# NC

**I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:**

**1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Externalism claims that some individuals have better ability to access the truth but that doesn’t explain how we deliberate between who is motivated correctly.**

**2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98,** Essay by David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, “Why Contractarianism”, within the book Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement. Book written by Peter Vallentyne [https://b-ok.cc/book/975363/60f3f7] 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa

Fortunately, **I do not have to defend normative foundationalism**. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that **we have**, ready to hand, **an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions**. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that **choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference**. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. **Since I do not believe that we have objective interests**, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; **we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations**. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? **We can say**, of course, that his **behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework**. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. **If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather**, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. **Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another**. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since **in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And** there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. **We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification.** There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For **an extramoral mode of justification is already present**, existing not side by side with moral justification, **but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self**. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that **moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.**

#### Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

### Offense

#### I negate that the appropriation of outer space is unjust.

#### [1] Banning appropriation prevents private entities from fulfilling existing contracts with governments.

Loren Grush, daughter of 2 NASA engineers so she knows whats up, June 18, 2019, The Verge, “Commercial space companies have received $7.2 billion in government investment since 2000”, [https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/18/18683455/nasa-space-angels-contracts-government-investment-spacex-air-force] mc

Early investments from a government agency, like NASA or the Air Force, can be a crucial step in the evolution of commercial space companies from scrappy startups to successful businesses. That’s according to a new report from Space Angels, an investment firm focused on the space industry, which quantified how much money government agencies have invested in private aerospace firms over the last 18 years. The analysis reveals just how important a role the government still plays in the private space industry. It found that early public investment can sometimes be the difference between life and death for a company. “I think it’s really important for people to recognize that it isn’t just the private sector deciding to do something,” Chad Anderson, CEO of Space Angels, tells The Verge. “The government has played a key role in the development of entrepreneurial space companies.” “THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SPACE COMPANIES.” Space Angels made the report at the request of NASA, as the agency wanted to know just how its investments over the last couple of decades have affected the private sector. Ultimately, Space Angels found that 67 space companies received a total of $7.2 billion in investments from the government between 2000 and 2018. And about 93 percent of that investment went into companies dedicated to launching rockets. “It’s no surprise,” says Anderson. “Government funding has been directed at reducing the barriers to entry, and the biggest barrier in the beginning is launch.” The report highlights SpaceX as a prime example of how early government investment contributed to the success of a company. During its first decade of operation, SpaceX operated off of $1 billion, and about half of that money came from government contracts from NASA, according to the Space Angels report. Musk notably thanked NASA for the agency’s support after SpaceX launched its very first Dragon cargo capsule to the International Space Station in 2012. “They didn’t do this alone,” says Anderson. “They couldn’t have done it without the help of NASA.”

#### [2] Forecloses the ability for future contracts.

**Christensen 16,** "Building Confidence and Reducing Risk in Space Resources Policy," Ian Christensen. Project Manager [https://room.eu.com/article/building-confidence-and-reducing-risk-in-space-resources-policy] // recut ahs emi

Like most areas of economic activity, **space resource** utilisation **business plans are based** **upon** the ability to access a resource, produce a product, service, or goods based from the resource, and produce revenue from that product based on established market activities. An economic system requires a level of regulation and oversight to ensure it functions. Regulation and governmental oversight is part of an overall market framework that provides stability and confidence in validity for commercial entities and those that invest in them. Just as the commercial companies are in the initial stages of developing and validating hardware, governments have begun to establish regulatory and policy frameworks. US President Barack Obama signed into a law in November 2015 a fairly comprehensive piece of legislation focusing on the development of the US commercial space sector, the ‘US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015’. One title of this law, Title IV - Space Resource Exploration and Utilization, has elicited considerable international attention. It authorises US commercial entities engaged in the recovery of space resources to possess, own, transport, use and sell space or asteroid resources obtained in accordance with US and international law. In layman’s terms, the Act makes asteroid mining permissible under US law for US entities. This provision has led many to question whether the US law violates the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the document which represents the primary source of international law governing space activities. At issue is whether authorising the use of space resources violates Article II of the Treaty, which states ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means’. The most prohibitive interpretation of this Article would suggest all **extractive** or consumptive **uses of space resources** on celestial bodies would be **prohibited**. An interpretation of this type **would have obvious negative impact on business** plans focused on space resources utilisation, **and** by extension the **security of investments** in those plans. However, opinion is consolidating around the interpretation that the US law is in compliance with the OST. Both the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) - the primary international professional society for attorneys in the space sector - and European Union (EU) officials have issued statements indicating belief that the Act is compliant. The Act itself contains an explicit disclaimer of extraterritorial sovereignty. In February 2016, the Government of Luxembourg announced its intent to develop a specific legal and regulatory regime focused on space resources. While the exact details of this legislation are unknown at this time, it is certain that it will be supportive of the legal right to access, possess, use, transport and sell space resources, as the policy is part of a broader initiative designed to attract space resources companies to operate from Luxembourg. While the question of how the US Act relates to Article II of the OST is not the primary focus of this article, the discussion does highlight the current role of political risk in the nascent space mining industry. Speaking at a panel in 2013, Bob Richards, CEO of prospective lunar resources company Moon Express, stated there was a risk in assuming governments will be supportive in defending space resources businesses’ rights to operate in space. He said: “We are making some broad assumptions and interpretations to existing treaties that were set up by governments in the past. We are assuming that commercial ventures will be allowed and there will not be some kind of international backlash.” **Signalling** this **support** - ie**, reducing political risk and establishing** the underlying frameworks to enable **activity** - is one reason governments enact legislation of the type represented by the US Act. Legislation and regulation is also a means by which governments ensure that they meet obligations to international agreements and treaties. In this regard the US law is as notable for what it does not include, as for what it does. Article VI of the OST establishes an obligation for states to be responsible for the space activities of their entities, including non-governmental actors such as commercial companies. It states, in part, that ‘the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty’. States typically respond to this obligation through national regulations, laws and licensing regimes. The space resources provisions in the US Act did not establish any elements of this regulatory framework, instead requiring the executive branch of the US government to deliver a report with recommendations (which would cover other activities in addition to space resources). It can be expected that the pending legislation in Luxembourg might also address a regulatory approach. This results in a condition of **uncertainty – or risk** – as the commercial entities continue to execute their business plans. The lack of a regulatory framework does **not** necessarily create an environment c**onducive to business** development. The current situation in the US is one in which the government has clearly signalled its intent to support commercial space resources development - but has yet to fully implement the regulatory framework to enable that support. The passage of the US Act, legislative action in other countries and the increasing activities of space resources-focused commercial enterprises creates a window - and a need - for additional action to define a regulatory scheme that reduces the political risk faced by the commercial sector while simultaneously upholding national obligations to the international legal system.

#### [3] Private appropriation is consistent with international law. No OST violation – sovereignty and private property are distinct.

Pace 11 (Scott Pace is the director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and former Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation at NASA. “Merchant and Guardian Challenges in the Exercise of Spacepower” Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Chapter 7, February 2011, National Defense University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch7.html, TDA)recut emi

Current international law recognizes the continued ownership of objects placed in space by governments or private entities. Similarly, resources removed from outer space (such as lunar samples from the Apollo missions) can be and are subject to ownership. Other sorts of rights in space, such as to intellectual property and spectrum, are also recognized. Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, however, specifically bars national appropriation of the Moon or other celestial bodies by claims of sovereignty or other means. It also says that states shall be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control. Thus, the central issue is the ability to confer and recognize real property rights on land, including in situ resources found on the Moon and other celestial bodies. In common law, a sovereign is generally required to recognize private property claims. Thus, the Outer Space Treaty, by barring claims of sovereignty, is usually thought to bar private property claims. Many legal scholars in the International Institute of Space Law and other organizations support that view. Other scholars, however, make a distinction between sovereignty and property and point to civil law that recognizes property rights independent of sovereignty.34 It has also been argued that while article II of the treaty prohibits territorial sovereignty, it does not prohibit private appropriation. The provision of the Outer Space Treaty requiring state parties to be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control leaves the door open to agreements or processes that allow them to recognize and confer property rights, even under common law.

#### [4] The aff is not in mutual self-interest because countries want to keep their own economies ahead of others. only privatization can spur that economic growth.


Edwards 09 (Chris, Director of Tax Policy Studies @ CATO Institute, M.A. in Economics, “Privatization”, February 2009 <http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/privatization>) recut mc


Governments on every continent have sold off state-owned assets to private investors in recent decades. Airports, railroads, energy utilities, and many other assets have been privatized. The privatization revolution has overthrown the belief widely held in the 20th century that governments should own the most important industries in the economy. Privatization has generally led to reduced costs, higher-quality services, and increased innovation in formerly moribund government industries. The presumption that government should own industry was challenged in the 1980s by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and by President Ronald Reagan. But while Thatcher made enormous reforms in Britain, only a few major federal assets have been privatized in this country. Conrail, a freight railroad, was privatized in 1987 for $1.7 billion. The Alaska Power Administration was privatized in 1996. The federal helium reserve was privatized in 1996 for $1.8 billion. The Elk Hills Petroleum Reserve was sold in 1997 for $3.7 billion. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation, which provides enriched uranium to the nuclear industry, was privatized in 1998 for $3.1 billion. There remain many federal assets that should be privatized, including businesses such as Amtrak and infrastructure such as the air traffic control system. The government also holds billions of dollars of real estate that should be sold. The benefits to the federal budget of privatization would be modest, but the benefits to the economy would be large as newly private businesses would innovate and improve their performance. The Office of Management and Budget has calculated that about half of all federal employees perform tasks that are not "inherently governmental." The Bush administration had attempted to contract some of those activities to outside vendors, but such "competitive sourcing" is not privatization. Privatization makes an activity entirely private, taking it completely off of the government's books. That allows for greater innovation and prevents corruption, which is a serious pitfall of government contracting. Privatization of federal assets makes sense for many reasons. First, sales of federal assets would cut the budget deficit. Second, privatization would reduce the responsibilities of the government so that policymakers could better focus on their core responsibilities, such as national security. Third, there is vast foreign privatization experience that could be drawn on in pursuing U.S. reforms. Fourth, privatization would spur economic growth by opening new markets to entrepreneurs. For example, repeal of the postal monopoly could bring major innovation to the mail industry, just as the 1980s' breakup of AT&T brought innovation to the telecommunications industry. Some policymakers think that certain activities, such as air traffic control, are "too important" to leave to the private sector. But the reality is just the opposite. The government has shown itself to be a failure at providing efficiency and high quality in services such as air traffic control. Such industries are too important to miss out on the innovations that private entrepreneurs could bring to them.

# theory

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – screenshots in the doc prove they don’t





#### 1- Open source does equal the playing field

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.

#### Fairness is a voter since if the rounds been skewed its impossible to determine who the better debater was. Education- constitutive purpose ie why schools fund. Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline 2. Necessitates judge intervention to see if we meet th brightline and 3 collapses because we use offense defense paradigm. Drop the debater on theory: 1. Drop the arg is the same thing since the argument was their entire advocacy text. 2. Its key to deterring future abuse No RVIs – a] illogical – fairness is a burden just like the aff has the burden of inherency b] norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms c] chilling effect – debaters are scared to check real abuse which means inf abuse goes unchecked d] substance crowdout – prevents 1AR blipstorms and allows us to get back to substance

# AC

## fwk

**Utilitarianism collapses into contractarianism.**

John J. **Thrasher**, Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University, Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April **2013**), pp. 423-436 ///AHS PB

**If** you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning (KD 25). **This goal of reasoning and action is the absence of pain** and the tranquility that comes from living without fear (KD 3).4 This kind of pleasure, ataraxia, is unhindered tranquility, rather than a sensation of active pleasure.5 It is a psychological fact, according to Epicurus, that we do actually seek ataraxia and that our lives go best, from a subjective point of view, when we pursue ataraxia. It is the natural goal of beings like us. If fear of the gods, death, and pain constitute sickness of the soul, removing those ailments constitutes its health. This psycho logical hedonism creates the justification for the normative hedonism that practical reason ing should aim at ataraxia.6 The normative ideal of Epicurean practical rationality is a hedonistic form of instrumental rationality with the final end of ataraxia. In the parlance of modern decision theory, it is a maximizing theory of rationality. Given a set of ordered preferences, individuals chose rationally when they choose to act on their highest valued goals. To choose less pleasure rather than more pleasure when given the choice is paradig matically irrational and contrary to nature. Given this conception of practical rationality and virtue, it is hard to see how one can single-mindedly pursue pleasure and accept the constraints of justice. Traditionally, virtue ethical theories solve this problem by making the virtue of justice constitutive of happiness with deontic restraints built into the formal conditions of happiness.7 To use the Rawlsian terminology, the right flows naturally out of the good.8 This solution, however, will not work for the Epicurean. Unlike in Aristotelian or Stoic virtue theory, the standard of Epicurean happiness is not an objective, formal standard, but rather the subjective, psychological state of ataraxia. The Epicurean has a reason to (j> only if he or she believes that (J)-ing will reliably lead to the final end of ataraxia. If all reasons are instrumental in this sense, how is it possible for the Epicurean to have reason to constrain his or her pursuit of the goal of nature by the deontic demands of justice? To give a plausible account of justice, the Epicurean needs to explain how to justify the demands of justice as a means to the final end of ataraxia. One version of this problem arises in the context of friendship. Epicurus claims . .every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits it confers on us" (VS 23). Given this statement about the value of friendship and KD 25, how can friendship be non-instrumentally valuable while also being beneficial because of the benefit it confers? Some have argued that genuine friendship is impossible unless we amend the basic egoistic element of Epicurean practical rationality.9 In contrast, Matt Evans argues that there are two basic approaches to understanding friendship in a consistently egoistic way (Evans 2004, 413). Friendship as "indirect egoism" involves incorporating the good of a friend or of friendship generally into one's own good. This is the interpretation that Timothy O'Keefe favors (O'Keefe 2001a). The alternative is Evans's preferred view, "direct egoism," that one's own good "stands or falls" with the good of one's friend (Evans 2004, 413). Indirect egoism is, for O'Keefe, a two-level hedonistic theoiy. Choice of desires is governed directly by hedonic concerns and those desires then pick out particular actions, which are only indirectly related to the original hedonic calculus (O'Keefe 2001a, 300-302). In contrast, Evans's direct egoism applies the hedonic calculus to action selection. Evans maintains that Epicureans can "reason their way to friendship" through direct egoistic means (Evans 2004, 423). What is true of friendship will likely be true of justice so it is imperative to determine whether the Epicurean hedonic calculus is meant to apply to actions (direct egoism), desires (indirect egoism), or something else entirely. The direct egoist interpretation has the benefit of being the easiest to reconcile with KD 25. The indirect egoist interpretation makes it easier to understand how the Epicurean can incorporate friendship and justice into hedonism. Another possibility, between direct and indirect egoism, is what Gregory Kavka calls "rule egoism" (Kavka 1986, chap. 9). Although Kavka developed his version of rule egoism in the context of understanding Hobbes's ethical theory, there are enough similarities between the two accounts for a plausible Epicurean version as well. The hedonic calculus applies directly to rules rather than to desires or action. Furthermore, rules can be generalizations over desires or actions, e. g. "don't cultivate a desire for riches" or "seek out friends." The first is a rule that indicates what desires will lead to pleasure whereas the second is a rule that indicates a particular set of actions that will likely lead to pleasure, namely having friends. **Rule egoism has several benefits over direct and indirect egoism. First, it is more general. Both actions and desires are mentioned throughout KD and VS as the possible object of choice. Rule egoism recognizes the importance of both actions and desires to the end of ataraxia and accounts for both in terms of rules. Second, rule egoism is simpler and likely more reliable than direct or indirect egoism. It is reasonable to expect that the typical Epicurean would be bewildered in the face of the multiplicity and complexity of choices that would face him or her on any given day. The stress of deliberating over actions on the direct egoist interpretation of KD 25 would often create anxiety rather than tranquility. Similarly, it is not clear that, given the complexity of the world, the direct approach would reliably lead to ataraxia. The indirect approach is not better on this count partly because desires do not necessarily pick out unique action in decision situations, partly because the indirect egoist faces the same problem as the direct egoist at the level of desires. By using rules, however, the Epicurean can rely on the knowledge embodied in the rules without having to deliberate in each case.** This explains the reason that Epicurus spends so much time in his writing listing rules and maxims. He gives rules about how to reduce sexual passion (VS 18), the irrationality of suicide (VS 38), the danger of envy (KS' 53), and the dangers of great wealth (VS 67). In all of these cases, and many more, Epicurus is passing on wisdom about how to reliably achieve ataraxia. He is playing the part, of a guide who has walked down life's tangled road and is reporting to those who have yet to see everything he has seen. These maxims or rules are the embodiment of the successful use of practical rationality in the past. Following these types of rules is, therefore, an application of direct egoism in an indirect way. Given the limited cognitive capacity and time of the Epicurean rational agent, relying on rules as a guide can be, following Gigerenzer and Goldstein, a "fast and frugal" way of reasoning based on heuristics communicated as rules or maxims (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). **Instead of choosing over the expected outcome of individual acts, the rule egoist chooses sets of rules to follow based on the expected outcome of following that rule or set of rules** (Kavka 1986, 358-359). In the next section we will see how understanding Epicurean practical rationality as "rule-hedonism" makes it possible to reconcile Epicurean practical rationality with justice. 3 The Possibility of the Contract Once we understand Epicurean practical rationality as applying to rules rather than to particular actions or desires, we can see how the Epicurean can reconcile the imperatives of practical rationality with the demands of justice. **A particular social contract is a set of rules that regulates behavior in certain public settings.** The Epicurean agrees to a particular set of rules in order to more reliably achieve and maintain personal ataraxia. We might wonder, however, why the Epicurean would need a contract at all. Why wouldn't the first personal application of practical rationality be sufficient for ataraxia? Why is the social **contract** necessary? In a world of practically rational Epicureans, the social contract seems either otiose or harmful. Either the contract recommends what practical rationality would recommend or it conflicts with practical rationality. On its face, Epicurean contractarianism looks either unnecessary or impossible. I will argue here that the Epicurean social contract is both necessary and possible. **The social contract is necessary, as I will argue in the next section, for its coordinating, assuring, and specifying functions**. The social contract is possible because of the role that rules can play in Epicurean practical rationality. In this section I will argue that the Epicurean social contract is consistent with Epicurean practical rationality and, hence, possible, while fulfilling an important social role. The Epicurean social contract is fundamentally instrumental; **it is a "pledge of reciprocal usefulness neither to harm one another nor be harmed**" (KD 35). To be consistent with Epicurean practical rationality, then, the contract must secure benefits that would not be possible without the contract. If, however, one only has reason to enter into a contract because of the benefits, what reason does one have to follow the contract when there are no benefits and only costs? This is the heart of the concern that the Epicurean cannot be a good citizen. If citizenship involves the possibility of sacrifice, why should we expect the Epicurean to comply? Here again, we see the same kind of problem that we saw in §2 concerning friendship; the solution is also similar.

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[1] Psychology – Agents intuitively don’t like consequences. Botti et al 09, Botti, Simona, Kristina Orfali, and Sheena S. Iyengar. "Tragic Choices: Autonomy and Emotional Responses to Medical Decisions." *J Consum Res Journal of Consumer Research* 36.3 (2009): 337-52. 2009. Web. Specifically, we study how making a tragic choice, versus having the same tragic choice externally made, affects individuals’ desire for autonomy and their emotional reactions to the same decision outcome. Prior research has shown that the sense of agency and internal locus of control associated with the act of choosing lead to perceptions of personal causality, whereas the imposition of a choice is removed from the idea of personal causality because it presupposes an external, rather than internal, locus of control (Brehm 1966; deCharms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1985; Langer 1975; Seligman 1975; Taylor and Brown 1988). Stronger causal ascriptions, in turn, have been found to magnify the intensity of emotional responses to an event, so that perceptions of personal causation intensify positive affect from desirable outcomes but also enhance negative affect from undesirable outcomes (Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen 1995; Landman 1987; Ritov and Baron 1995; Weiner 1986). Thus, we hypothesize that a decision outcome following a tragic choice will generate more extreme negative emotions when it is personally chosen because of a greater sense of causality; in contrast, when the same tragic choice is externally determined, negative emotions will be lessened by the per- ceived absence of a causal link with the aversive experience. Yet the torments of making tragic choices do not necessarily reduce people’s desire for autonomy. Prior research has shown that consumers confronted with choices that detrimentally affect their well-being still prefer making these choices themselves rather than having the same choices made for them by somebody else (Botti and Iyengar 2004; Botti and McGill 2006). This desire for choice in spite of its negative consequences can be attributed to consumers’ belief that they will maximize subjective utility by selecting the option that best matches personal preferences (Hotelling 1929). Even when individuals are unaware of their preferences, choosing activates a psychological immune system that facilitates preference matching by subjectively bolstering the value of a personally selected outcome (Gilbert et al. 1998). Through subjective bolstering decision makers are able to reduce the emotional discomfort of decisions that may not be consistent with individual preferences by con- vincing themselves and others that they had chosen the best- matching option (Brehm 1966; Festinger 1957; Shafir et al. 1993).

#### [2] Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

## adv

#### Outer space mining makes rare earth mining more ethical and equitable

Suttle 20 - Adam Suttle, Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, November 2nd, 2020 “Exploring the ethics of commercial space exploration in the 21st century” [<https://bmsis.org/exploring-the-ethics-of-commercial-space-exploration-in-the-21st-century/>] Accessed 12/7/21 SAO

Conversely, some deontological views may argue that humans should take any action necessary to prolong the survival of our race and other lifeforms on Earth. If humans and other lifeforms became multi-planetary, it can be viewed as the next evolutionary step in our progression. Having life habitant elsewhere improves the odds for survival into the future and increases the resource supply. A mining infrastructure in space would significantly increase the supply of resources to humanity. Some of our most cherished devices are dependent upon rare-earth elements and non-renewable metallic deposits, which have a limited supply in the Earth’s crust. Not to mention that some resources are only sourced from a few places in the world, where there is a lack of control over the safety standards for workers. For example, cobalt, an essential component to many batteries, is mainly mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where it is estimated a third of the miners are in the informal sector, including 25,000 children who experience extremely exploitative and dangerous conditions for as little income as $2 a day [8]. Many of the materials required for smartphones, renewable energy infrastructure, computers and medical instruments are dependent on such limited deposits, with unethical sources. In order for humanity to sustain the increasing standards of living that stem from the ‘seeds of technology’, and combat regional inequality, new abundant supplies of the depleting reserves must be discovered. Space mining offers this opportunity, and thus with an increased supply and resource security, material costs would be driven down. Ultimately, this could improve humanity’s standards of living as manufacturing becomes globally more affordable.

#### REE mining wrecks global biodiversity – that’s irreversible

Dutta et al (Tanushree Dutta, Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Hanyang University; Ki-Hyun Kim; Minori Uchimiyab, USDA-ARS Southern Regional Research Center; Eilhann E. Kwon, Department of Environment and Energy, Sejong University; Byong-Hun Jeond; Akash Deep, Central Scientific Instruments Organisation; & Seong-Taek Yun), Environmental Research, Science Direct, October 2016 ["Global demand for rare earth resources and strategies for green mining", https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0013935116302249, accessed 8-21-2019] BH

Rare earth mining and extraction procedures constitute massive exploitation of earth's resources and destabilize/deteriorate soil and water ecosystems. One of the biggest concerns of REE mining from the primary ore deposits such as bastnasite and monazite is the resultant radioactive stockpiles. Rare earths frequently co-exist with radioactive minerals like thorium and uranium imparting radiological effects during their recovery (Binnemans et al., 2013; Ault et al., 2015). The release of the radionucleotides along with other contaminants like dust and heavy metals may also bear serious environmental costs. Processing one ton of REEs is associated with the generation of 2000 t of toxic waste and 1000 t of wastewater contaminated with ammonium sulfate and heavy metals (Su, 2009). Immediate negative effects of REE mining include severe soil erosion, biodiversity loss, land use change, flooding, pollution of air, soil, and water, and crop uptake of REEs, consequentially leading to human health issues (Tang and Li, 2000; Liu, 2002; Chen, 2010; Anonymous, 2011; Carpenter et al., 2015). Using satellite imagery, Guo (2012) depicted the visual changes in the landscape caused by the surface/mountaintop mining in the Ganzhou area of the Jianxi province of China. Biological, environmental, and human health effects of mountaintop mining activities have been well documented (Gilbert, 2010; Holzman, 2011; Beggs, 2012; Bernhardt et al., 2012). Alarmingly, some of these human health and environmental impacts are irreversible and persistent even after reclamation of the mine site (Palmer et al., 2010). China adopted an alternative technique in 1997, which is referred to as in-situ leaching of clays. This technique deploys leaching holes 0.8 m in diameter and 1.5–3 m in depth at an intermittent distance of 2–3 m. Leaching occurs over a prolonged period of time (150–400 days) with application of 3–5% ammonium sulfate solution (Yang et al., 2013). This in-situ leaching protects the soil and vegetation. Nevertheless, enforcement of such in-situ leaching must be preceded by a thorough geotechnical survey of the mining area and nearby locations. Otherwise, there may be low REE recovery (up to 5%), groundwater contamination, an increase in soil and water pH, and nutrient pollution of downstream rivers (Liu, 2002; Palmer et al., 2010).

#### Turn: Property rights are key to incentivizing clean up

Werner 18 - Debra Werner, Space News, April 23, 2018 “Debris removal missions face technical, legal and financial hurdles” [https://spacenews.com/debris-removal-missions-face-technical-legal-and-financial-hurdles/] Accessed 1/11/22 SAO

Once those missions show active debris removal is possible, active debris removal ventures will face their biggest challenge: raising money for the ventures. Nobody has a clear idea how much active debris removal should cost, said Luc Piguet, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne scientific adviser. A series of commercial missions in the next few years will shed light on the cost of debris removal and reveal government and commercial demand for the service. “In today’s world, it is not enough to say, ‘I will do something because it advances technology and cleans something up,’” Innocenti said. “You also have to demonstrate a business link.” ESA member states agreed that e.Deorbit, the agency’s initiative to capture the defunct Envisat, was “a fantastic mission” and they would like to fund it, Innocenti said. “The problem comes when you have to prioritize with respect to a launcher, Earth observation, telecommunications support, science and all the rest. It’s a question of priority. If it had the commercial return, that would change the priority.”

#### Turn: Property rights key identify who owns debris and hold them responsible for clean up

Muñoz-Patchen 18 - Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen, Chicago Journal of International Law, 8-16-2018 “Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty” [https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1741&context=cjil] Accessed 1/11/22 SAO

Despite Strahilevitz’s general view that chattel property can be unilaterally abandoned, he recognizes an exception for property without subjective or market value. 101 In practice, the abandonment of this type of property is often regulated and would not be categorized as unilateral abandonment.102 To be unilaterally abandoned, no other party can be the recipient of transferred property.103 For this reason, it is not unilateral abandonment when someone disposes of trash in a receptacle managed by a private or public disposal service.104 Property without subjective or market value—like trash, pollution, or, as this Comment argues, space debris—imposes costs on society if it is unilaterally abandoned.105 Because of this, the abandonment of trash and other unwanted goods is regulated to either prevent unilateral abandonment or force abandoners to bear the costs of cleaning up.106 The state may fine a litterer, demand that someone trying to dump larger property properly sell or dispose of it,