# K

#### Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –

#### Fluidity- A) Differentiation - signifiers refer to other signifiers without having a final signified to relate to which produces a constitutive lack from the inability to reach true meaning. This instability forces us to form a world in pursuit of the lost gaps to fulfill the subject’s desires. B) Language is constantly changing- it’s contextually produced with respect to temporality and cultures because every individual indexes to language differently.

#### The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects the lack.

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

#### Prefer: A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place. B) Everything is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted. C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.

#### The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the known, the material, calculable. In an attempt to control the world around us, we sacrifice the very nature of knowledge itself while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life.

**Mills,** Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist, Process Psychology, [www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm](http://www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm).

When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

#### Capitalism sustains itself through the hollow promise of new innovations that will eventually allow humans to master nature. The aff’s drive to innovate by reducing patents plays into this fantasy and endlessly tries to fill the lack.

**Dean 17 -** “Still Dancing: drive as a category of political Economy” by Jodi Dean, Dept. of Politics, Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Žižek often describes Capital as Real. “The self-propelling circulation of Capital,” he writes, remains more than the ever the ultimate Real of our lives, a beast that by definition cannot be controlled, since it itself controls our activity. . .”32 The point is not that laws, states, policies, and practices play no role in enabling the paths capital takes. Nor is it that there is no difference between neoliberal capitalism and welfare state capitalism. Žižek is not saying that capitalism is an ahistorical, economic force that necessarily exceeds any attempts at regulation. Rather, **there is an excess of capitalism that persists through yet beyond its instantiation in production, consumption, and exchange**, its ideological manifestations in ideas of the free market, and the mathematical formulae and equations of economists.“**Self-propelling circulation” points to** drive as this Real of Capital, the “vanishing mediator” between processes of production and the abstract spectrality of finance. The persistent force **compelling capital’s ceaseless circuit and entrapping us within its unrelenting need to accumulate is the movement of drive as death-drive, a drive beyond life, balance, and efficiency and into the negativity of unavoidable destruction. This is the excess that cannot be controlled as long as capitalism exists,** the excess underlying capitalism in its different guises, **the perpetual push to accumulate, expand, and intensify, the endless circuit of creation and destruction, the inescapable drive to grow and profit that turns into devastation and loss.** Understanding Capital in terms of the Real of the drive expresses capitalism’s compulsive force without reiterating liberal and capitalist claims for an inevitable economic logic and thereby obscuring changes in capitalism. As Foucault discusses in his 1978-1979 lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, classical liberal economics emphasized free markets. If the state would refrain from interfering, fair prices and reasonable distributions of goods would result from individuals selfinterested transactions—Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand.” Should the state attempt to manage or regulate these transactions, however, it would inevitably distort them. In contrast, neoliberals stressed competition. Here the role of the state was to insure not free markets but free competition. At every level of society, **competition**—inclusive of the resulting inequalities— **was alleged to unleash excellence and productivity.** Over the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became clear that real existing neoliberalism involved neither free markets nor free competition. Whether one focuses on ongoing tariffs, subsidies, and restrictions in global trade, the exclusivity of most Wall Street deals, capitalism’s tendencies toward monopoly, the social and control conditions establishing many of presuppositions for what can be bought and sold, or mainstream economists’ own acknowledgements that the suppositions of their models don’t hold in real-life conditions, **the free market is a myth—with powerful effects. The myth may be a lie, but it still “formulates the truth of capital.”**33 Likewise, contemporary **financial markets might be blood-thirsty and cut-throat, but they aren’t competitive,** not if by “competitive” we imagine some kind of open contest with clear, fair rules, and not if we think that competition has disciplining effects. On Wall Street, the competition is between bankers for their salaries and bonuses, a mindset that rewards shortterm deal-making and the overall number of deals made, not the outcome of the deal for parties to it. Nonetheless, the fiction of competition expresses a truth of capitalism, what people believe, their sense of an unavoidable struggle over goods, resources, and opportunities that are necessarily limited and scarce. **The “winner-take-all” logic of transactions in the contemporary networks of communicative capitalism manifests the truth in the lie of competition. Capitalism doesn’t actually rely on competition, yet we have to describe it this way in order to formulate its effect on us.** When Žižek asks “beyond which point does competition break down and the winner take all,” he misstates the primary question. 34 Presuming an actuality of competition, he overlooks not just the differences between popular and economic notions of competition, but the way this ambiguity informs a new configuration of waged work. He passes over the practical impact of competitive fictions. In growing numbers of fields, more tasks and projects are conducted as competitions: those doing the work are not paid unless they win. People work for a chance at pay. Rather than having a right to the proceeds of our labor by virtue of a contract, ever more of us are in win/ lose situations where remuneration is treated like a prize. In academia, art, writing, architecture, entertainment, and design people feel fortunate to get work, to get hired, to get paid. The Obama administration has given “inducement prizes” a key role in its “Strategy for American Innovation.” Explicit in its goal of amplifying competition, the White House wants to use “high-risk, high-reward policy tools such as prizes and challenges to solve tough problems.”35 But who is in a position to take such risks? Only those who are already “the haves,” those with little to nothing to lose, those whose success does not depend on competition (even as competition is presented as what determines success). The prize as inducement does more than amplify the entrepreneurial risk presupposed in capitalist models of innovation; it alters it 10 such that the risk is distributed downward, transferred from the capitalist to the worker. Work performed may not be work remunerated. Winners get money; losers don’t. The only link between the work and the remuneration comes from the prize giver, who is now in the position of judge, charitable giver, and beneficent lord with no particular obligation to those who have worked. Work as a collective enterprise, with multiple conditions and participants, all of whom depend on the “prize” for their livelihood vanishes. Workers don’t even appear as workers; they are competitors, and then the winner and the losers. Most prizes involve an element of prestige, that “extra something” associated with a prize. Discussing the “extra something” provided by brands like Nike, Žižek notes a kind of impossible limit position: although the capitalist ideally would like to be able to sell just a brand name and “get money for nothing,” this is impossible “since nobody is prepared to pay for nothing more than a name.”36 More radical is the shift effected by a prize-based reward structure: workers pay to work. In the instance of one competition, appropriately called the “X Prize,” competitors “spent 10 to 40 times the amount” of the award. The material costs were transferred onto the ones doing the work; they paid to do the work. For writers, bloggers, artists, and film-makers, working for less than nothing, paying for work, has become a commonplace (bringing with it the elimination of growing numbers of print newspapers in the US and cuts in numbers of paid journalists). In the form of an explicit governmental policy depicted as a competition, prizes usher in a new and acceptable relation to work bringing with them a likely decrease in opportunities for contract-based work and work for pay. Insofar as prizes produce the one, the winner, they elaborate a form of exploitation and expropriation of the common particular to communicative capitalism—network exploitation.37 Complex networks are characterized by a particular distributive pattern, “power laws.” As theorized by Albert-László Barabási, under conditions of free choice and preferential attachment, nodes in a complex network will distribute themselves such that the top one or two get a lot and the majority get a little.38 Academic citations, book sales, movie tickets, blog hits, and the distributed labor of creating of apps for smart phones all follow this pattern, one described in popular media as the 80/20 rule or the “winner-take-all” or “winner-take-most” characteristic of contemporary capitalism. In these examples, the general field out of which the one emerges is the common. Without the work of the many, the one would not emerge. **Exploitation consists in stimulating the creative production of the field in the interest of finding, and monetizing, the one. Expansions in the field produce the one** (hubs are an immanent property of complex networks). Such exploitation contributes to the expropriation of opportunities for income and paid labor, as 11 in the examples of print journalism and university presses. Network exploitation results in a dewaging of skilled, intellectual labor. **Drive is the “vanishing mediator” between the one and the many, the winner and the losers, the hit and the long tail. It accounts for the way neoliberalism manifests competition without competition. On the one hand, many need to be compelled to compete, to play and participate; they need to act as if they believe that capitalism mobilizes competition in order to inspire creativity and generate efficiency.** On the other, not only do actual competitions redistribute the costs of work onto workers and eliminate direct obligations of employers to employees, but they also benefit those already possessing the material means necessary to compete, thus placing these material means as outside the very competitive processes that ostensibly produce them. **Competitors are thereby rendered oddly passive, not creative producers at all. Drive is the “third level” linking subjective experience and objective exploitation, the fact that the latter depends on the “objective deception” or lie of the former.**39 Differently put, drive is the name of this reflexive turning back round upon itself or passivity at the core of activity.

#### The aff’s nuclear deterrence focus recreate violence while envisioning a satisfaction of fiat. They craft infinite repetition and obsession with unifying the Real.

**Matheson 15** – Dr. Matheson is a former debate coach at Harvard University and a current candidate at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Center, His research focuses on intersections of rhetoric, media, and theories of psychoanalysis and deconstruction.“Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive” [https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537] // ahs em \*bracketed for grammar

It is worth noting that the Symbolic need not have a permanent structure either. Constellations of tropes are made durable, but not permanent, by what Lundberg calls “affective labor” and I have generally referred to as cathexis. That the belief in determinism persists in some quarters should not discredit the Real or the drive for unmediated experience (i.e., the death drive). Instead, it should highlight our tendency to mistake the durable but artificial structures of the Symbolic for some metaphysical truth of the Real, just as the Bomb is conflated with God. This is also why Lacanian psychoanalysis is consistent with the emerging set of ideas grouped together as speculative realism. Humanity mistakes its reality for the Real, and is only shocked into perspective when the latter is revealed by the inadequacy of the former. As Lacan wrote, To be a psychoanalyst is simply to open your eyes to the evident fact that nothing malfunctions more than human reality…nothing is more stupid than human destiny, that is, that one is always being fooled. Even when one does do something successfully, it is precisely not what one wanted to do. (Psychoses 82) The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. **Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is [has] “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality** (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. **We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened.** The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because **the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7** **The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration.** But it is only one part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. **We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes.** Instead, **the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction.** Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. **War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing** left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” **As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real.** CHAPTER 2: PLAYING WARGAMES [W]ar and business are conflicts resembling games, and as such, they may be formalized as to constitute games with definite rules. Indeed, I have no reason to suppose that such formalized versions of them are not already being established as models to determine the policies for pressing the Great Push Button and burning the earth clean for a new and less humanly undependable order of things. --Norbert Weiner, God & Golem, Inc. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate…everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using 74 counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. **Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice** (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us… First, the tuché, which we have borrowed…from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton…it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion**. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly 76 attempts to reach the chaos of contingency.** They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). **Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is** the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But **the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real.** In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). **Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition.** When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. **Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence**—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of 77 chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: **we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules.** Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

#### The institutionalized logic of fear precludes the possibility of a rational cost-benefit analysis of counterterrorist policies, and acts to pacify dissent and opposition to state security programmes. This leads to endless rights erosions and increased terrorism, turns case.

Jackson 15 - Richard Jackson, professor of peace studies at The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, in Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2015 “The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism” [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1009762, Vol. 8, No. 1, 33–54] SAO

The significance of the epistemological crisis lies primarily in its consequences for counterterrorism thought and practice – which are inextricably bound together and inseparable, in any case. That is, the epistemological crisis can be understood as generative of certain kinds of thinking, actions and practices. As Daase and Kessler (2007, 412) describe the process by which contemporary understandings of terrorism construct the basis for action: “It is the relationship between what we know, what we do not know, what we cannot know and what we do not like to know that determines the cognitive frame for political practice.” Or, as Zulaika (2012, 58) quoting Merton notes: “If men (sic) define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (1968, 475). Once the premises of the epistemological crisis have been accepted as true, and especially once they have been institutionalised and internalised, they then form the logic or cognitive frame for action. From another perspective, it can be argued that, once accepted and institutionalised, the epistemological crisis acts as a kind of policy paradigm, forming a central part of the “elite assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers” (Campbell 1998b, 385). Crucially, the epistemological crisis is not about individual or collective negligence or the personal failures of counterterrorist officials; those in charge of preventing terrorism are likely to be genuinely concerned, responsible individuals acting in what they perceive to be the best interests of society (Zulaika 2012, 52). Rather, counterterrorist failings and abuses are the result of the broader epistemic structures and conditions – the policy paradigm – under which officials are forced to think and act. Apart from the trillions of dollars and millions of people in the “security-industrial complex” who are currently invested in preventing the coming terror (see Zulaika 2012, 51; Baker-Beall and Robinson 2014), the first and most obvious consequences of the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism are all the fantasy-infused security practices and postures discussed earlier, as well as the extensive programmes of security theatre enacted at airports and elsewhere, the institutionalisation of the state of exception, and socially disciplinary practices such as mass surveillance, control orders, counter-radicalisation programmes, resilience initiatives and the like. Zulaika (2009, 18) argues that contemporary counterterrorism represents a form of thinking that resembles “the mental world of medieval witchcraft and inquisitorial nonsense”. Considering some of the magical realist thinking inherent in contemporary counter-radicalisation programmes (see also HeathKelly 2012a), including the official expression of notions of pre-crime, the concept of “risky citizens”, efforts to control words and images considered to be capable of infection, and more, such an assessment is entirely apposite. Another obvious and related consequence of the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is the institutionalisation and sedimentation of a politics of fear (see Jackson 2013, 2007). In an atmosphere of permanently “waiting for terror” and moral panic, threat levels are raised and lowered by officials, often on the basis of fantastical projection rather than hard evidence, and public fear is manipulated for electoral gain and the promotion of non-terrorism-related political projects. In the process, the interplay of knowledge and ignorance transforms a public fear of terrorism into a general and permanent epistemic fear (Zulaika and Douglass 1996), one which can be easily manipulated for political gain. From this perspective, the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is functional to political elites who can manipulate uncertainty and the underlying logic of the crisis for direct political and material gain. A third predictable consequence of the epistemological crisis in terms of risk management and preemption are the well-documented and highly destructive counterterrorist practices of preemptive war, the use of drones to kill terrorist suspects, torture and rendition, control orders and mass surveillance. For example, given that we cannot know for certain who the terrorist is, only that they certainly exist and are plotting mass destruction, and that we cannot take the risk that inaction will allow them to complete their mission, it makes perfect sense to include as many people as possible on any terrorist watch list. It is now known that in the United States, “More than one million names are included on secret lists of suspected terrorists maintained by the Obama administration”. While “people on the list are likely to be subject to enhanced surveillance”, not surprisingly in the context of the epistemological crisis, “almost half of the people on a key government list don’t have known ties to any specific terrorist organisation” (Lee 2014; emphasis added). Given the way that uncertainty and the unknown nevertheless create an imperative to act preemptively, it is perhaps surprising that many more people are not on the secret list. Of course, the reason for this is likely to be that virtually everyone is under surveillance anyway, as the Edward Snowden revelations demonstrate. A fourth consequence of the epistemological crisis is the many “false positives” (Heath-Kelly 2012a) produced by the moral imperative to act, even if “it turns out to be wrong”. Here we can note the hundreds of thousands of people killed in the invasion of Iraq aimed at preempting the “world’s most dangerous regimes… [from] threaten[ing] us with the world’s most destructive weapons”, as George Bush famously argued. Similarly, thousands of others have been rendered, detained, imprisoned, tortured, assassinated in drone strikes, or like Jean Charles de Menezes, shot to death in domestic counterterrorist operations. In each case, the moral imperative to act preemptively overwhelmed any caution which might have been engendered by uncertainty or lack of knowledge. Official calculations under the conditions of the epistemological crisis state that it is better to act than not act, even if it turns out to be wrong and leaves innocent people dead or injured. Similar logic applies to the greatly enhanced security measures across society, mass surveillance, de-radicalisation programmes, control orders, and the like, as well as efforts to curtail opposition and dissent in all forms, in case it proves to be the work of terrorists. Knowing that there are terrorists in our midst, but not knowing who they are or what they are planning, we are bound to watch everyone, detain anyone, secure everything, preempt attacks and prevent terrorist intentions from emerging in the first place. Another consequence of the epistemological crisis is that the symptoms – or the “signs of future threat”, as Martin (2014) puts it – rather than the deeper roots or causes of terrorism become the primary focus of action.6 That is, preventing the inevitable coming attacks becomes the main objective of counterterrorism, rather than the prevention of the circumstances and conditions that lead to terrorism in the first instance (Frank 2014, 333). This is both a consequence and cause of the taboo which prevents direct knowledge of terrorist subjectivity. It is also the result of rendering previous knowledge about terrorist behaviour obsolete, the fatalism of accepting that terrorism will occur whatever actions are taken, and the processes of knowledge subjugation about the kind of policies and circumstances which give rise to terrorism in the first place. In any case, counterterrorism efforts have become fixated on the anticipation of imagined future plots, rather than focused on the current actual threat and its causes (Mueller 2006). Finally, the epistemological crisis precludes the possibility of the rational evaluation or cost-benefit analysis and assessment, of counterterrorist policies (Mueller and Stewart 2011), and acts to pacify dissent and opposition to state security programmes. Instead, in a context bound by anti-knowledge and the unknown, speculation, imagination and counter-factual, unprovable knowledge becomes a substitute form of assessment, and the (non)victims of terrorist attacks that never occurred (but could have) are counted as evidence of success: Fighting terror is like fighting car accidents: one can count the casualties but not those whose lives were spared by prevention. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Israelis go about their lives without knowing that they are unhurt because their murderers met their fate before they got the chance to carry out their diabolical missions. This silent multitude is the testament to the policy’s success. (Luft 2003, 3)

#### The alt is to embrace the politics of a death drive. This is a crucial first step to liberation and a new form of subject formation that breaks free of a politics of repetition.

McGowan ‘13 “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) Accessed on 7/25/19 AHS// emi

In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional conception of progress always runs aground. Th is paradox must become the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and the source of our enjoyment.32 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various eff orts to reach it. The limit separating us from the good society is the very thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it. In place of this pursuit, a psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us from the good rather than toward the good itself. Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is what undermines all perfection. But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social order changes its very nature. Instead of being the burden that one seeks to escape, repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode through which one att ains satisfaction. Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence. Th is idea of politics lacks the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political energy.33 What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way 21 that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of global capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion and development. The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that psychoanalysis makes to political thought. But since it is a concept relatively foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like. Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political problems: the ineffi cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift repression. The two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that already exist and silently inform both. Th e wager of what follows is that the revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom. The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem of subjectivity. The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a barrier to it. A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 22 on society itself. Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not. This theory would inaugurate political change by insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature of loss. Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. It is through the death drive that the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition of the initial loss sustains this freedom. By embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. Rather than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.

#### No perms:

#### [1] Reject the logic of permutations- They sever the bonds between different theories and integrate them into new symbolic formations.

**Sondey 14** “Capital As Master-Signifier: Žižek, Lacan, And Berardi” William Sondey- A Thesis submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University for a Master of Arts Degree AHS//EMM

Berardi argues that the internal logic to semio-capital‘s and its various subsystems is one of recombination. According to Berardi, cognitive activity has always been the foundation upon which all human production is based, but to a lesser extent in industrial capitalism (34). In industrial production, the mind primarily served as the driving force behind routine muscle movements. However, in semio-capitalism, the need to innovate and communicate in a variety of languages and media increases the importance of cognitive capacity (34). Berardi argues that **cognitive activity within the context of the post-mechanical economy of semio-capitalism now follows a logic of recombination. Recombination is both a form of cognition as well as a mode of operation. It is the breaking down info-commodities into their basic elements, the organization of these discrete parts in new ways, and finally the construction of entirely new assemblages of data from these parts.** Recombination is fundamentally the boiling down of semio-capital‘s signs and symbols into their fundamental elements and the quilting of those elements together in a novel formation. **Examples of such recombinant elements include the ones and zeros of binary code as well as the four components that make up human DNA sequencing.** Both of these coding languages provide the constituent elements for human life and computer software just as the raw data elements of info-commodities provide the necessary coding for the construction of semio- capital‘s signs and symbols. **The logic of recombination is problematic according to Berardi because it is not dialectical** (149). **The constant re-articulation of elements in novel formulations results in the erasure of histories; there is no traceable linear progression of an element‘s existence. Elements are frozen in time in a sort of perpetual present until their bonds are radically severed and are integrated into a new symbolic formation. As such, recombination precludes the possibility of sustaining meaning as all elements appear in a static present without reference to other instances of signification.**

#### [2] Structural Abuse: No perms in a method v method debate. There is no plan to test competition with because the whole AFF is a plan. Combining methods meshes speech acts together in an arbitrary way which guarantees an AFF ballot.

# Case

### fwk

#### Jouissance is the greatest pleasure – k hijacks.

McAleer 17 - Graham McAleer, The Ethics of Fashion, December 9th, 2017 “Lacan’s critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism” [http://www.ethicsoffashion.com/lacans-critique-benthams-utilitarianism/] Accessed 11/24/19 SAO

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was involved in the founding of my undergraduate institution, the “Godless College,” University College London. Nonetheless, I have never been taken with his ethical thought. Benthamism or utilitarianism is, with Kantianism, one of the two most dominant ethical theories taught at colleges in the Anglosphere. I’m not sure it has the same hold in European universities; possibly because central Europe has an indigenous ethical theory, value ethics. I am far more persuaded by value ethics. The central dispute between Bentham and value ethics (Scheler, Kolnai, Wojtyla) is the original moral character of the world. Bentham thinks objects ethically neutral: only once an object/act/event is lifted into the moral calculus of the greatest happiness of the greatest number does it come to have moral bearing. By contrast, value ethics argues that what populates our world intrinsically bears value tones, discrete value textures that shape our ethical assessments. This position is also shared by Shaftesbury, Smith, and in my opinion, Hume. To this dispute, Lacan adds that the use of the greatest happiness principle is not the generous and altruistic act that Bentham, and his follower, J. S. Mill, believes. Pleasure scrambles any clean distinction between egoism and altruism. The utilitarian principle gains its user a secret satisfaction: “It is a fact of [psycho-analytic] experience that what I want is the good of others in the image of my own” (Seminar 7, Chapter 14). The core of my psyche is The Thing, the unconscious, a place of “unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee.” How to escape? Things are not so simple: I don’t altogether want to flee. This place is also the origin of my jouissance, the confused pleasure offered by a bewildering aggressivity. Bentham’s mistake is to think we have clarity about pleasure: that we can index our pleasure so as to understand the application of the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Seminar 2, Chapter 1). However, jouissance confuses me: I both want it, and not. Pleasure is deceiving and I am no good guide to my own pleasure. This is no mere pragmatic or epistemological problem: applying the principle well is not possible; pleasure is necessarily bewildering. What is The Thing we want, and flee? It is a place of vulnerability, where longing and violence entwine. Is escape possible? Sort of. In affirming what countermands aggression — the moral law — I do right by others, and therewith myself: I remove myself from the place of violence as I affirm the good of others. This is only ever a partial affirmation of the other. Altruism is also always egoism. And yet even my egoism is deceived: I do also want to affirm The Thing, the place of jouissance. Egoism would be to pursue my pleasure to the utmost but I recoil from my gravest identity: to make my pleasure gravid would also be to dig my own grave. Thus, affirming the other I surreptitiously affirm myself (egoism) and simultaneously deny myself (not egoism): I am neither true friend to others or myself. Benthamism is built on the least trusty worthy of foundations: pleasure.