, he says. Helium-3 mining would not be that hard or expensive, relatively speaking, says Kargel. But the energy market for it depends on needed further physics advances which seem potentially near, possibly this decade, he says. Although the Moon may offer commercial space prospectors a more immediate commercial space mining than asteroids, these potentially PGM-rich bodies still hold an allure for anyone in need of precious metals for potential use in the building of space architecture. By some estimates a 100-meter diameter metallic asteroid might contain PGMs worth as much as $12 billion. And if PGMs are ever imported back to Earth, as Kargel told me in a Forbes post nearly a decade ago, “Metals used sparingly because of their high prices would suddenly become much more available for applications that we might not even dream of now.” Thus, Kargel says that commercial mining of PGM asteroids may still have a future but refuses to put a date on when he thinks it will finally happen. It’s going to take an Elon Musk-type figure to either kill the idea or proceed with the idea, he says. Kargel says not only will asteroid mining require additional new advances in both spacecraft technology and launch capability, it will need someone with deep pockets to fund serious space-mining development in a way that enables them to absorb losses of billions of dollars year after year until the technology and mining operations can be scaled up to be profitable. Then unless the metals mined from the asteroids are only used for offworld construction and resources, there’s a potential problem with the economics of importing innumerable quantities of PGMs back to Earth. Paradoxically, what was extraordinarily precious may become extraordinarily cheap. While that may lead to new ingenious and more economical uses of PGMs on earth, it would probably make a space-mining operation’s balance sheet insolvent. If the PGM price per troy ounce is driven down on earth due to this new cornucopia of asteroid metals, says Kargel, prices for space metals would be driven down to such an extent that launch and space operational costs would again make space-mining untenable. “That to me is a conundrum,” said Kargel.

#### Asteroid mining decrease emissions

MIT Technology Review, October 19th, 2018 “Asteroid mining might actually be better for the environment” [https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/19/139664/asteroid-mining-might-actually-be-better-for-the-environment/] Accessed 1/8/22 SAO

But profit margins are only part of the picture. A potentially more significant aspect of these missions is the impact they will have on Earth’s environment. But nobody has assessed this environmental impact in detail. Today, that changes thanks to the work of Andreas Hein and colleagues at the University of Paris-Saclay in France. These guys have calculated the greenhouse-gas emissions from asteroid-mining operations and compared them with the emissions from similar Earth-based activities. Their results provide some eyebrow-raising insights into the benefits that asteroid mining might provide. The calculations are relatively straightforward. Rocket launches release significant amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The fuel on board the first stage of a rocket burns in Earth’s atmosphere to form carbon dioxide. For kerosene-burning rockets, one kilogram of fuel creates three kilograms of CO2. (The second and third stages operate outside the Earth’s atmosphere and so can be ignored.) Reentries are just as damaging. That’s because a significant mass of a re-entering vehicle ablates in the upper atmosphere, producing NOx such as nitrous oxide (N2O), a greenhouse gas that is about 300 times more potent than CO2. By one estimate, the space shuttle released about 20% of its mass in the form of N2O every time it returned to Earth. Hein and co use these numbers to calculate that a kilogram of platinum mined from an asteroid would release some 150 kilograms of CO2 into Earth’s atmosphere. However, economies of scale from large asteroid-mining operations could lower this to about 60 kilograms of CO2 per kilogram of platinum. That needs to be compared with the emission from Earth-based mining. Here, platinum mining generates significant greenhouse gases, mostly from the energy it takes to remove this stuff from the ground