## AC

#### Agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98, David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.

**And because agents takes their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior. Gauthier 2,** David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998 ///AHS PB //Recut by ScopaI shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that **in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations, **each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**, of course, **can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows**. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may represent **such a practice** as capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreement **is the basis of morality**. Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable. **Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**. We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone. **This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**. The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else. **Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one. **Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism.

#### Prefer–

#### 1. the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### 2. Flexibility – Contracts are key to Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

#### 3. Regress – A) Only my framework answers the question “why be moral”, since agents have a reason to restrain their conflict due to self-interest rather than some non-existent transcendental principle B) When we compare between frameworks we suppose a higher evaluative mechanism, which presupposes a higher one, which means only self-contained rules in contracts are coherent.

#### 4. Action theory – Only contracts explain why agents have normative potential with the power to establish ethical principles. Anything else alienates the subject from their own conception of ethics.

#### reject consequences-

[1] Psychology – Agents intuitively don’t like consequences. Botti et al 09, Botti, Simona, Kristina Orfali, and Sheena S. Iyengar. "Tragic Choices: Autonomy and Emotional Responses to Medical Decisions." *J Consum Res Journal of Consumer Research* 36.3 (2009): 337-52. 2009. Web. Specifically, we study how making a tragic choice, versus having the same tragic choice externally made, affects individuals’ desire for autonomy and their emotional reactions to the same decision outcome. Prior research has shown that the sense of agency and internal locus of control associated with the act of choosing lead to perceptions of personal causality, whereas the imposition of a choice is removed from the idea of personal causality because it presupposes an external, rather than internal, locus of control (Brehm 1966; deCharms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1985; Langer 1975; Seligman 1975; Taylor and Brown 1988). Stronger causal ascriptions, in turn, have been found to magnify the intensity of emotional responses to an event, so that perceptions of personal causation intensify positive affect from desirable outcomes but also enhance negative affect from undesirable outcomes (Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen 1995; Landman 1987; Ritov and Baron 1995; Weiner 1986). Thus, we hypothesize that a decision outcome following a tragic choice will generate more extreme negative emotions when it is personally chosen because of a greater sense of causality; in contrast, when the same tragic choice is externally determined, negative emotions will be lessened by the per- ceived absence of a causal link with the aversive experience. Yet the torments of making tragic choices do not necessarily reduce people’s desire for autonomy. Prior research has shown that consumers confronted with choices that detrimentally affect their well-being still prefer making these choices themselves rather than having the same choices made for them by somebody else (Botti and Iyengar 2004; Botti and McGill 2006). This desire for choice in spite of its negative consequences can be attributed to consumers’ belief that they will maximize subjective utility by selecting the option that best matches personal preferences (Hotelling 1929). Even when individuals are unaware of their preferences, choosing activates a psychological immune system that facilitates preference matching by subjectively bolstering the value of a personally selected outcome (Gilbert et al. 1998). Through subjective bolstering decision makers are able to reduce the emotional discomfort of decisions that may not be consistent with individual preferences by con- vincing themselves and others that they had chosen the best- matching option (Brehm 1966; Festinger 1957; Shafir et al. 1993).

#### [2] Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

### Contention

#### [1] The Outer Space Treaty affirms – “national appropriation” in Article 2 applies to all entities under a national sovereign – that’s the best legal meaning and most coherent.

Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 653 2019 <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6> JS

The broad text in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides an ordinary and unambiguous meaning free from absurdity.90 The language of Article II is short: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”91 At first glance, the language clearly intends to bar ownership over all aspects of outer space, with the only wrinkle of confusion being the meaning of “national appropriation.” Stephen Gorove, a space law expert, has suggested it is better to first define appropriation before determining how “national” modifies the term.92 Broadly, appropriation is “the taking of property for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence.”93 In this regard, appropriation is of a “national” character when it is by an entity under the sovereignty of the state from which they come or represent.94 Even though Article II uses the “national” language, its ordinary meaning is most closely linked to all sovereignties and the individuals and entities that attain property rights under the authority of a sovereign. A separate insight of classic legal realism logically lends itself to the same conclusion. For an individual to hold property rights in something, the government must legally recognize the property rights.95 The language of Article II bars governments from recognizing property interests in outer space for themselves. Because individuals and private entities cannot hold property rights in something without recognition from a sovereign that it will protect their rights, a correct interpretation of the language of Article II should bar the ability of private entities and individuals to appropriate rights over celestial resources as well. If a state recognizes a property right held by an individual over a celestial body or resource, such recognition would constitute a form of national appropriation because it is essentially “a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals” to that body or resource.96 The text of Article II naturally leads to the conclusion that its non-appropriation language is binding on all actors— state and private.

#### [2] This is in line with the spirit of the treaty.

Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 653 2019 (2) <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6> JS

There exists a direct counter-argument that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty does not apply to private actors at all, only to state actors.150 This argument rests primarily on the idea that a treaty is a kind of contract between states that benefits their citizens but does not directly bind their citizens to international obligations.151 However, the purpose behind the drafting of the Treaty in the first place most logically stands for the conclusion that ensuring safety and ecological standards in outer space has always been important.152 Allowing a loophole for private actors to essentially do whatever they want with celestial resources and planetary bodies goes directly against the core purpose of having such a treaty in the first place.

#### [3] OST not mentioning private entities flows aff – accepted legal interpretation means this proves lack of intent to exclude private entities.

Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 653 2019 (3) <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6> JS


Expressio unius est exclusion alterius is a widely accepted international canon of interpretation.127 It states that when interpreting international materials, one should presume things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.128 Defined as “[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative,”129 the canon can theoretically be applied to support the conclusion that the Outer Space Treaty does indeed prohibit the appropriation of celestial resources by both state and private actors. At the time of the Treaty’s drafting, in the 1960s, only state actors were interested in outer space endeavors; it was far beyond the realm of possibility for the drafters to even imagine the technological advancements and privatization of space interests that have since occurred. Through the treaty, the drafters were speaking only to the audience to whom it would apply: sovereigns. If the drafters intended for private actors to be governed differently, expressio unius could be applied negatively to support that they would have explicitly addressed this in the Treaty.130 Because Article II of the Treaty addresses a specific issue (non-appropriation of celestial resources and bodies) within the context of every actor to which it applied at the time of its drafting (state actors only), the canon should apply to say if the drafters wanted any interested entity to be excluded from the Treaty’s non-appropriation effect, they would have expressly stated so in the text, thus drastically altering its literal interpretation.

#### [4] Contractarianism requires parties to be on equal footing when entering agreements or else the agreement is corrupted by the unequal influence of those in power. However, private corporations skew this by violating the common heritage doctrine central to the OST and unequally centralizing the benefits from space appropriation.

## disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – screenshots in the doc prove they don’t



#### 1- Open source does equal the playing field

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.

#### Fairness is a voter since if the rounds been skewed its impossible to determine who the better debater was. Education- constitutive purpose ie why schools fund. Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline 2. Necessitates judge intervention to see if we meet th brightline and 3 collapses because we use offense defense paradigm. Drop the debater on theory: 1. Drop the arg is the same thing since the argument was their entire advocacy text. 2. Its key to deterring future abuse No RVIs – a] illogical – fairness is a burden just like the aff has the burden of inherency b] norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms c] chilling effect – debaters are scared to check real abuse which means inf abuse goes unchecked d] substance crowdout – prevents 1AR blipstorms and allows us to get back to substance