## fwk

#### Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –

#### The world is structured by language—signifiers mediate reality by defining concepts through differentiation, or by classifying them by what they are not. However, the nature of that opposition is unstable because signifiers’ meaning is constantly in flux.

* **Van Haute 3 – Van Haute in Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Fall 2003** (Philippe. *Against Adaptation Lacan's "Subversion" of the Subject*. Other Press, 2003) [<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/46467/pdf>] Accessed 1/14/19 AHS//EMM

Thus it also becomes clear why we said, in our exposition of Freud above, that the expression “reality outside of us” re- quires further consideration, and cannot simply be accepted as it stands. The world in which we carry on our everyday ex-istence is always already structured by the signifiers of language. The world in which we shape our lives receives its form from our expectations, intentions, representations, and so on, and these are themselves structured in turn by the symbolic systems that determine us (for example, in articulating the difference between man and woman). At the very least, then, the opposition between language and the thing about which it speaks is more complex than we suggested above, and than Freud sometimes seems to think. The world about which we speak and in which we live is no “brute” reality; it is itself al-ready mediated and structured by the signiﬁers of language, which allow it to appear as a meaningful and differentiated environment (Umwelt). The signiﬁer actively institutes meaning. Language does not simply reflect reality; it is not the expression of a previ-ously given order. The reality in which we carry on our existence must, on the contrary, be understood in a pregnant sense as the effect of the order of signiﬁers. In this context, Lacan points out that signifiers are essentially determined diacritically or differentially. In other words, they signify primarily on the basis of their difference from other signiﬁers and not, for ex-ample, by referring to a non-linguistic reality. Let us return to our example of the difference between “man” and “woman.” It is clear that the signiﬁer “man” only has meaning as opposed to the signiﬁer “wom[x]n”—for what could “man” mean with-out “wom[x]n”? The signifiers “man” and “woman” receive fur-ther meaning from a complex network of references in which signifiers such as “human,” “animal.” and “plant,” for example, hold a central place. The meaning of a signifier is in the first place dependent upon the linguistic context of which it is a part. Moreover, the fact that a signiﬁer only receives meaning from a complex network of signitive references immediately implies, for Lacan, that the meaning of a signiﬁer changes ac-cording to the context in which it is taken up. When an analysand says in an analytical session, Je vais a la mer (“I am going to the sea”). the analyst might hear, le vais a la mere (“I am going to the mother”), basing her interpretation on other associations that the analysand has formulated in the course of this or other sessions. A second example can perhaps make the point somewhat clearer. Some years ago, for professional reasons, I opened a bank account in Holland, and the bank clerk asked if I had any “titles.” 1 replied that I did, but immediately added that I wanted to keep them in Belgium, where l was liv-ing at the time. The man looked at me strangely, and asked me if the “titles” were not valid in Holland. After a bit of talking back and forth, it turned out that he had meant academic titles, while I, because of my Belgian background, had understood “titles” in the sense of the French titles (“financial securities").9 Just as the associative context determined the meaning of the signifier mer/mere (“sea”/“mother") in the first example, so here the meaning of the signiﬁer “title” changes depending on whether it is to be understood in an academic context or an economic one. The production of meaning is thus in principle a process that cannot be closed off. There is no ultimate con- text that could, as it were, embrace all contexts and so bring the production of meaning to completion.

#### The differential nature of language necessitates that signifiers inevitably fail to translate what the subject wants to express, creating a constitutive lack. Through continuous attempts to fill lack and become complete, minorities are excluded through their inability to match the perceived perfection of the perfect subject.

**Viego 7,** Antonio. *Dead Subjects Toward a Politics of Loss in Latino Studies*. Duke University Press, 2007.

As I briefly explained earlier, every human organism must at some point choose language in order to express his or her needs. Bruce Fink succinctly argues that the child allows ‘‘him or herself to be represented by words.’’42 In Seminar 1, Lacan illustrates this point when he teaches, ‘‘All human beings share in the universe of symbols. They are included in it and submit to it, much more than they constitute it. They are much more its supports than its agents.’’43 Since language is a system of signifiers in which each signifier means something only by virtue of its difference from another signifier, every demand we make in language will always have a distorting effect with respect to the need we try to express in its medium. There are, ultimately, no positive terms in language. When the human organism inscribes itself in language it be-comes a subject of language, and as a result of this inscription every determi-nation of the subject will be by necessity indeterminate. Lacan understands the inscription of the subject in language as constituting a loss, a loss of a hypothesized fullness prior to the impact of language that he will refer to as belonging to the order of the Real. This notion of fullness prior to language is also conceptually linked to Lacan’s theory of jouissance. The privative effects of language as structure on the speaking organism, therefore, have to do with this primordial loss. Once we become subjects of the signifier we can never simply make good on this loss; it is irremediable. And what of the generative effects of language as structure on the speaking human organism? These have to do with how language generates human desire. Dean describes how ‘‘the agent of the cut that produces both subject and object is, of course, language. According to Lacan, symbolic networks dissect the human body, producing leftovers that cause desire. The ill fit between language and the body introduces wrinkles and gaps that generate desire. We might say that the unconscious and desire exist only as a conse-quence of this disharmony between the structures of language and those of the body.’’44 The understanding of the subject as an effect of the signifier and the idea of this primordial loss that attends each human subject’s inscription in language continue not to figure in theories of ethnic-racialized subjectivity and experi-ence within critical race and ethnicity studies knowledge projects like Latino and Chicano studies, for example. Why, we might ask, should we even be concerned with these failures of engagement? What, if anything, do we stand to lose or gain by taking or not taking these issues into consideration? The result for our scholarship is an undertheorized explanation of loss and trauma at the psychic, political, juridical, and economic levels, as well as an overly simplistic and commonsensical conceptualization of human subjectivity in which we bracket the effects of language on the speaking organism in order to win back some empty promise of fullness and completeness. In this latter compensatory, falsely reparative critical move, we, against our best intentions, provide precisely the image of ethnic-racialized subjectivity as whole, com- plete, and transparent, an image upon which racist discourse thrives and against which we imagine we are doing battle.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace the lack. This is key to preventing psychological violence and coheres the nature of who you are.

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] //ahs em

It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-widening spiral of existential deadends. How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

#### Impact calculus –

#### [1] It’s a question of orientation towards the form of desire which is a prior question to the content of that practice and proves consequences are incoherent

#### [2] The aff comes on the same layer as theory, offense is whether space appropriation embraces or further the lack, and we only gain offense under the standard. This is reasonable clarification- check othr in cx.

#### Embracing the lack as a form of abjection is key to deconstructing dominant social order and allows for liberating empowerment of marginalized bodies.

**Sandoval-Sanchez 05,** Alberto. “Politicizing Abjection: In the Manner of a Prologue for the Articulation of AIDS Latino Queer Identities.” American Literary History, Oxford University Press, www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/stable/pdf/3567907.pdf?refreqid=search%3A65f310cecaaae277446c9633d2f17f6e.//Scopa Julia Kristeva defines **abjection** in Powers of Horror in terms of "what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules" (4) **allows for the examination of** the very special **dynamics between self and other in queer male bodies in given relations of power that fuel the machinery of homophobia, racism, xenophobia, machismo, and AIDS phobia. Abject bodies are repulsive because they manifest and inflict a confusion of boundaries which** punctures, fractures, and **fragments** the assumed unity, **stability**, and closure **of the identity of the hegemonic subject** and the body politic of the nation. Although abjection is "above all about ambiguity" (9), it still has the power to be felt somatically and symbolically; it infects/affects both the material body and the self. Elizabeth Grosz's theorization on the abject is applicable here to visualizing its existential dimension: "**It is** the underside of a stable subject identity, **an abyss at the borders of the subject's existence**, a hole into which the subject may fall when its identity is put into question." (72). For this reason, **it must be kept in check, out of sight,** always expurgated **to avoid** any erosion and/or **traversal of borders. Threatening to contaminate the symbolic order, undoing cultural taboos** around the body, **and putting at risk all systems of cultural order** and logic, **people of color, homosexuals, people living with AIDS, and migrants** in the US **must be kept at bay and relegated to the margins, just as bodily fluids, secretions, and waste are repelled**. Once expelled from the national body politic, **the unclean and improper Other is translated as** an alien, as a monster, **an excess or lack that provokes disgust, anxiety, horror, and fear**. I propose that the queer Latino abject subject located at the privileged site of boundaries can empower himself given his posi tionality between exclusion and incorporation**. Abject Latino queer bodies in liminal zones of abjection can transgress borders, allowing for the possibility of subversion and emancipation**. In this way, **abject** Latino queer **bodies are dangerous because they** do **challenge and menace the fragile limits of the order of things and social**. The **politics of abjection** that I suggest is rooted in Latino queer bodies with AIDS-unos cuerpos marked by race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, AIDS, and migration, unoscuerpos that endanger and **trouble the cohesion of the social order by destabilizing the borders between normal and deviant**, insider and outsider, sameness and difference, health and illness, life and death. These bodies are the site where abjection operates to validate difference and alterity. **It is through the condition of abjection**-that continual struggle between the subject and the abject-**that a subjectivity in process is articulated in all its performativity**. By centering on how abjection is experienced en came y hueso, my approach allows for the notion of perceiving abjection as a performative act, "a doing and a thing done" (Diamond 1), **always a becoming that has the potential to disrupt normality**. It is **through** unending acts of **performative abjection** that **the marginalized Other can gain agency**, subvert, and resist. I want to inquire specifically how Latino queer bodies materialize and enact abjection as a strategic performance where identity is always in the making to manifest difference and display a new politics of identity in all its inconsistencies and paradoxes. I am interested in investigating what modalities of abjection operate in Latino/a queer cultural projects and how abjection molds new forms of cultural pro duction. Indeed, up to what point do Latino/a queer cultural performances materialize a discursive site of/for abjection that menaces the homogeneity and stability of official hegemonic culture and identity and its anxieties that keep the queer, the AIDS survivor, the Latino/a migrant, the racial and ethnic Other locked in place? Since abjection problematizes bodies and identities once boundaries are crossed, what is at stake is the dramatic construction of subjectivities in process and mutational identity formations always at risk of dis solution and further marginalization. By privileging and reclaiming abjection, the Other inhabits a liminal and interstitial space that rec ognizes the provisionality of identity and the processual nature of cultural practices, such as transculturation. In the words of Kristeva: "Where am I? instead of Who am I? For the space that engrosses the deject, the excluded, is never one, nor homogeneous, not totalizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and catastrophic. A diviser of ter ritories, languages, works, the deject never stops demarcating his universe whose fluids confines.., constantly question his solidity and impel him to start afresh" (8). In doing so, **to embrace abjection is to undo**, in some part, **racism, shame, homophobia, and the fear of death, allowing for a source of self-empowerment and a liberating counterhegemonic force** of bodies in revolt that corporalize difference and heterogeneity with the potential to never cease **"challeng[ing their] master" with** a boundary crisis, the instability of meaning, and the **disruption of order**.

#### Prefer the framework –

#### [1] Solves oppression- [a] Empowerment – overcoming the lack ensures agents view themselves as active which motivates agents to combat systems of oppression rather than viewing themselves as passive objects. [b] Explanatory power –oppression operates through the categorization and otherization from the lack.

#### [2] Performativity – debate is a fundamentally a game. We desire wins and avoid losses – only psychoanalysis explains the constitutive drives of the activity which proves it outweighs.

#### [3] Bindingness – the lack is constitutive to the structure of language and the nature of the subject. Any action a subject take is inevitably mediated through signification. We cannot escape our mediation through language which means an understanding of it comes first.

#### [4] All communication is constrained by the lack, even the flow because of its linguistic content, which means the standard is a side constraint on the judge evaluating the round.

#### [5] Desires come first-

#### A) Only my framework answers the question “why act”, since agents have a reason to due to their own motivations rather than some non-existent transcendental principle.

#### B) Identity –the creation of the subject determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.

#### C) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.

#### [6] Staticizing identity is violent- [a] Molarity– conflating macropolitical structures with ontological reality flattens millions of experiences with essentialist notions of ontological death. [b] ressentiment- the reactive definition of minorities to historical events destroys the possibility of freedom and the active creation of value. [c] temporality that is always associated with the oppressor fixates whiteness into originary agency.

## Offense

#### I defend The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### [1] Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new “frontiers” and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. Privatized space research mobilizes fears of ecological, political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for new utopian futures, or the search for Earth 2.0. These imaginaries reflect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier. In contrast, eco-centric visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroyers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a multispecies process—off the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. This article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and political earthly life. Outer space imaginaries are booming. Reborn from Cold War projects into the post-9/11 securitized era, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are proliferating, creating new material impacts and new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion. Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of technoscientific progress and human mastery over nature. Space programs are increasingly privatized, with tech entrepreneurs leading the way to extraterrestrial futures. I refer to these projects, oft en framed as a necessary step in human social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on Earth. Th ese share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defi ned by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question. Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, innovation, or human exceptionalism, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace intention from life’s expansion. Earth 2.0 and Home and Away 159 eco-centric imaginaries off er diff erent understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories. Th is article traces these two imaginaries for the future of life aft er Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. Th e word “imaginaries” builds on the definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of effects and entanglements between language, cultural production, scientifi c research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial expansionary megaprojects. Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research programs, policy proposals, social movements, and private investments, they bring displacements of ontological, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present—with both oppressive and liberatory possibilities (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconfi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements work through analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar 2017). These two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve seeing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter 1997). Th ese visions range from the widespread use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s uniqueness in the universe, to the politically unifying “overview eff ect” proposed by Frank White (1987). Early space programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientifi c understandings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-fi rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present” (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication fi gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. 160 Micha Rahder Leaving Earth—Fact or Fiction? Th ere is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. Th e boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Th ese projects and imaginaries share signifi cant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, known as SETI (Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spacefl ight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. Th is article has a bias toward US-based projects, both public and private, as these are most prolifi c and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private companies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. Th e charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republican Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a scientifi c institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imaginaries are on the rise as the international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself. Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fi ction and fantasy long relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). Th is division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical, and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). Th e Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fi ction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fi elds are drawing attention to how science fi ction has long infl uenced technological and scientifi c developments, particularly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfi eld notes, “fi ctions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. Th ese dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams fi nding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fi ctional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the Home and Away 161 scientifi c gaze (Redfi eld 2002). Language can shape the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might participate in them. Refl ecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and diff erence as opposed to a unifi ed singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While biological and philosophical debates over the defi nition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that defi ne life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief history of human projects oriented toward life’s expansion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. Th is focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). Th is choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward, examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfi guring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to Anthropocene “ Th ings that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting human expansion into space have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy 2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientifi c progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close relation with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capacity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth” environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, reinforcing ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management of more-than-human worlds (DeLoughrey 2014). Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the United States and Europe have oft en been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather than imagining others we might one day escape to (Cockell 2006). Narratives of new capitalist frontiers led many environmentalists to view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle**,”** fearing it will lead to ideologies of a disposable planet (Hartmann 1986). Yet expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extraterrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, entrepreneurial capitalists—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fi ll this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most oft en articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond Earth is no longer defi ned by competing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shift ed from sudden nuclear annihilation to the slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Th ough understood as new or diff erent, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastructures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa. As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way. These sometimes amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth, and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control. This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries Earth 2.0 Dominating current eff orts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partnerships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range from imperialist nationalisms to profi ts to new utopian Home and Away 163 social orders, oft en mixed together in unexpected confi gurations. Yet these Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures.

#### Alienation from nature leads to violent tech management.

Dodds 12 - Joseph Dodds, MPhil, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK, MA, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK BSc, Psychology and Neuroscience, Manchester University, UK, Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol) of the British Psychological Society (BPS), and a member of several other professional organizations such as the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, 2012 [“Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos” p 70 ]cdm recut ahs emi

Here there are echoes of Freud's (1916) idea of 'anticipatory mourning' and the associated attacks and spoiling that we will study below (see p. 72). However, for Searles **the natural world is not just a space for externalizing our conflicts.** Rather, **a healthy relationship to the non-human environment is essential for human psychological well-being.** Furthermore, one consequence of our **alienation from nature is an omnipotent longing for fusion with our technology,** and a powerful anxiety should this fully occur. Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology which is wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead ... [**T]his technology-dominated world [is] so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience** ... to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it ... [T]his 'outer' reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous waste products are part of our physical selves (Searles 1972: 368**) The further we are alienated from nature, the more we are driven into primitive regressive identification and omnipotent fascination with our technology**, a powerful positive feedback loop. **The inner conflict between our human and non-human selves**, and our animal and technological natures, **is projected onto the environment, further rupturing the relationship and leading to a spiral of destructiveness as we** 'project this conflict upon, and thus unconsciously **foster, the war** in external reality between the beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and \*(hu)man's technology which is ravaging them' (ibid.). Here we are in Klein's paranoid-schizoid world, with a primitive ego unable to differentiate between good and bad mother. While ecologists portray a good eco-mummy doing battle with bad techno-mummy, things are not so simple. As we have seen, civilization (and its technology) is a defence, a 'good mother' to protect us from capricious and uncaring mother nature (Freud 1930), but, as Searles suggests, we are supposed to accept that 'our good mother is poisoning us' (Searles 1972: 369). For Searles (1972), behind both nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe lies the raw destructiveness Kleinians link to Thanatos, or what Erich Fromm (1992) understands in terms of necrophilia. Searles (1972: 370) argues that at this level of functioning **we project 'our own pervasive, poorly differentiated and poorly integrated murderousness, bora of our terror and deprivation and frustration, upon the hydrogen bomb, the military-industrial complex, technology.'** We may find the slow, more controllable death from pollution preferable to 'sudden death from nuclear warfare' or we might yearn for the quick relief of a nuclear blast to the 'slow strangulation' of environmental devastation (Searles 1972: 370). Living with such apocalyptic threats leads to a kind of ultimate version of the defence Anna Freud (1936) described as identification with the aggressor. At an unconscious level **we powerfully identify with what we perceive as omnipotent and immortal technology, as a defense against** intolerable feelings of insignificance, of deprivation, of guilt, of **fear of death** ... Since the constructive goal of saving the world can be achieved only by one's working, as but one largely anonymous individual among uncounted millions ... **it is more alluring to give oneself over to secret fantasies of omnipotent destructiveness, in identification with the forces that threaten to destroy the world.** This serves to shield one from the recognition of one's own guilt-laden murderous urges, experienced as being within oneself, to destroy one's own intrapersonal and interpersonal world. (Searles 1972: 370) In this view, **we are seeing a kind of repetition on a planetary level of an early intrapsychic anxiety situation.** In childhood 'a fantasied omnipotence protected us against the fUll intensity of our feelings of deprivation, and now it **is dangerously easy to identify with seemingly limitless technology and to fail to cope with the life-threatening scarcity of usable air, food, and water on our planet'** (ibid.). Unfortunately our technological powers have outstripped our emotional maturity, and the omnipotent phantasies of infancy now have a frightening objectivity. In place of a religion we no longer believe in, or hopes for future generations we no longer have meaningful contact with, we identify with our immortal, inanimate technology. In this realm of omnipotent fantasy ... mother earth is equivalent to all of reality ... a drag ... to **our yearnings for unfettered omnipotence** ... It may be not at all coincidental that our world today **is threatened with extinction** through environmental pollution, to which we are so strikingly apathetic, just when we seem on the threshold of technologically breaking the chains that have always bound our race to this planet of our origin. I suspect that we collectively quake lest our infantile omnipotent fantasies become fully actualized through man's becoming interplanetary and ceasing thereby to be man ... [W]e are powerfully drawn to suicidally polluting our planet so as to ensure our dying upon it as men, rather than existing elsewhere as ... gods or robots ... [T]he greatest danger lies neither in the hydrogen bomb ... nor in the more slowly lethal effect of pollution ... [but] in the fact that the world is in such a state as to evoke our very earliest anxieties and at the same time to offer the delusional 'promise' ... of assuaging these anxieties, effacing them, by fully externalizing and reifying our most primitive conflicts ... **In the pull upon us to become omnipotently free of human conflict, we are in danger of bringing about our extinction.** (Searles 1972: 371

#### [2] Extraterrestrial imaginaries scapegoat culpability of environmental destruction and are unobtainable utopias.

**Rahder 2** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] // ahs emi

These utopian visions are still grounded by earthly concerns. Jacob Haqq-Misra argues for “liberating Mars,” basing future settlement not on an extension of earthly sociopolitics (whether organized in terms of nation-states or corporations) but instead by establishing a new Martian planetary citizenship to create a “test bed for new ideas that could lead to unforeseen epistemic transformations of our values and preferences” (2016: 66). Yet his argument compares this “transformative experience” to a “trust fund child” gaining new values from a wilderness trip (65). “Nature”—whether earthly wilderness or Martian extremity—is called upon as a resource for human cultural transformation, reimagining a modernist dichotomy as the basis for a planetary move beyond modernism. Th ese narratives frame the search for a new Earth 2.0 as a necessary project for collective human and environmental survival. Defl ecting critiques that space programs divert too many resources from earthly problems, Cameron Smith and Evan Davies (2012) claim that “all worthwhile things” (among which they list boats and wedding rings) are worth large expense. Space expansion, framed as a form of long-term insurance for the human species, is moved from the question “Can we aff ord to go?” to “Can we aff ord not to?” (Hartmann 1986). This powerful mixture of apocalyptic narratives, new resource frontiers, and utopian schemes combine to create a sense of space expansion as not just inevitable, but a present in which we are behind rather than working toward something yet to come. As Musk argued in a speech at the International Astronautical Congress: “It’s 2017 . . . We should have a lunar base by now.” Th is present, beholden to the future, makes strange work of history. Earth 2.0 imaginaries offer the opportunity to start anew; these narratives erase collective responsibility for harms done by colonial projects and seem to “cleanse” history (Redfi eld 2002: 797). Alternately, history is turned into an “objective” knowledge resource for avoiding repeated mistakes (e.g., HaqqMisra 2016). Most striking is the frequent collapse of timescales, with recent historical and deep evolutionary time brought into new resonances (Codignola et al. 2009). Space expansion is commonly fi gured as an inevitable step in a conjoined evolutionary-colonial history: “We wriggled onto dry land, ventured out of the African savannah as apes, set sail for new worlds—how Home and Away 165 could we not expect, someday, to live in colonies on Titan or starships cruising through deep space?” (Austen 2011). Th is vision places white, Western, masculine techno-capitalist humanity at the pinnacle of evolutionary scales. Th e future Earth left behind in Earth 2.0 imaginaries tends to fall into two categories. By far, the most common are visions of an Earth destroyed, uninhabitable to humans if not to all carbon-based life. Other narratives project that we might get off Earth in time to “save” it from ourselves, leaving behind a global park of purifi ed nature (Austen 2011). Both versions resonate with environmentalisms that take an anti-humanist turn, as in visions of humanity as a global pollution or disease, out of balance, or otherwise in need of reduction or eradication (Anker 2005; Dumit 2005). Projections of natural purity resonate in multiple directions, into pasts and futures, and both on and away from Earth. Lisa Messeri (2017a), working with scientists searching for potentially habitable exoplanets, notes that “earthlike” planets are imagined as a kind of new Eden, representing a purification of human industrial histories by way of long-term futures. These futures of Earth 2.0 proliferate both at home and away—a rebooted humanity off ered a chance to “do nature better,” to recapture Eden.

#### Envisioning utopias will always fail and causes psychic violence.

Stavrakakis, 99 Yannis Stavrakakis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government @ University of Essex; *Lacan and the Political*, pg. 99-100 // ahs emi

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopia**n** meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat.The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same.

#### [3] privitzated appropriation of space is a narcissistic search for fulfillment and wholeness, which is structurally impossible because of alienation from the real.

**Kilbryde 15** - “Space Travel as a Means for Re-Enchantment, Unification, and Spiritual Fulfillment” by Ana Kilbryde\* The University of Brighton, East Sussex, United Kingdom [http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/Journal/JOA-Final/JournalOfAstrosociology-Vol1.pdf#page=89] // ahs emi

One may describe this sense of unification with the universe as something incomprehensible and sublime. It certainly cannot fit into any existing framework, as nondualism is a primordial, organic consciousness without subject or object (Katz, 2007, p. 3-14). Moreover, attempting to categorize a sense of unity into a theoretical framework requires recognition of an object, which implies a duality between the object and the subject. After all, the argument here is that the search for unification results from a sense of separation brought about by dualist ideologies and binary modes of thinking. This “ecstasy of unity” runs parallel to what Abraham Maslow (1976, p. 6-16) deemed ‘peak experiences’. These are mystical experiences of egoless amalgamation with the world. They are experiences of wholeness and integration in which the individual existed effortlessly in the here and now. Both these peak experiences and experiences of unity are comparable to ideas inherent in East Asian religions such as Confucianism and ideas such as Zen. These experiences of unity hold no definitions of the world or distinctions between us and the cosmos, and assumedly neither do feelings of enchantment, as its adversary, i.e., disenchantment, is a consequence of rationalization. In Ideas and Opinions, Einstein wrote that “The true value of a human being is determined by the measure and the sense in which he has attained liberation from the self” (Einstein, 1954, p. 12). Therefore, one may view enchantment through unification as an abandonment of one’s identity, self, and ego, and as an appreciation of a unified existence. A notion incredibly similar to the ‘ecstasy of unity’ is the concept of the ‘Overview Effect’, which is a term formulated by Frank White (1987) in his book The Overview Effect – Space Exploration and Human Evolution. White’s interest lies with the experiences astronauts encounter when looking upon the Earth from space, which has been described as a cognitive shift in one’s awareness (White, 1987). Astronauts have claimed that during this time, the conflicts that divide our society vanish, boundaries disappear, and there is an inherent urge to create a unified planetary existence. They also claim to possess a new appreciation for the preciousness and size of our planet and a will to protect this ‘pale blue dot’ (Sagan, 1994) becomes clear and critical. Flight experience has spiritually transformed an increasing number of astronauts, and reports indicate that this change in attitude often remains long after they return to Earth. Rusty Schweickart, Chris Hadfield, Mike Massimino, and Tom Jones are among the astronauts said to have experienced the effect (Sato, 2008). In recent years, space psychologists commenced research upon the salutogenic aspects of space flight (Suedfeld, 2005), that is, focusing on the benefits that arise from stressful or somewhat negative experiences during space programs. Suedfeld et al. (2010) investigated the memoirs of 125 space travelers and found that from stressful and somewhat negative experiences in space, these individuals developed greater levels of appreciation for others and nature, enhanced spirituality and power over that spirituality, and enhanced personal strength. This finding indicates that space travel has the potential to foster enlightenment and unification. Scientific discoveries have painted a picture of an infinite universe with the potential for endless discoveries and countless possibilities, and this potentially arouses enchantment and awe. However, does this re-enchantment serve as a prelude to, or even a manifestation of, narcissism? It is not dismissible, as Christopher Lasch (1991, p. 13-15) recognizes a rising level of selfawareness, self-identity, self-reflexivity, and celebrity status and acclamation in today’s society. The concept of narcissism that Lasch is referring to is not the same as the definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), although they do share characteristics. Instead, the focus here is upon Lasch’s idea of the narcissist in an ever-growing capitalist society. Among incessant self-awareness, reflexivity and self-affirmation, the narcissist tends to seek meaning in every aspect of their lives, their cravings have no limits and they never seem to be satisfied. This implies that the search for unification may well be the narcissist seeking self-fulfillment, that it is superficial rather than spiritual and may just be another thing they want to attain. Similarly, Dickens and Ormrod “have argued that members of the pro-space movement exhibit a form of adult narcissism” (Ormrod, 2007; Dickens & Ormrod, 2007, p. 137). Space travel, capital, and industry could be viewed as an attempt to regain feelings of omnipotence similar to that felt at the stage of primary narcissism whereby the mother and the rest of the world is seen as an extension of the infant’s self, so he therefore mistakes this dependence on his mother as his own supremacy (Freud, 1973). Dickens and Ormrod (2007, p. 138) make comparable links between experiencing space and primary narcissism, e.g., the feeling of weightlessness in space is similar to the feeling experienced in the womb and argues the journey to space is a representation of a universal urge to detach themselves from the mother.

#### Fantasy productions are not neutral models of risk but collusions between capital and state that prevent the change they’ll talk about. The aff rejects this model of beautifying space policy.

**Ormrod 11 -** “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space” by James S Ormrod School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, Falmer BN1 9PH, Sussex, England; e-mail: j.s.ormrod@brighton.ac.uk Received 17 August 2011; in revised form 19 September 2012 [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/d16511] // ahs emi

I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe. The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension). This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of NASA’s Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). Beyond world risk society? 741 The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy, as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power. Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities. Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd. Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space. Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999).

## method

#### The aff gets perms. Inter-disciplinarity is essential in space

Schwartz & Milligan 16 - James S.J. Schwartz, Department of Philosophy, Wichita State University, and Tony Milligan, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, in the Book “The Ethics of Space Exploration” pgs 1-3, published 2016 ““Chapter 1: Introduction: The Scope and Content of Space Ethics” [Space and Society, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39827-3] Accessed 12/1/21 SAO

Space ethics epitomizes inter-disciplinarity. Its contributors range from astrobiologists to science fiction authors, from geologists to philosophers, from lawyers to political scientists; and from engineers to planetary scientists. It should come as no surprise, then, that space ethics as a field of inquiry resists a simple, unified description. Rather, it is comprised of a broad spectrum of issues and questions that draw on equally diverse intellectual resources. On the more “theoretical” side of this spectrum are characteristically normativeand meta-ethical questions, i.e., questions related to the construction, standing and evaluation of ethical theories: Does the space environment (including the solar system and beyond) contain anything of inherent value (i.e., anything that is valuable for its own sake)?1 Or is space a mere instrument available for the satisfaction our preferences? What is the moral status of our relationships to various aspects of the space environment—e.g., do we have an ethical obligation to respect or constrain our activities on entities such as asteroids, comets, moons, or planets? If extraterrestrial life (including microbial life) is discovered, would it fall under the scope of moral consideration? And if so, in what way? And for what reasons? And to what degree? In short, how should the consideration of the space environment impact upon the way in which we reason about what to do and about what matters? Meanwhile, on the more “practical” side of the spectrum, there are a variety of questions about the ethical evaluation of existing and proposed activities in space: 1. Can national and global expenditures on space exploration be justified? Is existing support adequate, insufficient, or superfluous? How should this support be divided between human and robotic exploration? 2. What are the risks associated with various forms of space travel, including long-duration spaceflight? Are space travel participants given adequate information about these risks, and is their assessment of them sufficiently objective? 3. To what extent should we preserve pristine space environments, such as asteroids or planetary surfaces? Are sites potentially home to extraterrestrial life (or traces of past life) more worthy of preservation? How diligently must we work to avoid contaminating extraterrestrial sites with terrestrial microbes, some of which might survive long periods of exposure to vacuum? Why is any preservation warranted in the first place—to protect opportunities for scientific research? Or because, e.g., asteroids or planetary surfaces, or extraterrestrial life forms, are inherently valuable and hence worth preserving for their own sake? 4. What is the most fair and effective way to regulate particularly “popular” locations in space, e.g., low-Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbit (GEO)? Orbital slots in LEO are particularly useful for Earth observation satellites, and LEO is the dominant milieu of human spaceflight. Meanwhile, GEO is particularly useful for global telecommunication satellites. Should access to positions in Earth orbit be permitted on a first-come, first-served basis, or should access to Earth orbit be subject to some kind of social justice constraint? 5. Debris from nearly 60 years of activity in space poses an increasing hazard to both human and remote operations in Earth orbit. What responsibilities do we have to limit the production of this debris? Are we obliged to “clean up” this debris if we can develop the requisite capabilities? 6. Should property rights be granted to those interested in developing space resources, e.g., to corporations such as Planetary Resources, which are interested in extracting mineral resources from asteroids? Should the granting of these rights be made on a basis of first-come, first-served, or should there be an equitable sharing of the resources from space? Would it ever be permissible to terraform a planet, i.e., to use geophysical engineering to turn a previously uninhabitable planet into one that is suitable for human settlement? 7. What kinds of challenges will denizens of space colonies and settlements face? What form of governance or social organization would maximize colonists’ security and their personal liberty in an extremely hostile environment where basic resources, such as water and air, must be manufactured? As the reader will see, most of these questions—“theoretical” and “practical” alike—are treated in the contributions to this volume. And for a variety of answers to them we point you to the subsequent chapters. What we wish to emphasize at present is that none of the above questions fall under the exclusive remit of any one scientific, or philosophical (or other liberal arts) discipline. For instance, the “theoretical” task of constructing an ethical theory for conduct in space should draw not only on discussions in philosophy (viz., normative ethics), it should also draw on the space sciences—astrobiology, astronomy, planetary science, etc. After all, an adequate ethic for space should be designed with some minimal account of what the space environment is comprised of. Similarly for the specific question of the moral status of extraterrestrial life, which implicates not only astrobiology and normative ethics, but also chemistry and biology in the sciences, and in philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language. Regarding the more characteristically “practical” questions, resolving those identified in (1) relies critically on the space and social sciences. The space sciences for limning the possibilities of exploration and the expansion of scientific knowledge; the social sciences (anthropology; economics; philosophy; sociology) for assessing and predicting how the course of space exploration will impact upon society. After all, the value of scientific research more generally, and space research in particular, is not often self-evident—its manifestation requires a human perspective. Detailing the risks implicated in (2) requires extensive biological and medical knowledge about the effects of reduced- and micro-gravity environments on living organisms. Thus any ethical assessment of the risks posed to space travel participants would not only be an exercise in bioethics and business ethics, but also an exercise in the life sciences. In addition to many of the disciplines already mentioned, the questions identified in (3)–(6) pertain to the law and regulation of space, and thus call on counsel from space lawyers and policymakers. And finally, the task of how to maximize liberty and security in space settlements (7) raises questions of interest to engineers, political philosophers, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. Neither our list of ‘big questions’ nor our list of relevant disciplines is meant to be exhaustive, but we hope that the reader is left with the impression that space ethics presents a unique and engaging setting for the fruitful interchange of ideas from a diverse array of scientific and liberal arts perspectives. To this end, the contributions to the volume are accessible and state-of-the-art overviews of several of the major issues in space ethics, and should provide readers with an authoritative introduction to the key issues in the field. However, since a history of space ethics is not the particular subject matter of any contribution, we find it helpful here to provide a brief overview of the development of space ethics as it pertains (broadly) to the contributions to this volume.

#### Methodological pluralism is essential to disability studies

Baglieri 10 - Susan Baglieri, Jan W. Valle, David J. Connor, and Deborah J. Gallagher, Journal for Remedial and Special Education, March 5th 2010 “Disability Studies in Education: The Need for a Plurality of Perspectives on Disability” [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0741932510362200] Accessed 4/26/19 SAO

Like Andrews et al. (2000), we find no use for the notion that competing methodological frameworks, ideas, or positions must inevitably give rise to schisms (or opposing factions) that make dialogue and action impossible. Nor do we believe that disagreement must invariably produce discordance. Much depends on how we approach disagreement. It can either be welcomed as an opportunity to deepen and broaden understanding, or it can be met with resistance and even outright rejection. The latter does not appear to have served us very well. A refusal to participate in genuine dialogue rarely does. More often than not, it leads to a lot of hard feelings and misunderstandings, but not much else. Jim Paul (2002) made the case that “the strong resistance to philosophical changes is a marker for a discipline, or area of professional practice, being in the ‘parenthesis’ of change, or experiencing the cumulative effects of bracketing ideas that do not fit within the conventional discourse . . .” (p. 74). In plainer terms, resistance to dialogue means that change is closer than it may seem precisely because bracketing ideas that do not fit within conventional discourse has clearly not resolved fundamental questions about the nature of various educational disabilities—or many other problems confronting special education for that matter. The evolution of DSE by special educators who felt confined by the self-imposed limitations of their own discipline and looked to DS in general has given rise to a diverse body of knowledge that is globally recognized (Gabel & Danforth, 2008). At its core, DSE holds that understandings of disability occur through human expectations and interactions in social contexts. As such, it offers much to the traditional field of special education, providing various lenses through which to view disability