# AC

## fwk

#### Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –

#### The world is structured by language—signifiers mediate reality by defining concepts through differentiation, or by classifying them by what they are not. However, the nature of that opposition is unstable because signifiers’ meaning is constantly in flux.

* **Van Haute 3 – Van Haute in Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Fall 2003** (Philippe. *Against Adaptation Lacan's "Subversion" of the Subject*. Other Press, 2003) [<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/46467/pdf>] Accessed 1/14/19 AHS//EMM

Thus it also becomes clear why we said, in our exposition of Freud above, that the expression “reality outside of us” re- quires further consideration, and cannot simply be accepted as it stands. The world in which we carry on our everyday ex-istence is always already structured by the signifiers of language. The world in which we shape our lives receives its form from our expectations, intentions, representations, and so on, and these are themselves structured in turn by the symbolic systems that determine us (for example, in articulating the difference between man and woman). At the very least, then, the opposition between language and the thing about which it speaks is more complex than we suggested above, and than Freud sometimes seems to think. The world about which we speak and in which we live is no “brute” reality; it is itself al-ready mediated and structured by the signiﬁers of language, which allow it to appear as a meaningful and differentiated environment (Umwelt). The signiﬁer actively institutes meaning. Language does not simply reflect reality; it is not the expression of a previ-ously given order. The reality in which we carry on our existence must, on the contrary, be understood in a pregnant sense as the effect of the order of signiﬁers. In this context, Lacan points out that signifiers are essentially determined diacritically or differentially. In other words, they signify primarily on the basis of their difference from other signiﬁers and not, for ex-ample, by referring to a non-linguistic reality. Let us return to our example of the difference between “man” and “woman.” It is clear that the signiﬁer “man” only has meaning as opposed to the signiﬁer “wom[x]n”—for what could “man” mean with-out “wom[x]n”? The signifiers “man” and “woman” receive fur-ther meaning from a complex network of references in which signifiers such as “human,” “animal.” and “plant,” for example, hold a central place. The meaning of a signifier is in the first place dependent upon the linguistic context of which it is a part. Moreover, the fact that a signiﬁer only receives meaning from a complex network of signitive references immediately implies, for Lacan, that the meaning of a signiﬁer changes ac-cording to the context in which it is taken up. When an analysand says in an analytical session, Je vais a la mer (“I am going to the sea”). the analyst might hear, le vais a la mere (“I am going to the mother”), basing her interpretation on other associations that the analysand has formulated in the course of this or other sessions. A second example can perhaps make the point somewhat clearer. Some years ago, for professional reasons, I opened a bank account in Holland, and the bank clerk asked if I had any “titles.” 1 replied that I did, but immediately added that I wanted to keep them in Belgium, where l was liv-ing at the time. The man looked at me strangely, and asked me if the “titles” were not valid in Holland. After a bit of talking back and forth, it turned out that he had meant academic titles, while I, because of my Belgian background, had understood “titles” in the sense of the French titles (“financial securities").9 Just as the associative context determined the meaning of the signifier mer/mere (“sea”/“mother") in the first example, so here the meaning of the signiﬁer “title” changes depending on whether it is to be understood in an academic context or an economic one. The production of meaning is thus in principle a process that cannot be closed off. There is no ultimate con- text that could, as it were, embrace all contexts and so bring the production of meaning to completion.

#### The differential nature of language necessitates that signifiers inevitably fail to translate what the subject wants to express, creating a constitutive lack. Through continuous attempts to fill lack and become complete, minorities are excluded through their inability to match the perceived perfection of the perfect subject.

**Viego 7,** Antonio. *Dead Subjects Toward a Politics of Loss in Latino Studies*. Duke University Press, 2007.

As I briefly explained earlier, every human organism must at some point choose language in order to express his or her needs. Bruce Fink succinctly argues that the child allows ‘‘him or herself to be represented by words.’’42 In Seminar 1, Lacan illustrates this point when he teaches, ‘‘All human beings share in the universe of symbols. They are included in it and submit to it, much more than they constitute it. They are much more its supports than its agents.’’43 Since language is a system of signifiers in which each signifier means something only by virtue of its difference from another signifier, every demand we make in language will always have a distorting effect with respect to the need we try to express in its medium. There are, ultimately, no positive terms in language. When the human organism inscribes itself in language it be-comes a subject of language, and as a result of this inscription every determi-nation of the subject will be by necessity indeterminate. Lacan understands the inscription of the subject in language as constituting a loss, a loss of a hypothesized fullness prior to the impact of language that he will refer to as belonging to the order of the Real. This notion of fullness prior to language is also conceptually linked to Lacan’s theory of jouissance. The privative effects of language as structure on the speaking organism, therefore, have to do with this primordial loss. Once we become subjects of the signifier we can never simply make good on this loss; it is irremediable. And what of the generative effects of language as structure on the speaking human organism? These have to do with how language generates human desire. Dean describes how ‘‘the agent of the cut that produces both subject and object is, of course, language. According to Lacan, symbolic networks dissect the human body, producing leftovers that cause desire. The ill fit between language and the body introduces wrinkles and gaps that generate desire. We might say that the unconscious and desire exist only as a conse-quence of this disharmony between the structures of language and those of the body.’’44 The understanding of the subject as an effect of the signifier and the idea of this primordial loss that attends each human subject’s inscription in language continue not to figure in theories of ethnic-racialized subjectivity and experi-ence within critical race and ethnicity studies knowledge projects like Latino and Chicano studies, for example. Why, we might ask, should we even be concerned with these failures of engagement? What, if anything, do we stand to lose or gain by taking or not taking these issues into consideration? The result for our scholarship is an undertheorized explanation of loss and trauma at the psychic, political, juridical, and economic levels, as well as an overly simplistic and commonsensical conceptualization of human subjectivity in which we bracket the effects of language on the speaking organism in order to win back some empty promise of fullness and completeness. In this latter compensatory, falsely reparative critical move, we, against our best intentions, provide precisely the image of ethnic-racialized subjectivity as whole, com- plete, and transparent, an image upon which racist discourse thrives and against which we imagine we are doing battle.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace the lack. This is key to preventing psychological violence and coheres the nature of who you are.

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] //ahs em

It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-widening spiral of existential deadends. How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

#### Reject the duty to extend human life. We cannot fulfill this project. One day the sun will explode - the futile attempt to save humans encourages us to destroy all that we consider to be sub-human.

Milligan 15 - Tony Milligan, PH.D. lecturer in philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire and specializes in ethics, in his 2015 book. [Nobody Owns the Moon: The Ethics of Space Exploitation]eec

And so, what I am suggesting here is that recognition of a duty to extend human life is above all a way of responding to a special bond to other members of our moral community and not primarily responding to them merely as members of the same biological species. A commitment of this sort, to a sense of moral community, seems to be in play when we criticize the special failures which are often involved in racism, anti-Semitism and similar forms of prejudice. Suppose, for example, I assert that the most extreme forms of the latter involve both false beliefs (about culture or biology) and a betrayal of humanity. By doing so I would not be suggesting that they involve a betrayal of our genetic similarity. Rather, I would be suggesting that they involve the betrayal of a deep bond which is made possible by various aspects of our shared biological nature but which might equally be made possible by the possession of some other biological nature and which is, in any case, an achievement of social history rather than a mere biological given. Should we then extend our conception of moral community beyond the human, so that it comes to include non-humans, that too might be a very good thing. Indeed, at any given time, we are already members of several communities and a community of fellow creatures may be entirely within our reach. However, communities of the relevant sort result from a shared history rather than from a community-forming decision. The strength and ethical significance of any particular bond is something which cannot be wished into existence or, indeed, wished away. (And it is precisely the latter which is the special mistake from which familiar prejudices evolve.) Two Objections In spite of all that has been said above, two important objections to the idea of a duty to extend human life may be difficult to ignore. One centers upon practicality and other upon over-estimation. On the side of practicality it may be held that, in this context, ought implies can. If we cannot actually do anything to significantly extend the survival of humanity then we cannot reasonably be held to have any such duty. And here, the difficulties of extending human life are both familiar and formidable. Yes, we could (and probably will) go to Mars and (barring extreme misfortune) we will establish a stable presence off-world and nearby on the Moon. Perhaps we will also establish a presence somewhat further away from the Sun, in the asteroid belt, among the moons of the gas giants. But this will still leave humanity doomed to extinction during the latter stages of our Sun's life-cycle. Reaching anywhere else and surviving will be difficult and perhaps to all intents and purposes impossible, because of the sheer immensity of space. Matters may simply not be within our control. The odds against our survival beyond the lifetime of our sun may not be good. In which case it may be seriously misguided to think and act as if we will have more time at our disposal than the limited time that we do in fact have. The difficulties of inter-stellar travel, the problems facing any attempt to construct an Ark to preserve human life elsewhere, may simply turn out to be too great. Indeed, at present, I am reluctantly inclined to suspect that this may turn out to be the case. However, this may simply be my own short-sightedness. I rather hope that it is and the hope may not be misplaced and it need not collapse into some manner of faith in the future. After all, prediction about the remote future generally fails. Based upon our limited human capacity to envisage the future in realistic ways (a human limitation in support of which we may appeal to two millennia of seriously misleading Utopian and dystopian literature written by some of the most intelligent humans ever to have lived) it seems reasonable to say that we are, again, in a poor epistemic position to know whether or not the spreading of humanity beyond the solar system will ultimately be possible. And if we do not know then, as a precautionary matter, it may be best to allow that survival and spread, on a cosmic scale, may be a possible outcome. And in this case we may indeed have a duty to fry and make it happen. Uncertainty about the long-range future of humanity may well favor acceptance that the claimed duty is a genuine duty. The second objection concerns over-estimation and more specifically, the way in which the endorsement of a duty to extend human life may promote an already damaging over-estimation of our human importance (damaging to the environment, to other creatures, to all that is not human). Carl Sagan once remarked that we are the universe's way of being conscious of itself.- Although we may understand what was meant, even here a form of species prejudice may be evident or at least risked. Unless we are to discount the awareness of other (already-existing) terrestrial creatures, the point is rather that we are the universe's way of being conscious of, or theorizing, itself as a universe or, as a cosmos (an orderly law-governed system). And this is slightly more accurate if rather less elegant. But perhaps we are no such thing. Perhaps there are many beings with similar or even greater capacities. What then would make us so special? To affirm the importance of humanity we might be thrown back solely upon humanity as a community of beings to which we happen to belong and to whom we owe special loyalties that we do not owe to others (although, no doubt we owe them something). But if we do so it may be better to focus upon our community being a good one rather than an indefinitely prolonged one. This same dilemma (familiar from Homer and Aristotle) may be present in the life of the individual: is it better to live longer or to live well? (Both, incidentally, opted for the latter.) If we are not unique, or at least if we are not an extremely rare sort of thing, it may seem better to accept that ultimately our community of beings will play out its limited run of time. Indeed, an acceptance of this might improve the quality of our ethical flunking just as acceptance of mortality by the individual human ma}' make their life less wasteful and misdirected. This too is a concern of a deep sort and one which is not easily disposed of. Yet, although deliberation of this kind may be deep, so too is our connection to humanity and the idea of a duty to humanity. Depth confronts depth and we are left with no guarantees about getting matters right. Yet in this instance the countervailing consideration draws upon the possible existence of other beings about whose nature we have no current knowledge and whose actual existence we cannot obviously presuppose.

#### Impact calculus –

#### [1] It’s a question of orientation towards the form of desire which is a prior question to the content of that practice and proves consequences are incoherent

#### [2] The aff comes on the same layer as theory, offense is whether space appropriation embraces or further the lack, and we only gain offense under the standard. This is reasonable clarification- check othr in cx.

#### Prefer the framework –

#### [1] Performativity – debate is a fundamentally a game. We desire wins and avoid losses – only psychoanalysis explains the constitutive drives of the activity which proves it outweighs.

#### [2] Bindingness – the lack is constitutive to the structure of language and the nature of the subject. Any action a subject take is inevitably mediated through signification. We cannot escape our mediation through language which means an understanding of it comes first.

#### [3] All communication is constrained by the lack, even the flow because of its linguistic content, which means the standard is a side constraint on the judge evaluating the round.

#### [4] Desires come first- A) Only my framework answers the question “why act”, since agents have a reason to due to their own motivations rather than some non-existent transcendental principle. B) Identity –the creation of the subject determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade. C) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.

## Offense

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### [1] Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new “frontiers” and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. **Privatized space** research **mobilizes fears of ecological, political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for** new **utopian futures**, or the search for Earth 2.0. **These imaginaries** reflect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and **enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier**. In contrast, eco-centric visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroyers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a multispecies process—off the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. This article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and political earthly life. Outer space imaginaries are booming. Reborn from Cold War projects into the post-9/11 securitized era, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are proliferating, **creating** new material impacts and **new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion.** Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many **extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of technoscientific progress** and **human mastery over nature**. Space programs are increasingly privatized, with tech entrepreneurs leading the way to extraterrestrial futures. I refer to these projects, oft en framed as a necessary step in human social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on Earth. Th ese share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defi ned by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question. Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, **innovation**, or **human exceptionalism**, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace intention from life’s expansion. Earth 2.0 and Home and Away 159 eco-centric imaginaries off er diff erent understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories. Th is article traces these two imaginaries for the future of life aft er Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. Th e word “imaginaries” builds on the definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of effects and entanglements between language, cultural production, scientifi c research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial expansionary megaprojects. Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research programs, policy proposals, social movements, and **private investments**, they bring **displace**ments **of ontological, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present**—with both oppressive and liberatory possibilities (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconfi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements work through analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar 2017). These two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve seeing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter 1997). Th ese visions range from the widespread use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s uniqueness in the universe, to the politically unifying “overview eff ect” proposed by Frank White (1987). Early space programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientifi c understandings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-fi rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present” (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication fi gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. 160 Micha Rahder Leaving Earth—Fact or Fiction? Th ere is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. Th e boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Th ese projects and imaginaries share signifi cant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, known as SETI (Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spacefl ight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. Th is article has a bias toward US-based projects, both public and private, as these are most prolifi c and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private companies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. Th e charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republican Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a scientifi c institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imaginaries are on the rise as the international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself. Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fi ction and fantasy long relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). Th is division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical, and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). Th e Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fi ction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fi elds are drawing attention to how science fi ction has long infl uenced technological and scientifi c developments, particularly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfi eld notes, “fi ctions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. Th ese dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams fi nding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fi ctional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the Home and Away 161 scientifi c gaze (Redfi eld 2002). Language can shape the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might participate in them. Refl ecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and diff erence as opposed to a unifi ed singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While biological and philosophical debates over the defi nition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that defi ne life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief history of human projects oriented toward life’s expansion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. Th is focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). Th is choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward, examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfi guring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to Anthropocene “ Th ings that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting **human expansion** into space have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy 2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientifi c progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close relation with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capacity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth” environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, **reinforci**ng **ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management** of more-than-human worlds (DeLoughrey 2014). Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the United States and Europe have oft en been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather than imagining others we might one day escape to (Cockell 2006). Narratives of **new capitalist frontiers** led many environmentalists to view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle**,”** fearing it will **lead to ideologies of a disposable planet** (Hartmann 1986). Yet expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extraterrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, **entrepreneurial capitalists**—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fi ll this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most oft en articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond Earth is no longer defi ned by competing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shift ed from sudden nuclear annihilation to the slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Th ough understood as new or diff erent, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastructures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa. As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way. These sometimes **amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth,** and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control. This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries Earth 2.0 Dominating current eff orts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partnerships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range from imperialist nationalisms to profi ts to new utopian Home and Away 163 social orders, oft en mixed together in unexpected confi gurations. Yet these Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures.

#### [2] Extraterrestrial imaginaries scapegoat culpability of environmental destruction and are unobtainable utopias.

**Rahder 2** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

These utopian visions are still grounded by earthly concerns. Jacob Haqq-Misra argues for “liberating Mars,” basing future settlement not on an extension of earthly sociopolitics (whether organized in terms of nation-states or corporations) but instead by establishing a new Martian planetary citizenship to create a “test bed for new ideas that could lead to unforeseen epistemic transformations of our values and preferences” (2016: 66). Yet his argument compares this “transformative experience” to a “trust fund child” gaining new values from a wilderness trip (65). “Nature”—whether earthly wilderness or Martian extremity—is called upon as a resource for human cultural transformation, reimagining a modernist dichotomy as the basis for a planetary move beyond modernism. Th ese narratives frame the search for a new Earth 2.0 as a necessary project for collective human and environmental survival. Defl ecting critiques that space programs divert too many resources from earthly problems, Cameron Smith and Evan Davies (2012) claim that “all worthwhile things” (among which they list boats and wedding rings) are worth large expense. Space expansion, framed as a form of long-term insurance for the human species, is moved from the question “Can we aff ord to go?” to “Can we aff ord not to?” (Hartmann 1986). This powerful mixture of **apocalyptic narratives, new resource frontiers, and utopian schemes** combine to **create a sense of space expansion** as not just inevitable, but a present **in which we are behind** rather than working toward something yet to come. As Musk argued in a speech at the International Astronautical Congress: “It’s 2017 . . . We should have a lunar base by now.” Th is present, beholden to the future, makes strange work of history. **Earth 2.0 imaginaries** offer the opportunity to start anew; these narratives **erase collective responsibility for harms done by colonial projects and** seem to **“cleanse” history** (Redfi eld 2002: 797). Alternately, history is turned into an “objective” knowledge resource for avoiding repeated mistakes (e.g., HaqqMisra 2016). Most striking is the frequent collapse of timescales, with recent historical and deep evolutionary time brought into new resonances (Codignola et al. 2009). Space expansion is commonly fi gured as an inevitable step in a conjoined evolutionary-colonial history: “We wriggled onto dry land, ventured out of the African savannah as apes, set sail for new worlds—how Home and Away 165 could we not expect, someday, to live in colonies on Titan or starships cruising through deep space?” (Austen 2011). Th is vision places white, Western, masculine techno-capitalist humanity at the pinnacle of evolutionary scales. Th e future Earth left behind in Earth 2.0 imaginaries tends to fall into two categories. By far, the most common are visions of an Earth destroyed, uninhabitable to humans if not to all carbon-based life. Other narratives project that we might get off Earth in time to “save” it from ourselves, leaving behind a global park of purifi ed nature (Austen 2011). Both versions resonate with environmentalisms that take an anti-humanist turn, as in visions of humanity as a global pollution or disease, out of balance, or otherwise in need of reduction or eradication (Anker 2005; Dumit 2005). Projections of natural purity resonate in multiple directions, into pasts and futures, and both on and away from Earth. Lisa Messeri (2017a), working with scientists searching for potentially **habitable exoplanets**, notes that “earthlike” planets **are imagined as** a kind of **new Eden, representing a purification of human industrial histories** by way of long-term futures. These futures of Earth 2.0 proliferate both at home and away—a rebooted humanity off ered a chance to “do nature better,” to recapture Eden.

#### Envisioning utopias will always fail and causes psychic violence.

Stavrakakis, 99 Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government @ University of Essex; *Lacan and the Political*, pg. 99-100 // ahs emi

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that **the need for utopian** meaning **arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict,** when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, **the** beatific side of **fantasy is coupled** in utopian constructions **with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The** naivety—and also the **danger**—of utopian **structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy** is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia **is based on** the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to **violence**; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, **this** **representation is** usually articulated as a total and universal representation**, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real**, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

#### [3] privitzated appropriation of space is a narcissistic search for fulfillment and wholeness, which is structurally impossible because of alienation from the real.

**Kilbryde 15** - “Space Travel as a Means for Re-Enchantment, Unification, and Spiritual Fulfillment” by Ana Kilbryde\* The University of Brighton, East Sussex, United Kingdom [http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/Journal/JOA-Final/JournalOfAstrosociology-Vol1.pdf#page=89] // ahs emi

One may describe this sense of **unification with the universe as something incomprehensible and sublime.** It certainly cannot fit into any existing framework, as nondualism is a primordial, organic consciousness without subject or object (Katz, 2007, p. 3-14). Moreover, attempting to categorize a sense of unity into a theoretical framework requires recognition of an object, which implies a duality between the object and the subject. After all, the argument here is that **the search for unification results from a sense of separation brought about by dualist ideologies** and binary modes of thinking. This “ecstasy of unity” runs parallel to what Abraham Maslow (1976, p. 6-16) deemed ‘peak experiences’. These are mystical experiences of egoless amalgamation with the world. **They are experiences of wholeness and integration in which the individual existed effortlessly in the here and now.** Both these peak experiences and experiences of unity are comparable to ideas inherent in East Asian religions such as Confucianism and ideas such as Zen. These experiences of unity hold no definitions of the world or distinctions between us and the cosmos, and assumedly neither do feelings of enchantment, as its adversary, i.e., **disenchantment, is a consequence of rationalization.** In Ideas and Opinions, Einstein wrote that “The true value of a human being is determined by the measure and the sense in which he has attained liberation from the self” (Einstein, 1954, p. 12). **Therefore, one may view enchantment through unification as an abandonment of one’s identity, self, and ego, and as an appreciation of a unified existence.** A notion incredibly similar to the ‘ecstasy of unity’ is the concept of the ‘Overview Effect’, which is a term formulated by Frank White (1987) in his book The Overview Effect – **Space Exploration** and Human Evolution. White’s interest lies with the experiences astronauts encounter when looking upon the Earth from space, which **has been described as a cognitive shift in one’s awareness** (White, 1987). Astronauts have claimed that during this time, the conflicts that divide our society vanish, boundaries disappear, and **there is an inherent urge to create a unified planetary existence.** They also claim to possess a new appreciation for the preciousness and size of our planet and a will to protect this ‘pale blue dot’ (Sagan, 1994) becomes clear and critical. Flight experience has spiritually transformed an increasing number of astronauts, and reports indicate that this change in attitude often remains long after they return to Earth. Rusty Schweickart, Chris Hadfield, Mike Massimino, and Tom Jones are among the astronauts said to have experienced the effect (Sato, 2008). In recent years, space psychologists commenced research upon the salutogenic aspects of space flight (Suedfeld, 2005), that is, focusing on the benefits that arise from stressful or somewhat negative experiences during space programs. Suedfeld et al. (2010) investigated the memoirs of 125 space travelers and found that from stressful and somewhat negative experiences in space, these individuals developed greater levels of appreciation for others and nature, enhanced spirituality and power over that spirituality, and enhanced personal strength. This finding indicates that space travel has the potential to foster enlightenment and unification. **Scientific discoveries have painted a picture of an infinite universe with the potential for endless discoveries and countless possibilities, and this potentially arouses enchantment and awe.** However, does this re-enchantment serve as a prelude to, or even a manifestation of, narcissism? It is not dismissible, as Christopher Lasch (1991, p. 13-15) recognizes a rising level of selfawareness, self-identity, self-reflexivity, and celebrity status and acclamation in today’s society. The concept of narcissism that Lasch is referring to is not the same as the definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), although they do share characteristics. Instead, the focus here is upon Lasch’s idea of the narcissist in an ever-growing capitalist society. **Among incessant self-awareness, reflexivity and self-affirmation, the narcissist tends to seek meaning in every aspect of their lives, their cravings have no limits and they never seem to be satisfied. This implies that the search for unification may well be the narcissist seeking self-fulfillment, that it is superficial rather than spiritual and may just be another thing they want to attain.** Similarly, Dickens and Ormrod “have argued that members of the **pro-space movement** exhibit a form of adult narcissism” (Ormrod, 2007; Dickens & Ormrod, 2007, p. 137). Space travel, capital, and industry could be viewed **as an attempt to regain feelings of omnipotence similar to that felt at the stage of primary narcissism** whereby the mother and the rest of the world is seen as an extension of the infant’s self, so he therefore mistakes this dependence on his mother as his own supremacy (Freud, 1973). Dickens and Ormrod (2007, p. 138) make comparable links between experiencing space and primary narcissism, e.g., the feeling of weightlessness in space is similar to the feeling experienced in the womb and argues the journey to space is a representation of a universal urge to detach themselves from the mother.

#### Fantasy productions are not neutral models of risk but collusions between capital and state that prevent the change they’ll talk about. The aff rejects this model of beautifying space policy.

**Ormrod 11 -** “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space” by James S Ormrod School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, Falmer BN1 9PH, Sussex, England; e-mail: j.s.ormrod@brighton.ac.uk Received 17 August 2011; in revised form 19 September 2012 [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/d16511] // ahs emi

I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: **the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe.** The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how **fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension).** This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of **NASA’s** Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). Beyond world risk society? 741 **The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy,** as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. **These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power.** Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. **Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities.** Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. **Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd.** Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. **Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space.** Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999).

## method

#### [1] Jouissance is the greatest pleasure.

McAleer 17 - Graham McAleer, The Ethics of Fashion, December 9th, 2017 “Lacan’s critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism” [http://www.ethicsoffashion.com/lacans-critique-benthams-utilitarianism/] Accessed 11/24/19 SAO

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was involved in the founding of my undergraduate institution, the “Godless College,” University College London. Nonetheless, I have never been taken with his ethical thought. Benthamism or utilitarianism is, with Kantianism, one of the two most dominant ethical theories taught at colleges in the Anglosphere. I’m not sure it has the same hold in European universities; possibly because central Europe has an indigenous ethical theory, value ethics. I am far more persuaded by value ethics. The central dispute between Bentham and value ethics (Scheler, Kolnai, Wojtyla) is the original moral character of the world. Bentham thinks objects ethically neutral: only once an object/act/event is lifted into the moral calculus of the greatest happiness of the greatest number does it come to have moral bearing. By contrast, value ethics argues that what populates our world intrinsically bears value tones, discrete value textures that shape our ethical assessments. This position is also shared by Shaftesbury, Smith, and in my opinion, Hume. To this dispute, Lacan adds that the use of the greatest happiness principle is not the generous and altruistic act that Bentham, and his follower, J. S. Mill, believes. Pleasure scrambles any clean distinction between egoism and altruism. The utilitarian principle gains its user a secret satisfaction: “It is a fact of [psycho-analytic] experience that what I want is the good of others in the image of my own” (Seminar 7, Chapter 14). The core of my psyche is The Thing, the unconscious, a place of “unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee.” How to escape? Things are not so simple: I don’t altogether want to flee. This place is also the origin of my jouissance, the confused pleasure offered by a bewildering aggressivity. Bentham’s mistake is to think we have clarity about pleasure: that we can index our pleasure so as to understand the application of the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Seminar 2, Chapter 1). However, jouissance confuses me: I both want it, and not. Pleasure is deceiving and I am no good guide to my own pleasure. This is no mere pragmatic or epistemological problem: applying the principle well is not possible; pleasure is necessarily bewildering. What is The Thing we want, and flee? It is a place of vulnerability, where longing and violence entwine. Is escape possible? Sort of. In affirming what countermands aggression — the moral law — I do right by others, and therewith myself: I remove myself from the place of violence as I affirm the good of others. This is only ever a partial affirmation of the other. Altruism is also always egoism. And yet even my egoism is deceived: I do also want to affirm The Thing, the place of jouissance. Egoism would be to pursue my pleasure to the utmost but I recoil from my gravest identity: to make my pleasure gravid would also be to dig my own grave. Thus, affirming the other I surreptitiously affirm myself (egoism) and simultaneously deny myself (not egoism): I am neither true friend to others or myself. Benthamism is built on the least trusty worthy of foundations: pleasure.

[2] Psychology – Agents intuitively don’t like consequences. Botti et al 09, Botti, Simona, Kristina Orfali, and Sheena S. Iyengar. "Tragic Choices: Autonomy and Emotional Responses to Medical Decisions." *J Consum Res Journal of Consumer Research* 36.3 (2009): 337-52. 2009. Web. Specifically, we study how making a tragic choice, versus having the same tragic choice externally made, affects individuals’ desire for autonomy and their emotional reactions to the same decision outcome. Prior research has shown that the sense of agency and internal locus of control associated with the act of choosing lead to perceptions of personal causality, whereas the imposition of a choice is removed from the idea of personal causality because it presupposes an external, rather than internal, locus of control (Brehm 1966; deCharms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1985; Langer 1975; Seligman 1975; Taylor and Brown 1988). Stronger causal ascriptions, in turn, have been found to magnify the intensity of emotional responses to an event, so that perceptions of personal causation intensify positive affect from desirable outcomes but also enhance negative affect from undesirable outcomes (Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen 1995; Landman 1987; Ritov and Baron 1995; Weiner 1986). Thus, we hypothesize that a decision outcome following a tragic choice will generate more extreme negative emotions when it is personally chosen because of a greater sense of causality; in contrast, when the same tragic choice is externally determined, negative emotions will be lessened by the per- ceived absence of a causal link with the aversive experience. Yet the torments of making tragic choices do not necessarily reduce people’s desire for autonomy. Prior research has shown that consumers confronted with choices that detrimentally affect their well-being still prefer making these choices themselves rather than having the same choices made for them by somebody else (Botti and Iyengar 2004; Botti and McGill 2006). This desire for choice in spite of its negative consequences can be attributed to consumers’ belief that they will maximize subjective utility by selecting the option that best matches personal preferences (Hotelling 1929). Even when individuals are unaware of their preferences, choosing activates a psychological immune system that facilitates preference matching by subjectively bolstering the value of a personally selected outcome (Gilbert et al. 1998). Through subjective bolstering decision makers are able to reduce the emotional discomfort of decisions that may not be consistent with individual preferences by con- vincing themselves and others that they had chosen the best- matching option (Brehm 1966; Festinger 1957; Shafir et al. 1993).

#### [3] Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### [4] Utilitarianism is a bad rule to use.

Card and Smith 20 - Dallas Card & Noah A. Smith, Stanford University & the University of Washington, January 2020“On Consequentialism and Fairness” [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.00329.pdf] Accessed 2/5/20 SAO \*We don’t endorse the authors conclusions or rhetoric

Although utilitarianism is highly influential, there are fundamental problems with it. First, aggregating well-being requires measuring individual welfare, but it is unclear that it can be measured in a way that allows for fair comparisons. Even if we restrict the set of morally relevant entities to humans, issues of subjectivity, disposition, and self-reporting make it difficult if not impossible to meaningfully comparison across individuals (Binmore, 2009). Second, even if there were a satisfactory way of measuring individual well-being, there are computational difficulties involved in estimating these values for hypothetical worlds. Given that well-being could depend on fine-grained details of the state of the world, it wis unclear what level of precision would be required of a model in order to evaluate well-being for each entity. Thus, even estimating the overall value of a single state of the world might be infeasible, let alone a progression of them over time. Third, any one-number summary of the distribution of preferences will fail to distinguish between dramatically different distributions. Using the sum, for example, will treat as equivalent two states with the same total value, but with different levels of inequality. While this failing is not necessarily insurmountable, most solutions seem to undermine the inherent simplicity of the utilitarian ideal.9 Fourth, others have challenged the premise of impartiality on the grounds that it is subtly paternalist or patriarchal, emphasizes individual autonomy over relationships and care, and ignores existing relations of power (Friedman, 1991; Driver, 2005; Kittay, 2009). Undoubtedly, there is a long and troubling history of otherwise enlightened philosophers presuming to know what is best for others, and being ~~blind~~ to the harms of institutions such as colonialism, while believing that certain classes of people either don’t count or are incapable of full rationality (Mills, 1987). Ultimately, it seems inescapable to conclude that there is no universally acceptable evaluation function for consequentialism. Rather, we must acknowledge that every action will entail an uneven distribution of costs and benefits. Even in the case where an action literally makes everyone better off, it will almost certainly benefit some more than others. As such, the most credible position is to view the idea of valuation (utilitarian or otherwise) as inherently contested and political. While we might insist that an admissible evaluation function conform to certain criteria, such as disinterestedness, or not being self-defeating (Parfit, 1984), we must also acknowledge that advocating for a particular notion of value as correct is fundamentally a political act.

#### [5] Actor spec fails in context of space

Milligan 16 - Tony Milligan, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London in the Book “The Ethics of Space Exploration” pgs 132-133, edited by Schwartz and Milligan, published 2016 “Chapter 9: Space Ethics Without Foundations” [Space and Society, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39827-3] Accessed 12/14/21 SAO

If the truth of claims about ethics (including space ethics) is in some way bound up with how authoritative agents might respond, what follows? Well, at least a certain difficulty. Whereas we ordinarily have a good grasp of who might be an authoritative agent with regard to terrestrial matters, and how such agents might see, and respond to, particular actions and events, we have very little grasp of who might count as an authoritative agent in the context of distant space settlements with a range of vulnerabilities and psychological pressures that we simply cannot appreciate. Understanding what it is to be such an agent is very different from understanding a science-fiction film. Beyond accepting various important platitudes about murder, rape and cruelty (a good number of which any livable ethic would have to satisfy) we simply have very little idea of how they would see their worlds and respond to them, very little sense of what the best sort of response would involve. What this means is that the content of any account of the foundations of ethics which we could actually specify, and which might be shared between ourselves and such future agents, would have to be exceptionally thin. It would have to be a list of platitudes in the strict sense, i.e. claims of such an extremely general sort that we are all likely to affirm (and which might establish minimal adequacy conditions for a plausible ethic) but from which very little can actually be deduced. Platitudes of this sort can be very useful. We probably cannot do without them. They may certainly help us to tell if we are on roughly the right track, but they may not do much more than this sort of odd-job. As foundations in the initially specified sense of being both stable (in terms of truth or even assertability by authoritative agents at all times and in all places) and also salient to the deduction of detailed ethical judgements when considered in conjunction with various more local items of knowledge, they will simply be unfit for the task. Stability they might achieve but not stability and deductive salience. Indeed, the former will arguably be secured only at the expense of the latter. The more general they are the more stable they will be, but also the less informative. If this is right then something noteworthy follows about the proper scope of space ethics. Arguably, it has an important role in shaping our deliberations in near and medium-term contexts, the requirements of justice within the latter, what would constitute a sustainable program of activities in space and the rudimentary shape of an appropriate contemporary attitude towards space as the next frontier. This will probably cover us adequately for discussions about the ethics of early settlement but not far beyond it. At some point the frontier simply turns into more of an event horizon. Or, at least, it is not obvious that space ethics is going to be the most illuminating sort of discourse that we can currently bring to bear upon matters in the more distant future. When we attempt to stretch the discourse beyond such bounds it may remain edifying but it will begin to resemble a form of science fiction or perhaps even to constitute a form of the latter. We might also expect it to win fewer awards. (Kim Stanley Robinson and Stephen Baxter need not feel threatened.) In any case, the line between the two will become blurred and it will do so for a good reason. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does mean that the reliability of familiar sorts of ethical deliberation in such contexts will either be compromised or else they will function as a coded way of commenting upon the present or at least upon more proximate matters. (About which something more reliable can be said.) Here, I am drawn to think of my own faltering attempts to make sense of the ethics of life on a multigenerational ship, en route to some other star system, and how indispensable it was to couch the discussion in terms of various classic science fiction treatments of the scenario rather than to build it out of fundamental principles (Milligan 2015a, pp. 134–51). To be sure, something useful can be said in such discussions, but anything deep that is said may turn out to concern our current predicament or what it is to be human rather than space exploration as such. And this is slightly paradoxical because it means that the further we try to reach into a human future in space and understand the ethics of such a future, the more we are thrown back upon what is familiar, proximate and deep. The danger then is one of imagining that we can specify, by appeal to known and homely considerations, more than the very broadest and most general ethical features of how this more distant and troubling future might be lived.

#### [] Impact calc—the aff isn’t consequentialist – a) traversing the fantasy is a way subjects orient themselves towards the world, not a consequence to achieve b) you can’t aggregate because traversing the fantasy is not something to be quantified and c) consequences perpetuate the fantasy by attempting to achieve an unattainable utopia.

#### [] Pain and pleasure are signifiers that we ascribe meaning to but its impossible to describe something as pain or pleasurable because there is no 1:1 relation between signifiers to the signified.