## k

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the best strategy to combat oppression. This provides both sides reciprocal access to generating liberation strategies and outweighs the aff ROB on scope.

#### The aff replicates anthropocentrism by discounting the onto-epistemological power of outer space

Ferrando 16 - Francesca Ferrando, Liberal Studies Program, New York University, in the Book “The Ethics of Space Exploration” pgs 147-149, edited by Schwartz and Milligan, published 2016 “Chapter 10: Why Space Migration Must Be Posthuman” [Space and Society, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39827-3\_10] Accessed 12/1/21 SAO

It is now time to consider the impact of space encountering on human identity and existential insights, by delving into the specific change of perspective brought along by space traveling. This radical shift, known as the overview effect, consists of a series of epiphanies experienced by astronauts looking at the Earth from outer space. In his book The Overview Effect: Space exploration and human evolution (1998), Frank White relates such a shift in consciousness to that specific geographical perspective, stating: “Mental processes and views of life cannot be separated from physical location” (3). Humans are embodied beings; their materiality is a process supported and deeply affected by their surroundings. White further asserts this point by emphasizing the fact that the astronauts in Earth orbits and the lunar astronauts have different types of epiphanies: “The orbital astronaut sees the Earth as huge and himself or herself as less significant. The lunar astronaut sees the Earth as small and feels the awesome grandeur of the entire universe…Both programs change the astronaut’s perception of the Earth and of his or her own identity, but in quite different ways” (ibid., 36). To White, the overview effect is so significant, that he affirms: “It is possible to grasp the true implications of this evolutionary process only by seeing it from the viewpoint of the universe as a whole, and from that perspective, the Overview Effect may point to humankind’s purpose as a species” (ibid., 5). The overview effect is of key importance to space ethics, allowing us to approach the topic of space migration not only from the usual utilitarian perspective, but also from an onto-epistemological standpoint: resonating with Heidegger, space physically becomes “a way of revealing”. 10.5 Conclusions The affects and effects of space travel are life-changing, as Valentina Tereshkova remarks: “As soon as I begin staring into the starry ways in the sky, I physically realize how close they are. Those who have already been in space, yearn with all their hearts and souls to haste there again and again” (2015, 10). Tereshkova recently volunteered for a one-way trip to Mars, believing in a project which, even though not accomplished yet, may soon enough become actual. This chapter responds to the urgency for reflecting on the large-scale ethical implications, socio-political challenges and technological preconditions of space migration. In the first section of this chapter we have demonstrated that in the ancient world astronomical insights had a direct impact on social events, architectonical structures and religious beliefs: knowledge of space was crucial to the understanding of the Earth and to the development of human civilizations. In the second section we have underlined how, in the space race, humans lost their ontological primacy. While humanistic categories such as gender, race, nationality, among others, are still affecting the practices of going to space, the anthropocentric ontological primacy of the human has been challenged. On one side, non humans animals were launched first and have preceded humans in space. On the other side, robots are better suited to survive to outer space conditions.28 Thirdly, space migration brings to the bioethical debate on human enhancement new terrain of discussion by addressing, among other controversial issues, the search for alien life and the possibility of creating hybrids and chimeras between human animals and non-human animals, who may be better fitted to live on planets other than Earth, with all the bioethical concerns that crossing such species boundaries may raise. In the third section we have highlighted how outer space cannot be thought separate from Earth: space technology is already causing space debris, an environmental hazard both for spacecrafts as well as for life on Earth. Space pragmatics should be revised by developing sustainable space technology in order to comply with the theoretical premises based on the “Outer Space Treaty” (1967), expanding the beneficial vision of space exploration and space migration, from humans and Earth, to non-human beings and non-human agents, including other planets, stars, natural satellites and asteroids, approaching outer space under specific environmental regulations. Space exploration and interstellar traveling are setting the conditions for a socio-cultural, bio-technological and geo-political evolution, which is radically challenging the notion of the human, of the cosmos and of life itself. From an onto-epistemological perspective, the narratives of outer space are feeding a posthuman paradigm shift by decentering the Earth from the center of the known universe, and placing hypothetical human and non-human beings on other celestial bodies; furthermore, space migration and the adaptation to extraterrestrial conditions may eventually bring along the evolution of posthumanities. Outer space represents a literal and physical place beyond anthropocentrism, Earth-centrism, biocentrism and life-centrism, although these discriminatory categories are reappearing in human activities and pragmatics in space: this is why space is crucial to Posthumanism as much as Posthumanism is necessary to space. Outer space can finally be seen as the becoming29 of the human, not only linguistically (as a “posthumus”, the etymological root of the term “human”), but also ontologically. Outer space has historically performed and continues to manifest as a way of revealing in the processual constitution of human and posthuman identities. Through a comprehensive analysis of past, present and future legacies, this chapter stresses the importance of adopting a posthumanist approach in space migration, in order to manifest, instead of old habits and new wars, desirable futures for humans and non-humans alike.

#### Foreclosing the failure of radical ecological and social arrangements in space cements the normative architecture of capital

Valentine 12 - David Valentine, Anthropological Quarterly, Fall 2012“Exit Strategy: Profit, Cosmology, and the Future of Humans in Space” [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/488890] Accessed 1/13/22 SAO

Should we take these cosmological accounts seriously? Recently, as I explained my attempt to do so to a colleague, he became very angry with me. He argued that the cosmological mission of NewSpace entrepreneurs can only be fantasy, and to treat it as anything else was intellectually and politically dangerous because it obscured the extractive and exploitative ideologies that are fundamentally at the heart of any capitalist endeavor. Giving a counter example, I noted that several of my interlocutors are concerned about potentially civilization-killing asteroids hitting Earth and that their plans are practical and non-fantastic in the sense that species have been eradicated by asteroids before, a possibility that exceeds the demands, fantasies, or time frame of capitalism. I mentioned the famous Tunguska event of 1908 where a comet or asteroid hit a remote area of Siberia with a force roughly equivalent to 1,000 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. My colleague himself exploded at this point: “capitalism does more damage on the face of the Earth every day than that asteroid did at that moment!” While I’m not sure whether he was accurate or how one might assess the material impact of capitalist endeavors in a single day vis-á-vis a large asteroid strike, his point is not to be ignored. Yet what struck me most about this argument is, again, the implication that Earth and its recent human history brackets the totality of human experience and of its future, and that the evidence of capitalism’s effects on the Earth relegates potential asteroid strikes or human settlement in space necessarily to the realm of fantasy. On the other hand, my NewSpace interlocutors see the assumption— on the part of most of the public, governments, and social critics—that the human future is constrained by the upper limits of the Earth’s atmosphere and by the time-span of modernity as itself a dangerous fantasy. In the words of one presenter at the 2011 ISDC: “Something is going to hit us, we need to survive. We have to convince people of that.” In this view, the Earth-bound gaze ignores Earth’s context in a broader environment of the solar system and assumes an historical context which spans merely hundreds rather than billions of years. They see history in terms of a species imperative to expand in order to protect life and intelligence by distributing humans across the solar system and even the galaxy (as shown by Olson and Farman in this issue). But they too assume that Earth-originating, historically-recent free market principles will underpin such expansion, even as some might imagine or hint at other social and exchange forms arising in the encounter with space. What I seek here is another kind of exit strategy: an escape from the assumption (whether rightist or leftist) that the encounter with space will simply produce a repetition, extension, or logical conclusion of history, human sociality, exchange relations or any other human phenomena that have emerged on the surface of our planet. From libertarian supporters of NewSpace endeavors, this requires following through on the radical promises they see offered by a future in space with an acknowledgment that the context of space may produce radically-different kinds of social and exchange relations. From those who see human settlement of outer space as a fantasy or a dangerous distraction from the realities of environmental collapse and capitalist excesses, this requires a willingness to engage seriously with the possibilities of space as a context for human futures. From both, it requires an engagement with contemporary human activity that is not already explained by the brief span of modern human history. Again, it is important to reiterate I am not proposing a contradiction between cosmology and capital. NewSpacers are excellent capitalists; they certainly want to make money, and they see market forces as key to the settlement of space. Concomitantly, other entrepreneurs have visions of the social good that their enterprises will bring about, and may find finance capitalism’s short-termism equally vexing and necessary to navigate. Yet, NewSpace is unique not only in that it encompasses diverse industry sectors, but more importantly because it envisions itself as shaping the total future of the human species and of life on Earth itself; in this way, it is cosmological. And again, these are not exclusive goals. Several of my interviewees have contested my characterization of a necessary tension between NewSpace entrepreneurs’ and investors’ goals. In interviews, people like Kollipara, whom I cited above, see a distinction between these goals but not a tension. For Kollipara, profit is both the proximal engine and purpose of NewSpace enterprises, and he sees the investment problems of NewSpace industries as natural problems of any nascent industry. But going is still the end goal: like most other interviewees, Kollipara was willing to accept my ticket to Mars, to abandon his Earthly wealth to be part of the vanguard of the human future. While the market is seen by Kollipara and others as the natural engine for this radical evolution of the human future, the two are not smoothly aligned, and one cannot fully explain the other. I conclude with another return: to the future. The very idea of “the future” provokes suspicion in anthropologists because of its suturing to the teleologies of modernity and capitalism. And “space” is the iconic site of modernity’s future. Yet, again, as Collins (2008) notes, if we accept that “the future” is necessarily the steady path of neoliberalism (or, alternatively, its overturning by a socialist revolution), aren’t we just buying into those very teleologies? In turn, if we don’t pay attention to the explicit utopian human futures of people who are powerful enough to at least set them in motion, are we not preventing ourselves from becoming involved in one of the emerging debates about what a human future should look like? To be sure, the future that NewSpacers envision is already known to them; like the anthropologies that Collins critiques, it is a future past, though in this case built on the premise of free markets, American exceptionalism, science fiction precedents, a valorization of colonialism, and libertarian principles and ethics. But if NewSpace is in a position to enact at least some of its cosmological visions, I am arguing we should engage with those visions in their own terms, and not foreclose them within the unfolding of a story that we already know (the eternal success of neoliberalism or the inevitability of an environmental and socialist revolution) so that we may engage with this future and the surprising sociality and exchange relations that may emerge from it. This requires taking these future visions of humans in space—no matter how apparently extreme— seriously, as a cosmology with teeth.

#### Alternative: Reject neoliberal determinism. Instead of embracing failure we must be attentive to the difference introduced by space as a critical project.

Valentine 15 - David Valentine is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Platypus, May 5, 2015 “Failure and the Future” [https://blog.castac.org/2015/05/failure-future/] Accessed 1/14/22 SAO

There’s nothing quite as satisfying for the modern as an historical prediction about the future, or about a large transformational project, that has—inevitably—failed. Whether as specific as predictions of particular technologies (where’s my flying car?), or as general as claims that market solutions will erase social inequalities (capitalism will eventually end poverty!), critical scholars have demonstrated that faith in a progressive future is fundamentally a political and ideological project of the modern era. But this satisfaction with modernity’s failures alerts us to the fact that we never-moderns still have faith in one kind of prediction, which is precisely the prediction of inevitability of failure of such transformational projects and their promised positive futures. Indeed, one could say that what we call the end of the modern or of history was inducted in this affective mode: an ironic stance toward now-faded modernist futures, their hubris and hopefulness simultaneously exposed as illusions of a progressive but failed modernity. This is nowhere more apparent than in critical approaches to the human conquest of space beyond Earth. The recent negative publicity about Mars One is a case in point. Announced in 2012, Mars One’s founder, Bas Lansdorp, proposed sending privately-funded, one-way human missions to the Red Planet with volunteer crews, enabling the establishment of a Mars colony by 2029. Lansdorp has argued that such a remarkable goal could be achieved using existing technologies and could be funded by media rights to what, he argued, would be the solar system’s most-watched reality television program. Mars One and its volunteer crew selection process garnered enormous interest in the press, on television, and online, but its previous media-darling status is now on rocky ground due to the revelations of a mission finalist. As such, it now appears as yet another fantasy of universalizing capitalist relations, dashed on the shores of technological impossibility and capital’s internal contradictions, leaving capitalism (and the human species) to face its consequences firmly on Earth and begin its atonement at the dawn of the Anthropocene, that is, the current, human-impacted geological epoch of Earth. In my six-year ethnographic project, currently in its final stages, on outer space settlement advocates and their visions of the future, study participants have also been privately predicting Mars One’s failure for years, though for different reasons than those of media and scholarly observers. Despite Mars One’s claims, the engineers, rocket scientists, and entrepreneurs who have been involved in the space settlement movement for decades saw the practical holes in this future plot line all too quickly. But the synchrony between these analyses of Mars One’s failure is not my point; rather, it is the differences between their opening premises and the consequences of those differences. What intrigues me is how the cracks in Mars One’s plans reveal differences in how to span the gap between past, present, and future for which, as Hannah Arendt notes, we are poorly prepared. Since her 1963 essay, The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, outer space has been, for scholars on the left, the site both of an ultimate dehumanization and of fantastical modern, technologized statecraft, distracting us from our imminent collision course with auto-extinction. Mars One stands as the latest example of such fantasy. For outer space settlement advocates, the multiple possible locations for humans and their ecologies in space—including on Mars—are the very promise of human futurity. Mars One, for them, is just poorly planned and resourced. The challenge I face in my current research and writing is how not to write off the futurity of my informants’ visions with a check issued by the urgency of the contemporary, for despite the long list of gaps in Mars One’s plans, there is a huge amount of labor and capital involved in better-planned visions for space settlement—so large that it would be dangerous to write off its effects, whatever they may be, as mere fantasy. Without discarding the important insights of Arendt and her intellectual descendants, my work is to take seriously both the engineering and scientific labor of my informants and the visions of the future that drive them. What is profoundly anthropological about their work is the requirement to take space not as an empty signifier guaranteeing the modern, capitalism, or the future, but as the location of real places (as Lisa Messeri has shown), as multiple kinds of nature to which humans may adapt themselves through technological interventions. That is, they take the difference of space not necessarily as a contrast to Earth or as a site of escape from Earth, but as multiple places that are also different from each other and that thus that require different kinds of thinking about what a future world might be. That attention to “world” and future must incorporate everything from gravity, air, light, and food to labor, race, gender, and exchange, to haircuts, proprioception, sunlight, and privacy. My query is this: What difference (to world, to future, to imagination, to science) is introduced by outer space that makes our critical tools inadequate for thinking about difference, relations, and humans beyond Earth? And might this difference, then, introduce a possibility for thinking futurity not simply in terms of modernity’s failed progress but along lines of multiple ways of becoming? That is the question with which I am grappling as I begin to write my book based on this research. Stay tuned!

# 2

#### Thus, the alternative: I am plagiarizing the 1AC. It’s mine. The aff has nothing left to bargain with. This is the best challenge to systems of property. We shatter the illusion of neoliberal control of knowledge production.

Froomkin 13 - David Froomkin, The Morningside Review, Published in Partnership with Columbia University Libraries, Columbia Undergrad Student, May 1st, 2013 “Plagiarism as Revolution, Concept as Content: Apotheosizing the Author under the Aegis of Appropriation” [https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/TMR/article/view/5441] Accessed 9/29/21 SAO

“Art is either plagiarism or revolution.” —attributed to Paul Gauguin In “It’s Not Plagiarism. In the Digital Age, It’s ‘Repurposing.,’” Professor Kenneth Goldsmith writes about his course “Uncreative Writing,” which explores the concept of authorship. His students study the Internet’s impact on the proliferation of plagiarism. Goldsmith observes that “the sheer penetration and saturation of broadband . . . makes the harvesting of masses of language easy and tempting,” going on to discuss new artistic methods facilitated by the Internet that rely on appropriating previous artistic works (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). In his course, Goldsmith encourages—and even requires—his students to plagiarize. Worried about the conventional and clichéd way in which creative writing is often taught, with students told that their job as authors is to produce works of originality, Goldsmith established his course as an alternative: We retype documents and transcribe audio clips. We make small changes to Wikipedia pages (changing an “a” to “an” or inserting an extra space between words). We hold classes in chat rooms, and entire semesters are spent exclusively in Second Life. Each semester, for their final paper, I have them purchase a term paper from an online paper mill and sign their name to it . . . Students then must get up and present the paper to the class as if they wrote it themselves, defending it from attacks by the other students. What paper did they choose? Is it possible to defend something you didn’t write? Something, perhaps, you don’t agree with? Convince us. (“It’s Not Plagiarism”) By making his students express themselves in words not of their own choosing, Goldsmith forces them to confront what constitutes authorial intent. Though they copy, they engage in the significant job of arranging. Even in choosing which paper to plagiarize, his students necessarily express themselves. Moreover, as they are appropriating others’ ideas, the aesthetic value of their products must derive entirely from the method of composition. “Uncreative Writing” proposes a radical redefinition of authorship for the digital age, which would make context the new content. Indeed, it suggests that even if it is impossible to create substantively original works, art may still derive its aesthetic value from its conceptual basis. To justify his project, Goldsmith invokes the example of novelist Jonathan Lethem, whose February 2007 article in Harper’s Magazine, “The Ecstasy of Influence: A plagiarism,” epitomizes the kind of patch-written project Goldsmith extols. There is not a single new idea in Lethem’s essay; instead, it synthesizes the ideas of a great number of authors—and indeed does so without obvious attribution. As Lethem’s title points out, his entire essay is a plagiarism. Goldsmith writes, In academia, patchwriting is considered an offense equal to that of plagiarism. If Lethem had submitted this as a senior thesis or dissertation chapter, he’d be shown the door. Yet few would argue that he didn’t construct a brilliant work of art—as well as writing a pointed essay—entirely in the words of others. It’s the way in which he conceptualized and executed his writing machine—surgically choosing what to borrow, arranging those words in a skillful way—that wins us over. Lethem’s piece is a self-reflexive, demonstrative work of unoriginal genius. (“It’s Not Plagiarism”) That Lethem’s finished product succeeds stylistically is unquestionable. Despite his almost complete reliance on appropriation, Lethem manages paradoxically to create a brilliant work of art by synthesizing his influences so beautifully. As Goldsmith points out, it is the conceptually elegant method by which Lethem crafts his essay that gives it its appeal. Goldsmith characterizes copyright criticism as the centerpiece of Lethem’s argument. “Echoing the cries of free-culture advocates such as Lawrence Lessig and Cory Doctorow, [Lethem] eloquently rails against copyright law as a threat to the lifeblood of creativity,” he writes (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Yet, Lethem does much more than simply criticize copyright. Lethem’s observation that all works of art embody their antecedents leads him to argue that copying is not only inevitable, but desirable. Many masterpieces owe their creation to artists’ inspiration by predecessors. Thus, Lethem questions the traditional conception of authorship, which rests on the assumption that creators produce works of unique inspiration (63). This assumption underpins Jane Ginsburg’s 2009 article “The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright,” in which Ginsburg, a Columbia law professor, defends the traditional view of authorship. In stark opposition to Lethem’s critique, she views copyright as vital in protecting this tradition. “Vesting copyright in authors,” she writes, “made authorship the functional and moral center of the system” (148). Ginsburg believes that authorship is the basis of a social system of value. Lethem’s argument for copying, she suggests, is an affront to authorship. To allow anyone to plagiarize an author’s work would be to reduce its value and thus be an attack on the author. Ginsburg worries that “the advent of new technologies of creation and dissemination of works of authorship not only challenges traditional revenue models, but also calls into question whatever artistic control the author may retain over her work” (148–9). The prospect of authors losing their creative control scares her, because she equates authorship with originality and fears the demise of originality. Ginsburg criticizes advocates of a free culture who claim that copyright “somehow degrades the noble calling of disinterested creativity” (152), labeling them “techno-postmodernists.” She writes: “If the author is dead, or must be dethroned, then the reader not only lives, but reigns supreme. Readers give meaning to the texts they peruse; reading itself becomes a creative act” (151). The postmodern theory supposes that readers rather than authors give meaning to texts today in the act of reading them. This would undermine the traditional concept of authorship by devaluing the role of the author. Ginsburg views techno-postmodernism as nihilistic because it challenges her value system. Ginsburg argues that “the Internet gives concrete effect to the postmodernist theory of reader as creator, for all readers can remanipulate the text, and none can impose unilateral significance” (151). As Goldsmith points out in his article, the Internet makes appropriation easy, which Ginsburg would argue facilitates the dethroning of the author. It would be easy to label Goldsmith a techno-postmodernist and to interpret his course as an attack on authorship, yet the opposite is true. By reimagining what the author can be in the 21st century, Goldsmith defends authorship against those who would devalue it. Ginsburg might see the goal of the course as manipulating text to expose a lack of “unilateral significance,” fitting with her thesis about readers’ replacement of the author (Ginsburg 151). However, Goldsmith’s course is concerned not with the role of the reader, but of the writer. It is not a course in techno-postmodernism. The “new writing has an electronic gleam in its eye,” but “its results are distinctly analog, taking inspiration from radical modernist ideas and juicing them with 21st-century technology” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Indeed, Goldsmith rightly rejects the nihilistic notion that authorship is dead. He agrees with Ginsburg that this is a theory under which “individual creativity is discredited” (Ginsburg 152). Rather, Goldsmith argues that the new literature is “a writing imbued with celebration, ablaze with enthusiasm for the future, embracing this moment as one pregnant with possibility” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Ginsburg’s account of the techno-postmodernists does not reflect Goldsmith’s argument: he suggests that by copying, writers can create works of aesthetic value—and that this is perhaps the only source of creativity left to artists today. Goldsmith is trying not to dethrone, but to inaugurate, the author. Lethem represents better the idea behind Goldsmith’s course; indeed, his theory defends postmodernism from charges of nihilism, reinterpreting what postmodernism means in the context of authorship. Lethem examines T.S. Eliot’s preoccupation with attribution, implying that it reflects a broader social paradigm. Lethem argues that this obsession with citation “can be read as a symptom of modernism’s contamination anxiety. Taken from this angle, what exactly is postmodernism, except modernism without the anxiety?” he asks (62). Lethem suggests there is nothing nihilistic about this postmodern approach to creation. Rather, he reconciles postmodernism with a concept of authorship, suggesting that authors may still create original works of art using techniques of appropriation. Copying, Lethem says, allows authors to “make the world larger” (65). This strongly implies that he has not abandoned the possibility of creating works of originality. In light of Lethem’s claim that appropriation reinforces authorship, it is possible to consider Goldsmith’s course a reaction to the supposed nihilistic reductionism of Ginsburg’s techno-postmodernists. Goldsmith’s seeming willingness to concede the death of originality proves chimeric, as he ultimately suggests that copying allows his students to produce work of incredible creativity. Goldsmith observes that his students will at first invariably react with horror to his instruction that they copy. Yet, ultimately, they reconsider their objections. Goldsmith describes how “after a semester of my forcibly suppressing a student’s ‘creativity’ by making her plagiarize and transcribe, she will tell me how disappointed she was,” not because her creativity had been stifled, but “because, in fact, what we had accomplished was not uncreative at all; by not being ‘creative,’ she had produced the most creative body of work in her life” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Goldsmith’s seeming dismissal of authorship is an attempt to reclaim it in an age in which, to many, it seems impossible to create a substantively original work. Indeed, Goldsmith’s article can be interpreted as an articulation of a fundamental principle of authorship: that creation is as much about methodology as about material—and, moreover, that through plagiarism his students elevate method to material. For Goldsmith, the “trend among younger writers who take [Lethem’s] exercise one step further by boldly appropriating the work of others without citation, disposing of the artful and seamless integration of Lethem’s patchwriting,” reveals that “context is the new content” (Goldsmith 3). Modern technology has created an aesthetic sensibility that considers appropriation an essential aspect of authorship. What matters is no longer what one says, but the mode of her saying it. Still to Goldsmith, the postmodern writer gains authorship by creating a work of aesthetic merit. Thus, in a world in which “long-cherished notions of creativity are under attack, eroded by file-sharing, media culture, widespread sampling, and digital replication,” Goldsmith’s course “rise[s] to that challenge by employing strategies of appropriation, replication, plagiarism, piracy, sampling, plundering, as compositional methods” (“Uncreative Writing” 1). “Along the way,” he writes in his syllabus, “we’ll trace the rich history of forgery, frauds, hoaxes, avatars, and impersonations spanning the arts, with a particular emphasis on how they employ language” (1). Goldsmith’s course thus focuses on employing language to express old ideas in new ways, which he believes permits new authorship. Yet there is an ambiguity at the heart of Goldsmith’s idea. Writing of the beauty of plagiarists’ products, Goldsmith concludes that “far from being coercive or persuasive, this writing delivers emotion obliquely and unpredictably, with sentiments expressed as a result of the writing process rather than by authorial intention” (“It’s Not Plagiarism”). Goldsmith seems to distinguish between compositional method and creation, the latter alone associated with traditional views of authorship. In this, he channels postmodernist French philosopher Michel Foucault, who argues that authorship is a modern concept, sure to wither away. Foucault claims in his 1969 essay “What Is an Author?” that “the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction” (Foucault 119). Thus, he argues authorship is a characteristic of, rather than requisite for, a work. Authorship matters to Foucault only because it affects the perception of a work. Foucault anticipates presciently the controversy over the disappearance of authorship. Moreover, he argues that “the author function will disappear . . . in such a manner that fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function according to another mode, but still with a system of constraint—one which will no longer be the author, but which will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced” (119). Foucault expresses the postmodern theory that claims that authorship will be replaced by a different lens through which to interpret text. Foucault does not address Ginsburg’s concern, shared by Lethem and Goldsmith, about the demise of originality, but another idea from the same essay may better reflect the postmodern development in authorship. Foucault advances the concept of “discursivity,” a specific—and heightened—form of authorship in which creators establish not only an idea but an avenue for ensuing ideas. “Founders of discursivity,” Foucault writes, “are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts” (Foucault 114). He gives as his examples Freud and Marx, who pioneered fields of thought. Perhaps the new aesthetic sensibility of the digital age extends the realm of Foucauldian discursivity to include all works that are plagiarized by the “techno-postmodernists.” These works spawn methodological progeny in a parallel fashion to Marx’s and Freud’s inspiring their heirs. If Goldsmith’s methods of appropriation can indeed be considered an extension of the realm of discursivity, then the very plagiarism that Ginsburg decries as defacing an original work instead uplifts it, giving the original creator’s authorship a discursive character. Viewed this way, Goldsmith’s process could heighten authorship itself. Lethem provides perhaps the best extension of Foucault’s theory of authorship. Asking whether “our appetite for creative vitality require[s] the violence and exasperation of another avant-garde, with its wearisome killing-the-father imperatives,” Lethem suggests “we [might] be better off ratifying the ecstasy of influence—and deepening our willingness to understand the commonality and timelessness of the methods and motifs available to artists” (67). Lethem proposes to end discussions of modernism and postmodernism, and instead to embrace methods of reuse as a definitive aspect of authorship. To do so would be to embrace the collaborative character of authorship in contemporary times. This is exactly what Goldsmith does in “Uncreative Writing.” By employing plagiarism, Goldsmith revolutionizes the concept of authorship, which he says derives not only from the substance of a work but also from its very composition. Like Ginsburg, he maintains that authorship still lives, but he differs from her in his rejection of the limited view of authorship which she defends. Instead, sharing Lethem’s view that plagiarism allows contemporary artists to create works of originality, Goldsmith expands authorship twice: once by recognizing the significance of appropriation and again by extending Foucault’s discursivity.

#### There is a doublebind – Either you think the K is wrong and ownership is good so you vote neg because they have failed to prove private ownership is bad, or you think the aff is true and its good to allow me to steal their intellectual labor because property rights are unethical and you vote neg because they have no arguments left in the round.

#### Evaluate arguments about the form of debate over content level arguments about the resolution. three warrants:

#### [1] Sequencing DA: Establishing ethical forms of debate is a perquisite to evaluating content. We have to agree upon what truth is before we evaluate the truth value of particular arguments

#### [2] Material Violence DA: Evaluating form gives the judge the ability to preserve debate as a safe space which is key to access and minimizing psychic violence

#### [3] Probability DA: Voting on content will not result in any legislative change in the real world. Your ballot can empirically shape practices in this space.

# 3

#### interp – the aff may only gain offense from the resolution ie that T the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. to clarify, pre-fiat offense is extra t.

# case

#### O/V

#### communism isn’t part of the aff’s advocacy text – abolishing property rights doesn’t mean suddenly we’re communist. terminal solvency deficit.

#### on beller:

[1] Information overload is inevitable but debate solves – we learn to filter through information.

#### [2] Attempting to construct meaning is inevitable – people want ideals to live by and thus we need to try to make normative decision making within that.

#### Turn: Nixon’s proclamation that “Gold is dead” marked the end of material labor relations. With no anchor to production the financialization of capitalism has made revolution impossible. Only the exacerbation of viral reactions solves through catastrophic collapse. Communism will fail.

Baldwin 15 - Dr. Jon Baldwin, London Metropolitan University, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, July 2015 “Baudrillard and Neoliberalism” [https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/baudrillard-and-neoliberalism/] Accessed 10/5/20 SAO

As would be expected of a thinker from the left concerned with issues of political economy, Jean Baudrillard’s work can be used to illuminate the machinations of geopolitical finance and the global economy. The most significant event to recently occur to this economy was the financial crash and crisis of 2007/8. A Baudrillardian reading of these events is the prime focus of the essay. Baudrillard’s work proposes that the origins of the crash can be found in the transformation of capitalism into a new form of hyper-capitalism, namely neoliberalism. As well this is the transformation of the economy into a financial simulacrum, namely a hyper-real economy. This article proposes that the suspension of the gold standard by United States President Richard Nixon in 1971 is the principal act of deregulation of the market. This fundamentally transmuted the nature of the economy. This ‘freeing’ of the market can be understood as a semiotic act, even a creative act, and is compared to radical movements in the arts. It is common to use the phrase gold standard to refer to a model of excellence or a foundation upon which judgement may be based. Postmodernity may be defined as an era that has lost such gold standard foundation. Nixon’s claim that ‘Gold is dead’ echoes Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim that ‘God is dead.’ Nothing is the same after this. There is no longer any possible morality of the market. The flow of capital is freed from any anchor to real wealth. We witness, as Baudrillard had fully anticipated, the virtual international autonomy of financial capital. Monetary debt becomes a mere paper promise and the world becomes more successful at creating claims on wealth than creating wealth itself. This is the play of floating capital. In this financial simulacrum money becomes a sign free of any reference to real wealth or production. When this simulacrum is exacerbated to the point of parody, the bubble bursts and crash ensues. The crash and crisis of neoliberalism can be seen to fully correlate with Baudrillard’s principle of exacerbation. The article begins by outlining the official and unofficial accounts of the crash of 2007/8. It suggests that capital is, to a certain extent, perpetual crisis. The move of the economy into neoliberalism and the discontent this facilities is remarked upon. The deregulation of the gold standard is a key moment in the move to a hyper-real economy. Analogies with post-modern architecture, music, literature, and poetry are made. These analogies are possible because, at heart, they all involve issues with the political economy of the sign. Indeed, in the early 1970’s Baudrillard had identified a certain correlation between Saussure and Marx on the semiotics of value. The deregulation of the gold standard is argued in the article to be central to the genealogy of the hyper-real economy. The implications of this are considered as well as consequences of the move to simulated finance and the virtual market. One outcome is the freeing of the economy and unlimited financial speculation. The trans-economics of speculation is argued to be exacerbated to the point of parody, and hence the bubble bursts. The article concludes with a discussion of the Baudrillardian motif of exacerbation. The world’s leading economies are in crisis and the harsh repercussions of the financial crash of 2008 are still being felt. The global financial meltdown continues and economic inequality has reached extremes not seen for a century. Business and government in their economic activity, commercial or military expansion, corruption, and surveillance are widely distrusted. Many people regret the consumerism and social corrosion of modern life. However the emancipatory activities of protest, activism, and both the traditional and radical left, appears already exhausted, ineffectual, and have yet to deliver**.** Less fortunate people in the west seem entrapped in a form of what Baudrillard would call Stockholm syndrome – expressing empathy for a system that does not have their interests at heart and which conceals gross inequalities of wealth, power, and opportunity. They seem content to accept exploitative and precarious working conditions, and the compensatory pathologies of narcissistic consumption (retail therapy), media spectacle (a thousand channels and nothing on), fantasies of status and advancement (the mythologies of advertising), and celebrity idolatry (the twittered selfie). Meek acceptance or resignation to a banal, materialistic, nihilistic society appears complete for some. Capital and affluent societies have always had waves of boom and bust – stasis and chaos – but what is crucial about the current financial situation is its scale. It is a global crisis and not regional like other previous crashes. It cannot be contained, assistance is not available from some other region, and austerity measures are already being met with civil disobedience. Dependent on one’s perspective, this heralds one of the greatest catastrophes of recent history or one of the most significant opportunities for radical change. Nobel laureate economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has proposed that the crisis – the fall of Wall Street, the revelation of the machinations of the bankers, and market fundamentalism – presents a legitimation crisis to capitalist society akin to the effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall upon communism. What was the catalyst for the crash? After decades of largely steady growth and expansion the global economy began to reveal signs of distress in 2007. On the 9th August BNP Paribas is the first major bank to acknowledge the risk of exposure to the subprime mortgage market and freezes three of their funds. Subprime lending is typically made to those who may have difficulty maintaining the repayment schedule. These high credit risk loans are characterized by higher interest rates making them lucrative to the institutions granting them. The chief executive of another major bank, Northern Rock, will later claim that this was ‘the day the world changed.’ In 2008 it became apparent that financial difficulty had snowballed and that the world was experiencing the onset of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Day by day there was the utter collapse of huge and household name financial institutions, the failure of core businesses, stock and housing market downturn, and decline in consumer wealth and economic activity. Global retirement funds dropped by 20 per cent in a single week. Economies worldwide slowed, credit was tightened, and international trade declined. Banks had to be bailed out by nation states to avert a meltdown on Wall Street. A number of causes and triggers of the crash were proposed with varying weight given by differing authorities. These involved a complex intersection of economic policies and deregulation. They include the encouragement of home ownership, the relatively easy access to loans for subprime borrowing, and subsequent overvaluation of bundled subprime loans, all of which assumed the housing market would continue to grow indefinitely. There were also questionable modes of trading by buyers and sellers, an ambition for short-term instant profit over longer term growth. There was a lack of adequate capital holdings by banks and insurance companies to support the financial commitments they made. An important distinction should be made here between the individual and the economic system itself. Often it is all too easy to scapegoat a few individuals for their failings in the attempt to present the financial system as essentially just and workable. Undoubtedly there were individuals’ idiosyncrasies within the system. There was blatant greed, idiocy, insider dealing, criminal activity, and escalation of little more than Ponzi schemes. There were dealers on cocaine, antidepressants, or anti-anxiety medication, which fuelled exuberance and the taking of risks one would normally avoid. Memorably, Tom Wolfe cites a study that discovered that “traders with unusually high levels of testosterone at the start of the trading day could be counted on to turn a profit by the day’s end.” However, when it came to sex “his demonstration rarely took more than 60 seconds. It went pump pump pump pump pump pump pump pump oo-oo-oo-oo-oo-oooouh uh oo agghhh and bingo – roll off, snore like a bear” (Wolfe, 2013: 19). Traders treated their customers with disdain, referring to them as ‘muppets’, ‘guppies’, ‘suckers’, ‘marks’, ‘sheep’, ‘chumps’, ‘lambs’, ‘baby seals’ (Ibid). But these were the only people actually providing ‘liquidity’, that is, ready money. Also worthy of consideration are the hiring policies of financial Human Resources departments with their tried and tested techniques for ensuring they only hire the most aggressive and money-driven of all their candidates, and their ability to weed out anyone with morals, restraint or empathy. Whilst there is an element of ‘human error’ to the crash ultimately focus should be upon the economic system itself, a system that churns out and feeds off such individuals. The U.S. Senate’s report, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, concluded that the crash was the result of “high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street” (U.S. Senate: Levin-Coburn, 2011). Concomitant with this, and to address and attempt to lessen the chance of a recurrence, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act regulatory reforms were adopted. This was an overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory system on a scale not seen since the restructurings that followed the Great Depression. The act attempts to increase regulation of banking and risk, increase transparency of markets (in particular derivatives), and protect consumer and insurance interests. There are further measures to increase standards and cooperation in accounting procedures and credit rating agencies. The ambition of the legislation is announced as follows: “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes” (Ibid.). Alongside the new regulatory measures there have been two dominant responses to attempt to lessen the impact and aggravation of the crisis. One is unprecedented fiscal stimulus such as institutional bailouts and quantitative easing – the printing of more money – to promote economic activity. Another has been the implantation of austerity measures such as public spending cuts, and certain tax increases. The general mood from western governments and big business has been one initial embarrassment and hand-wringing followed by an air of business as usual: the show must go on. There has been the regulatory patching up, the closing of a few loopholes, the making of some cuts here, and a stimulus of the economy there. The belief is that after several years, maybe even a decade or two, economic growth will return to the previous level and things will be back to normal. The masses must tighten their belts. They must accept the slashing of public spending, the shrinking of social protection, and an impoverished quality of life. They must accept the thwarting and regression of progressive change. They must knuckle down and ride out the storm while seeing advancement opportunities for their children dwindle to levels unknown for more than half a century. That is the mainstream official, Wall Street, version of events. On this account the crash presents no insurmountable obstacle to the ideology of free market capitalism. The crash is seen as just a blip. There is historical amnesia and myopia in this official vision. On the other hand there is a more critical view of the crash. Capitalism, its critics say, has always had waves of boom and bust. A boom fuelled by lending and private debt is always and inevitably followed by bust. Witness the recent bubbles in third world debt (1980s), the Asian meltdown (1990s), dot.com fever (2001), and property and mortgages (2007). On this view capitalism is perpetual crisis. The regular and cyclical nature of boom and bust is apparent in a broad historical overview of US economic activity. There were depressions in the 1830s, 1870s, and 1890s, and a financial panic in 1907: “It is interesting to note that all were immediately preceded by some kind of speculative financial boom that went bust, followed thereafter by the sharp and deep contraction of the real economy in the wake of the speculative bust” (Rasmus, 2010: 11). The crash of 1929 was a massive financial catastrophe chiefly caused by highly leveraged speculative borrowing. Hand-wringing and regulation followed such as the introduction of rules to stop such leveraged speculative trading by banks with customer deposits. Certain stability in the 1950s and 60s followed and there was no major financial catastrophe until the deregulation and removal of the aforementioned rules in the 1970s and 80s. Hence we arrive at another massive financial catastrophe caused in part by highly leveraged speculative borrowing. Again, this is being followed by hand-wringing and regulation. And so it continues like endless sequels to a film that was awful to begin with. As Marx and Engels had anticipated in The Communist Manifesto, “And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises?…by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises” (Marx, 2002: 184). What is crucial, however, about the contemporary financial situation is its scale. In the late 1990s Baudrillard had proposed that “what has triumphed isn’t capitalism but the global” (Baudrillard, 1998: 10). It may now already be a cliché and a form of wishful-thinking for some, but Christian Marazzi suggests that this is “one of the greatest crises of history” (Marazzi, 2011; 9). joseph Stiglitz has proposed that the crash presents a legitimation crisis for capital and should all but silence the most vociferous supporters of neoliberalism (the neoconservative supported vision of ‘capitalism on steroids’). This may well be overly optimistic but what remains significant is the fact that ‘capitalism’ or ‘neoliberalism’ is now emerging as the name of the problem rather than as something that seems obvious, the best, natural, or even inevitable. The term neoliberalism was originally coined in Europe in the late 1930s to suggest a new form of liberalism following the decline of interest in classical liberalism. It fell out of favour until recently whereby the meaning has shifted somewhat to embrace a host of related ideologies, mode of governance, and policy packages that are all favourable to a hyper-capitalism. There is a clear relationship with globalisation and imperialism. There are nuances but typically the political philosophy of neoliberalism supports total economic liberalisation, ultra-free trade, open markets with no geographic restriction, complete deregulation, and on-going privatisation. It would weaken and decrease the public sector in favour of the private sector. For its critic’s neoliberalism is a form of fundamentalism as crude and dangerous as any other fundamentalism. This market fundamentalism seeks market solutions and suggests competition as the answer to any problem. The competition, however, is not on a level playing field: it is won by those with connections and concentration of capital, founded on imperialism, slavery, theft, and lineage. The players take illegal short cuts, creatively cut corners, exploit others, and avoid tax payments. As with any competition it ensures that there are some winners but a majority of losers. This is at odds with the neoliberal claim that competition ensures the best outcome for all involved. A political economy has been established which ultimately only benefits a wealthy elite. Neoliberalism advocates the unfettered use of free market techniques and principles outside the spheres of commerce and business in the creation of new markets and interventions in non-economic areas and social space such as health, care, education, culture, energy, and so on. The basic premise is that everything will run better if run as a business. The neoliberal answers to the canonical questions of philosophy, such as ‘Why are we here?’ and ‘What should I do?’ are answered thus: We are here for the market, and you should compete. Neoliberals tend to believe that “humans exist for the market, and not the other way around” (Treanor, 2005). The human is defined as merely a potential entrepreneur, the middle-manager of their own life, which is seen as their own initial capital and enterprise. Neoliberalism perhaps makes sense only to those already holding the bargaining chips of economic power, or the poor souls who have internalised this ideology and definition of their finite time on earth in purely economic terms. Since the 1970s neoliberalism as a practical system of government has been implemented in various forms around the world often under the guise of liberal-democracy but in reality as variants of crony capitalism (a sprinkling of liberal legitimacy to dictatorships), corporatocracies (the corporate takeover of nation states), and unfettered and unrequested globalisation. The governments of Ronald Regan and Margret Thatcher, with big business whispering and tonging in their ears, are said to have done much to facilitate and disseminate such neoliberal ideology. A key resource for their ideas is Friedrich Hayek’s paranoid and unwarrantedly influential book The Road to Serfdom. Hayek argued that the trend, as he saw it, towards socialism and collectivisation occurring throughout the west in the 1940s was incompatible with freedom and democracy. The fear is of the growth of the state and variants of socialism. His ideology is perhaps best summarised by Ronald Reagan’s famous quip: “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’” Given the recent bank bailouts this rings rather hollow today. Thatcherism is largely synonymous with neoliberalism. The tributes that followed the recent death of Thatcher revealed how much of neoliberalism is now taken for granted even of the left of the political spectrum. One delightful piece of dissention was offered by Labour M.P. Glenda Jackson in a House of Commons speech which went against the mainstream of historical amnesia. She spelled out the disapproval of such neoliberalism for the general population of the UK. Thatcherism wrought “the most heinous social, economic and spiritual damage upon this country… We were told that everything I had been taught to regard as a vice – and I still regard them as vices – was, in fact, under Thatcherism, a virtue: greed, selfishness, no care for the weak, sharp elbows, sharp knees, all these were the way forward…[people know] the price of everything and the value of nothing” (U.K. Parliament, CM201213). Also typical in enumerating the social problems, growing populist reaction, and discontent of neoliberalism are the heartfelt words of a UK school teacher: “We train children to be successful, ruthless, greedy and selfish; our virtues are money, fame and looks. We do not reward kindness, do not value loyalty, we do not care about courage” (Griffiths, 2013: 11). The World Health Organisation has predicted that depression is on track to become the second most widespread disease, after heart disease, in the developed world by 2020. Oliver James (2008) posits a strong correlation between rising rates of mental distress and nations most advanced in neoliberalism. Our hugely increased wealth over the past half century has done nothing to increase our happiness. In fact not only does market capitalism have little impact on improving levels of happiness but it actually exacerbates certain types of mental illness. Rates of distress among women in the UK almost doubled between 1982 and 2000. This is also true of the US and in striking contrast with more egalitarian and collectivist countries. Capitalism itself, with countless boom and bust cycles, is fundamentally bi-polar, swinging from the hyped-up mania and exuberance of a boom to the depression and come down of a bust. The advocacy of cognitive behaviour therapy, James suggests, must be refuted as merely a sticking plaster for a sick society which encourages individuals to try to think positively rather than challenge the status quo. James describes the human being under neoliberalism as a passive, empty, anxious, isolated person for whom life has no meaning except work and who compensates for this through compulsive consumption. Our emotional malaise is a direct result of increased competitiveness, individualism, materialism, and the way that these exploit our insecurities. Selfish capitalism generates insecurity and inflates comparisons. A winner-takes-all competitiveness merely creates losers and a pandemic of low self-esteem. It offers only compensatory pathologies around consumption, celebrity, and status. The acceleration of neoliberalism is clearly a crisis in itself, and a back-drop to the actual crash. There will be numerous ways of telling the story of the crash and the ‘biggest bubble in history’ but at some stage all plot lines will converge to one place and one time: Camp David, Maryland, on the afternoon of Friday 13th August 1971. Here, in secret, Richard Nixon met Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns and other advisers. The backdrop was high inflation, and high unemployment. These were implications of the fact that since the mid 1960’s the US had begun to borrow enormous sums to fund Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ and the Vietnam War. In essence “the US began to live – and kill – considerably beyond its means” (Kunkel, 2012:23). To avert a run on America reserves Nixon announced the advice he was going to follow on television on Sunday 15th August, before the markets opened: “I have directed Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold … Now, what is this action – which is very technical – what does it mean for you?” (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?%20pid=3115%20#axzz%201UZnES7PMon). Indeed, what does it mean and what are the implications today? Previously the Bretton Woods system of international financial exchange had fixed exchange rates based on the US dollar, which was redeemable for gold by the US government at the price of $35 per ounce. This anchor meant that the U.S. was committed to backing every dollar overseas with gold. The dollar was anchored to gold and other currencies were anchored to the dollar. Paper banknotes in circulation carried the guarantee that they could be exchanged for a certain amount of gold. As gold is scarce, this put strict limits on the amount of money that governments could print. The suspension of the direct convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold ushered in the era of freely floating currencies. This is a move away from the strict post-Depression regulation of U.S. finance. The current world monetary system assigns no special role to gold; indeed, the Federal Reserve is not obliged to tie the dollar to anything. It can print as much or as little money as it deems appropriate. Nixon’s neat opportunism “changed the rules of world trade” (Auters, 2010: 35). and Slavoj Žižek confirms that the decision to abandon the gold standard for the US dollar “was the sign of a much more radical shift in the basic functioning of the capitalist system” (Zizek, 2012: 17). In semiotic terms Nixon suspended the relationship between a sign and its referent – in this instance money and gold. This disconnected the circuit between paper and bullion, and hence representation and the real. The implications following this type of divorce of sign systems from their referent (even if the relationship was always only ever idealist or utopian) underpin much of Baudrillard’s work. The implications of the loss of a core referent, or loss of a sign systems connection to a reality, are often discussed under the rubric of postmodernism. The much debated term was first used around the 1870s but gained wider currency in the 1970s. Following Nixon there is no transcendental law of capital and in many ways anything goes. There is incredulity to grand narrative of the modern, planned, regulated market. One can make an analogy with developments in the arts. Around the date of the ‘Nixon Shock’, July 15, 1972 at 3.32 pm to be exact, Pruitt–Igoe, a large urban housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, was given the final coup de grâce by dynamite and the first stage of demolition was complete. For architectural theorist and provocateur, Charles Jenks, this was the day modern architecture died and a new paradigm emerged: postmodern architecture. The destruction of the complex, typified by poverty, crime, and segregation, signalled the failure of public policy planning and is seen as a direct indictment of the ideals of modernism and of the society-changing aspirations of the International School. Modernist architectural form, planning, and space were meant to regulate good conduct and healthy behaviour. Postmodern architecture, for better or worse, is incredulous to such ambitions and has loss the gold standard and regulation of modernist planning. In music one might point to composer Arnold Schoenberg’s ambition of the emancipation of the dissonance. Music loses the standard of tonality and arguably sounds like the dissonance of emancipation. Literature loses the regulated contract between author, text, and reader with fragmentation, paradox, parody and questionable narrators. The work of art loses the divine and cult value. It is no longer the representation of a referent just as money is no longer a representation of gold or wealth. Religious and mythological themes, the portrait of the patron, the landscape, and the slice of modern life all dissipate. Art becomes a self-referential sign system playing with its own possibilities. Its referent becomes other art movements and as such becomes simulation. New Age spirituality is a quasi-sentiment of the ineffable freed from the dogma and rituals of the standard of institutionalised religion. In Baudrillard’s signature theory, reality itself becomes a self-referential system disconnected from the gold standard of the Real. Let us take a moment to stretch a tentative analogy with what happened in poetry and the deregulation of verse. The Oxford Companion to English Literature announces that “Verse in the twentieth century has largely escaped the straitjacket of traditional metrics.” Likewise we can say that ‘Economics in the twenty first century has largely escaped the straitjacket of the traditional regulated market.’ In England ‘free verse’ was initially a term of derogation before it became a battle cry, and today is more or less a neutral descriptor. Emerging at the advent of European modernism, the French term vers libre, first used by Gustave Kahn in the late 1880s, signified poetry free from the closed forms such as the sonnet, villanelle, or sestina, making very little or no use of traditional rhyme or meter. Kahn refused all legitimacy to traditional meter, seeing in it only a constraint, “an essentially political one – the inherited legacy of royal centralism and absolutism, put to work in servile manner” (Meillassoux, 2012: 22). Charles Baudelaire, with his focus on modern life in the city, also signals the freeing of poetry from strictly religious, mythological, or natural referents. There is no standard in terms of form or content that poets are bound or restricted by. For pedagogical convenience we can cite the myth of Arthur Rimbaud as pioneering these developments. The poet is raised to ‘seer’ with ‘verbal hallucinations’ and ‘verbal alchemy’ under the aegis of the theory that ‘inventing the unknown calls for new forms’. This is Rimbaud, in his own words, “exempt from all morality” (Robb, 2001: 194). Une Saison en Enfer was one of the first modern works of literature to show “that experiments with language are also investigations into the self.” Fifteen years before the vers libre made its official appearance in French literature, the idea that poems could be written without rhyme or metre “sounded like artistic vandalism” Ibid.). For Stéphane Mallarmé, Rimbaud was the sort of ‘attractive hooligan’ who could, and did, do “serious damage to French literature” (Ibid.). In ‘Crisis of Verse,’ Mallarmé will speak of the “exquisite and fundamental crisis” (Meillassoux, 2012: 21). occasioned by the emergence of free verse. The qualified acceptance of free verse is enabled insofar as “God had ceased, for the young Mallarmé, to guarantee the status of literary symbols” (Ibid.: 28). For verse, as the poet believes, there are to be no political or centralist constraints, no referents or standards, no morality, and ‘God has ceased.’ For the economy, as Nixon states, there are to be no political or centralist constraints, no referents or standards, no morality and ‘Gold is dead.’ For organised religion and philosophy, as Nietzsche states, there are to be no political or centralist constraints, no referents or standards, no morality, and ‘God is dead.’ If we have broken with these standards and referents of poetry, religion, and philosophy then it is because we have killed their guarantor and transcendental signified – God. If we have broken with these standards and referents of the economy then it is because we have killed their guarantor and transcendental signified – Gold. The ending of the gold standard may not be the single cause of the current crisis but it is certainly an enabling factor. In 1973 dollar-gold convertibility was abandoned once and for all. Enter now the play of borrowing and lending: all monetary debt since has been “mere paper promises” (Kunkel, 2012: 23). Overall indebtedness has grown faster than most national economies: “In the last forty years, the world has been more successful at creating claims on wealth than it has at creating wealth itself” (Ibid.). Marx’s circuit M – C – Mˈ (Money – Commodity – Money) becomes, as he anticipated, M – Mˈ (Money – Money). In likewise, fashion pioneer of semiology, Ferdinand de Saussure’s formula S – R (signifier and signified comprise the (S) sign which refers to (R) a referent) become S – S (Sign – Sign). That is, it becomes what Baudrillard will term a simulation, a self-contained self-referential sign system. In the financial economy money – a ‘paper promise’, a ‘claim on wealth’ – becomes a sign free of any reference to real wealth or production: a financial simulacrum. Economic referents enter into a play of self-generated signs abstracted from real value. In The Mirror of Production, Baudrillard summarises: “The sign no longer designates anything at all. It approaches its true structural limit which is to refer back only to other signs. All reality then becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structural simulation” (Baudrillard, 1975: 128). A financial bubble, viewed through a Baudrillardian lens, can be conceived as one such simulation. It is becoming routine in discussions of Baudrillard to note the uncanny nature of how his thought anticipates and seems to predict future developments: “the prefigurative qualities of Baudrillard’s writing are, now, self-evident” (Noys, 2012). Problems with the symbolism of the disentangling of the gold-standard are emblematic and the seeds of the current crash are planted in the early 1970s. Baudrillard notes, in 1973, that this process culminates in the ‘virtual international autonomy of finance capital’, in the uncontrollable ‘play of floating capital’. When financial capital is extracted from ‘all productive cautions’, and even from ‘all reference to the gold standard’, then ‘general equivalence’ becomes the strategic place of the manipulation: “Real production is everywhere subordinated to it. This apogee of the system corresponds to the triumph of the code” (Baudrillard, 1975: 129). Here, in a characteristic motif, the economic real (of production for instance) is subordinated to economic simulation: simulation becomes more real than the real (hyper-real). The code now becomes the greater political problem than alienation, exploitation, inequality, and so on. The financial simulacrum should not be taken as having no effect on everyday economic life: the code, the model, precedes the real. The economy is hence forth considered hyper-real. Elton McGoun uses Baudrillard’s notion of hyper-reality in his study of intrinsic value. The simulation-model and virtual market comes to determine the real economy itself: “decisions affecting production and employment are made on the basis of stock prices, and not on the basis of production and employment” (Elton, 1997: 113) The following conclusion is reached: it is not the ‘real economy’ that shapes reality but activity in the financial economy. “The financial economy is thereby more real than the real economy itself; it is a hyper-real economy” (Ibid.). This results in a financial simulation which consists of an exchange sphere without any reference to economic reality. It is an internal (virtual) exchange with no referent. The sophistication of the financial simulacrum tends to reduce the degree of materiality of the financial reality. Schinckus explains the evolution from commercial fairs to financial markets, whereby “the goods were not exposed anymore and the transactions (on paper) became symbols” Schinckus, 2008: 1086. Finance has largely abandoned its role of raising capital or supporting entrepreneurial activity (with subsequent variants of exploitation) and is now almost totally dedicated to speculation. Orléan evokes the ‘virtual character’ of finance to describe this disconnection with the sphere of production (Orléan, 1999). Schinckus uses Baudrillard to tease out some of the consequences of the move to e-finance and the technological virtualization of the financial market. The emergence of automatic trading and the creation of electronic financial products have profoundly modified the organisation of the markets and financial exchanges themselves. The ‘Iowa Electronic Market’, created in 1988, was the first virtual market where all interactions took place online. Oral negotiation has been superseded by an abstract sociability whereby traders only interact via computer screens. Wolfe describes traders “trying to monitor six screens at once, six screens that fan out three over three, obscuring any connection we have to the real world” (Wolfe, 2013: 27). This leads to a ‘screen sociability’ which sees traders “personify their screen by giving them a hypothetical personality” (Schinckus, 2008: 1081). Often stock market transactions (or rather risks) concern minute quantities, which may be just fractions of a per cent. But when these are amplified into quantities of hundreds of millions of dollars of shares these fractions soon add up. One might buy a stock (any stock, it is immaterial – and herein lies one of the very problems) to hope to inflate the general share price and then sell immediately and attempt to make an instant profit. Or vice versa, sell then buy. Wolfe cites an early example from the pioneer Edward Thorp: “He bets $332.5m – virtually one third of a billion – on selling a stock short – and bets another third of a billion buying the same stock to make a profit of one one-hundredth of 1%. Think of risking a total of close to two thirds of a billion dollars to make $2.5m! Sheer madness” (Wolfe, 2013: 21). One effect of the emergence of quantitative trading is that “It had nothing to do with any stock’s or bond’s value. It was a purely mathematical way to game the markets” Ibid.). One issue with this creation of a virtual market is the ambition to reach the idea of the ‘perfect market’ model seen only in economic theory textbooks. In this case, “the finance reality has become a “hyper-reality” i.e. the image of the theoretical reality that we have in mind” (Schinckus, 2008: 1082). One trend of this desire to develop ‘hard models’ in finance has been the rise of econophysics, whereby economists, physicists, statisticians and computer specialists endeavour to apply models seen and developed in physics to the market. In these instance financial quotations are studied as if they behaved, for example, like gas molecules. These models then actually shape the market by being transformed into computational algorithms to price or hedge financial securities with the belief that returns will behave like physical entities. One prominent simulation model, certainly influential in derivatives, has been the Black-Scholes formula published in 1973. This was meant to cut risk and scientifically legitimate the activities of options markets around the world. However, over-reliance upon the model, and its incorrect axioms (e.g. the presupposition of negligible probability of extreme price change) was said, by the likes of NassimTaleb and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, to spiral into the worldwide October 1987 crash. Capital freed from regulation has no obstacle to circulation and value radiates “endlessly in every direction” (Baudrillard, 1987: 25). Recently, trade in derivatives worldwide was one quadrillion US dollars, which is ten times the total production of goods on the planet over its entire history. This is one sense of what Baudrillard means by ‘floating capital’. There is no anchor in real production or wealth. Žižek has recently suggested that the stages in the predominant mode of money seem to obey the Lacanian triad of psychoanalytic concepts of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary. Gold functions as the Real of money (what it is ‘really worth’); with paper money we enter the Symbolic register (paper is the symbol of its worth, worthless in itself); and, finally, the emerging mode is a purely ‘Imaginary’ one – money will increasingly exist as a purely virtual point of reference, of accounting, without any actual form, real or symbolic (the ‘cashless society’) (Zizek, 2012: 101). Financial speculation is “without reference to production or its real conditions…it plays now on its own orbital circulation and revolution alone” (Baudrillard, 1998:1). One result of this is the ‘fictitious’ nature of wealth, as Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy suggest in The Crisis of Neoliberalism. For instance, income is withdrawn against asset bubbles, and there are claims made on future wealth that neither can, nor will, be produced. The signs engendered by the financial simulation cannot fully be converted into real wealth, as the market is currently experiencing. Duménil and Lévy make the case that neoliberalism has less been an ideological programme on behalf of free markets than a quest for more high income on the part of the upper classes. This goes against the traditional legitimisation of neoliberalism by positing old fashion greed against liberty and free-flowing markets. In true ‘trickle-down’ fashion, however, this quest for wealth and property also appeals to the middle-class and the poor. Subprime lending was the attempt to extend to ordinary consumers “through rising home prices [consumer debt, student loans, credit, etc.], a fictitious income long enjoyed by the financial classes. The scheme could hardly last” (Kunkel, 2012: 28). This is congruent with the claim by Angela Mitropolous and Melinda Cooper that the crisis was generated by “usury from below that extended beyond the limits which were tolerable to capital” (Noys, 2010: 46). This is to say that the growth of the bubble accelerated and inflated into what The Economist has called “the biggest bubble in history.” For Baudrillard, the crisis was an always already coming implosion impacted upon by the hyper-real economy and trans-economics of speculation. This is a flouting of the ‘law’ of value, of the market, production, surplus-value, and the’ very logic of capital’. The trans-economic develops into “a game with floating, arbitrary rules, a jeu de catastrophe” (Baudrillard, 2001: 1). Interestingly here, the crisis has come and traditional political economy has come to an end, “but not at all as we expected it to – it will have ended by becoming exacerbated to the point of parody” (Ibid.). The financial crisis has emerged, the bubble has burst, and we witness one of the biggest threats to capitalism and neoliberalism thus far, through the exacerbation of simulation. This has not come about through radical politics and not – as much as it would have been desirable to be agents of change – through critique, or dialectics, or rational discussion, or insurrection, or event, or act, or the deconstruction of political concepts, or long-term revolution, or instant revolt, and so on. Baudrillard’s argument is that we need to follow this process and exacerbate further the contradictions of the hyper-real economy to ensure its demise. If capital is now floating capital, then let us let it float away. This is the parodic, ironic, and ecstatic play of the processes often analysed under the rubric of postmodern. Regarding the crisis there is no transcendent critique at play but immanent implosion. This resonates with the theoretical manoeuvre that Benjamin Noys (2012) has identified as ‘accelerationism.’ Noys notes that there are those who argue for the need to ‘radicalise and deepen the tendencies’ that led to the current crisis: “The tendency now becomes the immanent radicalisation of capital’s own dynamic of deterritorialisation” (Noys, 2010: 51). For Baudrillard, this immanent implosion and exacerbation is “a way of putting an end to the economy that is the most singular in style, ultimately more original than our political utopias” (Baudrillard, 1998: 2). Ecstasy is the process in play rather than dialectics. The only revolution in things today is no longer in their dialectical transcendence (Aufhebung), but in “their potentialization, in their elevation to the second power, in their elevation to the Nth power, whether that of terrorism, irony, or simulation” (Baudrillard, 1990: 63). Baudrillard proposes that it is from the inside, by overreaching themselves, “that systems make bonfires of their own postulates, and fall into ruins” (Baudrillard, 2001: 6). This is the fate that arguably awaits the exacerbation of neoliberal capital. Rather than confront power, one must use power against itself. As Baudrillard cites as a preface in Forget Foucault, “As in judo, the best answer to an adversary manoeuvre is not to retreat, but to go along with it, turning it to one’s own advantage” (Baudrillard, 1987). In a methodological consideration Baudrillard writes that the only justification for thinking and writing is that it accelerates these terminal processes. “Here, beyond the discourse of truth, resides the poetic and enigmatic value of thinking” (Baudrillard, 2000: 83). Exacerbation is a radical form of Daoism, a going with the flow, not offering resistance but letting the power of the system destroy itself. This is certainly counter intuitive and a novel proposition but is perhaps better placed than the attempt to confront a vastly more powerful opponent head-on, or to attempt make an absurd system moral or regulated. Neoliberalism and its “democratic dictatorship is shaping up nicely,” Baudrillard claims(Baudrillard, 1997: 149). If this is the case then ultimately, for Baudrillard, we are to challenge this from the realm of the symbolic. The economic and semiotic system suppresses and is built upon the denial of the symbolic: one must “therefore displace everything into the sphere of the symbolic, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law “(Baudrillard, 1993: 136). Is this principle of exacerbation, which is witnessed in the escalation and overbidding of (‘primitive’) potlatch competition that Baudrillard frequently return to, going to be effective in the ruination of neoliberalism? It is at moments like the socio-economic present that we are most likely to find out.

#### Antirealist philosophy ignores that material reality can function outside of human interaction. The 1AC forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action

Bryant 13 - Levi Bryant gives a talk titled "Onto-Cartography: On Towards a Borromean Critical Theory" on YouTube - Transcript auto generated by YouTube, published on June 9th, 2013 “Levi Bryant on Object-Oriented Philosophy & Speculative Realism” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUxVKTg0RtI&t=2352s] Accessed 2/3/20 SAO \* lots of transcript errors tbh, I fixed all the underlined stuff I think -sao

Critical theorists argue that there is nothing in the referent itself that makes things what they are for society but rather that it is language discourse and practice that carves up the world in a particular way the social the political implications of the social constructivist thesis are obvious if it is true that signs are arbitrary which is to say that signs have no natural or mimetic link with what they signify and that signifying systems can carve up the world in a variety of ways and if it is true that how things are sorted into clients is ineffective the signifier of signified relation rather than properties belonging to the things themselves then it follows that justifications for inequality premise none claims about what is natural and intrinsic and therefore ineluctable and this is already a mistaken concept of I think that's been blown apart by Darwin but that's another discussion fall apart because it is language and practices that carve up the world in this way not the world itself that is structured in this way insofar as languages historical one has both across different languages and throughout history carved up the world in a variety of different ways there is no one way the world must be carved we could just as easily name our two doors workers and owners there is nothing in the doors themselves it dictates that people must be sorted to pass through them in one way rather than another rather what makes it door ladies is what Lucretia's have calls a byproduct of how we relate to these stores the critique of fetishism in the semiotic turn has us been profoundly important to emancipatory struggles in showing that certain social formations are the effect of our practices and how we signify things we undercut justifications for oppressive social relations that claim that things must be this way because they are natural but therefore people are merely occupying their intellect able and necessary social positions and in showing that these things are socially constructed that we are the ones who made things this way we open up the possibility of constructing alternatives jejak puts it being a king is an effect of the network of social relations between a king and his subjects but and here is the fetishistic misrecognition to the participants of the social bond the relationship appears necessarily in an inverse form they think that they are subjects giving the king royal treatment because the King has already himself outside the relationship to his subjects a king because if the determinations of being a king were a natural property of the person that framework that sees being a king as a natural property of being the being King also sees a buddy obedience to the king as just in legitimate by nature by contrast a theoretical orientation that recognizes that a king is only a king because of the social relations that make him a king caused him to question the legitimacy of the king sovereignity by one showing that it is weed that made Kings Kings that we can choose to rescind this on this our entity and organized society in different ways at the formal level similar arguments have been deployed against capitalism racism heteronormativity and patriarchy the basic operation of the CT or critical theory consistent unmasking essentialist theological and naturalist justifications for social systems premise and quality what delusive atari called state thinking demonstrating that in reality they are social constructions that unjustly defend the privilege of a few and that are capable of being otherwise okay so the dangers of SR in the limits of critical theory I think there are dangers speculative realism in light of the foregoing we can see why the apparently abstract concerns of speculative realism have generated so much controversy and politically oriented domains of the humanities through its critique of correlationism it doesn't you know this critique of fetishism is a form of correlationism and its defense of realism as our risks arguing that the key really is the king in other words critiques of correlationism the defenses of realism are not mere technical philosophical issues but have very significant political implications. radical emancipatory political theory has been correlational and anti-realist through and through in arguing that it is language and social practices that carve up the world Ct is correlational stood in that it treats categories were types as resulting from our discourse about the world Santee realist and arguing that types or clients that we attribute to the world male-female straight gay black white and so on are the result of social constructions of discourses and practices in our therefore not natural kinds seen in this light blanket condemnation blanket condemnation of correlationism risk undermining decades of hard won emancipatory victories in the name of justice and equality however before proceeding it is important to note that matters are significantly more complex in the foregoing suggests first many political critiques in the tradition of CT proceed on the basis of realist premises in other words that both show they both show that certain social categorizations are socially constructed and that they are based on false claims about our biology for example in seeking to demonstrate that male-female by that the male-female binary is performative or socially constructed Butler attempts to show how even biology does not support this binary this is a realist argument similarly when Stephen Jay Gould critiques eugenics in the miss measure of man he shows among other things how biology does not support the claims of the race theorists often it is realistic heels to the nature of human beings that we are plastic and that there are no significant genetic differences between men and women and people of different races that serve as grounds for the unmasking of fetishes practices fetishes practice bio and CT second it is not clear that whether or not one is a correlational store a realist is an either/or proposition it is possible to be a correlational stood out some things and realist about others the discussions of SR there's been a tendency to overlook the fact that CT has largely been concerned with critiques of social kinds while there are important examples to the contrary CT has largely been occupied with demonstrating that categories are kinds pertaining to human identities and how societies are organized or socially constructed in hacking has argued that if we are to understand these debates it's important to distinguish between interactive kinds and non interactive kinds an interactive kind is a kind that has the capacity to change the thing that it represents as such it functions as both a description and norm following Butler for example we can treat a kind like female as interactive when a person is categorized as female this category doesn't simply describe features that the referent assumed underneath it but also presents a normative script in defining how women ought to be in order to be women it is because women naturally have these properties the story goes that they are classified as women or it or pardon me is it because women naturally have these properties that they are classified as women or do women perform these things as a result of being categorized in this way interactive kinds change the social status of the person is assumed under them consider how becoming a professor or being characterized as mentally ill changes one's social status and legal status and the people subsumed under them adopt attitudes and practices towards these categorizations this suggests that that they denote not natural features but rather are socially constructed by contrast a non interactive kind such as being hydrogen changes nothing in hydrogen atoms unlike the person subsumed under the kind of being depressed who might begin to enact or perform symptoms of depression as a consequence of being categorized in this way hydrogen atoms don't change their behavior and properties as a result of being categorized in a particular way interactive kinds are reflexive in that they change what they categorize and we can adopt stances towards them while non interactive kinds are non reflexive it is possible to be a realist about some things in an anti realistic correlational step out other things debate surrounding SR need to be far more precise about these issues exploring questions of whether or not all kinds are natural whether some kinds are natural and others are constructed in determining just where we might draw the line where as far a risks undermining advances in global struggles by dismissing wide bodies of EMT realists critique well supported by homography sociology and linguistics CT has made it very difficult to address certain contemporary political questions. as we saw in the last section the gesture of CT consists of bracketing the referent so as to reveal the fetishistic misrecognition at the heart of essentialist social categorizations in the naturalization of certain types of social organization such as those found in patriarchy capitalism and heteronormativity this is led to a tendency to treat all political inequalities as discursive or semiotic into treat all political problems as problems of discursivity under this model of politics the production of political change consists in unmasking the fetishistic misrecognition upon which on just social relations are based there by disclosing the illegitimate see of certain social relations and opening the possibility for forging new social relations critical unmasking has been an extremely powerful tool in emancipatory struggles especially in struggles for gender equality racial equality fights against the monarchical power and struggles for sexual freedom but it's nonetheless problematic for two reasons first it is not clear that the power structuring social relations is solely discursive or semiotic in character features of geography technologies how infrastructure is arranged and a mean infrastructure very literally power lines roads waterways the number of calories a person gets a day mediums and channels of communication how time is structured in day to day life during the working day it networks and paths of distribution all contribute to the organization of social relations and function to reinforce from our relations the people might very well know that their circumstances are unjust that they suck that they're full of but have little option but tolerating but of tolerating them because the structuration of their geographical conditions allows for no alternatives CT tends to proceed from the premise that people tolerate unjust conditions because they have mistaken beliefs and that it is merely a question of revealing the untruth of these beliefs to produce change while ideology no doubt plays a significant and key role in sustaining unjust social assemblages this overlooks the role that things themselves play in organizing power second the basic schema of CT makes it difficult to raise the necessary political questions pertaining to one of the most important issues of our time global warming the political questions posed by global warming are of a different order than those found in traditional CT in practicing practices of debunking fetishistic Mis recognitions the tendency of CT is to reduce the world to deep discursivity or the semiotic well clearly fetishistic misrecognition plays a role in social practices to contribute and they contribute to global warming climate change also raises questions about the AL ito of the earth the properties of fossil fuels, the release of frozen methane gas in the tundra into the atmosphere the numbers of calories required to sustain global populations how those calories are gotten from place to place along highways the units of energy required to distribute those calories to produce them in run cities and holds the impact of various agricultural practices and so on these questions cannot be adequately addressed so long as we bracket the referent no responding to these issues requires realist or materialist ontologies that recognize the efficacy of things themselves in bracketing the reference in the name of the discursive discursively and semiotic lee constructed CT makes it difficult to even recognize these things as sites of the political okay so here perhaps the political opportunity of SR we'll see where it goes right I would like to suggest that SR at its best moments and it's had a lot of bad moments it's not a rejection or annulment of CTS critiques of fetishistic and this recognition premise on social constructivism but is a theoretical framework that both expands our understanding of what exercises power and social assemblages and what sites belong to the sphere of the political scene in this light SRS various critiques of correlationism the defenses of realism need not be taken as rejecting weak social constructivism but as delimiting the domain where these models of critique are appropriate and applicable while opening a space to recognize the political efficacy of things as well as opening new sites of political import where recognition of the real is necessary such as climate change from this vantage the problem with CT it's not that it is correlational still made such as monarchy sexual identities racial identities and ideology and so on that are indeed socially constructed in correlation instead it over states correlationism its tendency is to see all power as semiotic or discursive and to see all beings as effects of the signifier forclosing the role that non signifying entities play in exercising power or social relations in making it difficult to realize the real properties of non-human entities in the differences they make in the world by contrast the theoretical orientation suggested by some variants of s are the new materialist feminism's after network theory in the assemblage theory of Blues and Watari suggests a broader political theory and set of strategies that can be modeled on Lacan Borromean knot okay so the lucania bromine knot is free interlinked rings and they have the interesting property know one of the Rings being tied directly to another one of the Rings but if you cut or sever any one of the Rings the other two rings fall legs somehow they're connected without any tool from being directly connected and he names each one of these ranks after one of the three orders so we have the order of what he calls the meal which I rework in terms of the material the order of the symbolic just ended up or finished up parking bow and the order of imaginary which doesn't mean something that's merely imagined or fantasize it's a world of the images right and so we can place here neurology discusses the world not in terms of its materiality you know what biology or neurology might describe right but in terms of how we experience the world our body and objects in the world around us so in his final teaching Lacan flattens his three orders conceiving them as interrelated domains that are on all on equal footing without one domain over coding the others in Lacan - earliest teachings it was the order of the imaginary that was dominant in the second phase of this thought the order of the symbolic structured the orders of the real and the imaginary in the third phase it is the real that organizes the other two orders in the final phase we are to thank the simultaneous and synchronous interrelation of all three orders without one order over coding the other two orders the political theory inflected by s are the new material isms and after network theory yet sympathetic to CT would attempt a similar gesture the domains of the symbolic would retain the claims of traditional CT and we're going to constitute what we might call semio politics for the critical unmasking in deep debunking of discourses and narratives legitimizing various power relations and identities who appeals to nature divine orders and ASL or glasses the domain of the imaginary would be the domain of human and alien phenomenology exploring the lived experience of how humans encountered the world around them but also how various non-human such as animals bacteria plants technologies and institutions selectively relate to the world around them finally the domain of the real would be the exploration of those properties that really do belong to things and the efficacy things organize the efficacy of things working other things here my remarks must be brief and impressionistic but with Borromean critical theory now BCT new domains a political interim inquiry and intervention are opened for example we now learn that semio politics only tells us one part of the story of regarding power relations so under the symbolic you know semio politics which focuses on narratives discourses ideology rhetoric and ages and activities of debunking those things we want to retain all of that of course all right but a lot of this person and semiotic agencies play an important role in the form that the social relations take it's also true that all sorts of non signifying agencies pertain to the order of the real good fit in to contribute to the order or organization of social relations and power as well a difficult to pass a mountain range for example contributes to the form social relations that economy take not by virtue of how we signify the mountain but by virtue of what the mountain itself is premises on the real BCT would ask for additional forms of political analysis for our repertoire of theoretical tools so we get geopolitics which might not be the best term for me to use because when we talk about geopolitics we tend to think about global politics between nations here geopolitics would be something very literal it would be the features of geography such as rivers weather patterns mountain ranges and so on and the role that those play in organizing social relations and limiting the possibilities of people we would get infrapolitics in the domain of the real in for politics Thank You doc all right which would be politics that examines the features of infrastructure all right highways power lines fiber optic cables the accessibility of satellite technology for different sorts of people right so you know part of the reason that say a remote village in in Alaska is going to be the way it is because of its non relation to certain features of infrastructure and we have the domain of the real many accommodation of the real and the symbolic something that politics we have chronopolitics which is how features of time in the structuration of time during the working day and the responsibilities that people have limit their ability to engage in other sorts of activities right and so here are things such as fatigue are going to become real political issues that need to be addressed and probably - attention to these other domains bct would also open a space for perhaps unrecognized ways in which power functions to perpetuate unjust social relations while also existing in the invention of new strategies for political intervention geopolitics would explore the impact of features of geography the availability of resources ocean currents weather patterns local fauna mountain ranges rivers and so on on the form that social assemblages tank but would also investigate polluted political questions outside of questions of human justice and quality such as those posed by eco theorists and critical animal theorists with some notable exceptions the tendency of semio politics has been to restrict the political to questions of human justice and quality almost entirely ignoring the animal and the ecological of the site of the political we need new political categories and frameworks to raise these issues as figures such as Stasi alaimo Rosie Cortado calar Co and wolf among others have argued have all done an excellent job and beginning to develop within this framework infra politics would investigate the role of the technological and urban infrastructure's play on the structuration of social relations and power here we would investigate how ROS train lines the properties of various media such as The Telegraph the sort of power use contribute to the form that social assemblages Hank and how politics functions not by virtue of how we signify them but by virtue of what they are and how they're configured similarly we have another category here thermal politics thermo Tolliver politics will begin from the premise that in order for people to live for cities to run for production to take place and so on energy is required in the form of calories of various fuels moreover this energy must be produced to distribute it to be consumed so it converges with infra politics and of course the consumption of energy produces waste as its byproduct thermo politics would investigate how energetic concerns contribute to the form sexual relations take the impact of consumption and waste and the manner in which energetic requirements exercise power over life finally chrono politics would investigate how temporal constraints contribute to the structure ation of Strothers social relations and the perpetuation of oppressive forms of power and so in a lot of cases it might be that people you know to respond to rights question or to loosen quote Hardy's question or Spinoza's question even and why do people tolerate you know the oppressive conditions in which they live or I didn't one of the standard answers that CT has given us to a critical theory is because there do they have mistaken beliefs they're in the grips of an ideology right and if we just disabuse them of these beliefs they would no longer tolerate these conditions some of the issues might just be issues of time right that they wake up at six o'clock in the morning have to get their kids ready for school they go to a grueling horrible job for that day come home have to do chores all the energy they have left to do is to watch a really horrible reality television show and you know drink you know a glass of wild turkey and fall asleep in their chair as they watch this they just don't have any time available to be able to even think about something else and so time itself the creation of time for people comes up potentially emancipatory active in opening political thought to the domain of the real rather than restricting it to the domain of the imaginary and symbolic BCT promises to disclose unexpected ladies in which oppressive power functions and maintains itself both I'm asking new sites of political struggle and new possibilities of intervention at the level of therefore politics for example it's difficult to imagine the possibility of the Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street in the absence of the internet and social media such as Twitter and Facebook because prior to this information had to be transported through the channels to the news media or face-to-face encounters these new media opened the possibility of new forms of organization while also allowing emancipatory collectives to bypass party systems that were before required to disseminate and organize action due to infrastructure of limitations on communication the point isn't that these media cause these forms of political action that would be ridiculous but that they rendered it possible recognising that the material mediums of communication can render entirely new forms of emancipatory politics possible.

#### The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize.

Robinson 12 - Andrew Robinson, Ceasefire, August 24th, 2012 “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: From Revolution to Implosion” [https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-10/] Accessed 3/9/20 SAO

Baudrillard and resistance Last week, this column explored Baudrillard’s account of the collapse or implosion of capitalism. What does all of this mean for political resistance? For one thing, it means that the dominant system must continue to be opposed. For Baudrillard, there is always something missing from the code. It is always incomplete, leaving a radical remainder. The system is based on a split. The code is differentiated from reality. It has to be, to avoid symbolic exchange. It cannot achieve the complete inclusion which comes about with generalised reversibility. Yet the code tends to take over all of social space. Its “other” disappears or becomes invisible. It tries to be a complete system, a total reality. It largely succeeds in sucking intensity from social life. Yet it also remains vulnerable, because of the exclusion on which it is based. Baudrillard theorises resistance in terms of the irruption of the symbolic in the realms controlled by the code. It is something like what Hakim Bey terms the ‘return of the primitive’. We really need the dimension of the ‘secret’. Its forced revelation is destructive and impossible. The return of the symbolic is discussed in various ways in different texts. Resistance arises when subjects come to see their own programmed death in the accumulation, production and conservation of their subjectivity. They become fiercely opposed to their reduction to the regime of work-buy-consume-die. Resistance becomes increasingly nihilistic, in response to the programming of the universe. It becomes resistance to the code as meaning, and at the same time as lack of intensity. In seeking to restore intensity, it resorts to the modalities of symbolic exchange. The impossibility of “revolution” It is important to differentiate Baudrillard’s view from standard accounts of revolution. To be sure, this is the position from which Baudrillard emerges. In the early work, The Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard argued that the regime of the code could only be destroyed by a total revolution. ‘Even signs must burn’. Baudrillard’s early work can be read as a call for a Situationist-style overthrow of capitalism through a revolution in the everyday, which breaks the power of the code and of signs. In more recent works, Baudrillard rethinks this view. He claims that revolution is now impossible. Baudrillard makes this claim because of the end of production. Revolution was historically seen as the liberation of the productive energy of humanity from the confines of capitalism. But if production no longer exists, this kind of vision has no hold. Labour has become another sign. There is no tendency for it to liberate itself by moving beyond capitalism. Baudrillard is deeply critical of standard leftist responses to neoliberalism. He criticises revolutionaries of his day for seeking a return to the “real”. He sees this as nostalgia for the previous, Fordist period of capitalism. People seek to get rid of the code, and go back to the earlier kind of simulation. Or they seek to identify something which is not yet signified in the system and which ought to be – for instance, excluded groups who should be included. This actually ties people to the prior forms of the dominant system. For Baudrillard, the weapons of the previous period are already neutralised in the order of the code. Revolution is a casualty of the end of the period of system-expansion. Explosions and revolutions are effects of an expanding order. This expanding order is an effect of the regime of production. But simulation is instead an inward-looking order. It is ‘saturated’ – it cannot expand any further. As a result, explosion will never again happen. It has been replaced by the ‘cold’ energy of the simulacrum. Instead, there is constant implosion. The world is saturated. The system has reached its limits. It is socially constructed as dense and irreversible, as beyond the ‘liberating explosion’. Baudrillard believes that we are past a point of no return: the system can’t be slowed down or redirected to a new end. We are in a ‘pure event’, beyond causality and without consequence, and every effort to exorcise hyperreality simply reinforces it. These are little fractal events and gradual processes of collapse which no longer create massive collapses, but exist horizontally. Events no longer resonate across spheres. It is as if the forces carrying the meaning of an event beyond itself have slowed to a standstill. The London ‘riots’ or the student fees protests, for example, do not turn into generalised rebellions in Britain as perhaps they still might in Egypt or Greece. We are in an era of ‘anomalies without consequences’. But the system will nevertheless come to an end, by other means. Even if people can’t revolt, a reaction is certain. Explosive violence is replaced by implosive violence, arising from a saturated, retracting, involuting system. The system has lost its triumphal imaginary because of its saturation. It is now in a phase of mourning, passing towards catastrophe. Things don’t get transcended anymore, but they expand to excess. Baudrillard sees this as the culmination of a kind of negative evolution. Systems pass through stages: a loose state produces liberty or personal responsibility; a denser state produces security; an even denser state produces terror, generalised responsibility, and saturation. Beyond saturation there is only implosion. Anti-consumerism is another target of critique. Criticising consumer society for doing what it claims to do – for supplanting ‘higher’ virtues with everyday pleasures – is a false critique which reinforces the core myth of consumerism. Consumer society functions as it does, precisely because it does not provide everyday pleasures. Rather, it simulates them through the code. Baudrillard also criticises moral critique and scandal, such as Watergate. He argues that the system requires a moral superstructure to operate, and the revival of such a superstructure sustains the system. What is really scandalous is that capital is fundamentally immoral or amoral. Moral panics serve to avoid awareness of this repressed fact. Similarly, critiques of ideology risk reaffirming the system’s maintenance of the illusion of truth. This helps cover up the fact that truth no longer exists in the world of the code. Since there is no reality beneath the simulacrum, such analyses are flawed. It is now the left (or the Third Way) that tries to re-inject moral order and justice into a failing system, thereby protecting it from its own collapse. Baudrillard implicitly criticises theories such as Laclau’s, which seek to re-inject meaning and intensity into politics. For Baudrillard, this task is both impossible and reactionary. Baudrillard sees the system as creating the illusion of its continued power by drawing on or simulating antagonisms and critique. There is thus a danger that critique actually sustains the system, by giving it a power it doesn’t have. Trying to confront and destroy the system thus inadvertently revives it, giving it back a little bit of symbolic power. He also sees conspiracy theories and current forms of Marxism as attempts to stave off awareness of the reality of a systematic code. In any case, the energy of the social is simply a distorted, impoverished version of the energy of “diabolical” forces (i.e. of symbolic exchange). Baudrillard thinks that societies actually come into being, not for the management of interests, but coalesce around rituals of expenditure, luxury and sacrifice. Politics itself was a pure game until the modern period, when it was called upon to represent the social. Now politics is dead, because it no longer has a referent in reality. This is because it lacks symbolic exchange. The absence of symbolic exchange leads also to an absence of possibility of redistribution, either North to South or elite to masses. Fascism also resists the death of the real, in a similar way. It tries to restore in an excessive way the phenomena of death, intensity and definite references, in order to ward off the collapse of the real. Fascist and authoritarian tendencies revive what Baudrillard terms ‘the violence necessary to life’ – they keep up some kind of symbolic power. (Baudrillard’s Lacanian heritage is clearly shown in this idea of a necessary violence). Baudrillard has a certain sympathy for the desire to escape hyperreality in this way, but also sees it as futile. People doing this – both left and right – are trying to resuscitate causes and consequences, realities and referents, and recreate an imaginary. But the system deters such efforts from succeeding. Le Pen for instance is ultimately absorbed, as the mainstream integrates and repeats his racist ideas. This analysis could also be applied to various “fundamentalisms” and ethno-nationalist movements today. This kind of resistance is ultimately reactionary, seeking to restore the declining regime of signs. But it can only be understood if its basis in energies of resistance to simulation is recognised. It is because it channels such resistance that it is able to mobilise affective forces. Baudrillard’s analysis is here similar to Agamben’s view that the sovereign gesture is now exercised everywhere because of the rise of indistinction and indeterminacy. The paradox is that the performance of fundamentalism often leads back towards the world of simulation and deterrence. Such movements map symbolic exchange onto the state, restoring some of its reality, but ultimately contributing to the persistence of simulation. Resistance from inside the regime of power is impossible because of deterrence. Baudrillard suggests that it’s now impossible to imagine a power exercised inside the enclosure created by deterrence – except for an implosive power which abolishes the energies preventing other possibilities emerging. He also suggests that the loss of the real is irreversible. Only the total collapse of the terrain of simulation will end it, not a test of reality. A truly effective revolution would have to abolish all the separations – including the separation from death. It cannot involve equality in what is separated – in survival, in social status and so on. The strategy for change is now exacberation, towards a catastrophic end of the system. Baudrillard believes that the resultant death of the social will paradoxically bring about socialism.

#### The aff’s imagination of a “new communist horizon” is an envisioning of a utopia that will always fail and causes psychic violence.

Stavrakakis, 99 Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government @ University of Essex; *Lacan and the Political*, pg. 99-100 // ahs emi

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopia**n** meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat.The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

#### Turn: Material analysis results in over focus on production. This is why empirically communist countries tend toward ecological destruction which means you can’t solve the terminal impact. Marxist analysis is a false materialism that centers the human in all discussions of power. This forecloses emancipatory change

Bryant 14 - Levi R. Bryant in the book Onto-Cartography, published in 2014 “Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media” [https://www.euppublishing.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1394557044520/Bryant%20-%20Onto-Cartography%20-%20Introduction.pdf] accessed 7/31/21 SAO

The term materialism became so empty that Žižek could write, “[m]aterialism means that the reality I see is never ‘whole’ – not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it” (Žižek 2006: 17). This is a peculiar proposition indeed. What need does matter have to be witnessed by anyone? What does a blind spot have to do with matter? Why is there no talk here of “stuff”, “physicality”, or material agencies? It would seem that among the defenders, materialism has become a terme d’art which has little to do with anything material. Materialism has come to mean simply that something is historical, socially constructed, involves cultural practices, and is contingent. It has nothing to do with processes that take place in the heart of stars, suffering from cancer, or transforming fossil fuels into greenhouse gases. We wonder where the materialism in materialism is. We might attribute this to a mere difference in intellectual historical lineages – those descended from the Greek atomist Democritus on the one side and the critical theorists hailing from historical materialism on the other – but unfortunately, this perversion of materialism, this reduction to the cultural and discursive, has very real analytic and political effects. At the analytic level, it has had the effect of rendering physical agencies invisible. This arose, in part, from the influence of Marx’s analysis – who was not himself guilty of what is today called “historical materialism” – of commodity fetishism, which showed how we relate to things under capitalism is, in reality, a relation between people or social (Marx 1990: 165). Marx was right. When a person buys a shirt, they are not merely buying a thing, but are rather participating in an entire network of social relations involving production, distribution, and consumption. However, somehow – contrary to Marx’s own views – this thesis became the claim that things aren’t real, or that they are merely crystallizations (Marx 1990: 128) of the social and cultural. Based on this elementary schema of critical theory, the critical gesture became the demonstration that what we take to be a power of things is, in reality, a disguised instance of the economic, linguistic, or cultural. Everything became an alienated mirror of humans and the task became demonstrating that what we found in things was something that we put there. To speak of the powers of things themselves, to speak of them as producing effects beyond their status as vehicles for social relations, became the height of naïveté. This placed us materialists in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, we were supposed to be “hard-nosed materialists,” believing that everything is physical, that the idea or concept doesn’t determine the being of being as in the case of Hegel or Plato. Weren’t we supposed to turn Hegel on his head? Didn’t turning Hegel on his head entail showing that ideas issue from material relations, rather than material things issuing from ideas? On the other hand, our theorizations somehow led us to see discursivity, the concept, the social, the cultural, the ideological, text, and meaning – the ideal – as being the stuff that forms being. How had this happened? We went so far in our “historical materialism” that we even came to denounce all the findings of science and medicine as discursive social constructions (which isn’t to say these practices shouldn’t be subjected to ideological critique). The analytic and political consequences of this were disastrous. Analytically we could only understand one half of how power and domination function. The historical materialists, critical theorists, structuralists, and post-structuralists taught us to discern how fashion exercises power and reinforces certain odious social relations by functioning as a vehicle for certain meanings, symbolic capital, and so on. Yet this is only part of the story. As Jane Bennett puts it, things have their power as well (see Bennett 2010). Unfortunately, discursivist orientations of social and political theory could not explain how things like turnstiles in subways, mountain ranges, and ocean currents also organize social relations and perpetuate forms of domination because they had already decided that things are only vehicles or carriers of social significations and relations. Because things had been erased, it became nearly impossible to investigate the efficacy of things in contributing to the form social relations take. An entire domain of power became invisible, and as a result we lost all sorts of opportunities for strategic intervention in producing emancipatory change. The sole strategy for producing change became first revealing how we had discursively constructed some phenomenon, then revealing how it was contingent, and then showing why it was untenable. The idea of removing “turnstiles” as one way of producing change and emancipation wasn’t even on the radar. This was a curious anti-dialectical gesture that somehow failed to simultaneously recognize the way in which non-human, non-signifying agencies, structure social relations as much as the discursive. On the other hand, the shift from materialism to the discursivism of variants of historical materialism rendered it impossible to address one of the central political issues of our time: climate change. Thinking climate change requires thinking ecologically and thinking ecologically requires us to think how we are both embedded in a broader natural world and how non-human things have power and efficacy of their own. However, because we had either implicitly or explicitly chosen to reduce things to vehicles for human discursivity, it became impossible to theorize something like climate change because we only had culture as a category to work with. Having brought about the dissipation of the material in the fog of binary oppositions introduced by signs, there was no longer a place for thinking the real physical efficacy of fossil fuels, pollutants, automobiles, sunlight interacting with the albedo of the earth, and so on. Even among the ecotheorists in the humanities we find a preference for discussing portrayals of the environment in literature and film, rather than the role that bees play in agriculture and the system of relations upon which they depend.

#### Technological determinism is self-defeating and ignores social factors and diverse societies

Susen 19 - Simon Susen Department of Sociology, University of London, in the Journal Philosophy & Social Criticism, October 9, 2019 “No escape from the technosystem?” [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0191453719866239?journalCode=pscb] Accessed 9/22/21 SAO

A major irony of Feenberg’s book is the following contradiction: on several occasions, he criticizes, and distances himself from, technological determinism; key parts of his argument suggest, however, that he himself flirts with, if not subscribes to, technological determinism. He rightly maintains, and convincingly demonstrates, that ‘society and technology are inextricably imbricated’.240 This insight justifies the underlying assumption that there is no comprehensive study of society without a critical sociology of technology. Yet, to contend that ‘[s]ocial groups exist through the technologies that bind their members together’241 is misleading. For not all social groups are primarily defined by the technologies that enable their members to relate to, and to bond with, one another. Indeed, not all social relations, or social bonds, are based on, let alone determined by, technology. Of course, Feenberg is right to argue that ‘technologically mediated groups influence technical design through their choices and protests’.242 Ultimately, though, the previous assertion is tautological. This becomes clear if, in the above sentence, we replace the word ‘technological(ly)’ with terms such as ‘cultural(ly)’, ‘linguistical(ly)’, ‘political(ly)’, ‘economic(ally)’, or indeed another sociological qualifier commonly used to characterize the specificity of a social relation. Hence, we may declare that ‘culturally, linguistically, politically, and economically mediated groups influence cultural, linguistic, political, and economic conventions through their choices and protests’. In saying so, we are stating the obvious. If, however, we aim to make a case for cultural, linguistic, political, or economic determinism, then this is problematic to the extent that we end up reducing the constitution of social arrangements to the product of one overriding causal set of forces (whether these be cultural, linguistic, political, economic, technological, or otherwise). While declaring that he is a critic of technological determinism, Feenberg – in central passages of his book – gives the impression that he is one of its fiercest advocates. Feenberg’s techno-Marxist evolutionism is basedon the premise that ‘progress is realized essentially through technosystem change’243 – that is, on the assumption that, effectively, human progress is reducible to technological development. Feenberg is right to stress that ‘[t]echnical progress is joined indissolubly to the democratic enlargement of access to its benefits and protection from its harms’.244 ‘Concretization’,245 understood in this way, conceives of progress as a ‘local, context-bound phenomenon uniting technical and normative dimensions’.246 We may add, however, that progress has not only technical (or technological) but also economic, cultural, and political dimensions, which contain objective, normative, and subjective facets. At times, the differentiation between these aspects is ~~blurred~~, if not lost, in Feenberg’s account, given his tendency to overstate the power of technology at the expense of other crucial social forces. In other words, progress is not only ‘inextricably entangled with the technosystem’,247 but it is also indissolubly entwined with the economic, cultural, and political systems in which it unfolds and for (or against) which it exerts its objective, normative, and subjective power. The preceding reflection takes us back to the problem of techno-reductionism: The struggle over the technosystem began with the labor movement. Workers’ demands for health and safety on the job were public interventions into production technology.248 All struggles over social (sub)systems have not only a technological but also various other (notably economic, cultural, and political) dimensions. Demands made by particular subjects (defined by class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability – or a combination of these sociological variables) are commonly expressed in public interventions not only into production technology, but also into economic, cultural, and political systems. In all social struggles (including class struggle), technology can be an important means to an end, but it is rarely an end in itself. Put differently, social struggles are partly – but seldom essentially, let alone exclusively – about technology.

#### Turn: Technological data is key to decenter human oriented thinking which the impact – their criticism of cybernetics languishes in a tecno-skepticism that stalls out between post-modernism and the Anthropocene and dooms us to neoliberal capital.

Berger 15 - Edmund Berger, Deterritorial Investigations 4-1-2015 ["The Anthropocene and the End of Postmodernism available online at: https://deterritorialinvestigations.wordpress.com/2015/04/01/the-anthropocene-and-the-end-of-postmodernism/ accessed - 10-16-2019]cdm

There is an irony, then, that our ability to monitor and visualize the unfolding of Anthropocenic forces has come from the same forces that helped put neoliberalism itself into play. Early ecological modeling programs utilized DYNAMO, a programming language developed at MIT by a team led by Jay W. Forrester. Forrester, incidentally, had cut his teeth on computerized complexity at MIT’s Servomechanisms Lab, where he oversaw the research into the Whirlwind computer. One of the essential moments in the history of computational technology, Whirlwind was designed to aid in anti-aircraft firing systems during combat; it worked in conjunction with the SAGE project, which had its own incredible impact on both computers and the emerging economic infrastructures of neoliberalism.[12] Forrester, however, left the realm of the military-industrial complex and pursued the development of industrial dynamics – a complicated application of cybernetic theory to better enable streamline the relationships between production, supply-chains, consumer demand, and inventory levels. While industrial dynamics assisted firms first dipping their toes into the new world of global trade, it also provided Forrester with the tools to go to work on modeling ecological complexity.[13] Following DYNAMO widespread interest was to be found in the hallways of global governance in modelization technology, with both the United States and the United Nations generating their computer models for tracking environmental conditions. In 1978 the US’s National Research Council launched its National Climate Program, following the recommendations of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. A year later a World Climate Conference was held in Geneva; this spawned the creation of a World Climate Programme, overseen in part by the United Nations. By 1988 the trajectories of these institutions led the United Nations to establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As Paul Edwards discusses in his remarkable A Vast Machine: “With scientists from most nations and government representatives from 193 member nations, the IPCC is a genuinely global organization. It marks the institutional achievement of infrastructural globalism in climate science, the organizational backbone of today’s climate knowledge infrastructure.”[14] He continues: The IPCC does not conduct scientific research; instead, its purpose is to assess — collect, synthesize, and evaluate — knowledge about climate change, its impacts on people and ecosystems, and the options for mitigating its extent and adapting to its effects. To make this assessment, the IPCC solicits and compares virtually all of the most current research in climate-related fields. Thousands of scientists are involved, either directly (in composing the assessments) or indirectly (as reviewers, or simply as researchers whose work is considered during the assessments). Large teams of contributing authors, organized by smaller teams of lead authors, work to prepare each chapter of an IPCC report. IPCC rules specify that these teams of authors “should reflect a range of views, expertise and geographical representation,”and potential authors from developing nations are recruited aggressively. The 2007 IPCC report involved more than 500 lead authors and thousands of contributing authors from around the world.[15] Yet as Edwards makes clear, the knowledge of the Anthropocene organized by the IPCC and related institutions, relies on an incredible transnational network of computers, information sharing platforms, arrays of data-capturing sensors, remote monitoring stations, programs capable of taking this data and modeling atmospheric transitions, chemical processes, and the ways in which a shifting environment can impact the complexity of human society, with its own reams of infinite data. Climate science, he argues is a “global knowledge infrastructure”.[16] There are multiple reasons, beyond the immediacy of the Anthropocene itself, for why this is essential with grappling with at our current juncture. First is the question of “infrastructure” itself. All physical or even governmental and economic infrastructure in the postmodern world is produced or reproduced through the utilization of a preexisting knowledge infrastructure that more often than not comes to us through computerized modelizations that are themselves subjected to neoliberalism’s techno-economic paradigm. To begin grasping the dynamics of how to transition out of neoliberalism means to engage with the politics of infrastructure, and by extension, the knowledge infrastructure – the ways that knowledge is produced and organized in coordination with particular apparatuses. The second reason is that the global knowledge infrastructure of climate science stands in stark contrast to the global knowledge infrastructure of neoliberalism